

Threatening your Own.
Electoral Violence within Ethnic Groups in Burundi and Beyond

by

Manuela Travaglianti

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Politics
New York University
January, 2014

Kanchan Chandra

Acknowledgements

The list of people who contributed to the making of this dissertation is long, and I'm grateful to all of them. Most importantly, I was privileged to work with a terrific dissertation committee that offered insightful advice in any meeting, where everyone's feed-back complemented the others' with a different perspective. I thank Kanchan Chandra for introducing me to—and guiding me through—the study of ethnicity, and for instilling rigor into my research. David Stasavage always pointed at the big picture, and I'm grateful for the advice he provided any time I needed and for his generosity in supporting my fieldwork and in collaborating on additional work on primary education in Burundi. Mike Gilligan pushed me to follow my fundamental research interest in political violence, and I thank him for always reminding me that inspiration can come at unexpected times—as was, indeed, the case—and for believing in this project even when I doubted it. Without Alex Scacco's continuous and constructive nudging on the causes and consequences of political violence in Africa, my theory and empirical analysis would have been much less refined. I also thank Cyrus Samii for serving as an external reader; the insightful feedback based on his knowledge of Burundi will make this dissertation a better book.

Even though in the end I didn't study ethnicity through experimental

methodology, I'm grateful to Becky Morton for being a dedicated advisor and mentor in the early years of my PhD—her encouragement and support were crucial for bringing me to the US and securing my NSF doctoral dissertation improvement grant. I'm also grateful to Leo Arriola for welcoming me to UC Berkeley with both enthusiasm and very insightful discussions that greatly improved this dissertation. I was privileged to find in him a mentor and a colleague at the same time. For very useful discussions regarding the theory or interpretation of my data at various stages of the project, I wish to thank Dorina Bekoe, Dawn Brancati, Daniela Donno, Adam Harris, Alice Kang, Patrick Kuhn, David Laitin, René Lemarchand, Ted Miguel, Daniel Posner, Alan Potter, Peter Uvin, Allen Weiner, Jeremy Weinstein, and participants at the meetings of the African Studies Association (2012), the American Studies Association (2013), the International Studies Association (2013), the Midwest Political Science Association (2012, 2013), the Working Group on African Political Economy (WGAPE 2012), and the Stanford Center for International Conflict and Negotiation seminar (2013). I give special thanks to Lidewyde Berckmoes, who generously shared her ethnographic work on Burundi and allowed me to fully believe that what I saw in my statistical tables was indeed felt in people's hearts.

I was fortunate to find dedicated research assistants to help in collecting and coding statistical data and translating political audio recordings in Burundi: Alice Chantal Doudouze Irambona, Jean-Claude Karewa, Chris Bowman, and Antonio Travaglianti. René-Claude Madebari and Firmin Niyonemeye generously committed their time to arranging the collection of my questionnaires and the translation of party songs. I am indebted to the Coalition de la Société Civile pour le Monitoring Electoral for allowing me to administer my ques-

tionnaire to their monitors and observe the 2010 elections. I am also grateful to the Amatora Mu Mahoro project, the Burundi Ministry for Education, the Burundian Independent Electoral Commission, the European Union Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi, and the World Bank for kindly providing me with statistical data. Guillaume De Brier and Bob Rugurika have been precious gateways for a wide range of contacts and information, in addition to being good friends. My Burundi housemates Meghan Lynch and Marie-Claude Dupont shared laughter and support in coping with fieldwork's issues, as well as with (yet unknown) Burundian viruses. I am also grateful to Tim McGirk for bringing me on board with the UC Berkeley Investigative Reporting Program during my final year, which put my dissertation into a broader perspective and inspired my writing. And, of course, I could never have even scratched the surface of what Burundians really think without the availability of my interviewees and informants.

This dissertation was possible also thanks to the administrative support of the staff at the NYU Department of Politics, who made paperwork and logistics easy even when I wasn't in residence. The Stanford Political Science Department and the Berkeley Center for African Studies hosted me in 2012-13 and provided everything I needed for writing. I acknowledge NSF Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grant No. 1024374, the NYU Summer Fieldwork Fellowship, the NYU Politics Department, and the Stanford Center for International Conflict and Negotiation Goldsmith award for financial support. Matthew Ritchie helped me with great dedication to write this dissertation beautifully. All errors are of course my own.

The process leading to this dissertation was fun thanks to my friends and

to people I met all over the world. The experiences and adventures I shared in New York, Boston, California, and Burundi are warm memories that I will never forget. Among my friends, Leila Montaser-Kouhsari and Emna Belgasmi deserve a special thanks for making our NYC apartment feel like home, and Gizem & Emre and Elena & Jens for being my home in NYC after I moved to California—even right before a move or a new baby.

My mother and my father, Franca and Antonio, are my biggest cheerleaders. They've always nurtured and supported my passions and wishes with unconditional love and enthusiasm, and this dissertation is for them. Despite our physical distance I always felt them so close, and making them—and all of my family—proud makes all the effort worthwhile.

Dulcis in fundo, no achievement would have been so joyful, no disappointment so bearable, if Marco hadn't been by my side in any single moment. With his love and support, he is behind every word written here—and everything I will write in the future.

Abstract

In this dissertation I propose and test a theory of *intra*-ethnic electoral violence. I argue that intimidation and violence can be used by politicians to control the electoral support of coethnics, specifically, by demobilizing coethnic opposition candidates and by coercing the support of coethnic voters. Two other important theoretical pieces flow from this argument: that violence may be used to mobilize participation (as opposed to depress turnout), and that violence escalates with an increase in size and internal political polarization of the coethnic group.

I evaluate this mechanism by analyzing sub-national patterns of violence in Burundi, a country divided between ethnic groups. I first show that the violence preceding the 2010 elections occurred, in contrast, *within* these groups, as political parties used violence to signal their strength and their ability to protect supporters, punish political defectors, and coerce political opponents *within* the same ethnic group. In order to identify the precise conditions that drive violence, I built an original dataset with information on violent acts, socioeconomic factors, public services, and parties' armed capabilities, for each municipality in the country. I show that violence spiraled between the largest parties competing for control of the same ethnic group: was greatest when the majority ethnic group was larger and politically polarized.

Since my argument is about employing violence to boost participation, I also test the impact of violence on voting behavior. I code the perception that voting was influenced by intimidation—through a questionnaire to more than two thousand local election monitors in every municipality—then analyze the sub-national electoral results. My analysis shows that intimidation-driven voting and actual turnout rates were associated with *more* violence, especially in localities where the incumbent relied on strongmen and therefore was perceived to be a powerful coercive actor.

These results are bolstered by extensive interviews with all political sides and non-governmental organizations. To capture the nuances of political messages, I collected and translated recordings of political-party rallies, TV interviews, and campaign songs. I finally demonstrate that my argument possesses external validity by showing that electoral violence in Zimbabwe and Sri Lanka followed the same pattern as in Burundi.

Contents

Acknowledgements	iii
Abstract	vii
List of Figures	xiii
List of Tables	xviii
1 Introduction	1
1.1 Introduction	1
1.2 Motivation and Relations with Existing Work: Pre-Election Violence in Ethnically Divided Societies	3
1.3 The Argument	9
1.4 Summary of Findings and Roadmap of the Dissertation	12
2 The Logic of Intra-Ethnic Violence before Elections	22
2.1 Introduction	23
2.2 The Foundations of the Argument	25
2.3 Targeting Candidates to Eliminate Them	29
2.4 Targeting Voters to Enforce Turnout and Vote Choice	30

2.5	“Violent Outbidding”: Violence as a Signal of Warning and of Protection	34
2.6	When Violence Occurs: Electoral Incentives	41
2.7	Other Strategies to Increase the Vote of the Ethnic Group	45
2.8	Intra-Ethnic and Inter-Ethnic Violence	50
2.9	Conclusions	52
3	Politics, Violence, and Ethnicity in Burundi	54
3.1	Introduction	55
3.2	Power, Violence, and Ethnicity before Independence	56
3.3	Intra-Ethnic Power Competition and Inter-Ethnic Violence before the Civil War	63
3.4	Violence and Ethnicity in the 1993 Elections	68
3.5	Violence and Ethnicity during the War and Negotiations	72
3.6	Violence and Ethnicity in the 2005 Elections	75
3.7	Conclusions	79
4	The 2010 Elections	81
4.1	Introduction	81
4.2	The Institutional Framework	83
4.3	Political Parties	86
4.4	How Does a Party Win?	92
4.5	The Municipal Election	99
4.6	The Voting Process	103
4.7	Ethnic Appeals	112
4.8	Convincing <i>and</i> Coercing	115

4.9	Coercion	118
4.10	Conclusions	130
5	The Electoral Logic of Violence across Municipalities	132
5.1	Introduction	132
5.2	The Data	136
5.2.1	Electoral Violence	136
5.2.2	Other variables	140
5.3	The Data at First Glance	145
5.4	The Estimation Strategy	152
5.5	Violence under Uncertainty	157
5.6	When Intra-Ethnic Competition Fuels Violence	167
5.7	Carrots and Sticks	176
5.8	Robustness Checks	181
5.9	Conclusions	189
6	Reactions to Violence	193
6.1	Introduction	193
6.2	Did Voters Vote “for Fear”: a Questionnaire to Electoral Observers	195
6.3	Violence, Turnout, and Incumbent’s Support	204
6.4	Conclusions	222
7	Beyond Burundi	225
7.1	The Current Impossibility of a Cross-National Test	226
7.2	Violence as a Mobilization Strategy: Trends and Case-Study Ev- idence	231
7.2.1	“Disciplinary murders” in Zimbabwe	241

7.3	Intra-Ethnic Electoral Violence in Ethnically-Divided Sri Lanka	253
7.4	Conclusions	274
8	Conclusions	279
8.1	Summary of Contributions	279
8.2	Summary of Findings	282
8.3	Implications for Further Research	286
A	Is it appropriate to use 2005 vote shares to measure party competition in 2010?	292
B	Bibliography	294

List of Figures

1.1	Violent elections in Sub-Saharan Africa according to countries' ethnic fractionalization. (Adapted from Arriola and Johnson (2012a))	6
1.2	Violent strategies that can increase the vote share of an ethnic party	8
1.3	The argument in steps	12
2.1	Objective of electoral violence according to political inclinations of coethnic voters	32
2.2	Violence in voters' payoffs	39
3.1	1935 Map of Africa. Burundi falls within the yellow borders of the Belgian territories, together with what is the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda nowadays. Source: de Saint-Martin and Schrader (1937).	60
3.2	Burundi today.	61

3.3	Burundian bill, with the image of the Monument for National Unity, built in 1990 (under Buyoya) by the Italian architect Herman Menegeti. The monument recalls the values of unity and solidarity that are part of the Burundian culture, and represents wood logs collected by several people that are tied and carried together—following the popular wisdom of pooling resources together (<i>Gusenyeru ku muguzi umwe</i>).	68
3.4	Conflict lines: 1997-2007. Source: Vorrath (2010)	75
4.1	Electoral strategies	95
4.2	Ethnic and party structures and propensity to electoral violence	100
4.3	Factors of concern in the secrecy of the vote	107
4.4	State-sponsored violent and non-violent violations between November 2009 and February 2010.	117
4.5	Number of municipalities divided according to occurrence of violent and non-violent illegal incidents	118
4.6	Targets of pre-electoral violence by incumbent party	122
4.7	Temporal sequence of violent events. (Municipal elections were held on May 24th)	124
4.8	Targets of pre-electoral violence by incumbent party	125
4.9	Nature of pre-electoral violence perpetrated by incumbent party	131
5.1	Distribution of violent events before the 2010 municipal elections (four weeks before)	138
5.2	Summary of state-sponsored violence	150
5.3	Summary of <i>selective</i> violence	151

5.4	Violence by ethnic group size and intra-ethnic party competition	151
5.5	Summary of intra-ethnic violence	153
5.6	Historical administrative maps of Burundi	158
5.7	Predicted number of state-sponsored pre-electoral violent events	165
5.8	Predicted number of violent events, with confidence intervals. . .	170
5.9	Marginal effects of incumbent's ethnic group size on number of state-sponsored violence	181
5.10	Dot plots for dependent and selected independent variables (province- level).	184
5.11	Returnés from 1972 repatriated by UNHCR between 2002 and 2008. Source UNHCR (2008)	190
6.1	Average perception of observers that voting was influenced by intimidations	199
6.2	Average perception of observers that voting was influenced by intimidations (2)	200
6.3	Predicted effect of state-sponsored violence on intimidation-driven voting, conditional on CNDD-FDD ex-combatants per capita . .	205
6.4	Relationship between turnout and incumbent' share of eligible votes in 2010 municipal election	207
6.5	Turnout patterns in the municipal elections	214
6.6	Impact of incumbent-sponsored violence on turnout conditional ex-combatants and population density	222
7.1	Relationship between EVOTE and ELF. Source: Chandra (2009)	231

7.2	Percentage of people fearing of being victim of intimidations during election campaign. Adapted from Afrobarometer Round 4 (2009), question Q47.	233
7.3	Relationship between Afrobarometer statistics on fear of being victim of intimidations during election campaign and turnout in presidential elections	235
7.4	Pre-election violence and voter turnout. Source: Bekoe and Burchard (2013)	236
7.5	Votes and turnout in first and second presidential round in Zimbabwe (2008)	247
7.6	Election violence in Zimbabwe 2008 (March-June 2008)	252
7.7	Typology or violence in the five weeks preceding the legislative election in Sri Lanka in 2000 and 2001. Source: (Centre for Monitoring Election Violence, 2002a,b).	263
7.8	Ethnic targets of violence in the five weeks preceding the legislative election in Sri Lanka in 2000 and 2001. Source: (Centre for Monitoring Election Violence, 2002a,b).	264
7.9	Targets of violence in the five weeks preceding the legislative election in Sri Lanka in 2000 and 2001. Source: (Centre for Monitoring Election Violence, 2002a,b).	266
7.10	Relationship between pre-electoral violence and ethnic size across districts in 2001 parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka	268
7.11	Territorial control of the Tamil Tigers in 2006. Source: Stokke (2006)	270
7.12	Pre-election violence and parties' vote share in previous elections	271

7.13 Violence by ethnic group size and intra-ethnic party competition in Sri Lanka 2001 elections	273
7.14 Violence and percentage of fraudulent polling stations	274

List of Tables

3.1	Ethnic background of incumbent chiefs, 1929-45. Source: Lémarchand, 1994:44	59
4.1	Principal parties contesting 2005 and 2010 municipal elections	93
5.1	Summary statistics	146
5.2	Summary statistics by occurrence of violence	147
5.3	Determinants of state-sponsored violence	162
5.4	Determinants of violent events escalation	174
5.5	Impact of public goods provision on state-violence	178
5.6	Robustness Checks: all violence (1-5) and state-sponsored violence (6-10)	186
6.1	Determinants of perception that voting followed intimidations	203
6.2	Turnout averages in peaceful and violent communes	216
6.3	Determinants of 2010 turnout	218
A.1	FNL vote share in 2010 explained by Frodebu 2005	293

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

“At night, the electoral campaign is to intimidate voters, not to convince them.” With these words in August 2010, a senior member of the Hutu opposition party FNL summed up the political strategies employed during the 2010 electoral campaign in Burundi.¹ A few months earlier, jogging groups ran around a village in the north chanting “We will tie you up and shoot you.”² A few weeks later, a local monitor in Kayanza province confirmed that some political parties “told the population that as soon as they are not elected, they will cut their heads.”³ Such events were not isolated. During the four weeks preceding the 2010 elections, over 200 acts of violence fueled insecurity and murder across Burundi’s towns and villages. Inequality, mistrust, and conflict have reigned for decades between the dominant Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups, and so most would predict turmoil and violence between these groups. Instead, perpetrators targeted vot-

¹Author’s interview, Bujumbura.

²Human Rights Watch (2010b).

³Author’s questionnaire.

ers and candidates of their *own* ethnic group. Ethnically heterogeneous places experienced *less* violence than localities with large ethnic majorities. And, in the towns most affected by violence, *more* people went to the polls on election day, not less.

This dissertation confronts these facts, and offers the theory that violence is also used by politicians as a tool to obtain the electoral support of those sharing the same ethnic identity, through the coercion of coethnic voters and the suppression of coethnic candidates. Even though violence is often described as a way to suppress voter turnout, I build upon the study of intra-group violence in civil conflicts and posit that physical harm or the threat of it can serve as a *mobilizing* strategy as well. In the attempt to signal an expected cost from retaliatory violence greater than what could be inflicted by opponents, violence may indeed become a self-sustaining strategy for all parties. The main empirical implication of this theory is that intra-ethnic violence—both less-obvious intimidation and outright physical attacks—is a function of both the size and the internal party fragmentation of the ethnic groups, which determines proximity to the winning electoral threshold.

By developing for the first time a theory of intra-ethnic violence in elections, my dissertation complements existing explanations for election-related violence in ethnically divided societies. Previous studies have typically focused on inter-ethnic violence. They posit that politicians either suppress the turnout of the non-coethnic opposition,⁴ radicalize the ethnic issue and appeal to mass extremism,⁵ or foment violence between ethnic groups in order to increase the

⁴See Collier and Vicente (2010a); Kagwanja (2003); Klopp (2001); Kasara (2012); Kimenyi and Ndung'u (2005).

⁵Rabushka and Shepsle (1972); Horowitz (1985).

salience of ethnic divisions.⁶ This dissertation accounts for data and behavior that these analyses do not. Further, my dissertation advances the literature on ethnic politics by extending the study of intra-ethnic violence to countries that are not experiencing civil wars.⁷

1.2 Motivation and Relations with Existing Work: Pre-Election Violence in Ethnically Divided Societies

Electoral violence is violence and intimidation targeting individuals and property with the objective of influencing the electoral process, and by extension its outcome. Electoral violence is generally distinguished from other forms of political violence by its timing, perpetrators and victims, objectives, and methods (Fisher, 2002; Bekoe, 2012; Höglund, 2009; Sisk, 2008). It is also distinct from other acts of spontaneous or criminal violence because it is organized deliberately. The majority of electoral violence tends to take place prior to elections, and is perpetrated predominately by the incumbent (Straus and Taylor, 2012).

While most elections are peaceful, electoral violence is frequent and consistent enough to cause serious concern. It is estimated that during the past two decades approximately one-quarter of elections in Africa have included violence (Bekoe, 2010; Arriola and Johnson, 2012a). Considering both full-scale violence and less-obvious intimidation, this proportion rises to almost half of

⁶Wilkinson (2004); Wilkinson and Haid (2009).

⁷Brubaker and Laitin (1998); Höglund (2005); Laitin (1995); Lilja and Hultman (2011); Jaeger and Paserman (2006); Pearlman (2009); Straus (2006); Caspersen (2009); Hislope (1996); Staniland (2012); Warren and Troy (2011); Boyle (2009).

elections in Africa since 1990. Electoral violence is not a contemporary phenomenon, however: intimidation and violence occurred during elections as early as the time of Ancient Rome (Troxler, 2008), and marred elections in France and England in the early 20th century (Seymour and Frary, 1918; Hibbs, 1973; Garrigou, 1992; Ihl, 1993; Hoppen, 1994; Wasserman and Jaggard, 2007) and the American South throughout the second half of the 19th century (Kousser, 1974; Gumbel, 2005).

The causes for pre-electoral violence have yet to be clarified: detailed case-studies offer various scenarios. Generally, violence is employed to intimidate voters or to strike down candidates (Rapoport and Weinberg, 2001). Opposition candidates can be arrested, deported, assassinated, or prevented from campaigning in given locations, as occurred in the Philippines (Chua and Rimban, 2011), Sri Lanka, and Ethiopia (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2009; Human Rights Watch, 2005), to name only a few. Violence can be used to alter the electoral geography of the constituency by disenfranchising or displacing the challengers' support base, as exemplified in recent elections in Kenya (Kimenyi and Ndung'u, 2005; Kasara, 2012) or in Zimbabwe (International Crisis Group, 2005b). Intimidation and outright violence can also aim at altering voters' preferences—coercing them to abstain, as in the 19th century U.S. (Kousser, 1974; Gumbel, 2005)⁸ or to swing. Violence can even be exploited to trigger a psychological mechanism that strengthens group identity attachment (Wilkinson, 2004). However, even though the empirical evidence is considerable and very detailed, these case-studies are not cumulative, and few studies focus on conceptual aspects of elections and violence to provide a unified theory explaining why and

⁸For a theoretical overview of violent turnout suppression strategies, see Chaturvedi (2005); Collier and Vicente (2010a); Robinson and Torvik (2009); Bensele (2003).

under what conditions *which* forms of violence take place.

A systematic data collection effort at the cross-national level has begun in recent years, but findings are not yet conclusive. While Arriola and Johnson (2012a) find that the outbreak of pre-election violence is associated with poverty, slow growth, and a history of civil war, Straus and Taylor (2012) indicate that pre-electoral violence is most likely to occur when there are close elections, authoritarian or anocratic regimes, low growth rates, and low per-capita income. These violent elections occur primarily in countries that are ethnically heterogeneous, yet none of the cross-sectional studies on election-related violence has so far found a clear and significant correlation between ethnic fragmentation and electoral violence (Straus and Taylor, 2012; Arriola and Johnson, 2012a).

However, even if in the cross-national statistical analysis the effect of ethnic diversity is not significant—due perhaps to country-specific characteristics, or to confounding factors such as poverty or political institutions—if existing theories are correct we should still see suggestive trends across countries. If elections in multi-ethnic societies are expected to be more violent when ethnic groups compete for power, then lower ethnic diversity should decrease the likelihood of electoral violence. Instead, not even a cross-table conforms to this expectation. Building from the data collected by Arriola and Johnson (2012a) on 596 presidential and parliamentary⁹ elections held worldwide between 1985 and 2005,¹⁰ the table in Figure 1.1 shows the proportion of elections marred by more than 25 physical injuries or deaths in the 12 months before polling day, according to different levels of ethnic fractionalization.¹¹ This index ranges from

⁹Parliamentary elections are included when they lead to the election of the executive

¹⁰I am very grateful to Leo Arriola for sharing these data.

¹¹Like other indices of ethnic fractionalization, Fearon's F index (Fearon, 2003) measures the probability that two individuals selected at random in a given country's population will

0 to 1, with higher values indicating higher ethnic heterogeneity; so, we expect that elections in the countries with a low F-value (included in the first row) would be less violent than those in countries with higher F-values. In contrast, in this sample less-diverse countries have as much violence, if not slightly *more*, than very diverse countries.

Figure 1.1: Violent elections in Sub-Saharan Africa according to countries' ethnic fractionalization. (Adapted from Arriola and Johnson (2012a))

FEARON'S F INDEX	ELECTIONS	ELECTIONS WITH VIOLENCE	PROPORTION OF ELECTIONS WITH VIOLENCE
0-.25	148	30	20%
.26-.5	117	19	16%
.51-.75	139	21	15%
.76-1	192	37	19%

This evidence suggests that existing theories fail to account for an important element of pre-electoral political violence in multi-ethnic societies. To account for this gap, I argue here that in countries with large majorities violence is exploited before elections to gain control of an ethnic group that is instrumental for victory, targeting candidates and voters not of other ethnic group(s) but from within the *same* ethnic group.

According to the classical theories, political divisions within an ethnic group encourage intra-ethnic elites either to radicalize the ethnic issue and appeal to mass extremism, which increases the distance between ethnic groups and propels them toward violent outcomes (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972; Horowitz, 1985),


be of different ethnic groups; however, he also considers the cultural distance of the ethnic groups, as proxied by the differences in the languages they speak.

or to foment inter-ethnic violence that increases the salience of ethnic divisions (Wilkinson, 2004; Wilkinson and Haid, 2009; Snyder, 2000) in order to win their own ethnic electorate.

These arguments offer compelling explanations for the strategies driving political violence preceding elections in some multi-ethnic societies. However, none of them explains the 2010 elections in Burundi, when political parties employed violence against candidates and voters from the *same* ethnic group, and violence did not decrease but rather increased in localities where the group of non-coethnics was smaller. Burundi is not a unique outlier: there is evidence of political and violent competition occurring within single ethnic groups in other countries. In Sri Lanka, political violence during the campaign preceding the parliamentary elections in 2000 and 2001 intensified as the dominance of the Sinhalese increased, and most violence took place between the two main Sinhalese parties (Centre for Monitoring Election Violence, 2002a,b, 2004). In Iraq, political divisions among both the Shi'a and Kurdis before the 2010 elections caused conflicts within these communities when political factions sought to monopolize their entire ethnic constituency. In Afghanistan, human-rights organizations have found evidence of attempts to monopolize the Pashtun vote by threatening voters and the campaigners of other candidates (Human Rights Watch, 2005). In all of these cases, violence did not erupt in outright riots, and appeared to be motivated by rivalries between parties within the same ethnic group.

In order to explain how my argument relates to existing theories, it suffices to think that a party can in fact employ two strategies to increase its vote share. The first increases the number of cast ballots in favor of the party (i.e.,

Figure 1.2: Violent strategies that can increase the vote share of an ethnic party



increases the numerator), while the second decreases the number of cast ballots (i.e., decreases the denominator). Obviously, a party can pursue both strategies. Existing theories of ethnic violence before elections account for only a subset of these possible strategies: the use of violence to decrease the denominator (by suppressing the participation of non-coethnic voters) and to mobilize coethnics by stressing the conflict between the ethnic groups. However, I posit that there are two more methods for achieving control over the coethnic vote: mobilization of voters by fear, and elimination of coethnic challengers. At their core, these two strategies are based on violence. Figure 1.2 sums up this logic, and illustrates how the argument fits into the existing literature.

1.3 The Argument

Building on this distinction, here I illustrate my argument in simple steps, summarized graphically in Figure 1.3. The underlying assumption is that political parties are interested in gaining the support of the ethnic group with which they are associated. It should be noted that this theory considers the ethnic preferences and behavior of candidates and voters only in the specific moment of pre-electoral competition. In such a context, if multiple parties contest the election, they will compete for the support of the *same* ethnic group. This condition therefore does not contrast with the established constructivist approach to ethnicity—according to which ethnic identities are neither fixed nor exogenous—but simply establishes that in the short time preceding an election ethnicity has taken precedence over other cleavages or issues of contention.

In order to obtain the support of their coethnic electorate, politicians might employ rhetorical appeals, or offer economic promises or transfers, patronage, or bribes—and there is plenty of evidence that they do all of these things (see, e.g., Lemarchand (1972); Van de Walle (2001); Chandra (2004); Posner (2004)). However, if the political parties have the capability to inflict harm, they can also add violence to this menu of choices. While economic benefits and ideological and personal preferences are certainly important to voters, intimidation might be even more persuasive, and arguably violence constitutes the most powerful deterrent of all—especially in contexts where voters have no personal or institutional means to protect themselves from it.

Violent control of a group, both during elections and in general, takes two forms: elimination of rival leaders, and coercion of people. In the first case, a party will resort to heavy-handed measures to remove electoral competitors

by preventing coethnic challengers from even participating in the elections. In addition to non-violent means—such as refusing to register a party or arresting the candidates—this can also be achieved by harassing, frightening away, or even killing candidates. The employ of violent strategies against competing rivals is widely documented as a campaign strategy in general (e.g., Bekoe (2012); Rapoport and Weinberg (2001)), and also specifically as a strategy to cope with intra-ethnic fractionalization in the framework of civil war (e.g., Staniland (2012); Lilja and Hultman (2011); Höglund (2005); Caspersen (2009)).

In the second case, violence is employed to *coerce* voters into certain voting behavior. Such violence tends to be selective: it targets actual or potential defectors, and in so doing it begins with visible political actors such as candidates or activists, in order to send a clear warning to as many voters as possible. It follows that this kind of pre-electoral violence is therefore potentially low-intensity; it does not take the form of riots (such as the ethnic riots described by Wilkinson (2004)) or of massive suppression or displacement of voters (as studied by Kasara (2012), among others), but rather of a few acts against strategic targets.

I argue that violence is employed to influence different voting behavior according to the political inclinations of the targets, both the choice of *whether* to vote and the choice of *whom* to vote for. Precisely, I argue that a party can use violence to enhance the turnout of lukewarm supporters and to compel the vote of political defectors and opponents within the same ethnic group. Intimidation and violence are therefore used to rally voters not through the gain from voting for a certain party, but rather through the danger attached to *not* voting for a party.


In pursuing this strategy, it is key for politicians that their threats appear

credible to voters. If simple intimidation is not credible, politicians must resort to costly signals—that is, to outright violence against people and properties of meaningful interest and visibility—to punish manifested support of coethnic political challengers and to deter such support in the future. And, while the military strength signaled by increased violence reinforces the credibility of such threats, it is also indicative of the ability of a given party to respond to any retaliation against voters who support the party.

Therefore, when multiple parties compete for the support of the same ethnic group, they find it necessary to appear as strong as possible in order to ensure that voters are too frightened to deviate from their wishes. Further, supporting a strong party allows a voter to avoid violence both from the party for which he or she cast the ballot and from rival parties. Similar to the classical logic of ethnic outbidding, once a party begins to employ intimidation then all others that are able must do so as well, in the attempt to set the highest cost (most violent bid) in the electoral competition.

Now, when would a party rely on such coercive means to mobilize the ethnic base? I argue, in accord with much of the existing literature, that parties employ violence when they fear losing power, or from the challenger's perspective when they see the chance to win. An uncertain electoral result is in fact the situation with the highest returns for violence; therefore, a party will be more likely to employ violence when it is close to the winning threshold, as opposed to when it expects to lose massively or win handily. I expand this hypothesis by positing that in an ethnically divided society, where political parties compete—and employ violence—for the support of only one ethnic group, it is the size of the ethnic group and its internal fragmentation that determine closeness to

Figure 1.3: The argument in steps



the winning threshold, and as such also determine the returns for a violent campaign. In particular, I posit that violence is more likely when intra-ethnic party fragmentation is near a level that allows at least one party to be close to the winning threshold, and that violence within an ethnic group is more likely when that group's share of the population is larger. These hypotheses can be further refined according to the specific electoral context of the country or locality under analysis.

1.4 Summary of Findings and Roadmap of the Dissertation

The rest of this dissertation is structured as follows. In Chapter 2 I present my theoretical argument and discuss its empirical implications. The chapter opens by discussing the scope conditions—that political parties possess the capability to inflict harm, that ethnic identities are politically salient, and that political

parties are nested within the ethnic groups. I then present my argument. I begin by discussing the strategy of violent suppression of coethnic rival candidates and parties. I then elaborate how violence can be employed to enforce voting behavior (that is, to boost turnout and vote preferences) and why it escalates to signal both an expected cost from retaliatory violence and a stronger capability to protect supporters from the opponent's retribution. I review other explanations for electoral violence in multi-ethnic societies and analyze how they relate to mine, discussing the conditions under which they apply. The final section explores how electoral violence against coethnics relates to violence against non-coethnics.

Following this discussion, I then evaluate how my theory applies to the case-studies of Burundi (analyzed in-depth in Chapter 3, 4, 5, and 6) and elsewhere (in Chapter 7.) The analysis of the case of Burundi relies upon interviews, questionnaires, and an original dataset of quantitative sub-national data—which includes election-related violent events, electoral and socioeconomic factors, public policies, and the armed presence of political parties in each of the 129 Burundian municipalities—that I collected in the field between 2009 and 2010, sponsored by a National Science Foundation Dissertation Improvement Grant. In Chapter 3 I discuss the presence of the scope conditions in the Burundi case, and the internal validity of an analysis of the 2010 elections with respect to the country's modern history. I elaborate on the psychological, economic, and institutional factors that made ethnicity salient in the first place and continued to influence its salience over time—illustrating that the two major ethnic groups of Hutu and Tutsi are not monolithic entities, but rather are fragmented among regional, familial, and political lines that have competed for control of the group or the

state. Then I elaborate on the recent use of violence by political actors to gain and retain power, and demonstrate that violence has been consistently employed over the years as a coercive strategy to obtain the support of people (either civilians in wartime or voters during elections), to punish defectors and publicly warn against potential defections, and to physically eliminate challengers. This history increased the credibility of threats, both by creating common knowledge that certain political actors are prepared and willing to resort to violence and by increasing the coercive power of threats by linking them to memories of past violence. I finally discuss how political institutions—namely the introduction of power-sharing between the Hutu and Tutsi in all major organs of state power, from Parliament to the Army—drastically reduced the usage of inter-ethnic violence to cement intra-group cohesion and led instead to conflicts *within* the ethnic groups becoming apparent and more salient.

In addition to providing a solid foundation for the study of political violence in contemporary elections, this historical account is also very important for assessing how violence in 2010 was not driven just by parties that only recently developed from the civil war. While certainly the lack of political culture and a greater access to strongmen in the form of ex-combatants contributed to increasing the feasibility and expected returns of a violent campaign, the *willingness* to engage in violence and the specific strategies employed were certainly not exclusive to post-conflict young political parties. Chapter 3 thus ensures the internal validity of the findings from the study of the 2010 elections in Burundi, and expands them conceptually in demonstrating that electoral violence can be a subset of general political violence—violent strategies can travel across political conflicts if the scope conditions and the overarching goals are the same.

In the two chapters that follow I explore the use of coercion specifically during the 2010 elections, in order to test the key implications of my theory: first that political parties employ violence against *coethnic* voters to mobilize their electoral support out of fear, and second that such violence escalates in places where the outcome of the vote is uncertain and that the winning threshold is determined by intra-group fragmentation. I discuss the first implication in Chapter 4 and the second in Chapter 5.

I begin Chapter 4 with an extensive overview of the context of these elections. I describe the institutional framework that regulated access to power in 2010, and the characteristics of the major political parties that competed for power—including their capability to employ violence. I also describe the conditions under which these parties could achieve victory, in turn explaining the conditions under which they intensified their efforts and resorted to violence. I then discuss how the entrenchment of political parties (and former rebel groups) and the existence of flaws in the voting process made it highly credible to both voters and candidates that violence could be employed in retaliation against those who did not comply. Next, I elaborate on how intimidation and violence fit into the menu of campaign options for Burundian political parties. To do so I rely on extensive interviews with representatives of all political sides and non-governmental organizations and on recordings of political rally speeches, TV interviews, and campaign songs that I collected and translated, and I disaggregate the nature of the violent incidents and the identity of the perpetrators and targets in proximity to the election. This shows that the parties focused on their own ethnic strongholds with both carrots and sticks: while

they presented themselves as the best representative of the given ethnic group (i.e., they engaged in “ethnic outbidding”), they also worked to intimidate voters and demobilize opposition candidates within the same ethnic group (i.e., they engaged in “intra-ethnic violent outbidding”). This provides considerable empirical evidence that violence was used to signal strength and the ability to protect supporters, to punish defectors and intimidate potential defectors, and to coerce opponents.

In Chapter 5 I test the expectation that violence escalates in places where the outcome of the vote is uncertain and the majority ethnic group is larger and not very fragmented. To do this, I carry out a quantitative analysis of my original subnational data where I analyze the determinants of all violent events taking place in municipalities during the weeks preceding election day. Specifically, I employ a negative binomial model and an ordered logit model to account for variations in both the number and the nature of the acts of violence across municipalities. Such analysis provides considerable evidence regarding the relationship between violence and proximity to the winning threshold, large ethnic-group size, and intra-ethnic party competition. In order to shed light on the electoral motivations that drive a party to employ violence, I begin by investigating the nature and distribution of violent events perpetrated by the incumbent party—which initiated the majority of incidents in the weeks and months preceding the polling, and which possessed the resources to implement both a violent and non-violent electoral campaign. Most electoral violence around the world is indeed perpetrated by incumbent governments (Hafner-Burton et al., 2012), or more generally sponsored by state forces such as militias and police

(Gartner and Regan, 1996; Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta, 2010). Accordingly, the findings in this chapter have implications for other countries as well. Chapter 5 shows that violence preceding the 2010 Burundi elections was strategically limited to uncertain seats: the ruling party was most violent in the districts where it expected to win or to lose by only a small margin (rather than to win handily or lose massively). Further, violence escalated in places where the opposition also initiated violence. In these districts, violence was directed predominately against voters and candidates of the same ethnic group as the incumbent. Digging deeply into the data, I provide further evidence for the hypothesis that greater intra-ethnic party fragmentation of the opposition produces less violence—not because small opposition parties are crucial sources of electoral support, but rather because such small opposition parties can be easily demobilized or coerced, offering little retaliation.

Moving to the territorial variation of all acts of violence, I show that escalation of pre-electoral violence in each administrative district can be explained by the district's ethnic composition and intra-ethnic political fragmentation, while controlling for a set of social, economic, and military factors. Number and intensity of violent events in a municipality are greatest when the majority ethnic group is larger and with an asymmetric party structure—that is, where the margin of victory between the first and second party within the ethnic group is not close, and the opposition to the winning party is not highly fragmented. In other words, violence spirals between the strongest parties competing for the control of the same ethnic group. Results are robust to a battery of checks that address various forms of territorial correlation among the observations and use a different estimation model.

In Chapter 6 I discuss the empirical implications of my theory: if, as I show in the previous chapters, violence was employed with the goal of boosting electoral participation, then the effect of violence should be observable in electoral results. To test this, I investigate whether violence influenced voters' beliefs (that is, whether voters cast their ballots out of fear) and I evaluate the impact of intimidation and violence on actual voting behavior in the context of the 2010 municipal elections. To address the first point, and overcome the challenge of capturing voters' psychological motivations, I measured the perceptions of voting behavior being influenced by intimidation through a questionnaire administered to more than two thousands local election monitors from every municipality. According to these data, perceptions of voting behavior being influenced by intimidation appear to be associated with the level of violence in the municipality—especially if that violence was targeted at specific individuals (rather than being group clashes)—and with more intense state-sponsored violence only in localities where the number of incumbent-associated ex-combatants was higher, and thus where the incumbent party was perceived to be more powerful.

Violence did have an impact on voting behavior, as it *increased* electoral turnout—particularly when the incumbent could rely on a pool of strongmen and therefore make *credible* threats to those who would not comply while also offering credible security to supporters. This finding is enhanced by an analysis of the impact of procedural fraud: based on statistical techniques to analyze sub-national electoral returns, I show that the incumbent achieved this increase in participation (in turn correlated with an increase in vote share) in a fair

(at least procedurally) way—that is, without denying votes to other challengers or manipulating and fabricating official vote counts. This demonstrates that electoral manipulation took place prevalently *before* the polling through intimidation and coercion that altered the free expression of what would have been true political preferences.

Chapter 7 concludes the empirical assessment of my theory by discussing its applicability beyond Burundi. While (because of the scarcity of publicly available appropriate data) it is not yet feasible to carry out a systematic test of the logic of intra-ethnic electoral violence on a large scale, I nonetheless provide considerable empirical evidence from cross-national trends and from case-studies to support the plausibility of my theory. In order to cover the details of my argument, I separate the two key claims on which the theory rests—the role of violence in *mobilizing* voters, and the targets of violence being *coethnics* rather than non-coethnics. Then I discuss the empirical evidence available for each. I begin by showing that, according to existing statistical studies and survey data from Sub-Saharan Africa, there is no clear and definitive link between pre-election violence and turnout—which demonstrates that violence is not (or at least, not always) aimed at suppressing turnout, but (also) at enhancing it.

In a specific discussion of violence as a mobilizing strategy, I focus on Zimbabwe—one of the African countries most renowned for its high levels of electoral violence—to explore the process of violent campaigning. An analysis of three decades of electoral improprieties allows me to show clearly that violence can be used for multiple purposes, among which mobilization is important. This case-study also allows me to elaborate on the use of both violent and non-

violent strategies at the same time, on the nature of intimidation (which ranges in scope from the threat of removing benefits to the threat of removing security and peace), and on the methods employed by political parties to convey the ability to monitor and punish defectors—even when the vote is actually secret.

I conclude with the analysis of Sri Lanka, a case-study that I employ primarily to discuss the occurrence of violence between coethnics rather than non-coethnics. This analysis demonstrates that, like in Burundi, in Sri Lanka the parties focused on their own ethnic strongholds with both carrots and sticks: knowing that cross-ethnic voting was unlikely, they presented themselves as the best representative of the given ethnic group (ethnic outbidding) while also working to intimidate voters and demobilize opposition candidates within the same ethnic group (intra-ethnic violent outbidding). I further rely on sub-national data regarding pre-electoral violence, ethnic-group size, and electoral results for the 2000 and 2001 parliamentary elections—the most violent in Sri Lanka’s history—to show that the relationship between these data is similar to the results I found for Burundi. And, even though the data are available at a much lower level of geographical disaggregation than my dataset for Burundi, the implications are clear. Like in Burundi, most election-related violence is perpetrated by the largest parties within the Sinhalese majority, which targeted one another and did so more when the size of their coethnic support base was larger. And, the incumbent is again the largest perpetrator of violence, especially when it is stronger and expects to be closer to the winning threshold.

Chapter 8 concludes by summing up the main theoretical claims and empirical findings of this dissertation and then discussing the implications for future

research.

Chapter 2

The Logic of Intra-Ethnic Violence before Elections

Dans la politique, comme dans le sport, tous les moyens sont bons

(In politics, like in sports, anything goes.)

Burundian senior party leader, August 2010.

*È molto più sicuro l'esser temuto che amato quando s'abbia a mancare
dell'uno de' due.*

*(It is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be
dispensed with.)*

Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, 1532¹

¹Translation by W.K. Marriott (Machiavelli, 1948)

2.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines my theory of intra-ethnic violence preceding elections. The underlying assumptions of this theory are that political parties are interested in gaining the support of the ethnic group with which they are associated, and that they can employ violence to achieve this goal. I argue that violence is a tool employed during electoral competition to achieve control of a coethnic electorate through the coercion of voters and the suppression of candidates. Specifically, I argue that when there is a reasonable chance to reach the winning threshold a party might employ violence against his own coethnics in order to enhance the turnout of lukewarm supporters and to compel the vote of political defectors and opponents within the same ethnic group. Intra-ethnic violence is thus a function of both the size and the internal party fragmentation of the ethnic group, which determine closeness to the winning threshold.

When multiple parties emerge within an ethnic group, one of the most likely outcomes is intra-ethnic party competition—that is, competition between these parties to control the ethnic support group. This outcome occurs especially if ethnicity preempts other axes such that there are few cross-cutting cleavages that parties are able or willing to employ.² In these cases, political parties are expected to compete for the support of coethnics by making increasingly extremists ethnic appeals (Horowitz, 1985). However ethnic rhetoric is not the only method for obtaining the support of coethnic voters, and it has been widely documented that it can also be accompanied by ideological appeals, economic transfers, patronage, and outright bribes. I show that intimidation

²See Chandra (2005) for a discussion of alternative outcomes when multidimensional ethnic identities are present.

and violence are an additional way to achieve control of an ethnic group: while intra-ethnic political parties present themselves as the best representative of the given ethnic group (i.e., they engage in “ethnic outbidding”), they can also work to intimidate voters and demobilize opposition candidates within the *same* ethnic group (i.e., they engage in what I call “intra-ethnic violent outbidding”). Further, analogously to the strategy of using violence to suppress the turnout of the non-coethnic opposition, violence can also be employed to repress the turnout of the coethnic opposition—a strategy that produces lower returns, however.

By developing for the first time a theory of intra-ethnic violence in elections, this research complements existing explanations of election-related violence in ethnically divided societies. Previous studies have typically focused on inter-ethnic violence; they posit that politicians suppress the turnout of the non-coethnic opposition, or radicalize the ethnic issue and appeal to mass extremism until violence breaks out between groups, or foment violence between ethnic groups in order to increase the salience of the ethnic division. My theory advances this literature by proposing additional violent strategies for obtaining the support of the coethnic constituency.

This chapter opens by discussing the scope conditions on which my theory rests. I then present my argument with the goal not only to explain the role of violence in shaping party competition in an ethnically divided society, but also to outline the conditions under which violence is used, and whether it is an optimal strategy for political actors. In order to explain step-by-step how violence can be used to establish electoral control over an ethnic group, I begin by discussing the strategy of violent suppression of coethnic rival candidates and parties. I

then elaborate on how violence can be employed to enforce voting behavior—namely to boost turnout and influence vote preferences—and why it escalates to signal both an expected cost from retaliatory violence greater than what can be inflicted by opponents and a stronger capability to protect supporters. In this discussion I draw from studies on the use of violence against coethnics during domestic and nationalist conflicts, because strategies to control civilians during civil conflicts have elements in common with strategies to control voters during electoral conflicts. I then review other explanations of electoral violence in multi-ethnic societies and analyze how they relate to mine, discussing the conditions under which they apply. The final section explores how electoral violence against coethnics relates to violence against non-coethnics.

2.2 The Foundations of the Argument

Before entering into the specifics of my argument, it is important to clarify the principal concepts employed, and the scope conditions on which my theory rests.

First, *electoral violence* is the set of acts of violence and intimidation targeting individuals and property with the objective of influencing the electoral process, and by extension its outcome. Electoral violence is generally distinguished from other forms of political violence by its timing, perpetrators and victims, objectives, and methods (Bekoe, 2012; Höglund, 2009; Sisk, 2008). It is also distinct from other acts of spontaneous or criminal violence because it is organized deliberately, and from fraud because it does not constitute a procedural infringement to election laws (Lehoucq, 2003). Like Straus and Taylor (2012), I consider both the deliberate use of physical harm and the threat of

physical harm to be electoral violence.

Beyond that, my theory rests on three important scope conditions: that political parties possess the capability to inflict harm, that ethnic identities are politically salient, and that political parties are nested within the ethnic groups. The first condition is key for the employ of violence as a coercive strategy before elections, while the second and third are necessary for the application of such violent strategy within ethnic groups. I elaborate on each below, and in the final section of this chapter I explore the scenarios that occur when these assumptions are relaxed.

Coercive ability. In order to employ violence, a party must possess the resources to do so. Such resources might derive from the monetary means to hire strongmen, control of private militias, control of the army or of police forces (especially in the case of incumbents³), and connection to criminal organizations or armed groups (either active or recently demobilized). The ability to engage in violence need not be defined in absolute terms, but instead should also be viewed in relationship to the resources of other parties contesting the election—even though a party is capable of deploying a few dozen strongmen around election time, for example, it might still be considered weak in comparison with a challenger who deploys hundreds. Furthermore, past historical or electoral behavior can be important for creating a *reputation* as a political actor able to inflict physical harm; a brand-new party able to deploy hundreds of strongmen might still be perceived as weak if others have done so consistently for a longer period of time. It should be noted that the presence of this condition is different

³A state is, by definition, holder of the monopoly of force in the state. However, the state should *not* be in a condition to make use of such force to ensure possession of power even against the rule of law. The example therefore refers to cases in which government actors exercise undue control over state forces.

and independent from a political culture of non-violent competition—or from simply a general lack of willingness to engage in violence. In fact, while both resources and willingness must be absent for electoral violence not to occur, the presence of only the willingness to employ violence will not lead to violence unless resources are available. In this case, violence would simply be unfeasible.

