Masterproef
Politieke Communicatie

"Just for the sake of Madiba." Media and voter personalisation of politics in the South African national elections of 2014.

Marjolein Koster

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Promotor: Prof. Dr Christ'l de Landtsheer
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Preface

For a long time I have been interested in South Africa. I cannot recall how this started, but perhaps it has something to do with beautiful pictures and stories of people I know. Of course, the story of Nelson Mandela triggered me as well. Several attempts to either study or do an internship in this country failed. When I heard that the national elections would be in the period of April-May 2014, which was exactly the period this thesis had to be written, it seemed like a unique chance to go there and do any research related to the South African elections.

Several people asked me: "Why do you have to go all the way to South Africa to write your master thesis? There are so many interesting topics to research here as well." First I couldn't really answer this question. After all, the idea of working on this thesis with the fantastic Table Mountain right in front of me and exploring a new and beautiful city were factors that definitely influenced my choice. Now that I've been here and after I have spoken to many people, South African or non-South African, experts or just the average inhabitant, I realised that stepping out of your comfort zone always learns you something new. The more you learn about other political systems and societies, the more you get to understand your own. I do want to argue that actually going somewhere else can absolutely not be compared by learning from the books. Recently an article about the positive outcomes of studying or living abroad appeared in Time Magazine. A bulk of research shows that when having international experience, people become more able to make connections among disparate ideas, are better problem solvers, display more creativity and have better job opportunities. It confirms my experience: learning how to live in a different culture gives you new perspectives.

During this process there have been several people that have guided and supported me. First of all I want to thank my supervisor professor Christ'l de Landtsheer. She provided help when I had questions about the process and theory. Next to that I would like to thank professor Robert Mattes from the University of Cape Town who gave me new insights on politics in South Africa. Also Miriam Manak, a Dutch freelance journalist in Cape Town, gave me valuable information. My friend Gerben Solleveld has been a great help for me on election day by driving me around town, handing out the surveys and taking pictures. Last I want to thank my Cape Town friends for all the support and good time that I've had there.

The title comes from a conversation with an old lady in a township. She was thinking of voting for another party, we had interesting conversations about that. When I asked her on election day what decision she made, she answered she would vote for the ANC, 'just for the sake of Madiba'. It opened my eyes. A very intelligent women, who knows about all the things that are happening within the ANC, who doesn't agree with the lifestyle of Zuma, votes for the ANC out of loyalty for that great man who gave her freedom.

List of figures, table and charts

List of abbreviations

ANC	African National Congress
COPE	Congress of the People
DA	Democratic Alliance
DP	Democratic Party
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
NP	Nationale Partij
NNP	New Nationalist Party
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

Abstract

This is a research on media personalisation and personalisation in voter behaviour in the case of the South African elections of 2014. Three parties and their party leaders were included in the analysis: the ANC with Jacob Zuma, the DA with Helen Zille and the EFF with Julius Malema. Media content analysis of three South African newspapers has been conducted to see if there is individualisation (focus on politicians instead of the party) and privatization (if there is a focus on the private life of the politician). Next to that surveys and interviews have been conducted to ask the electorate what their reasons are to vote for a certain party. The conclusion is that media personalisation is present to some extent that can be compared to some European multiple party systems, but personalisation in voter behaviour seems to be almost non-existent. People are far more driven by social structures in society and the history of *apartheid* still plays a great role in determining voter behaviour.

Keywords: South Africa, elections, media personalisation, personalisation in voter behaviour

Table of contents

1. Introduction

1.1   Personalisation and politics in South Africa

Recent history of South Africa is very promising. Since its democracy is established, many good things happened in this country. Inflation is avoided, expending debt is stabilized, jobs have been created and the poorest people now have better access to the basic necessities (Mattes, 2002). Different people say the South African constitution is one of the most promising in the world. Unfortunately, the democracy as it is now is far from ideal.

Not only government is responsible for the limited democratization. Although citizens fought the apartheid regime, political participation now is low (Mattes, 2014). South Africans are mostly not active in communities or political organizations and also contact with government is low. These rates are extremely low in comparison with neighbouring countries, while often they are poorer and have less access to information. Therefore a sense of disinterest of South Africans can be traced here. This can be linked to Downs (1957) economic theory of voting: people seek for a balance between the costs and benefits of voting and it turns out that for many deepen into politics doesn't give anything in return. In daily life, knowledge of politics isn't needed. In general there is low trust in politicians and political institutions (Mattes, 2014), which might (partly) be caused by the low contact rates with the government. This can be linked to the closed list system and the fact that it is difficult to hold representatives accountable.

South Africa and its political system has many reasons to believe personalisation is limited. You cannot vote on candidates en still people vote according to their (social) background (Hart, 2014). But, when following the news, even people who are not living in South Africa cannot deny that certain politicians are very well known. Therefore it is interesting to see to what extent personalisation is present in the South African media. There are many ways to define personalisation. The most common one is the phenomenon that candidates are of greater importance than the parties in the political discourse (Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004). This can either be because they become the embodiment of the party or because their personal life receives much media attention (Rahat & Shaefer, 2007)

During the entire thesis terms such as Africans, whites and coloured will be used. Although these refer to the groups how they were during apartheid, it is still often a way of pointing out the group you are talking about as it is still very much linked to neighbourhoods and class (Bray, 2010).

1.2   Research question

Personalization of politics is a complex phenomenon and can be looked at from different perspectives. In this thesis, both 'media personalisation' and 'voter personalisation' will be researched. The following research question is developed:

RQ: To what extent is personalisation of politics present in the South African media and in the voter behaviour of the South African electorate during the national elections of 2014?

Previous research on this gives very different results for similar cases. This is mostly due to the fact that different definitions and therefore different operationalizations have been used. It is a relatively new concept and because of its complexity it is hard to find one research method that gives a satisfactory outcome. Media personalisation is often accused of politics drifting away from content, since the focus would be more on for example how charismatic a politician is. Voter personalisation is then seen as irrational and easy on determining a vote, since people might not deepen into policies. But, another perspective notes that holding politicians accountable for what they do, is actually the opposite of these two.

It must be noted that this thesis has an exploratory approach, since there is no research on this subject in this country. First the case of South Africa will be discussed and after that the concept of personalisation will be explained more. After that these two can be connected. Different research methods will be used to come to an answer on the research question.

1.3   Social relevance

Especially in the past few years there has been a lot of (international) attention for malfunctioning of the South African government. There has been a lot of criticism for the way the ANC rules the country. Stories of many empty seats in the parliament, not abiding to rules and guidelines set by the government itself and the great evidence of corruption give the ANC a careless and uninterested image (Boraine, 2014).

These elections are seen as quite essential. South Africa is celebrating its 20 years of democracy and with a milestone like this, many evaluations take place. The first important factor for these elections is that this is the first time that the post-apartheid generation can vote. This generation is called 'Born Frees' and grew up in a democratic society. A pro-democratic shift is therefore expected, but the remarkable thing is that survey evidence shows the opposite (Mattes, 2012). Nelson Mandela pointed out that young people have the possibility to heal South African society (Bray, 2010). Since South Africa has a young population, these 'Born Frees' are quite a big

part of the entire population that can vote, but many Born Frees did not register themselves as voters.

The second factor is the recent corruption scandal president Zuma is in, which is known as Nkandla. Millions of governmental funds have been used for the security of Zuma's villa (Hart, 2014). There has been a lot of media attention for this, which is personalisation as well. A final factor which is important for these elections is the death of Nelson Mandela in December 2013. Some say this woke up many South Africans and for some time the feeling of being a 'rainbow nation' was back. The interesting question is whether these three unique factors will influence the elections. Young people will more often vote according to personalisation, Zuma's scandal can lead to a negative form of personalisation and the reminding of Mandela might cause people to vote for the ANC, which can be seen as a form of personalisation as well.

1.4   Scientific relevance

In general, there is no real research to be found about personalisation in South African politics. Personalisation is seen as a defining trend in political communication, yet there is still little evidence for it. There have been some studies, but often methods are mixed and they are single-case studies (Holtz-Bacha, Langer & Merkle, 2014). This will be a single-case study as well, but by researching more and more cases it becomes possible to compare countries and therefore the results can be analysed better. To quote Karvonen (2009, p. 21): 'comparative efforts are simply indispensable for developing a better understanding of personalisation'.

While public polling grew in popularity in the beginning of the '90s (when politics was in transition), it has failed to grow into a major force in South Africa's new democracy. There is very little coverage of the political party preferences and how citizens asses government performances or candidates (Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). Even election polls are hard to find.

2. Theory
2.1 The case of South Africa

The democracy that South Africa is now has a long and complex history. The apartheid regime was established in 1948 by the National Party, because the white population feared a governmental overtake by the black Africans. In daily life this meant races were living separately, with white people having all the benefits. One big important factor is the fact that at that time land had been appointed to whites. Still now they own most of it.

During the apartheid especially black Africans were treated badly. They got the lowest paid jobs, could not attend school and weren't allowed to travel around freely. The average white earned eight times more than the average black person. Some small parts of the country were appointed to Africans and they were no longer citizens of South Africa. Whenever they tried to accomplish something in the whites people area, they were treated as strangers without valid papers. Townships also originate from this area. Every city had to have one in order to have the Africans as a cheap workforce. These townships had to be of some distance from the city and especially railways were used for separation.

Many anti-apartheids movements were established. For example the Black Consciousness movement, from which Steve Biko is seen as the father. In all different ways, people were fighting the apartheid, with Nelson Mandela as the most famous example. He and his fellows were jailed because of that. In the '80s, people around the world were into freeing Mandela. In a 1985 Security Council statement of the UN is written: 'the members of the Council believe that a just and lasting solution in South Africa must be based on the total eradication of the system of apartheid, and the establishment of a free, united and democratic society of South Africa.'[1]But it was not only the UN that was concerned with South-Africa, many countries were either financially supporting the ANC or joined the Anti-Apartheid Movement. This movement operated worldwide, but was strongest in the UK and Ireland. There where demonstrations, conferences and publications to draw attention to the faith of the black majority in South Africa. Because of these forms of support, the ANC was able to become more structured (Boraine, 2014).

International pressure in the late '80s made sure some members of the government stepped down. Between 1990 and 1994 South African politics was in transformation as the apartheid government began informal talks with the leaders of the liberation movements. Later this resulted in formal negotiations (Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi, 2005).

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[1]http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/85-88/Chapter%208/85-88_08-5-The%20question%20of%20South%20Africa.pdf

Another important player in reaching a democracy is Oliver Tambo. He was not an activist as Mandela, but was more in the background and played an important role in the Harare Declaration. This declaration focused on unity and equal citizenship, which includes the right to political participation. Also an interim government had to be formatted to 'supervise the process of drawing up and adoption of a new constitution' (Boraine, 2014). This new constitution is completed in 1996 and will be discussed further in paragraph 2.1.2.

Many different factors, directly or indirectly related to the apartheid regime, make South Africa as a young democracy a unique case in world politics. Major inequality levels (OECD, 2009), one party that almost has absolute power because of the majority, the economic welfare, the ongoing segregation, the father of the nation, Mandela who just passed away and many more examples can be stated.

In this chapter the focus will be on the current situation and the consequences of the governments ruling. Also the political and population structure will be discussed in order to give a full understanding of the case. At last, an analysis of the media in South Africa will be included as well.

2.1.1 Life during (post)apartheid

The freeing of Nelson Mandela and the first democratic elections in 1994 turned South Africa into a free society. Since the establishment of the democracy many positive developments have occurred. The national budget deficit has shrunk and because of affirmative action in education, business and employment a black middle class is created. The poor now have access to medicine and education, electricity and water (Mattes, 2002). Bray (2010) points out that indeed the large majority of black South Africans say their lives have improved since the end of apartheid. Although whites tend to be a bit more ambiguous on this subject, in general relations between races have improved.

But, every positive story comes with a negative side and unfortunately the *rainbow nation* didn't just solve problems. Some problems remained and others have emerged recently. According to Bray (2010) democracy did not give equal opportunities for everyone and Mattes (2002) says that although there are some reasons for optimism, there are many ground for serious concern.

First of all, Mattes et al. (2000) point out that from all Southern African countries they researched, South Africa has the highest levels of xenophobia, which results in the population still begin very segregated. In divided societies people often identify themselves more with their

ethnical group rather than with the nation as a whole. It is a good thing that surveys from 1995 on show that at least 90 percent is proud to be South African (Mattes, 2002). But Bray (2010) also points out that there is still a lot of segregation. Many children grow up mostly having contact with people who are like them. Racism is not seen as a key problem anymore (Mattes, 2002). Bray (2010) also points out that race is not the only or even the strongest determinant of identity anymore. A case study amongst young people in and around Cape Town pointed out that friendships are formed across people from different colours, especially when there are opportunities to spend time with each other in other places than school. It shows that individuals 'manipulate' their identity by adjusting to other races, for example change the dress, music and language. But, this study relates to 'Born Frees', while survey research on xenophobia questions the adult population. Sears and Brown (2013) talk about how early childhood already shows prejudice and stereotyping. Kelly and Duckitt (1995) found that black South African children tend to choose white peers to play with, up to an age of about 10. After that they have a preference for children of their own ethnicity. Many research on this topic shows similar results and it is argued that this is because children already recognize that being white is desirable because it is associated with a higher social status. Sears and Brown (2013) indicate that social class is better distinguished by children than ethnicity, but in South Africa there is a key correlation between these two, which makes it plausible that children also differentiate on race.

There are two different schools of thought about xenophobia and the effect of contact with the other 'group'. Putnam and Blumer argue that contact with the other group feels like a threat. The argument they use is that in areas with a lot of diversity, trust in others is lower. Pettigrew and Wagner say that contact with other people leads to more understanding. Thijssen and Dierckx (2011) therefore did a research which focused on a neighbourhood within a city, since it can differ a lot where in the city you live. They concluded that real contact in the sense of knowing your ethnically different neighbour leads to more understanding, while superficial contact leads to feelings of threat. This explains the different schools of thought, because it was assumed that people who live in culturally diverse areas have contact, but it doesn't necessarily have to be so. The researchers do note that there might be a difference between countries.