Salient ethnicity. There is a large body of theoretical and empirical literature regarding the salience of ethnic identities in proximity to elections. One of the most relevant findings is that politicians will play the “ethnic card” for strategic reasons when ethnic groups constitute winning electoral coalitions that are easy to create, sustain, and track,⁴ and when ethnic rhetoric increases the salience of this ethnic cleavage. On the other hand, voters tend to support co-ethnic candidates because they expect larger policy transfers, especially in the context of limited information and resources. So, it is apparent that the relevance of such an ethnic cleavage is neither exogenous nor fixed. My argument, however, focuses on a very precise moment: the months leading to election day. I define here that ethnicity is politically salient when voters associate their ethnic identities with the identity of the political candidate or party. This is therefore a time-specific definition that applies to only the electoral period.⁵ With no prior information regarding what has caused ethnic identities to become salient, this definition establishes only that, for a snapshot of political beliefs before an election in which ethnicity takes precedence, in that moment—over all other cleavages or issues of contention—ethnic identities can be considered politically “salient.” Building upon the distinction proposed by Chandra (2009, 2011b), the focus here is not on whether a political party presents itself as ethnic—that

⁴See, among others, Posner (2006), Chandra (2004), and Wilkinson (2004).

⁵See Chandra (2004) for a similar discussion.

is, it openly champions a given ethnic group—but rather on whether voters support it based on ethnic considerations. This background condition is properly applicable to many contexts, and there is considerable evidence regarding societies that approach elections with deep divisions and political beliefs determined by ethnic cleavage. In one of the most recent studies, for instance, Eiffert et al. (2007) found that the salience of ethnic identity increases relative to other group identities at election time in ten African countries.

Political parties nested within ethnic groups. This scope condition simply allows for intra-ethnic party competition, as defined for example by Horowitz (1985). While there might be different parties competing in a multi-ethnic society, such parties must be competing for the primary support of only one ethnic group. Parties may be differentiated by sub-ethnic or non-ethnic cleavages, such as regional or ideological differences, but these cleavages must overlap with the ethnic cleavage (and not cross-cut it). This scope condition mirrors the conditions in a large number of countries; even if parties that cross-cut ethnic groups do exist (e.g., Ghana), in many young multi-ethnic democracies political parties attract portions of the same ethnic group and seldom appeal to multi-ethnic constituencies. This is due to the political history of countries built upon ethnic alliances aimed at redistributing the spoils of power among members of the same groups (Diamond et al., 2007; Bates, 1983; Lemarchand, 1972). With the introduction of democratic competition in societies with scarce political ideologies and campaign resources, ethnicity continues to be a powerful catalyst of political support. As such, even when new political parties emerge or split from existing ones, ethno-regional identity remains one of the major factors differentiating them, especially in the absence of policy stances (Horowitz, 1985)

and other relevant social and religious cleavages such as those found in Western Europe (van de Walle, 2003).

2.3 Targeting Candidates to Eliminate Them

Now that these scope conditions are clear, I illustrate the two strategies that allow a party to establish electoral control over its associated ethnic group. I begin by discussing the strategy of violent suppression of coethnic rival candidates, and then elaborate on how violence is employed to enforce voting behavior.

One of the classical strategies for reducing electoral competition is to prevent challengers from contesting the elections. This could be achieved by a variety of means, from refusing to register a party, to arresting candidates, forcing them to flee, or even killing them. This strategy has been widely conceptualized and documented in the electoral violence literature (e.g., Bekoe (2012); Rapoport and Weinberg (2001)). If multiple parties compete for support of the same group, the interaction between such parties is likely to take a zero-sum character. In this context the most immediate target is therefore political candidates from coethnic parties.

Such a strategy is consistent with the general use of violence during civil wars to establish leadership over a group. During domestic conflicts armed groups often splinter into factions, and it is common that these factions resort to fighting against one another to establish leadership over the group (Fjelde and Nilsson, 2012; Cunningham et al., 2009). In ethnic conflicts, it is indeed documented that intra-ethnic factions attempt to demobilize opposing leadership in order to establish control of the group; examples range from Iraq (Staniland, 2012) to Sri Lanka (Lilja and Hultman, 2011; Höglund, 2005) to the former

Yugoslavia (Caspersen, 2009).

2.4 Targeting Voters to Enforce Turnout and Vote Choice

The second strategy that can be employed by politicians to establish electoral control over an ethnic group is to obtain the support of voters. In order to mobilize the coethnic electorate, politicians might seek to influence voter beliefs and preferences. Ethnic appeals are one method of achieving this, but are not the only way to compete for the coethnic vote—such ethnic rhetoric may go hand-in-hand with economic transfers, patronage, or bribes (see, e.g., Lemarchand (1972); Van de Walle (2001); Chandra (2004); Posner (2004); Kramon (2013).)

Generally, during a politician’s electoral campaign, candidates encourage voters to make their choice based on personal gain (of a job, policy, or reward, or simply psychological satisfaction), but also possibly in light of a potential cost. Voting for the “wrong” side may entail loss of a job, welfare, public security, private property, personal safety, or even one’s own life. While these strategies are related and can be employed at the same time, it is conceptually helpful to distinguish among them.

Intimidation, I argue, should be classified as a broad and comprehensive category based on the strategy to rally voters not through the gain from voting for a certain party, but rather through the danger attached to *not* voting for a party. Within this framework, violence can be one among many methods to make one choice less appealing than another—and arguably, violence constitutes the most powerful deterrent of all. Under the threat of intimidation and

violence, voters must balance the costs of not following the wishes of the violent party with the benefits of voting for their preferred candidate. Such a cost can be immediate (physical acts of violence on a voter or property) or simply anticipated. The threat of violence discourages voters from pursuing their choices, and persuades them by force of fear. Put simply, politicians employ violence to *coerce* the support of coethnic voters.

As Kalyvas (2006) notes, coercive violence tends to be both retrospective and prospective: it aims both to punish an action that has already been taken (in this case, supporting a coethnic political challenger) and to deter such support in the future. Coercive violence also tends to be, by definition, *selective*; it targets actual or potential defectors, and in doing so it begins from *visible* political actors, such as candidates or activists, in order to send a clear warning to as many people as possible. By being selective *and* visible, this form of violence is not only cost-effective—it “kills just one to terrify thousands,” as a Chinese proverb says⁶—but also particularly persuasive to voters since it demonstrates that defectors will be identified and punished, making free-riding less desirable. This kind of pre-electoral violence is therefore potentially low-intensity: it does not take the form of riots (such as the ethnic riots described by Wilkinson (2004)) or of the massive suppression or displacement of voters, but rather of a few acts against strategic targets. Of course, by maintaining its selective nature, coercive violence can also escalate, which I describe in Section 2.6.

I further posit that as a tool of coercion, violence is employed to influence different voting behavior according to the political inclinations of the targets: specifically the choice of *whether* to vote and the choice of *whom* to vote for.

⁶Cited in Kalyvas (2006).

Borrowing from the literature on distributive politics (Cox, 2009), I refer to these strategies as, respectively, “mobilization” and “persuasion,” and include them in Figure 2.1 below. In the case of mobilization, a party employs violence to increase the turnout of passive supporters—to get-out-the-vote. I indicate this strategy in the left-hand column. Violence is here used as a turnout-enforcing strategy, which goes as follows: rather than (or in addition to) paying members individual or public economic transfers in the effort to mobilize their turnout (Nichter, 2008; Morgan and Vrdy, 2011; De La O, 2013), parties instead threaten and punish those who would not turn out—they use the stick rather than (or in addition to) the carrot. This strategy requires only turnout monitoring, which is easy for parties to implement and for voters to perceive.⁷

Figure 2.1: Objective of electoral violence according to political inclinations of coethnic voters

		<i>Political preference</i>	
		Committed to support party	Not Committed to support party
<i>Turnout</i>	Inclined to vote	No violence	Persuasion
	Inclined to not vote	Mobilization	Mobilization and Persuasion

The right-hand column of Figure 2.1 refers to voters who are not close

⁷In many developing countries it is required that a voter dip his or her finger into ink. It is thus immediately apparent whether a given person has already voted or not.

supporters of the violent party, ranging from defectors to opponents. In these cases, violence seeks to discourage potential defectors or lukewarm opponents from supporting another party. Defectors can be punished, and such punishment serves as a warning to other potential defectors. Hardcore opponents can be forced to turn out for the violent party, or (as discussed in Section 2.1) simply discouraged from turning out at all. The choice of which behavior to enforce might depend, for instance, on the electoral incentives provided by the given electoral race. In a context in which it is crucial for a party to win as many votes as possible from the ethnic group—for instance because the non-coethnic opposition is not expected to swing or to abstain—a violent mobilization strategy produces higher returns than turnout-suppression since by coercing one voter the party effectively gains two *votes*, one for itself and one fewer for its opponent.

These strategies are close to those employed by illegal, insurgent, or criminal actors when they seek to gain the support of a given population or to overthrow a government. Kydd and Walter (2006) explain that terrorists engage in deterrence because they must convince the targeted government’s defenders that continued backing of the government will be costly, and the population they wish to control that they have the power to punish whoever disobeys. Similarly, a political party that wishes to defeat an opponent must convince its backers that voting for the opponent will be costly, and convince the support base it wishes to control that it has the determination and capability to punish whoever does not vote. This strategy also has much in common with the behavior of political leaders in authoritarian regimes, and with the leaders of armed groups during civil war. According to the classical argument of “in-

group policing,” violence against civilians can be used to secure control over a population by punishing defection to the opposing side (Kalyvas, 2006; Mason, 1996), which in conflicts organized around ethnicity entails the use of punishment against coethnics (Brubaker and Laitin, 1998). This can occur to establish social and military control—such as among the Tamils during the Sri Lanka civil war, which opposed Tamils and Sinhalese (Höglund, 2005; Laitin, 1994; Lilja and Hultman, 2011). This method is also employed to *prevent* defections—for example, against Palestinians perceived to collaborate with Israelis (Jaeger and Paserman, 2006; International Crisis Group, 2008; Pearlman, 2009), or against members of Basque society uncooperative with or unsympathetic to the ETA agenda (Laitin, 1995). Or, it can be used to secure obedience, as in Rwanda among the Hutu during the ethnic genocide of the Tutsi (Straus, 2006). The same strategy can be applied to electoral competition.

2.5 “Violent Outbidding”: Violence as a Signal of Warning and of Protection

The strategy of employing intimidation to coerce voters to undertake certain voting behavior is based on the promise of retaliation if voters do not comply. This promise is based, in turn, on a knowledge of the electoral behavior of voters, and constitutes the core of this conceptual framework of violence perpetrated in a selective manner. Of course, electoral behavior can be difficult to control. Although turnout might be easily verified—by checking voting registries, or simply an elector’s finger for marking ink—determining for whom individual voters cast their ballots is problematic when the ballot is secret.

However, effective intimidation does not actually require a lack of secrecy at the ballot box. Even though vote-monitoring can be challenging when the ballot is secret, there are still ways for parties to make educated guesses—especially in small, rural, or less-populated electoral districts. For example, the literature on clientelism recognizes that voting behavior can be monitored at a lower cost in rural areas, where voters are often embedded in their communities; their social and political histories are known and their behavior is potentially discernible to neighbors, to family, and to party activists and strongmen (Powell, 1970; Bensele, 2004; Stokes, 2005; Stokes et al., 2013). If the ability to monitor voting choice is useful for providing voters with economic rewards in exchange for their support, it is likewise useful for providing voters with peace for the same reason, or with retribution if support is not given.

Such information about voting choices also need not be related directly to how individuals voted, but more broadly to how a *community* voted, an obvious way to identify areas where people voted for the opposition in large numbers. Thus, voters (from any side) are threatened not only with direct individual violence if they do not comply with the violent party's wishes, but also with the lack of public security due to the violent party's retaliation against a community that did not comply as a whole. To paraphrase a Burundian party song, people were encouraged to vote for the ruling party to prevent that party from resuming the war—a threat that is vivid in people's minds after years of civil conflict, as I discuss in Chapter 7. A highly-educated and wealthy supporter of the opposition put this argument to me in very rational terms: "As much as I wish to have my party win, I wish even more that the ruling party would be reelected, in order to ensure the safety of my fellow citizens." Accordingly, voters

expect that even though a party cannot control how individual votes are cast, an overall negative electoral result might ignite the party's violent retaliation, which makes non-compliance very costly.

Further, I argue that for voters the decision either to comply with violence or to free-ride is not just a function of the information possessed by parties about individual voting behavior, but rather of the *perception* of voters about the information possessed by parties. This perception can be altered by psychological pressures, such as the spreading of rumors about parties' alleged ability to discern how ballots are cast—such as the claim by the ZANU-PF party to possess machines that revealed how individuals voted during the 1980 election in Zimbabwe, or the rumor that one could see through the envelope where the ballot was placed during the 2010 municipal elections in Burundi. Or, voter perceptions could be altered by undue social control at the polls, such as the presence of party representatives sitting close to the ballot booths.

Furthermore, the voting decision is certainly affected by the retaliatory *cost* attached to the probability that the party knows the voter's choice; if such cost is very high, then even a small probability that the party knows a voter's choice would make the voter more inclined to comply. As such, the decision whether to comply with violence or free-ride is not just a function of the actual information possessed by parties about individual voting behavior, but also of the *perception* by voters of the information possessed by parties, and of the retaliatory *cost* attached to the probability that the party knows the voter's choice. Therefore, politicians who wish to influence the behavior of either a voter or an opposing candidate need to be *credible*. They must provide credible information to the audiences whose behavior they hope to influence. If that

audience is the voter, this information is that the violent party is strong, and resolute enough to inflict serious costs should the voter not comply; if that audience is an opposition candidate, the information is that the violent party is willing to continue fighting the opponent to match and overcome its power. Politicians thus resort to *costly signals*—that is, to outright violence—against people and properties of interest and great visibility, such as local political offices, candidates and activists, and their homes. These signals, consistently with a typology of coercive violence, are not indiscriminate but rather selective.

It must be noted that a powerful and credible coercive actor might never *need* to exercise outright violence in order to obtain the compliance of targets. During an electoral campaign, the absence of full-scale violence could indicate either that politicians choose not to engage in violence, or that they engage in intimidation but this has not escalated into physical attacks. As a classic example, the source of the Italian Mafia’s power to compel people is often just the threat of violence, rather than its exercise; as the anti-Mafia Italian parliamentary commission described, “More often no outright intimidation is needed. ‘Advice’ is sufficient.”⁸ In fact, increases in criminal violence in a locality are interpreted as the end of the dominance of one family in that locality (Sberna and Olivieri, 2013). Similarly, increases in electoral violence within an ethnic group can be interpreted as the end of the dominance of one party in the country or specific district. In this case, a party finds it necessary to appear as strong as possible in order to ensure that voters are too frightened to deviate from the violent party’s wishes.

As a consequence, when a party faces a coethnic competitor that can itself

⁸Quoted in (Della Porta and Vannucci, 1999).

inflict violence on the electorate and that can retaliate, the party would use the infliction of harm to reinforce the credibility of its threats and to signal the resolve to continue fighting—like nation-states in terms of classic theories of inter-state bargaining (Schelling, 1966), or intra-ethnic rebel leaders who resort to violence to signal their strength to the civilian population (Boyle, 2009).⁹ The military strength signaled by increased violence is also indicative of the ability of a given party to respond to potential retaliation against voters who decided to support the party. These signals are aimed at influencing the expected utility function of voters, and therefore their political behavior.


Borrowing again from the civil-war literature, a voter’s utility function is similar to the utility function of an insurgent, in that it depends on the expected benefits the voter receives from such support minus the expected costs of providing the support (Mason, 1996). While the “cost” is clearly the retribution for lack of electoral support, in a context of more than one party threatening the use of force this “benefit” must necessarily also include protection; ideally, supporting a strong party allows a voter to avoid violence both from the party for which he or she cast the ballot and from rival parties. Put simply, weak parties are not in a position to compel voters—they do not offer credible retribution, but further they do not offer credible protection from retaliation by other violent competing parties.

Figure 2.2a illustrates this concept using an extremely simplified utility function. A voter’s payoff is given by the benefits derived from supporting a party (P_A , in this case) and from the costs of not supporting the competing

⁹Boyle (2009) describes how intra-group violence (especially against civilians) was employed as a method through which factions of the fragmented Sunni and Shi’a signaled their political strength in Iraq between 2004 and 2007.

Figure 2.2: Violence in voters' payoffs

(a) Payoffs from violence, according to voting choices and parties' strength



(b) Voter's payoff

		<u>Voter</u>	
		Supports P_A	Supports P_B
<u>Party</u>	Strong P_A	No Violence No P_A violence <i>P_B Violence prevented</i>	Violence P_A Violence <i>No P_B violence</i>
	Weak P_A	Violence P_B Violence <i>No P_A violence</i>	No violence No P_B violence <i>P_A violence prevented</i>

party (P_B). Without elaborating on whether such benefits (and costs) are directed at the constituency as a whole or at the individual voter, one can include retribution under the “cost” category and protection under the “benefit” category. As such, by supporting a violent yet weaker party a voter obtains only the benefit of not experiencing retribution from that party, but *not* the benefit of being protected from the retribution of a stronger party. So, even though a voter may be reluctant to provide loyalty and support to the strongest violent party because of ideological, economic, or expressive preferences (such as disapproving of violence), that voter might nonetheless back the violent party for fear of punitive response, as well as for fear of not obtaining sufficient protection otherwise, as shown in Figure 2.2b. Analogously to armed groups, for political parties it is therefore strategic to prefer to be feared if the opponent is feared, rather than to be liked but not feared.¹⁰ Political parties intensify their attacks in order to signal both an expected cost from retaliatory violence greater than what can be inflicted by opponents, *and* a stronger capability to provide protection and security to supporters.

Overall, while various forms of intimidation might be inflicted on voters (such as the threat of not providing jobs or public services), potentially in conjunction with other forms of reward-type electoral strategy, it is likely that the threat or use of force is chosen by a party when it believes that the party is not liked enough to ensure the support of voters. And, when simple intimidation is not expected to increase the cost associated with the “wrong” vote—either because threats are not sufficiently credible or because a competitor is also expected to inflict retaliatory costs—then the party might instead engage in

¹⁰Paraphrased from Kalyvas (2006).

actual physical harm. As a consequence, intra-ethnic parties engage in violent outbidding, and violence becomes the optimal strategy for all.

2.6 When Violence Occurs: Electoral Incentives

When would a party rely on such coercive means to mobilize the ethnic base? This section explores the conditions that make parties prone to employing violence as an electoral strategy. I also assume as per my first scope condition that parties are actually capable of inflicting violence, and thus this section models only the incentives that make them *willing* to employ violence.

The driving hypothesis of this theory is that parties employ violence when they fear losing power, or from the challenger's perspective when they see the chance to win. An uncertain electoral result is in fact the situation with the highest returns for violence; therefore, a party will be more likely to employ violence when it is close to the winning threshold, as opposed to when it expects to lose massively or win handily.

The employ of violence when a party is close to the winning threshold is corroborated by cross-national evidence:¹¹ Straus and Taylor (2012) find that 70% of cases of high electoral violence happened when there was a 40% or less margin of victory, and Hafner-Burton et al. (2012) show that incumbent governments are likely to use election violence when they fear losing power. The same logic can be observed within individual countries: Wilkinson (2004) argues that in India the incentives for ethnic polarization and riots are greatest in

¹¹This is contrary to Collier and Vicente (2010b).

districts where electoral races are closest, and Dhattiwala and Biggs show that killings in Gujarat most likely occurred where the party faced the greatest electoral competition. Similarly, Zimbabwe's incumbent ZANU-PF party inflicted more violence on the opposition MDC when the latter threatened its prospects of victory (Krieger, 2000, 2005), and similar tactics were used by the Cambodian government in the first multi-party elections in 1993 (Hafner-Burton et al., 2012). Even in Victorian England and Wales, violence was more intense in heavily-polarized constituencies (Wasserman and Jaggard, 2007).

This definition of electoral competitiveness is general enough to identify the conditions that make violence more likely under various electoral rules. For example, a small margin of victory is usually cited as an indicator of competitiveness because it shows a close race between two parties; however, this situation would predict closeness to the winning threshold—and therefore highest returns for violence—under plurality rule, and not always otherwise. If, for instance, parties compete under majority rule (in which a party or a candidate must win over 50% of the vote to be elected) and the political arena is highly fragmented, a low margin of victory between the first and the second parties implies that none of them is close to the winning threshold—a condition that would occur, by contrast, when the margin of victory is larger instead.

This example also demonstrates that while such a conceptualization of competitiveness is general enough to entail different implications for different electoral contexts, it is also precise enough to illuminate the relationship between violence and intra-ethnic fragmentation. In fact, in a context characterized by political parties that compete—and employ violence—for the support of only the same ethnic group, it is therefore apparent that the size of the ethnic group

and its internal fragmentation determine closeness to the winning threshold, and as such also determine the returns for a violent campaign. This leads to the general hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: The use of violence for electoral control of an ethnic group is a function of both the size and the internal political fragmentation of that ethnic group.

Let us again consider majority rule as an example. Majority rule is not rare, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa where most presidents are elected by absolute majority (Golder and Wantchekon, 2004). Intra-ethnic party fragmentation therefore brings a different outcome according to the size of the ethnic group—that is, the size of the constituency that can be mobilized. In general, since violence is employed by a party that has some probability of reaching the winning threshold, it follows that greater party fragmentation reduces the incentive for any party to use violence against coethnics, since they would still not be close to the winning threshold. In contrast, lower levels of party fragmentation have a different impact on violence according to the size of the ethnic group. If the ethnic group is small, violence is more likely to occur with an asymmetric distribution—where one party already controls a large portion of the ethnic constituency. If the ethnic group is large, violence is *less* likely to occur with an asymmetric distribution—one party alone will be able to win without resorting to further mobilization and persuasion.¹²

¹²This reasoning is analogous to the logic underpinning a party's choice of whether to form a pre-electoral coalition or to run for office alone; as Golder (2006) notes, symmetric coalitions are more likely to form when the expected coalition size is large (but not too large) and potential coalition partners are similar in size, while asymmetric coalitions are *less* likely to form when the overall coalition size becomes sufficiently large, and the largest party decides to compete for office alone.

In a proportional setting the goal is to win as many votes as possible; therefore, a higher level of intra-ethnic fragmentation does not hinder the parties' chances to gain power. However, even though the threshold is constituted by the minimum vote share required to enter parliament, the returns for violence actually increase with the size of the ethnic constituency. This situation makes violence an acceptable option for parties that are small (as a consequence of either the size of the ethnic group or its fragmentation, or both) but most rewarding for parties that are large—that is, in a context with lower intra-ethnic fragmentation and larger ethnic-group size.

The abstract implications of this discussion are the following two hypotheses, which can be refined according to the specific electoral context of a country or locality under analysis.

Hypothesis 2: Violence is more likely when intra-ethnic party fragmentation is near a level that allows at least one party to be close to the winning threshold.

Hypothesis 3: For the same value of intra-ethnic fragmentation, violence within an ethnic group is more likely when that group's share of the population is larger.

Two additional considerations are in order before moving on to discuss how intra-ethnic violence relates to other methods of increasing a party's vote share, and to inter-ethnic violence in general. First, the hypotheses outlined above refer to the electoral conditions that make parties willing to engage in violence. However, as I discussed in Section 2.6, parties might engage in a spiral of violence in the attempt to set the highest cost for non-compliance. In this process, weaker parties that do have the ability to inflict harm might not have the ability to

engage in *sustained* competition, or might simply recognize that they constitute a militarily weak competitor and therefore drop from the violent race. So, even though violence can occur among all parties, it nonetheless escalates more among the strongest (and potentially largest) ones. Second, these hypotheses can refer to electoral conditions at either the national or sub-national level, which might differ due to the underlying demographic and political structures.

2.7 Other Strategies to Increase the Vote of the Ethnic Group

Now that I have illustrated the logic of intra-ethnic electoral violence, I would like to return to the other strategies employed by politicians and campaigners to mobilize the coethnic vote. In Figure 1.2 I present a diagram that explains how existing analyses of pre-electoral ethnic violence theorize the use of violence to suppress participation of non-coethnic voters and to mobilize coethnics by stressing the conflict between ethnic groups. However, how do these theories relate to the argument proposed in this dissertation, and under which conditions will we observe the application of such theories?

Leading theories of ethnic competition observe that when ethnic-group size is large enough to ensure victory, politicians attempt to establish ethnicity as the only politically relevant identity. In order to do this, parties employ diversionary strategies that seek to emphasize the external threat posed by non-coethnics—thus increasing ethnic identity fervor among the coethnic electorate and constructing a winning political constituency around the party that most champions the interests of the threatened group. This logic is best illustrated

in Wilkinson’s influential study of ethnic riots in India—one of the few cases in the literature where violence is intended not to suppress the activities and turnout of the opposition but instead to enhance participation, leveraging the psychological mechanism of identity manipulation. According to this strategy, which can be associated with the “rally ’round the flag” effect in international relations (in which international disputes highly increase national fervor and popular support for the government), politicians deliberately foment ethnic violence because such violence has the effect of creating solidarity among their own electoral coalition while also distracting the electorate from other issues. In other words, violence has a “priming” role, and as such is predicted to occur between ethnic groups. Specifically, inter-ethnic riots break out more in the most competitive districts, when the size of the anti-minority group allows it to reach winning thresholds, and when parties do not rely on (or need) minority support. The empirical implication of this argument is that violence decreases with higher party fragmentation, because in this situation where parties are more likely to rely on minority votes. Examples commonly cited to support this claim include the above-mentioned riots fostered by the Hindu BJP in India competing against the multi-ethnic Congress (Wilkinson, 2004; Wilkinson and Haid, 2009; Snyder, 2000), Protestants against Catholics in Ireland in the 19th century (Hoppen, 1994; Wilkison, 2012), and the Democratic Party in Southern U.S. States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Wilkison (2012) based on Cecelski and Tyson (1998); Crowe (1969); Olzak (1990).)

While this argument stands in clear contrast with my theory—in both the theoretical explanation for the role of violence, and the empirical implications—such divergence is a product of very basic contextual conditions. As Wilkinson

and Haid explain in their recent study of Indu-Muslim riots in Gujarat, ethnic riots are not the product of already-solid ethnic identities, but “are best seen as an exercise in what Riker has termed ‘heresthetics’, the art of increasing the salience of some dimensions and agendas over others” (Riker, 1986; Wilkinson and Haid, 2009). The assumption here is that ethnic identities exist but are not sufficiently strong to ensure the electoral support of these coethnics. In other cases, however, the ethnic cleavage may already be politically salient, and candidates know well in advance that members of the other ethnic group(s) would not likely switch party support. If ethnicity is already politically salient for voters, then ethnic riots may not be a cost-effective tool for electoral belief-manipulation.

The other leading explanation for electoral conflict in multi-ethnic societies takes place in a context of salient ethnic identities. In the context described by Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) first and Donald Horowitz in 1985, ethnic cleavage preempts other issues of contention such that electoral competition plays along the axis of ethnicity. In such a context there is no significant number of voters located between the ethnic parties and competition therefore occurs on the flanks, pushing political parties to engage in a spiral of increasingly extremist ethnic positions in order to appeal to their ethnic constituencies—the phenomenon of “ethnic out-bidding.” In turn, radical ethnic appeals increase the distance between ethnic groups, and can propel them toward violent outcomes. The empirical implication of intra-ethnic party competition would thus be inter-ethnic tensions, and possibly outbursts of violence. According to Horowitz, this outcome is particularly likely when there are two parties per ethnic group, while higher intra-ethnic fragmentation might lead to the formation of multi-ethnic

coalitions.

This claim appears again to contrast with my empirical implication. However, even if at first sight the two arguments do not seem reconcilable, they nonetheless also do not necessarily exclude each other. First, inter-ethnic violence that erupts following the increase in tensions between ethnic groups is usually a by-product of the electoral process rather than an instrument of political competition. Second, the ethnic outbidding analysis predicts that when there is intra-ethnic competition ethnic parties use extremist positions to appeal to coethnic voters. My argument is also that intra-ethnic parties seek the support of coethnic voters; however (and here is the difference), when rhetoric is not sufficient, coercion is employed. Further, when violence is used for mobilization purposes, ethnic appeals and violence may complement one another, as voters are coerced to turn out for the party that has already presented itself as the champion of the interests of the ethnic group.

During informal meetings in the Burundian towns and countryside, the two parties representing the Hutu ethnic group engaged in a competition to present themselves as the most pro-Hutu. Both parties described how they had fought a war to bring power to the Hutu majority, and if the ruling party noted that they successfully ended the war and brought peace and power to the Hutu population, then the opposition accused them of negotiating the end of the war by allowing Tutsi into their party lists, selling out Hutu interests. The situation was almost identical in Sri Lanka, where the two largest Sinhalese parties accused one another of accommodating the Tamil separatist insurgency or even of collaborating with the insurgents. My argument correctly predicts this intra-ethnic outbidding accompanied by deliberate intra-ethnic violence as

an additional method for acquiring the coethnic vote.

This leads to the following question: does rhetoric outbidding always lead to inter-ethnic violence? The answer appears to be no, since there are other contextual conditions that can interact with the salient ethnic divide and make inter-ethnic violence less likely. Chief among these factors is whether the institutional framework determines that political competition is a zero-sum game between the ethnic groups. Political institutions such as power-sharing and proportional representation guarantee all ethnic groups access to power. So, even if the ethnic groups should position themselves on opposite stances, they would know that each has guaranteed access to power and state resources, which softens the political conflict and the grievances between the groups (and possibly favors the emergence of an intra-ethnic cleavage). Competition ceases to be a zero-sum game between the ethnic groups, but is a zero-sum game between parties within the same ethnic groups. In Chapters 3 and 4 I discuss how the introduction of these power-sharing institutions at the legislative and executive level contributed to the emergence of conflict *within* ethnic groups and the lessening of conflict between different ethnic groups in Burundi.

There is also evidence of other cases in which ethnic parties participate in rhetorical outbidding with no resulting violence. Mitchell et al. (2006) show that in Northern Ireland, where there is no cross-cutting cleavage and therefore little room for inter-ethnic bargaining, traditionally-moderate parties have moved towards the center to take advantage of power-sharing institutions; this in turn has allowed the traditionally-extreme parties to move to more accommodating positions, appearing more “relevant for governance,” while simultaneously remaining the strongest “defender” of the ethnic cause. Moving to the Balkans,

Caspersen (2009) explains that in Bosnia and Croatia intra-ethnic elite competition was characterized by ethnic outbidding based on appeals not only to extreme popular attitudes, but also to other politically relevant audiences such as political party elites and the state.

2.8 Intra-Ethnic and Inter-Ethnic Violence

The theory proposed in this chapter explains the strategy of election-related violence against coethnic voters and candidates. But, as shown in Figure 1.2, intra-ethnic violence is not the only strategy that can take place before elections. One must ask not only why violence would target coethnics, but also why violence would target coethnics *only*, or in different situations would target *both* coethnics and non-coethnics. In this section I do not aim to propose a theory of how intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic violence are related to one another, but rather to suggest a few cases in which violence against non-coethnics may not be useful or effective, leaving as a viable strategy the use of violence against only coethnics. For example, a non-coethnic constituency might be needed to achieve the winning threshold (Wilkinson, 2004), or it might not be sufficiently large to pose an electoral threat or to reduce the “denominator” of the vote share. In the latter case, controlling the coethnic electorate is key to winning, so violence is, at a minimum, intra-ethnic.

But, when would one observe intra-ethnic violence *only*? This case might occur when coercion of non-coethnics is not efficacious. Even when influencing the non-coethnic population could be useful for increasing a party’s vote share, there are two cases in which inter-ethnic violence would not take place. First, in a context of salient ethnic identities, intimidation and violence against

non-coethnics might be less effective because of high identity costs for voters in supporting a candidate from another ethnic group. In other to swing, a voter will have to overcome an identity cost due to this attachment to his or her preferred party, which I posit is a function of an ideological/partisan component as well as of an ethnic component: if ethnic identities are very salient, a voter who supports a different party but shares the same ethnic identity as the violent candidate is less “distant” than a voter who shares neither the ethnic identity nor the partisan identity. *Ceteris paribus*, a candidate would maximize the chances to get opposition support by intimidating a coethnic opposition supporter rather than a non-coethnic opposition supporter. It follows that, in such a case, attempting to persuade the non-coethnic electorate might not be effective, unless the cost of violence is larger than the cost of voting against ethnic preferences. Second, the vote of non-coethnics might be difficult to influence due to electoral rules that guarantee the political representation of ethnic groups—that is, proportional representation or ethnic power-sharing—and so provide substantial incentives for candidates to appeal to coethnics and for voters to vote ethnically.

It is worth noting that this strategy of intra-group violence as an electoral tool can be exported to other social or political groups, under the conditions that these groups are politically salient and that political cleavages overlap with them—the same scope conditions on which my theory of intra-ethnic violence rests. When, in fact, political parties or candidates compete for the support of the same group of voters, such competition, like competition between different parties for the vote of the same ethnic group, can turn violent. A notable example is intra-party competition, such as in party primaries or when certain

electoral rules (e.g., preferential voting) encourage candidates to compete for the support of the same group of voters.

2.9 Conclusions

This chapter outlined a theory of electoral violence used as a tool by politicians to achieve control of a coethnic electorate by demobilizing coethnic opposition candidates and coercing the support of coethnic voters. This analysis complements existing theories of violence preceding elections in multi-ethnic societies, which predict outbreak of tensions and violence between the different ethnic groups of a society. Drawing on multiple literatures—from civilian violence during nationalist conflicts to criminal organization behavior, from electoral violence to inter-state bargaining—as well as on empirical evidence from cross-national and individual country studies, I have posited that in addition to other uses of violence for demobilization purposes (against opposition candidates and voters) pre-election intimidation and violence can be used to *mobilize* the support of the group of coethnics. Since the success of such a violent mobilization campaign depends on the credible expected costs attached to not following a party's wishes, my theory entails that political parties will intensify their attacks in order to signal both a cost from retaliatory violence greater than what can be inflicted by opponents, and a stronger capability to provide protection and security to supporters.

My theory further posits the conditions under which such pre-electoral violence is more likely to occur and escalate. The main empirical implication of the theory is that intra-ethnic violence—both less-obvious intimidation and outright physical attacks—is determined by ethnic-group size and the level of

party fragmentation within that ethnic group. My empirical hypotheses are explored in the rest of this dissertation.

Chapter 3

Politics, Violence, and Ethnicity in Burundi

War is not between the rich and the poor.

War is between the rich and the almost-rich.

Alexis Sinduhije, 2009¹

When two elephants fight, it is the grass that gets trampled.

Burundian proverb²

¹Author's interview, August 2009.

²Cited in Human Rights Watch (1998).

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter I illustrate the politics of Burundi from a historical perspective in order to provide a solid foundation for the study of political violence in contemporary elections. This chapter is guided by the objective to trace the connections between political power, ethnicity, and violence. My theory treats ethnicity as fixed during the short time of the electoral campaign; however, the ethnic cleavage in Burundi overlaps with other cleavages—for instance, political inequalities in the past—and with the history of war. Since in Burundi these three factors cannot be easily separated, I analyze them together while proceeding through the nation’s modern history. This chapter highlights the key factors, institutions, and actors that determine how ethnicity and violence have been linked in the fight for power.

Rather than simply providing a political history of Burundi, this chapter first elaborates on the psychological, economic, and institutional factors that made ethnicity salient in the first place and continued to affect its salience over time. Second, it elaborates on the recent use of violence by political actors to gain and retain power. Looking at the patterns and strategies of violence in the past enables me to highlight country-specific factors influencing the propensity of political actors to employ violence during the most recent electoral conflict. I explore how past violence increases the credibility of threats, both by creating common knowledge that certain political actors are prepared and willing to resort to violence and by increasing the coercive power of threats through linking them to memories of past violence. This chapter thus ensures the internal validity of the findings from the study of the 2010 elections, and expands them conceptually in demonstrating that electoral violence can be a subset of general

political violence—violent strategies can travel across political conflicts if the scope conditions and the overarching goals are the same. Throughout this historical account, I illustrate the targets and motives of violent incidents in the past and relate them to the strategy of violence during the more recent 2010 elections.

3.2 Power, Violence, and Ethnicity before Independence

Burundi is one of the oldest monarchies of Africa, dating back to the fifteenth century (Mworova, 1987; Ben Hammouda, 1995). In the absence of written historical accounts for the times preceding colonization, the precise nature of historical political and social structures remains a subject of debate. However, existing accounts agree in accepting the two primary ethnic groups of Hutu and Tutsi—that are estimate to make up, respectively, 85% and 14% of the population³—and in asserting that these groups co-existed relatively peacefully. As Lemarchand (1994) explains, “Status, not ethnicity, was the principal determinant of rank and privilege”. The same name “Hutu” had both an ethnic connotation and the social meaning of “social subordinate”—for instance an ethnic Tutsi would be a Hutu in the presence of a wealthier patron. Furthermore clans and patron-client ties were key determinants of one’s social ranking, sometimes independently of one’s own ethnic identity.⁴ In addition to the Hutu

³These numbers refer to 1926. Despite many continue to use this proportion, Lémarchand argued that it would not be implausible that Tutsi made up up to 20 % of the population in 1994 (Lemarchand, 1994).

⁴Lemarchand (1994) also criticizes the usual common description of physical and occupational differences between the two groups (according to which Tutsi were tall and slim farmers, and Hutu were small and thick-set cattle-herders), noting that such differences were

and Tutsi, the Ganwa were linked to the royal family, and the Twa constituted a small minority of the population.⁵ These groups constitute different social categories (*amoko*), but had the same language, culture, and territorial localization (Mworova, 1987).

Before colonization, power rested with the royal family, the Ganwa. Below the king were administrative authorities (the chiefs), delegated authorities (*Vyariho*, chiefs' representatives), and judicial authorities for local conflict resolution (the *Bashingantahe*). Hutu performed important administrative and ritual functions in the royal domains (Lemarchand, 1994). The Ganwa's formal ethnic identity is debated. While some argue that Tutsi dominated for 400 years (Makoba and Ndura, 2006), others claim that the royal family was ethnically mixed (Ben Hammouda, 1995; Gahama, 2001). Drawing on a variety of carefully-analyzed historical sources, Mworova (1987) concludes that family clans had a crucial role in the political system, but that sources are silent on the ethnic identity of such clans (Mworova, 1987). Clientelistic networks along family (clan) lines always played an important role, but after a demographic explosion in the nineteenth century clan-based clienteles multiplied and became increasingly relevant for political, economic, or simply personal purposes. (Mworova, 1987)

During this era, conflicts were due primarily to competition for royal power or for land, and ethnic identities were not contentious. Missionaries and colonizers who arrived in Burundi during the nineteenth century considered the

not mutually exclusive.

⁵It is common to find the plural of these names also spelled as Bahutu, Batutsi, Baganwa, and Batwa, as in the local language Kirundi. In Kirundi the singular is indicated by the prefix "Mu" and the plural by the prefix "Ba" ; therefore one would say "Muhutu" to indicate one Hutu individual, and "Bahutu" to indicate many Hutu people. For ease I choose to use consistently the English word.

Hutu and Tutsi to be different races; under an ideology that identified races apt at ruling (the Hamites) and those apt at serving (the Bantus), the Tutsi were associated with the former, characterized by superior moral and intellectual capabilities. The origins of the Tutsi were traced to Southern Egypt or Ethiopia, and the Tutsi became known as “white people under a black skin” (Gahama, 2001; Mariro, 1998).

In addition to highlighting an ethnic categorization that had been largely unproblematic in the past, the colonial administration imposed also a new political hierarchy that favored a subset of the pre-colonial elite, both in term of their clan and of their ethnic identity, which planted the seeds for ethnic inequalities. Even though Belgians formally applied a system of indirect rule that retained native local political systems, such a system instead mixed tradition with change. The colonial administration imposed by the Belgian colonial power was based on the recognition (and the enhancement) of the princely powers, in order to reduce what Belgians perceived as a weak feudal system in which territorial power and privileges were given by the king only to the princes of his own dynasty and sometimes in an arbitrary fashion among these princes (Chrétien, 1983). The monarchy was then left with a mostly symbolic role and was deprived of the important possibility to control the chiefs. Furthermore the number of chiefdoms was progressively reduced (from 133 to 35) by grouping previously independent chiefdoms under the authority of an influential Ganwa, power was given predominantly to the royal family of the Bezi as opposed to the other royal family of the Batare,⁶ and Hutu chiefs were replaced with Tutsi or

⁶Both these families descended by two kings, following the traditional system according to which once a new king ascended to the throne, the princes associated to the older dynasty would loose their princely status and became Tutsi, while the ones of the current dynasty were Ganwa (Chrétien, 1983; Lemarchand, 1994). The royal cycle was, at least since XVIII

Table 3.1: Ethnic background of incumbent chiefs, 1929-45.
 Source: Lémarchand, 1994:44

Year	Number	Batare	Bezi	Tutsi	Hutu
1929	133	41	35	30	27
1933	46	16	20	7	3
1937	44	15	20	8	1
1945	35	8	17	10	0

Ganwa (see Table 3.1) (Chrétien, 1983; Lemarchand, 1994). Higher education and administrative positions were reserved for the Tutsi, and the first ethnic census was carried out in 1926. This created a drastic change in the structure of Burundian society, and initiated the cycle of political exclusion for the Hutu demographic majority, as well as the hardening of ethnic identities which escalated just before independence. However, it is important to note that not all Tutsi enjoyed access to power, and it was competition for power *among* the Tutsi minority that shaped the first three decades following independence from Belgium in 1962, and nurtured the inter-ethnic conflict as well.

Following these power and social changes, popular revolts erupted in the 1920's and 1930's against the new rulers and the colonial administration as whole. In these revolts, "Tutsi, princes, and Europeans were all identified with a power structure that was responsible for their [the insurgents'] misfortune" (Lemarchand, 1994). Violence was also employed by political actors as a coercive instrument to achieve political control of the population. As an example, Pierre Baranyanka, the Belgian political protégé that controlled one of the largest chiefdoms in Burundi during the colonial period, employed violence on century, made of four kings (Mwani), called Ntare, Mwezi, Mutaga, and Mwambutsa. The king ruling in the early XX century was Mwezi Gisambo, whose family constituted the group of the Bezi (literarily, "the sons of Mwezi"), while the oldest dynasty descended from Ntare Rugambo and constituted the group of the Batare (literarily, "the sons of Ntare").

Figure 3.1: 1935 Map of Africa. Burundi falls within the yellow borders of the Belgian territories, together with what is the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda nowadays. Source: de Saint-Martin and Schrader (1937).





Figure 3.2: Burundi today.



a daily basis to enforce discipline (Russell, 2013). When political parties were finally established, they too resorted to this form of coercive violence. The two major political parties, the UPRONA (Union pour le Progrès National), associated with the Bezi royal family, and the PDC (Parti Démocrate Chrétien), led by Baranyanka's sons, and thus associated to the Batare family, entered in competition with one another for the control of the state (Lemarchand, 1994). Within the framework of this competition, violence was an act of correction, the result of which was to be obedience. Building upon his archival research in the Archives Africaines in Brussels and the Archives nationales du Burundi, Russell (2013) reports that when Baranyanka was initially challenged by propagandists in *his territory*, he threatened to send armies of Twa and colonial soldiers to rape the women of the region, and later went accompanied by a large group of Twa men to go hunting nearby, leaving the region in fear. On the other hand, the Uprona used to control their territories by sorting and inspecting the local population for PDC sympathies. As Russell compellingly put it:

These were punished with physical abuse and forced purchase of an Uprona membership card at a punitive rate, and then, allegedly, the Upronistes began assembling target lists of prominent PDC members. The violence visited upon these individuals was spoken of in informatively euphemistic terms; the Upronistes termed their violence 'Uguhanura,' a matter of 'advice'. Asked under interrogation how they intended to 'advise' their enemies, the response was straightforward: 'By beating them up a little bit.' (Russell, 2013)

3.3 Intra-Ethnic Power Competition and Inter-Ethnic Violence before the Civil War

The first three decades following independence were characterized by an increasingly-authoritarian regime that largely excluded the Hutu from power. But, ethnic groups in Burundi have never been monolithic entities, and were often divided by sub-ethnic rivalries—in particular among the group with closer access to power. Violence was recurrent, and (as I illustrate below) was used both within and between ethnic groups. What’s more, inter-ethnic violence that posed the threat of upheaval by the majority was exploited to cope with intra-ethnic competition within the minority. The deadly events of inter-ethnic conflict in turn created powerful memories that crystallized fear and ethnic attachments in people’s minds across both the Hutu and Tutsi.

The pro-Belgian PDC party defeated the Uprona in the municipal pre-independence elections in 1960, however the latter prevailed in the subsequent legislative elections in 1961 and was destined to remain the source of power in Burundi for decades to come. Uprona was led by Prince Luis Rwagasore, who studied in Belgium, supported leftist ideology, and married a low-class Hutu woman. He embodied tradition, modernity, and unity on an unstoppable path toward independence. Belgian authorities—who wished to keep the country under their control—resorted to sponsoring a nascent purely Hutu party, the People’s Party (Parti du Peuple, PP). In the 1961 elections, Uprona gained a commanding majority and formed a government split equally between Hutu and Tutsi ministers (Prunier, 1994).

However, Rwagasore was killed soon after the elections over dynastic is-

sues within his own royal clan. The specter of the 1959 Rwanda “democratic revolution”—in which thousands of Tutsi were killed and many others forced into exile—prompted the Tutsi to take complete control of Burundi.⁷ In the subsequent elections Uprona still maintained its commanding majority—as well as its ethnic heterogeneity. Two-thirds of the elected members of parliament were in fact Hutu, both from Uprona’s so-called Monrovia faction and from the Belgian-sponsored PP party. When Hutu leader Gervais Nyangoma was not picked for the role of Prime Minister in 1965, he staged an unsuccessful coup—the first attempted coup of many in Burundi. This event produced the first instance of inter-ethnic violence in the central province of Muranyva: the Tutsi army killed 2,000 Hutu, who in turn had killed 500 Tutsi. After just one year, Michel Micombero—a general who fought both the putschists and the riots—staged a successful coup, abolishing the monarchy and creating a dictatorship along ethnic and regional lines.

It was under the Micombero regime that the high politicization of the ethnic cleavage in Burundi was finally established, and power was kept in the hands of the Tutsi. However, the elites that rose to power under Micombero were not the same as those who had held power under the colonial regime. Ethnically, they were still Tutsi, but came from a different, lower-level clan (Hima) and region (Bururi in the south, as opposed to Muranyva, in the center). The small Tutsi ethnic group was thus fragmented along subethnic cleavages—both territorial and familiar. To cope with this intra-ethnic fragmentation, Micombero supported ethnic violence to cement Tutsi around him as a check on potential Hutu aggression (Prunier, 1994). He thus employed the well-known strategy

⁷When in 1965 Pierre Ngendandumwe, Rwagasore’s old lieutenant and an ethnic Hutu, became Prime Minister, he was shot dead by Rwandese Tutsi refugees.

of creating a “rally ’round the flag” effect, increasing a group’s support for the leader who presents himself as the most supportive of the group’s interests threatened by outsiders. The Bururi group was able to lobby for power over the dangers of the Hutu peril. As Lemarchand notes, “Rather than assume that control of the state by Tutsi elements would inevitably lead to massive violence, we should view the violence as the anticipated outcome of persistent competition among the Tutsi elite for the control of the state ... The greater the danger posed by Hutu threats, the lesser became the salience of intra-Tutsi rivalries; the more intense these rivalries, on the other hand, the more tempting it became for Hutu elements to turn the situation to their advantage” (Lemarchand, 1994). This strategy increased solidarity within the Tutsi group, but also intensified the cleavage between hardliners and moderates, and also the cleavage between Hutu and Tutsi since the former were constantly suspected of plotting against the Tutsi and hence harassed (Lemarchand, 1994). Not surprisingly, in 1969 a Hutu-led coup d’état was allegedly plotted, and inter-ethnic violence brutally escalated in 1972 with ferocious retaliation against Hutu civilians and the organized killing of educated Hutu elements across the country.

This bloodbath left an unforgettable mark in the minds of those who survived. It also deeply affected those who fled the country and found refuge in camps across the border. It was in fact in one of these refugee camps in Tanzania that the first organized resistance movement emerged, animated by the goal of liberating the Hutu people from the oppression of the Tutsi. This movement, called the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (Parti pour la Liberation du People Hutu, PALIPEHUTU), was peaceful in design, viewing violence as

only a last-resort strategy (Watt, 2008).⁸ However, from the Mishamo camp in Tanzania the Palipehutu quickly spread to the Burundian countryside, and created its armed branch—the Forces for the National Liberation (Forces de Liberation Nationale, FNL)—in 1985. Among the refugees, the experiences of dispossession and violence were remembered and turned into narratives, which reinforced and reconstructed the ethnic identities of both Hutu and Tutsi in a climate of fear, victimization, and suspicion—clearly described by Malkki (1995) in her ethnography—to the point that Hutu refugees even refused vaccinations for fear that it was a program of mass sterilization (Malkki, 1995). These narratives were brought back to Burundi when the refugees returned after the civil war.

In addition to highlighting the Hutu peril, another method to gain support of the entire Tutsi ethnic group in the face of intra-ethnic conflict was to employ violence within the ethnic group itself. Such violence (consistent with what I posit in my theory) was indeed very different in nature, and it aimed both to eliminate competitors and to punish defectors. When in 1971 elites from the competing Tutsi Muranyva group plotted a coup d'état, punishment was harsh. In 1976 another intra-Tutsi struggle took place: Micombero was deposed by a member of his own clan and village, general Bagaza. This new and repressive dictatorship reserved the leading posts in the government and the army for Bagaza's closest allies—all Tutsi of the Hima group, from the Bururi region. The subsequent imposition of taboo on the ethnic question (Nidondera, 2008; Ben Hammouda, 1995) only covered up the discriminations against Hutus in all domains of the political and economic sphere, and increased the generalized

⁸See also a speech by the founder of Palipehutu, Rémy Gahutu, retrieved at [http : //www.youtube.com/watch?v = GitGhKKL6o](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GitGhKKL6o)

feeling of confusion and fear in the population (Buyoya, 1998). By 1985 there were only four Hutu cabinet ministers out of 20, 17 Hutu MPs out of 65, two Hutu members in the Uprona Central Committee out of 5, and only 10 percent of teachers and 20 percent of students at the National University were Hutu (Prunier, 1994).

The final intra-Tutsi fight brought power in a bloodless coup to General Pierre Buyoya, another Tutsi of the Hima group from Bururi. Buyoya re-opened dialogue on the ethnic issue, and began a politics “of national unity.” Such policy followed another intense wave of inter-ethnic violence in 1988 in the Northern towns of Ntega and Marangara, on the border with Rwanda. Here, Hutu peasants instigated by the Palipehutu (Watt, 2008; Prunier, 1994) killed local Tutsi for three days until the army arrived and reversed the situation, indiscriminately killing the Hutu. In total, 200,000 died in the region. In response a new cabinet was formed, with a Hutu prime minister and several Hutu ministers. A study produced a “charter for national unity” that was later approved by referendum. But despite the appealingly-named charter, the ethnically-mixed composition of the government, and a display of unity even in the state architecture (see the Monument for National Unity, built in 1990, in Figure ??) the inter-ethnic power-sharing was “just written on paper” and managed by the Tutsi themselves—as former President Buyoya himself told me.⁹ The Tutsi, in fact, still maintained full control of the army, a situation perceived as a threat by the Hutu (Buyoya, 1998). As political consultant Gérard Nduvayo (a former spokesperson for the Uprona party) defined it for me, it was a “unity of appearance, or, better, based on the use of force.”¹⁰

⁹ Author’s interview, August 2009

¹⁰ Original quote: “Unité de façade, ou mieux, une unité armée.” Author’s interview, August



Figure 3.3: Burundian bill, with the image of the Monument for National Unity, built in 1990 (under Buyoya) by the Italian architect Herman Menegeti. The monument recalls the values of unity and solidarity that are part of the Burundian culture, and represents wood logs collected by several people that are tied and carried together—following the popular wisdom of pooling resources together (*Gusenyeru ku muguzi umwe*).

3.4 Violence and Ethnicity in the 1993 Elections

When President Buyoya opened multi-party elections, he was expected to win; however, it became increasingly evident that the opposition party Front for Democracy in Burundi (Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi, FRODEBU), created semi-clandestinely by Melchior Ndadaye and legalized in 1992, was catalyzing substantial popular support. The development of this electoral campaign demonstrates how ethnicity and violence came to play a role in the electoral context.

The first thing to note is that the electoral campaign proceeded on two

2009.

rather different tracks. What candidates said in official rallies and meetings was different from what local propagandists emphasized in secret and informal meetings. The Frodebu, in particular, relied on local Hutu administrators in the countryside (Palmans, 2008), and on the fertile terrain prepared by years of grassroots propaganda by the Palipehutu. As soon as the Uprona recognized the increasing popularity of the Frodebu, it resorted to staging a campaign based heavily on portraying the Frodebu as tribalist—essentially accusing it of being the party of the Hutu (or even the ‘legal arm’ of the Palipehutu) to use its demographic superiority to destroy the minority. In the informal meetings, Buyoya was presented secretly as the “last card” to represent the interests of the Tutsi (Ndarubagiye, 1999), and Frodebu activists did the same for Ndadaye (Reyntjens, 1993, 2000). The latter pointed at Uprona as responsible for the discrimination and violence against the Hutu, thanks to control over the army (Palmans, 2008). While these ethnic appeals were banned under law, the informal meetings could not be monitored by the electoral commission (Sinunguriza, 2004). In addition to the informal campaign, the Uprona-affiliated press also contributed to create divisionism, as was later deplored by the newly-elected Ndadaye (Palmans, 2008; Department de la Documentation, 1993).

In addition to ethnicity, violence was another factor in the campaign. Violence did not erupt into outright riots or killings before or during the polling, “since both parties were expecting to win,” as one of my sources pointed out.¹¹ William Munyembabazi—at that time a member of the Frodebu, and closely linked to the head of propaganda and recruitment—put it more explicitly: “They [Uprona] believed that they would win the elections: that is what pro-

¹¹Author’s interview with a member of a civil society organization, Bujumbura, August 2009.

tected us [the Hutu].”¹²

However, violence did play a more subtle role and, in line with the theory I propose in this dissertation, served multiple purposes. First, there was the verbal and physical harassment between activists and voters of the Uprona and Frodebu parties. Members and candidates of Uprona (the *Badasigana*) were victims of incidents perpetrated by the Frodebists (Department de la Documentation, 1993). Tutsi militias (made of youths and school dropouts) engaged in criminal acts (Ndarusigiye and Mayoya, 2000) and spread intimidating rumors that the army would not allow the Hutu to gain power—that, in such a case, there would be massacres (Poulain, 1998; Ndarubagiye, 1999). Outspoken members of the Frodebu were also victims of harassment and physical intimidation by local authorities affiliated with the Uprona (Reyntjens, 2000).

However, in addition to these episodes of inter-ethnic violence, repression and intimidation took place *within* ethnic groups as well. In such cases, violence was a tool for coercing voters to support the party or for punishing defectors. Uprona forbade any Tutsi to vote for Frodebu (Ndarubagiye, 1999), and Tutsi who had joined Frodebu were considered “traitors” and were physically intimidated to make them quit the party (Reyntjens, 2000). Frodebu youth, for their part, were also reported to use heavy-handed measures to coerce Hutu who were not in line with the ideology of the party (Birabuza, 1999). Violence and the threat of violence were thus used to *increase* political support. The threat of violence, in particular from the Tutsi, relied on the army, which had proven in the past to be capable—and willing—to inflict massive violence. But, past memories of inter-ethnic violence, in particular in 1972, were also partly responsible

¹²Author’s interview, August 2009.

for cementing ethnic identities, and the election fired ethnic passions that were already present in both the individual and the collective mentality (Chrétien and Mukuri, 2002).

Following weeks of intense campaigning, Ndadaye was elected president with about two-thirds of the vote share, and his party gained 72% of votes in the following legislative elections. Even though not all Hutu voted for Ndadaye or Frodebu, and not all Tutsi voted for Buyoya and Uprona, nonetheless the majority of Hutu voted for the Frodebu, and the majority of Tutsi for the Uprona (Lemarchand, 1994). President Buyoya stepped back and Ndadaye became the new president, creating an ethnically-mixed government that included Tutsi members in relevant positions, such as the prime minister. However, the nomination of Hutus in the administration was followed by the replacement of both Tutsi and Hutu Uprona civil servants, all the way down to low-level political and bureaucratic positions. These changes left many Tutsi worried about the possibility of losing not only the symbols of their hegemony, but also their permanent sources of monetary income and of familial patronage (Prunier, 1994). The specter of losing power drove extremist Tutsi army officers to plot a coup d'état only a few days after the election, which was prevented by others within the army. Then, only three months later, a new plot succeeded: Ndadaye and his closest collaborators were killed, precipitating a bloody 13-year civil war.

3.5 Violence and Ethnicity during the War and Negotiations

Looking at the strategies of violence employed by armed groups, and the origins of armed movements that later became political forces, reveals whether strategies of violence in Burundi have been consistent across time and political events, and therefore whether electoral violence was a subset of more general political violence. The analysis below shows that violence during this period was used not only to attack and destroy the enemy, but also to compel obedience from civilians—a pattern that had already been observed in the 1993 elections and before, and which would occur in the 2005 and 2010 elections as well. Since many political parties in the post-conflict elections developed from armed groups during the war, their wartime actions provided a point of reference for their ability to produce violence.

Waves of violence were perpetrated on Tutsi peasants by Hutus organized by local Frodebu cadres following the news of the president's death. The army then retaliated against the Hutu, but soon forces on both sides began to fragment. After escaping the coup, former minister of interior Léonard Nyangoma established a new movement, the National Council for Defense of Democracy (Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie, CNDD), and its armed branch, the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie, FDD). This group fought the army, but not together with the Palipehutu-FNL, and it soon splintered into factions, among which the most powerful was led by Pierre Nkurunziza. Vorrath (2010) reports that the conflict lines changed substantially between 1997 and 2007, and intra-Hutu violence

eventually almost outnumbered Hutu-Tutsi violence, especially as peace negotiations progressed toward a power-sharing agreement (see Figure ??). While the causal mechanism is debatable (Was it the fragmentation of the Hutu ethnic group that produced the institutional framework, or did the political formula pushed during negotiations open the way for new power struggles between the primary armed groups?), the Hutu ethnic group nonetheless fragmented, and these factions did not always cooperate.

So, the question becomes, what strategies were used by these factions to gain the support of the population? Apparently, the largest armed group, the FDD, was prone to employing coercion. While it is difficult to estimate what percentage of the population lived under compulsion—and how many uncooperative civilians were threatened and killed—numerous cases have been reported of civilians being publicly beaten, of civilians killed for refusing to follow the rebels, and of civilians forced to provide resources and labor to soldiers stationed in their territories (Human Rights Watch, 1998). Youth gangs were created to terrorize the population, on both the Hutu and Tutsi side, and people expressed the feeling of being trampled between two sides that both demanded support and both punished those who did not cooperate (Human Rights Watch, 1998). Overall, indiscriminate and inter-ethnic violence was accompanied by violent acts aimed at coercing support and preventing defections within the potential support base of the rebels.

On the other side, the Burundian government—which since 1996 had been again guided by Buyoya—forced Hutu civilians into regroupment camps, and then arrested and killed those suspected of having ties with the CNDD. Forced labor within the camps was also widespread (Human Rights Watch, 1998), and

Tutsi youth militias terrorized the population and forced displacement. Further, the Tutsi government faced internal opposition from factions within the military and Tutsi political parties; notably, former President Bagaza had founded a political party (the Party for National Recovery, Parti pour le Redressement National—PARENA) that favored a more extremist Tutsi stance. Such opposition was quickly repressed, and Bagaza imprisoned.

Peace negotiations began secretly in 1997, and opened officially in 1998 in Arusha, Tanzania. The Arusha agreement recognized straightforwardly that the nature of the Burundi conflict was “fundamentally political, with extremely important ethnic dimensions,” stemming “from a struggle by the political class to accede to and/or remain in power.”¹³ Accordingly, a novel institutional framework was negotiated to guarantee access to power for both the Tutsi and Hutu. The new constitution—which came into effect in 2005, just before the elections that year—imposed a fifty-fifty split between Hutus and Tutsi in the Senate and army, a national assembly divided sixty-percent Hutu and forty-percent Tutsi, and ethnic quotas for the executive branch. Candidate quotas were also in place, such that for every two candidates listed from a given ethnic group, a third must be from another.

Negotiations were not smooth, and the largest armed group, the CNDD-FDD, was finally accused by its rivals (and in particular the Palipehutu-FNL) of selling out Hutu interests.¹⁴ The Palipehutu itself refused to sign the agreement until 2006, and continued to be active in some provinces of the country until the demobilization in 2008. The parties taking part in negotiations were di-

¹³Article 4, Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (28 Aug 2000)

¹⁴The Arusha peace agreement was signed in 2000, but CNDD-FDD signed the ceasefire only in 2003.




Figure 3.4: Conflict lines: 1997-2007. Source: Vorrath (2010)

vided into two politicoethnic groups: the Group of Seven (G7), which included the Hutu Frodebu, Palipehutu, Nyangoma’s CNDD, and other smaller parties (PL, Burundi Republican Party PRB, People’s Party PP, FROLINA), and the Group of Ten (G10), Tutsi parties that included Bagaza’s Parena, Uprona, and other smaller parties (PRP, Abbasa, Anadde, PS, Inkinzo, Av-Intwari, PT). The CNDD-FDD and FNL joined only later. The signatories of the Arusha agreement and ceasefire would also become the primary political competitors during subsequent 2005 elections.

3.6 Violence and Ethnicity in the 2005 Elections

The municipal and legislative elections of 2005 were supposed to be a turning point in the transition from war to peace. I propose here an analysis similar

to the one I provided for the 1993 election in section 3.3, and focus on the role played by ethnicity and by violence. Municipal elections were held in June, followed by the legislative election held in July. The members of the Senate were then elected by the municipal councils, and the president elected by the Parliament.

Ethnicity certainly played a role during the electoral campaign. An opinion survey carried out across the country by the University of Burundi a few months before municipal polling revealed that voting preferences were largely marked by ethnic identities (Nimubona, 2005). What's more, a majority of the population expressed support for the leaders of parties that were *not* part of the transitional government—namely CNDD-FDD's Nkurunziza for the Hutu, and Parena's Bagaza for the Tutsi—as opposed to the Frodebu and Uprona parties that had held the presidency between 2003 and 2005. Parties outside the current government were perceived to better champion the interests of their respective ethnic groups. The survey also reveals the impact of past violence on ethnic identities: ethnic preferences were strongest in the municipalities most affected by violence, or which hosted displacement camps (Nimubona, 2005).

The power-sharing institutional framework also reinforced the ethnic vote—in competition for the fixed vote share and number of seats, political parties tended to appeal to their ethnic support base and present themselves as the candidates who truly represented their ethnic group's interests. The power-sharing formula agreed upon during the negotiation was for ethnic groups only, and not specifically for politicoethnic groups (the G7 and the G10). This produced a situation in which some Hutu were part of Tutsi parties, and some Tutsi part of Hutu parties, but these politicians were voted for by their families and

coethnic patronage groups only,¹⁵ and were commonly considered “job-seeker” candidates who did not represent their ethnic group. Such comments emerged in the intra-ethnic propaganda of both groups: while the Uprona, MRC, and Parena campaigned against one another to gain the support of the Tutsi electorate (Rutamucero, 2007), the CNDD-FDD, Frodebu, and CNDD campaigned against one another for the support of Hutus. For example, Frodebu blamed CNDD-FDD for its brutality against civilians during the war, and claimed that CNDD-FDD had betrayed the Hutu cause by allowing Tutsi to join the party (International Crisis Group, 2005a). In other instances, the CNDD-FDD attacked Frodebu for exploiting ethnic divisions to the benefit of leaders who became even richer while the population was impoverished (Coalition de la Société Civile pour le Monitoring Electoral, 2005a). A new political cleavage had emerged, but it was nested almost entirely *within* ethnic groups (Nimubona, 2005). As in 1993, the genuine electoral campaign was carried out during the night.¹⁶

And, again, violence was a relevant factor during the campaign. As in my theory, violence and the threat of it were employed as a mobilization strategy—a “wrong” ballot was attached to a cost for either the individual voter or for the entire community. The CNDD-FDD in particular threatened to return to war should it not win, and also threatened many with retaliation if they did not vote for it (International Crisis Group, 2005a; Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l’Homme, 2010).

In the words of a CNDD-FDD activists, each voter was encouraged to “Remember the eagle [the symbol of CNDD-FDD]: he who will forget will be pecked

¹⁵ Author interview with civil society, August 2009.

¹⁶ Author’s interview with a member of the Ligue Iteka, August 2009

on his head!”¹⁷ To make this threat credible, CNDD-FDD’s leader Pierre Nkurunziza spread the rumor that he still had 35,000 rebels ready to act (Bentley and Southall, 2005). The Coalition de la Société Civile pour le Monitoring Electoral (COSOME)—the Burundian organization that deployed the largest group of local electoral monitors—noted that in some cases ex-combatants walked along waiting lines of voters to influence them, and CNDD-FDD activists told voters that they would not be able to go back home safe should the CNDD-FDD not win the elections (Coalition de la Société Civile pour le Monitoring Electoral, 2005b). The Frodebu responded by deploying hundreds of youths, allegedly to protect the population from intimidation and aggression by the CNDD-FDD, and violent group clashes were reported between activists of these two parties (Coalition de la Société Civile pour le Monitoring Electoral, 2005a). Rumors were spread that the FNL—and its armed forces, which had not yet signed the peace agreements—supported the Frodebu against the CNDD-FDD (Coalition de la Société Civile pour le Monitoring Electoral, 2005a).

In sum, both the Frodebu and CNDD-FDD employed intimidation and threats on an electorate that was not committed to vote for them (International Crisis Group, 2005a), and the exhibition of force was produced to show committed supporters that the parties were capable of protecting them, consistently with the logic outlined in Section 2.6 and exemplified graphically in Figure 2.2a. Unfortunately, the available data are not sufficiently fine-grained to analyze the location of the major incidents of violence, and the nature of the election—the first after a civil war—makes it difficult to attribute with certainty

¹⁷Reported in Coalition de la Société Civile pour le Monitoring Electoral (2005a) in original Kirundi wording (“Muribuka ya nkona, uwudatora inkona iramurarako, imunobe mu mutwe”) as well as French translation: “Rappelez-vous de l’aigle, car celui qui l’oublira sera picoré sur sa tête”.

the use of pre-electoral violence to *political* strategies or to the political culture (and lack thereof) of political parties. The next two chapters will therefore focus on the second post-conflict elections in 2010 and analyze the strategies and the conditions under which violence was used by politicians for political purposes. As I will show building upon a variety of qualitative and statistical data, pre-electoral intimidation and violence in 2010 followed the patterns established in the past—it was employed as an instrument of coercion to achieve the desired outcome, which, largely due to the power-sharing institutions, coincided with the mobilization of the coethnic electorate.

3.7 Conclusions

This chapter shows how violence and ethnicity are linked to each other in Burundi's modern political history. I illustrate that the two ethnic groups of Hutu and Tutsi are not monolithic entities, but have often been fragmented among regional, familial, and political lines that have competed for the control of the group—or the state *tout court*. In these fights, there are several factors that remained consistent over the years; namely the use of violence as a coercive strategy to obtain the support of people (either civilians in wartime or voters during elections), to punish defectors and publicly warn against potential defections, and to physically eliminate challengers. Youth groups have been longtime recruited to intimidate people and often engaged in inter-group clashes. Electoral campaign always developed along the two tracks of general, official discourse, and personalist, ethnic, and intimidatory messages.

While these factors have remained constant, what changed was the usage of inter-ethnic violence to cement intra-group cohesion. This strategy has in

fact dramatically decreased in conjunction with the civil war negotiations, subsequent peace agreements and new Constitution that imposed a split between Hutu and Tutsi in all major organs of state power, from the Parliament to the Army. However, as I clearly outline throughout the chapter, intra-ethnic violence has not substituted inter-ethnic violence: it was simply shadowed by the latter and became apparent and more salient once the inter-ethnic conflict was addressed at the political level.

The evidence provided in this chapter is therefore crucial to establish that the events occurred around the 2010 elections (which are described in the following two chapters) were not isolated and/or driven by peculiar motivations linked to 2010 only. The historical account shows the presence of my theory scope conditions: that political parties should possess the capability to make credible threats in order to employ violence as a coercive strategy before the elections, and that ethnic identities were politically salient and the ethnic groups politically fragmented. The historical account is also very important to assess that violence in 2010 was not just driven by actions of parties that only recently developed from the civil war. While certainly the lack of political culture and the greater access to strongmen in the form of ex-combatants contributed to increase the feasibility and expected returns of a violent campaign, the *willingness* to engage in violence, as well as the specific strategies, were certainly not exclusive of post-conflict young political parties. This chapter thus ensures the internal validity of the findings from the study of the 2010 elections in Burundi, and, most broadly, demonstrates that electoral violence can effectively be a subset of general political violence—violent strategies can travel across political conflicts if the scope conditions and the overarching goals are the same.

Chapter 4

The 2010 Elections

*In the U.S. people work on swing voters,
here we consolidate our strongholds.*

William Munyembabazi, CNDD's general secretary, 2010

4.1 Introduction

The historical account in Chapter 3 offered evidence regarding the tendency and ability of Burundi's major political actors to rely on violence for coercive purposes—in the past elections, as well as throughout the civil war and previous decades. I now specifically explore the use of coercion during the 2010 elections in order to test the key claims of my theory: first, that political parties employ violence against *coethnic* voters to mobilize their electoral support out of fear; and second, that such violence escalates in places where the outcome of the vote is uncertain and that the winning threshold is determined by intra-group

fragmentation, with large parties competing for the same constituency employ violence to show their willingness and ability to punish defectors and protect supporters.

I discuss the first implication in this chapter, and the second in Chapter 5. However, before tackling the parties' electoral strategies I provide an extensive overview of the context of these elections. I describe first the institutional framework that regulated access to power in 2010, and then the characteristics of the major political parties that competed for power—including their capability to employ violence. I also describe the conditions under which these parties could achieve victory, which in turn explains the conditions under which they intensify their efforts and resort to violence. I then discuss how the entrenchment of political parties (and former rebel groups) and the existence of flaws in the voting process made it highly credible to voters that violence could be employed in retaliation against those who did not comply.

Having provided the necessary information to fully understand the electoral framework of the 2010 elections in Burundi, I then proceed as follows. First, I build upon my extensive interviews with political leaders, media, and local and international observers to delineate the methods of political parties and explain how intimidation and violence fit into these strategies. I move to disaggregate the nature of the violent incidents and the identity of the targets in proximity to the election, and show that the parties focused on their own ethnic strongholds with both carrots and sticks: while they presented themselves as the best representative of the given ethnic group (i.e., they engaged in ethnic outbidding), they also worked to intimidate voters and demobilize opposition candidates within the same ethnic group (i.e., they engaged in intra-ethnic violent outbidding).

Second, I show that while in these districts violence was directed predominately against voters and candidates of the same ethnic group as the incumbent, non-coethnic parties were also targeted when their presence posed a threat. I provide considerable empirical evidence that violence was in fact used to signal strength and the ability to protect supporters, to punish defectors and intimidate potential defectors, and to coerce opponents. Disentangling these different strategies offers an understanding of how violence can be used for multiple purposes at the same time, and as such how violence can take place both between *and* within ethnic groups if necessary. Digging deeply into the data, I offer initial evidence for the hypothesis that higher intra-ethnic party fragmentation of the opposition produces less violence—not because small opposition parties are crucial sources of electoral support, but rather because such small opposition parties can be easily demobilized or coerced by a strong competitor.

Third, I report that violence was used in districts where the violent party determined that it was unable to win the confidence of the constituency through only non-violent strategies—a feature that I capture by looking both at the abuse of power, bribes, and gifts, and at the provision of public goods across municipalities.

4.2 The Institutional Framework

The 2010 elections took place over four months. As in 2005, in 2010 people voted for municipal councils, for Parliament, and for the administrative organs of sub-municipal districts (called hills, or *collines*). Unlike in 2005, however, they also elected the president, who had been endorsed by Parliament in 2005 via indirect election. The municipal elections (*élections communales*) were held in May,

followed by the presidential ballot in June, the legislative ballot in July, and village-level elections in September. Burundi is divided into 17 provinces, 129 *communes* (municipalities), 375 *zones*, and 2,908 *collines* (hills) and *quartiers* (neighborhoods).

The electoral rules were contained in the constitution approved on March 18, 2005, and in three bills that regulated electoral law (Loi n.1/22 du 18 septembre 2009), municipal law (Loi n.01/0016 du 20 avril 2005 portant organisation de l'administration communale, revised in 2010 by the Loi n.01/02 du 25 janvier 2010), and the organization of the political parties (Loi n.1/006 du 26 juin 2003 portant organisation et fonctionnement des partis politiques). According to these regulations, municipal councils are elected in each of the 129 municipalities through a proportional system on closed party lists. The electoral code required that both Hutu and Tutsi candidates be included in the closed party lists (i.e., voters cannot express a preference for the candidates within a party list), without specifying the order. Even though the electoral code did not set the ethnic composition of the elected members of the municipal councils, the Independent Electoral Commission had to ensure that no more than 67% of communal administrators could be of the same ethnic group.¹

The president is elected for a five-year term by universal suffrage with an absolute majority. Should an absolute majority not be obtained in one ballot, a second round must be held within fifteen days between the two candidates who obtained the most votes in the first round. The president is also assisted by two vice-presidents—one charged with political and administrative affairs, and the other responsible for economic and social affairs. These two vice-presidents are

¹Article 266 of the constitution.

nominated by the president and then elected via majority rule by both the National Assembly and the Senate. They should come from two different political parties, and from two different ethnic groups.² During the 2005-2010 government, President Pierre Nkurunziza was from the CNDD-FDD party and of Hutu ethnic origin. The first vice-president was Martin Nduwimana, a Tutsi from the Uprona party (replaced after resignation in 2007 by Yves Sahinguvu, another Tutsi from the same party); the second vice-president was Alice Nzomukunda, a Hutu woman from the CNDD-FDD (replaced in 2006 after her resignation by Marina Barapama, another Hutu woman from CNDD-FDD).³

The members of the National Assembly are elected by proportional representation from closed multi-ethnic party lists for each province. In the 2010 election the number of National Assembly seats allocated to each constituency was proportional to the province's share of the population at the last census, carried out in 2008. Parliament must have 60% Hutu and 40% Tutsi members, at least 30 % women, and three members of the Twa ethnic group are co-opted. For every three candidates on a party list only two may have the same ethnicity, and for every four candidates at least one must be a woman.⁴ While the election of the National Assembly is direct, the Senate is instead elected indirectly by the municipal councils: two senators are elected by the councils for each of the 17 provinces, one Hutu and one Tutsi. Finally, the five members of the hill and neighborhood councils are elected via universal suffrage and without party affiliation.

²Articles 122, 123, and 124 of the constitution.

³Gender quotas (30%) were also in place for the composition of the municipal councils, the Parliament, the Senate, and the party lists, however they were not required for other government positions.

⁴Articles 98, 168, and 169.

4.3 Political Parties

Twenty-four parties took part in the 2010 municipal election. A few were brand new, and it is difficult to distinguish and classify the parties on a left-right continuum or according to ideology. Political parties in post-independence African countries were not built around social and religious cleavages as they were in Western Europe (van de Walle, 2003). In Burundi in particular, parties are usually distinguished based on their historical origins—namely, their participation in the independence struggle and the first multi-party elections in 1993, or their development from the civil war’s armed groups or from existing parties (Observatoire de l’Action Gouvernementale, 2009).⁵

Political parties did possess a written program or a manifesto, and did campaign on some political issues—for instance, the provision of public services, the implementation of a tribunal for war crimes, or the fight against corruption. However, in the 2010 elections they tended to rely heavily on informal meetings and door-to-door campaigning, the message of which was targeted more at individuals and local communities and did not necessarily mirror the official programs. As an example, while the incumbent CNDD-FDD party campaigned openly on the social and economic policies implemented during its first mandate—such as abolition of primary-school fees and free healthcare for mothers and children—in clandestine campaigning it also stressed the political and security acquis obtained by the Hutu ethnic group in the civil war and its seizure of power (International Crisis Group, 2010). This was stated very clearly by a

⁵According to Burundian political scientist Julien Nimubona, the Uprona may be considered more conservative than others. (Author’s interview, September 2010). See also Rubli (2013) for an overview of how political parties addressed the issue of transitional justice in their discourse.

local electoral monitor in September 2010:

The parties did not talk about the same issues. In fact during the informal campaign they used intimidation and gifts, while during the official campaign they used precise programs.⁶

This existence of two channels for electoral campaigning in 2010—the official position and the discourse in nightly meetings and door-to-door campaigning—followed a pattern already observed in both 1993 and 2005.

Overall, and despite (or because of) ethnic quotas, political parties continued to be associated with specific ethnic groups, and many were further connected to armed groups from the civil war. Among the largest parties, many had participated in the elections in 2005—the Frodebu, CNDD-FDD, CNDD, Uprona, Parena, and MRC, and other smaller groups as well. These parties were joined by the FNL, which developed from the Palipehutu-FNL armed group led by Agathon Rwasa, and which was characterized (consistent with its history) by a strong pro-Hutu ideology and message. Political splinters also joined the elections—for example, the UPD party (Union for Peace and Development, *Union pour la Paix et le Développement*) had been dormant in 2005 but reactivated when CNDD-FDD party president Hussein Radjabu was jailed and expelled in 2007 under the accusation of destabilizing the state. The ADR party (Democratic Alliance for Renovation—*Alliance Démocratique pour le Renouveau*) was founded by former second vice-president Alice Nzomukunda, who resigned from her position citing corruption and human-rights abuses, and

⁶Original: “On n’a pas parlé de la même chose car dans les informelles, ils utilisaient des intimidations et des cadeaux tandis que dans les officielles, ils utilisaient des programmes précis.” Reported in my expert questionnaire by an electoral monitor of the Coalition de la Société Civile pour le Monitoring Électoral in Kayanza province. See Chapter 6 for a longer description of the questionnaire.

who was later expelled from the CNDD-FDD. The Frodebu-Nyakuri (“genuine”) party was created by the former speaker of the National Assembly, Mr. Jean Minani, who defected from Frodebu in 2007 and formed a satellite party of the CNDD-FDD. Finally, the Movement for Solidarity and Democracy (*Mouvement pour la Solidarité et la Démocratie*) was registered in 2008, guided by internationally-recognized journalist and founder of a popular independent radio station Alexis Sinduije, an ethnic Tutsi born and raised in one of the predominately-Hutu municipalities of the capital Bujumbura (Kamenge). His party’s leadership also included Hutu members.

Of the 24 parties that presented their lists for the municipal elections, only five competed in all 129 municipalities—the CNDD-FD, Frodebu, FNL, Uprona, and UPD. Three more parties contested the election in over 100 municipalities—the MSD, CNDD, and Frodebu Nyakuri. Seven of these parties presented presidential candidates—the CNDD-FDD, FNL, Frodebu, UPD, CNDD, Uprona, and MSD. Table 4.1 indicates some key points regarding the seven parties that presented presidential candidates, and below I provide additional information on the resources available to each of these parties, particularly in terms of their political culture and ability to engage in intimidation and violence.

To begin with the ruling CNDD-FDD, it must be clear that the incumbent had a full set of electoral options at its disposal. It was one of the most powerful armed groups during the civil war, providing a large support base and a well-oiled mobilization structure. As an armed organization it owed much of its military and political effectiveness to the country’s largely-Hutu peasant population (Nindondera, 2012), and control of the population at that time was ensured through a parallel administration and police force. These administered

the policy and economy, as well as a system of protection and safety carried out primarily by the youth group *Imbonerakure*. Therefore, the CNDD-FDD relied on a position as a representative of Hutu interests (it stood up for the Hutu cause and eventually ensured peace), but also on a controlling and potentially coercive image—increased by the group’s record of violence, coercion, and retaliation against enemies during the war, and after the war by its influence over over the largest group of ex-combatants in the country and over the state police and intelligence service. The latter included a large number of ex-combatants from the CNDD-FDD armed group recruited full-time or hired as occasional informants (Human Rights Watch, 2009). The CNDD-FDD also possessed the economic resources to buy votes⁷ and the capability to distribute valuable positions, jobs, and services conditional upon partisan affiliations.⁸ As such, intimidations were intended broadly, and the threat of physical security was just another threat on top of others that the incumbent was capable of implementing.

The FNL party had the most extremist positions regarding ethnicity, often accusing the ruling CNDD-FDD of collaborating with the Tutsi and not representing the interests of the Hutu. Its coercive ability was substantial: the FNL was in fact the last armed group to be demobilized and transformed into a party,

⁷This use of state resources was denounced by local civil society and human-rights organizations.

⁸There is evidence that the ruling CNDD-FDD asked people to become members of the party as a condition for receiving a job or other services; by asking people to officially become a supporter, the party was therefore able to make individuals’ choices visible, track them more easily, and put considerable social pressures on voters. The ruling party’s political structure was also hierarchical and well-organized (Personal conversation with Lidewyde Berckmoes, July 2013). Further, there are documented cases of people who were denied services or threatened that they would not receive jobs or medical services if they did not join the party. At high levels, Frodebu members were blocked from management positions in major state and parastatal enterprises, which were headed instead by members of the CNDD-FDD (Author’s interview with Frodebu’s spokesperson, August 2009. See also Nidondera (2008)).

and it relied on the second-largest group of demobilized soldiers—well-known for abuses on the civilian population during the war. The rivalry between the CNDD-FDD and the Palipehutu-FNL armed groups during the final years of the civil war and after the 2005 elections also contributed to the tension between these two political parties—and therefore to the message sent to their political supporters and potential defectors.

While the Frodebu was the winner of the 1993 election and relied on a strong mobilization structure before the civil war, its mobilization capability was greatly reduced by 2010. In its rhetoric, the Frodebu at first tried to disqualify the CNDD-FDD in the eyes of the Hutu electorate as a “Tutsi tool”⁹, but the reality was that the organization was often identified with gentrified politicians disconnected from the masses (Nindondera, 2012)—a sentiment that also emerged in the 2005 University of Burundi survey that I described in Chapter 3 (Nimubona, 2005). Further, in 2005 the Frodebu enjoyed the support of the Palipehutu-FNL, which sustained it as the challenger to the CNDD-FDD; however, such support vanished once the FNL itself became a political party. Frodebu did create a youth group that was verbally antagonistic towards and physically challenged the ruling party’s Inbonerakure (Embassy Bujumbura, 2009a); however, the party had no control of the military or the police, and had already been subject to harassment, arrests, and killings by the police and the intelligence department in the past. As such, Frodebu did not constitute a large electoral and militarily threat during the 2010 elections.

The CNDD and UPD parties were also small in electoral terms, and new to the political arena; yet, they were still able to employ force. Party lead-

⁹Author’s interviews in 2009 and 2010. See also Nidondera (2008)

ers Léonard Nyangoma and Hussein Radjabu (respectively) had occupied key positions in the past. Radjabu had been a leading fighter in the FDD group, and CNDD-FDD party president until 2007; Nyangoma was the founder of the CNDD armed group (from which the CNDD-FDD Nkurunziza-led splinter developed) that demobilized almost 3,000 combatants by 2010. These parties therefore possessed strategic and military resources that made them suited to intimidations and violence, but they nonetheless had limited electoral support compared with the CNDD-FDD and the FNL.

Given its longstanding history in the one-party state for decades, Uprona was very entrenched, especially among the Tutsi population. The party controlled the Army before the civil war, and the number of demobilized soldiers of the former Armed Forces of Burundi (*Forces Armées Burundaises*) was very high. Uprona's youth group—the *Jeunesse Révolutionnaire Rwagasore* (JRR)—was very involved during the war and continued to exist during the elections. However, the party's greatest electoral weapon was to remind voters, at least informally, that Uprona was the only party to truly represent the interests of the Tutsi, who would otherwise be left unrepresented.

The brand-new party MSD attracted the sympathies of youth, urban, and educated voters, and allegedly also the support of ex-combatants and enrolled soldiers unsatisfied with current conditions.¹⁰ Even though the leader of the party and many senior members were of Tutsi ethnic origin, the support base was ethnically-mixed (International Crisis Group, 2010). While the party's territorial control was limited, its youth organization was active. On the other hand, the MSD leader, Alexis Sinduhije, was accused of turning his back on

¹⁰ Author's personal communication with an Army general and a journalist. Bujumbura, August-September 2010.

the CNDD-FDD after having encouraged the radio broadcast organization he managed¹¹ to support the CNDD-FDD during the electoral campaign in 2005.¹² He certainly aimed to gain votes across the political and ethnic spectrum, including the ruling party's electors, but the retaliation of the government made this quite difficult.¹³

In sum, even though the parties described above were all capable of intimidation and violence in one way or another, their credibility as coercive actors was certainly not the same, and their ability to credibly protect supporters from the retaliation of other parties also differed. If smaller parties like the Frodebu were not in the best position to confront the CNDD-FDD, and therefore were more easily intimidated without outright violence, they could nonetheless still compete with one another.

4.4 How Does a Party Win?

The power-sharing institutions, the historical legacy, and the psychological context of these elections all had important consequences for the electoral strategies of the political parties. By ensuring that elections were not a zero-sum game

¹¹The African Public Radio—*Radio Publique Africaine* or RPA by its French acronym.

¹²The exact motivations for this cannot be clearly inferred from the interviews carried out in Bujumbura and Brussels between 2009 and 2011. According to some, Sinduhije was driven by the conviction that a CNDD-FDD victory would finally bring peace in Burundi and encourage inter-ethnic cooperation; according to others he was driven by self-interest after being denied political positions. However, it is certain that Sinduhije had been very critical of the government during its first mandate, and denounced abuses of power that were noted by other civil society organizations and human-rights organizations (e.g., corruption, use of state money for private purposes, extra-judicial intimidations and violence.)

¹³The independent newspaper Iwacu, commenting on the MSD party leader, wrote in June 2011, “Facing the ‘steam-roller’ CNDD-FDD, the access to votes of the Hutu population was not easy. He [Sinduhije] had to pursue votes in the same constituencies as the Uprona, which was better entrenched” (Original: Face au rouleau compresseur CNDD-FDD, l'accès aux voix des Hutu n'était pas aisé. Il a dû chasser sur les mêmes terres que l'Uprona, mieux implantée.”) Published online on 18 June 2011.

Table 4.1: Principal parties contesting 2005 and 2010 municipal elections

Party	History	Leader ethnicity and region	No. ex-combts	2005	2010
CNDD-FDD	The ruling party. Founded in 1994 as rebel movement, it became a registered party in 2005, after having signed the peace agreement in 2002. It was associated to the Hutu majority, despite having included Tutsi member to respect the party quotas	Hutu, Ngozi	12,912	Y (57.3%)	Y (62.17%)
CNDD	Developed from one of three factions of the CNDD-FDD. Led by the CNDD founder Léonard Nyangoma	Hutu, Bururi	2,692	Y (4.1%)	Y (.98%)
FNL	Never contested elections before 2010. Evolved politically from the Palipehutu-FNL armed group, past animated by a pro-Hutu ideology and still composed predominantly by Hutu members. It registered as a political party one year after the 2008 cease-fire	Hutu, Ngozi	10,894	N	Y (15.04%)
FRODEBU	The party of the President elected and killed in 1993, associated to the Hutu majority	Hutu, Kayaanza		Y (23.3%)	Y (6.36%)
MSD	New political party registered in 2009, led by an internationally recognized journalist of Tutsi origins (but party leadership included also Hutu cadres)	Tutsi, Bujumbura		N	Y (4.75%)
UPD	Dormant party in 2005, reactivated once the former CNDD-FDD party president was expelled from the party in 2007. Could be considered as a splinter of the ruling party	Hutu, Ngozi (Muslim)		Y (0%)	Y (1.65%)
Uprona	For decades the only party, traditionally associated to the Tutsi ethnic group, and, in 2010, with a an more aged population	Tutsi, Muramvya		Y (6.3%)	Y (7.86%)


for ethnic groups, the mandated representation for ethnic groups at all levels of government reduced the fear that the minority could lose all power, but also restricted the share of power that the majority could effectively gain. In this section I discuss in detail the electoral strategies that arose in this environment. However, I want to first sum up the primary electoral strategy by using the same words used by many of my interviewees: “The Hutu will compete among each other for their share of the pie.” In order to win, a party needed to mobilize coethnic voters.

The diagram in Fig. 4.1 clarifies this concept: obtaining control of the coethnic constituency is crucial for a party in order to win the seats that are mandated by law to that ethnic group. Even if in principle a party could still appeal to non-coethnic voters, such a strategy would not be feasible on a large scale because of the strong psychological and institutional incentives for both groups to side with coethnics.¹⁴ Note that this does not imply that the support base of the parties was coethnic *tout court*: parties were able to gain the support of non-coethnics (by including candidates of a different ethnic group into their lists and thus getting the vote of their family and close supporters, or by mobilizing people on religion or non-ethnic issues, for example), but such strategies were limited to small numbers and the support base among party voters was known to be *largely* ethnic.

In principle a party could deliberately employ violence to suppress the non-coethnic opposition, a strategy that would reduce the denominator and thus increase its vote share. But, since a given ethnic proportion needed to be reached overall—at both the municipal and legislative levels—such a strategy would be

¹⁴A fuller discussion of the ethnic vote is provided in Section 4.7.

Figure 4.1: Electoral strategies



feasible only if the party also elected non-coethnic candidates. While this was possible at least for larger parties that were potentially able to elect more than one of the candidates in their lists,¹⁵ it would *still* be crucial to mobilize the coethnic base in order to obtain the number of votes to elect more than one candidate in the first place. Further, the purpose of post-conflict negotiation was to stop the inter-ethnic conflict that plagued Burundi for decades by guaranteeing both Hutu and Tutsi access to power; major political actors would lose considerable legitimacy, in the eyes of both the population and the international community, if they attempted to again suppress the non-coethnic opposition. As a consequence, the incentives for inter-ethnic violence aimed at suppressing the non-coethnic opposition were greatly reduced, and emphasis was instead placed on mobilizing, at a minimum, the coethnic base.

¹⁵The electoral code requires that every party have ethnically heterogeneous lists and that lists be blocked. According to the number of votes obtained, a party might be able to elect more than one candidate from its lists, and if they are from different ethnic backgrounds then the overall ethnic proportion would be respected.

So, the question becomes, when accounting for both ethnicity and political divisions, what were the winning thresholds? The proximity of municipal, presidential, and legislative elections made the first one an important test for parties to show off and verify their popular support. Obviously every party would aim to gain as many votes as possible, but there were certain thresholds that determined a party's chances of victory. For winning the presidency, a party needed the absolute majority of votes. And, while the majority threshold would be at the national level, such a result at the local level would also ensure control of the municipal councils (and therefore of the Senate), as well as of Parliament. As such, parties aiming at winning the presidency would consider proximity to the majority of the vote share as the condition with the highest electoral stakes, and so the most important goal of electoral campaigning. This condition would apply to all parties competing for the presidency, but especially to the incumbent—the one that would most likely reach this threshold at the national level. Furthermore, since a party would try to mobilize the ethnic constituency, the returns from violence would be lower when the size of the Hutu ethnic group in a given district was not sufficiently large to reach the threshold, in contrast with when the Hutu made up the majority of the district's population.

However, what if there were intra-ethnic competition? Following the goal of controlling the vote of the coethnic base, a political party would attempt to discourage opposition *candidates* from running, while encouraging coethnic *voters* to support the party. In fact, if a party could rely on credible intimidation, it would be better off to intimidate opposition voters into changing their votes rather than into simply staying at home—this way, a coerced vote would have

a twofold effect, resulting in a higher payoff. To clarify this point it's worth considering a simple ethnic-political structure: suppose that the Hutu ethnic group makes up 70% of the population in a district, and is divided into party CNDD-FDD (relying on 40% of the total vote share) and party FNL (relying on 30%). Assuming, as it would be in Burundi, that the 30% Tutsi population can be neither mobilized nor suppressed by either Hutu party, then the CNDD-FDD would obtain 70% of the vote share by mobilizing the coethnic FNL's constituency, rather than only 57% by suppressing that constituency. Furthermore, if the FNL is also able to employ violence, it may respond with the same strategy and employ violence against the CNDD-FDD to demobilize CNDD-FDD candidates, intimidate CNDD-FDD voters, and assure its own supporters that it is able to protect them.

However, intra-ethnic party fragmentation brings a different outcome according to the size of the ethnic group—that is, the size of the constituency that can be mobilized. Violence, I argued in Chapter 2, is an investment made by a party that has some probability of reaching the winning threshold (in much the same way that other electoral strategies are decided). For parties equipped with credible coercive skills and resources, violence is the strategy of choice when the electoral stake is high. It follows that, in general, higher party fragmentation reduces the incentive for any party to employ violence, since it will still not be close to the winning threshold. However, lower levels of party fragmentation result in a different impact from violence, according to the size of the ethnic group. If the ethnic group is small, violence is more likely to occur with a very asymmetric distribution—where one party already controls a large portion of the ethnic constituency. But, if the ethnic group is large, violence is

less likely to occur with a very asymmetric distribution—one party alone will be able to win without resorting to further intimidation.

This situation can be pictured as in the two figures below. Figure 4.2a shows possible combinations of the ethnic and party structures of the electorate. For simplicity, let me focus on party competition within only the Hutu ethnic group (in lighter shades of grey). The left-hand column of Figure 4.2a represents the case in which the Hutu group is small and divided into two symmetric (cell A) or asymmetric parties (cell C). The right-hand column shows the same party fragmentation in the condition of a large Hutu group. The figures show that, under majority rule, within a small ethnic group a party has a greater probability of gaining office when it begins from an already-strong position (cell C); investing in a violent campaign is more likely to bring a party closer to the threshold compared to when ethnic polarization is greater (cell A). In contrast, low ethnic political polarization already brings the largest party ahead of the threshold, making violence unnecessary (cell D).