Secondly, unemployment is still very high, especially among the African population. Recent numbers show an unemployment rate of 25,2%[2] and according to some this is actually much higher, since many people do not register as seeking for a job. Specifically the high long-term unemployment can also harm society. In comparison with similar countries, employment rates in the '90s were extremely low, concerning there is a good labour productivity (OECD, 2009). Recently

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[2] http://beta2.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=737&id=1

the unemployment rates have gone down slightly. This is mostly due to first the pushing of the mining sector, by improving efficiency and later by the development of the service sector (OECD, 2009). Not everybody agrees upon this last development being a good one. Turok (2014) points out South Africa might have gone to a service society too fast by implementing trade liberalisation. Also Kowalsky et al. (2009) point out the system maintained complex with a negative outcome for the consumer. As a consequence inward stock of FDI has multiplied by 13 in South Africa, local products cannot survive and therefore it is difficult to create jobs. This becomes clear by the fact that outward FDI decreased. As Turok (2014) puts it: "Do we want cheap products from Asia or pay a bit more and create jobs here?" According to calculations from the OECD (2010) the expectation is that economy will keep growing on a long term, but the employment growth has declined, which means economy is not growing fast enough to employ the growing labour force. Also, whether or not being employed is very much dependent on ethnic group, gender, age and skills (OECD, 2008). When employed, Africans still earn four times less than whites, mostly because they are in lower skilled jobs. There is a declining trend to be seen concerning this.

Thirdly, South Africa is one of the countries in the world where inequality is very high[3] and these differences have grown since the abolishment of apartheid (OECD, 2009). Inequality already begins at the start of life. Bray (2010) points out that there are children who grow up in great luxuries attending Model C schools, while there are also still many children, in rural or urban street areas, who don't have access to basic services and the schools they attend are of bad quality. A positive thing is that the welfare state is extended and an important part of this are the child-support grants for poor parents. It shows government is certainly trying to provide basic needs for everybody. A report by the OECD (2009), comparing Brazil, China, India and South Africa (all rising economies in the '90s and beginning of 2000) shows that although economy has grown, there isn't much improvement in living standards, meaning poverty didn't decline and income inequality stayed the same. Furthermore, the share of total income by the top increased. Leibbrandt et al. (2010) found that the richest 10% of the income distribution accounted for 58% of total income in 2008 compared to 54% in 1993. Bray (2010) also points out that the intra-racial inequality has increased, meaning that now class has replaced race as the cause of cleavages in post-apartheid society. Although extremes are divided like this, still most white people are relatively rich, living in the more developed parts of the country and also still having the privileges of life during apartheid. Almost all poor people are black and many live in areas with bad infrastructure and less opportunities to develop. The OECD (2010) says that job creation and unemployment reduction are the main priorities to reduce inequalities and to sustain growth. While there are many facts that show improvement in life, for example the decrease of people living in extreme poverty, people

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[3]http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/SI.POV.GINI/rankings

evaluate their economic position more negatively now than they did before democracy came (Mattes, 2002). This probably has to do with growing inequality and people seeing better chances. There are many ways to define poverty, as it is something which has to be assessed relatively. There is an agreement that overall poverty in South Africa didn't significantly changed in the first five years of democracy (Bhorat & Van der Westhuizen, 2008). Concerning the period after that, there is no consensus whether or not poverty has declined, which at least shows it hasn't significantly. There have been many improvements in the form of access to clean water, electricity and free housing.

Fourthly, In comparison to other African societies, support for democracy is quite low in South Africa (Mattes, 2002). This is a result from the Afrobarometer which asks about what form of governmental rule people prefer. The current form is definitely better than the rule of apartheid, but in general people are not very optimistic about the democracy. The South African population doesn't seem to get the concept of democracy. Socioeconomic goods are thought to be more essential than for example elections, multiparty competition and freedom of speech (Mattes, 2002). As mentioned in the introduction, political participation in South Africa is very low. While people from this country are very keen on protesting, they become passive if they have the opportunity of influencing. Voter turnout in 1994 was relatively high, but is declining.

Hart (2014) talks about a passive revolution, a term coined by Gramsci. It is a revolution which is top-down. There is low trust in political institution and elected representatives (Mattes, 2002). Ties between voters and their government are weak, there is increasing disaffection in policy, trust in government is declining as well is the satisfaction with economic and political performance (Mattes, 2002). People have the feeling that politicians are not interested in their opinion (Mattes, 2002). Not only political participation of South African citizens is low, also the surprising lack of public opinion polls (Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi, 2005) suggests low interest in politics from many parties in society as well. Sears and Brown (2013) point out that political participation in later stages of life is much dependent on the civic engagement in earlier life. Generally parents who a better educated are more engaged in political events and tend to involve their children more, which in the case of South Africa can again lead to a distinction between the different population groups, as white parents at this stage have gotten better education. Robinson and Friedmann (2007) point out that civic society is not that meaningful in South Africa. Organisations do not reach significant outcomes. Finkel and Ernst (2005) show that civic education in South Africa does improve the political knowledge, but doesn't teach skills how to participation in politics.

There are much more things to say about daily life in South Africa, but these are the main developments that are important to this research. In the next paragraph the political structure in South Africa will be discussed.

2.1.2 Political structure

In this paragraph the focus is on the current political structure as it originated from the start of the democracy in 1994. It will not go into detail on the apartheid regime. The republic of South Africa is a federal republic with a multiple party system. The biggest party is the African National Congress (ANC), which is often referred to as the party of Nelson Mandela. The political power is divided according to the trias politica principle and therefore South Africa has three capital cities: the parliament is situated in Cape Town, which means this is the legislative capital. The executive power is based in Pretoria and the juridical power is settled in Bloemfontein.

When the democracy was settled in 1994, a constitution had to be written. It is now often claimed that South Africa has one of the best constitutions in the world. Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) say that public polling at that time influenced the content.

The aims of the 1996 Constitution are clear: "Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights; Lay the foundation for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law; Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; and build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations." (chapter 1(2)). The Constitution is supreme, so parliament as well as the executive arrive should abide to it. In theory the South African democracy is well developed, but in practice one party is dominating for twenty years now. As Boraine (p. 57, 2014) puts it: "Democracy according to Zuma at least, means the dominance of the majority rather than the protection of minorities."

In chart one there is an overview of the results of all democratic elections till now, including the one from 2014. It shows directly that the ANC by far has the most votes. It also shows that other parties come and go, with the DA being the only one remaining and growing., but it's not even coming near to winning. Since this thesis is about personalisation in the 2014 election, only the parties relevant in this election will be discussed. These are the ANC, the DA and the EFF.

Chart 1 - Results national elections South Africa 1994-2014. Source: IEC[4]

The African National Congres (ANC) was already established in 1912 to stand up for the rights of the black Africans and its origins are mainly in the Xhosa population. It had an own military department and by some countries it was seen as a terroristic organisation. During apartheid this political movement was forbidden and many people, among them Mandela, were arrested for fighting this. Already before democracy was established, this party showed great popularity in de public opinion polls (Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). Nowadays it is a social democratic party and stands for a non-racial society.

The Democratic Alliance (DA) also originates from an anti-*apartheid* movement. During the years it has had many different names. The current name comes from the merge between the Democratic Party, the New National Party and the Federal Alliance. Most white and coloured people vote for this party and as a consequence they are the ruling party in the Western Cape. It is now a liberal party and the official opposition of the ANC.

The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) was a new party in the 2014 elections as it has just been founded in 2013 by Julius Malema. He was expelled as president of the ANC Youth League, because he caused dissension in the party. The party criticises the ANC and the DA for being

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[4] Only parties that received above 2% are in the chart. It must be noted that after 1999 the NNP, FA and DA were merged.

capitalistic. Their own stances concern free housing, healthcare and education and redistributing the land which in the past has been allocated to the whites. Also, mining and banking should be nationalised.

There is a lot of criticism on the government of 2009-2014. The fact that the ANC has had majority for twenty years now threatens the democratic level. In total there are 400 seats in the National Assembly and the ANC is only a few seats away from the two-third majority[5], which makes it very easy to be the decisive party (Mattes, 2002). Also, for every election since 1994, the ANC didn't have a fear of losing the national elections. There is no competition for them. According to O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) there should always be the possibility of winning and losing, because otherwise there are no fair electoral and decision-making arrangements. Thus it is arguable that the ANC can do what they want, since the electorate will not punish them for it.

Concerning the current malfunctioning of the government, it must be said that governing South Africa is not an easy job. At first the focus was more on the transformation of the legislative landscape. But eventually, as the report on oversight and accountability of 2009 states: "The mandate of Parliament is achieved through passing legislation, overseeing government action, and facilitating public participation and international participation."[6] Oversight is not the role of the opposition only, but of the legislature as an institution. Important aspects of this oversight role are the protection of rights and liberties of citizens, control over spending of the tax money, the delivery of the policies and the improvement of transparency and enhancement of trust in politics. This last point is largely ignored, since only recently the Secrecy Bill is introduced. This bill states that people can get prisoned for revealing governmental secrets. It is not passed yet. De Vos calls it a thoroughly bad piece of legislation "aimed at allowing the covering up of wrongdoing and abuse of power by the intelligence services" (Boraine, p. 62, 2014). What's also in the report is the need for separation of powers. This is absolutely not how the South African government worked last twenty years.

Another criticism is the corruption which is very present in the government. The most recent example, which is also of great relevance to this research, is the Nkandla scandal. An amount of 206 million Rand of tax money has been spend on upgrading the private house of ANC leader Zuma. First Zuma said he didn't know about this, but a report by the Public Protector Advocate revealed that he was aware of the fact that he was conducting corrupt business (Twala, 2014).

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[5] In fact, chart 1 shows that in 1999 en 2004 elections the ANC got a two-third majority of seat allocated.
[6] http://www.parliament.gov.za/content/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20OVAC%20Model%20-%20edited%20Word%20version%20-%20Replaced%20Diagrams,Chapter%20Upper%20case_27-Jan-09~1~1.pdf

There has been a lot of debate about the release of this report, since it might influence the outcome of the elections and it could harm the image of the ANC. Since the release the focus has been on this scandal a lot, especially by other parties who say they will fight corruption. A good quote comes from Boraine (2014): *"If corruption were and event in the Olympic Games, the ANC government would be festooned with silver and bronze – and perhaps a few gold medals as well .. and like the Olympics, without the close attention of the media the public would know very little of it"* (p. 91).

Another big problem in South African politics is nepotism. According to Boraine (2014) there seems to be a small percentage of MPs from the ANC who actually are competent and qualified. The closed-list-system is partly responsible for this. During the elections people can only vote for a party, not for a specific candidate (Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). So people are not directly elected and cannot be held responsible for what they do. The Electoral Task Team (ETT) therefore advised to shift away from the current list system towards a combined list or a constituency-based system. This would lead to a people's parliament far more and can solve the current lack of accountability. Unfortunately, within the ETT there was a lot of discussion about this and the members could not agree what would be the best option. According to a public opinion poll held on this subject, people were quite satisfied with the fairness, equality and inclusiveness, but when it comes to the accountability of individual representatives, only 60% thought the current system works (Mattes, 2004). Also Mattes (2002) raises concern of limited voters' control. There has been conducted a survey among the members of the National Assembly and the great majority wanted to retain the current system, because it gives minority parties a chance in the parliament and it is immune to gerrymandering (Boraine, 2014).

Also, the controlling bodies often consist out of many ANC members as well and as a consequence the parliament is not independent. Even key personal from court are incompetent, while the Constitution is very clear the people appointed should be qualified. The Helen Suzman Foundation (HSF) battled this.

The malfunction of the current government is also to be seen in the procedure for questions to the president, deputy president en cabinet ministers. These should be replied to within 14 days, which barely happens (Boraine, 2014). This is a serious problem, since many questions lose their relevance when time passes. There are serious sanctions for MPs who do not abide to the rules, including exclusion of the parliament. Unfortunately these consequences are rarely taken.

One can easily give the argument of voter representation being the reason for the ANC majority. But Mattes (2002) points out that many of these voters are 'dissatisfied black voters who

do not identify with the ANC yet have thoroughly negative views of virtually all other parties' (p. 25). Also in the next paragraph will be explained what other factors determine peoples vote.

People must not forget South Africa is still a very young democracy. As Kaase (1994) points out, when states shift from either totalitarian or authoritarian regimes to democratic rule, elites play important roles and will continue to do that in de process of democracy building.

2.1.3 Population and determinants of voting behaviour

This research is focused on personalisation and its influence on voter behaviour, but literature assumes that there are important factors, some of them specifically concerning South Africa, which cannot be ignored when analysing voting behaviour.

In the case of South Africa, the place where people live is also of influence. Children grow up in neighbourhoods either African, coloured or white and they attend schools which are also dominated by one race (Bray, 2010). Especially children who grow up in poorer areas, their chances of contact with others are low as mobility and other ways of seeking contact are limited. Also, within neighbourhoods there is a lot of social interaction. "The realities of post-apartheid Cape Town are that most young people spend most of their time in their immediate neighbourhoods, and that adults at home are struggling not only with their own ghosts of apartheid, but with how to understand and engage with the realities of contemporary society." (p 167)

As this research will be conducted in Cape Town and its surroundings, this needs more elaboration. Cape Town is one of the areas where coloured people dominate. According to a 2011 Census the city has over 3,7 million inhabitants, from which 42,4% is coloured (Statistics South Africa, 2012). Remarkable is the growth rate in the past 15 years, which is over 45%, mostly caused by the explosive growth of Black Africans by 124.3%. This is due to the abolishment of *apartheid*. During that time Africans were not allowed to live wherever they wanted, so after 1994 many people came to Cape Town in the hope to find a job. This can also be seen in the age distribution where the age group of 20-29 is dominating and the median age is 28. Also the group of 0-4 years old is growing. Remarkable is also the growth of 65+ inhabitants, which are mostly whites.

Cape Town is in the Western Cape, which is the only province in South Africa where the ANC doesn't have a majority, but the DA does. Since the Western Cape is very developed and did quite good in comparison to many other provinces, this is something the DA really promotes itself with. The 2011 census shows a decline in unemployment, with 76% of the labour force being employed. Also income distribution has improved and more people have access to piped water,

flushing toilets and electricity. But there still remains a big gap between the different population groups with Black Africans being in the most disadvantaged positions. Reasons for the growing economy are according to the Government of Cape Town (2013) the young population that boosts demand for goods and services, relatively low unemployment, foreign investment, targeting international markets and good health services, education and housing. It sounds as if this is something every person, especially the people who are less-off, which are the Black African ANC voters. The cause for this paradox in cognition and behaviour is not something rare, it appears that in practice ideology and the voter decisions are often not in line with each other. Cape Town is also one of the cities were different ethnicities live mixed with each other. According to theory mentioned in paragraph 2.1.2 this can either lead to more or less acceptance, dependent on the type of contact people have.