As Horowitz (1985) notes, large ethnic groups can afford the luxury of having more than one political party. However, this implies that these parties are both in a good position to win (cell B). Such a circumstance fuels outbidding, and—expanding on Horowitz’s predictions—therefore prompts the employ of *all* strategies to ensure the highest return. In Burundi, intimidation was a powerful and effective strategy: a voter’s expectation of receiving violence in retaliation or punishment, before or after the election, would obviously be a greater deterrent to disobedience than receiving a prize in return, especially because voters did not possess institutional means to protect themselves from

violence.¹⁶ For parties that could rely on coercive capability, intimidations could even be cheaper than economic transfers. It follows that a bipolar intra-ethnic competition would be characterized by outbidding between the intra-ethnic challengers, not only with ethnic appeals and economic transfers but also with intimidation and violence. When a powerful party confronted a smaller or weaker party, violence would either be less likely to occur (if the latter did not pose an electoral threat, as in cell D) or to escalate (if it was indeed important to win the contest, but the weaker party was easily intimidated without recurring to outright violence). The trend towards violence, according to both the size and the political fragmentation of an ethnic group, is shown in Figure 4.2b, where the winning threshold is construct as function of both the ethnic group size and the intra-ethnic party competition.¹⁷

4.5 The Municipal Election


The empirical analysis that follows focuses on the electoral campaign of only the first election in 2010—the election of the municipal councils. Although it would be interesting to compare the campaign strategies for different types of elections with different electoral rules, the temporal proximity of these polls would make it hard to distinguish between pre-electoral intimidatory violence and post-electoral retaliatory violence or protests. A further important detail also makes the last three polls unsuitable for comparison with the first municipal

¹⁶The police was largely controlled by the incumbent and there are many cases in which harassment and violent went unpunished, as reported by the Burundian organization Association Burundaise pour la Protection des Droits Humains et des Personnes Détenues (APRODH, Protection of Human Rights and prisoners in Burundi) and the international Human Rights Watch.


¹⁷It should be noted that these figures are not built from a formal model.

Figure 4.2: Ethnic and party structures and propensity to electoral violence

(a) Politicoethnic combinations



(b) Violence trends according to size and fragmentation of ethnic group



election: immediately after the proclamation of the municipal election results, many opposition parties denounced the validity of the municipal polling (due to alleged intimidation and bribery, lack of secrecy in the ballot box, orchestrated power cuts, and so on), and called for a boycott of the subsequent rounds. Civil society organizations condemned the climate of intimidation that might have affected the vote before the poll, but did not dispute the actual numbers provided by the Independent Electoral Commission—the CENI in its French acronym (Coalition de la Société Civile pour le Monitoring Electoral, 2010b). The international community provided an overall positive evaluation, suggesting that any fraud that might have occurred would have been insufficient to change the outcome of the election. As such, the electoral process continued as planned. However, boycott of the subsequent elections by almost all opposition parties significantly altered the dynamics of party competition before the presidential and legislative balloting, and added an additional scope of violence—to coerce voters *not* to turn out.

That said, even though the municipal election was only to elect councils charged with local administration, there are several reasons that this election had important implications at the national level. Most importantly, the communal councils themselves elect the Senate, a key institution charged with overseeing the government and nominating the senior civil service¹⁸—making the composition of local councils particularly strategic and appealing for all competing national parties. As a Burundian analyst put bluntly, “Why would the CNDD-FDD need to win at the 2010 municipal elections? To win the 2010 senatorial

¹⁸Senators are elected by an electoral college composed of members of the municipal councils. Loi N1/ 22 du 18 septembre 2009 portant revision de la loi N1/015 du 20 avril 2005 portant Code Electoral (hereafter, *loi électorale*): Art.141

elections. The administration of the municipalities is essentially a machinery to implement central authority at the local level”¹⁹ (Nshimiye, 2010). Further, because the presidential and legislative elections were only a few weeks away, the national-level parties used the municipal elections as a test of strength before deciding alliances for the subsequent polls (MOE-UE, 2010; El Abdellaoui, 2010). Cultural anthropologist Lidewyde Berckmoes described this additional importance of municipal polling:

I was told time and again that pre-election voting polls would be of no use in predicting election outcomes in Burundi: only on the polling day would people show their true colors. Accordingly, the first of the five elections that were scheduled in 2010, despite the fact that they were only at the communal level, were predicted by many of my interlocutors to be the most important. They would reveal the hidden political identities, and thus what was also to be expected from the presidential elections. (Berckmoes, 2013)

As a consequence of these circumstances, the electoral campaign for municipal polling was all about national-level parties, of which seven had presidential candidates. In the words of political scientist Julien Nimubona, “The campaign was animated by the presidential candidates, and the message conveyed during the campaign was the message of the parties at the national level, not the message of the candidates at the municipal level; people voted for the presidents of the parties, not the presidents of the municipal councils.”²⁰ The Coalition de la Société Civile pour le Monitoring Électoral (COSOME, the largest non-governmental organization for local electoral monitoring) stated in its report that “the municipal election has been shadowed by the presidential election.

¹⁹Original: “A quoi sert-il au CNDD-FDD de triompher aux élections communales de 2010 ? A triompher aux élections sénatoriales de 2010. Les administrations communales restent essentiellement des relais et des rouages de raffermissement de l'autorité centrale au niveau local.”

²⁰Author’s interview, September 2010. See also Vandegiste (2011).

During the electoral campaign we saw first and foremost those who were presidential candidates, rather than the candidates for the municipal councilors.”²¹

Each municipality elects its own local council, so the municipal elections offer independent observations also suitable for statistical analysis. On the other hand—and this ensures consistency between the local and national analyses—the structure of incentives for political parties was the same at both the national and municipal levels: the parties’ national leadership coordinated the campaign strategy across districts, relying on a functioning party machine to implement strategy. Or, if the party was not sufficiently entrenched in a territory or hierarchically structured to enforce the national strategy, local party leaders faced the same political incentives as national leaders—to be elected, and to be rewarded by the national party. Further, the ethnic quotas that regulated access to Parliament and government positions applied to municipal councils as well, and no more than 67% of municipal administrators could be of the same ethnic group.

4.6 The Voting Process

In this section I describe in detail the voting procedure. As I explain in the theoretical framework, the strategy of employing pre-electoral threats and violence to mobilize the electorate does not strictly require that the vote not be secret. When a party threatens a community with violent retaliation should it not win, the party need not verify the voting behavior of individual voters—

²¹Original: “Le scrutin des communales a en outre été occulté par le scrutin présidentiel. Au cours de la campagne électorale, on a vu davantage ceux qui étaient candidats aux présidentielles, plutôt que les candidats conseillers communaux” (Coalition de la Société Civile pour le Monitoring Electoral, 2010a).

the overall outcome is enough. However it is likely that punishment will most strongly target opponents and free-riders. The compliance of the latter, and therefore the success of pre-electoral threats and violence, is affected by the *perceived* probability that they could be identified. As such, it is crucial to assess whether these conditions existed in Burundi. Indeed, there were several issues that made the 2010 polling not fully free of pressures. COSOME supervised the polling through the deployment of local observers in every polling station across the country, and summarizes the atmosphere as follows:

Regarding the influence of the vote, it was a predominant issue and it could have played a determinant role in the voting choice. Among the elements that influenced the vote, we can cite: the placement of the booths, the distribution of the electoral cards, the abuses of power by the poll clerks and the party representatives, the gifts, etc.²² (Coalition de la Société Civile pour le Monitoring Electoral, 2010b).

Intimidation is commonly considered part of a fraudulent voting process, since such activity alters the free expression of what would have been true political preferences. But, apart from ballot-box stuffing and vote-buying—which in Burundi is called “achat des consciences,” literally “buying of one’s conscience” and not just one’s vote—actual intimidations and violent acts also influenced voting behavior. In particular, here I explore the factors that could plausibly affect a voter’s perception that his or her vote choice may be known to political parties. These factors primarily concern how and where a vote was physically cast.

²²Original: “Quant à l’influence du vote, c’est un fait majeur et qui peut avoir joué un rôle déterminant dans le sens du vote. Parmi les éléments qui ont influencé le vote, nous pouvons citer : la disposition des isolements, la manière de distribuer les cartes d’électeurs, l’abus de pouvoir des membres des bureaux et des mandataires politiques, les dons, etc.”

First, there is the actual ballot. Unlike in most countries, where voters indicate their preference on one ballot, in the 2010 Burundi election voters used multiple ballots. Specifically, each voter was given one ballot for each party contesting the election; inside the ballot booth the voter was then supposed to place the ballot of the preferred party into a white envelope, and all other ballots into a black envelope. After placing these two envelopes into two different ballot boxes in front of the poll clerks, the voter's right index finger (or another finger if that one was not present) was marked with indelible ink. Figure 4.3a shows the two ballot boxes in a rural polling station.²³ For the presidential elections—where there was only one candidate—the voter was required to place the only ballot into the white or the black envelope. This procedure was also employed during the elections in 1993²⁴ and in 2005, and was criticized by some opposition parties who denounced that it could be employed instrumentally to violate the secrecy of the vote—voters could hide the unused ballots and then show them as a proof of their vote. To address this issue the members of the polling station were supposed to check that voters did not hide any ballot,²⁵ and the 2009 electoral code introduced penal sanctions for those who kept ballots after exiting the polling station (MOE-UE, 2010). Most importantly, in addition to counting the ballots placed into the white envelopes—that is, counting the votes for the given parties—the poll clerks were also supposed to count the ballots discarded

²³This photo was taken during the presidential election in June 2010. The ballot boxes were the same as in the municipal elections. The voting booths were positioned differently, however, so the voting booth in this picture does not reflect the general image of voting booths for the municipal election.

²⁴During the 1993 elections voters were given nine ballots for nine parties, but had to place only the one for the preferred party into the ballot box (Information retrieved from a campaign speech of presidential candidate Ndadaye in Buyenzi (Mairie de Bujumbura) on April 3, 1993 (Nahimana and Hatngimana, 2007).

²⁵Loi électorale, article 55.

in the black envelopes, in order to ensure consistency. However, according to the report issued by COSOME, which deployed local monitors in every polling station throughout the country, the ballots placed in the black envelopes were not counted systematically (Coalition de la Société Civile pour le Monitoring Electoral, 2010a).

Second, there are measures at the ballot booth. The placement of ballot booths inside the polling stations did not ensure the privacy of the voter in the act of placing the ballots into envelopes. This issue was noted by all electoral observation missions (Commission Episcopale Justice et Paix, 2010; Association Dushirehamwe, 2010; Coalition de la Société Civile pour le Monitoring Electoral, 2010b; Union Européenne, Mission d' Observation Electorale, 2010). In particular COSOME noted that the placement of the ballot booths was problematic in nearly 100% of polling stations (Coalition de la Société Civile pour le Monitoring Electoral, 2010b), and had to be corrected for the subsequent presidential, legislative, and village-level elections. Figure 4.3b shows that due to the orientation of the wooden structure of the booth, the people in the room might be able to see the behavior of the voter. While on the one hand the poll clerks could therefore check that voters did not hide the ballots to be placed in the black envelope—addressing the first point of concern—they could also potentially see the actual preferred ballots.

Most importantly, however, voter behavior was also visible also to the political parties' representatives, who were stationed nearby. This constitutes the third factor: the electoral code allowed political parties to nominate representatives to assist with all stages of the polling procedure, from the beginning to the vote-counting—a practice employed at least since the 1993 presidential elec-

Figure 4.3: Factors of concern in the secrecy of the vote

(a) The two ballot boxes. Credit: M. Travaglianti



(b) The placement of a ballot booth. Photo credit: AFP



(c) Members of the police voting outside a polling station after voting. Credit: M. Travaglianti



tions (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1993b). These representatives were not supposed to campaign or talk to voters, but rather to provide every political party with a way to observe polling. If any point of concern occurred such representatives could contest it and have it reported on the official minutes,²⁶ a copy of which would be signed and given to each party representative. Despite these good intentions, however, the mere presence of party representatives, and the fact that the polling booths were sometimes close to their seats (Commission Episcopale Justice et Paix, 2010), could easily have been perceived as a way to control voting behavior and therefore to influence voting.

As a further issue of concern, members of the police or the Army were also reported to bring weapons inside the polling station, and to hang around the station even after casting their votes—with the potential to intimidate voters waiting in line. Figure 4.3c shows a group of policemen outside the polling station where they were registered to vote. COSOME reported that in one out of ten polling stations the local monitors noted evident attempts to pressure and intimidate voters (Coalition de la Société Civile pour le Monitoring Electoral, 2010b).

Finally, proxy voting was observed in at least one-third of the polling stations. It usually regarded people voting on behalf of members of their own family. While such practice was allowed under article 49 of the electoral code for people who could not reach their polling station for professional or medical reasons, COSOME alleged that the practice was abused in certain cases (Coalition de la Société Civile pour le Monitoring Electoral, 2010a).

²⁶Loi électorale, article 42.

These factors affected the dual exclusive relationship between individual voters and politicians in the act of casting the ballot. However, the control of political parties went well beyond election day itself. Voters were constantly immersed in a dense, networked, controlled environment. According to Berckmoes (2013), parties often demanded public manifestation of membership, and “the prevalence of pervasive social control in the neighborhoods made political association rather exclusive.” The social context of a rural population also increased the ability to monitor political behavior: for rural voters who are embedded in their communities, their social and political histories are often known and their behavior is potentially discernible to their neighbors, to their family, and to party activists and strongmen employed by the parties (Stokes, 2005; Stokes et al., 2013). As evidence of this, Berckmoes (2013) reports that despite parties often demanding public manifestations of membership, sometimes youths tried to fake their preferences in order to be accepted by their community or to avoid retaliation. Furthermore, a large number of ex-combatants from the CNDD-FDD armed group were recruited by the intelligence service; some became full-time intelligence agents, but most worked as occasional informants (Human Rights Watch, 2009). During a post-election focus group led by the National Democratic Institute, a farmer from Bujumbura stated clearly that “..There were people in certain political parties, in particular the CNDD-FDD and the FNL, that were charged of identify who participated in this or that meeting”.²⁷ Not only did such an environment increase the perception that

²⁷Original: “Dans certains partis politiques, particulièrement le CNDD-FDD et le FNL, il y avait des gens chargés d’identifier les personnes qui avaient participé tel ou tel meeting.” (Levy, 2011)

voting choices were not fully secret, but it also increased the expected capability of retaliation by forces close to the violent parties. Opposition parties offered an official statement to this effect in the aftermath of the municipal elections:

What safety for a rural voter, who went to vote with the heart full of death threats, that he received by his ex-combatant neighbor who accompanied him until the polling station and observed him during the entire voting process? (ADC-Ikibiri, Alliance des Démocrates pour le Changement au Burundi, 2010)²⁸

Such factors therefore increased the effectiveness of intimidation and violence by making the threat of targeted violence more credible and compliance more desirable. Complying with the wishes of a party threatening *indiscriminate* retaliation in case of defeat would protect a supporter from violence only if other voters complied; however, the expectation that violent parties could keep track of individual supporters and defectors would ensure safety for a supporter in any case. And, of course, if more than one party resorted to intimidation, supporting the strongest would therefore increase the likelihood of being protected from violence.

The overall picture is therefore relatively clear. Due to the entrenchment of political parties (and former rebel groups) on the ground, and to certain potential flaws in voting procedure, it was highly credible to voters that violence could be employed in retaliation against those who did not comply with the wishes of violent political parties. The perceived ability of parties to infer voting behavior made free riding more costly, and increased the incentive for voters to comply in order to position themselves on the safe side. Adding to this was the

²⁸Original: “Quelle sécurité totale pour un électeur paysan, qui est venu au scrutin ayant à l’âme des menaces de mort qu’il a reçues de la part de son voisin démobilisé armé, et qui l’a accompagné jusqu’au lieu de vote, et qui l’observe durant toute l’opération jusqu’ l’isoloir ?”

fact that large parties could build upon a history of violence as an instrument of coercion for political and material support (as outlined in Chapter 3) and upon an existing effective structure of control and coercion. As such, Burundi offered very fertile terrain on which to implement a coercive electoral campaign.

On the other hand, the possibility of fraud during the vote and in the immediate aftermath was not very high. The widespread presence of international and local electoral monitors as well as of representatives from all major parties, and at all moments of the polling, confined opportunities for fraud—at the local level to ballot-stuffing or ballot-box replacement after the vote (a tactic that is very difficult to implement on a large scale), or at the Electoral Commission level to fabricating aggregate numbers (overall the most likely strategy). Further, if such activities were detected, the loss of legitimacy for the government—especially by the large community of international organizations and donors—would potentially be a higher cost than that of simply enforcing turnout and support. Therefore, while opportunities for fraud were certainly available, and may indeed have occurred to some extent, they would have to be put into place only *after* the polling, and so were riskier and potentially less effective than pre-electoral activities. As such, it is plausible to imagine that procedural fraud would not be considered an alternative method of influencing the outcome of the vote, but rather a complementary one: violence to manipulate *voters* and affect how they cast their vote, and (if necessary) fraud to manipulate *votes* that had already been cast.

4.7 Ethnic Appeals

Now that the electoral context and the incentives for pre-electoral violence are clear, I begin my empirical analysis by assessing in more detail the extent to which ethnicity was politically salient during the electoral campaign and whether party competition was nested within or spread across ethnic groups, which constitute two of my theory's scope conditions. I then look at the use of other electoral strategies to mobilize the population.

As I outlined in Section 4.3, political parties contesting the election in 2010 continued to be associated with ethnic groups. Qualitative data suggest that ethnicity was used to appeal to voters. Commentators stated that in 2010 the struggle for power had become a “political game, not anymore an ethnic game.” However, while this meant that the fiercest competition was observed between political parties, it need not imply that for the same group of voters the ethnic cleavage was superseded by the partisan one. While only one party made reference to the ethnic issue explicitly,²⁹ politicians did play the “ethnic card” in several ways. As in 1993 and 2005, the official electoral campaign—characterized by public rallies, meetings, and TV and radio interviews—was heavily accompanied by an unofficial campaign with the door-to-door activities and night-time meetings. The message and methods of these campaigns were radically different: when the former talked about programs and ideas, the latter was concerned mostly with the identity of party leaders and candidates, money (vote-buying), and intimidation. Certain candidates were employed in coethnic areas to rally their own ethnic constituency, and the composition of the top of the closed party lists reflected the ethnic composition of the municipality where

²⁹The FNL, during a public meeting.

the list was presented.³⁰

As a senior party leader told me, “In the US you focus on swing voters; in Burundi we campaign to consolidate our *strongholds*,”³¹ and the stronghold was associated with ethnicity. Even if Burundians are willing to move on from existing divisions as a reaction to inter-ethnic conflict, the memory of war and past history of exclusion and violence has left behind a legacy of fear, hate, and mistrust between the groups (as outlined in Chapter 3). This remains evident in private happenings, such as weddings, parties, and funerals, and was expressed clearly in a recurrent statement from several of my interviewees, that “the wounds are too deep; it is too early to forget the divisions”³²

Hutu also did not want to lose the security and access to power that they had acquired through a bloody war and long negotiations. As one of my interviewees described the Hutus, “They are not stupid: even if they don’t like the president, or disagree with his violent methods, they will not vote ... to give power back to the Tutsi. Right now, power has to stay among them.” Furthermore, the power-sharing provisions of the peace agreements³³ regulated access to power for both the minority and the majority, and parties were still seen as representative of their own ethnic group. It is true that the existence of ethnic quotas within

³⁰The ethnic composition of the top of party lists in the counties of the capital Bujumbura almost always reflected the ethnic composition of the electoral constituency—with the exception of the FNL party, whose lists (at least in the capital) were composed almost entirely of Hutu candidates. These are the lists submitted to the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) before the communal elections. Following the electoral protests and boycott, this information became sensitive and CENI was reluctant to grant access. As such, I could access the party lists for only a small subset of municipalities in the capital.

³¹Author’s interview, William Munyembabazi, CNDD general secretary, August 2010.

³²Interview with former women’s civil movement organizer, Tutsi, July 2009. This also emerged in interviews with party members, voters, and members of civil society organizations in July-August 2009, and June-September 2010. See also Berckmoes (2012).

³³Ethnic quotas, proportional representation, and ethnic balance in the most powerful institutional positions.

parties should ensure that parties are multi-ethnic and do not represent just one group. However, similarly to what I noted for the 2005 electoral period, parties are still viewed as representative of the largest ethnic group; non-coethnic members are often described as political accompanists who have “sold out” (*accompagnateurs politiques*), or as money-oriented candidates.

No pre-electoral coalition was in place before the municipal polling,³⁴ and no bargaining between leaders of the same ethnic groups had been successfully finalized. According to rumors within diplomatic circles and interviews with senior party leaders, opposition leaders whose parties were targeted by violence during the campaign were offered, unofficially, important institutional positions, including the vice-presidency. These offers were refused because of the opposition’s higher electoral expectation, or because such offers were perceived as a way to make the opposition dependent on the ruling party.³⁵

So, following the centripetal strategy of ensuring the votes of the strongholds, candidates and activists within the Hutu majority presented themselves during the numerous *informal* meetings as the most supportive of the Hutu group, thus engaging in a form of ethnic out-bidding. For instance, it was continuously pointed out that parties associated with the Hutu majority, in particular the incumbent CNDD-FDD, were in favor of coethnics in spite of the multi-ethnic composition of the party imposed by law.³⁶ However, contrary to the

³⁴As I outlined earlier, the municipal elections were a test of the parties’ strength before deciding alliances for the presidential and legislative elections in June and July (El Abdellaoui, 2010). An alliance was expected in the run-off of the presidential election, had it not been boycotted.

³⁵“We would have become the president’s employees; he could fire us at his convenience and we could not get anything done” (Interview, FNL and MSD senior members, August and September 2010.)

³⁶Author’s interview with campaign organizers of CNDD-FDD and MSD, and with FNL supporter, Bujumbura, July-September 2010

commonly-expected consequence of ethnic out-bidding, although political discourse moved often to the ethnic extremes, tensions and violence did not arise around ethnic differences but rather characterized partisan ones, mostly within the Hutu majority.

It is worth remembering that this strategy of ethnic rhetoric and intra-ethnic verbal and physical intimidation was also present in 2005—the first elections that took place after the conflict and the power-sharing peace agreements. Even though new actors entered the electoral context, and there was a fierce competition between political parties, ethnicity still played a great role both at the elite level and for voters and activists (Nimubona, 2009). Further, verbal and physical intimidations had also appeared in 2005, and like in 2010 tensions were observed between the CNDD-FDD and the Frodebu (majoritarian Hutu parties) and between Uprona, MRC, and Parena (Tutsi parties.) (Coalition de la Société Civile pour le Monitoring Electoral, 2005c)

4.8 Convincing *and* Coercing


In addition to ethnic appeals, economic transfers were also used—in the form of both individual goods (such as money, beer, and clothes) and club goods. In this section I address the relationship between these non-violent electoral strategies and the violent strategies discussed thus far. Existing literature often treats violent and non-violent strategies as either-or alternatives (Robinson and Torvik, 2009; Collier and Vicente, 2010a; Chaturvedi, 2005; Ellman and Wantchekon, 2000). This classification is based on the understanding that economic transfers provide voters with an incentive to vote, and violence with a deterrent. However, when violence is *also* an incentive to vote, what drives politicians to use

the stick or the carrot? Is violence an alternative, or an *additional* strategy?

Many observers noted that the CNDD-FDD, in its ambition to maintain power, employed *all* the means at its disposal to achieve this end—often including state resources and administrative power (CEJP, 2010). One of the local electoral monitors whom I surveyed in September 2010 stated, referring to the situation in the municipality of Gatara (Kayanza province), that the ruling party campaigned on the abolition of primary-school fees, but the “most important strategy that it employed was intimidation and gifts (money and beer).” However, were these resources employed together in the same constituency, or only separately on different targets? In order to address this question, I rely on first-hand information collected by the Conférence Episcopale Justice et Paix (CEJP), a religious organization created by the group of Burundian Bishops (Conférence des Evêques Catholiques du Burundi, CECAB) that engaged in programs to prevent violence and violation of human and civil rights before the 2010 elections, such as the organization of workshops and monitoring of polling. The CEJP documented a range of violations during the electoral period, including campaigning before the legally-authorized campaign period, assassinations, arbitrary arrests, verbal confrontations, fraud, restrictions on the right to free assembly, bribery, and hiring and firing based on political affiliation. The available data do not overlap with the period of the official campaign that I consider later for the subnational analysis of violence, but instead refer to the months between November 2009 and February 2010. Furthermore, incidents are reported for only a subset of the Burundian municipalities (56 out of 129), and it is not possible to infer from the available reports whether the remaining municipalities did not experience any illicit campaign practices or were simply not covered by

CEJP informants. Therefore, results are intended to be taken as only suggestive of existing patterns.


Figure 4.4: State-sponsored violent and non-violent violations between November 2009 and February 2010.



As Figure 4.4 shows, in the sample of municipalities where at least one illegal incident was reported by CEJP monitors, the incumbent engaged in *both* violent and non-violent behavior. The non-violent incidents documented here are illegal political meetings, fraud (for instance, attempts to provide identity cards to underage people, or to condition the provision of jobs to membership in the ruling party), gifts, abuses of power, and abuses of state resources for campaign purposes. Violent incidents are instead threats, public quarrels, intimidation, group clashes, disruption of meetings, arbitrary arrests, and killings. Abuses of power and non-violent violations appear to be more numerous than verbal and physical acts of violence. However, the latter are not concentrated in localities that were peaceful—almost all incidents of violence occurred in municipalities that *also* experienced non-violent illegal strategies. Figure 4.5 shows

this pattern clearly: even though half of the municipalities where the incumbent implemented non-violent strategies were not touched by any form of violence, when violence did occur it took place predominately in those municipalities that were already targeted with non-violent illegal methods. While the limitations of the data do not allow distinguishing between the specific actors targeted by these electoral violations, and the data are by no mean exhaustive, these results are nevertheless suggestive of an electoral strategy according to which parties resort to violence *in addition* to employing other non-violent strategies, perhaps when the latter are not sufficient.

Figure 4.5: Number of municipalities divided according to occurrence of violent and non-violent illegal incidents



4.9 Coercion

Moving to violent behavior, this section elaborates on the goals pursued by violent methods during the period that preceded the election. In brief, violence was clearly used as an electoral tool—namely, it was a cost attached to a ballot cast “wrongly,” a way to signal voters and challengers of a party’s armed

strength, and a method to prevent threats to the complete control of an ethnic group. In fact, verbal violence was common in the informal campaign, which aimed “to intimidate, not to convince,” as a senior party member defined it for me.³⁷ Opposition supporters were clearly pressured and intimidated to join the ruling party (International Crisis Group, 2010).

There are several sources of evidence of such coercive strategy aimed at mobilizing voters (rather than at demobilizing them). Among the most compelling cases, Human Rights Watch researchers reported that ruling party members went door-to-door at night warning opposition supporters that they would be killed or chased away if the CNDD-FDD did not win the elections.³⁸ One of the local electoral monitors I surveyed in September 2010 stated that, during the informal campaign, the CNDD-FDD and FNL told the population that if they did not obtain a satisfactory number of votes the 1993 civil war would start again.³⁹ Another informant stated that while political parties publicly followed a peaceful platform, during the informal campaign they intimidated the population with the threat that if they were not elected it would mark a return to rebellion.⁴⁰ Most explicitly, parties “told the population that as soon as they are not elected, they will cut off their heads”⁴¹ (Electoral observer, Kayanza province.)

It should be noted that parties threatened violence both if individual voters

³⁷Author’s interview with an FNL senior member, August 2010.

³⁸Human Rights Watch (2010a)

³⁹Original: “le CNDD - FDD et le FNL disaient dans des activités informelles que si on ne leur donne pas des voix satisfaisantes que la guerre de 1993 va reprendre que la population va regagner le Kibira” [the forest where rebels used to hide during the civil war].

⁴⁰Original: “Ils disaient d’une part la même chose mais dans la campagne informelles, ils exagéraient en intimidant la population que si une fois ne sont pas élus, ils vont retourner dans la rebellion.” (Observer, Kayanza province)

⁴¹Original: Il y en a ceux qui disaient à la population que quand ils ne seront pas élus, ils leur couperont des têtes donc les tuer.

did not comply and if the community as a whole did not show electoral support. As I described in Section 4.6, a number of factors created in voters the perception that the political parties could infer voters' choices, from social control to direct observation during election day.

In addition to direct threats by party candidates and activists, slogans and songs chanted by jogging youth groups were also characterized by a hostile cadence and serious threats to those who supported opposition parties: "If you don't vote well it will get hot,"⁴² "We will tie you up and shoot you."⁴³ Even more directly, a song by the CNDD-FDD said, "Don't mess with us. You will burn in fire as soon as you do. The CNDD-FDD is a political party that nobody can defeat."⁴⁴

Maintaining a practice common during the previous elections as well as the civil war, almost all relevant parties had a youth wing, and tended to justify such activities as a retaliation instrument against other parties' intimidation, to show the population that the party could fight back and protect the loyal population. In the words of the president of one party's youth wing, the group's primary objective was to "protect the party" (in this case, the Frodebu) by acting as a "deterrent" against the intimidation efforts of the ruling party's youth, the Imbonerakure.⁴⁵ Similarly, the FNL deployed their youth in their own neighborhoods "to ensure the security of their members" (HRW, 2011).⁴⁶ Even the

⁴²Interview with UPD senior leader, and other opposition members and supporters, Bujumbura, August-September 2010, and Bruxelles, August 2011.

⁴³CNDD-FDD youth group chant, cited in Human Rights Watch report, May 2010.

⁴⁴Original working in French translation by author's research assistants: "Qu'on y touche pas, c'est impossible (c'est impossible), qu'on y touche pas (qu'on y touche pas), c'est impossible (c'est impossible), qu'on y touche pas.....S'ils touchent, ils se font brûler par le feu incessamment, CNDD FDD est un parti politique dont personne ne peut dfer."

⁴⁵Diplomatic conversation reported in US cables (Embassy Bujumbura, 2009a).

⁴⁶Interview with FNL supporter in 2009, carried out by Human Rights Watch researchers.


Uprona created groups of youths that engaged in surveillance against the incumbent's Imbonerakure, as early as in 2009. The MSD party also employed youths and ex-combatants to retaliate. As one of my informant commented, "They [the CNDD-FDD] attacked us constantly. What were we supposed to do, just get beaten and stare at them?" On the other side, an informant close to the Imbonerakure explained me that the organization was deployed in the districts of Bujumbura Rural (where the FNL opposition was strong) to fight back against the opposition's youth wing and show that the ruling party was strong enough to retaliate and reestablish stability.⁴⁷ This low-level violence was therefore employed as a show of strength in the twofold attempt to scare challengers and to assure the party's own supporters that it was the actor most able to provide security. These testimonies provide sound evidence of the strategy outlined in my theory according to which political parties wished to appear strong in order to either make a threat or protect the constituency who would express electoral support.

How common were these acts of violence? Figure 4.6 below shows the frequency of such violent incidents, and the pattern of state-sponsored violence in particular (in Figure 4.6b). The data show that violence took several forms: from group verbal and physical clashes (generally among party activists) to beatings, arrests, and killings.


⁴⁷personal conversations, August 2010, December 2011.

Figure 4.6: Targets of pre-electoral violence by incumbent party

(a) All incidents of violence



(b) State-sponsored violence



Such a broad variety of violence might initially lead one to think that these acts were not correlated or driven by the same logic, but a look at the targets clarifies why violence was employed by politicians, and that these acts were indeed driven by a consistent strategy. The graphs in Figure 4.7 are created


⁴⁸Accessed at <http://burundi.ushahidi.com/>.

violence intensified before election day and disappeared after the polling, suggesting that these violent events were associated with the electoral context in a deliberate and organized fashion. The graphs also show that violence was “selective” and targeted specific political actors (candidates and party activists) but not the masses; this finding is key, as it shows that violence in Burundi was not a form of terrorism aimed at scaring people, or at priming ethnic identities like the riot-system observed in other societies (e.g., Wilkinson (2004)). By targeting national and local *party candidates*, such violence was clearly aimed at demobilizing the opposition leadership, following the logic outlined in Section 2.3. Furthermore, efforts to demobilize opposition parties began well before the official 2010 campaign with the harassment and imprisonment of national opposition leaders. Hussein Radjabu, previously an ally of the government who later became the leader of a potentially-dangerous splinter of the ruling party, was arrested and condemned to 13 years of imprisonment in the hope that his newly-formed party could not develop—hence reducing party divisions within the Hutu group. Similarly, MSD leader Alexis Sinduije, an outspoken opponent of the ruling party, was arrested in 2008 and again briefly during the 2010 campaign, and the government registered his party only in June 2009 after more than a year of delays—“out of fear that Sinduhije will use his influence effectively against the ruling party in the upcoming elections,” according to a diplomatic cable (Embassy Bujumbura, 2009b).

By targeting *party activists*, violence was also aimed at demobilizing opposition activities and creating a climate of fear for voters. Political activists were harassed and even killed for not joining the CNDD-FDD party; as an example, some families in Cibitoke province went into hiding in fear of punishment for

their partisan membership (Ligue des droits de la personne dans la région des Grands Lacs, 2009). In the words of an international human-rights protection officer, “Continuing arrests and violence on opposition local candidates and activists had the scope and the effect of discouraging both local candidates from running and supporters from backing their candidates.”⁴⁹


Figure 4.7: Temporal sequence of violent events. (Municipal elections were held on May 24th)



Most specifically, violence against the strongest challenger was not only more frequent, but also most intense. During the final four weeks before the municipal elections, members of weaker parties such as the Frodebu were verbally harassed, while members of the stronger FNL were threatened, beaten, and even killed, consistent with the predictions outlined in Section 4.5 and Section 2.5 of the theory. In general, verbal harassment and intimidation were

⁴⁹UNHRC officer, personal communication, July, 2010.

Figure 4.8: Targets of pre-electoral violence by incumbent party



methods for voicing a warning to the community of non-committed supporters. However, this low-level violence was also employed as a show of strength in the twofold attempt to scare challengers and to assure the party's own supporters that it was the actor most able to provide security.

In contrast, most significantly violent incidents were undoubtedly aimed at discouraging the targeted voters or the support base of a party from supporting a challenger. The testimony of a supporter of the FNL, collected by researchers

from Human Rights Watch in 2010, is very indicative of this: “I was coming from an FNL meeting. I came across five people in the road with CNDD-FDD clothing. They started to hurl insults and told me to quit the FNL” (Watch, 2011). Observers from the CEJP, the largest religious organization actively involved in monitoring the elections, reported the rumor that in some of the capital’s northern neighborhoods the incumbent party was distributing weapons to kill opponents (CEJP, 2010). But, this form of intimidation was not the prerogative of only the incumbent party—in an instance of violence between the UPD and FNL, the former in fact accused the latter of hiding weapons “to kill anyone who did not support FNL” (Amatora Mu Mahoro incident report).

And, if severe violence was used against *opposition* members to compel them not to support a challenger, such violence was even stronger against *defectors*. This strategy is at the intersection of the “persuasion” and “punishment” that I discuss as part of my theory. Targeting defectors aims to reduce the number of actual defectors (by killing them or by persuading them to desist) as well as to reduce the number of *potential* defectors by sending a clear warning. Such a punishment strategy began well before the official campaign. For instance, a former CNDD-FDD member who switched to support the UPD party—a splinter of the CNDD-FDD—was killed shortly after he opened the new municipal UPD headquarters in January 2010. What’s more, he was killed just outside his home, so that everyone could see it. Other former supporters who left the ruling party to support a new splinter group or an existing challenger were often harassed, threatened, or beaten (HRW, 2011; CEJP, 2010). Violence against such splinter groups was thus particularly strong, as both a punishment and a warning to others who might follow the initial defectors. A senior FNL mem-

ber, speaking to me informally in 2011, summarized his view of the incumbent's strategy very clearly: "The CNDD-FDD is targeting, in essence, three actors: the big enemy—that is us [the FNL]—and the former friends—that is the UPD, and the MSD."⁵⁰

What relationship did this coercive violence have with ethnicity? Violence against non-coethnics constituted only 8% of the total incidents initiated by the incumbent party, even if municipalities were ethnically mixed. The largest share of this inter-ethnic violence was against the MSD party, which was a fierce critic of the ruling party but also often considered the largest challenger to the Uprona party in the competition for the Tutsi constituency. As outlined earlier, the MSD leader was of Tutsi ethnic origins, and the party was allegedly supported by demobilized soldiers of the former (Tutsi) Burundian Army (Forces Armées Burundaises, FAB).⁵¹ However, due to the constitutional requirement of ethnic quotas for candidates *within* the parties, both the Uprona and MSD included candidates of Hutu ethnic origins. At the local level, Hutu candidates or supporters were sometimes brought to informal party meetings in predominantly Hutu constituencies, because as one of my informants from the MSD explained to me, "that was a way to have people trust us and listen to us more."⁵²

Cases of defection from the ruling party (or more generally from the Hutu ethnic group) to the MSD were therefore not rare. Some occurred purely because of ideological preferences and the perception that the MSD was a source of change compared to the old parties, including the CNDD-FDD. Others defec-

⁵⁰ Author's personal communication, Bruxelles 2011.

⁵¹ See Berwouts (2012). Also author's interview with a journalist and with an Army general (Bujumbura, September 2010).

⁵² Author's interview, Bujumbura, August-September 2010.

tions may have been for more strategic reasons—Hutu candidates had incentives to move to Tutsi parties, since a position near the top of a closed party list in a Tutsi party might have been more appealing than a lower position in the list of a Hutu party. For the same reason, Tutsi moved to the CNDD-FDD, allowing the latter to fill the positions reserved for Tutsi with ethnic members of its own party. These defections threatened the monopoly of the Hutu incumbent over its constituency and therefore necessitated punishments, which both demobilized the leadership and sent a strong warning to the population in a visible fashion—such as the grenade thrown into the house of a former CNDD-FDD supporter in Burundi’s northeastern Cankuzo province the day he attended the opening of the provincial MSD office.⁵³ Other forms of public intimidation were targeted at properties: party offices were vandalized, and unknown assailants even dumped feces into an MSD headquarters in Gitega province.⁵⁴ Other than aiming at demobilizing the MSD party, these actions constituted a punishment as well against the MSD leader, due to his political sympathies for the CNDD-FDD during the 2005 electoral campaign that turned into harsh criticism afterwards, as discussed in Section 4.3.

It is worth noting that acts of violence against the other two Tutsi parties—Uprona and MRC—were much more limited in both number and nature. Activists of the Uprona and the MRC were mostly reported to quarrel with those of the CNDD-FDD, and this violence never reached the level perpetrated by the incumbent when the latter confronted the activists of other opposition parties. This is clearly visible in Figure 4.9: even accounting for violence against the MSD, violence was apparently most intense when the target was from the

⁵³Watch (2011).

⁵⁴Watch (2011).

Hutu ethnicity of the incumbent. In particular, the intensity of violence perpetrated against the Uprona and MRC parties was similar to that against the two other smaller Hutu parties, the CNDD and Frodebu. What these parties had in common was a lower willingness, and capability, to retaliate. As outlined in Section 4.3, the Frodebu party had only limited control of the Army, and voters tended not to support a party that was unable to provide security against the retaliation of a powerful loser.⁵⁵ These parties were also aware that they would never have reached the votes required to take the presidency. So, in the case of the small Hutu parties, violence was minimal both because the electoral threat to the incumbent was low and because the threat of violence to the opposition was sufficient.

The two Tutsi parties, Uprona and MRC, were not likely to pose an electoral threat to the incumbent either, but for the opposite reason: they mobilized a different electorate than the incumbent's support base. Defectors to these Tutsi parties were negligible, and the Uprona and MRC support bases would have not been swayed away to CNDD-FDD. Their votes, in essence, could be neither bought nor coerced. Uprona allegedly gave up any hope for the presidency and focused instead on competing with the other Tutsi parties—the MRC and MSD—since the strongest Tutsi party would obtain key government positions assigned to the Tutsi by virtue of ethnic quotas. Indeed there is evidence of low-level violence—mostly public quarrels between activists and youths—taking place among Uprona, MRC, and MSD members.

⁵⁵ Author's interviews, August 2009, August 2010.


4.10 Conclusions

This chapter begins the empirical assessment of my theory's key points. I test here the expectation that political parties would employ violence against coethnic voters to mobilize their electoral support out of fear. My analysis relies on a combination of qualitative information from original primary and secondary sources, and on data regarding violent incidents that occurred during the weeks preceding election day in 2010. I show that during the electoral campaign political parties focused on their ethnic strongholds with both peaceful and violent means: while they presented themselves as the best representative of the given ethnic group (i.e., they engaged in ethnic outbidding), they also worked to intimidate voters and demobilize opposition candidates within the same ethnic group.


Violence was directed predominately against voters and candidates of the same ethnic group as the incumbent, but non-coethnic parties were targeted as well when their presence posed a threat. I provide considerable empirical evidence for the various strategies theorized in Chapter 2 that underpinned the use of violence by the incumbent: to signal strength and ability to protect supporters, to punish defectors and warn potential defectors, and to coerce opponents. Disentangling these different strategies offers an understanding of how violence can be used for multiple purposes at the same time—and, as such, how violence can take place both between *and* within ethnic groups.

Figure 4.9: Nature of pre-electoral violence perpetrated by incumbent party


(a) All parties



(b) When Hutu parties are targeted



(c) When Tutsi parties are targeted



Chapter 5

The Electoral Logic of Violence across Municipalities

Qu'on y touche pas. S'ils touchent, ils se font brûler par le feu incessamment.

(Don't mess with us. You will burn in fire as soon as you do.)

(Ruling party's campaign song, Burundi, 2010)

5.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the violence that occurred in the weeks preceding the municipal election in 2010. Verbal intimidation was widespread in private meetings throughout the 129 municipalities, but not all were touched by public threats and physical violence (Figure 5.1a). According to my theory and building upon the initial evidence provided in Chapter 4, we would expect violence to escalate in the presence of intra-ethnic party competition—in particular when

a party is near to winning and the opposition is compact and able to fight back. This chapter elaborates on these expectations, and provides considerable evidence on the relationship between violence and intra-ethnic party competition, large ethnic-group size, and proximity to the winning threshold. Overall, the analysis here leaves little doubt that pre-electoral violence was a strategy employed by strong parties to compel the vote of coethnics through signaling the ability and willingness to enforce the highest control.

Building upon original data collected in the field between 2009 and 2010, I examine the determinants of subnational territorial variation in violence. I rely on an original dataset of quantitative sub-national data—which includes violent events, electoral and socioeconomic factors, public policies, and the armed presence of political parties—to show that the escalation of pre-electoral violence in each administrative district can be explained by that district’s ethnic composition and intra-ethnic political fragmentation. In order to shed light on the electoral motivations that drive a party to employ violence, I begin by investigating the nature and distribution of violent events perpetrated by the incumbent CNDD-FDD party, which initiated the majority of incidents in the weeks and months preceding the polling, and which possessed the resources to implement both a violent and a non-violent electoral campaign. Most electoral violence around the world is indeed perpetrated by incumbent governments (Hafner-Burton et al., 2012), or more generally sponsored by state forces such as militias and police (Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta, 2010). Accordingly, the findings in this chapter have implications for other countries as well.

I show first that state-sponsored violence preceding the 2010 Burundi elections was strategically limited to uncertain seats: the ruling party was most

violent in districts where it expected to win or to lose by only a small margin (rather than to win handily or lose massively). Second, violence escalated in places where the opposition also initiated violence. In these districts violence was directed predominately against voters and candidates of the same ethnic group as the incumbent CNDD-FDD, a finding that complements the evidence in Chapter 4 that violence was used to signal strength and the ability to protect supporters, to punish defectors and warn potential defectors, and to coerce opponents from the same ethnic constituency. Digging deeply into the data, I then provide further evidence for the hypothesis that greater party fragmentation of the *coethnic opposition* produces less violence—not because small opposition parties are crucial sources of electoral support, but rather because such small opposition parties may be easily demobilized or coerced, offering little retaliation.

I then move to analyze the determinants of the escalation of all violence across municipalities. If one party inflicts further violence when opponents do the same—consistent with the logic of “violent outbidding” outlined in my theory—then it is necessary to test under which electoral conditions party competition turns most violent. I do this by analyzing the determinants of all violent events taking place in the municipalities during the weeks preceding election day. I find that the number of violent events in a municipality is greatest when the majority ethnic group is larger and with an asymmetric party structure—that is, where the margin of victory between the first and second party within the ethnic group is large, and the opposition to the winning party is not highly fragmented, a condition in which at least one of the parties is close to the winning threshold (discussed in Section 4.4.) These findings are consistent with the

hypotheses proposed in my theory.

In order to dig deeply into the mechanism that explains the use of violence during electoral competition, I also consider an additional specifications, which disaggregates further the nature of the violent events. Namely, I create an intensity coding for violence based on the *nature* of the event, rather than on the number of incidents. Results show that intra-ethnic party competition within the majority affects not the occurrence of violence, but rather its escalation—both in number and in nature. Results are robust to a battery of robustness checks that address various forms of spatial correlation among the observations and use different estimation models.

Finally, I elaborate on the relationship between violent and non-violent electoral strategies that I first explored in Chapter 4. I previously suggested that violence was employed in districts where the party thought it was unable to win the confidence of the constituency through only non-violent strategies—a feature that I captured by looking at both the abuse of power and bribes. I now exploit the territorial variation in the provision of public goods across municipalities—namely, the construction of new schools following the much-advertised policy of abolishing primary-school fees—to back up this claim. I find that the incumbent CNDD-FDD employed violence in municipalities where voters from the same ethnic constituency were expected not to support the party—in essence as a last-resort option, used to coerce voters when other forms of persuasion were not expected to suffice.

5.2 The Data

5.2.1 Electoral Violence

I measure electoral violence by relying on the data collected by the project “Amatora Mu Mahoro,” which recorded *verified* occurrences of election-violence incidents in all of Burundi’s 129 municipalities. Amatora Mu Mahoro is a project established by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the Civil Society Coalition for Election Monitoring (Coalition de la Société Civile pour le Monitoring Electorale, COSOME), the Quaker Peace Network – Burundi (QPN), the Episcopal Commission for Justice and Peace (Commission Episcopale Justice et Paix, CEJP) and Oxfam Novib, with the support of USAID. Instead of opening the platform to the public (as was the case with project Ushahidi in Kenya), Amatora mu Mahoro limited participation to a group of more than 400 trained election monitors stationed throughout the country and supervised by 34 provincial supervisors based in all 17 provinces. These monitors were instructed to follow a rigorous protocol to ensure consistency in the identification and the verification of violent incidents. Incidents were considered verified only after monitors could triangulate the facts with at least two sources, of which one was not a media source—acceptable sources were victims, eyewitnesses, hospital employees or hospital reports, police members or police reports, and media. Moreover, rather than publishing reports immediately, the project’s staff called the monitors to ask for more information about each incident before posting it to the website, and monitors completed a questionnaire for every violent event that they signaled, in addition to a situation report on

the general conditions of the municipality.¹

For the purpose of Amatora Mu Mahoro, Electoral violence was defined as “every act of violence or threat of violence against people or goods (physical, moral, psychological, or economic) perpetrated for electoral purposes.”² (Amatora mu Mahoro, 2010a). Such a definition therefore included threats of violence, destruction of property, group physical clashes, and killings in each municipal district between the official start of the campaign and the day before municipal elections (a period of four weeks). Violence on election day itself is coded separately, and not included in this study. Violence that was not strictly related to political activities—such as land conflict or robberies—is also not included, and monitors were trained to distinguish various other forms of violence from strictly political violence. (Amatora mu Mahoro, 2010a) Likewise, riots are excluded unless a political link was established.


Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of the violent incidents recorded by the Amatora mu Mahoro project during the four weeks preceding the municipal election. There is good geographic variation across the 129 municipalities, and the intensity of violence does not appear to be territorially clustered. In these data the number of violent events in a municipality ranges from zero to seven. A maximum of only seven violent incidents in a municipality is admittedly not a large number, and one might object that such small differences are not meaningful, and perhaps driven by random events—especially when these numbers bring together incidents of various natures, such as killings and verbal clashes. However, I argue that these numbers are indicators of a general pattern in

¹See Amatora mu Mahoro (2010b,a,c).


²Original: “Tout acte de violence ou toute menace de violence contre une personne ou un bien (physique, morale, psychologique ou économique) perpétré à des fins électorales.

Figure 5.1: Distribution of violent events before the 2010 municipal elections (four weeks before)

(a) Territorial distribution of violent incidents across municipalities



(b) Distribution of violent incidents across municipalities



the geographic distribution of violence. As I outlined earlier, in Burundi informal political mobilization activities started long before the beginning of the official campaign. This took the form of illegal rallies (mostly by the ruling CNDD-FDD), grassroots meetings, and door-to-door canvassing, but also of intimidatory jogging groups, deployment of youth militias, and the intimidation, jailing, or torture of candidates and activists—all events that were deliberately planned or at least driven by contentious political competition.³ As such, if political competition between parties was contentious in the period preceding the official four-week campaign, then it is very unlikely that violence would drop immediately afterwards; if anything, violence would increase. Similarly,

³See, among others, Human Rights Watch (2009); Commission Episcopale Justice et Paix (2009).

if a locality experienced no violence before the start of the electoral campaign, it is unlikely that violence would erupt with no reason. Further, even though information on past political violence is unfortunately not as fine-grained and rigorously collected as the data provided by Amatora mu Mahoro for the four weeks of the official campaign, the places where violence was reported in the past—either before the official campaign, or during the 2005 campaign—show corresponding high levels of violence during the 2010 campaign.

As a second way to address this potential caveat, I create an intensity coding of pre-election violence based on the *nature* of the incidents, rather than on their number. In other words, I create an ordinal variable that ranges from 1 to 9 where lower values correspond to intimidation and threats, and higher values to physical attacks and killings. Intermediate values are group clashes and attempted attacks against both people and properties. This coding is based on the information provided by the Amahora mu Matoro project. The resulting dependent variable therefore has more than two categories, and the values of each category have a meaningful sequential order where a value is “higher” than the previous one, even though the distance between one category and the following is not the same between all pairs of categories. Both specifications are employed for the empirical analysis.

Finally, I exploit the fine-grained nature of the data collected by Amahoro Mu Matoro—where the specific political party is noted when the violent event is initiated by a party leader or supporter⁴—to focus on only state-sponsored violence. The definition of “state-sponsored violence” here includes incidents initiated by forces associated with the state—party activists or candidates, and mili-

⁴For events initiated by administrative officers, voters, or criminals, the identity of the initiator is not indicated.

tias or strongmen (such as the youth wing of the CNDD-FDD or ex-combatants associated with the CNDD-FDD armed group). I follow Hafner-Burton et al. (2012) in also including the police among this group. Police forces are usually controlled by the state, and in the specific context of Burundi were predominantly composed of ex-combatants of the CNDD-FDD (Samii, 2010). By this definition, state-sponsored violence constituted up to four-fifths of the overall cases of violence where an initiator was reported.

5.2.2 Other variables

In this Chapter I estimate whether violence targeted coethnics or non-coethnics, and if it was driven by political fragmentation within the ethnic groups. To do this, I employ a variety of independent variables. As an indicator of party competition, I rely on the classical measure of “effective number of parties” for the previous election year, 2005 (ENPV). The computation of the effective number of parties is based on the formula introduced by Laakso and Taagepera (1979), which weights the count according to the party’s relative strength.⁵ This variable is computed using the 2005 municipal elections results, since the parties’ vote shares in 2010 may be endogenous to violence. However, because in 2010 there were parties that did not participate in 2005,⁶ electoral results from 2005 may not be indicative of the full context and conditions that preceded the 2010 elections. To address this potential caveat, in Appendix A I analyze whether the composition of the opposition to the incumbent in 2005 can predict the composition of the opposition to the same party in 2010, and I show that

⁵The value is computed as $1/\sum v_i^2$, where v_i is the vote share of each party i . Such a measure weights parties with a higher vote share more heavily than parties with a lower vote share, and so provides a better measure of actual party competition.

⁶Specifically, the FNL, UPD and MSD

the 2005 election results properly capture the partisan cleavages in 2010.

I also compute the ENPV for each ethnic group, following the same procedure as before but computing the vote shares for each party as relative to the votes received only by parties coded from the same ethnic group. Political parties in Burundi are coded as ethnic based on the ethnic appeals they made, and on the ethnic group from which their support bases were predominantly composed. This definition is consistent with the definition and coding proposed by Chandra (2009, 2011b).⁷ In order to define which ethnic group a party represented, I rely on both primary and secondary sources.⁸ I also compute the effective number of parties of the opposition only (both of all parties and of Hutu parties) to capture the political fragmentation of the opposition to the incumbent CNDD-FDD. In order to measure political divisions differently, I also compute the fractionalization index (FI) (Rae and Taylor, 1970), which measures the probability that a randomly selected pair of individuals in a municipality will belong to different political parties. The fractionalization indices are computed both for all parties and for only those considered representative of the same ethnic group.⁹

I include indicators for average wealth of the municipality, urban or rural environment, and the party's access to arms or strongmen. These factors might

⁷It should be noted that according to Chandra (2009) a political party is coded as ethnic by campaign appeals if the ethnic appeals it makes are open and central to the campaign message. As I have outlined earlier, Burundian political parties did not make ethnic appeals openly, but their discourse in private gatherings—which constituted the bulk of the campaign—was heavily ethnic. Therefore, by Chandra's definition, Burundian political parties were ethnic by both campaign appeals and support base.

⁸For 1993 elections, see Sinunguriza (*les lections au Burundi*: 67, also 84-85). For 2005, I follow Uvin (2009) and Watt (2008): 82. For 2010, I follow Vandegiste (2011), media and NGO reports, and personal communications with politicians and civil society between June and September 2010.

⁹The fractionalization index is equal to $1 - \sum v_i^2$.

have influenced where parties employed violence, but also previous electoral results; so, their inclusion is important in order to prevent omitted variable bias.

Estimates about the size of the Burundian *ethnic groups* are usually based on colonial studies. In the absence of a more recent ethnic census, in order to measure the size of Hutu and Tutsi populations in each municipality I rely on the vote share obtained by the parties associated with the specific ethnic group (and whose support base was strongly associated with that group) in the legislative election of 1993—this was the first election open to multi-partitism, and ethnicity was highly mobilized.¹⁰ Even if the vote in 1993 was not split perfectly between the two ethnic groups because the regional origins of candidates played a role, there can be little doubt that the majority of Hutu voted for the Frodebu and the majority of Tutsi for the Uprona.¹¹ This is not a perfect proxy, because it does not account for any change in the population that might have occurred during and after the war. However, by 2010 most of the displaced people had returned to their pre-1993 homes, and most of the remaining internally-displaced Burundians live in camps located close to their previously-owned land, so the proportion of the ethnic composition of the municipalities before and after the

¹⁰The main party associated with the Hutu majority was the Frodebu, while the Uprona was the corresponding party for Tutsi. Other smaller parties have also been coded—see for example Sinunguriza [les élections au Burundi: 67, also 84-85] “à propement parler, ce vote [scrutin présidentiel] avait une connotation ethnique évidente, comme on peut le voir au résultat. Dans les localités où il y avait une forte concentration ethnique tutsi, Buyoya a eu beaucoup des voix. Dans les localités où il y avait une forte concentration ethnique hutu, c’est Ndadaye qui a obtenu plus de suffrages.” Similar opinions were expressed regarding the same parties for 2005 (Uvin, 2009: 40; Watt : 82). I use the percentage vote share obtained by the Tutsi parties as opposed by that obtained by the Hutu parties because in one of the 17 provinces (Cankuzo) the Frodebu party, which was associated with the Hutu, was barred from participating in the elections—hence the percentages would not necessarily mirror the electoral support.

¹¹Lemarchand (1994:183). Interviews in 2009 and 2010.

war is likely comparable. A more detailed discussion of this variable is presented in the robustness checks section. Based on these proxies, I also compute the ethnic fractionalization index (EF) at the municipality level, by using the classical formula of $1 - \sum s_i^2$, where s is the share of the population that is Hutu or Tutsi (according to the definition above) and i is the ethnic group, Hutu or Tutsi.

The *average wealth* of the municipalities is computed as the average value of the well-being of the household located in the given municipality according to the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) carried out in 2010. It is a continuous variable ranging between 1 and 5, computed by averaging at the municipality level the values of the DHS wealth index for each surveyed household.

The average *literacy level* of the municipality is computed as the average value of the highest educational level obtained by the heads of the households in the given municipality. As with wealth, literacy is also based on the DHS, and is a continuous variable ranging between 1 and 5 computed by averaging the values of the DHS education level of each surveyed household.

In order to account for the parties' capabilities to produce (or threaten) violence, I exploit the geographical localization of *demobilized ex-combatants*, recorded at the municipal level by the Burundi National Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) Commission.¹² Those are people who joined the armed groups during the war and entered the DDR program following the end of the war and the demobilization of the group itself. They are listed by

¹²I was granted access to these data from the DDR Commission through the Fragile States, Conflict & Social Development Unit of the World Bank. I am grateful to Cyrus Samii and Leanne Bayer for their help in obtaining these data.

the identity of the armed group of which they were part. While arms are still available and widespread within the country,¹³ suppliers of violence may not be as easily available, so ex-combatants—usually young and without a stable job—provide a potential source of trained and loyal thugs. Furthermore (and as I illustrated in Chapter 3), the use of youth gangs to carry out intimidation and violence constitutes a pattern in Burundi dating at least from the 1993 elections, during both the electoral periods and the civil war. It also emerged from several conversations in the field that ex-combatants were perceived to bring violence, and the demobilized CNDD-FDD soldiers were also employed for social surveillance. In order to account for the size of the population in the municipality, I use the number of ex-combatants per every 100 inhabitants. I further disaggregate this number by the former armed groups with which the demobilized soldiers were affiliated.

I also include a binary indicator of whether the municipality is *urban* or *rural*, based on the sampling strategy adopted for the 2005 nationwide survey *Enquête par Grappe Indicateur Multiple* (MISC3), carried out by the statistical office of Burundi (ISTEEBU) and UNICEF. In this study, 16 municipalities out of 129 are considered urban (13 constitute the capital province of Bujumbura, and the remaining three are the towns of Gitega, Ngozi, and Rumonge). This indicator accounts for the possibility that party competition might pick up the effect of the urban-rural cleavage, an issue particularly relevant given that urban voters tend not to support the incumbent, for example because the latter implements policies that benefit rural more than urban areas (Harding, 2012). This concern is appropriate in Burundi, where less of 10% of the total population in

¹³See the data at the province level collected by the Small Arms Survey project in Burundi (Pézard and de Tessières, 2009)

2008 lived in urban areas.¹⁴

Finally, I compute the *population density* of the municipalities, employing the subnational information from the 2008 census (Troisième recensement général de la population et de l’habitation de 2008), and the territorial area calculated through geometries. Population density is employed here as a proxy for social control, based on the assumption that people who live in a dense and networked environment are more easily controlled than those who live sparsely. As I discussed in Section 4.6, social control was pursued by political parties with a deep and pervasive presence in the territory (in particular by the incumbent CNDD-FDD), which increased both the party’s ability to monitor voters (identifying supporters and defectors) and the perception of voters that they are being controlled, making intimidation more compelling—and so potentially making outright violence less necessary.

5.3 The Data at First Glance

Table 5.1 reports summary statistics of all variables, and Table 5.2 compares the mean values of all variables for municipalities that did not experience any violence (columns on the left) to the mean values of those where there was at least one violent event (on the right). These values are consistent with our expectations. In fact, even though the differences between peaceful and violent municipalities are often not large, they nevertheless suggest that violence occurred more in towns with slightly less political fragmentation (both within the majority ethnic group and in general), higher incumbent vote shares, and a larger Hutu majority. Violence is also slightly more prevalent in poorer munic-

¹⁴Burundi 2008 census.

Table 5.1: Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Pre-electoral violence	1.504	1.719	0	7	129
Pre-electoral selective violence	0.581	0.872	0	4	129
State-sponsored violence	0.76	1.171	0	6	129
Opposition-sponsored violence	0.333	0.688	0	4	129
CNDD-FDD % (2005)	53.678	27.795	2.776	90.188	129
Margin of victory (2005)	46.486	25.118	0.326	89.17	129
ENPV (2005)	2.369	1.121	1.181	6.678	129
ENPV H. (2005)	1.682	0.417	1.104	2.765	129
Hutu size	0.727	0.194	0.091	0.975	122
Ethnic fract.	0.322	0.13	0.05	0.5	122
Wealth	2.971	0.822	1.739	5	128
Literacy	1.32	0.471	1	3.706	128
Urban	0.124	0.331	0	1	129
Pop. density	13.847	46.153	0.723	338.307	129
Ex.combts p.c.	0.394	0.273	0.051	1.687	129
Ex.combts p.c. (CNDD-FDD)	0.081	0.093	0	0.527	129
Ex.combts p.c. (opp)	0.313	0.244	0.036	1.671	129
Turnout (2010)	93.710	3.337	80.45	102.84	129

ipalities and urban contexts, but municipalities with higher population density tend to experience less violence. With a population density of about 300 people per square kilometer, Burundi is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa; it is therefore possible that violence is employed less in more-densely populated areas because it is easier to achieve social control there. The presence of ex-combatants, both in general and specifically from the CNDD-FD former armed group, is also associated with more violence. Voter turnout is already extremely high in Burundi, with a minimum of 80% of the registered votes, and tends to be even higher in violent municipalities.

Table 5.2: Summary statistics by occurrence of violence

Violence?	No			Yes		
	Mean	Std. Dev.	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
CNDD-FDD % (2005)	51.813	29.406	50	54.858	26.851	79
Margin of victory	44.219	26.641	50	47.921	24.168	79
ENPV (2005)	2.441	1.083	50	2.323	1.149	79
ENPV H. (2005)	1.734	0.471	50	1.65	0.378	79
Hutu size	0.690	0.215	48	0.751	0.176	74
Ethnic fract.	0.337	0.126	48	0.312	0.131	74
Wealth	2.947	0.772	49	2.985	0.856	79
Literacy	1.301	0.357	49	1.332	0.531	79
Urban	0.1	0.303	50	0.139	0.348	79
Pop. density	16.223	60.089	50	12.343	34.948	79
Ex.combts p.c.	0.395	0.248	50	0.393	0.289	79
Ex.combts p.c. (CNDD-FDD)	0.077	0.084	50	0.084	0.099	79
Ex.combts p.c. (opp)	0.318	0.23	50	0.31	0.254	79
Turnout (2010)	93.384	3.52	50	93.917	3.221	79

These suggestive relationships are apparent in the bar graphs of Figures 5.2 and 5.3, where I plot the number of violent events per municipality according to the Hutu ethnic-group size, party competition, vote shares, and number of ex-combatants. Figure 5.2 refers to the incidents of violence perpetrated by the incumbent only, while Figure 5.3 refers to all incidents of violence recorded during the electoral campaign. Several trends are visible. First, it is apparent from Figure 5.2a that the incumbent CNDD-FDD perpetrated more violence in a condition of uncertainty—that is, when it was close to the winning threshold of 50% of the vote share, as opposed to when it expected to lose massively or win handily. State violence was also most frequent when the incumbent faced a united intra-ethnic opposition as opposed to a number of (weaker) challengers (Figure 5.2c), when the size of the incumbent’s ethnic group was larger (Figure 5.2b), and when the number of ex-combatants of the former armed group of the CNDD-FDD increased (Figure 5.2d). When I also include in the count the acts of violence initiated by the opposition, I find that *selective* violence was more intense in municipalities that have a proportion of the Hutu ethnic population larger than 60% (Figure 5.3a).¹⁵ This is consistent with the “ethnic mobilization” violent strategy: Hutu parties would employ violence only when their ethnic constituency might allow them to win. Violence also peaks when the political space is asymmetric (Figure 5.3b), which provides further evidence that only strong parties facing strong challengers (as opposed to either dominating

¹⁵I refer here to violence that targeted specific voters and candidates (and not to group clashes or acts of vandalism) because this specification shows more consistent patterns. Selective violence is clearly one step above group clashes in terms of intensity, and also constitutes the classical method of achieving coercion (Kalyvas, 2006) that I discussed in Sections 2.4 and 2.5. As such, considering only targeted acts of violence is not an arbitrary sampling, but rather an even better strategy for identifying the determinants of a coercive electoral campaign.

or weak opposition) would resort to increasing violence in order to outbid each other's threats.

When I cross-tab both ethnic-group size and intra-ethnic party fragmentation in Figure 5.4, the mean values of violence—initiated either by the incumbent or by all parties—follow the pattern theorized in Figure 4.2b in Chapter 4: when the proportion of the Hutu ethnic group is less than 60%, violence is less and generally occurs when intra-ethnic fragmentation is minimal. This is the situation when one of the intra-ethnic parties already controls a large share of the group, which positions it closer to the threshold. By contrast, when the Hutu size is large, not only is the mean value of violence at the municipal level higher, but it also peaks when the ethnic group is more politically fragmented into larger competing parties. This pattern is consistent with the general implications discussed in Sections 2.6 and 4.4. the natural empirical implication of the fact described by Horowitz (1985) that large ethnic groups enjoy the luxury of having more than one party that can reach the winning threshold—once these parties compete between them, they may employ violence to mobilize support of the ethnic group.

A potential alternative explanation is that violence takes place against a small group of non-coethnics to suppress their turnout in order to increase the vote share of coethnic parties in a competitive intra-ethnic race. By lowering the participation rate of non-coethnics, the vote share of intra-ethnic parties might eventually mirror the intra-ethnic division. The qualitative evidence I provided in Chapter 4 already showed that this form of violence was not common, and that violence instead tended to be employed against members of the same ethnic group—chiefly within the Hutu. I now build on the subnational geo-localized

Figure 5.2: Summary of state-sponsored violence




Figure 5.3: Summary of *selective violence*





Figure 5.4: Violence by ethnic group size and intra-ethnic party competition



data to provide further evidence that intra-ethnic competition fueled *intra*-ethnic violence in Burundi, by considering the targets of the violent events.

As a first step I focus on intra-ethnic pre-electoral violence, and in Figure 5.5 I show how the escalation of intra-ethnic violence is related to electoral variables. If the competing hypothesis of a non-coethnic turnout-suppression strategy explains the pattern found earlier that violence escalates as the Hutu size goes up, one should also find that *intra-Hutu* violence therefore *decreases* as the Hutu size goes up. Instead, Figure 5.5a shows exactly the opposite, indicating that municipalities with a larger Hutu population experienced more violence between Hutu parties because of competition for the same ethnic constituency—a constituency that was sufficiently large to ensure the desired electoral victory. This is confirmed by Figure 5.5b, which shows the same pattern for violence perpetrated by the incumbent CNDD-FDD. The incumbent inflicted more violence on coethnic candidates, activists, and voters when the share of the coethnic population went up, but also when it faced the most competitive contexts—that is, when it was close to the winning threshold of 50% (Figure 5.5c).


I now turn to a statistical analysis of the territorial variation of violence, beginning with the violence initiated by the incumbent, to precisely test the logic of pre-electoral violence that I proposed in Hypotheses 1 and 2.

5.4 The Estimation Strategy


I now employ my original dataset to explain the intensity of violence across Burundi in the weeks preceding the 2010 municipal elections, I employ two models, according to the given measurement of violence. When intensity is measured by the *number* of violent events, I estimate a model of the following

Figure 5.5: Summary of intra-ethnic violence


(a) Selective violence over ethnic group size




(b) State-violence over Hutu size



(c) State-violence over incumbent's vote share



(d) State-violence over Hutu ENPV



form:¹⁶

$$E[y_i|\mathbf{x}_i] = \exp(\mathbf{x}'_i\beta)$$

where i indicates the unit of observation—the 129 municipalities—and y_i counts the number of violent events recorded by the Amatora mu Mahoro project. A count variable can take only nonnegative values, so it cannot follow a normal distribution, as shown in the frequency distribution in Figure 5.1. The preponderance of zeros and small values, and the clearly discrete nature of the dependent variable, make a least square model inappropriate for the estimation. While Poisson analysis is often employed for count data, such a model is based on the assumption that the mean and variance are the same—a condition that does not hold for my sample. In fact, the distribution is skewed to the right, and the ratio of the sample variance over the mean number of events is 1.87. Furthermore, this overdispersion may be due to failure of the assumption of independence of events that is implicit in the Poisson process—for example the occurrence of a violent event in a municipality may make subsequent violent events in the same municipality more likely.¹⁷ With such a distribution, I fit a negative binomial model (which is more appropriate in cases of over-dispersion) allowing for unobserved heterogeneity.

When instead I employ the intensity coding of violence based on the *nature* of the acts of violence, I fit an ordered logit model of the following form:

$$y_i^* = \mathbf{x}'_i\beta + \varepsilon_i$$

¹⁶Greene (2008)

¹⁷This constitutes a very plausible condition within the framework of the strategy of violent outbidding that I propose in my theory, according to which once a party employs violence then all others that are able so must so as well, in the attempt to signal their willingness and capability to punish defectors and protect supporters.

in which the dependent variable has more than two categories and the values of each category have a meaningful sequential order where a value is “higher” than the previous one, even though the distance between one category and the next is not the same between all pairs of categories. This model defines the unobserved latent variable y_i^* with values of $y = 0, 1, 2 \dots$ being observed as y_i^* crosses progressively higher thresholds—for instance passing from attempted harm to torture to killing.¹⁸ In this dataset, y takes values from 0 to 9.¹⁹ The resulting panel dataset has more than 129 observations since each municipality might experience more than one type of violence, so I cluster the standard errors by municipality.

In both models, \mathbf{x}'_i is the vector of independent variables. I seek to estimate whether violence targeted coethnics or non-coethnics, and if it was driven by political fragmentation within the ethnic groups. To do so, I employ the ethnic-group size variable and the political variables. Specifically, I use the effective number of parties—or the incumbent’s vote shares when I analyze state-sponsored violence—in the 2005 election. In order to test the expectation of Hypotheses 2 and 3 and consistent with the trends reported in Figure 5.3, I estimate both the linear effect of party competition on violence (among all parties or within ethnic groups) and the non-linear effect as well, by including a quadratic term to account for potential decreasing marginal returns.²⁰

¹⁸(Greene, 2008).

¹⁹The the actual specification of the values is the following: 0 no publicly observable violence, 1: disturbances, 2: intimidations, 3: harassment, 4: destruction of property, 5: group clashes, 6: attempted harm, 7: arbitrary arrest, 8: physical harm or torture, 9: killing or attempted killing.

²⁰Cameron and Trivedi (1998).

The vector \mathbf{x}'_i also include the average wealth and literacy of the municipality, urban or rural environment, the party's access to arms or strongmen, and population density. These are factors that might have influenced where parties employed violence, but the same factors could also have influenced previous electoral results. As such, their inclusion is important in order to prevent omitted variable bias.

I also include province fixed effects. In Burundi municipalities are grouped in provinces, and provinces are sometimes associated with specific features, such as the territorial origin of politicians and presidential candidates, which were relevant in driving voting choices due to expectation of future benefits. For instance, President Nkurunziza and FNL leader Agathon Rwasa were both from Ngozi, the CNDD leader Leonard Nyangoma was from Bururi, the Uprona party was also popular in Bururi, and the Frodebu-Nyakuri leader Jean Minani was from Kirundo. Some provinces also experienced more violence and fighting during the civil war (such as Bujumbura Rural, Cibitoke), and others were considered more unstable because of their proximity to the borders with Eastern Congo (Bubanza, Cibitoke), with Rwanda (Kirundo), or with the refugee camps in Tanzania (Makamba, Rutana). Further, most of the current administrative divisions date back to the colonial period, when Burundi was ruled by royal families (sometimes in competition with one another), whose territories became *chefferies* and *sous-chefferies* that evolved into the current provinces and municipalities (Lemarchand, 1994)—as the maps in Figure 5.6 allow to visualize graphically.²¹ There could thus be unobserved factors at the province level

²¹The colonial administration altered the number and government of the ancient royal powers. Before colonization Burundi was fragmented into four main spheres of influence: the Eastern region, under the Batare princes; the core area around then-capital Muranyva, under the direct control of the king; the territories between the capital and the Batare-controlled

that affect the variation of pre-electoral violence across the municipalities. Such unobserved factors might in turn be correlated in some way with the other observable variables of the model, such as voting preferences, provision of public goods, or economic conditions. I therefore estimate a multi-level model that includes province fixed effects. In such a model, the unobserved variables at the province level are treated as fixed parameters and are allowed to be correlated with the observed variables. This methodology is equivalent to estimating the effect of independent variables on the electoral violence within each province.²²

5.5 Violence under Uncertainty

I now estimate the statistical model, results of which are reported in Table 5.3. I begin by analyzing the electoral conditions under which the incumbent CNDD-FDD employed violence during the electoral campaign. Following the logic outlined in Section 4.5, I expect that the incumbent party would resort to violence specifically when close to the majority of votes, and that it would employ this violence against the largest opposition party. To test these expectations, I employ as a dependent variable the number of violent events initiated exclusively by the incumbent party in the four weeks preceding the municipal election. I first estimate Model 1 with a negative binomial regression with province fixed effects.

region, under the rule of the Bezi princes (sons of the king); and the north-south strip along Lake Tanganika, controlled by various semi-independent Hutu or Tutsi chiefdoms. The chiefdoms were then progressively reduced in number, and sometimes assigned to princes from different territories and so considered alien. The country was eventually divided in “territories,” and in turn divided into “provinces” (that can be associated with the chefferies). The sous-chefferies became the *communes* (i.e., the municipalities) in 1959. For further information on administrative development during the XX century, see Sénat du Burundi (2010); Lemarchand (1994); Chrétien (1983).

²²See Gelman and Hill (2006).

Figure 5.6: Historical administrative maps of Burundi

(a) The chiefdoms in 1945, under the Belgian administration. Source: Gahama (1980) in Sénat du Burundi (2010)

(b) The administrative divisions in 1965, after independence. Source: Gahama (1992) in Sénat du Burundi (2010)



(c) Current administrative divisions



Summary statistics presented in Figure 5.2a suggest a curvilinear relationship, so I estimate the impact of the vote shares gained by the incumbent in the previous municipal election on the number of incidents by including a quadratic term to allow for potential decreasing marginal returns—I expect that violence would peak right around the winning threshold of 50%. The coefficient of the vote share obtained by the incumbent in the previous municipal election is initially not significant, but becomes significant once I control for unobserved factors at the province level (column 1). The impact of the vote share obtained in the previous election is highly significant, and its effect is curvilinear, with a peak (as expected) just below the 50% vote share. In substantive terms and holding other factors at their mean, moving from a municipality where the ruling party obtained one quarter of the vote share in the previous elections to a municipality where it obtained half increases the expected amount of state-sponsored violence by more than 130% (from .23 to .53 violent events); moving from the latter municipality to one where the ruling party obtained three-quarters of the vote share in 2005, the expected number of violent events drops by half (to .28.) The predictive margins are plotted in Figure 5.7b.

These results are robust to the inclusion of the set of controls (column 4)—the ethnic-group size, the average wealth and the average literacy level of the municipality, the number of ex-combatants associated specifically with the armed group CNDD-FDD, and the number of violent events initiated by opposition parties (to control for retaliatory violence after opposition attacks). Two coefficients bear attention: ethnic-group size and the number of events initiated by the opposition. The large and significant coefficient for the size of the Hutu ethnic group—the group of the incumbent CNDD-FDD—suggests

that electoral violence was predominantly intra-ethnic. To be confident in this result, I estimate the model again on the subset of violent events initiated by the incumbent and specifically targeting Hutu candidates and voters. Results are reported in column 5, and are virtually identical to those in column 4—the size of the coefficient of the ethnic group size is actually much larger. The predicted effect of moving from a municipality in which the Hutu share of the population is 50% to where it is 90%, holding all other factors at their mean, is an increase in the expected number of state-sponsored violent events from .25 to .76—a bump of 200%. This again supports the claim that electoral violence is employed as a tool to monopolize a party’s own ethnic group. Figure 5.7a shows the predicted effect of Hutu ethnic-group size on state-sponsored pre-electoral violence.

The coefficient for the number of opposition-initiated events is also positive, significant, and substantial. The predicted number of violent events perpetrated by the ruling party moves, *ceteris paribus*, from .38 in a municipality where the opposition is non-violent, to 2.1 in municipalities with the highest opposition-initiated violence—an increase of more than 400%. This indicates that such violence was not unilateral, but rather became more intense when other parties also employed violence within the same municipality. This finding is consistent with the “violent outbidding” hypothesis proposed in my theory. According to this argument, violence is employed by parties as a costly signal to compel voters to certain voting behavior; violent parties must signal both an expected cost from retaliatory violence greater than what can be inflicted by opponents, and a stronger capability to provide protection to any supporters who are themselves targeted. Therefore, it is in the parties’ best interests to employ further violence

when the challenger does the same.

Table 5.3: Determinants of state-sponsored violence

Violence specification	Count (1)	Count (2)	Count (3)	Count (4)	Count (Hutu targets) (5)	Count (6)	Type (7)	Type (8)
CNDD-FDD (2005)	0.069* (0.04)			0.111*** (0.04)	0.130*** (0.04)		0.076 (0.05)	
CNDD-FDD (2005) ²	-0.0068*** (0.00)			-0.0011*** (0.00)	-0.0013*** (0.00)		-0.001** (0.00)	
ENPV opp. (2005)		-0.184 (0.21)						
ENPV H. opp. (2005)			-1.065* (0.58)			-1.006† (0.61)		-1.640* (0.89)
Hutu size				2.580*** (0.93)	5.260*** (1.34)	1.472* (0.85)	4.312** (2.12)	2.751 (1.92)
Opp.violence				0.406*** (0.15)	0.536*** (0.18)	0.293* (0.16)	0.517** (0.22)	0.453* (0.24)
Wealth				0.352 (0.26)	0.944** (0.41)	0.339 (0.31)	0.601* (0.36)	0.705** (0.32)
Literacy				-0.042 (0.63)	-1.669 (1.21)	-0.187 (0.62)	-0.487 (0.81)	-0.619 (0.87)
Ex.combts p.c. (CNDD-FDD)				0.781 (1.76)	1.082 (1.99)	0.841 (1.86)	2.799 (2.88)	2.457 (2.63)
Urban				0.581* (0.33)	1.080** (0.47)	0.849** (0.37)	1.420** (0.62)	1.392** (0.70)
Pop. density				-0.009** (0.00)	-0.022* (0.01)	-0.006 (0.00)	-0.017** (0.01)	-0.014* (0.01)
Intercept	-1.445 (1.22)	0.383 (0.63)	1.408 (0.91)	-5.500*** (1.73)	-8.838*** (2.03)	-0.818 (1.41)		

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. † $p < 0.15$; * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

These findings can be refined. If, all else equal, the ruling party sponsors more violence when the opposition does the same, then the driver for violence is not simply proximity to the winning threshold, but also the willingness and ability of the opposition to employ violence in retaliation. An incumbent whose re-election is in danger might just through intimidation be able to coerce lukewarm supporters and opponents into voting. With no challenger ready to retaliate, the cost of non-compliance for voters may already be sufficiently high that no further warning is necessary. Similarly, opposition candidates who are unable to fight back may be easily demobilized without resort to continuous attacks. Preliminary evidence of this was reported in Figure 4.9a in Chapter 4. Therefore, it is key to look now at characteristics that make the *opposition* violence-prone.

Larger parties might possess both the incentive and the capability to endure sustained competition. Such parties are driven by the expectation of obtaining positions of power, and so might be able to recruit more strongmen from their base. In Burundi, even though opposition leaders rarely admitted it, the supremacy of the ruling party prevented opposition parties from reaching the majority vote share necessary to win the presidency. The opposition was thus motivated by the goal of winning just a meaningful share in the parliament and, consequentially, relevant positions in the government.²³

Therefore, in order to check for this additional implication, I estimate the impact of fragmentation of the opposition—measured by the effective number of parties of the opposition only—on the intensity of violence initiated by the incumbent. Results are reported in columns 2, 3, and 6 of Table 5.3 and are clear:

²³This justifies the willingness of an opposition party to employ violence even if that party would nonetheless obtain much less than the 50% vote share threshold for the presidency.

the incumbent engaged in more violence when facing a sizeable *intra*-ethnic opposition, but not when facing a number of small intra-ethnic challengers.²⁴ In fact, the coefficient for the effective number of parties of the entire opposition is not significant (column 2), while in contrast the coefficient for the effective number of parties within the Hutu ethnic group is instead significant, negative (column 3), and substantial even when including all controls (column 6, the p-value is .101). The expected amount of state-sponsored violence in a municipality with only one intra-ethnic opposition party is .48, but decreases to .16 if the intra-ethnic opposition is composed of 2.1 effective parties—a decrease of almost 70% which leaves no doubt that the incumbent party resorted to more violence when it faced a strong coethnic challenger. The predicted number of state-sponsored events is plotted against the number of effective Hutu opposition parties in Figure 5.7c.


Further, the incumbent did not resort only to more violence in this context, but also to more *intense* violence. I estimate Model 2 by ordered logit with clustered standard errors at the municipality level (with a dataset of 182 observations). The results in columns 7 and 8 demonstrate that, holding size constant, violence against many (and thus smaller) coethnic challengers was less aggressive than violence against one coethnic challenger, and (again, as predicted) peaked in proximity to the 50% threshold.

Finally, the results show that neither wealth nor literacy are associated with the intensity of state-sponsored violence. The number of ex-combatants from the armed group CNDD-FDD is surprisingly not significant either, even though the coefficient is in the expected direction. One explanation could be


²⁴It is worth remembering here that opposition parties, even smaller ones, did not ally in pre-electoral coalitions before the municipal elections.

Figure 5.7: Predicted number of state-sponsored pre-electoral violent events


(a) Effect of proportion of Hutu population



(b) Effect of incumbent vote share in previous election



(c) Effect of number of intra-ethnic opposition parties



that the incumbent party possessed sufficient resources and coercive power to perpetrate violence regardless of the presence of ex-combatants in the territory. However, I provide a closer look at the impact of ex-combatants in the next chapter. Two coefficients that deserve attention measure the impact of urban or rural locality and of population density in the individual municipalities. Both variables are significantly related to the escalation of state-sponsored violence under all model specifications. Specifically, violence is much more intense in urban localities, which can be explained by the fact that urban population is usually more inclined to support opposition to the ruling party. However, also considering that this effect is found when all else is held constant including political and social features, this finding suggests that urban centers are targeted because in these places the incumbent has a harder time persuading voters with mere intimidation. This interpretation is backed by the other finding that violence tends to decrease in places with higher population density, which speaks to the effectiveness of coercion. In these localities voters are embedded in communities that are densely populated and networked, and as a consequence these voters are generally more easily controlled than those living sparsely. The hierarchical social and political structure, the entrenchment of the major political parties and former armed groups, and the strength of social and family ties in these places contributed to support the perception that control by the incumbent was strong—both to infer voting behavior and to effectively engage in targeted retribution afterwards. This potentially made intimidation alone a sufficient tool for coercing the behavior of candidates and voters, without the necessity of engaging in outright violence. Note that this is not merely an urban/rural distinction—even though population density is high in cities, some

rural municipalities are densely populated as well, and in fact the three urban municipalities outside the capital Bujumbura (Gitega, Ngozi, and Rumonge) are no denser than many rural counterparts.

5.6 When Intra-Ethnic Competition Fuels Violence

Now that I have assessed the determinants of the use of pre-electoral violence by one party—the most powerful one—I next analyze how party competition encourages the escalation of violence. I have so far outlined that violence is used when a single party is close to the winning threshold, and escalates when the opposition is not fragmented and in fact retaliates. However, we do not know the conditions under which the opposition engages in violence, or under which violence reaches higher peaks. We also know by now that in Burundi the parties with coercive credibility and incentives to use violence were predominantly within the Hutu ethnic group. Accordingly, one expects that violence would escalate in the presence of intra-ethnic party competition when there is the expectation that a party could indeed reach the winning threshold. And, as outlined in Section 4.4, reaching the winning threshold in the 2010 election depended on both (Hutu) ethnic-group size and the intra-ethnic structure of party competition. This section therefore has a twofold goal: to test the expectation I just outlined, and to discuss further how alternative theories—particularly on the use of violence to suppress the turnout of the non-ethnic opposition or to prime ethnic identities—do or do not fit the case of Burundi.

As in Section 5.5, I begin by estimating the negative binomial model, results


of which are reported in Table 5.4. I first test the linear and quadratic effect of party competition on the intensity of violence. Then, I include the set of controls (column 3). According to existing studies, we expect that violence would be highest in more ethnically-heterogeneous districts, and that it would decrease linearly with the number of parties. However, following the logic proposed here, I would expect instead that violence reaches its peak as a function of party competition within ethnic groups, and increases in districts with larger ethnic majorities. As the results in column 1 show, the effective number of *all* parties appears not to explain the cross-national variation of violence. The margin of victory is also not significant (result not shown for space's sake). Both findings suggest that it is not the competitiveness of the elections—defined as the race between the major parties across *all* ethnic groups—that drove politicians to use violence in Burundi. I then replace the effective number of parties with the intra-Hutu version of the ENPV (column 2). Here, the coefficient is significant. Because the coefficient of the linear term is positive and the coefficient of the squared term is negative, the quadratic has a parabolic shape, with maximum achieved at the level of about 1.6 effective Hutu parties. This value is indicative of an asymmetric party structure, wherein the margin of victory between the first and second party is high, *and* the opposition to the winning party is not highly fragmented—a fragmented opposition would in fact increase the value of the effective number of parties index. This speaks to the notion of competitiveness, which should be taken as the condition in which little swings bring the highest returns—a condition that, depending on the context, might not coincide with the proximity of parties to one another but rather with the proximity of parties to the winning threshold, as explained in Section 2.

This results are consistent with the findings of the previous section on state-sponsored violence: according to Hypothesis 2 applied to the Burundian context, parties are, *ceteris paribus*, more likely to engage in intra-ethnic violence if they are asymmetric in size. However, both ethnic-group size and group fragmentation have a significant impact on the intensity of violence across municipalities; since the number of parties within each ethnic group can be influenced by the size of the ethnic group itself, in order to avoid omitted variable bias I include both variables in the estimation (column 4). The estimated coefficients maintain the same direction and significance level but increase in value, suggesting that the correlation between size of ethnic groups and intra-ethnic ENPV is negative. This is contrary to the expectation in the literature. However, considering that many political parties in Burundi developed only recently and mostly from armed groups during the civil war or from political splinters, this correlation is possibly related to the specific history of war and transition in the country rather than purely to electoral dynamics.

Interestingly, holding the Hutu group size at its mean of 75% of the population in the district, the coefficient of the intra-Hutu ENPV indicates that violence is most intense when the biggest party within the ethnic majority falls just short of reaching the absolute majority of votes. It does follow that politicians will employ more violence when they face strong opposition, but also when they are close to the winning threshold. The effect is substantial: holding other factors at their mean, moving from a municipality where the number of effective Hutu parties is 1.2 (a context in which the largest party has over four-fifths of the vote share within the group) to one where the Hutu ENPV is 1.7 (a context in which the largest party has just two-thirds of the vote share from the group)

increases the expected amount of pre-electoral violence by almost 70% (from .96 to 1.6 violent events). When intra-ethnic party fragmentation increases instead to the maximum 2.7 Hutu ENPV (a context in which the largest party has about half the vote share from the group), the expected number of violent events drops to .35—that is, by almost 80%. Figure 5.8 graphs the predicted number of incidents, with the confidence intervals, holding all else at the mean.

Figure 5.8: Predicted number of violent events, with confidence intervals.



On the other hand, these coefficients also show the role of ethnicity in shaping electoral constituencies: when the ethnic constituency shrinks, politicians have less incentive to employ violence because they do not expect non-coethnics to swing to their side under any circumstances. In fact, the coefficient for the *size of the majority* is strong and positive, meaning that a percentage point increase in the size of the Hutu population in the municipality substantially increases the intensity of violence. However, it should be noted that if (following Hypothesis 3) all violence increases as the size of the ethnic group increases, then in principle the coefficient for the size of the Hutu ethnic group should not be significant. In fact, since the two ethnic groups in Burundi are mutually

exclusive,²⁵ a decrease in the Hutu population—associated with a decrease in intra-Hutu violence—would correspond to an increase in the Tutsi population—associated with an increase in intra-Tutsi violence. Since violence is coded as the count of all total events, there should not be any difference in the predicted number of incidents. This is not what we see.

Instead, the Hutu size coefficient is suggestive of competition taking place predominantly within the Hutu group—a finding that complements empirically the discussion in Section 4.3 explaining the lower capability of Tutsi parties to employ violence to mobilize the Tutsi electorate. In fact, the violent events initiated exclusively by Hutu parties constitute 90% of total events, and three out of four incidents took place between members of Hutu parties only. It is therefore very plausible that the coefficient for the size of the Hutu group is driven by the variation in Hutu-initiated violence, and so supports Hypothesis 3 specifically with regards to the Hutu group. This also explains why the coefficient for the ethnic fractionalization index is not significant (column 5). In order to increase confidence in this claim, I estimate the model using as a dependent variable the number of violent events between Hutu parties (column 7): the coefficient of size is actually twice as strong.

It should be noted that that the curvilinear effect of intra-ethnic party fragmentation is stronger when province fixed effects are included in the model. This suggests that the relationship between electoral variables and violence in the individual provinces is not consistent across provinces. As such, the coefficients estimated by pooling all observations together are weaker than those that explain the within-province variation. In particular the capital city province of

²⁵There is a third ethnic group, the Twa, but their size is negligible for this analysis.

Bujumbura (Bujumbura Mairie) appears to skew the results, confirmed by the fact that the significant curvilinear effect of intra-ethnic party fragmentation is present when I estimate the model again dropping the 13 municipalities of Bujumbura Mairie from the sample.

This issue is not merely methodological, but has an important substantial implication. Bujumbura's districts are characterized by a more educated, opposition-prone, wealthier, and larger Tutsi voting population. The lack of significance of intra-Hutu fragmentation here suggests that in this context Hutu parties employed violence not to cope just with coethnic challengers, but also to target actors beyond their ethnic base. However, Bujumbura Mairie is not the only province with a large Tutsi minority; the provinces of Cankuzo and Mwaro are, on average, divided fifty-fifty, and Bururi and Muramvya have up to a 40% Tutsi population—and yet the coefficients remains the same even when these provinces are included in the regression. This suggests both that multiple violent strategies can be employed at the same time, and also that more than ethnicity determined the dynamics of violent mobilization in this election. Among these factors, less effective control of the population in the capital is plausibly the most relevant.

Finally, in column 6 I estimate the model on the number of *selective* violent events (excluding group clashes and acts of vandalism). The summary statistics provided earlier indicated that the pattern of the distribution of violence is stronger when limited to selective violence. Such targeted violence would indeed constitute the classical method to achieve coercion, making this specification even more suited to identifying the determinants of coercive electoral campaigning. The coefficients are in fact very similar to those estimated with

the other specifications, except for the Hutu size.

All effects outlined so far are robust to the inclusion of controls, and socioeconomic and military variables also reveal interesting substantial effects. The coefficient for average wealth of the municipality is again not significant—in contrast to the extensive literature on political violence, which asserts that poverty decreases the recruitment costs of thugs and that poor people are prone to being victimized (Bratton, 2008). Violence is not consistently associated with voters' education either. Like for state-sponsored violence, the number of ex-combatants per capita is not significant but in the expected direction.

Table 5.4: Determinants of violent events escalation

Violence specification	Count	Count	Count	Count	Count	Count (selective)	Count (intra-Hutu)	Type	Type
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
ENPV (2005)	-0.112 (0.11)								
ENPV H. (2005)		4.984* (2.74)		5.993** (2.76)	6.205** (2.74)	11.750*** (3.77)	10.834** (4.96)	9.221** (3.68)	9.496*** (3.58)
ENPV H. (2005) ²		-1.475* (0.80)		-1.711** (0.80)	-1.815** (0.79)	-3.269*** (1.12)	-3.508** (1.57)	-2.681** (1.06)	-2.680*** (0.98)
Hutu size			1.792*** (0.67)	1.852*** (0.71)		1.738* (1.05)	3.273** (1.43)	3.070* (1.65)	2.790* (1.56)
Wealth				0.234 (0.21)	0.256 (0.21)	-0.072 (0.27)	0.247 (0.32)	0.227 (0.28)	0.214 (0.37)
Literacy				-0.166 (0.34)	-0.279 (0.36)	0.550 (0.45)	-0.054 (0.72)	-0.405 (0.61)	-0.291 (0.78)
Ex-combts p.c.				0.517 (0.65)	0.407 (0.72)	0.820 (0.69)	-0.251 (1.10)	0.057 (1.20)	0.223 (1.27)
Urban				1.116*** (0.24)	1.130*** (0.29)	0.698 (0.60)	0.697 (0.48)	1.425*** (0.41)	1.828*** (0.51)
Pop. density				-0.006* (0.00)	-0.006 (0.00)	-0.008** (0.00)	0.023 (0.12)	-0.014*** (0.01)	-0.016** (0.01)
Ethnic fract.				-1.070 (1.02)					
Intercept	0.578 (0.64)	-3.780 (2.33)	-1.193 (0.92)	-7.214** (2.97)	-5.255* (2.74)	-13.460*** (3.82)	-11.972*** (4.33)		-8.018* (4.65)
Buja excluded?	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

In order to dig deep into the mechanism explaining the use of violence during electoral competition, I finally consider the additional specification based on the definition of violence intensity and the nature of violent events. I fit an ordinal logit, clustering the standard errors by municipality, and province fixed effects are also included. The results are in column 8 of Table 5.4. The coefficients are again similar to those obtained by using the count of violent events. This confirms that a certain level of party fragmentation is significantly associated with more intense violence—intimidation and destruction of property are followed by group clashes and more serious harm and killings when the ethnic-group size increases, holding intra-ethnic party competition at its mean of 1.65, and when intra-ethnic party competition is asymmetric, holding the ethnic-group size is at its mean of .75. As I noted in Section 4.9, the targets of low-level violence are smaller parties (such as the Frodebu and the CNDD), whereas the targets of high-level violence (group clashes, torture and killings) are the candidates and activists of larger and more powerful parties, such as the FNL. This finding confirms once more the reasoning proposed earlier that intimidation is less likely to escalate when the strongest party faces a small and fragmented intra-ethnic opposition (arguably because low-level violence is sufficient), and conversely is more likely to escalate against larger opponents in order to send a strong signal.

As a robustness check, I treat this ordinal variable as if it were continuous. In this case, I simply employ OLS regression with robust standard errors clustered again at the municipality level. This methodological approach, even though it is not the most appropriate for the data, is acceptable because the dependent variable has nine categories and OLS regression is easier to understand.

The results in column 9 confirm the ones obtained with the ordered logit.

5.7 Carrots and Sticks

Before concluding, I want to go back to the discussion of the relationship between peaceful and violent electoral strategies. The data discussed in Section 4.8 were suggestive of an electoral strategy according to which parties employ violence *in addition* to employing other non-violent strategies, perhaps when the latter are not sufficient. To dig more deeply into this issue, I investigate whether the escalation of state-sponsored violence is indeed related to the provision of material benefits and to the anticipated electoral returns produced by a non-violent campaign. Anecdotally, it was common knowledge that the incumbent party would bring food, beer, money, and memorabilia to its electoral rallies, but apart from the data collected by the CEJP that I discussed in Section 4.8 there is unfortunately no additional information on the territorial distribution of economic transfers and bribes during the official campaign. However, an alternative method for clarifying whether the use of non-violent strategies determined (or at least conditioned) the use of violent strategies is to look at the provision of public services. Public services are a form of transfer highly valued by voters; even with voting behavior in Africa supposedly driven primarily by ethnicity and clientelism, politicians do provide public goods once in office (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Keefer and Vlaicu, 2008), and there is increasing recognition that voters are also driven by factors such as urban/rural cleavages (Nugent, 1999; Harding, 2012), economic factors (Lindberg, 2012; Kimenyi and Romero, 2008; Posner, 2004), incumbent performance (Lindberg and Morrison, 2005), and provision of public goods (Weghorst and Lindberg, 2013).

Such recognition is not misplaced in Burundi, where voters did indeed reward the incumbent CNDD-FDD for increased access to primary schools following the abolition of school fees in 2005 (Travagianti, 2013). Building upon this evidence, I therefore estimate whether the provision of public services in municipalities was associated with different levels of violence by the incumbent party.

In order to measure public-service provision at the subnational level, I focus specifically on public education and consider the change in number of schools per municipality between the school year before the CNDD-FDD first took office (2004/05) and the year of the subsequent election (2009/10). Public education was a relevant issue during the 2010 electoral campaign, and the incumbent CNDD-FDD campaigned heavily on its record of abolishing school fees (Travagianti, 2013). In order to cope with the spike in students attending primary school, new schools and classrooms were built, and new teachers hired and trained. I therefore estimate the model employed in the section on state sponsored-violence with the inclusion of a variable measuring the change in number of schools between 2005 and 2010. These data come from the official yearbooks of Burundi's Ministry of Education. I also control for the change in number of students enrolled in primary school to account for the change in the demand for schools, and for province fixed effects to account for existing differences in education infrastructures. According to the view that violence and material benefits are alternative strategies, one should expect that an increase in public goods would be accompanied by a corresponding decrease in violence. However, and consistent with the suggestive evidence provided by the CEJP data and interviews, this expectation is not met: the coefficient of change in

Table 5.5: Impact of public goods provision on state-violence

	(1)	(2)	(3)
CNDD-FDD % (2005)	0.113*** (0.04)	0.085** (0.04)	0.112*** (0.04)
CNDD-FDD % (2005) ²	-0.001*** (0.00)	-0.001** (0.00)	-0.001*** (0.00)
Hutu size	3.016*** (1.12)	5.165*** (1.54)	3.477*** (1.11)
Δ students	-0.000 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	
Δ schools	-0.028 (0.03)		0.014 (0.03)
Δ schools (bin)		4.126** (1.61)	
Δ schools*Hutu size		-6.022*** (1.99)	
Δ students (bin)			2.132 (1.51)
Δ students*Hutu size			-3.750* (2.03)
Intercept	-5.696*** (1.70)	-5.870*** (1.54)	-5.637*** (1.64)
Controls and F.E.	Y	Y	Y

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

schools is indeed negative, but far from being significant (column 1). It remains unchanged even when I drop the CNDD-FDD vote share in 2005 to avoid multicollinearity.²⁶ The controls are not listed in the table for the sake of space, but they are included in the regression. This finding suggests that violence was employed across constituencies *in addition to* the provision of public goods.

Nonetheless, the expectation that a constituency is satisfied with the provision of public goods may prompt the incumbent into using less violence in places where the size of the constituency would make the ethnic support important for

²⁶While certainly the resulting increase in infrastructure depended on the increased demand for education, it might also be correlated with the level of support for the CNDD-FDD in that municipality in 2005.

winning. In other words, the provision of services might not be a determinant factor per se in the choice to employ violence, but instead only a factor on which the choice to employ violence can be conditioned. So, I include an interaction term between the Hutu group size—representing the potential support base—and the increase in schools. To make the interpretation of the interaction term simpler, I use a binary indicator of change in the number of schools equal to 0 if the change is below the national average, and 1 otherwise. Socio-demographic indicators are included, as well as province fixed effects to account for existing differences in educational attainment. The coefficient of the interaction term is in column 2 of Table 5.5, and is significant and negative.²⁷ This suggests that, holding the previous vote share and all socioeconomic factors constant, the impact of the size of the ethnic group on violence decreases as more schools are built in the municipality. In other words, the incumbent would employ less violence in large ethnic constituencies if it had already provided them with more public goods. The difference in the marginal effects can be seen in Figure 5.9a.

However, the abolition of primary-school fees was supported and heavily financed by the international community in the effort to achieve the UN Millennium Goal of ensuring primary education for all children.²⁸ Therefore, the government may not have had complete freedom in allocating this form of public goods, and the increase in infrastructure likely depended on increased demand for schooling rather than on discretionary allocation of funds. As such, it cannot be concluded from the significant interaction coefficients that the ruling party mobilized support by deliberately providing supporters with public goods

²⁷The direction and magnitude of the interaction term is the same when the continuous variable is used.


²⁸Half of the government budget destined for education was financed by donors.

and opponents with violence. I therefore interpret the result as evidence that violence—as a tool to mobilize and persuade voters—is employed where voters are expected either not to support the party or not to swing. In fact, voters in a municipality that (for any reason) received fewer new schools over the incumbent’s first mandate might have been unhappy—especially given that school attendance substantially increased over the same period.

Furthermore, even if the given public good (the abolition of school fees, here) was extended to all municipalities, this does not imply that all municipalities appreciated it in the same way. This allows us to elaborate on the interpretation that violence is employed where voters are expected not to support the party. I employ another indicator that captures the propensity of voters to support the incumbent based on response to the public goods provided by the government during its first mandate. Sticking with the same public good of primary education, I consider the change in school attendance in each municipality between the abolition of school fees in 2005 and the election in 2010. In fact, while the abolished fees accounted for only about 15% of the total cost for a family to send children to school,²⁹ the abolition of these fees had a remarkable psychological impact on the Burundian people (Ndayisaba, 2009), and on how Burundian citizens voted in the 2010 elections (Travaglianti, 2013). This change varied across municipalities as a function of socioeconomic factors, and *not* as a function of previous support for the government (Travaglianti, 2013). To ease the interpretation of the interaction term, I again employ a binary indicator of change in school enrollment, equal to 0 if the change is below the national average and 1 otherwise. The interaction is again significant, and in the expected

²⁹Other expenses include academic material, uniforms, and contribution to the school’s budget.

Figure 5.9: Marginal effects of incumbent’s ethnic group size on number of state-sponsored violence



direction: the size of the incumbent’s ethnic group is positively associated with more incumbent-initiated violence when the change in school attendance was below average, as shown in figure 5.5.b. All of these results are robust to the inclusion of province fixed effects. In essence, it seems that violence was not used as an alternative to the provision of public goods. Further, even if the employ of violence as an alternative to economic transfers cannot be fully ruled out with the available data, we can nonetheless maintain that violence constituted a last-resort option, used to coerce voters when other forms of persuasion were not expected to suffice.

5.8 Robustness Checks

The results outlined so far are robust to a battery of checks pertaining to the characteristics of the sample, the nature of the dependent variable, and the

geographical distribution of the data presented in Table 5.6.

I begin by dropping the capital city Bujumbura from the sample of municipalities. Bujumbura is a large city, with urban, economic, and ethnic characteristics that differ from the rest of the country. I earlier discussed potential reasons that violent strategies in Bujumbura might be driven by additional motivations. Although many factors can be accounted for by the set of controls, I estimate the model by discarding the 13 municipalities that constitute the capital city. As shown in columns 1 and 6, removing the administrative municipalities that make up the capital does not produce substantive changes in the estimated coefficients. The different result obtained with intra-Hutu violence is discussed earlier in Section 5.6.

I continue by checking that the results are robust to potential correlation with unobserved variables. The first potential correlation that could weaken the results is the intra-class correlation between observations in the same provinces. If observations within a certain municipality are correlated with the ones located within the same province but not with the ones located within a different province, then the standard errors of the model would be underestimated, rendering significance tests invalid. As a first step, I check the intra-class correlation (ICC) of the variables. There is no intra-class correlation for the dependent variable (number of violent events in a municipality), even though ethnic-group size and other independent variables instead demonstrate moderate intra-province correlation. The comparative scatterplots in Figure 5.10 show the distribution of selected variables grouped together vertically by province (dot plots). I then perform a one-way analysis of variance for the regression residuals: the intra-class correlation coefficient is equal to 0 for any specification of pre-electoral

violence.³⁰

The third robustness check addresses the potential spatial correlation of the observations. Events in one location may have spill-over effects in neighboring locations, either by influencing directly the propensity of politicians to use violence or by affecting other context conditions that may be related to violence in another district. In fact, it is possible that acts of violence may instigate a sequence of events that leads to further violence in a spatially channeled way, for instance through retaliation.³¹ Similar considerations might apply to other explanatory variables—for instance, if economic development depends on urbanization or a given agricultural production then wealth might be concentrated in certain geographical spaces. Population density might be higher in urbanized areas, for example, or ex-combatants might be geographically concentrated near the sites of major events during the civil war. Spatial dependence is present whenever correlation across cross-sectional units is non-zero (Anselin et al., 2008). This could affect the error term (in the so-called spatial error model)³² or pertain to the dependent variable (in the spatial auto-regressive models) where the dependent variable is affected by the values of the dependent variable in nearby units—the latter differing from the spatial error model in that both the error term and the covariates in nearby units impact the current unit (Anselin et al., 2008; Beck et al., 2006). This would violate the key


³⁰In order to compute the residuals I fit a negative binomial generalized linear model and then compute the Pearson residuals, which exhibit skewed distributions for non-normal family distributions.

³¹Attacks on a party's supporters could lead to a retaliatory action against the initiators of the attack in a neighboring municipality. I am not considering time-series data, but the period of observation is four weeks, so this sort of spatial feedback effect could plausibly take place within that time window.


³²The spatial error model occurs, for example, when spatially correlated covariates are omitted from the model

Figure 5.10: Dot plots for dependent and selected independent variables (province-level).


(a) Dot plot for violence



(b) Dot plot for ethnic group size



(c) Dot plot for ENPV Hutu



statistical assumption of the independence of observations, leading to biased estimates. I therefore estimated the model through a spatial-autoregressive model with spatial-autoregressive disturbances (ASAR), which includes the weighted average of the dependent variable. Analogously to the spatial lag operator, the spatial lag for variable y consists of the weighted average of the neighboring observations, with the weights specified geographically in this case. Formally, for a cross-sectional observation i for variable y , the spatial lag would be $\sum_j W_{ij}z_j$, where W_{ij} is the weighted matrix based on the geographic distance between the centroids of the administrative units. A spatial autoregressive model is easily estimated when the outcome of interest is a continuous variable, but the spatial set-up with a discrete dependent variable is much more difficult. At this stage, I estimate only the linear model below, with the spatial lag as a robustness check.

$$y_i = x_i \beta + \rho W_i y_i + \epsilon_i$$

The coefficients, reported in column 3, are similar in size and significance to those produced by the main model. The coefficient of the spatial lag is, surprisingly, not positive but it lacks significance. Indeed, the Moran's I test suggests that there is no spatial correlation for violence. However, it must also be considered that since the variable is discrete, the test may not be fully accurate.

The fourth robustness check pertains to the choice of the statistical model to estimate. I calculate the logged number of incidents per observation and run an OLS regression with robust standard errors. The log is computed on the number of violent events plus one, in order to avoid losing all observations with no violence that could not be log-transformed because they are coded as zeroes. Results are in in columns 4 and 8—they are again virtually identical to the primary results.

Table 5.6: Robustness Checks: all violence (1-5) and state-sponsored violence (6-10)

	No Buja (1)	RE (2)	ASAR (3)	Log violence (4)	No 1972 returns (5)	No Buja (6)	RE (7)	Log violence (8)	No 1972 returns (9)
ENPV H. (2005)	8.450*** (2.40)	4.131* (2.26)	5.807* (3.39)	1.894 (1.28)	6.455** (2.55)				
ENPV H. (2005) ²	-2.411*** (0.71)	-1.200* (0.64)	-1.522* (0.91)	-0.517 (0.34)	-1.749** (0.74)				
CNDD-FDD % (2005)						0.120*** (0.04)	0.032 (0.02)	0.059** (0.03)	0.111*** (0.04)
CNDD-FDD % (2005) ²						-0.001*** (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.001** (0.00)	-0.001*** (0.00)
Hutu size	0.665 (0.93)	1.518** (0.59)	2.746** (1.17)	0.759* (0.41)	1.072 (0.77)	1.945* (1.08)	1.460* (0.83)	1.498** (0.64)	2.372** (1.10)
Opposition violence	0.541*** (0.11)				0.582*** (0.11)	0.389** (0.16)	0.245 (0.16)	0.221 (0.15)	0.409*** (0.15)
Wealth	0.268 (0.20)	0.080 (0.20)	0.393 (0.45)	0.177 (0.15)	0.240 (0.17)	0.327 (0.30)	0.234 (0.28)	0.279 (0.31)	0.346 (0.26)
Literacy	-0.171 (0.51)	-0.131 (0.31)	0.087 (0.72)	-0.127 (0.26)	-0.151 (0.29)	0.053 (0.88)	-0.356 (0.40)	0.026 (0.50)	-0.036 (0.62)
Ex-combts p.c.	-0.918 (0.92)	0.237 (0.39)		0.183 (0.42)	0.015 (0.60)				
Urban	0.989*** (0.33)	1.550*** (0.35)		0.993*** (0.17)	0.887*** (0.26)	0.398 (0.47)	1.262*** (0.48)	1.451 (0.91)	0.481 (0.39)
Pop. density	0.074 (0.10)	-0.005** (0.00)		-0.005** (0.00)	-0.005* (0.00)	0.073 (0.15)	-0.009* (0.00)	-0.006** (0.00)	-0.010** (0.00)
Ex-combtsCNDDFDD						0.118 (2.58)	1.006 (1.32)	1.075 (1.88)	0.871 (1.78)
Intercept	-7.327** (2.86)	-4.105** (2.00)	-9.017** (4.01)	-2.153 (1.50)	-3.404** (1.67)	-5.475*** (1.97)	-1.739 (1.18)	-2.192 (1.69)	-5.337*** (1.85)
Observations	113	121	121	121	113	113	121	121	113

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

The final robustness check pertains to the quality of one of my main independent variables. As noted in Section 5.2, the variable used to proxy the size of the Burundian ethnic groups—the vote shares obtained by the parties associated with the specific ethnic group in 1993—does not account for any change in population during and after the war. Between 1993 and 2010 there were three main elements of demographic change in the populations of the municipalities: demographic increase or decrease, and population movements. Assuming (as is very plausible given physical and psychological segregation during the war) that inter-ethnic marriages were not common after 1993, then any demographic increase would not substantially change the proportion between the ethnic groups. Reliable numbers across municipalities of those killed in the war differentiated by ethnic group are not available, so unfortunately these changes cannot be accounted for. However, movements of people abroad or to other regions of the country could pose a problem, since these movements often relate to populations targeted by ethnic violence. These people moved to neighboring countries (Rwanda, Tanzania, and Democratic Republic of Congo) as refugees, or to other regions of Burundi as internally displaced people (IDPs). Between refugees and IDPs, over a million people left their traditional home regions.

The 1972 and 1993 events generated the largest refugee movements. In 1972 the violent actions of the Burundian military against the Hutu population led to the movement of approximately 300,000 people, most of whom fled to Tanzania as refugees (ICG, 2003; Ngaruku and Nkurunziza, 2005; Watt, 2008). In 1993 the violence that followed the assassination of President Ndaye led to the movement of an estimated 687,000 refugees, also fleeing largely to Tanzania—approximately 10% of Burundi’s population at the time. (ICG,

2003; Ngaruku and Nkurunziza, 2005). Between 2002 and September 2011, more than half-a-million Burundians—primarily from neighboring Tanzania—were repatriated. Significant groups of Burundians also returned from DRC and Rwanda, formally 14,643 and 7,968 respectively. Due to the high naturalization rates of 1972 refugees in Tanzania, this group constituted of only 11% of the total repatriates between 2002 and 2011. This is important since these people would not be included in the 1993 population, which could potentially cause an additional bias. The map in Figure 5.11 shows where the 1972 refugees who were repatriated between 2002 and 2008 settled. Even though the numbers are too low to completely alter the ethnic make-up of populations at the municipal level, I nevertheless drop municipalities where *rétournés* constitute more than 1% of the population (as per the 2008 census)—for a total of eight municipalities. The results on this reduced sample (reported in columns 5 and 9) are virtually identical to those on the full sample.

As for the internally displaced populations, they were estimated to have progressively declined from a peak of 800,000 in 1999 to about 100,000 people by 2010 (just over 1% of the total population), among whom over half are located close to their own land. The remaining 700,000 (plus at least 500,000 refugees) returned to their pre-1993 homes. Almost 80% of IDPs now have access to their original properties, which they continue to use for agricultural purposes (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2005). Displaced people had the right to vote and participate in the electoral process in 2005 (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2005) and 2010 (International Displacement Monitor Center, 2011; Zeender, 2011), to the extent that they had the means to pay for their identity card—a problem that is common to *all* poor


people in Burundi. Even though, based on these facts, the IDPs are not likely to meaningfully alter the ethnic composition of a population, as a robustness check I compute the correlation between vote shares received by the Hutu and Tutsi parties in 1993, 2005, and 2010, following the same coding used for the ethnic ENPV. This correlation is very high at .8, suggesting that (assuming people voted ethnically in 2005 and 2010) demographic changes did not meaningfully impact the ethnic composition of the municipalities, and therefore that my findings are reliable with respect to ethnic group size.

5.9 Conclusions

This chapter continues the empirical assessment of my theory's predictions regarding the conditions that make electoral violence most likely to erupt and escalate. Exploiting the territorial variation of violence across Burundi's 129 municipalities, I investigate first what drove one party to employ increasingly more violence in the municipality, and then what factors fueled pre-electoral violence in general. According to the logic proposed in my theory, and building upon the initial evidence provided in Chapter 4, I expected that one-sided violence would escalate in uncertain seats and against a unified opposition, and that in general pre-electoral violence would be fueled by intra-ethnic competition. These expectations are clearly confirmed by the statistical analysis.

First, data show that in the Burundian election campaign state-sponsored violence was strategically limited to uncertain seats: the ruling party was most violent in the districts where it expected to win or lose by only a small margin (rather than to win handily or lose massively). Second, incumbent-sponsored violence escalated in the presence of low party fragmentation of the coethnic

Figure 5.11: Returnés from 1972 repatriated by UNHCR between 2002 and 2008. Source UNHCR (2008)



opposition. While I showed in Chapter 4 that both coethnic and non-coethnic parties could be targeted when their presence posed a threat, the sub-national analysis quantifies this claim and provides considerable empirical evidence that the most frequent targets in the incumbent's struggle to maintain power were coethnic candidates and voters, especially members of larger opposition parties. Further, I provide compelling evidence that violence was employed in districts where the party thought it was unable to win the confidence of the constituency through only non-violent strategies—a feature that I capture by looking both at the provision of public goods and at the popular response to such provision of goods across municipalities.

Moving to the territorial variation of all acts of violence, I show that escalation of pre-electoral violence in each administrative district can be explained by the district's ethnic composition and intra-ethnic political fragmentation, while controlling for a set of social, economic, and military factors. Number and intensity of violent events in a municipality are highest when the majority ethnic group is larger and with an asymmetric party structure—that is, where the margin of victory between the first and second party within the ethnic group is not close, and the opposition to the winning party is not highly fragmented—a situation that explains how the proximity to the majority of the winning threshold is achieved according to the size and internal political fragmentation of the ethnic group.

A final finding emerging from this empirical analysis is that violence is much more intense in urban localities, but also in localities that have a lower average population density. This result is very relevant because it connects the escalation of violence to a lower ability of a party (notably, the ruling

party) to control a territory due to weaker political and social ties. In such cases, due to the party's weaker ability to issue a credible threat to defectors—both inferring voting behavior and effectively engaging in targeted retribution afterwards—intimidation alone is not sufficient to persuade voters and violence then escalates.

Chapter 6

Reactions to Violence

On ne discute pas avec celui qui lui commande

Do not question he who commands you

(Burundian proverb)¹

6.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the empirical implications of my theory: if, as I have shown in the previous chapters, violence was employed with the goal of boosting electoral participation, then the effect of violence should be observable in electoral results. To test this, I proceed in three steps. First, I investigate whether violence influenced voters' beliefs—that is, whether voters cast their ballots out of fear. I do this by building from firsthand data on the perception that voters were influenced by intimidation when they cast their ballots. These

¹From the collection of Rodegem (1961)

data are constituted by a questionnaire that I administered in every municipality across the country a few months after the municipal elections, which reveals that perceptions of voting behavior being influenced by intimidation appear to be associated with higher levels of violence in the municipality—especially if that violence was targeted at specific individuals (rather than being group clashes among activists). Further, the impact of state-sponsored violence had a greater (positive) effect on the perception that voting followed intimidation in localities where the number of ex-combatants was higher—and thus where the incumbent party was perceived to be more powerful.

Second, I evaluate the impact of intimidation and violence on actual voting behavior in the context of the 2010 municipal elections by analyzing electoral results. Since electoral returns could potentially be influenced both by pre-electoral intimidation and by post-electoral ballot rigging, I begin by assessing the potential impact of procedural fraud. By relying on statistical techniques to analyze sub-national electoral returns, I show that while turnout appears to have been enhanced by extreme measures, it seems that the incumbent achieved this increase in a fair (procedurally) way—that is, without denying votes to other challengers or manipulating and fabricating official vote counts.

Having determined that the positive association between turnout and votes for the ruling party was not the result of ballot-stuffing, I investigate whether this association was instead due to pre-electoral intimidation and violence. I find that, in line with my theoretical expectations, violence did increase electoral turnout, particularly when the incumbent could rely on a pool of strongmen and therefore make *credible* threats to those who would not comply, and also offer credible security to supporters.

6.2 Did Voters Vote “for Fear”: a Questionnaire to Electoral Observers

As the first step in testing whether electoral violence constituted a successful mobilization strategy, I begin with an analysis of the responses to a questionnaire I administered to local electoral observers across the country. Within the framework of formal observation of the final round of elections—the village-level elections—the Coalition de la Société Civile pour le Monitoring Electorale (COSOME) required every observer to fill in a questionnaire regarding how the polling and vote-counting were carried out in each polling station. COSOME was the largest non-governmental organization involved in the election; with the support of the international community, it deployed local monitors in every polling station throughout the country, for a total of more than 2,500 during the village-level elections. These monitors were not affiliated with political parties. In partnership with COSOME I attached two additional pages to the organization’s questionnaire, in which I asked specific questions about campaign practices in the weeks that preceded the official electoral campaign for the municipal elections. Among the questions, I included one concerning the perception of what influenced voting behavior in the district. Respondents provided a binary answer (Yes or No) to the following question in French: “In your opinion, did the population of this electoral district vote for certain parties as a result of intimidation?”² Since there was more than one observer per village, and more than one village per administrative unit (municipality), I computed the average value of the responses in each municipality, which gives a continuous

²Original: “À votre avis la population d’ici a voté certains partis suivant des intimidations?” Questions were all in French, consistent with the COSOME questionnaire.

indicator ranging from 0 to 1. Even though the number of COSOME local observers deployed for the village-level elections was fewer than for the municipal elections, those who monitored the former were among those who monitored the latter. These observers in general resided in the same electoral district that they observed (or in the near vicinity), and therefore they were certainly informed about the context on which they were asked to comment.

At the aggregate level, one in four observers perceived that voters in the monitored district voted under intimidatory pressures, which is suggestive that violence and threats indeed *visibly* affected part of the electorate. Such numbers refer to the whole set of municipalities—both those that experienced violence during the four weeks preceding the municipal campaign, and those that did not. When looking specifically at observers in municipalities that experienced at least one act of violence, the number perceiving intimidation goes up to one-third, as shown in Figure 6.1a. Such a difference is statistically significant.³). That said, one should not be surprised that even in places where there was no visible violence during the few weeks preceding the elections the monitors still had some perception of intimidation; it may in fact be the case that such intimidation took place privately but did not escalate to public threats or acts of violence.

Assuming that the monitors' perceptions are accurate, this is strong initial evidence that the occurrence of political violence in a municipality is associated with voting behavior, and so deserves further investigation. The question then becomes, among all acts of violence, which affected voters the most? Was an

³The p-value for the difference in intimidation-driven voting between peaceful and violent municipalities is less than 0.02, so the difference in means is statistically significantly different from 0.

increase in violence associated with an increased inclination to vote “for fear”? Addressing these questions is key to testing my theory’s implications. First, according to the empirical analysis of the past decades of violent competition for power, not all parties were expected to be able to control territory and enforce orders in the same manner. From these considerations, one would expect that intimidation and violence perpetrated by stronger parties—such as the incumbent—would produce higher rates of coerced voting. Second, the likelihood that voters will comply with the wishes of the violent party is based on the extent to which the party is perceived to be able to effectively enforce threats and retaliation. If more than one party employs intimidation during the campaign, a voter will consider which is most likely to (a) identify the voter’s true behavior, and then (b) follow up with punishment. According to the explanation proposed in my theory, violence is therefore instrumentally perpetrated by parties to coerce voters and send them a signal regarding the parties’ willingness and ability to retaliate. More intense violence (when parties engage in violent outbidding) should therefore produce a more compelling signal, and so *ceteris paribus* one would expect higher rates of people voting under the pressure of intimidation when violence is most intense.

I begin to assess these expectations by looking at the observers’ responses in municipalities that experienced *different types* of violence. First, in Figure 6.1b I show that the perception of intimidation-driven voting was higher in municipalities with at least one state-sponsored act of violence, as opposed to those with no state-sponsored violence. Such a difference is again statistically significant to a t-test (with a p-value for the difference equal to .02). Interestingly, this difference does *not* exist between places that did or did not experience

opposition-sponsored violence—which suggests that the opposition was not as successful as the incumbent in appearing to be the strongest competitor.


Next, in order to provide initial evidence for the logic of “violent outbidding,” I look at the perception of intimidation-driven voting over the number of violent events, perpetrated both by all parties (Figure 6.2a) and specifically by the ruling party (Figure 6.2b). Initially, the pattern is not clear—it seems to suggest an inverted-U relationship such that the vote for fear was enhanced by high levels of violence, but *not* in the most violent places. However, when I restrict the sample to acts of *selective* violence—such as jailing, intimidation, torture, and killing of candidates or voters—the pattern clearly suggests that the most intense violence is also associated with the most intense intimidation-driven voting behavior (Figure 6.2c). Put briefly, the occurrence of violence in a given municipality appears to be associated with a larger perception that the general voting behavior of the municipality was influenced by intimidation—especially if the state was the perpetrator of the violence and if that violence targeted selectively specific individuals,⁴ rather than being group clashes among activists. As this selective violence increased, so did the perception of voting out of fear.

In order to dig deeply into this issue and account for other relevant features of the different municipalities, I analyze statistically whether subnational variation in the local observers’ perceptions is explained significantly by subnational variation of pre-electoral violence and other subnational features. I estimate an OLS regression using the normalized indicator of the observers’ answers as a


⁴In the intensity coding based on the nature of the violent event used in the previous chapter, the highest values also correspond to targeted violence—e.g., killings and torture versus verbal clashes and group clashes. Therefore, this finding sheds light on both the impact of the targeting and the nature of deliberate political violence.

Figure 6.1: Average perception of observers that voting was influenced by intimidations

(a) All violence



(b) State-sponsored violence



(c) Opposition-sponsored violence






Figure 6.2: Average perception of observers that voting was influenced by intimidations (2)


(a) Number of violent events



(b) Number of state-sponsored violent events



(c) Number of *targeted* violent events



dependent variable. As for the summary statistics presented above, I begin by using as an explanatory variable the number of all violent events. Following the reasoning that violence perpetrated by a strong party is more compelling than violence perpetrated by a weak party, I look at the impact of state-sponsored violence, and (building on the suggestive finding that increased targeted violence appears to be associated with increased intimidation-driven voting) I estimate the impact of the count of selective violence. I then include socio-economic controls—average wealth, education level, a measure of party competition, and the previous vote share obtained by the incumbent CNDD-FDD in the specification with state-sponsored violence (to control for the extent to which the electorate was already siding with the violent party). Province fixed-effects are also included to control for any province-level unobserved heterogeneity.

Results are reported in Table 6.1. The extent to which the general voting behavior of a given commune was perceived to be influenced by intimidation is significantly predicted by the number of violent events (columns 1 and 2)—and in particular by the number of selective acts of violence (arrests, personal intimidations, tortures, and killings, columns 3 and 4), rather than by group clashes and verbal threats (columns 7). The number of violent events perpetrated by the state is also significant (column 5), even though the coefficient is significant only at the 85% level when all controls are included (column 6, p-value of .129). Based on the histograms in Figure 6.2a and 6.2b, I include a square term for the violence variable; however, even though the coefficient of the squared term is negative—and thus consistent with the inverted-U relationship—it is far from significance levels (results now shown). Such results are robust to the inclusion of the battery of factors measuring socio-economic and demographic conditions

as well as vote shares from the previous election. It is relevant to note that the coefficient for the percentage of Hutu population in the municipality is positive, which suggests that people were perceived to vote out of fear in predominantly Hutu districts, and which therefore confirms that that coercion was not intended to demobilize Tutsi constituencies (even if such constituencies would numerically constitute an electoral threat). The coefficient is significant at the 85% level but loses power in the specification of state-sponsored violence.^{5,6}

⁵By contrast, the coefficient of the ethnic fractionalization value is not significant. Since lower ethnic diversity is due either to a large Hutu population or to a large Tutsi population in the municipality, the lack of significance of the ELF coefficient is a further indication that intimidation-driven voting was most relevant in predominantly Hutu municipalities.

⁶It is remarkable that the coefficients estimating the impact of the percentage of Hutu population, the intensity of various forms of violence, and the incumbent's previous vote share retain their significance when they are included together in the estimation model, despite the multicollinearity that exists among them.

Table 6.1: Determinants of perception that voting followed intimidations

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Violence	0.031*** (0.01)	0.034** (0.02)						
Selective violence			0.073*** (0.03)	0.079*** (0.04)				
State-violence					0.045** (0.02)	0.038* (0.02)		-0.012 (0.03)
Mass violence							0.020 (0.02)	
Hut size		0.202* (0.13)		0.227** (0.12)		0.153 (0.14)		0.202 (0.14)
Urban		-0.118 (0.15)		-0.046 (0.10)				-0.039 (0.15)
Pop.density		0.001 (0.00)		0.001* (0.00)		0.000 (0.00)		0.001 (0.00)
Wealth		-0.000 (0.06)		0.015 (0.05)		-0.004 (0.06)		-0.008 (0.05)
Literacy		0.137** (0.07)		0.105* (0.07)		0.149** (0.09)		0.178*** (0.09)
Ex.combts(all)p.c.		0.033 (0.14)		0.070 (0.13)				
Ex.combts(CNDD-FDD)p.c.						0.345 (0.35)		-0.487 (0.39)
Ex.combts(opp)p.c.						-0.022 (0.16)		-0.017 (0.18)
State-violence*Ex.combts(CNDD-FDD)								0.694*** (0.28)
Constant	0.279*** (0.13)	-0.106 (0.29)	0.279*** (0.13)	-0.163 (0.26)	0.278*** (0.13)	-0.129 (0.31)	0.311*** (0.14)	-0.046 (0.28)
Adj. R-Square	0.200	0.182	0.221	0.209	0.199	0.174	0.164	0.215


Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Note that: * $p < 0.15$; ** $p < 0.10$; *** $p < 0.05$.

But, even if a community is highly connected, a party's presence must still be visible to be effective. To dig deeper into this issue, I also consider the number of ex-combatants living in municipalities. The logic that violence perpetrated by a strong party is more compelling than violence perpetrated by a weak party can be extended to the case of a party whose strength and social control varies across localities. To test this conditional implication I focus on state-sponsored violence, and include in the estimated model an interaction term between the number of acts of violence perpetrated by the incumbent and the number of per capita ex-combatants of the CNDD-FDD (as a proxy for the presence of strongmen associated with the incumbent). Such interaction is indeed significant, and in the expected direction: the impact of state-sponsored violence had a greater (positive) effect on the perception that voting followed intimidation in localities where the number of ex-combatants was higher—and thus where the incumbent party was perceived to be more powerful. This conditional effect is shown graphically in Figure 6.3.

6.3 Violence, Turnout, and Incumbent's Support

The results of the previous section show that the perception of voting being influenced by intimidation was significantly affected by the intensity of pre-electoral violence—especially when the perpetrator relied on strongmen—as well as by demographic characteristics, such as a higher percentage of Hutu population and higher territorial density. Even though these data refer to self-reported perceptions from local electoral monitors, the results are suggestive that a strategy of

Figure 6.3: Predicted effect of state-sponsored violence on intimidation-driven voting, conditional on CNDD-FDD ex-combatants per capita



intimidation and violence was successful in influencing voting behavior when it was implemented by strong parties, especially among the same group of Hutu coethnics. It follows, then, that the effect of violence should be observable in electoral results. In the specific context of Burundi—as explained in Section 4.4—violence is expected to boost electoral participation, and to coerce voters to support the violent party.

I begin this analysis by exploring how voter turnout and support for the ruling party are related to each other in the context of the 2010 municipal elections. According to my theory, voters will eventually comply with the party that sends the most credible signal. In Burundi, this party was likely to be the incumbent CNDD-FDD. Further, the incumbent possessed the means to implement any form of intimidation, non-violent or violent. Therefore, one would expect an increase in turnout to produce higher vote shares for the incumbent. I address this expectation by looking at the relationships between different election-related re-


sults. First, I employ one of the indicators introduced by Myagkov et al. (2009) to discover fraud—the relationship between turnout (T) and a party’s share of the eligible electorate V/E (i.e., over the number of registered voters). When one regresses turnout, T against V/E —that is, when one estimates the expression $V/E = \beta T + \alpha$ —one can spot suspicious anomalies due to electoral manipulation, and also analyze how voter participation and preferences are related to one another. The assumption underpinning this method is that, in normal circumstances, if turnout increases then *ceteris paribus* a party should share in this increase or at least not suffer from it. Specifically, the coefficient β should approximate the party’s share of the actual vote and α should equal zero. While the estimated coefficients rarely match perfectly with the actual numbers, β coefficients significantly above 1.0 suggest that votes have been illegitimately transferred to the candidate or party, ballot boxes have been stuffed with artificial votes, or extreme measures have been taken to inflate a party’s support (Myagkov and Ordeshook, 2010; Myagkov et al., 2009).

Figure 6.4a plots the ruling party’s share of the eligible electorate against the turnout rate in the 2010 municipal elections.⁷ The graph shows that an increase in turnout brings an increase in the share of votes for the incumbent CNDD-FDD. The trend is even more striking when compared with the rather flat relationship for the coethnic challenger FNL, which appears not to gain in vote share from the increase in turnout (Figure 6.4b). The question arises: was this overwhelming support for the incumbent driven by electoral manipulation?

All major opposition parties declared that massive fraud occurred before,

⁷It should be noted that there is a municipality whose turnout rate exceeds 100%: Mubimbi, in the province of Bujumbura Rural. Since the motivation for this anomalous value is unknown, I drop this district from the sample in all estimations concerning turnout.

Figure 6.4: Relationship between turnout and incumbent's share of eligible votes in 2010 municipal election



during, and after the voting process. They stated that the ruling party manipulated voters before the elections by intimidating them into voting, and then disrupted the electoral results by faking the numbers and by replacing ballot boxes across the country, among other strategies. The complaints of the opposition are listed in the joint declaration issued in June 2010. The list of accusations was significant, an excerpt is below:

Technically a number of ID cards allowed several people to vote more than once without any control. The indelible ink was not indelible... A black-out was caused on the whole territory, in the precise moment in which many polling station were carrying out the ballot counting. It has been reported that during this black-out many party representatives were asked by the police to leave the polling places, leaving the counting to any fraudulent clerk... Many party representative have never signed the vote counting minutes. Several minutes have been rewritten outside the polling station and others have been falsified. It has been observed also the forced signature of the minutes even if the ballots in the black envelopes were not counted....A few days after the polling, there were discovered some ballot boxes, locked and hidden outside the polling station, with ballots that had

yet not been opened... (ADC-Ikibiri, Alliance des Démocrates pour le Changement au Burundi, 2010)⁸

However these claims were not quantified—it was not clear how many polling stations were involved, and how the results would have looked different should these manipulations not have occurred. Indeed, lack of transparency in the distribution of the electoral minutes, errors in the aggregation of results at the provincial and national level, lack of pursuit and prosecution of electoral infractions by the police and the administrative organs, and limited access to complaints filed on the municipal elections were all also noted by the European Union Electoral Observation Mission (MOE-UE, 2010). In addition to this, the MOE-UE also remarked that the door-to-door campaign was often based on acts of manipulation and intimidatory messages.⁹

While both forms of manipulation—of votes and of *voters*—might have influenced the overwhelming support that the ruling party received, it is important to separate election fraud (violation of procedures pertaining to elections) from political pressures aimed at changing voter preferences and behavior. As Lehoucq (2003) notes, “Even if we can demonstrate that retainers voted against

⁸(Original: “Sur le plan technique, les nombreuses cartes doubles d’identité et d’électeurs ont permis plusieurs individus de voter plusieurs fois, sans aucun contrôle. L’encre indélébile ne était que de nom....Sur tout le territoire national, une coupure générale du courant a été provoquée, et ce juste au moment où beaucoup de bureaux de vote procédaient aux opérations de dépouillement. Il a été rapporté que pendant cette période de coupure, bien de mandataires des Partis politiques ont été sommés par les policiers de sortir des lieux de dépouillement, laissant l’opération la merci de n’importe quel fraudeur.... Beaucoup de mandataires n’ont jamais signé sur les procès verbaux de déroulement des opérations de vote. Bien de Procès verbaux ont été rédigés en dehors des lieux de vote, d’autres ont été falsifiés. L’on a aussi constaté la signature forcée des procès verbaux de dpouillement sans que les bulletins contenus dans les enveloppes noires ne soient comptés....Dans la suite, et ce après quelques jours du scrutin, des urnes scellées, cachées en dehors des centres de vote, contenant encore des bulletins de vote non encore dépouillés, ont été découvertes dans plusieurs endroits du pays.”)

⁹Original: “D’ailleurs, la MOE UE a été interpellée quant à une campagne de porte à porte plus musclée, souvent basée sur des actes de manipulation et des discours d’intimidation. A ces inquiétudes se sont ajoutées les rumeurs de plans d’arrestation des membres de l’opposition et de distribution d’armes.” (MOE-UE, 2010).

their own interests, we cannot call this fraudulent unless a law has been broken.” Building upon this distinction, I investigate whether the suspicious positive association between turnout and support for the incumbent party was driven by procedural or post-electoral fraud, or by voter manipulation through pre-electoral intimidation and violence.

To do this, I follow Myagkov et al. (2009) and estimate the expression $V/E = \beta T + \alpha$ using the 2010 municipal election results provided by the National Independent Commission. By regressing the CNDD-FDD’s share of eligible votes on turnout, I obtain a β coefficient of 2.6. This value suggests that votes have, on average, been illegitimately transferred to the incumbent party. However, the β coefficient for the share of eligible votes of the FNL—the largest and most violent coethnic challenger, which would normally constitute the greatest concern for the incumbent party—is close to zero (-0.09), suggesting that the additional votes for the CNDD-FDD were not illegally denied to the FNL. The constant term α for the first model is extremely high (-191), which signals either data contaminated by fraud, or non-linearities in the relationship between T and V/E that must be accounted for (Myagkov and Ordeshook, 2010).

However, before declaring fraud, one must verify that the key assumption on which the model rests—that turnout varies as a function of factors uncorrelated with a party’s share of voters—holds for Burundi’s subnational sample. Such an assumption is violated if, for instance, there are factors that correlate with both partisan preferences and one’s likelihood of voting. This occurrence is not implausible—for example, rural districts tend generally to turn out more than urban districts in Sub-Saharan Africa (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2011), and

also tend to be biased in favor of incumbent parties (Harding, 2010; Conroy-Krutz, 2009). The tendency of incumbents to provide basic services to rural populations is one of the leading explanations for overwhelming support for incumbents (Harding, 2010). This situation is indeed documented for Burundi in Travaglianti (2013). On the other hand, rural municipalities (in Burundi and elsewhere) might be easier to mobilize—through both violent and non-violent means. When controlling for urban/rural municipality (or simply estimating the model on the subsets of rural or urban municipalities) the turnout coefficient drops to close to 1 and the intercept drastically decreases.

The same occurs when I estimate the impact of turnout on CNDD-FDD share of the registered voters *within* provinces: the turnout coefficient comes very close to the actual vote share obtained by the ruling party, and the intercept drops to 15, suggesting that the anomalous coefficients from the pooled sample are driven mostly by district heterogeneity rather than by fraud.¹⁰

As a further test of the suspicious relationship between extremely high turnout and overwhelming support for the incumbent, I look at the distribution of turnout across municipalities. If data are reasonably homogeneous, then the turnout distribution ought to be approximately normally distributed. Pooling all municipalities together, the distribution of turnout is a bit different from a normal distribution—especially for the highest bar, which appears to be taller than it should be (shown in Figure 6.5a, with a superimposed normal distribution). Running a Shapiro-Wilk test, which is specifically designed to detect departures from normality, we can in fact reject the null hypothesis that

¹⁰Cases like this one, which appear suspicious at first glance but are not marred by irregularities, are not rare. See Chapter 6 of Myagkov et al. (2009) for examples of recent electoral contests from the United States.

turnout is normally distributed (p-value of 0.00002). However, taking the subset of urban and rural municipalities separately—which, as I just outlined, are not homogeneous—the situation is different: the distribution of turnout does not seem to seriously violate the normality assumption in urban areas (Figure 6.5e), and in fact the null hypothesis of the Shapiro-Wilk test cannot be rejected, with a p-value of .94. In contrast, however, *rural* areas exhibit a suspicious distribution (Figure 6.5f), and the Shapiro-Wilk test returns a p-value of .15.

An analysis of historical turnout rates is helpful for assessing whether these very high turnout rates and non-normal frequency distributions are peculiar to the 2010 election or rather are consistent over time with the country's history. Figure 6.5 shows the turnout distributions at the aggregate national level for the municipal elections in 2005 and the legislative and presidential elections in 1993. It appears that turnout in 2010 varied across municipalities in a fashion that is consistent with the turnout rates in 2005. In fact, if anything the distribution of turnout in 2005 was even less regular than in 2010 (Figure 6.5b), with a Shapiro-Wilk test rejecting the null hypothesis that turnout was normally distributed in both urban and rural areas.¹¹ Similar trends can be observed for the two electoral rounds in 1993 (Figures 6.5c and 6.5d): once again the Shapiro-Wilk test rejects the null that the distribution is normal at the aggregate national level, and not when only urban municipalities are counted.¹²

¹¹The p-values are 0.0 for the pooled sample, 0.1 for only urban municipalities, and 0.0 for only rural ones.

¹²The p-values for both of the 1993 elections at the aggregate level is 0.0, while for urban municipalities it is 0.71 for the presidential round and 0.45 for the legislative one. Turnout in rural municipalities was not deviant from a normal distribution for the legislative elections, but was substantially skewed to the right for the presidential election—which was the first and most contentious in that year's polling.

Importantly, the 1993 elections were not found to be fraudulent. The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs reported that the vast majority of eligible voters were able to register, and a high percentage voted on election day. Further, on election day the transport of ballot boxes was handled in a manner that limited the possibility for fraud (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1993a,b). However, intimidation from rival candidates between and within ethnic groups was widespread (as discussed in Chapter 3.)

These facts suggests that, overall, voting behavior has been fairly consistent across elections in Burundi, and therefore the 2010 municipal election cannot be considered an outlier. While turnout appears to have been enhanced by extreme measures, especially in rural areas, it seems that the incumbent might have achieved this increase in a fair (procedurally) way—that is, without denying votes to other challengers or manipulating and fabricating official vote counts. That said, it should be noted that these findings refer to results aggregated at the municipal level, rather than at the lowest level of the polling station (the latter were never released), and therefore they cannot be taken as conclusive proof that the 2010 elections in Burundi were fraud-free. Further, information that would be key to resolving any remaining doubts—such as the complaints presented after election day and the district-level results—was never provided by the Independent National Electoral Commission. However, the findings are nonetheless strongly suggestive that the positive association between turnout and votes for the ruling party was not prevalently due to ballot-stuffing.

What, then, drove up both turnout and the incumbent's electoral support? I argue that the largest determinant was constituted by intimidation and violence—the natural implication of the violent get-out-the-vote campaigning


that is posited in my theory. Coercion is a powerful form of electoral mobilization that may have had significant influence in driving the high turnout at the polls—especially in rural areas where control could be more easily enforced due both to tightly-connected communities and political entrenchment and to lower costs for intimidation (of any sort). The peculiar findings on turnout and vote share would therefore be the product of manipulating the *voters*, and not of manipulating the results.

As such, I move on to analyzing the subnational turnout rate in the 2010 municipal election. Turnout is a clear indicator of both the scope that pre-electoral violence pursues and the success that it achieves—if one or more parties intimidate people into turning out, the outcome of a successful violent campaign can only be an increase in turnout. However, despite the expectation that a successful violent mobilization campaign would produce higher electoral support for the violent party, more votes might *not* necessarily translate into higher vote share for the violent party—for instance, because other parties also succeed in mobilizing voters, thus driving the denominator up. Further, a larger vote share does not necessarily indicate an increase in votes, but can also reflect a decrease in participation. Therefore the effect of the two competing strategies of turnout-suppression and turnout-enhancement would be indistinguishable, and any association between violence and vote share will not help in adjudicating both the role and the impact of pre-electoral violence. For this reason, in order to assess the impact of pre-electoral violence, I focus on only the analysis of *turnout*.