In order to cast a vote, South Africans must have an ID and register for voting. Almost every South African has an ID, but many people do not register. For the 2014 elections, about 80,5% registered and from all of these 73,48% voted. Especially young people didn't register, but after an extra opportunity by the IEC some did.

There are many theories that suggest people feel more connected to persons who are similar to them. Kinder (2013) points out that for example during job interviews, people tend to choose those that have the same gender, age, ethnicity, interests etc. In politics this does makes sense: you choose something to represent you and who else can do that better than someone who is similar to you? Garzia (2011) finds that in many Western democracies people tend to like the politicians who match personality traits with their own. This is extremely hard to measure, since people are often not aware of this. This can also be traced back in systems with preferential voting. Thijssen (2012) shows that both females and ethnic minorities attract more preference votes. The expectation is that these votes are given by people who feel familiar with them. This theory is supported by a research from Vecchione, González Castro and Caprara (2011) which shows that both in Spain and in Italy, people tend to vote for a candidate whom their personality is perceived as similar to them. This similarity is even more important when it is about traits that are specifically for that political thought. They argue that traits of the candidate have become more important determinant for voting behaviour than gender, income and education.

Another influencing factor on voting behaviour is personal contact. Andre, Wauters and Pilet (2012) point out that there are different ways in which the electorate can have contact with a candidate and all of these have a positive correlation with giving preference votes, which is a form of personalisation. Because in the South African system people cannot vote for a person, there are few direct linkages between the representatives and the electorate (Bratton, Mattes &

Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). Thijssen and Jacobs (2004) found that the more local the election, the more preference votes are being given by the electorate. This can be due to the stronger social ties and the more direct social contact.

Perhaps not only socioeconomic and demographic factors determine voter decisions, also the political generation one belongs to might be of influence. The process of socialisation is very important for the further political life. Sears and Brown (2013) begin by saying that early experiences in life, meaning childhood and adolescence, already show for example party identification, racial prejudice, nationalism thoughts, support for party leaders or regimes and ideology and it is generally assumed that these thoughts will have a lasting influence on life. The Michigan socialisation study shows that especially party identification is something that is transferred by family. There is even the notion that when political identity is transferred through the family, these ties are stronger and political engagement higher. Since now almost one-third of the eligible in South Africa are too young to remember the apartheid regime (Mattes, 2012) they are socialized in a democracy where there are many opportunities for political participation. Inglehart's (1990) socialisation hypothesis says later political participation depends on two things: that what happens in the late adolescence is most important and post-authoritarian generations must experience better economic, political or education in order to have different thoughts. It relates to what Sears and Brown (2013) mention as second and third thoughts about socialisation: certain (big) changes, such as a war, can have significant influence and that life can be divided in stages and in each stage other factors are determining voter behaviour. The age of 17-25 is especially a stage in life when people can be influenced. This is because the core orientations are not that steady yet and after this age people should be crystalized. Inglehart's theory is important in the case of South Africa concerning the 'Born-Frees'. Bray (2010) points out that for children and adolescents growing up in the late 1990s and early 2000s, apartheid is something they didn't experience. All adults can vote now, discrimination is abolished and there are no legal restrictions for black people anymore. Although polls show that black South Africans say their lives have improved after apartheid, these Born Frees don't have anything to compare their lives to. They are more tended to see whether *their* lives have improve in the last few years. This might cause a great dissatisfaction towards the ANC. On the other hand, the legacy of apartheid still shapes everyday life. South Africa remains a very segregated society. The current political situation is therefore very important for the political development of these youngsters. Something important has been noted by Bray (2010): *"In summary, colour is an important dimension in young people's constructs of their own and others' identities, but it does not mean the equivalent to 'race' as used in the apartheid era and by the adult generation"* (p. 169). According to Inglehart's hypothesis, today's youth is growing up in a society of wealth, which means their basic needs are fulfilled and now they are looking for something else. In the case of South Africa, most people now have a roof

on top of their heads, children grow up having basic education and hunger belongs to history. What's important for this generation are jobs and equal opportunities and this might influence their vote. In paragraph 2.2.2 there will be further elaborated on these developments in society.

Another theory that might be applied to the case of South Africa is that people want to be in the winning team. For all five elections from 1994 on, it was clear from the beginning that the ANC would be the winner. This can stimulate people to vote for the ANC.

Graham (2012) used a 2011 census to look at the profile of DA and ANC voters. First of all, DA voters are concentrated in the provinces Gauteng, the Western Cape and the Eastern Cape. ANC voters are more spread among the country, with a focus on Gauteng and Kwazulu Natal. Secondly, DA voters are very urban, with 88% living in the city. For the ANC this is 55%. Thirdly, there is a great relation between the first language of a person and the party he or she identifies with. 91% of the DA voters have either Afrikaans or English as their first language, whereas for the ANC Xhosa and Zulu are the languages most spoken by the electorate. Other languages, such as for example English or Afrikaans together only make up 20%. Fourthly, DA voters are older than ANC voters, with the first one having 50% of their voters in the age category of 36-55. For the ANC, about 50% is below the age of 35. It must be noted that this is a census from 2011, when the 'Born Frees' were not allowed to vote yet. As discussed in paragraph 2.1, the expectation is that these young people will vote differently, most likely less for the ANC. Unfortunately there is no Afrobarometer yet for 2013 or 2014. As a fifth difference in voters for these two parties education is noted. Both parties attract mostly people who finished secondary education, but the ANC attracts more voters who have either no, informal or only primary education. The DA attracts more people who have tertiary education and post graduates. The census doesn't ask about income level, but it does ask about poverty and it becomes clear that DA voters almost never live in poverty, whereas ANC voters do more often.

Also, when looking at how a public opinion and thus political behaviour is formed, there are many psychological factors that have to be taken into account. People most often look at behaviour, since this is the most obvious and 'easy' to measure in a research. But there is so much underlying someone's political behaviour. According to Glynn, Herbst, O'Keefe, Shapiro and Lindeman (2004) an opinion is build up from beliefs, values and attitudes. Beliefs relate to how we see the world and live our lives, values are ideals and attitudes that consist out of cognitions, affect and behaviour. Something very important to note is that an attitude towards something doesn't automatically predict the behaviour of that person. For example, as a student not protesting for more grants doesn't mean you do not want to have these grants. Expressing an attitude is then the opinion a person has. This can either be verbally or through behaviour. The difference between

an attitude and an opinion is that the first is not always expressed and much more deeper strangled in someone's life. An opinion can change more easily and is dependent on the situation.

The fact that an attitude is formed by cognitions, affect and behaviour is something that needs more elaboration for the case of South African elections. Cognitions are based on the information a voter has. Only very few will have read the policies of the parties, but many will know at least something about the actualities, since in election period media are full of it. Affect is about liking or disliking something. Here the concept of xenophobia has an important role and also recent history cannot be neglected. The socialisation hypothesis of Inglehart can be applied here. It will be explained in paragraph 2.2.2. The following behaviour is already explained above and social factors are of great importance here. In contrast to Western democracies, South Africa has a less individualistic culture.

So how can we understand how an opinion is formed? The RAS model (receive-accept-sample) by Zaller (1992) gives us some insight. First, the information has to reach the people, which cannot be a huge problem concerning elections in South Africa since media penetration is high. But, the more specific the information, the smaller the public. In contrast, the second step, comprehending this information, is very interesting and discussable in this case as especially the African population that grew up in *apartheid* did not have (proper) education. It can also be linked to the logic of shortcuts Popkin (1995) talks about: it's not about whether you know something, it is about whether know how to use the available information and where you can find that information. Next to that, the country has eleven official languages and not everybody speaks English. Political parties often communicate in different languages, but of course not every candidate is able to actually speak all of these and most media in the country are English. Thirdly, the person has to decide whether or not to do something with the message. In the end, the receiver will or will not act according to the message. Here again social factors will be of influence. But Zaller also points out that the more knowledge a person already has, the bigger the chance that persuasive messages will be denied and the most recent information that has reached a person will be more influential. Cognitive dissonance is a concept which cannot be forgotten here. The clearest explanation comes from Festinger (1962). People have two different attitudes that cannot go together so one must be made more important. It is hard to point out how that happens, but a third argument can already make the difference. Often also attitude is adjusted to behaviour, so in the case of South African elections, people have always voted for the ANC, so they tell themselves that the policies this party has are good.

Perhaps all of this can be concluded in the Michigan model. This school of thought about voter behaviour argues that the party identification, which is formed by social conditions and group

loyalties and core values, brings voters in the 'funnel of causality' (Dalton, 1988). Later on in this funnel, aspects such as the opinions on the issues and candidate ratings can lead a voter to change the outcome and this can be influenced by particular events, friends and campaigns or the media. This idea comes from the book the American Voter and is still widely used to predict voter behaviour.

Here the spiral of silence also has to be noted. This concept is coined by Noelle-Neumann (1974) and the basic assumption is that whenever an opinion has to be expressed, an individual will look at the social environment and analyses whether his or her opinion is in line with what others think. If this is not the case, this person will either conform to the majority or remain silent, because they fear exclusion of the group. This can also hold other minorities back from expressing their opinion. The spiral of silence can be applied widely, for example on how people vote, how this process to this decision is being influenced but also during a research, especially when people are not in private. It relates to Aristoteles who says that individuals have a need for social acknowledgement. It must be noted that this theory is very much dependent on the context and the extent of tolerance within a group. In subgroups this effect will be stronger, because people have to comply to the group. It can also be argued that in politics this can even be stronger, since there are only very few people who really know about it, so others who aren't sure of their arguments will remain silent in fear of being incorrect. There has been an experiment to see whether this spiral of silence really applies and it appears that 25% doesn't adjust, 50% of the respondents adjusted a bit and 25% went along with the crowd.

A list of factors that determine the electorate's vote is endless, but the most relevant ones for this research have been threated above. Now the media system of South Africa will be discussed, since the overall agreement is that media is a source of information and can influence how people think and act.

2.1.4 Media system

Just as every country has its own specific political system which can influence voter behaviour, as well a media system can. According to Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi (2005) South Africa has a very well developed media system. Indeed, there are many different newspapers. Also, the recently released report for Freedom of the Press ranks South Africa at place 69 of 167 countries and 6th out of 49 for Sub-Saharan Africa (Freedomhouse, 2014) which is not a bad score. There are Eastern European countries that score lower. It must be noted that the country comes from a long way in achieving this status, but since this research focuses on the 2014 elections, the history of the media and the restrictions in press freedom before democracy will not be discussed. There are many different theories and studies on how to categorize media systems and the most prevalent will be

discussed here and applied to South Africa. After that the current relevancies will be discussed as well.

Hallin and Mancini did extensive research on media systems and came up with three different models: the polarized pluralist model, the democratic corporatist model and the liberal model. Eighteen countries were analysed using the following four dimensions: structure of the media markets, the degree and form of political parallelism, journalistic professionalism and the role of the state (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). This classification is very much focused at European countries, but can be applied to South Africa as well. The main aim of classifying media systems is to sort out how the relationship is with social and political settings. Hadland (2007) attempted to apply this theory to South Africa and concludes that the country is moving towards the Polarized Pluralism model 'with its characteristics traits of rising state intervention, instrumentalism, political parallelism and falling journalistic professionalism' (p.28). Within this model newspapers aren't used that often in comparison to other types of media, but they still have a very large target market within the country.

As becomes clear from what is discussed above, it is always a battle between government and media who can influence the public more. Although South Africa doesn't score that bad concerning press freedom, there are serious reasons for concern. First of all the implementation is the Secrecy Bill mentioned before is a very important factor for evaluating press freedom and for the way how government works. Government overrules media here.

Secondly, Twala (2014) notes that in election period, the ANC does have some power in limiting media coverage of the opposition. Also during these elections, several political commercials, for example from the DA, were banned from television, probably because they were criticizing the ANC. Van Aelst et al. (2012) already mentioned that political actors might use privately owned media for personalisation, but in some cases also government owned media is used to influence voters.

2.2 Personalization in politics: the change of the 20th century?

There is a great consensus concerning the shift towards more personalized politics in (Western) democracies (Axford & Huggins, 2002). McAllister (2007) notes that it has become more and more common that the focus is on the politician instead of on the parties. Despite the agreement, evidence is hard to find. Reasons for this are the inconsistency of data, different personalities and differences in what the electorate sees as what is important in the personality of a politician. Fact is that in media party leaders are becoming more visible than the party itself. But, many researchers also note that this trend is different across countries (Kaase, 1994; Holtz-Bacha, Langer & Merkle,

2014). This personalisation is part of a bigger change, which is accused of drifting away from content.

Although personalisation has got a lot of attention in the past few years, the concept can be traced back further. Holtz-Bacha, Langer & Merkle (2014) even argue it is as old as politics itself. Individuals always played an important role. But the present shift is different. Underlying is a fundamental change in democratic systems, without the change of institutions (McAllister, 2007). The causes can be found in globalization, decline of class and of course the influence of media (Axford & Huggins, 2002). According to Van Aelst, Shaefer & Stanyer (2012) this focus on candidates has two causes: the change in the media and a downfall in traditional affective ties between the electorate and parties. In the end researchers conclude by saying it is a complex concept.

This chapter will first give an overview of how personalisation is present in western democracies. Then certain concepts that are linked to this personalisation will be presented: postmodernism and the media. After this a paragraph will follow which shows how these concepts work together and it will show that personalisation is dependent on many factors and that it is hard to compare over time and across cultures because of the limited existing research. In the end this all will be applied to the case of South Africa.

2.2.1 Personalisation in Western democracies
There has been some research on personalisation of politics in the media. In this paragraph the results of previous studies will be discussed and compared so that the results of the analysis of the South African case can be compared to a broad overview of personalisation of politics in different countries in the world.

Although research is inconsistent, researchers did come to some conclusions about the concept of personalisation. In the introduction it is already mentioned that it is complex and it cannot be treated as a single concept. Also, it has to be seen as a trend, something that changes over time (Van Aelst et al., 2012). Holtz-Bacha, Langer & Merkle (2014) name the three most important factors that have to be cleared out before beginning a research. They name the time frame (election period or not), the perspective from which personalisation is looked at (media, politics itself or voters) and finally the type of personalisation. Personalisation on a media level can be divided in two levels, which by Rahat & Sheafer (2007) are called 'personalisation' and 'privatisation'. The first level is the rising of the media-coverage for the individual politician at the expense of parties. It can also be called 'individualisation' (Van Aelst et al., 2012) or when it concerns party leaders 'presidentialisation' (Vliegenthart et al., 2011). Van Aelst et al. (2012) even

argue you can operationalise more by distinguishing visibility of all politicians or by only looking at the top leaders. When looking beyond the first level, privatization is more focused on personal traits, which can be both political or private. This is important to include in analyses, since it might show different trends. Langer (2007) also calls this 'politicization or private persona'. This last form of personalisation is probably the reason why people talk about the shift away from content (Van Aelst et al., 2012). Rahat & Sheafer (2007) made a slightly different distinction: institutional personalisation, media personalisation en behavioural personalisation. This last dimension can be divided into the behaviour of the politicians or the electorate. It has to be noted that all these different types of political personalisation influence each other. This thesis focusses on the media personalisation, both levels that are explained above, and the voter personalisation. Voter personalisation can be seen as the process of weakening of partisanship and a more individualistic way of voting instead of taking into account the considerations of the social group. These two will be discussed more into depth in this paragraph. Other factors cannot be neglected, but the discussion about the causal relationship between them will not be treated into depth.

Next to the fact that personalisation is complex, it is a process in which the different parties – politicians, governmental institutions, voters and the media – are reacting on each other. Van Aelst et al. (2012) say that not only changes in media technologies, mostly referring to television, can be hold accountable. Political actors also personalised their strategies. Figure 1 shows an overview of the dimensions of personalisation in politics. This is a combination of several studies discussed above. The dimensions that will be researched in this thesis are circled.


Figure 1- Dimensions of personalisation in politics

Research from Kaase (1994) shows that there is no such thing as personalisation in Germany. It must be noted that he researched the 1990 elections, which were the first after the unification. It is hard to compare such special elections with other elections. A more recent research by Holtz-Bacha, Langer & Merkle (2014) reveals that the media during the 2009 campaign definitely had personalisation characteristics, with a great focus on Angela Merkel. In general research on the German case does show a prominent place for party leaders, but the trend only started recently and is not growing fast (Rahat & Sheafer, 2007), while personalisation is growing fast in the UK (Foley, 2000; Mughan, 2000). There seems to be more 'presidentialisation' in the UK: the focus is mostly on the leaders of the three biggest parties. Langer (2007) also noted an increasing trend in her longitudinal study from 1945-1999. Wilke and Reinemann (2001) did a longitudinal study of German campaigns from 1949-1998 and overall found an increasing trend of personalisation, but remarkably there is a peak in 1961. Vliegenthart, Boomgaarden & Boumans (2011) did a longitudinal study comparing the Netherlands and the UK and found similar results: personalisation and presidentialisation is far more present in the UK. What is especially interesting is that they find that the personalisation trend isn't necessary increasing. For some newspapers the trend was actually decreasing a lot. The researchers point out that overall the visibility of candidates was very much fluctuating, which according to them is driven by specific events which can be changes in governments or scandals. Kriesi (2011) says personalisation in the Netherlands did increase in the period of 1970-2000, but not to a great extent. His research also confirms relatively high personalisation in the UK, with no increasing trend. Also Germany and Austria score quite high on individualisation of candidates in the media. Very interesting here is that France is a true highlight compared to the other countries. Grbeša (2005) mixed different methods and theories with each other to analyse personalisation in the Croatian elections of 2000. She points out that attention to candidates in the newspapers was relatively high.

As will be explained in the methodological section, research on personalisation is hard to compare since different methods are used. Table 1 does attempt to give an overview of previous research that used the same method. The results derive from quantitative research in which the amounts of times a politician is mentioned is portrayed as a proportion of the amount of times the political party is mentioned. Not all methods are exactly the same and that is why the results are not always logically following up each other.

Table 1 - Proportional media attention political leaders/parties in newspaper headlines[7]

Country	Germany	UK	US	Netherlands
1949	0.09			
1961	0.79			
1969	0.54			
1990	0.45			
1998	0.66			
2006/2007		0.6-0.81		0.49-0.53
2009	0.92		5.6	
2010		1.37		

Different research points out that there is a relationship between the political system or governmental structures and the degree of personalisation. It is suggested that this focus on candidates is mostly present in presidential systems compared to parliamentary systems (McAllister, 2007).

For example, Kaase (1994) explains that in Germany the parties choose the party leader and therefore the governmental leader. The citizens do not have a last word in this. Also, the second vote in the German electoral system is important for determining the number of seats. This second vote is given only to a party and not to a candidate (Holtz-Bacha, Langer & Merkle, 2014). Also Wilke and Reinemann (2001) find extremely low personalisation rates for the German elections of 1949, which can be explained by the fact that during that elections parties didn't explicitly nominate candidates. The importance of the political system concerning media personalisation gets very clear from the research of Kriesi (2011) in which multiple Western democracies over time have been analysed. The Netherlands and Switzerland, the two countries that are a parliamentary democracy without a chancellor system score the lowest.

Next to the political system, also the media system can influence the extent and form of personalisation. As mentioned in paragraph 2.1.4 the media is controlled by the government for a great part. It is therefore likely that in South Africa criticism on the ruling party and party leader is limited.

There has been less research on privatization and again it depends on what operationalization is being used. Research from Holtz-Bacha, Langer & Merkle (2014) showed that the far most attention was for the political or professional qualities, both in the case of Germany and the UK. When it came to the personal qualities and attention for personal lives, this was far more present in the British media. This is due to the difference in the characteristics of the media

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[7] Sources fort his table are: Holtz-Bacha, Langer and Merkle (2014) for the UK and Germany, Kaase (1994) for Germany, Wilke and Reinemann (2001) for Germany, Wattenberg (1998) and Dalton (2000) for the US, Vliegenthart, Boomgaarden and Boumans (2011) for the Netherlands

in both countries. Langer (2007) shows that the privatization trend is similar to the individualisation trend, which is growing and fluctuating. The more attention for the candidate, the more attention for his characteristics. This is concerning leadership qualities. When looking at attention to personal lives, it seems to be very much dependent on the current prime minister. This becomes clear in a next article from Langer (2010) in which the so-called Blair-effect is being discussed. The focus is on the enormous amount of attention going to the private life of Blair in comparison to previous candidates. A longitudinal study in Germany by Reinemann & Wilke (2007) showed an increase in attention to the appearance of candidates. The trend of personalisation does set and emphasis on the charismatic skills of the representatives and especially the leaders of a party (Shaefer, 2001). While personalisation is a fast growing trend in the United States, Sigelman & Bullock (1991) didn't find a growing trend of privatization of candidates in the media. Also in Israel there is no trend to be found in the period of 1949-1981 (Rahat & Sheafer, 2007). Errera (2007) focused on attention for the personal life of French politicians and found that there is an increase to be noticed. Also Langer (2007) found an increasing trend in the UK, especially when Tony Blair and David Cameron were candidates. The research on the Croatian case mentioned before, also showed that when it comes to certain characteristics of politicians, the focus is mostly on the political related traits (Grbeša, 2005).

Basing your vote on the assessment of a politician is often seen as irrational (Converse, 1964), but some researchers point out that there is a shift in this thought as well. The assessment is often about political qualifications as well, which means people will ask themselves whether this person will be good a governing the country. This is not an irrational consideration at all. Some research even points out that it are those who are best educated who take into account candidates characteristics as well (Barisione, 2007; Evans & Anderson, 2005). Voter personalisation is hard to operationalise and therefore difficult to research. One way how to do it is by researching individualisation trends in society, which will be discussed in the next paragraph. Other ways are to analyse if political elites can influence the vote of the electorate. Survey research by Bartels (2002) showed that in the US candidate traits are only modestly influencing assessments and that there is no growing trend, but a wider research from Boiney & Paletz (1991) did detect that candidate image had become more significant and also the quality of the candidate is important for the success of a party (Jacobson, 1989). In Israel there seems to be a slow growing impact of the performance of political elites (Shamir & Arian, 1999; Arian & Shamir, 2001). Garzia (2011) researched how personalisation of politics influenced voter behaviour in Western democracies and shows that in the United States, 92% of the people say they rather vote for the person who they think is best than for the party they belong to. In some situations this can be decisive for the outcome of the elections. In the United Kingdom, party leaders have always played an important role, but according to Clarke, Sanders, Stewart and Whitely (2004) overall there is not an increasing

trend. In Germany still the strength of the party affiliation seems to be more important (Brettschneider & Gabriel, 2002). Garzia (2011) shows that different studies on the Italian case also show that voting is an expression of the self and therefore the party is more important than the party leader, except for the example of Berlusconi.

Voter personalisation is most often seen as a consequence of other types of personalisation and not as a cause for them. There are different causes to be traced for voter personalisation. Institutional factors are pointed out by Kaase (1994) for Germany and by Arian & Shamir (2001) in Israel. Also Audrey, Wauters and Pilet (2012) point out that a change in system of voting in Belgium influenced how people gave their preference votes, depending on how much influence this preference vote will have in the ultimate composition of the parliament. Also Wauters, Verlet and Ackaert (2012) showed that in the Belgium system, whether or not using electronic voting influenced preference voting a lot. Also again, it is assumed that personalisation in voter behaviour plays less of a role in parliamentary systems than in presidential systems (McAllister, 1996). It is argued by multiple researchers, that the closer the outcome of the elections, the bigger role assessments of candidates play (Garzia, 2011).

It can also be argued that voter personalisation is a consequence of media personalisation. This is derived from the assumption that media in general influences the public. Schulz, Zeh and Quiring (2005) argue it is quite likely that the change in personalisation of candidates fosters that people vote more for certain candidates. After all, media still is a big source of political information, pointed out by the electorate itself. Also Holtz-Bacha (2004) points out that 59% of the electorate thinks that how a politician behaves in his personal life, says something about how he will carry out his duty. This suggest that privatization can be influential as well.

Whereas mentioned before that media personalisation apparently is dependent on certain events, this also seems to be the case for personalisation in voter behaviour. Garzia (2011) argues that in various situations a politicians character played an increasingly important role, because of the context, for example during the 2004 elections in the US. This was after the 9/11 attack and there was a clear need for strong leadership, which was found in George W. Bush.

2.2.2 Shifts in society: postmaterialism and individualisation

It is already noted that personalisation in politics is dependent on both the political- and the media-system. Next to that, particular shifts in society can also be held responsible for focussing on candidates instead of the party. In this paragraph especially postmaterialism and individualisation will be discussed.

Many authors link this shift towards personalization to postmaterialism. In postmaterial societies, people have reached the maximum of their needs and therefore seek to another level in the pyramid of Maslow, which is found in the development of the self. Typical postmaterial values are self-expression, individual freedom and participation (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999). Whatever is scarce, that is what people want. According to Axford and Huggins (2002) the concept of identity changes. People are not wholly rational nor socialized, identity is changeable en the context is insecure. Individuals choose this context themselves en therefore choose whom they become. Politics and power in this matter has become a proliferation of symbols which blurs the lines between reality and image that surrounds us. As a consequence, the consumer does not know what the actual truth is. This is also called the hyper reality. Examples are the pseudo-events Boorstin (1962) introduced. These are events which don't have meaning without the existence of media, such as a press conference or the visit of a politician to a community centre.

Inglehart and Abrahamson (1994) looked at the proportion of postmaterialists on materialists in Western Europe. They looked at all generations born from 1886 till 1975 and found that with every generation this proportion of postmaterialists grows, but also for each generation there is an upwards trend. People were asked to point out what is important for them in life. Underlying to this is the assumption that what happens during adolescence is determinant for the rest of your life. There are clear trends to see, for example a dip in the 70s, because of the oil crisis. Abrahamson (2011) concludes that this growing trend is stagnating, because now in Western Europe every generation is born with access to all basic needs. The differences between generations get smaller. Inglehart and Abrahamson (1994) also point out there is a relation between a growing proportion of postmaterialists and the decline of trust in authoritarian institutes (which for example can also be seen in a decline in church-attendance), but there is still support for democracy. Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999) talk about more sophisticated voter behaviour, which is also related to far more people being highly educated nowadays.

Something very interesting comes from an article of Inglehart (2000), in which data from the World Value Surveys is used. In the period of 1981 to 1996 South African respect for authority increased by 14 points, which compared to other countries is very high. In the overview given in that particular article, only China scores higher. It assumes that people in South Africa are not very postmodernist, since they agree upon being governed instead of wanting to do it by themselves. It is not in line with previous findings that people in South Africa are not very much supporting democracy, which according to Inglehart should be a sign of postmaterialism.

The second big 'trend' in voting behaviour is individualisation. This is foremost pointed out by Franklin et al. (1992) who indicates that sociological determinants decrease. Also Dalton (1988)

argues there are psychological factors that individual thoughts structure the decision-making process of how to cast the vote. Dalton and Wattenberg (2000) even argue it is the most intense shift in voting behaviour since the 1920s. Holtz-Bacha, Langer and Merkle (2014) argue that modernization has led to a weakening of the traditional social ties. Whereas people first would vote according to the class or social environment they live in, they now are less dependent on that. In many societies it was easy to predict what somebody would vote, but now there are more floating voters, which means there is less party identification. Campbell et al. (1960) point out that party-identification is very important in how people view the world and that is why so many people hold onto it. It is how they structure their thoughts and it's easier to not every time have to think who to vote for. This is one of the reasons why personalisation in voter behaviour is more present in parliamentary systems. The assessment of leaders does become more important when in a parliamentary system the choice is between the two biggest parties (Garzia, 2011).

Partisan dealignment, as posed by Dalton (1984) is an ongoing trend among the Western electorate and the impact of personalities on voter behaviour will be the strongest when party ties are weakest. Van Aelst (2002) talks about the crisis of political parties. After the Second World War, parties were very important in people's lives. Sometimes people would say that even if a pig would be the party leader, it wouldn't make a difference in voting behaviour of the electorate. This has changed, due to a better educated electorate which is less bound to social structure and religion. But also in the US, party identification used to be a lot stronger. Garzia (2011) also agrees that individualisation in voter behaviour increases the chance that people vote differently each election, depending on the current fluctuations in society.