Turnout in 2010 was much higher than in 2005¹³ and in districts touched

¹³The numbers in Table 6.2 showing a turnout of 80% refer to the municipal elections held in June 2005. Participation in the July legislative elections was lower, at 77%.

Figure 6.5: Turnout patterns in the municipal elections



by pre-election violence in 2010 the increase in turnout between 2005 and 2010 was higher, in particular if the incumbent was the perpetrator. However, at first sight (Table 6.2) there is almost no difference in terms of turnout between the municipalities that experienced violence and the ones that did not. The same pattern is observable in the specific case of incumbent-driven violence. It should be noted, however, that turnout in 2010 was extremely high throughout the country, with a minimum of 80% and an average of almost 95%. Further, while these differences are minimal and not statistically significant, once I focus on the difference between municipalities that experienced and that did not experience *selective* (and by definition more intense) violence, the difference jumps to one percentage point and becomes statistically significant (the p-value for the difference between peaceful and violent municipalities is less than 0.07). This finding is consistent with the positive link found between selective violence and voting from fear outlined above, and suggests that *coercive* events (characterized by selective targets) were instrumental in raising voter participation, even in a context where participation was already extremely high. It is possible that group clashes and vandalism were intended only to increase tensions and prevent opposition campaign activities, while violence against individual activists or voters was instead intended (and had the effect) to discourage opposition voters from supporting their preferred candidates and encourage them to instead support the violent ones. Or, it could simply be that intense violence and clear targeted punishments were more compelling than group clashes and vandalism.

To finally explore whether violence had an effect on *actual* voting behavior across municipalities, I look at subnational turnout data and estimate an OLS regression on the 2010 turnout rate across the Burundian municipalities. Results

Table 6.2: Turnout averages in peaceful and violent communes

	All	Violence	State	Violence	Targeted	Violence
	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
2010 Turnout %	93.384	93.917	93.598	93.877	93.359	94.265
<i>T-test</i>	<i>p= 0.19</i>		<i>p= 0.32</i>		<i>p= 0.067</i>	
2005 Turnout %	80.279	80.627	80.688	80.202	80.303	80.790
Δ Turnout %	13.105	13.29	12.91	13.675	13.056	13.475
N	50	79	77	52	79	50

are reported in Table 6.3. I include a lagged dependent variable to account for unobserved historical factors that may explain current cross-sectional differences in participation rates—this variable is, not surprisingly, significant across all models. In model 2, I include socioeconomic control variables that showed a significant impact on the occurrence of violence, both to correct for omitted variable bias and to gauge substantive effects that are interesting for their own sake. Province fixed effects are included in all models. When we hold all else constant, each violent event in the municipality increased turnout by .3 percentage points. As expected, selective violent events had a stronger effect, increasing turnout by .6 percentage points. This effect is substantial. Violent events initiated by the incumbent in the municipality increased turnout by .6 percentage points.

Since high turnout is notoriously associated with electoral competition, and violence is associated with electoral competition as well, I include the value of party fragmentation based on the vote shares from 2010 (column 2). The coefficient of party competition does not impact the coefficient of incumbent-driven violence, and is consistent with the view that greater party competition is significantly associated with higher turnout. The infliction of violence from the opposition is positively associated with higher turnout, which corroborates

the theoretical claim that multiple parties would employ violence in the same constituency in an attempt to outbid each other with violence. Further, the inclusion of the count of incidents initiated by opposition parties does not change the impact of incumbent-initiated violence. The results are also robust to the inclusion of province fixed effects.

Table 6.3: Determinants of 2010 turnout

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Violence	0.000 (0.00)		0.003*** (0.00)				
State violence		-0.000 (0.00)			0.002** (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Selective violence				0.003* (0.00)			
Turnout 2005	0.127*** (0.03)	0.127*** (0.03)	0.071*** (0.03)	0.067*** (0.03)	0.075*** (0.03)	0.067*** (0.03)	0.077*** (0.02)
ENPV H. 2010			-0.010 (0.01)	-0.009 (0.01)	-0.009 (0.01)	-0.010 (0.01)	-0.013* (0.01)
Ex-combts (CNDD-FDD)p.c.			0.002 (0.03)	0.010 (0.03)	-0.004 (0.03)	-0.043* (0.03)	-0.052 (0.04)
Ex-combts (opp.)p.c.			-0.017 (0.01)	-0.016 (0.02)	-0.018 (0.02)	-0.018 (0.01)	-0.025** (0.01)
Hutu size			-0.019 (0.01)	-0.016 (0.01)	-0.021 (0.01)	-0.018 (0.01)	-0.023** (0.01)
Wealth			-0.015*** (0.00)	-0.014*** (0.00)	-0.014*** (0.00)	-0.015*** (0.00)	-0.014*** (0.00)
Literacy			0.021*** (0.01)	0.020*** (0.01)	0.019*** (0.01)	0.022*** (0.01)	0.025*** (0.01)
Urban			-0.040*** (0.01)	-0.034*** (0.01)	-0.038*** (0.01)	-0.036*** (0.01)	-0.035*** (0.01)
Pop. density			-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Opposition-violence					0.006*** (0.00)	0.005** (0.00)	0.005** (0.00)
State-violence*Ex-combts(CNDD-FDD)						0.036*** (0.02)	$\hat{\epsilon}$
State-violence*pop.density							0.000*** (0.00)
Intercept	0.829*** (0.02)	0.829*** (0.02)	0.921*** (0.04)	0.918*** (0.04)	0.921*** (0.04)	0.932*** (0.04)	0.943*** (0.04)
Adj. R-Square	0.573	0.573	0.671	0.661	0.675	0.680	0.696

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.15$; ** $p < 0.10$; *** $p < 0.05$ * * * $p < 0.01$.

Note: Hutu size not significant and not shown for space's sake.

Even though these estimation results provide sound evidence for the effect of pre-electoral violence on turnout, such results nonetheless do bear further attention. When would violence be *most* effective in influencing voting behavior? The controls suggest potential explanations, in that rural areas are found to turn out significantly more than their urban counterparts. Poorer municipalities also turned out more than wealthier ones. Municipalities with a higher aggregate of schooling turned out more than less-educated localities. These results are consistent with cross-national evidence of turnout determinants in Sub-Saharan Africa—using round 1 of the Afrobarometer survey in ten Sub-Saharan African countries, Kuenzi and Lambright (2011) find that voters are significantly more prone to participate if (among other features) they are more educated, live in rural areas, and are poorer. The positive link between education levels and voting can be explained by the general association between education and both understanding the voting procedure and having an interest in politics; however, the positive relationship with poverty and rural environments potentially encompasses several factors, including the ease of mobilizing poor and rural voters. Rural voters might in fact be more inclined to turn out to express satisfaction with the policies implemented by the incumbent during its first mandate (Harding, 2012, 2010; Nugent, 1999). This situation is documented for Burundi in Travaglianti (2013), where I show that increased access to primary education translated into electoral gains for the incumbent across the country, especially among the largely rural and less-wealthy electorate. However, as Lehoucq (2007) notes, it is also easiest to detect and punish defectors in “tightly knit communities—typically found in rural and ‘traditional’ areas.” Enforcement mechanisms and vote-buying are weaker in urban areas than in ru-

ral ones (Conroy-Krutz, 2009), and social cohesion and social conformity tend in turn to be higher than in urban areas. These conditions are all applicable to the Burundian countryside, where social and political hierarchies are prominent, the presence of political parties is structured and pervasive, and material opportunities (from jobs to access to public services) are sometimes conditioned on joining political parties—the ruling party in particular. It is therefore plausible that mobilization in *all* its forms was most successful in rural and poorer contexts.

But, was this effect dependent on violence? To address this question I add a few interaction terms to the regression: between violence and wealth, between violence and literacy, and between violence and ex-combatants. The socioeconomic features of the municipality drove voter participation regardless of the level of violence taking place in the municipality (results not shown for space's sake), which indicates that violent intimidation is only one of the factors influencing voting behavior in Burundi. The lack of significance of the interaction term indicates that the impact of violence appears not to depend on the socioeconomic features of the municipality.

Instead, the impact of violence is conditional on the presence of strongmen associated with the incumbent, proxied by the number of ex-combatants of the CNDD-FDD per capita (column 6). This result adds up to the finding in the previous section that an increase in state-sponsored violence produced a larger perception that voters were driven by intimidations in localities with a higher presence of CNDD-FDD ex-combatants. This speaks clearly to the notion of *credibility* by showing that violence perpetrated by a strong party is more compelling than that perpetrated by a weak party. Not only were Burundians

indirectly coerced by the presence of ex-combatants among their family and neighbors, but this made it easier to mobilize the population once violence was inflicted, because the probability of future violence was perceived to be much higher. One of my acquaintances in Bujumbura summed this up nicely:

People can vote with their heart, like for family, or with their head, like for getting a job, and then there is a coerced vote, when there is an ex-combatant in your family. (RC.M. Personal conversation, Bujumbura, September 2010)¹⁴

This correlation between credibility and voter turnout also provides empirical backing for a sentiment that I heard from several of my interviewees, according to whom the Burundian population would eventually prefer militarily-stronger parties because of the security that they provide. Accordingly, “People would not support the Frodebu because it has no control of the army anymore,”¹⁵ or, more generally, “Power in Africa is militarized. If one has no force, one has no power.”¹⁶ This logic sheds additional light on the decision taken by smaller Hutu parties not to engage in outright violence before the election. These parties, as I outlined earlier, established youth wings for the purpose of persuading their *committed* supporters that security could be ensured should the incumbent target them; however, they did not resort to violence as a tool to persuade lukewarm supporters or opponents because they lacked credibility in comparison with stronger challengers. So, although under my theory electoral violence is a tool to signal strength and therefore escalates when parties compete, this violent outbidding (and the impact it produces) is still conditioned on

¹⁴On peut voter par le coeur, c’est la famille, les tensions familiales, voter par la tête, ils sont les intérêts (avoir un boulot, garder son boulot s’on l’a déjà eu). En fin il y a le vote forcé, si tu as un démobilisé dans la famille.


¹⁵Interviews, 2010

¹⁶Interview with Alexis Sinduije, August 2009.

Figure 6.6: Impact of incumbent-sponsored violence on turnout conditional ex-combatants and population density

(a) Interaction between state-violence and municipal CNDD-FDD ex-combatants per capita

(b) Interaction between state-violence and municipal population density



the underlying credibility of parties as providers of violence. More broadly, this finding also speaks to existing scholarship that posits how electoral violence is the strategy of choice for weak parties (Collier and Vicente, 2010a), suggesting instead that such a strategy may not be cost-effective.

6.4 Conclusions

In this chapter I discussed the empirical implications of my theory by investigating whether violence influenced both the perception that voting followed intimidation, and the actual voting behavior on election day. This chapter also provided evidence regarding the conceptual claim that successful intimidation hinges on the ability of a political party to appear as a strong coercive actor capable of monitoring and punishing voters.

Firsthand data from a questionnaire administered to local monitors in every

municipality after the election revealed that voters *did* cast their ballots out of fear. In fact, the perception that voting behavior was influenced by intimidation appears to be positively associated with the level of violence in the municipality. Interestingly, this finding is stronger when violence perpetrated in the municipality was selective—that is, targeting specific individuals rather than being group clashes among activists. Further, the impact of state-sponsored violence had a greater (positive) effect on the perception that voting followed intimidation in localities where the number of ex-combatants was higher. This reinforces the value of conceptualizing pre-electoral violence as a coercive tool that must be credible; violence is most effective when perpetrated selectively, because this shows voters that the violent party is able to monitor and punish their behavior. Violence is also most effective when the violent party is indeed perceived to be more powerful.

In order to evaluate the impact of intimidation and violence on actual voting behavior in the context of the 2010 municipal elections, I analyzed subnational electoral results. However, electoral returns may be influenced both by pre-electoral intimidation and by post-electoral ballot rigging, so I first assessed the impact of potential procedural fraud. In the absence of documented irregularities at the municipality-level I relied on statistical techniques to analyze electoral returns. This “forensic” analysis showed that while turnout appears to have been enhanced by extreme measures, especially in rural areas, it seems that the incumbent achieved this increase in a “fair way”—that is, without denying votes to other challengers or manipulating and fabricating official vote counts.

With the possibility of ballot-stuffing removed, I then investigated whether

the positive association between turnout and votes for the ruling party was indeed due to pre-electoral intimidation and violence. I focused on turnout as the most reliable indicator of both the scope of pre-electoral violence and its success—if one or more parties intimidate people into turning out, the outcome of a successful violent campaign can only be an increase in turnout. I find that, in line with theoretical expectations, violence *did* increase electoral turnout. These results are also remarkably consistent with findings regarding the perception that voting followed intimidation, in that they show how *selective* violence was most effective in increasing turnout, and that state-sponsored violence had an impact when the incumbent could rely on a pool of strongmen and thus make *credible* threats to those who would not comply.

Chapter 7

Beyond Burundi

*Voters ... will have to choose between death and life
...If you vote for PF-Zapu you vote for death,
and if you vote for Zanu-PF you vote for life.*

Reuben Zamura, ZANU-PF candidate, Zimbabwe, June 1985.¹

*In order to ensure a victory for the people, there's no other option than
an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.*

Naveen Dissanayake, UNP candidate, Sri Lanka, 2001.²

¹Quoted in Kriger (2005).

²Quoted in EU Election Observation Mission (2001).

7.1 The Current Impossibility of a Cross-National Test

The theory proposed in this dissertation—that violence is a tool to mobilize the support of an ethnic group through coercion of coethnic votes and suppression of coethnic candidates—began with the observation of Burundi’s 2010 election and developed from there into a broader analysis of election-related violence in multi-ethnic societies. The in-depth discussion provided in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 includes considerable evidence of both the plausibility of the mechanism that I posit and its nuances. However, what I proposed in Chapter 2 is not a theory about Burundi but an abstract theory applicable to any cases that respect a set of scope conditions—namely, the presence of political parties possessing coercive capability, of politically salient ethnic identities, and of ethnically nested parties. These scope conditions are not restrictive, and can be found in a number of countries and political organizations. So, does my theory apply to these cases?

It should, but unfortunately providing a systematic test of the logic of intra-ethnic electoral violence is not yet feasible on such a large scale. The collection of data on electoral violence across the world began only very recently, and existing data are limited. I discuss below how such a test *would* be done, should all the data be available, and then I provide empirical evidence from cross-national trends and from case-studies in support of the plausibility of the theory.

In order to properly test my theory, we require several sets of indicators for the dependent variable and the independent variables. For the dependent variable, we need a measurement of pre-electoral violence that can be disaggregated to verify the identities of the individuals and parties both perpetrating

the violence and targeted by it. For the independent variables we need measures of intra-ethnic party fragmentation and of ethnic fragmentation or sizes of ethnic groups, as well as all socio-economic indicators and variables capturing the institutional framework and coercive ability of political parties.

Now, cross-national data of election-related violence have been collected (Straus and Taylor, 2012; Arriola and Johnson, 2012a) and are remarkably detailed—for instance Straus and Taylor (2012) distinguish between violence perpetrated by incumbent or challenger and between low-level or high-level violence. However, although these datasets have considerable potential to be employed for a cross-national test, they are not publicly available at the time I write this. Another hope can be found in the fine-grained data being produced at the subnational level. In the past few years local and international civil society and election-monitoring organizations have begun to implement innovative violence-reporting projects, based either on crowd-sourcing platforms (such as the Ushahidi project in Kenya’s 2007 elections)³ or on crowd-feeding platforms, such as the Amatora Mu Mahoro in Burundi, where the information is collected by trained monitors deployed across the country.⁴ Such platforms are increasingly employed and, especially when the data are crowd-fed,⁵ have the potential to provide extremely detailed and reliable information. So, even though historical data will not be available, within a few years the scholarship

³For Kenya, see: <http://legacy.ushahidi.com/>. Similar projects based on citizens’ reporting and SMS-based information-sharing have been implemented during Uganda’s 2011 elections (<http://www.ugandawatch.org/>) and Zimbabwe’s 2008 and 2013 elections(<http://sokwanele.com/>).

⁴The crowd-feeding platform has been introduced by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems within the framework of the Election Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) project that started in 2003.

⁵Crowd-sourcing comes with the risk that specific types of violence will go underreported (or over-reported) due to the informant biases.

may have access to valuable information from a set of contemporary elections in developing countries.

The independent variables also pose meaningful concerns at this stage. My theory rests on the assumption that politicians seek to obtain electoral control of an ethnic group; as such, one must be able to measure the size of the ethnic group and determine whether it is politically relevant. Further, there may be cases in which other cleavages cross-cut ethnicity (e.g., class, or ideology) (Chandra, 2005), which might therefore cause a spurious relationship between ethnicity and violence. For a cross-national analysis it might then be necessary to sample only countries with comparable cleavage structures, for instance by looking only at Sub-Saharan Africa where there is ample and documented evidence that ethnic identities are highly relevant to elections to the exclusion of other cleavages and issues (Ferree, 2012; van de Walle, 2003). These groups also share the characteristics of being less fluid than ethnic identities in other regions (Ferree, 2012), and of having subgroups that are nested⁶—which would be useful for ensuring consistency with the founding pillars of my theory and homogeneity across cases.

However, even assuming that we can put the issue of cross-cutting cleavages on the side for a moment, the availability of indicators today is regardless not sufficient. Ethnic diversity in large-N studies is usually measured by the ethnic fragmentation index. Even using the most recent indices—which rely on updated sources or different definitions of ethnicity (Fearon, 2003)—the problem remains that ethnic fractionalization does not reflect the distribution of groups

⁶However, as Ferree (2012) notes, deciding on the level of aggregation to consider is itself problematic: all of these subgroups might be politically salient, but not all will be used to create winning coalitions.

that are actually politically salient. The Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups (PREG) index constructed by Posner (2004), or the ethnopolitical cleavages index by Mozzafar et al. (2003) might provide more appropriate, theoretically-motivated indicators. Then, one should be able to classify ethnic parties and compute a measure of intra-ethnic competition. The indicators of party fragmentation are well-established in the scholarship (namely the Herfindahl concentration index, the fractionalization index by Rae and Taylor (1970), and the effective number of parties index by Laakso and Taagepera (1979)). However, in order to capture intra-ethnic party fragmentation, one must first define which parties are indeed “ethnic.”

Coding ethnic parties, and especially doing so at the cross-national level, is not an easy task. While it is commonly accepted that an ethnic party is one that champions the interests of an ethnic group, as Chandra (2011a) notes one should then clarify “what an ethnic group is, and how to tell whether a party is representing its interests.” In the empirical analysis of Burundi’s 2010 elections, I classified the parties as Hutu or Tutsi based both on the ethnic group that constituted the predominant support base and on whether the party was commonly perceived to most champion the interests of the Hutu or the Tutsi. I did so by employing primary and secondary sources, which allowed me to account for nuances in the parties’ rhetoric that might otherwise remain unobserved. For instance, even though in the official discourse many parties declared the intent to pursue the interests of *all* Burundians, I was able to (a) recognize that the same parties privileged one or the other group in private, and (b) quantify the extent to which the message offered in public was different from the message provided in private gatherings. The ethnic message was not


coded—that is, it was not offered in way that could be understood only by the target audience and not others. It was simply unofficial.

The most advanced effort to provide a coding of ethnic parties and politically activated ethnic categories is the Constructivist Dataset of Ethnicity and Institutions (CDEI) developed by Chandra (2009). This dataset allows the identification of ethnic parties according to measurement strategies that account for the use of both explicit and of implicit campaign messages. Based on the measurement of open and central ethnic appeals, the dataset codes the proportion of individuals who activated ethnic identities in their voting behavior as the vote share captured by ethnic parties in each country (EVOTE). In order to capture the support for political parties by an ethnically identified support base, the dataset introduces the variable ESVOTE, which measures the aggregate percentage of vote obtained by political parties that have an ethnically identified support base.⁷ The disconnect between ELF and the CDEI EVOTE is apparent in Figure 7.1 (in Chandra (2009)), which summarizes the relationship between ELF and EVOTE. For countries in which only some individuals activate ethnic identities in their voting behavior, the value of EVOTE would be less than 100%.

In conclusion, there is hope that my theory can be fully tested in the near future with data that are either available or currently being collected. At this stage, however, I can provide only general cross-national trends and case-study evidence to suggest the further applicability of my theory beyond Burundi. Fortunately, the evidence in this regard is abundant.

⁷The logic behind ESVOTE is that if a party is making an implicit ethnic appeal, it should show up in the nature of its support base even if we cannot code it in its message Chandra (2009).

Figure 7.1: Relationship between EVOTE and ELF. SOurce: Chandra (2009)



7.2 Violence as a Mobilization Strategy: Trends and Case-Study Evidence

The theory proposed in this dissertation is based on two key claims: one regarding the *role* of violence (for mobilizing voters, rather than for suppressing them), and the other regarding the *targets* of violence (coethnics, rather than non-coethnics). In the remainder of this chapter I take these two claims separately and discuss the empirical evidence available for each. This strategy not only provides a more nuanced test of the components of my theory, but also paves the way to expanding it. While this dissertation is centered on the concept of violence against people of the same ethnic group, the mechanism I propose can in fact be extended to any group that is politically salient and whose support is crucial for a party to achieve victory. At the core of this strategy is the choice to employ violence (or the threat of it) against candidates in order to strike them down, and against voters in order to coerce their support. This is

the first implication I discuss. Given that the strategy to eliminate opposition candidates—by imprisoning or killing them, or by disturbing or preventing their campaign activities—is widely accepted and documented, I focus specifically on the use of violence to coerce voters.


Intimidation, Rapoport and Weinberg (2001) report, is the most common form of electoral violence—more common than riots, and more common than turnout repression on voting day. Straus and Taylor (2012) quantify this observation, finding that elections marred by low-level violence indeed constitute two-thirds of all violent elections. According to Round 4 of the Afrobarometer survey carried out in 2008-09, on average one in two voters in Africa fears becoming a victim of intimidation or violence,⁸ as shown in figure 7.2a. The proportion of people who fear intimidation and violence varies considerably across countries, with the lowest level in Botswana and the highest in Zimbabwe, as shown in Figure 7.2b.

Now, intimidation is used, by definition, to coerce voters to engage in certain voting behavior, which can obviously be to vote for a given party or not to vote at all (Chaturvedi, 2005). However, even though these two coercive strategies are feasible and offer electoral returns (forced mobilization brings a higher vote share than forced abstention, if successful), the majority of discussions on electoral violence argue that intimidation is used to depress the turnout of opposition voters (e.g., Taylor et al. (2013)). I discussed earlier that both strategies can be pursued by the same party, perhaps against different targets, or that in


⁸This statistic is based on question Q47: “During election campaigns in this country, how much do you personally fear becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence?” Possible answers are 0=A lot, 1=Somewhat, 2=A little bit, 3=Not at all, 9=Don’t know, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing. (Afrobarometer Round 4, 2009). I recoded these results into a dichotomous variable in which the answer “Yes” comprises the values of 0-2, while the answer “No” comprises the remaining share of people who answered “not at all.”

Figure 7.2: Percentage of people fearing of being victim of intimidations during election campaign. Adapted from Afrobarometer Round 4 (2009), question Q47.


(a) All surveyed countries



(b) Fear by country



(c) Fear by urban/rural respondent



general different contexts can lead to different strategies. If intimidation and violence are perpetrated *only* to suppress turnout—as seems to be the predominant analysis—then we would clearly expect a negative relationship between fear of intimidation (as reported in the Afrobarometer survey) and turnout. However, if instead violence is not (always) aimed at suppressing turnout, but (also) at enhancing it, then we should expect, at a minimum, the lack of such negative relationship. This is indeed what occurs for the presidential elections held before or after the Afrobarometer survey took place, as shown respectively in Figures 7.3a and 7.3b.

The same negative relationship would be expected between pre-electoral violence and turnout. In contrast, however, the analysis provided by Bekoe and Burchard (2013) offers robust findings about the lack of such a negative relationship (Figure 7.4):


Despite the intuition that electoral violence should depress voter turnout, according to our analysis there is no significant effect of electoral violence on voter turnout in the aggregate. A closer look at the nature of electoral violence in Kenya reveals the multitude of purposes of violence; it may be used to depress turnout, to mobilize supporters, or to punish victors. Because of the many and contradictory purposes of electoral violence, it becomes difficult to measure its effects in the aggregate. (Bekoe and Burchard, 2013)

This evidence indicates the plausibility that intimidations and violence are used also for other purposes than depressing the opposition's turnout, including in fact the electorate's mobilization.

Academic research and human-rights reports suggest that pre-electoral violence is employed predominately by incumbents—notably the party with most resources and with more at stake from the elections. Interestingly most documentation reports that intimidation is broad, and encompasses threats of with-

Figure 7.3: Relationship between Afrobarometer statistics on fear of being victim of intimidations during election campaign and turnout in presidential elections

(a) Share of respondents that responded “Yes” and turnout in previous presidential elections



(b) Share of respondents that responded “Yes” and turnout in following presidential elections




Figure 7.4: Pre-election violence and voter turnout. Source: Bekoe and Bur-
chard (2013)

Table 1: Voter Turnout and Violence, Pooled Sample

Condition and Statistic	Executive Turnout	Legislative Turnout
Violence before election	66.1% (<i>n</i> = 87)	64.8% (<i>n</i> = 84)
No violence before election	64.9% (<i>n</i> = 50)	62.7% (70)
T-test	<i>t</i> = -0.42, <i>p</i> = 0.66	<i>t</i> = 0.68, <i>p</i> = 0.49

holding public services, money, or jobs, or eventually threats to personal and public security—following an escalating pattern, rather than an either/or strategy. This contrasts with recent theoretical propositions that have framed violence as a choice to be taken as an alternative to economic transfers, often preferred because it entails lower implementation costs. Instead, this evidence supports the complementary conceptual framework of pre-electoral violence proposed in this dissertation, according to which politicians encourage voters to make their choice in light of a potential cost—a cost to be defined broadly. Voting for the “wrong” side may entail loss of a job, welfare, public security, private property, personal safety, or even one’s own life. These costs are all part of the same strategy of constituting a deterrent to discourage a voter from not supporting a given party, where violence is potentially the most powerful deterrent.

Such intimidation is more compelling when control of the constituency by the political party is strong—that is, when voters perceive that politicians are able to monitor and sanction their voting behavior with reasonable accuracy. For instance, coercion is expected to be best implemented in rural areas be-

cause rural communities are tighter and social pressures stronger. If threats are sufficiently credible they might never need to escalate into outright violence, and such violence therefore occurs when support for the opposition is stronger. This can produce a situation in which intimidation might be widespread in rural areas, but violence escalates in urban areas or in opposition strongholds.

This implication has been confirmed for Burundi in the analysis provided in Chapters 5 and 6, and appears to also hold across Sub-Saharan Africa: as Figure 7.2c shows, the fear of being a victim of intimidation is greater in rural areas than in urban ones. In addition to showing that voters do fear intimidation when the incumbent is arguably more effective in imposing social control, this correlation also shows that in recent Sub-Saharan African elections voters tended to fear intimidation (but not necessarily to experience more violence) where the ruling party was stronger and the opposition weaker. This again suggests the potential role of violence for mobilization purposes. If intimidation is truly aimed only at suppressing the vote of the opposition, then fear should be most common in urban rather than rural districts; instead, we see the opposite.

Before moving to a closer analysis of specific cases in which the strategy of pre-electoral violence has allegedly been employed to coerce the support of voters, it is worth discussing the sources of politicians' coercive power—which in my theory are pre-conditions for electoral coercion.

Suppliers of violence can have several origins, including—as the analysis of Burundi indicates—ex-combatants of the armed groups from which political parties developed or with which they are associated. The availability of coercive resources therefore puts elections in post-conflict countries particularly

at risk for pre-election violence, and election-related violence is indeed significantly more likely if a country has recently experienced a civil war (Arriola and Johnson, 2012a). There are certainly many factors that can make *post*-conflict elections potentially violent: the lack of functioning democratic institutions to organize procedurally flawless elections and settle electoral conflicts, the possibility that former enemies will find it difficult to commit to a post-conflict peace agreement or electoral outcome, or the move by one or more parties to contest or disregard the election if results do not sufficiently benefit them, for example (Arriola and Johnson, 2012b; Höglund, 2009; Snyder, 2000; Kumar, 2004; Jarstad and Sisk, 2008; Reilly, 2002). These result chiefly in the eruption of violence after rather than before the vote. However, the availability of a military force to deploy in protest of the electoral outcome can also come in handy for mobilizing the electorate out of fear before the vote takes place—as Höglund (2009) notes, “tactics based on threat and intimidation should not be underestimated.” If studies on the transition from armed group to political party have stressed the lack of a political culture that can make former armed groups prone to recur to violence in general (de Zeeuw, 2008; Kumar, 2004; Paris, 2004), it is the availability of resources that makes them credible violent actors, and therefore makes feasible their coercive strategies. As an example, not all political parties that developed from armed groups in Burundi resorted to the same level of intimidation and violence—only the strongest one pursued this strategy (see Section 4.3.)

Regimes that developed from armed groups and that employed violence on voters during elections to stay in power are numerous, and many go under the classification of “electoral authoritarian” or “competitive authoritarian” regimes

(van de Walle, 2013; Schedler, 2013, 2006; Donno, 2013). According to Schedler (2013), in the past decades Sub-Saharan Africa has had the largest share of authoritarian elections—prominent examples in which intimidations marred these elections include Ethiopia (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2009), Sierra Leone (Christensen and Utas, 2008), and Rwanda. In all of these cases this violence aimed to suppress the support of opposition parties by demobilizing opposition elites and deterring voters from supporting them, both by keeping voters home and by forcing them to turn out.

However, ex-combatants and hired thugs need not be the only source of parties' military power. If parties have no proper militia branches (because, for instance, it is not a post-conflict country or strongmen are not easily hired), then another source of coercive power is constituted by criminal organizations. Moving away from Africa, this is evident even in countries that are considered free democracies—such as Italy, where politicians might seek the help of criminal organizations to control votes. As a mafioso told the judges in the 1990s “I do not solicit politicians, they solicit me at election time. I do not need them, they need me” (quoted in Della Porta and Vannucci (1999).) In contemporary Sicily, along with physical protection corrupt politicians might demand bundles of votes from organized crime. In Southern Italy the latter has created over the years a formidable structure of social control:

The Mafia makes it know in the environment in which it operates that it is able to control the vote and thus makes voters fear reprisals. Intimidations of this type is rather widespread and also the surveillance of polling places. In various cases the elections have been rigged. More often no outright intimidation is needed. Advice is sufficient. The absence of political energy and passion, the notion that a vote serves only to mark one's adherence to a clientele group and not to indicate a choice of ideas, and the leveling political tradition

among the different political parties all lead voters almost naturally, without any forcing, to respect the “marching orders” (Commissione Parlamentare Antimafia, 1993, quoted in Della Porta and Vannucci (1999))

Criminal organizations like the Mafia are therefore employed both as suppliers of credible threats and more generally as efficient brokers to manage and supervise the transaction of votes (Gambetta, 1993). Even though these practices are not allowed under Italian law, they are nevertheless widespread—two former Sicilian governors⁹ resigned due to allegations of Mafia ties, and almost one-quarter of the Sicilian regional assembly elected in 2008 were investigated for corruption or actually arrested for allegedly exchanging votes for favors with Mafia families (Sberna and Olivieri, 2013). In these cases, politicians and mafiosi are linked in an equilibrium (Gambetta, 1993) where the latter provide votes and physical protection, and the former businesses and legal protection. Organizations like the Mafia are exceptionally *credible*: the 1993 Parliamentary Anti-Mafia Commission reported that “even if no violence was deployed, it was understood that those who did not respect the vote suggestion of the family could suffer serious consequences” (quoted in Della Porta and Vannucci (1999).) The Mafia therefore represents the quintessential form of selective violence used for coercion in various businesses, including the electoral one. This is clearly described in the collection of interviews to Giovanni Falcone—one of the most engaged and effective judges in the anti-Mafia prosecution, murdered in a Mafia-led ambush in 1992—which constitute almost an ethnographic report on the structure, rituals, and functioning of the organization:

⁹The subnational government of Sicily (one of the first-level administrative divisions of Italy) is composed of a legislative branch and an executive branch. The governor is elected every five years by universal suffrage, under a plurality system.

In these organizations violence and cruelty are never gratuitous but instead represent the last resort, used when all other methods of intimidations have failed or when the gravity of the behavior requiring mafia “correction” is such that it must be punished by death (Falcone and Padovani, 1991).

Even if outright violence is still limited (because it is not necessary), in a subnational analysis of organized criminal acts perpetrated between 1983 and 2003 in Southern Italian provinces that are widely controlled by criminal organizations Sberna and Olivieri (2013) found a significant increase in the number of crimes during electoral months only in provinces where elections took place during that period.

Similar collaboration between politicians and criminal organizations or gangs, used as external providers of intimidation and violence, is not rare—among the most notable cases, in the “garrison” communities of Jamaica (Haid, 2010; Williams, 2011; Figueroa and Sives, 2002).

7.2.1 “Disciplinary murders” in Zimbabwe

Now that I have provided cross-national evidence supporting the use of violence as a mobilization strategy, I turn to specific elections where the strategy of pre-electoral violence is allegedly employed by political actors to coerce voters. Among the cases in which political parties (in particular, the incumbent) possessed coercive capabilities are elections in Zimbabwe, the analysis of which will demonstrate three things. First, violence can be used for multiple purposes, among which mobilization is important. Second, both violent and non-violent campaign strategies can be employed by political parties at the same time, and intimidation ranges in scope from the threat of removing benefits to the

threat of removing security and peace. Third, a party may become a successful coercive power—able to convince voters of its ability to monitor and punish defectors—even when the vote is actually secret.

Among the countries studied by Afrobarometer, Zimbabwe has by far the most-frightened voters. It is also one of the countries most mentioned in conceptual studies of electoral violence, cited as an example of pre-electoral violence aimed at *de*-mobilizing voters as an *alternative* to non-violent strategies (Collier and Vicente, 2010a; Robinson and Torvik, 2009), usually when the incumbent is weakened and unpopular and therefore “obliged to repress to maintain some political power” (Collier and Vicente, 2010a).

Sure enough, in recent elections in Zimbabwe violent repression has been a widespread strategy for the incumbent ZANU-PF. This strategy has apparently also been quite successful: turnout in 2008 was below 50% of eligible voters, and the major challenger (MDC opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai) withdrew from the presidential runoff despite having taken the lead in the first round. However, the question I address here is not whether violence is used in Zimbabwe for mobilization *as opposed to* repression (the answer would be no), but rather if it can be used *also* for mobilization, and if so under what circumstances.

A former British colony known variously as Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Zimbabwe gained independence in 1979 after 15 years of war. It is now a semi-presidential republic where the president is head of state and the prime minister is head of the government. Former armed-group leader Robert Gabriel Mugabe, who served as Prime Minister from 1980 to 1987, has been sitting as president since then. Even though Mugabe’s ZANU-PF was associated with the Shona ethnic group, winning rural Shona-speaking consistencies

in the past (Rotberg, 2000), since 2001 ethnicity has not been the predominant political influence in Zimbabwe (Cheeseman and Ford, 2010). Even if the ZANU-PF continues to receive support from predominantly Shona-speaking rural constituencies, the MDC (the current major opponent) is ethnically diverse (Sithole, 2001). Legislative elections were held in 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2008, 2013 and presidential elections in 1990, 1996, 2002, 2008, and 2013.

In the 2008 elections several irregularities were noted; in particular the presidential runoff in June raised concerns from the few international monitors invited to observe the election. Despite the fact that only countries and organizations perceived as friendly to the government of Zimbabwe were allowed to observe the elections (EISA, 2008), the Pan-African Parliament stated that “the current atmosphere prevailing in the country did not give rise to the conduct of free, fair and credible elections” (Pan African Parliament Election Observer Mission)—noting among other things that “hate speech, incitement of violence and war rhetoric instilled fear and trepidation amongst voters” (Pan African Parliament Election Observer Mission).¹⁰ For the first time, the Zanu-PF lost its majority in the House, and President Mugabe was forced into a run-off scheduled for June 2008 after receiving only 43% of the votes against 47% for MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai.

Violence peaked between March and June 2008; however, tensions, intimidation, and abuses of power by the incumbent started well before. Further, several illegal strategies were employed against opponents: for example, opposition candidates were prevented from campaigning, holding meetings, or participating in fair media coverage (EISA, 2008). Gerrymandering was also employed in cre-

¹⁰See also SADC (2008).

ating the electoral constituencies (EISA, 2008), and voter registration was not consistently conducted in all constituencies. In particular, the international organization Freedom House reported that voter registration went more smoothly in the ruling party's strongholds than in opposition regions, producing significant discrepancies between urban registration and rural (where the incumbent was favored).

In addition, as the March election date drew closer youth groups and war veterans linked to the ZANU-PF, as well as the police, targeted groups perceived to be supporters of the opposition, including students, human-rights activists, and representatives of certain NGOs (Human Rights Watch, 2008a). Like in Burundi, victims of political violence were not randomly targeted, but systematically included national and local leaders of the political opposition, community organizers, and opposition supporters. Was this violence aimed at discouraging people from turning out? Since many voters in opposition strongholds were disenfranchised by procedural violations, when voting was actually possible the violence discouraged people from turning out for the opposition—and in fact often encouraged them to support the ruling party to prevent future retribution. A report from the Open Society, in collaboration with the Open Society Institute and the Bellevue/NYU Program for Survivors of Torture, commented on this a year before the 2008 election:

The torture and political violence are the result of a deliberate government policy to frighten into silence anyone who may be considering supporting the opposition. In addition to the physical and psychological impact on the individual victims, such torture and political violence sends a chilling message to others: “be silent or this may happen to you.” (The Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, 2007)

The chairman of the Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights also noted the following:

What they are doing is targeting individuals that are the leaders and organizers and secretaries that organize groupings. They come in the middle of the night, pick you up, beat you and leave you there. They don't care if you die; that is one way they are beating people into submission.... They want people to be aware if anyone dares oppose the government this is what is going to happen to you. (quoted in The Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (2007)).

There's little difference between this situation and the context that preceded the 2010 election in Burundi described in Chapter 4. As in Burundi, the employment of violence against visible targets like candidates and activists in Zimbabwe had the twofold effect of demobilizing the opposition's leadership and organizational structure and of discouraging opposition supporters and sympathizers from voting for them. The strategy of using violence for multiple purposes, including to enhance voter support, became apparent after the first round in March, when the incumbent fell short of winning. According to *the Washington Post*—which was given access to the written record by a participant—during a military meeting shortly after the proclamation of the results a plan was devised with the acronym CIBD: Coercion, Intimidation, Beating, Displacement (Timberg, 2008).

During the run-up to the second round of voting in 2008, an estimated 200 to 300 people were killed and thousands beaten and tortured by Mugabe supporters and security forces, prompting Tsvangirai to withdraw from the presidential runoff despite having taken the lead in the first round. “Privately, opposition officials said the party organization had been so damaged that they had no hope of winning the runoff vote” (Timberg, 2008). However, beyond demobilizing the

MDC campaign structure, violence was also employed in retaliation to MDC supporters. ZANU-PF youths, members of a youth militia, and war veterans held “re-education” meetings coercing villagers to attend and torturing them to reveal the names of MDC supporters, who were in turn publicly tortured afterwards. The goal was simple, in the words of the general who led a re-education meeting:

This community needs to be taught a lesson. It needs re-education. We want people to come forward and confess about their links with the MDC and surrender to ZANU-PF (Human Rights Watch, 2008c).

In other cases, war veterans forced people to attend pro-government rallies where MDC supporters were made to burn their party cards and MDC T-shirts, then become members of the ZANU-PF. They also severely beat MDC supporters, and burned the homes of others (Human Rights Watch, 2008d). *The Washington Post* reports that in private briefings to Mugabe’s politburo former security chief Mnangagwa “expressed growing confidence that the violence was doing its job,” citing the large numbers of opposition activists who had been coerced into publicly renouncing their ties with Tsvangirai (Timberg, 2008) So, while unsurprisingly Mugabe won over 90% of the vote share, this share did not come from a decrease in turnout from the first round, but rather from a doubling of the votes cast for him (he went from 1,079,730 to 2,150,269) while the turnout remained the same at just over 42%. This is apparent in Figure 7.5, which compares the turnout and the votes received by the two presidential candidates in March and in June across the ten administrative regions. Interesting, the number of spoiled ballot also substantially increased between the two elections; this is consistent with a context in which people who were forced to vote were

Figure 7.5: Votes and turnout in first and second presidential round in Zimbabwe (2008)

Province	MARCH 29th						JUNE 27th					
	Tsvangarai (MDC)		Mugabe (ZANU-PF)		Spoilt	Turnout	Tsvangarai (MDC)		Mugabe (ZANU-PF)		Spoilt	Turnout
Bulawayo	49657	81%	11118	18%	551	30%	13291	30%	21127	48%	9166	14%
Harare	227166	78%	61215	21%	1452	40%	48307	20%	156478	65%	36447	31%
Manicaland	212029	59%	141592	39%	6061	48%	29561	8%	323284	87%	17525	48%
Mashonaland Central	75722	32%	157626	66%	4080	47%	4066	1%	276912	97%	3409	54%
Mashonaland East	119661	42%	160965	56%	4578	45%	11171	3%	315119	94%	7675	51%
Mashonaland West	107345	44%	134730	55%	3275	41%	18459	6%	256699	90%	10821	46%
Masvingo	145198	47%	156672	51%	7318	44%	12804	4%	321404	93%	9740	46%
Matabeleland North	70611	60%	42825	37%	3596	42%	40099	30%	84185	63%	9907	37%
Matabeleland South	34885	42%	46156	55%	2541	34%	21687	18%	92654	76%	7353	34%
Midlands	153288	47%	166831	51%	5363	44%	33555	9%	302407	85%	19438	45%

not willing to cast their ballot for the party that they did not like.¹¹

The tactics employed by the ZANU-PF in 2008 were, however, not new to Zimbabweans. According to Kriger (2005), “Organized violence and intimidation of the opposition, albeit of varying intensity, has been a recurrent strategy of the ruling party before, during and often after elections to punish constituencies that dared oppose it.” At the time of transitional elections in 1980, Mugabe led the ZANU party and had controlled its military wing during the independence war, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). During that election period, brutal acts of intimidation took place in ZANLA-dominated areas. The report issued by the British electoral observers found that ZANU-PF/ZANLA members who gathered outside assembly points employed various methods of coercion against voters:

[These methods of coercion] extended from brutal “disciplining murders” as examples of the fate awaiting those who failed to conform,

¹¹The data are taken from the independent website <http://www.sokwanele.com/>, based on data from the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission.

to generalized threats of retribution or a continuance or resumption of the war if the ZANU(PF) failed to win the election; to psychological pressures like name-taking and claims to the possession of machines that revealed how individuals had voted. (Commonwealth Observer Group and Commonwealth Secretariat, 1980) (quoted in Kriger (2005))

Indeed, Peel and Ranger (1983) suggest that one of the major factors driving people to vote for the ZANU-PF in 1980 was their desire for peace, and their belief that ZANU-PF was the one party that could ensure it. Peel and Ranger claim that that such belief was independent from the actual ability of the guerrilla army to be an effective mobilization machine, yet the line between promising violence to individual defectors and threatening to not ensure peace and safety for all is blurred—eventually, this amounts to the same strategy of attaching the high cost of lack of peace to a ZANU-PF defeat. There is a clear parallel in this strategy to the 2005 elections in Burundi that I described in Section 3.6, when people voted under the threat that war would resume if the CNDD-FDD did not win.

The underlying message of supporting a party because it is the one that would prevail in competition was conveyed also during Zimbabwe's 1985 elections: voters were openly reminded by the ZANU-PF that voting for the ZAPU opposition would jeopardize their protection and cause retribution. Violence and intimidation of suspected opposition supporters was common, including coercion to show support for the ZANU-PF (Kriger, 2005). What's more, while turnout continued to decrease over the years, violence did increase it periodically. In 1995, for example, ruling party youth and women coerced voters in Harare and Bulawayo who had avoided polling on the first day into voting the second day (Kriger, 2005). In the 2001 election, the Zimbabwe National Army

commander Constantine Chiwenga, a war veteran, reportedly toured army barracks to mobilize support for President Mugabe (Kriger, 2003). And, of course, there were the 2008 “re-education” meetings organized to compel MDC supporters to vote for Mugabe in the runoff election (Human Rights Watch, 2008b).

As such, in addition to showing that violence has consistently been employed for electoral coercion, this brief outline also empirically supports two related points that emerged from the study of Burundi: the use of violence in concert with economic-based intimidation, and the use of such intimidation even in the presence of a secret ballot.

As I discussed conceptually in my theory, politicians might encourage voters to make their choice in light of a potential cost. Voting for the “wrong” side could entail loss of benefits, among which loss of security is key. I outlined in Chapter 4 that in Burundi people considered political membership as a necessity to be able to enter the job market. Provision of basic public services, such as health care, were sometimes conditioned on being a member of the ruling party, and the denial of such services was threatened to opponents. Similarly, in Zimbabwe not voting for the ruling party was associated with the threat of not receiving food aid or land patronage (Boone and Kriger, 2010; Kriger, 2005). Kriger (2005) describes that the ruling party had previously threatened to deny or withdraw food relief aid in 1990, and this threat became heavier in the following years when an increasingly-large proportion of the electorate relied on food handouts. And, exactly like violence, denial of food aid to an opponent did not come only after an election, but also beforehand. Similarly, without a ZANU-PF party card people could not register for or receive government-

subsidized grain or farming equipment (Human Rights Watch, 2008a), and a report by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum stated that in 2005 “more people turned out for ZANU-PF than for MDC... for threat to have withheld the famine relief” (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2005). The best summary of this context is probably provided by the testimony of an opposition voter to a journalist of *the Independent*: “If the ruling party wins, it simply means that those of us who are believed to have voted for the opposition will starve, be beaten or chased out of our homes” (Kasambala, 2008).

This testimony bring us to the second point: the secrecy of the ballot box. *The Independent*’s interviewee expected retribution for those who were *believed* to have voted for the opposition, not those who were known to have done so. In fact the ruling party could not know with certainty the identity of those who voted for the opposition; however, in order to punish opposition supporters and to instill in voters the fear that their behavior could be discovered, the ZANU-PF resorted to various strategies. It first created a pervasive structure for social control in the strongholds—for instance, some village headmen and traditional leaders (whose salaries were substantially increased) ensured that people voted by accompanying them to the polling stations, while others took the names of villagers who voted or of those suspected of siding with the MDC (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2005). The Zanu-PF also used electoral results to identify areas where people voted for the MDC in large numbers (Human Rights Watch, 2008b) and then brutally punished the residents of these areas—even if the MDC *lost* to ZANU-PF in that district. The government also resorted to heavy-handed methods to individuate defectors. Torture camps were set up where suspected MDC supporters were beaten and tormented to punish them

for voting for the MDC, to extract information on the whereabouts of other MDC activists and supporters, and to force them to denounce the MDC and swear allegiance to the ZANU-PF (Human Rights Watch, 2008b). These acts of widespread and intense violence had the predictable effect of terrorizing people and making it less desirable to risk voting for the opposition, even if the choice in the ballot booth was not actually observed by anyone.