Party dealignment in South Africa is hard to analyse, since democracy is only existent for twenty years and this is a process that has to be analysed over a longer period. But, the Afrobarometer did measure party identification to some extent. Graham (2012) points out that during round 4, six out of ten people say they feel close to a political party from which most of them call the ANC as their party. In figure two, an overview of party identification is presented. Overall there is an increasing trend, which has a decline in 2008, but seems to be stable now. What is especially interesting is the growth of people who identify with the DA. It also becomes clear that there are very few people who identify with another party than the DA or the ANC.

Figure 2 - Party identification South Africa 2000-2011. Source: Afrobarometer[8]

The criticism, and therefore perhaps the focus, on elites is also a result of postmodern society (Kaase, 1994), since individuals are more keen on participating and evaluating their leadership.

Whether or not personalisation is therefore something which is more present in individualised societies will be discussed in paragraph 2.2.4. For now, the following quote from Manin (1997) puts a good conclusion to this paragraph:People vote differently from one election to another, depending on the particular persons competing. Voters tend increasingly to vote for a person and no longer for a party or a platform" (p. 219).

2.2.3 Politics in a media-era

Media is most often accused of the shift towards personalisation, which according to some goes hand in hand with a shift away from content and policies. For every type of personalisation, different causes can be thought of. Whereas there are researchers who point out that institutional personalisation can lead to media personalisation (Wattenberg 1998), media personalisation is more often seen as the cause of other types of personalisation. In general, media is a source of information and Schulz, Zeh and Quiring (2005) show that TV, radio and newspapers are increasingly used by the Germany electorate to gather political news. This paragraph will address some issues concerning the role of media in political communication nowadays.

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[8] Data retrieved from http://www.afrobarometer.org/data/data-by-country-n-z/south-africa.

According to multiple researchers, political communication is now in a third phase or stage. There have been given several names to this period, but they all relate to postmodern society in which television is playing a big role and political campaigns become more professionalized. According to Stromback (2007) marketing has become more important, since because of narrowcasting the specific audiences can be reached, which makes targeting more important. Also the plurality of the existing media makes that people have more choice and therefore some audiences are harder to reach. As discussed above, social ties are getting weaker in postmodern societies, which increases the role of media.

First of all, the real shift and attention to the phenomena of personalisation came together with the rise of television (Kaase, 1994; Blumer & Kavangah, 1999). One example that proves the power of television is the debate between Nixon versus Kennedy. The people who followed the debate from the radio pointed Nixon as a winner, but Kennedy's charisma blew away his opponent and television viewers pointed him as the winner (McNair, 2011). This is seen as a prove that charisma and looks do matter, which can be threat to democracy. This important factor of television debates is also something that Reinemann and Wilke (2007) found as a confirming factor for the increasing trend of personalisation. Also the pervasiveness of the media in the political process is related to the rise of television (Holtz-Bacha, Langer & Merkle, 2014). Hart (1992) also argues that seeing somebody often on television can revive a feeling of intimacy. When positively, this can generate more votes, but when people feel disappointed, people will feel betrayed. According to these results, it is generally assumed that technological developments of television have an impact on personalisation in voter behaviour. Schulz, Zeh and Quiring (2005) find that in Germany, people who are not interested in politics are more likely to use television as a source of political information. Another reason for media to enhance personalisation is the economization and competition in the media industry (Holtz-Bacha, Langer & Merkle, 2014). News that is sensational attracts attention, which means the media outlet gets more money. Probably this is more the case when talking about privatization. As a result, so called media-parties rise and they are seen as the key signifier in post-modern societies, as communicating through media is an essential part of this (Axford & Huggins, 2002).

Although media are often pointed out as the guilty factor, parties are often very keen on using this in a certain way (McAllister, 2007). Kaase (1994) points out that for leaders it is partly self-interest to separate themselves from their party and to develop strong ties to the media. Also Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999) point out that the fact that media and opinion polls can have influence on the voter, does not mean they automatically have. "media politics does not mean politics by the media" (p. 260). Different shifts in society have been discussed now and in the next paragraph a closer look will be given how all these changes come together.

2.2.4 Linking the factors: media, society and politics

According to Axford and Huggins (2002) also the decline in political party membership and trade unions, the low turnout rates and the growing distrust in politics characterise an electorate which is less interested and participate less in society. Kaase (1994) then points out that when individuals are non-aligned with a party, political leaders might become more important.

Multiple researchers also see a trend in voting behaviour which is complementary to all the other developments in society. Bartle and Griffiths (2002) hold three pre-assumptions: people have a preference for a certain party, this preference will not change, but respond to the political experience and for most people politics is something far away. During the time, there have been three different models of voting. The first one relies on social-psychological components and it's most important feature is party identification. This is also called the Michigan model and the individual is seen as a social animal who sees the world around him as a coming together of groups and loyalty. To simplify the complexity of politics, one joins a political party and sticks to this. In Western societies this model of voting is hardly existent.

A second model of voting is the economic one, which comes from neoclassical economy. Politics is a market as well. Parties strive to the maximum of profit and the electorate are consumers who want the get the maximum out of their input. People 'calculate' what vote will give the best for them in return. Problem here is that whatever you get in return also depends on what others vote (Bartle & Griffiths, 2002). So it is not a one on one exchange as it is in the commercial market. This is called the paradox of voting, since actually voting is not profitable at all. You invest by reading and exploring policies, but you will never know what you'll get out of it. Because of this, researchers believe this model is also not applied widely anymore.

The third model, which gets the far most attention this era in Western societies, is the marketing model. The basic assumption is that a combination of social, personal, cultural and psychological factors decide the vote. A lot of factors are included which are difficult to measure, for example lifestyle. In this model, the image of a party is very important, since voting for a party means expressing of your own thoughts and opinions. This model is the starting point for parties to develop a marketing strategy and campaign (Bartle & Griffiths, 2002). It is more and more accepted that this model is the one and only successful model for explaining voting behaviour in Western societies.

It is also argued that integrity and trustworthy have become very important factors for choosing a politician. This includes incumbency as well, since people judge the politician on how he did his job the last period (McAllister, 2007)

Perhaps all these trends come together in the following theory: personalisation, as well as in the media as in voting behaviour, plays more of a trend in right-wing parties. Examples are Pim

Fortuyn in The Netherlands (Kriesi, 2011) and Berlusconi in Italy (Vecchione, González Castro & Caprara, 2011)

Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999) question whether mediatisation is a threat to democracy. Mediatization according to them is related to both individualisation and postmaterialism. They conclude by saying that the focus is often on the US, where indeed perhaps media has gotten too much power. In Europe the situation is different: "There is some limited evidence that politics has migrated from the old party-centred arena to party-free arenas. But in both the old and the news arrangements, political forces still retain their monopoly of the political game, much like in previous times" (p. 258).

As a conclusion can be said that the forms and extent of personalisation is dependent on the political system, the media, the existing relations in society and most of all the entire context of the elections (Kriesi, 2011). McAllister (2007) has a very clear stance on this: *"The personalization of politics will remain a – and perhaps the - , central feature of democratic politics in the twenty-first century."*

2.2.5 Personalisation in South Africa

Since personalisation is something that is especially researched in Western democracies, there is a need to see how all the causes of the different forms of personalisation are existent in South Africa. All the discussed factors discussed above will be applied to this country.

Political instability and economical stress influence the electorate to search for strong leaders who can solve their problems (McAllister, 2007). The political system influences leadership. In parliamentarian systems, the party leader has more responsibility towards his party. In a multiparty systems the prime minister has a lot of power. Personalisation can be problematic in a coalition cabinet, since it is difficult to point out one person who is responsible for a certain failure (McAllister, 2007). Different researchers point out that in parliamentary systems the personalisation trend is weaker (Karvonen, 2009). Kriesi (2012) points out that the electoral system and regime type can be held accountable for most of the differences. In the case of South Africa, this means that it can be expected personalisation to not be or to a small extent present. South Africa has a multiparty system as well, just as Germany. Holtz-Bacha, Langer and Merkle (2014) point out that only two parties really have a chance on becoming the biggest and since the leader or the biggest party will become the Prime Minister, it is to be expected that these candidates get more personal coverage. In the case of South Africa this would mean that the leader of the ANC, Zuma, will have more personalisation than the leaders of the other parties. But there can be presidentialisation as well, meaning the focus is on party leaders. Van Aelst et al. (2012) argue that it doesn't necessarily

matter whether these candidates are really in the race of becoming president or prime minster. The extent to which privatisation is present in South African politics can also depend on the legislation concerning privacy (Holtz-Bacha, Langer & Merkle, 2014).

2.3 Hypotheses
Now that a wide variety on theory is discussed, some hypotheses can be developed.

H1: Both media personalisation and voter personalisation are less present in South Africa than in most Western democracies.

Different researchers, for example Rahat and Shaefer (2007), assume that institutional factors can influence the extent of personalisation. Since South Africa has a closed-list electoral system, there is no need for candidates to promote themselves. Also South Africa is not that individualised as Western societies and party identification is on a rise.

H2: President Zuma will have more 'media personalisation' than other political elites.

There are different theories to support this hypothesis. First of all, Zuma is currently the president and Kriesi (2011) found that there can be an effect which he calls the incumbency bonus. Secondly, he has the biggest chance on becoming the president again and thirdly, he recently has been in a corruption scandal, which according to Vliegenthart, Boomgaarden and Boumans (2011) increases visibility for a person in the media.

H3: DA party leader Helen Zille will have more voter personalisation than other political elites.

Previous research shows that personalisation is something fluctuating and that voter personalisation is dependent on what society needs at a certain time. Since Zuma has recently been in a corruption scandal, people might search for a leader that they can trust and who is transparent. Since the DA and therefore Helen Zille focused on fighting corruption in their campaign, this might be an (extra) reason to vote for this party.

H4: The 'Born Free' generation will have more 'voter personalisation' than older voters.

They are less influenced by historical reasons and are more keen on using the media. The expectation will be that this will actually be a negative personalisation, since president Zuma harmed the trust voters gave him by using tax money for his own benefit. Voters might be disappointed and search for either an alternative or will not vote.

H5: ANC voters will more often express social factors as determinants for their vote.

The ANC has a long history and because of former members of this party and its (former) members were the driving force for establishing a democracy and giving freedom to what is now

almost 80% of the population. Given the fact that this history is very recent and that a big part of the voter population still has memories of this, the expectation is that this will influence their vote. Moreover, South Africa's society is more collectivistic than individualistic, which means social factors will play a bigger role and also family is important. Parents will tell their children stories about living during *apartheid* and how the ANC brought an end to that.

3. Methodology

Political communication is a social science, which rarely gives yes or no answers in research. After all, it is people that are examined and the world around us is changing all the time. Triangulation refers to the use of multiple sources, methods and researchers in one study and is very useful for either increasing validity or for creating a broader sense of understanding (Lindhof & Taylor, 2012). Also Burnham, Grant, Lutz and Layton-Henry (2008) point out that triangulation in any way can overcome certain problems. Therefore, the process of personalisation will be analysed from two perspectives and both qualitative and quantitative methods will be used. This is mostly because from personal observations it seems that quantitative data will not give sufficient information.

3.1 Media personalisation: content analysis

Many research on personalisation focuses on the media attention in the election period. For some researchers this was three weeks (Holtz-Bacha, Langer & Merkle, 2014) or four weeks (Wilke & Reinemann, 2001), others hold two months as an election period (Kriesi, 2011) and even six months is sometimes used as a coding period (Rahat & Sheafer, 2007). Some researchers take all articles into account (Kriesi, 2011), others focus on political sections within a newspaper (Wilke & Reinemann, 2001).

Any article mentioning either the name of the ANC, DA or EFF or the names of their party leaders are included in the analysis. The choice to limit to these parties is because they are the only three that are actually of importance in the elections as can be seen in chart 1. Agang SA would first also be part of the analysis, but in the end this appeared to not make sense. The party only got 0,28% of all votes.

Kriesi (2011) did a study in which six European countries are compared. The selection of newspapers always included a quality newspaper and a tabloid and is most often based on the circulation. The choice of newspapers in this analysis is based on circulation and on the results from the survey analysis, since that gives the opportunity to analyse whether there is a relationship between the extent of personalisation and how the readers of that newspaper vote. The first newspaper included is the *Sunday Times*, the largest weekly newspaper. It is a quality newspaper and recently revealed the government corruption scandal. The second newspaper in this analysis is the *Cape Times*. This is the morning paper distributed in Cape Town and read relatively often by the respondents of the survey. Also the *Mail & Guardian* is analysed. This is a daily newspaper, distributed through whole South Africa and focuses more on politics than the others. It is read reasonably a lot by the respondents.

Because only newspapers are analysed, results are not representative for all media, but it makes it possible to compare to other countries. Also Kriesi (2012) found that results on personalisation in newspapers and television were similar.

3.1.1 Individualisation: quantitative analysis

Since the increased attention on political elites is mostly focused on the top leaders (Holtz-Bacha, Langer & Merkle, 2014), in this analysis only the biggest parties and their leaders will be included. Also, the closed list system of South Africa doesn't give room to analyse other candidates.

This first level of personalisation, visibility in the media, in previous research is operationalised as follows. Both the name of the party leader and the party itself will be counted in newspaper article headlines and will be proportionally reported (Holtz-Bacha, Langer & Merkle, 2014). As mentioned in the theory, this is a very widespread used method. Vliegenthart, Boomgaarden & Boumans (2011) used a formula in which all mentions in the article are taken into account and mentions in the headlines are counted double. They reason from the assumption that overall visibility is dependent on the total number of mentions. Kriesi (2011) coded the different relations that are written in either headlines, lead and the first paragraph of an article. Wilke and Reinemann looked at headlines and the first paragraph of an article.

3.1.2 Privatization: qualitative analysis

One tricky thing concerning the qualitative analysis is explained in the concept of phenomenology: the ambiguity of the lived world. This means that things that happen in our world have the ability to express more than one interpretation (Lindhof & Taylor, 2012).

In previous research on personalisation there is less attention for privatization. Holtz-Bacha, Langer and Merkle (2014) did this by distinguishing between political qualities and personal qualities and in addition to that references to the personal life and relatives were coded separately. Rahat and Shaefer (2007) say only media coverage of personal characteristics and personal life of the candidates should be taken into account. Both of these are in line with what Langer (2007) describes: you cannot separate the political qualities from the personal characteristics. Most of the time media will relate the personal issues to the political performance of the candidate. Van Aelst et al. (2012) conclude that privatization can best be operationalised by distinguishing between attention for the personal life and attention for personal characteristics. By doing this it is also clearly separated from individualisation, since according to many that is still about politics and privatization is not. They do acknowledge it is very hard to define which characteristics are political and which aren't. Langer (2007) is one of the few researchers that clearly set's out the

operationalization for these two aspects of privatization. Her method will be used here as well. This operationalization refers to the interpretivism paradigm in communication research as posed by Lindhof and Taylor (2012). In qualitative analysis much is based on the interpretation of the researcher, but by providing clear coding schemes, the chance on bias becomes smaller.

Logically, only the articles that mention one of the candidates will be analysed further. An article is classified for characteristics when leadership qualities are mentioned. Examples are strength, charisma, competence, intelligence, integrity etc. (Langer, 2007; De Landtsheer, 2004). An article is classified as personal life when it has at least one out of the following variables: family, personal appearance, life-style (hobbies, recreational activities, likes/dislikes), upbringing and religion (Langer, 2007).

3.2 Voter personalisation: surveys and in depth interviews

Although it is generally accepted that media does have some sort of influence on how or what people think and especially what people know, you cannot just take for granted attention for personalities in the media will influence voter decisions (Mugham, 2000). Therefore this second part is added to the research, to ask voters why they choose a certain party and see if there is any trace of personalisation to be found.

As explained in the theory, South Africa's population is very diverse and segregated in multiple ways. Since I am based in Cape Town and time and money form constraints in getting a representative sample, choices have been made to ensure at least some diversity in the respondents. It must be noted that this study is explorative. There isn't any research on any form of personalisation in politics in South Africa and therefore this study is meant to give a first understanding of what is going on. It doesn't aim at giving representative results nor does it try to do this.

As mentioned before, there is a lack of research on voter personalisation. There are many ways how to interpret it and therefore also many ways on how to operationalise. Personalisation in voter behaviour can refer to the concept of similarity: people tend to vote for persons with similar traits. This will not be treated here. The focus here will be on how media possibly influences voter behaviour. Theory shows there is also a relation between the degree of individualisation and how people vote. Socialisation has a less decisive role then and because the voter might feel less attached to a party, leaders can play an important role.

In both the quantitative and the qualitative research methods, the focus was on what party people voted for and why. If a political person is defined, there is personalisation. Next to that

media usage regarding political news has been asked for as well as demographics. Since previous observations and conversations learnt that personalisation might work more in a negative way than it might work positively, meaning one politician can be the reason to not vote for a party. This is quite hard to measure in a survey, since asking people why they didn't vote for another party can be a complicated question for respondents. The qualitative interviews have been added to give more information on this matter.

3.2.1 Quantitative surveys

During the election day, three voter stations have been visited. As there are no numbers to be found neither on average income nor ethnical diversity within neighbourhoods in Cape Town, the choice on the voter stations has been made by the researcher and is based on general knowledge about the composition of the city. This can be seen as a form of convenience sampling as discussed by Lindhof and Taylor (2012). Here respondents are chosen based on their convenient accessibility and proximity to the researcher. The size and time of this thesis is too small to visit multiple cities in the country as well as to put in multiple researchers.

The first voter station is in a township called Gugulethu. The population consists mostly out of Africans, people have a lower social background and are less wealthy. The second voter station is based in Sea Point, where white people dominate the population and the average income is higher. A third choice was on a voter station in the neighbourhood called Bo-Kaap, which is a Muslim and Indian community, but recently more known as a mixed area.

At all voter stations individuals were approached with the survey after they voted. This is to avoid influencing the voting process. The sampling used here is a non-random quota sampling, which means 30 surveys were taken at each voter station. It is very important that the survey is conducted shortly after voting, since then the decision-making process is most present in the mind of the respondents. Random sampling would be more ideal since then the results could be used to say something about the population as a whole, but in this case it was not possible due to limits in time and money. A pre-selection had then to be taken. As mentioned before, three voter stations have been visited to have a diverse sample, but as pointed out by Burnham et al. (2008) this type of sampling is not representative for the voter population. However, if quota samplings are carefully chosen and implemented, they can be nearly as reliable as random sampling.

Next to approaching respondents at the voter stations, the surveys were distributed in the social network of the researcher and it is also put online and distributed on fora and Facebook. The online version was more targeted towards younger people and people that voted for the EFF or Agang SA, to get a more diverse sample.

The survey has been added in attachment 1. There has been asked about previous voting, to see if people have switched parties. The question about reasons for voting for the particular party is purposely an open question, since it should not be leading people towards certain answers. As a result, these answers need to be coded, otherwise there cannot be taken statistical analyses. Concerning the media usage, certain newspapers are included based on their distribution number and the Cape Times is included because it is read a lot in this region. Concerning television, radio and the internet, there is asked specifically about how people use it for gathering political news. Demographics focus on age, gender, education and ethnicity.

3.2.2 Qualitative in-depth interviews

The expectation is that surveys wouldn't give sufficient results, therefore interviews have been taken. The sampling for this interviews is equal to that of the surveys. Respondents were approached and asked about their voting behaviour. The same questions were asked as in the survey, but it gave the opportunity to ask follow-up questions.

Burnham et al. (2008) pose two concerns about interviews: the issue of interview effects and the issue of interviewer fraud. Interview effects arise when respondents answer differently because of the interviewer. Especially the factor race seems to be important here. In this case, Black Africans might not be completely honest to the researcher, who is white. This has to be taken into consideration when analysing the results and making conclusions. Interviewer fraud is when for example time constraints lead to making up of interviews. Since audio-files from the interviews are added to this research, there is no interview fraud.

4. Results

In this section the results of the media personalisation content analysis and from the surveys and interviews will be presented.

4.1.1 Content analysis: individualisation

In table 2 there is an overview of articles that mention the political parties in the last four weeks before the elections. What becomes clear is that in all newspapers the ANC got far more attention than the other parties.

	ANC	ANC headline	DA	DA headline	EFF	EFF headline
Sunday Times	127	20	67	10	19	0
Cape Times	250	112	176	81	39	20
Mail & Guardian	152	85	54	19	9	15

Table 2 - Overview of articles mentioning ANC, DA or EFF

Within these results the articles that mentioned the parties in either the headline or in the lead were coded and after that the same was done for the party leaders. This resulted in proportional attention portrayed in table 3. The higher this number, the more visible the politician is, the more personalisation. It has to be mentioned that from this table, personalisation is quite high for Julius Malema, but actually there weren't that many articles in total. In total the proportional media personalisation is 0.42. To make that clear, table 4 has been added.

	Zuma	Zille	Malema
Sunday Times	0,60	0,20	1,00
Cape Times	0,31	0,19	0,50
Mail & Guardine	0,49	0,05	0,40

Table 3 - Mentioning party leaders in proportion to mentioning parties

	Zuma	Zille	Malema
Sunday Times	12	2	1
Cape Times	35	15	10
Mail & Guardine	42	1	6

Table 4 - Number or articles that mention party leaders in headline and/or lead

4.1.2 Content analysis: privatization

All articles that were coded as individualisation were checked if there was privatization of politics as well in there. Table 5 shows the percentages for the different newspapers and politicians. Due to the fact that individualisation was quite low for some party leaders, these privatizations numbers look quite extreme at some time. Overall, 43% out of the articles show privatization. In attachment 4 an overview of all articles that are coded as privatization are presented.

	Zuma	Zille	Malema
Sunday Times	66,67%	100,00%	0,00%
Cape Times	20,00%	13,33%	10,00%
Mail & Guardian	30,95%	100,00%	50,00%

Table 5 - Privatization

Concerning Zuma there is almost no need to further explain, but the Nkandla scandal is highly present in the articles. Nkandla is the name of the region Zuma is originally from and it refers to the house he has built with tax money. Related to this is attention to his family, since Zuma sometimes defends himself by saying he needs a big house for all his wives to live in. There is also attention to Zuma's background: "from a poor rural Zulu and working-class township background, presents a narrative of the cunning trickster with little formal education who always finds himself on his feet and takes what he needs with a nudge and a wink." (Sunday Times, May 4). Concerning political qualities of Zuma, this is especially traced in the articles about declining popularity rates in the polls. When the elections got closer, there was more privatization for Zuma. One example concerning his political qualities: "If Jacob Zuma were as good a president as he is a survivor, the country would be a much better place after his five years in the top job" (Cape Times, May 6).

Privatization for Zille is more about her political qualities: "She is losing support and people are leaving the DA because she is nothing but a dictator" (Cape Times, April 9). She is also called South Africa's own iron lady. For Julius Malema there is a balance between coverage of his political qualities, such as the fact that he lacks accountability, and a lot of criticism on his lifestyle. He often talks about how to take care of the poor, but lives a luxury life himself.

4.2.1 Survey results

In total there we 124 respondents. There were not notable missings in the dataset. As can be seen in chart 2, the biggest group of voters are from the DA, after that the ANC, followed by the EFF and then some small parties remain. Although this is not representing the outcome of the national elections, it does represent the outcome of the elections in the Western Cape to a certain extent. Most people (59,7%) voted for the same party as they did in the previous elections, but 29,8% indicates they either changed their vote or they didn't vote before. Most of them were under aged in 2009. From those who switched, which are 18 respondents, 11 of them were ANC voters in 2009. Other switchers were from either COPE, DA, IFP or PAC.

Chart 2 - Voter preferences respondents survey

Since asking respondents about reasons why they voted for a certain party was an open question, it needed to be coded in order to make it ready for analysis. Since most of the surveys are in imported by hand, it was possible to come up with some codes that are likely to be present in the answers. Some others were developed during coding. Since this research is about personalisation, this had to be included as well. The following categories have been created: personalisation: Zuma, personalisation, Zille: personalisation: Malema, negative about the ANC/ruling party, against corruption, social determinants, need for opposition, policies, representation, positive evaluation of the past, relating to history, freedom and democracy, personal contact and other. In table 6 an overview of these is presented.

	Frequency	Percentage
Personalisation Zuma	5	1,77%
Personalisation Zille	12	4,26%
Personalisation Malema	1	0,35%
Negative towards ANC/ruling party	7	2,48%
Against corruption	18	6,38%
Social factors	9	3,19%
Need for opposition	13	4,61%
Policy	78	27,66%
Representation	7	2,48%
Positive evaluation from the past	37	13,12%
History/freedom/democracy	30	10,64%
Personal contact	5	1,77%
Other	60	21,28%
Total	282	100,00%

Table 6 - Reasons for voting for a particular party

Concerning the personalisation categories, there is also a score given when people answered for example 'good leadership'. For example, respondent 73 gave as a first reason: 'We believe and trust in Helen Zille' and as a second reason: 'She fight for everyone'. But, there was also a respondent that didn't like Helen Zille and thought that if she got into power South Africa would go back to *apartheid*. In total 6,38% out of all reasons is personalisation. With the following two categories there might be some overlap. It can be assumed that when respondents give anti-corruption reasons this refers to the ANC, but it is only an assumption. Also when respondents point out they 'don't like the current government', this doesn't automatically mean they refer to corruption. Next are the social factors, which is coded when there is a reference to friends or family. The need for opposition was very clear in the answers. For example from respondent 54: 'they are the biggest opposition to ANC'. Also it has been pointed out several times that the DA forms a strong opposition to the current government. The category policy is very broad, but since it is not the focus of this research is on personalisation and not on policy this is not split out. Especially policies on jobs and education have been mentioned. Representation refers to reasons when people say the political party represents their group within the population. Positive evaluation from the past has both for the ANC and the DA been mentioned a lot. For the ANC this is mostly that people are thankful for the free houses they got or bursaries that were provided. In general it is said that in the past 20 years, there has been a lot of improvement for many people in South Africa. For the DA there were many direct references to the fact that the Western Cape, which is governed by the DA, has been indicated as the best governed province. The next category history/freedom/democracy actually only applies to ANC-voters. They refer back to apartheid and Nelson Mandela and the fact that he gave them freedom or democracy. Personal contact has been included as a factor since this might lead to personalisation as well, but not that many people gave this as a reason. Within the category 'other' there were many different sorts of answers. For example, there were several respondents that said 'To move South Africa forward', which is kind of meaningless and seems to be directly quoted from campaign leaflets.

Since this research is on personalisation, a dummy variable for personalisation in voter behaviour is created, which makes it possible to do regressions. In attachment 2, regression models have been added for all variables separately. The only significant result is then being white has a positive influence on voter personalisation. In model 6 below (table 7) all determinants have been added together. Age and voters of the IFP are significant factors. The IFP is probably significant because there are only limited number of IFP voters and a big part of these did mention personalisation as a determinant for voting. Actually the number of people who is identified with voter personalisation is too small (only 12) in this survey to get valuable results out of a regression. Therefore, there has also been a closer look at who these specific people are. Out of these 12 respondents, 83,3% votes for the DA, the mean age is almost 39, three out of four are female and

also three out of four have university education. Eleven out of twelve are white or coloured and they score a 1,96 average on media usage.

MODEL 6

	B	(sd)	Beta
(Constant)	-,562	,291	
Gender	,061	,062	,094
Age	,006*	,003	,219
Education	,053	,036	,183
Coloured	,121	,093	,194
Black African	,108	,103	,293
Media usage index	-,007	,050	,885
ANC	-,004	,198	,984
DA	,206	,183	,319
IFP	,919**	,375	,281
Agang SA	-,270	,454	-,082
EFF	,115	,229	,077
Other party	-,083	,258	-,044

R-square 0,223

Table 7 - Model 6. Determinants of voter personalisation[9]

It is interesting that one third of people who have voter personalisation are switchers. A closer look at their reasons to switch, doesn't show that much of a different pattern from the entire sample, but since the switchers mostly come from the ANC, they often give reasons such as being disappointed in the ANC or that he ANC is corrupt. One respondent pointed: "I don't like Zuma's lifestyle."

[9]The party COPE is used as reference category for the parties and whites as reference for ethnicity. Changing reference categories did not give other significant results.

Chart 3 - Newspaper usage (note: the answer 'never' has been left out of the chart to give an clearer view.)

Chart 3 gives an overview of the newspapers that are being read among the respondents. Fist of all it is clear that most newspapers are not being read that much, except maybe for the Sunday Times and the Cape Times, which are read by respectively 46,4% and 50%. Most people didn't use television that much to gather news (M=2,23, stdv=1,3), since 36% says they only watch 0-0,5 hour per day. 29,7% watched 0,6-1 hour per day. Only 9,9% watches over 2 hours per day. A similar pattern can be found for listening to news on the radio (M=1,84, stdv=1,3). More than half of the respondents, 57,8% does this 0-0,5 hours per day. Internet seems to be used more for news gathering (M=2,84, stdv=1,5). All categories get reasonable responses, with about a quarter (25,7%) using it 0-0,5 hours per day and 21,1 using it over 2 hours per day. There has also been created an index for media usage and the average in the sample is a score of 1,9.

The mean age of the respondents is 33,27 with a standard deviation of 12,7. The minimum is 19 and the maximum 82. The distribution between male and female respondents was fairly equal with 45,9% indicating being male and 54,1% being female. Most of the respondents had participated in university (45,2%). Others had lower education. In general, people score their political knowledge quite average. 38,9% gives themselves a 4 on a scale of 7 and 26,7% give themselves a 5. There is a slight unequal distribution to the right, which means people score themselves more often high than low. In chart 3, the ethnicities of the respondents are displayed. Xhosa is the biggest group, followed by coloured people and whites. The total of answers is more than the total of respondents. Some people identified themselves with multiple races. There are multiple reasons for that, with the most probable one being that the respondent has parents with different backgrounds. Also where there people who didn't want to identify and there where people

(on purpose or not) who identified many ethnicities. One other way to clarify this is that people do not want to be classified according to their race. Some people wrote on the survey: "I am South African!" or "Race doesn't matter anymore."

Figure 3 - Ethnicity respondents

To see to what extent the survey results can be representative, the profiel of DA and ANC voters in this survey is compared to the profile of the voters from the Afrobarometer census in 2011. Information about this can be found in paragraph 2.1.3. For the ANC, 76,1% of the respondets are 35 of younger (M=30,9, stdv =10,5), most of them had at least secondary education (70,7%) and 82,6% identifies themselve as Black African, most of them are Xhosa. The DA voters seem to be a bit older (68,5% below 35 years, M=33, stdv=12,3), 65,4% has univesity level education and 61,1% is white and 24,1% is coloured. This seems to be somehow similair to the population as a whole, except perhaps for the age distribution. DA and ANC voters also have different reasons for voting for their parties. This is displayed in tables 8 and 9[10]. It becomes clear that none of the ANC voters gave any form of personalisation as a reason to vote for the ANC. For them the policies of the ANC and the reference to the past are more important. DA voters have more reasons that are actually a respons to the ruling of the ANC: negative about the ANC, against corruption and a need for opposition. But also for them, policy is important as well.

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[10] When a category scored 0, this is not displayed in the table.

	Frequency	Percentage
Social factors	9	8,18%
Policy	34	30,91%
Representation	3	2,73%
Positive evaluation from the past	12	10,91%
History/freedom/democracy	28	25,45%
Personal contact	4	3,64%
Other	20	18,18%
Total	110	100,00%

Table 8 - Reasons voting for the ANC

	Frequency	Percentage
Personalisation Zuma	2	1,47%
Personalisation Zille	12	8,82%
Negative towards ANC/ruling party	5	3,68%
Against corruption	15	11,03%
Need for opposition	12	8,82%
Policy	32	23,53%
Representation	3	2,21%
Positive evaluation from the past	24	17,65%
History/freedom/democracy	2	1,47%
Personal contact	1	0,74%
Other	28	20,59%
Total	136	100,00%

Table 9 - Reasons voting for the DA

4.2.2 Results qualitative interviews

The main reason for including qualitative interviews next to surveys was mainly to get additional information which cannot be retrieved from quantitative data. That's why in this section the focus will be on those aspects and not too much on results that are similar to those found through the survey.

In attachment 3 there is an overview of the conducted interviews. It shows a variety of respondents. Something remarkable is that relatively many said they get their political information from either the political party they are a member from (ANC Youth League was mentioned some times), from family that works for the government and from people surrounding them. Also, whether or not a party is visible in the community, whether they improve something in their neighbourhood seems to be important. The following quote illustrates this.

"Because I've seen them working in the community and comes here and works and give back to the community. There's no actually reasons I just believe DA is payed the vote for. My father and mother they are part of the DA, mother is working in parliament for the DA. If they can do good in our communities, if I know this party can make a difference for our children I will vote for that party, whatever party it is. The problem is, they are never in my community." (Male, Gugulethu, 28, DA)

In general people talked about what either the ANC or the DA has done for them in terms of jobs, housing and education. The fact that the Western Cape is very well governed was mentioned many times. Some people also pointed out they actually didn't know that much about politics and just followed what their parents did.

The expectation was that when voter personalisation for Jacob Zuma would appear, this would be negative. Probably this is then not pointed out by ANC voters, this was information that was hard to get from the surveys, since there is asked about reasons to vote for a party rather than giving an opinion about politics in general or why other parties aren't worth the vote. During the interviews there was room to interrogate on this matter. This leaded to many more answers that had a personalisation factor in it. One women said the way Zuma acts can be a reason for her not to vote for the ANC: *"He has too many wives. That is the problem for us and it can encourage other people to do that as well."* (Female, 46, Gugulethu, ANC). There are some other examples that illustrate the thoughts on the Nkandla corruption scandal Jacob Zuma is in.

"He is the leader of South Africa and is supposed to set the example. You can't say he didn't know. He knew." (Male, Gugulethu, 48, DA)

"People are stealing money, people are using the party to have power, for their own purposes. So many negative things about the president. At the end of the day Jacob Zuma comes from that party. They made him the man he is today." (Male, Gugulethu, 28, DA)

"The president, there are so many things happening around him. As long as he is the leader of the ANC, I won't vote for that party." (Male, Sea Point, 54, DA)

"The ANC is too big and too corrupt and Zuma is to corrupt unethical leader. EFF is run by an even more corrupt guy." (Male, Bo-Kaap, 32, DA)

The last quote refers to Julius Malema as well and it seems that for this politician, voter personalization works negative as well:

"My other option was voting for the EFF, but the problem is, I haven't seen him much in action and I don't know what he can bring on the plate and there have been too many scandals about him." (Female, 24, Gugulethu, ANC)

A quick look at this negative personalization shows that all of these are DA voters. ANC voters see these problems as well, but either ignore it or focus on the fact that they vote for a party and not for a specific politician:

"I would never consider voting for another party, because I like the ANC. I don't like the way Zuma is doing things, but I like the ANC." (Female, 38, Gugulethu, ANC)

"I love the ANC, I was born with the ANC, all my family votes ANC. Everything I have is because of the ANC. (..) I don't know what I can say about Zuma, I'm just voting for my party. I don't like what he is doing. If he can step down, I don't mind. But it would not be a reason to not vote for the ANC." (Male, Gugulethu, 26, ANC)

"I'm afraid the apartheid comes back. I would never vote for another party. ANC, we come way back with this party. I'm not doing it for president Zuma, I'm doing it for all the black people. And everybody else, not just the blacks." (Female, Gugulethu, 20, ANC)

When speaking about personalization, perhaps also Nelson Mandela should be taken into consideration. From the interviews it seems that he still is a reason for many people to vote for the ANC. This is very much related to the entire idea that the ANC is the party that gave people freedom and democracy:

"I vote for this party because Nelson Mandela spent a lot of years in prison for us." (Female, 38, Gugulethu ANC)

"I had voted for the ANC, but I won't do it again. They have lost their integrity. At that time it was under Mandela and they had credibility." (Female, Sea Point, 46, DA)

"Because it is why I am here. It is because of the ANC that I have a shelter. There was no other party fighting for me. Madiba was in jail for me. (..) I know where I came from." (Female, Gugulethu, 66, ANC)

This indicates that these people have a very strong party identification and great loyalty for their party. The following quote make this even more clear:

"It's from way back from where I came from. From the apartheid. Where I come from, I am ANC, never ever, nothing is going to change me." (Female, Sea Point, 52, ANC)

Also, multiple respondents raised the issue that they are afraid apartheid will come back when the DA would be in power. Some quotes illustrates the xenophobia in South Africa:

"The horizon changed, but the focus remains. Under their rule we can express our religion freely. (..) I'm afraid that I don't know how I would express myself, and I am afraid to say this, under a so-called European leader. Because in Europe, Islam is being oppressed." (Male, Bo-Kaap, 59, ANC)

"Yes, I see it very much as a white party and that's a reason not to vote." (Female, Sea Point, 54, ANC)

"The problem is, the DA is coming from the National Party, from apartheid. The leader of the DA, sometimes she is talking about things that is making us black doubt. We don't want to go back to apartheid. We want the party that is going to unite everybody." (Female, 46, Gugulethu, ANC)

"You know the problem is a lot of black people see the DA as a white party, but it is not true. (…) They are afraid we will go back to the apartheid era. That is a misconception I would say." (Male, Sea Point, 54, DA)

Then there are some comments left that sum up the entire story. The following response shows how people are lacking trust in the government and it also refers to history: *"Now they are coming with lots of promises, but after the elections they will be quiet. Building houses, bringing change. For how long? I don't believe the promises now. I did at the time that tata Mandela was there and when Mbeki was the president of South Africa. Now you can't trust anyone."* (Female, 46, Gugulethu, ANC)

People seem to be fed up by the fact that promises are being made, but that poverty is still an ongoing problem in the country. Corruption is often called as a reason for that and president Zuma is held accountable: *"To be honest with you. Imagine if the ANC will take over. What disaster that would be. They don't deliver things. It's just promises they make. I've been on the waiting list for housing for 17 years. I suppose I'm not the only person who is waiting. The DA has quite good control what the Eastern Cape does. When the ANC takes over, we can say goodbye Western Cape. I want the DA to run the Western Cape. Not the ANC they will mess everything up. Corruption and especially the president, please."* (Female, Sea Point, 59, DA).

The following man shows that he does know what is going on, but history and the fear of change in the wrong direction holds him from switching to another party: *"Because of ANC we got the democratic right. They struggled for us to vote. To get to work and to free and fair. There have been some troubles with corruption, but they are still a young party, got to give them a chance.*

(..) They made a lot of changes, but people are only looking on the negative side. For me the DA is still like the old regime." (Male, Bo-Kaap, 44, ANC). The results from the interviews confirm previous results and give extra information that is useful to draw a conclusion for this research.

5. Conclusion and discussion

Now that the results have been discussed, hypotheses can be tested. After that an answer will be given on the research question. At last a discussion follows, where the researcher will reflect critical on the research and implications for further research will be suggested. Within this research crystallization is very important. According to Lindhof and Taylor (2012) it is good for a researcher to now and then step away from analysing data and reflect back on experiences while first recording the data to see if there were any patterns or themes missing from the analysis. There were many unrecorded conversations that did give valuable insights, but unfortunately cannot be used to support claims. This information can be used to give nuances in the conclusions and to reflect back in the discussion. Also, as said before, research in social sciences seldom gives clear answers. To quote Burnham et al. (2008): *"Politics is about power. Studying the distribution and exercise of power is, however, far from straightforward"* (p.1). As this thesis has an exploratory approach, the answers in the conclusion will not be straightforward, but give an idea about media personalisation and voter personalisation in South Africa.

5.1 Conclusion

Although the results cannot be representative in any way, the survey sample is very similar to the population of the Western Cape. Therefore results are certainly interesting and it gives a good insight in voter personalisation in South Africa.

H1: Both media personalisation and voter personalisation are less present in South Africa than in Western societies

Content analysis showed a proportional media personalization of 0.42. Out of all these, 43% are privatization of politics. This is somewhat low compared to other countries, but comes close to what is happening for example in the Netherlands.

Voter personalization was very minor in this research. Only 12 out of 124 respondents mentioned a leader of leadership as a determinant for voting for that particular party. For Zuma and Malema these were negative reasons and for Zille it was often positive. The qualitative interviews gave a bigger notion of this negative personalization, but for most people it is not a reason to not vote for the ANC, because of party identification and loyalty. Also, the fact that they don't really see another option, in the end the ANC gets their vote.

This hypothesis can be confirmed, although this is subjective since comparing cannot just be done. But it seems that in Western societies the proportions are higher and especially voter personalization is more important.

H2: President Zuma will have more 'media personalisation' than other political elites.

Jacob Zuma has a media personalization proportion of 0,46, which is higher than the average for all three politicians, but lower than the score of Julius Malema. But the actual numbers in which Zuma is central is much higher (see table 4).

It is hard to compare between politicians when it comes to privatization. Because both the DA and the EFF already got less media attention and their party. For example, Zille had individualization in two articles of the Sunday Times and both appear to have privatization as well, which results in 100% rate, while the actual number is nothing compared to Zuma. Both Zuma and Malema especially were criticized on their lifestyle which was linked to corruption. For Helen Zille the focus was more on here political qualities where she is often portrayed as harsh.

This hypothesis can be partly confirmed. In proportion to his party his is not more visible than his opponents, but in absolute numbers he certainly is. Therefore it can be said, Zuma is more visible in the media, but personalization is not that high compared to other political elites.

H3: DA party leader Helen Zille will have more voter personalisation than other political elites.

Out of the 6,38% voter personalisation, 4,26% was directed at Helen Zille. She is often pointed out as a strong leader. By DA voters it is given as a reason to vote for that party, so this hypothesis can be confirmed.

H4: The 'Born Free' generation will have more 'voter personalisation' than older voters.

Taken into consideration demographic factors, party preference and media usage showed a significant influence of age, but positively, meaning how older a respondent is, the more likely this person will call upon personalisation as a determining factor for voting behaviour. This perhaps has to do with the fact that they have more political knowledge or are more developed in how to cast their vote. Therefore, this hypothesis cannot be confirmed.

H5: ANC voters will more often express social factors as determinants for their vote.

Splitting out the reasons for the ANC and DA voters shows that ANC voters gave social factors as a reason 9 times, while DA voters didn't give this once. Therefore this hypothesis can be confirmed.

Now that the hypotheses have been either confirmed or rejected, an answer can be given to the research question, which is:

RQ: To what extent is personalisation of politics present in the South African media in the voter behaviour of the South African electorate during the national elections of 2014?

There certainly is a notion of media personalisation in South African politics, both individualisation and privatization are found in the newspaper sample. There is a lot of proportional visibility for the party leaders, which means they can be seen as the embodiment of the party. When somebody talks about either Zuma, Zille or Malema, everybody knows which party they represent. But, the ANC and Zuma got far more attention than the other politicians. This is probably due to the fact that they are the ruling party with a great majority, which gives room for a lot of criticism. Next to that, Zuma was in a corruption scandal that got a lot of media attention and this especially caused a lot of privatization as well. It can be seen as a response that Helen Zille is relatively often pointed out as a strong, honest and good leader. These results are similar to previous results: personalisation is dependent on actualities in society.

In general voter personalisation was only to a small extent present among the respondents. Far more often other reasons were given which are quite similar for ANC and DA voters. Policy is important to both groups and they both refer to jobs and education often. Whatever people vote, they see their party as the one who will improve this. It seems that ANC voters identify very strong with this party, which has historical roots. They are very loyal and other refer to what the party has done for them in the past. DA voters more often mention personalisation, either negative about Zuma or positive about Zille. Next to that, DA is seen as the strongest opposition party for the ANC which is needed according to the voters. Many DA voters are not especially very positive about the DA, but just very negative about the ANC.

As a conclusion can be said that media personalisation is present in South African media to a reasonable extent, but this does not really influence the votes of the electorate. It seems that the media system does not influence this that much, since a lot of it is owned by the government, but there is many critical news on the ruling party. Institutional factors can be of influence since the closed system does not give room for politicians to profile themselves and also candidates cannot be held accountable by the public. Social ties and history very much determine how people vote, which connects to the fact that South Africa is far less individual than Western societies. The last interview that had been conducted gave a good summery of the overall research:

"I grew up in the apartheid era. Yes, it was very difficult for us. But we also had it much easier than we have it now. You are not too black and not too white.. With the DA running the current government it has been easier for my dad to find a job. I feel the ANC is a corrupt government, they are not delivering on their promises. The DA has done more for the Western Cape." (Female, Bo-Kaap, 39, DA)

5.2 Discussion

This research had an exploratory approach that tried to give an idea of personalisation of politics in South Africa. There still is a great lack of longitudinal studies on personalisation of politics, while it must be seen as a trend and not something that is just occurring in society. This is due to the fact that the concept is rather recent. This study might be the beginning of an analysis of personalisation over time in South Africa.

Collecting the data was not always easy. At the voter station in Gugulethu it was very noisy and children and political parties sometimes disrupted the conversations. Also, there were some people who didn't speak English properly and therefore they couldn't fill in the survey. Some did fill in the survey, but left the space blank where they were asked why they voted for a particular party. This can point at ignorance, that they actually don't know why they vote for a party. But some also said their English was not good enough to write it down. At the Bo-Kaap voter station, many people didn't want to tell whom they voted for, which made it useless to interview them. Also, in general, regardless of interviewing them or not, people sometimes seem a bit afraid of telling personal reasons why they voted. One response from a young girl was: 'but aren't we going to get into trouble?' Because of these difficulties, there might be a slight bias in respondents. Next to these biases, the researcher can never be sure of being told the truth. It might seem as if the people at Gugulethu were very open about their decisions, it doesn't guarantee this is really what they voted for on the ballot. In some social environments, there seems to be social pressure to vote for the ANC. Perhaps if there had been the opportunity to talk to many people in private, outcomes had been more nuanced. A last difficulty concerning the surveys is the problem of reading handwriting. When it was not possible to read it, the answer was left out. Also, when categorising the answers it was also difficult. For example category 4 and 5 overlap, since most people that are dissatisfied with the ANC give corruption as the reason. But there are also people who give other reasons are there were many people raising the issue of corruption without referring to the ANC. Therefore these two categories have been distinguished.

Concerning the coding or the articles, it appeared to be difficult to analyse privatization. As mentioned in a lot of literature, the line between what's private and what is politics is thin. Especially when it comes to the Nkandla scandal, there is overlap. Building this house is something Zuma did in his private life, but it is done by tax money which can refer to politics as well. Coding the articles and also coding the reasons voters gave in the surveys is subjective. Due to the fact that this is a master thesis, there was no second coder and reliability cannot be checked.

The initial idea was to gather more in-depth interviews as a supplement to those already recorded on election day. Especially people who didn't vote and people who switched from one party to another will be interesting to interview. Unfortunately it was very hard to find these people.

The people who don't vote are not at the voter stations and people who switched their vote are quite rare in South Africa. The fact that the researcher doesn't have a social network in South Africa also made this harder. During the conducting of the interviews, it became clear some questions had to be adjusted. The problem with elections is that it doesn't give room to conduct the interviews again.

There is a lot of debate about how to operationalise any form of personalisation in politics. In this thesis media personalisation is measured by looking at the visibility of party leaders as a proportion of visibility of the party. This led to problems in the analysis, because some parties are less visible, but proportionally their party leader is. Does this mean this leader has a lot of personalisation, while he only has a few articles referring to him? Perhaps a bigger sample of articles would solve this problem, but it is a great question to keep in mind.

Concerning voter personalisation, the number of people that gave it as a reason was too small to actually give valuable conclusions about who those people are.

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Attachment 1 – Survey

Dear participant,
For my Master thesis in Political Communication I am curious about what determines your vote for a particular party. Please note that this survey is completely anonymous and the results will only be used for scholarly purposes. If you have any questions or recommendations, please contact me.
Best regards,
Marjolein Koster
Master student from the Netherlands

1. What party did you vote for in the elections for the National Assembly on the 7th of May 2014?
   o African National Congress (ANC)
   o Democratic Alliance (DA)
   o Congress of the People (COPE)
   o Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)
   o Agang SA
   o Economic Freedom Fighters
   o Other, please specify ……..
2. What party did you vote for in the elections for the National Assembly in 2009?
   o African National Congress (ANC)
   o Democratic Alliance (DA)
   o Congress of the People (COPE)
   o Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)
   o Other, please specify ……
3. Why have you voted for this party? Please give at least three reasons and start with the most important. If you have more, please specify as well.
   1.

   2.

   3.

   More:

Media usage
4. What newspapers do you read and how often on a scale of 1-5? (1 = once in a while, 5 = always. The newspapers you don't read you do not have to cross)

o Sunday Times	1	2	3	4	5
o Daily Sun	1	2	3	4	5
o Rapport	1	2	3	4	5
o Sunday Sun	1	2	3	4	5
o City Press	1	2	3	4	5

o The Sowetan	1	2	3	4	5
o Mail & Guardian	1	2	3	4	5
o Daily News	1	2	3	4	5
o Cape Times	1	2	3	4	5
o The Times	1	2	3	4	5
o Other	1	2	3	4	5

5. How many hours per day do you watch news programs on television?
   - o 0 - 0,5 hour
   - o 0,6 - 1 hour
   - o 1,1 - 1,5 hours
   - o 1,6 – 2 hours
   - o > 2 hours

6. How many hours per day do you listen to news programs on the radio?
   - o 0 - 0,5 hour
   - o 0,6 - 1 hour
   - o 1,1 - 1,5 hours
   - o 1,6 – 2 hours
   - o > 2 hours

7. How many hours per day do you use internet as a source of news gathering?
   - o 0 - 0,5 hour
   - o 0,6 - 1 hour
   - o 1,1 - 1,5 hours
   - o 1,6 – 2 hours
   - o > 2 hours

Demographics

8. What is your age?

9. What is your gender?

10. What is the highest form of education you <u>participated</u> in?
    - o Primary education
    - o Secondary education
    - o Secondary education + college
    - o Secondary education until grade 12
    - o University

11. How would you score your political knowledge? (1=very poor, 4=average, 7=very good)
    1   2   3   4   5   6   7

12. What ethnical group do you identify with?
    - o Black African
      - o Zulu
      - o Xhosa
      - o Basotho
      - o Bapedi
      - o Venda
      - o Tswana
      - o Tsonga
      - o Swazi
      - o Ndebele
    - o Coloured

o Indian/Asian
o White
o Other

Thank you for your participation!
Marjolein_koster@live.nl

Attachment 2 – Regression models determinants of voter personalisation

	MODEL 1			MODEL 2			MODEL 3			MODEL 4			MODEL 5		
	B	(sd)	Beta	B	(sd)	Beta	B	(sd)	Beta	B	(sd)	Beta	B	(sd)	Beta
(Constant)	,066	,040		,089	,087		-,047	,086		-386	,176		$1{,}527^{E}\text{-}1$	,146	
Reading Sunday Times	-,046	,019	-,234												
Reading Cape Times	,031	,017	,127												
Reading Mail and Guardian	,097	,027	,0341												
Media usage index				,012	,043	,028									
Black African							,082	,082	,143						
Coloured							,150	,098	,202						
White							,261**	,094	,392						
Level of education										,041	,027	,146			
Age										,006*	,003	,231			
Gender										,081	,060	,128			
ANC													$1{,}467^{E}\text{-}15$	,152	,000
DA													,185	,151	,309
IFP													,333	,223	,173
Agang SA													$1{,}595^{E}\text{-}15$	,252	,000
EFF													,125	,179	,104
COPE													$1{,}421^{E}\text{-}15$	,326	,000
Other													$1{,}694^{E}\text{-}15$	,206	,000
R-square	0,148			0,001			0,084			0,080			0,104		

Attachment 3 – Overview conducted interviews

	Voter station	M/F	Age	Education	Ethnicity	Party
1	Gugulethu	F	46	High school	Xhosa	ANC
2	Gugulethu	F	24	Metric/college	Xhosa	ANC
3	Gugulethu	F	66	Primary	Xhosa	ANC
4	Gugulethu	F	38	Secondary	Xhosa	ANC
5	Gugulethu	M	48	Metric/grade 12	Coloured	DA
6	Gugulethu	F	44	Primary	A Muslim, Coloured	Al Jama-ah
7	Gugulethu	M	26	Grade 12, college		ANC
8	Gugulethu	F	20	Metric, college	Christian, Xhosa	ANC
9	Gugulethu	M	25	Metric	Coloured	Patriotic Alliance
10	Gugulethu	M	28	Metric, college	As a person, but as a coloured	DA
11	Sea Point	M	54	Metric	Coloured	DA
12	Sea Point	F	54	Masters	White	
13	Sea Point	F	32	College	White	DA
14	Sea Point	M	40		I'm an African and I am Black.	ANC
15	Sea Point	F	52	Secondary	Xhosa	ANC
16	Sea Point	F	59		Coloured	DA
17	Sea Point	F	23	Tertiairy	White	DA
18	Sea Point	F	46	University	White	DA
19	Sea Point	F	54	Grade 10	Coloured	ANC
20	Sea Point	M	44		Cape Coloured	DA
21	Bo-Kaap	M	46	University	White	DA
22	Bo-Kaap	M	27		South African	DA
23	Bo-Kaap	F	19	College	Coloured	DA
24	Bo-Kaap	M	54	College	White	DA
25	Bo-Kaap	M	59		South African	ANC
26	Bo-Kaap	F	44	Masters	White	DA
27	Bo-Kaap	M	44	College	Muslim	ANC
28	Bo-Kaap	M	32	University	White	DA
29	Bo-Kaap	M	70		Muslim or South African	ANC
30	Bo-Kaap	F	39	Metric	I think of myself as a human being, but first of all I am a Muslim.	DA

Attachment 4 – Overview articles privatization

Privatization Zuma

Date	Newspaper	Titel article
Apri 9	Mail & Guardian	Parliament to establish ad hoc Nkandla committee
April 11	Mail & Guardian	Lawyers rush to bring comfort to Number One
April 11	Mail & Guardian	Cope withdraws from Nkandla special committee
April 13	Sunday Times	Zuma beats Cape minstrels' drum
April 16	Cape Times	The public protector and her respected office deserve unqualified support
April 20	Sunday Times	But Zuma himself takes hit, although die-hards stay true
April 20	Mail & Guardian	Tekwane residents grow disillusioned by ANC promises
April 22	Mail & Guardian	The battle brewing between ANC top six
April 23	Cape Times	Do not waste your vote
April 23	Mail & Guardian	DA seeks extension to Nkandla committee's lifespan
April 25	Cape Times	Pressure on, warns committee chairman
April 25	Mail & Guardian	A smile and a wave from the campaigning ANC chief
April 27	Sunday Times	Top cape gangster gets VIP invite to Zuma birthday bash
April 28	Mail & Guardian	ANC shuts down parliamentary Nkandla committee
April 28	Mail & Guardian	Zuma enjoys unrivalled support at CT prayer
April 29	Cape Times	Zuma off the hook until after polls as ANC dissolves Nkandla ad hoc committee
April 30	Cape Times	Opposition parties to vote against Zuma's re-election
May 4	Sunday Times	Zuma wants R2bn town in his back yard
May 4	Sunday Times	Election Focus. 'Vote for us: Zuma won't be here long'
May 4	Sunday Times	Plunge in Zuma ratings doesn't hit ANC
May 4	Sunday Times	Zuma, Pistorius: Is this really the best SA can do?
May 4	Sunday Times	Zuma sticks to the poor and avoids the haters
May 4	Mail & Guardian	Zuma fails to dazzle at Siyanqoba rally
May 5	Cape Times	Strong leadership needed
May 5	Mail & Guardian	Zuma: Nkandla security necessary after wife's rape
May 6	Cape Times	Yes, the ANC will win with ease, but Zuma won't be at the helm in 2017

May 6	Mail & Guardian	Zuma 'not worried' about Nkandla impact in elections
May 6	Mail & Guardian	Courts orders DA to retract Nkandla SMS

Privatization Zille

Date	Newspaper	Title article
April 9	Cape Times	ANC lured Pascoe|with offer of R1m, car - **Zille**
April 11	Mail & Guardian	**Zille:** Don't touch me on my Twitter
April 13	Sunday Times	Former DA chief says he defected to 'stick it to Zille'
April 20	Sunday Times	Taking a flyer with Zille is an eye-opener
April 22	Cape Times	32p hedy here plse

Privatization Malema

April 24	Cape Times	McKenzie accuses 'Gucci' Malema of hypocrisy
April 24	Mail & Guardian	Nine times McKenzie burned Malema with his open letter
April 24	Mail & Guardian	Gayton McKenzie: How stupid do you think we are, Malema
April 24	Mail & Guardian	Malema cleared for Parliament .. for now