As a final note, data collected by the independent organizations Sokwanele and MyZimVote provide us with a glimpse of the relationship between pre-electoral violence and fraud. Violence and fraud during the 2013 Zimbabwe election are mapped in Figures 7.6a and 7.6b; these events were submitted by citizens and electoral monitors during the two months preceding the election (held on July 30, 2013.) Even though these events were verified by the organizations, the data could still suffer from under-reporting biases in certain locations. However, given that the reason for underreporting would be the same fear of government retaliation, it is plausible to assume that in the same localities the bias should operate in the same direction—that is, if people tend to report violence in certain places more than others, then they should equally report the occurrence of fraud. So, these maps offer suggestive patterns despite the potential biases. One can note that fraud occurred in the same regions that were marred by intimidation and violence—and actually not in all of these violent places. This suggests that the incumbent employed both tools—in addition to non-violent intimidation—as additive strategies to influence the outcome of the vote, by attempting to change both the expression of voting preferences and the actual cast ballots if necessary.

7.3 Intra-Ethnic Electoral Violence in Ethnically-Divided Sri Lanka

The final step in demonstrating the external validity of my theory is to address whether intimidation and violence are used as a campaign strategy between members of the *same* ethnic group. As shown clearly in Figure 1.1 in the Introduction, according to recent data collected by Arriola and Johnson (2012a), elections in less-diverse countries are *not* more peaceful than those in countries with medium or high levels of ethnic diversity—if anything, less-diverse countries have as much violence or slightly more than very diverse countries do. While in highly fragmented societies the occurrence of violence before elections can be driven by different motivations—and so can potentially take the form of inter-ethnic conflicts—for societies that exhibit a medium-to-low level of ethnic diversity the data support the relationship I posit between ethnicity and pre-electoral violence. Further, they suggest that the motivation for intra-ethnic violence around election time might indeed be the electoral returns resulting from control of an ethnic group. In fact, a medium ethnic fractionalization value corresponds to cases in which a small ethnic group is less capable of producing the electoral support that, alone, would allow a party to reach a majority winning threshold—therefore offering little incentive for multiple parties to fight over control of the same group.^{12,13}

These data are nonetheless suggestive, however, and should not be taken

¹²These data refer specifically to presidential elections or to parliamentary ones when the latter lead to the election of the executive. Presidential elections are often contested under majority rule.

¹³For examples of the correspondence between fractionalization index values and ethnic structures, see Fearon (2003).

superficially. In more ethnically fragmented societies there might certainly be other forms of intimidation and violence that account for the levels of violence observed there—perhaps violence that displaces voters or suppresses participation by the opposition, and that targets a sizeable opposition from outside the coethnic group. Further, in more homogenous countries there may be cases when the ethnic cleavage is not politically salient and therefore any violence within groups is not properly driven by the precise goal of obtaining control of the group.

These cases, like Zimbabwe, are relevant for showing the general logic of pre-electoral violence that I posit in this dissertation, but not meaningful for discussing how such logic is at work in ethnically divided societies. And, of course, ethnic groups that are a minority at the national level might constitute the majority in subnational districts. In these cases, certain electoral rules such as proportional representation or minority quotas might exacerbate the competition between parties for control of the group—such as, for instance, in Iraq, where competition between Kurdish parties for control of the Kurds escalated into violence before the 2010 elections. In Afghanistan, human rights organizations have found evidence of attempts to monopolize the Pashtun vote by threatening voters and the campaigners of other candidates (Human Rights Watch, 2005). Intimidation and suppression of campaign activities also occurred during the 2002 mayoral election in Newark, NJ within the African-American community, who constituted the support base for both African-American candidates. Latino voters were expected to turn out for challenger Cory Booker, so the campaign for incumbent mayor Sharpe James concentrated on coethnic African-American voters. The James campaign employed both ethnic outbidding—he claimed

that Booker was not “black enough” to understand the African-American community¹⁴—and various forms of intimidation, from control of state jobs to deployment of thugs to visibly increase tensions in the streets (Reif, 2009).

So, in order to provide a detailed account of how electoral violence is used to establish control of the coethnic electorate outside Burundi, in the remainder of this chapter I discuss the case-study of Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka has a long-standing history of ethnic conflict between the Sinhalese and the Tamils. This ongoing situation is often considered one of the most intractable ethnic conflicts (Reilly, 2001), and culminated in a 26-year separatist war between the Sinhalese majority government and the ethnic minority Tamils that ended in 2009 with a victory by the government. Although citizens are also divided along ideological lines, the ethnic cleavage is politically salient, and ideology does not overlap with ethnicity but rather characterizes intra-ethnic divisions. Further, Sri Lanka has often been mentioned in the literature among the classical cases in which intra-ethnic competition prompts parties to produce increasingly extremist ethnic appeals—that is, to engage in ethnic outbidding—to please the ethnic support base (see Horowitz (1985)); showing whether such rhetorical outbidding is also accompanied by violent outbidding is therefore of particular relevance in such a notorious case.

Additionally, the ethnic composition of Sri Lanka resembles the ethnic composition of Burundi at the national level—even though ethnic groups tend to be more segregated in Sri Lanka, there is still variation across the country that can be exploited for analysis. On a related point, the electoral rules in Sri Lanka are different from those in Burundi, and produce different ways to reach

¹⁴Booker had some Caucasian descent

the winning threshold that can be employed analytically to elaborate on the general incentives for parties to resort to violence as a campaign strategy. The absence of electoral quotas for minorities is also important, as it allows us to discuss whether mandated representation leads to the emergence of intra-ethnic conflict (as can perhaps be inferred from Burundi's history) or simply *favors* it. Indeed, electoral violence in Sri Lanka has been widespread and intense, especially in the early 2000s, and fine-grained data on election violence are available to help shed light on the dynamics of violent electoral competition.

Under the constitution approved in 1978, Sri Lanka is a presidential government with a unicameral parliament elected by a system of proportional representation combined with preferential voting. During the civil war Sri Lanka continued to hold presidential and legislative elections, the most recent taking place respectively in 1999, 2005, 2010 and in 2000, 2001, 2004, and 2010.¹⁵ These elections have been marred by intense election-related violence.

According to the 1981 national census, the Sinhalese, who are mostly Buddhists with some Catholics, make up 74 percent of the population. Tamils, mostly Hindus with some Catholics, are 18 percent, Muslims 7 percent, Malays 0.3 percent, and Burgers 0.26 percent (Lilja and Hultman, 2011). These groups are not homogeneously distributed across the country. Sri Lanka Tamils form the overwhelming majority of the Northern Province, while Indian Tamils are concentrated in the plantation districts of the central highlands. The Eastern Province is an ethnic mix of Sri Lankan Tamils, Muslims, and Sinhalese, and the Sinhalese are dominant in the rest of the country. While ethnic diversity has

¹⁵The complete electoral calendar is the following: presidential elections took place in 1982, 1988, 1994, 1999, 2005, and 2010, while legislative elections were held in 1947, 1952, 1956, 1960, 1965, 1970, 1977, 1989, 1994, 2000, 2001, 2004, and 2010.

existed in Sri Lanka since before British colonization, the salience of the Sinhala-Tamil language cleavage emerged only after independence—previous conflicts were, in fact, largely between Catholics, Hindus, and Buddhists (Spencer, 2002).¹⁶

Elaborating on the political origins of the Sinhala-Tamil language conflict and on the causes for the resulting political salience of ethnicity is beyond the scope of this section; it suffices to say that since independence from Britain ethnicity has been a salient issue of contention in Sri Lanka. In particular, a legislation passed in 1956 imposed Sinhala as exclusive national language, a provision that also caused many Tamils to lose their jobs (Shah, 2012). While Tamils began to explicitly demand separation—in particular, through the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) party—state-sanctioned violence and anti-Tamil riots grew during the 1970s and early 1980s. The civil war officially began in 1983 with violent riots against Tamil people and properties in Colombo, and the consequent flight of Tamils in the north of the island. Among various small insurgent groups,¹⁷ the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)—more popularly known as the Tamil Tigers—soon emerged as the leading force of the Sri Lanka Tamils’ fight for secession. During this period, violence against coethnic civilians and rival armed group leaders was commonly employed to achieve monopoly control over the ethnic group (Lilja and Hultman, 2011), and the LTTE has consistently displayed intolerance towards competing Tamil forces (Stokke, 2006). In recent elections Tamil political parties jointly participated

¹⁶In the collection of historical and anthropological works edited by Spencer (2002), he explores that what marked legitimacy above all in the past was support and protection for Buddhism, regardless of the ruler’s ethnic identity—in fact the last kings of the pre-colonial kingdom were Tamil-speaking.

¹⁷Namely the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization, the Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students, the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Front, and the People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam.

under the Tamil Alliance, apart from the Eelam People's Democratic Party which sided with the government.

On the other side, the Sinhalese are also politically fragmented: the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP) have dominated political life for decades. In recent years the left-wing Sinhalese nationalist JVP, responsible for most of the anti-Tamil uprisings, has become the third-largest political party. Ethnicity has played an important role during electoral campaigns, with each party engaged in ethnic outbidding to present itself as most representative of the interests of the Sinhalese majority. Political rhetoric has been dense with historical allusions to an ancient tradition of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, portraying the Tamils as ancient enemies (Spencer, 2002). According to DeVotta (2002), "Each Sinhalese political party began seeking victory in the island's hypercompetitive political arena by trying to take the most truculently pro-Sinhalese, anti-Tamil stance" (DeVotta, 2002). Indeed, Sri Lanka is one of the cases discussed by Horowitz (1985) to elaborate on the process of intra-ethnic party formation and consequent ethnic outbidding, particularly between the Sinhalese-dominated UNP and SLFP driven (respectively) by center-right and center-left political ideologies (De Silva et al., 1993). This process, which began with the 1956 elections (Schaffer, 1995; Horowitz, 1985), continued for decades.

During the 1956 elections, the SLFP developed a political identity as a Sinhala-Buddhist party, campaigning on the nationalist promise to make Sinhala the only official language (Shah, 2012), a promise that that was implemented shortly after the election.¹⁸ In the 1960 elections each of the two

¹⁸It is worth noting that once in power SLFP leader Solomon W.R.D. Bandaranaike tried to compromise with less-discriminatory legislation. He was assassinated by an extremist

major Sinhalese parties tried to convince Sinhalese voters that it alone was best equipped to secure and extend Sinhalese dominance (DeVotta, 2002). The UNP controlled the government from 1977 to 1994, when the SLFP-led People's Alliance (PA)—guided by Chandrika Kumaratunga and supported by the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, especially in the Muslim community in the east¹⁹—took power in the legislative elections. The legislative elections were followed by the presidential ones, and both electoral campaigns were permeated by ideological and economic messages but also included ethnicity. The incumbent PA represented itself as the party of peace and ethnic harmony (Schaffer, 1995), and pledged to settle the ethnic issue through devolution of power in the Tamil-dominated North-East Province (where, since 1983, armed groups had begun the separatist insurgency). SLFP leader Chandrika Kumaratunga's candidacy as president was also endorsed by several Tamil parties (Schaffer, 1995). In contrast, during the presidential campaign the UNP accused the PA of taking an accommodating approach to the LTTE, "selling-out" Sinhalese interests (Shakoor, 1994; Schaffer, 1995)—a message that echoes claims by the Burundian Hutu FNL against the ruling CNDD-FDD in the post-conflict elections of 2005 and 2010. Despite these ethnic appeals the PA leader won the support of a majority of Sinhalese, in particular in the overwhelmingly Sinhalese Southern Province. This support increased in the subsequent presidential poll, including support from among Tamils and Muslims as well. The UNP performed better in districts with larger Indian-Tamil populations, thanks to its alliance with the CWC, in particular in the Central Provinces. The UNP outperformed the PA

Buddhist monk in 1959 (Shah, 2012).

¹⁹After the introduction of the proportional system, the largest political parties allied with smaller ones into electoral coalitions in order to reach meaningful vote shares.

in the three Eastern districts and in the North province thanks to the support of the Sinhalese minority that feared the PA's position on the insurgency (Schaffer, 1995).

With the war still active, the electoral campaign in 2000 centered on plans to resolve the inter-ethnic conflict. According to an election survey conducted by Sri Lanka Data Services a few weeks before the election, the majority of people said that the main issue faced by the country was the ongoing ethnic war (Xinhua, 2000). The election was perceived by the incumbent as a referendum on a proposed new constitution that would give more power to the provinces, including the north and east where Tamil separatists were fighting. The government also promised to escalate military operations against the Tigers. However, the PA also alleged that the UNP was in collaboration with the Tamils to dismember the island (Devotta, 2003). The main issue stressed by the UNP in that election was the rising cost of living and the economy. Even though the parties' platforms were not overwhelmingly ethnic, their support base was indeed so, and both the PA and the UNP depended largely on Sinhalese voters. The PA won with a slim lead, and formed a coalition for a very slim majority with the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and a small Tamil party, the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP). It can be noted that in Sri Lanka, unlike in Burundi, political parties formed alliances both before and after elections in order to achieve the winning threshold, and votes for the coalition came from the individual parties' support bases. For instance, the People's Alliance obtained the support of the Muslim population that voted for the SLMC. This is conceptually similar to the inclusion in Burundian party lists of candidates from the opposite ethnic group—such candidates are in fact voted for because

of their ethnicity rather than for any issues that transcend ethnicity.

However, after numerous defections within the PA majority, the president dissolved parliament one year later. New legislative elections were held in 2001, won by the UNP in coalition with the SLMC. Given that the People's Alliance's vote base had shrunk considerably, it was anticipated that the party could win only if it resorted to massive rigging and violence on a large scale (deSilva, 2002). Violence was not new to electoral competition in Sri Lanka (Shah, 2012), but the elections in 2000 and 2001 were the most violent in Sri Lanka's history. Yet, even if the major parties did resort to ethnic outbidding, violence in 2000 and 2001 occurred primarily between parties that relied on the *same* ethnic groups—between the PA and the UNP for control of the Sinhalese electorate, and between the Tamil National Alliance and the anti-LTTE EPDP for control of the Tamils. Politicians were apparently behind the violence: the EU Election Observation Mission (2001) observed that during the electoral campaign for the 2001 elections the president said as much at a party rally:

We have given freedom even to kill our own people. But this time we will not allow that to happen. We will murder the murderer. I say that clearly. We will not harass innocent people. Friends, it is all right to kill a murderer.

The UNP responded that it would reciprocate:

There's no point in resorting to Gandhian principles because the ones who unleash violence have no moral scruples and do not have the brains to understand the whole idea behind peaceful protests.... In order to ensure a victory for the people, there's no other option than an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. (quoted in EU Election Observation Mission (2001))

Violence was concentrated in certain parts of the country, generally away


from the main cities and towns, and was aimed at terrorizing the electorate through attacks on opposition candidates and their supporters (deSilva, 2002). In a study of political behavior in the Sinhalese village of Niltenna in the Kandy District in central Sri Lanka—a district that experienced massive violence during this electoral campaign—Höglund and Piyarathne (2009) describe that strongmen were brought to the village to obstruct the work of the other party, and that violence did not occur randomly or in riots but rather through the targeting of politically active individuals, such as campaign organizers. Furthermore, Höglund and Piyarathne find that supporters of the political opposition UNP were victims of electoral violence to a greater extent than the supporters of the party in power.

These observations extend to the rest of the country. The Centre for Monitoring Election Violence (CMEV) collected information on political violence over the five weeks of the official campaign period, both in 2000 and in 2001. According to CMEV, during the 39 days that preceded the 2000 poll a cumulative total of 2,044 incidents were reported, with the number almost doubling between the third and fourth weeks and then again between the fourth and final weeks (Centre for Monitoring Election Violence, 2002a). The period that preceded the December 2001 election was even more violent, with the total number of reported violent events rising to 2,735 (Centre for Monitoring Election Violence, 2002b). A classification of the acts of major violence by party in 2000 and 2001 is provided in Figures 7.7a and 7.7b. Figures 7.8a and 7.8b further show that the targets of electoral violence were within the same ethnic group.

These findings are analogous to the patterns of violent events during the electoral campaigns of both Burundi and Zimbabwe, which I outlined earlier

Figure 7.7: Typology of violence in the five weeks preceding the legislative election in Sri Lanka in 2000 and 2001. Source: (Centre for Monitoring Election Violence, 2002a,b).

(a) Major incidents in 2000



(b) Major incidents in 2001





Figure 7.8: Ethnic targets of violence in the five weeks preceding the legislative election in Sri Lanka in 2000 and 2001. Source: (Centre for Monitoring Election Violence, 2002a,b).



(and charted in Figures 4.6a, 4.6b, and 4.8b). This strongly suggests that the logic underpinning the use of violence in all of these cases is the same: like in Burundi and Zimbabwe, in Sri Lanka violence was not a way to create general instability, and like in Burundi it was also not a spontaneous outburst of inter-ethnic hatred exacerbated by a sustained and tense climate of ethnic outbidding, or a method to further prime ethnic identities. Instead, violence constituted a selective method of coercion against rival coethnic parties that threatened a party's chances of victory. If the underlying strategy is the same, the question becomes, was violence in Sri Lanka used under the same electoral conditions as in Burundi? That is, did the intensity of violence vary as a function of closeness to the winning threshold, and therefore according to the size of the ethnic group and to party fragmentation within this group?

Obviously one should consider the differences in electoral rules and party structures between Sri Lanka and Burundi. While in Burundi political parties operate individually, in Sri Lanka they ally in multi-ethnic coalitions, in gen-


eral between Sinhalese and Muslim parties. In particular, the small but solid SLMC was able to rally the block voting of Muslims, increasing the election prospects of the Sinhalese party with which the Muslims allied. While in 2000 the SLMC supported the incumbent PA, it withdrew this support shortly after to run alongside the UNP in the 2001 poll.²⁰ Similarly, in 2001 the PA enjoyed the support of the small anti-LTTE Tamil party EPDP. Furthermore, while in Burundi (and Zimbabwe) there is a dominant party and sizeable opposition parties that are unable alone to reach the winning threshold, in Sri Lanka there has been alternation of power between the two largest parties and their smaller allies for decades.

In fact, the first point to note is that unlike Burundi (and Zimbabwe), where state-sponsored violence constituted the large majority of violent events, in Sri Lanka violence was divided roughly evenly between events initiated by the PA and by the UNP. This can be explained, indeed predicted, by the fact that both major parties had a reasonable chance to win—in fact, in 2001 the UNP defeated the PA. This confirms that my theory applies broadly to the strongest parties possessing reasonable expectations of achieving power.

Figure 7.9 shows the distribution of violence: the PA and the UNP account for more than four-fifths of all campaign-related violence for which the perpetrators have been identified. Most importantly, candidates, activists, and properties of the intra-ethnic challenger constitute the largest share of violence perpetrated by both the PA and the UNP, and this share increases considerably between the election in 2000 and the even-more competitive election in 2001; when the race was closer there was no doubt that a party targeted its coethnic

²⁰A splinter from the SLMC, the National Unity Alliance (NUA), remained in alliance with the SLFP.

Figure 7.9: Targets of violence in the five weeks preceding the legislative election in Sri Lanka in 2000 and 2001. Source: (Centre for Monitoring Election Violence, 2002a,b).



rival.

Figure 7.9 shows further that especially in 2000 almost a quarter of events initiated by the PA targeted candidates and voters *within the same party*. This is likely a result of the preferential voting rule, which favors the emergence of intra-party competition: voters are allowed to pick a party and three candidates from that party at the district level. The candidates with the most votes are elected, while the percentage of votes captured by the party determines the number of seats it is allocated. Accordingly, candidates from the same party competed for the support of the same electorate, and Figure 7.9a leaves little

doubt that violence was among the strategies employed in this competition (see also (Devotta, 2003).) This finding indicates that the logic of intra-ethnic violence proposed in this dissertation is indeed applicable to groups defined in a broader sense—when political actors compete between each another for the electoral control of a group that constitutes the support base of both, intimidation and violence can be employed to strike at in-group rival candidates and coerce the behavior of in-group voters. It also shows that once a party begins to employ intimidation then all others that are able must do so as well, in the attempt to set the highest cost (most violent bid) in the electoral competition.

Taking all of this into account, I now move to analyzing whether violence across Sri Lanka increased as the ethnic-group size constituting the support base of violent parties also increased. Data on the ethnic-group composition of the population are only available at the first-level administrative division of the districts. At the time of these elections Sri Lanka was composed of 22 districts, the population of which in 2001 according to census ranged between roughly 400,000 and 2,200,000 (Sri Lanka Department of Census and Statistics , 2001).²¹ These divisions are not comparable to the highly disaggregated data of the Burundian municipalities (the population of which ranged between roughly between 20,000 and 155,000), and the small sample (22 observations) reduces the power of statistical tests. However these data nevertheless provide suggestive correlations. For simplicity I focus on the 2001 elections, which were also the most violent.


As Figure 7.10a shows, pre-electoral violence intensified in districts with a

²¹The census does not include information on the eastern and northern districts (namely, Digamandulla, Trincomalee, Batticaloa, and Jaffna and Wannai.) Data on these districts are based on the figures provided by Shah (2012).

sizeable groups. Although violence was less intense, dozens of incidents nonetheless did occur in these districts. According to other theories of pre-electoral violence, parties might target non-coethnics to suppress their turnout or to foment inter-ethnic riots to prime ethnic identities—a possibility that should in particular be expected in the presence of Tamils. Conversely, if my theory as presented here is correct, such violence would instead (or, at least, also) occur *within* ethnic groups to mobilize the support of those groups. And, as predicted, in Batticaloa and Digandulla, where Tamils made up respectively 74% and 18% of the population, and Muslims 25% and 44% (and even though in some parts of Batticaloa government forces attempted to prevent LTTE supporters from voting at all (People’s Action for Free and Fair Elections and the Movement for Free and Fair Elections, 2001)), major incidents were reported between candidates from the Muslim SLMC and Muslim-inclusive PA (EU Election Observation Mission, 2001). Similarly, even though the SLFP and the UNP did compete in the northern districts, conflicts were also recorded between the Tamil National Alliance and the anti-LTTE Tamil EPDP (EU Election Observation Mission, 2001).

From the data described so far, it is clear that violence was used by politicians to disrupt the campaigns of major challengers appealing to the same support base. According to my theory, violence should then be used primarily when it brings the highest electoral returns—that is, when the party is close to the winning threshold. Due to the electoral rules and existing party structure, in Burundi the incentive for the incumbent was higher when it was close to the majority of votes, and violence became more intense when the incumbent faced a sizeable yet smaller opposition that was able to fight back. Applying the same

Figure 7.11: Territorial control of the Tamil Tigers in 2006. Source: Stokke (2006)




the nationalist left-wing People's Liberation Front obtained 6% in the 2000 general elections. Due to the characteristics of the major parties, about half of the districts have a polarized intra-Sinhalese space (the intra-ethnic ENPV ranges from 1.85-1.99, which means that the two parties are roughly the same size), while in the other half the third party makes the space more fragmented. As expected, for the same value of intra-ethnic fragmentation the number of violent events is on average higher when the Sinhalese share of the population is larger. More specifically, when the proportion of the Sinhalese ethnic group is less than 80%, violence is less and generally occurs when the intra-ethnic fragmentation is lower—that is, when both intra-ethnic parties already control a large share of the group, which positions them closer to the threshold. The presence of additional competitors reduces the incentives for violence. By contrast, when the Sinhalese size is large, violence goes up, and it remains high even when the ethnic group is more politically fragmented into larger competing parties.

Of course these data are merely suggestive since they are disaggregated at only the large district level and do not distinguish between intra and inter-ethnic violence. Furthermore, the dynamics of Muslim and Tamil parties are not fully accounted for. However, even in this imperfect fashion, these data show a striking parallel with Burundi (see Figure 5.4) and, more broadly, confirm that this pattern of intra-ethnic violence constitutes the natural empirical implication of the fact (described by Horowitz (1985)) that large ethnic groups enjoy the luxury of having more than one party that can reach the winning threshold—these parties compete with one another, and can employ violence to mobilize support of that ethnic group.


And in closing, this section on Sri Lanka would not be complete without

Figure 7.13: Violence by ethnic group size and intra-ethnic party competition in Sri Lanka 2001 elections



a look at the relationship between violence and fraud. Allegations of fraud were widespread and deSilva (2002) reports that “expertly calibrated rigging in selected polling divisions had increased the government’s poll by 5 percentage points or more, nationally, while the UNP lost as much.” Heavy-handed means were employed to allow vote-rigging, such as thugs protecting poll clerks engaged in ballot stuffing, or killing poll workers transporting ballot boxes (Devotta, 2003; deSilva, 2002). According to the theoretical framework, and as shown in Zimbabwe, a party might employ both violence and fraud—in addition to nonviolent appeals and intimidation—as additive strategies to influence the outcome of the vote, by attempting to change both the expression of voting preferences and the actual cast ballots if necessary. On election day in Sri Lanka monitors affiliated with the Centre for Monitoring Election Violence visited over 60% of the polling station and recorded that 15% of the polling stations they visited operated in a seriously flawed manner because of irregularities (Centre for Monitoring Election Violence, 2002b). I exploit the variation in proportion

Figure 7.14: Violence and percentage of fraudulent polling stations



of flawed polling stations to explore whether fraud occurred in the same regions that were marred by intimidation and violence. Indeed, as shown in Figure 7.14, there is a positive correlation between campaign violence and election malpractice: high incidence of violence during the campaign correlates with a high level of violations on polling day.

7.4 Conclusions

This chapter concludes the empirical assessment of my theory of intra-ethnic pre-electoral violence. While (because of the scarcity of publicly available appropriate data) it is not yet feasible to carry out a systematic test of the logic of intra-ethnic electoral violence on a large scale, I nonetheless provide considerable empirical evidence from cross-national trends and from case-studies to support its plausibility. Specifically, I offer in-depth analyses of various components of the theoretical mechanism linking intra-ethnic divisions to electoral violence; this strategy allows me to reach a level of detail that would otherwise

not be possible in a large statistical analysis. While this approach does not provide statistical external validity, it at least offers a more nuanced application of the components of my theory, and moreover paves the way to expanding it.

In order to cover the details of my argument, I separate the two key claims on which my theory rests—the role of violence in *mobilizing* voters, and the targets of violence being *coethnics* rather than non-coethnics. Then I discuss the empirical evidence available for each. I begin by addressing the widespread opinion in the literature that when violence is employed to influence voting behavior it follows the goal of suppressing participation, rather than of increasing it in favor of a given party. I first consider the empirical implications of such claims, then show that there is no clear and definitive link between pre-election violence and turnout—relying both on an existing statistical study of elections across the world (Bekoe and Burchard, 2013) and on citizens’ responses from a recent Afrobarometer survey for a sample of Sub-saharan countries. The lack of this projected negative relationship between violence and turnout demonstrates that violence is not (or at least, not always) aimed at suppressing turnout, but (also) at enhancing it.

In a specific discussion of violence as a mobilizing strategy, I focus on Zimbabwe—one of the African countries most renowned for its high levels of electoral violence—to explore the process of violent campaigning. An analysis of three decades of electoral improprieties allows me to show clearly that violence can be used for multiple purposes, among which mobilization is important. This case-study also allows me to elaborate on other conceptual claims that were relevant to the construction of my theory, and that also emerged across the Burundi case-study. Namely I show that both violent and non-violent strategies can be

employed by political parties *at the same time*, and that intimidation ranges in scope from the threat of removing benefits to the threat of removing security and peace. Further, a party may become a successful coercive power—able to convince voters of its ability to monitor and punish defectors—even when the vote is actually secret.

Some of these factors also emerge in the analysis of Sri Lanka, a case-study that I employ primarily to discuss the occurrence of violence between coethnics rather than non-coethnics. This analysis demonstrates that, like in Burundi, in Sri Lanka the parties focused on their own ethnic strongholds with both carrots and sticks: knowing that cross-ethnic voting was unlikely, they presented themselves as the best representative of the given ethnic group (ethnic outbidding) while also working to intimidate voters and demobilize opposition candidates within the same ethnic group (intra-ethnic violent outbidding). While such a strategy may be the only alternative in districts composed by one predominant group, the analysis shows that in districts with larger ethnic minorities violence was still recorded primarily between parties from within the same ethnic group, either Sinhalese, Tamil, or Muslim.

In addition to discussing the use of ethnic rhetoric by the major Sri Lanka political parties, I also rely on sub-national data on pre-electoral violence, ethnic-group size, and electoral results for the 2000 and 2001 parliamentary elections—the most violent in Sri Lanka’s history—to explore whether the relationship between these data is similar to the results I found for Burundi. And, even though the data are available at a much lower level of geographical disaggregation than my dataset for Burundi, similarities are readily apparent. First, the majority of election-related violence is perpetrated by the largest Sinhalese

parties, which targeted one another and did so more when the size of their coethnic support base was larger. Second, the incumbent is again the largest perpetrator of violence (even though at a lesser extent, given the Sri Lanka bipolar political structure), especially when it is stronger and expects to be closer to the winning threshold (which, given the Sri Lankan electoral and political context, is equivalent to winning as many votes as possible). Such violence is again accompanied by other type of intimidation, and by fraud at polling stations on election day. The data also suggest that violence is associated with electoral returns that are a product of both ethnic-group size and intra-ethnic party competition, since for the same value of intra-ethnic fragmentation the number of violent events is on average higher when the Sinhalese share of the population is larger—exactly the same pattern observed in Burundi.

As such, from this analysis of the case-studies come two major empirical patterns. First, there is a strong connection between violent and non-violent types of intimidation, which suggests that intimidation should be classified as a broad and comprehensive category based on the strategy to rally voters on the base—not for the gain from voting for a certain party, but rather from the danger attached to *not* voting for a party. Second, the case-studies of Zimbabwe and in particular Sri Lanka suggest a revisiting of the relationship between violence and procedural fraud, suggesting that rather than constituting *alternative* strategies, they are instead part of a comprehensive effort put in place by parties—generally the incumbent—to win uncertain seats. Finally, the Sri Lanka case provides clear evidence that the strategy of pre-electoral violence about which I theorize in this dissertation is a coercive method to obtain control not specifically of the ethnic group, but simply of the *group* that constitutes the

party's expected support base. For example, intra-party competition is in fact not rare, in cases such as party primaries or when certain electoral rules (e.g., preferential voting) encourage candidates to compete for the support of the same group of voters. Such competition, like competition between different parties for the vote of the same ethnic group, can turn violent for the same reasons that my theory conceptualizes.²²

²²Example of violent intra-party competition are, among others, in Kenya and Malawi (Musuva, 2009).

Chapter 8

Conclusions

8.1 Summary of Contributions

This dissertation has offered and empirically discussed a theory that pre-electoral violence can be used by politicians as a tool to monopolize the electoral support of those sharing the same ethnic identity, through the coercion of coethnic voters and the suppression of coethnic candidates.

While electoral violence is frequent and consistent enough to cause serious concern, the causes for pre-electoral violence have yet to be clarified; a systematic data collection effort at the cross-national level has begun in recent years, but findings are not yet conclusive. In particular, even though these violent elections occur primarily in countries that are ethnically heterogeneous, none of the cross-sectional studies on election-related violence has so far found a clear and significant correlation between ethnic fragmentation and electoral violence (Straus and Taylor, 2012; Arriola and Johnson, 2012a), and countries with large ethnic majorities appear to be as violent as more ethnically diverse nations. To account for this gap, and specifically for the fact that none of the existing the-

ories on electoral violence in ethnically divided societies is able to explain the patterns of political violence preceding the 2010 elections in Burundi, this dissertation has argued that in countries with large majorities violence is employed in the period before elections to gain control of an ethnic group that is instrumental for victory, targeting candidates and voters not of other ethnic group(s) but from within the *same* ethnic group.

I have distinguished two options that are available to political parties for establishing control over the ethnic group: suppression of rival candidates, and coercion of voters. The latter differs according to the political inclinations of the targets, such that a party can use violence to enhance the turnout of lukewarm supporters and to compel the vote of political defectors and opponents within the same ethnic group.

Violence in the exercise of coercion is directed at punishing support for co-ethnic political challengers and deterring such support in the future. Politicians resort to increased violence against people and properties of meaningful interest and visibility as a costly signal when simple intimidation is not credible. Supporting a strong party allows a voter to avoid violence both from the party for which he or she cast the ballot and from rival parties. Therefore, when multiple parties compete for the support of the same ethnic group, a situation analogous to the classical ethnic outbidding argument takes place: once a party begins to employ intimidation then all others that are able must do so as well, in the attempt to set the highest cost (most violent bid) in the electoral competition.

In addition to explaining why violence would take place before elections between members of the same ethnic group, this dissertation has also explained under which electoral conditions a party relies on such coercive means to mobi-

lize the ethnic base. I argue, in accord with much of the existing literature, that a party is more likely to employ violence when it is close to the winning threshold. However, I have expanded this hypothesis by positing that in an ethnically divided society, where political parties compete—and employ violence—for the support of only one ethnic group, it is the size of the ethnic group and its internal fragmentation that determine closeness to the winning threshold, and as such also determine the returns for a violent campaign. In particular, I posited the pattern—to be further refined according to the specific electoral context of the country or locality under analysis—that violence is more likely when intra-ethnic party fragmentation is near a level that allows at least one party to be close to the winning threshold, and that violence within an ethnic group is more likely when that group’s share of the population is larger.

The argument that I propose positions this dissertation at the intersection of the scholarship in ethnic politics and electoral violence. My theory accounts for data and behavior that other analyses do not, and by developing for the first time a theory of intra-ethnic violence in elections this dissertation *complements*, rather than contradicts, existing explanations for election-related violence in ethnically divided societies. In fact, previous studies on electoral competition in such societies are divided between those in which ethnic identities are not salient enough—and therefore violence between groups is deliberately fomented to increase the salience of ethnic divisions¹—and those in which ethnic identities are already salient and politicians either appeal to mass extremism² or suppress the turnout of the non-coethnic opposition³. While my argument applies only

¹Wilkinson (2004); Wilkinson and Haid (2009).

²Rabushka and Shepsle (1972); Horowitz (1985).

³See Collier and Vicente (2010a); Kagwanja (2003); Klopp (2001); Kasara (2012); Kimenyi and Ndung’u (2005).

to cases in which the ethnic division is already salient (and therefore is not in conflict with the first set of theories), it is not irreconcilable with the second set either. On the one hand it is possible—and indeed likely—that intra-ethnic violence co-exists with intra-ethnic rhetorical appeals as different methods to pursue the same goal of control over the coethnic electorate; on the other hand a violent campaign aimed at increasing support from coethnics might well be accompanied by a violent campaign aimed at decreasing the participation of non-coethnics.

My dissertation further advances the literature on ethnic politics by extending the study of intra-ethnic violence to countries that are not in the midst of civil wars,⁴ and the literature on electoral violence by making a case for the use of violence to mobilize voters to turn out and to support a given party.

8.2 Summary of Findings

In order to discuss the theoretical framework and the empirical implications associated with the theory of violence advanced in this dissertation, I analyzed in-depth the case study of Burundi, and also evaluated how my theory applies elsewhere. For the analysis of the case of Burundi I relied on interviews, questionnaires, and an original dataset of quantitative sub-national data—including election-related violent events, electoral and socioeconomic factors, public policies, and the armed presence of political parties in each of Burundi's 129 municipalities—that I collected in the field between 2009 and 2010.

⁴For studies on intra-ethnic violence during civil wars, see Brubaker and Laitin (1998); Höglund (2005); Laitin (1995); Lilja and Hultman (2011); Jaeger and Paserman (2006); Pearlman (2009); Straus (2006); Caspersen (2009); Hislope (1996); Staniland (2012); Warren and Troy (2011); Boyle (2009).

This analysis provides a nuanced assessment of the theoretical framework, but also important implications for future research.

The analysis of the 2010 elections in Burundi demonstrated clearly that during the electoral campaign violence was used to signal strength and the ability to protect supporters, to punish defectors and intimidate potential defectors, and to coerce opponents. Parties focused on their own ethnic strongholds with both carrots and sticks: while they presented themselves as the best representative of the given ethnic group (ethnic outbidding), they also worked to intimidate voters and demobilize opposition candidates within the same ethnic group (intra-ethnic violent outbidding).

The quantitative analysis shows that pre-electoral violence was strategically limited to uncertain seats: the ruling party was most violent in districts where it expected to win or to lose by only a small margin. Moreover, violence escalated in places where the opposition also initiated violence. In these districts, violence was directed predominately against voters and candidates of the same ethnic group as the incumbent, and was more sustained when the incumbent faced a sizeable and unified *coethnic* opposition—not because small opposition parties are crucial sources of electoral support, but rather because such small opposition parties can be easily demobilized or coerced. Furthermore, by exploiting data on the provision of public goods—and the popular reaction to such provision—during the incumbent’s first mandate, I showed that violence constituted a last-resort option, used to coerce voters when other forms of persuasion were not expected to suffice.

Moving to the territorial variation of all acts of violence, I also showed that escalation of pre-electoral violence in each administrative district can be

explained, consistent with the theoretical expectations, by the district's ethnic composition and intra-ethnic political fragmentation—the number and the intensity of violent events in a municipality were greatest when the majority ethnic group was larger and had an asymmetric party structure (that is, where the margin of victory between the first and second party within the ethnic group was not close, and the opposition to the winning party not highly fragmented—that positioned at least one party close to the winning threshold of 50% of the vote.)

The dissertation also elaborated on the impact of such intimidation and violence on voters' beliefs and behavior. From a questionnaire administered to local electoral monitors in every municipality across Burundi, and from post-election results, it emerged that intimidation and violence significantly impacted the perception that voting behavior was influenced by intimidation—especially if the violence was targeted at specific individuals (rather than being group clashes), and intense state-sponsored violence had a greater effect in localities where the incumbent party was perceived to be more militarily powerful. In accord with the coercive goals that I theorize, I also find that violence did have a direct impact on voting behavior, as it increased electoral turnout—particularly when the incumbent could rely on a pool of strongmen and therefore make *credible* threats to those who would not comply (while also offering credible security to supporters). Moreover, I show that the incumbent achieved this increase in participation (in turn correlated with an increase in vote share) in a fair (at least procedurally) way—that is, without denying votes to other challengers or manipulating and fabricating official vote counts. This demonstrates that electoral manipulation took place prevalently *before* the polling through intim-

idation and coercion that altered the free expression of what might otherwise have been true political preferences.

Finally, I discussed the applicability of my theory beyond Burundi, providing considerable empirical evidence from cross-national trends and from case-studies. In order to cover the details of my argument, I separated the two key claims on which the theory rests—the role of violence in *mobilizing* voters, and the targets of violence being *coethnics* rather than non-coethnics. Relying on existing statistical studies and survey data from Sub-Saharan Africa, I showed that violence is not (or at least, not always) aimed at suppressing turnout, but (also) at enhancing it, and then used the case-study of Zimbabwe to explore further the process of violent campaigning to demonstrate that violence can be used for multiple purposes, among which mobilization is important. An analysis of Sri Lanka finally provided evidence of the occurrence of violence between coethnics rather than non-coethnics in a country that is similar to Burundi in terms of demographic and ethnic salience. I showed that, like in Burundi, in Sri Lanka the parties focused on their own ethnic strongholds with both carrots and sticks: knowing that cross-ethnic voting was unlikely, the parties presented themselves as the best representative of the given ethnic group while also working to intimidate voters and demobilize opposition candidates within the same ethnic group. Relying on sub-national data for the 2000 and 2001 parliamentary elections, I further showed that, again like in Burundi, most election-related violence was perpetrated by the largest parties within the Sinhalese majority, which targeted one another and did so more when the size of their coethnic support base was larger.

8.3 Implications for Further Research

The findings outlined in the previous section provide a nuanced assessment of how the theory proposed in this dissertation can be applied. But, they also indicate additional relevant results and pave the way for extension. A first takeaway point is that electoral violence constitutes a subset of political violence and, as such, violent strategies can travel across political conflicts if the scope conditions and the overarching goals are the same. Related to this point is the evidence (especially from the Sri Lanka case) that the strategy of pre-electoral violence about which I theorize in this dissertation is a coercive method to obtain control not specifically of the ethnic group, but simply of the *group* that constitutes the party's expected support base. This opens the way to include other forms of violent competition within groups—such as intra-party competition—into a comprehensive analysis of electoral violence. In addition, at least three further lines of further research depart from this dissertation: the implementation of coercion at the micro-level, the relationship between violent and non-violent strategies (including fraud), and the impact of political institutions on the incentives for intra-ethnic violent competition.

In outlining my theory I spend considerable time stressing that political parties employing electoral intimidation and violence as a coercive strategy must be credible, in both their ability to monitor voters and to punish them. However my theory does not fully elaborate on the ways in which parties implement these two crucial activities. The case-study of Burundi shows that the presence of ex-combatants was consistently associated with both violence and influence over voting behavior . Rural and densely populated municipalities also exhibited similar patterns, and youth groups' activities were anecdotally associated

with intimidation. I interpret these findings as evidence that in municipalities where the incumbent relied on a larger group of strongmen that party was best equipped to coerce voters. Similarly, the Zimbabwe case-study illustrates how war veterans, private militias, and youth groups were employed by the incumbent to inflict harm and torture, and how the party penetrated the social and political structure of the villages to monitor voting behavior even though the vote was actually secret.

Further work is therefore needed to explore the micro-dynamics of electoral coercion. An immediate extension would be an analysis of the impact of ex-combatants in post-conflict elections,⁵ which would also advance emerging literature on the transition from armed groups to political parties (de Zeeuw, 2008). Another interesting extension would focus on external actors hired to monitor and coerce voters, similar to the study on brokers employed to dispense bribes and patronage in clientelistic regimes (e.g., Stokes (2005); Stokes et al. (2013)). The example I provided about the connection between politicians and criminal organizations such as the Mafia in Southern Italy suggests that such a dynamics of decentralized electoral coercion might indeed take place, even in more developed democratic contexts.

The second point pertains the relationship between violent and non-violent strategies, including fraud. My theoretical framework recognizes that economic benefits and ideological and personal preferences are certainly important to voters, but also suggests that intimidation might be even more persuasive. The

⁵Case-studies on the life and reintegration of ex-combatants exist (e.g., Humphreys and Weinstein (2007); Gilligan et al. (2012)), but not on the role of ex-combatants during elections, and a cross-national dataset has not yet been produced.

evidence establishes that in the context of intimidation multiple forms of threats can be put in place at the same time by the same party—examples from Burundi and Zimbabwe show that the government threatened to withhold public services—and that arguably violence constitutes the most powerful deterrent of all, especially in contexts where voters have no personal or institutional means to protect themselves from it. The data from Burundi also suggest that violence was used when the constituency was not expected to support the incumbent based on the provision of public services. While most conceptual studies of electoral violence tend to consider violent and non-violent methods as alternative electoral strategies, my analysis suggests that they are instead consequential—violence is employed if other strategies are not expected to suffice. This finding should therefore be expanded, and considered in conjunction with the observation that the major perpetrator of violence before elections is the incumbent—the party that in general is able to use (and abuse) national resources. Given this, further investigation should focus on how powerful parties engage in a *comprehensive* effort that encompasses both violent and non-violent means to win uncertain seats. More broadly, the relationship to be investigated is the one between reward-based appeals and intimidation-based appeals.

Within this framework, it also is meaningful to address how violent strategies relate to fraud. Intimidation and violence are part of the larger set of electoral manipulation tactics. The goal of electoral manipulation is to influence the electoral outcome, although the ways of going about this differ in method, timing, and necessary resources. Election fraud is defined as the violation of procedures pertaining to elections; it can occur before the polling takes place (for example, by denying voter registration to eligible voters), during polling

(allowing people to vote multiple times), or afterwards (by stuffing ballot boxes or fabricating vote counts). Intimidation and violence occur by definition before the vote, and alter the free expression of what might otherwise have been true political preferences (Lehoucq, 2003).

However, most studies on the relationship between fraud and electoral violence focus on the impact of rigged elections on *post*-electoral protest (Tucker, 2007; Daxecker, 2012; Hafner-Burton et al., 2012; Crost et al., 2013). Although few address pre-electoral violence, Collier and Vicente (2010a) posit that a strong incumbent facing local competition will prefer bribery or ballot fraud to violence. This claim follows from the assumption that the incumbent can always win through ballot fraud, and that voters cannot be intimidated to vote for the incumbent. On the other hand, Molina and Lehoucq (1999) argue that the more competitive elections are, the more likely electoral fraud is since the stakes are higher for all participants. And, while violence has generally followed fraud when the latter does not seem sufficient to ensure the desired vote share (Rapoport and Weinberg, 2001),⁶ recent elections have been increasingly monitored—fraud certainly continues to exist, but it is nonetheless easier to detect, and now carries potential costs in terms of international recognition and aid. Similarly, the day of the election is now often remarkably peaceful (Bekoe, 2012; López-Pintor, 2006). This implies that, if procedural fraud does take place, it is more likely to occur before elections or afterwards: in both cases the ability of the parties (generally the incumbent) to influence the outcome of the vote might be constrained and less effective, raising the necessity of engaging in the alternative strategies to manipulate votes before they are cast. Accordingly,

⁶In such cases, violence took place during the polling.

pre-electoral intimidation and violence might be instead part of a comprehensive effort put in place by parties—generally the incumbent—to win uncertain seats.

A final implication of this dissertation concerns the role of political institution on contentious electoral competition in ethnically divided societies. The analysis of Burundi shows that the introduction of power-sharing between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups in all major organs of state power, from Parliament to the Army, drastically reduced the usage of inter-ethnic violence to cement intra-group cohesion, and led instead to conflicts *within* the ethnic groups becoming more apparent and salient. This can be explained by the fact that these kind of institutions, together with proportional representation, provide substantial incentives for candidates to appeal to coethnics and for voters to vote ethnically. Therefore, non-coethnics become an unlikely target of coercion, since the cost they face to comply is particularly high. While power-sharing institutions are not a necessary condition to encourage the emergence of intra-ethnic competition, they certainly constitute a sufficient condition for the decline in inter-ethnic competition—political competition ceases to be a zero-sum game among ethnic groups. However, political competition instead becomes a zero-sum game *within* ethnic groups. A potential outcome from this type of institutional provision can therefore be that while ethnicity remains salient, perhaps the electoral conflict goes from being inter-ethnic to intra-ethnic and, as a consequence, the salience of the intra-ethnic cleavage increases. A systematic investigation of this issue would contribute to the literature on institutional peace-building in ethnically divided societies, and by describing a transformation of the nature of the conflict would perhaps address longstanding

skepticism regarding recognition of the ethnic issue at the power level—blamed for entrenching ethnic divisions and perpetuating inter-ethnic conflict (Reilly, 2001; Simonsen, 2005; Belloni, 2004; Booth, 2001).

Appendix A

Is it appropriate to use 2005 vote shares to measure party competition in 2010?

All independent variable measuring political competition is based on the electoral results of the 2005 communal elections, as the parties' vote shares in 2010 may be endogenous to violence. However, a potential caveat may be that a number of parties that did not exist in 2005 took part in in the 2010 elections¹, hence the 2005 values may not be indicative of the context conditions which preceded the 2010 elections. In 2010 the strongest challenger to the ruling party CNDD-FDD was the FNL, a political momevement that was still active as an armed group in 2005, named Palipehutu-FNL. It is very likely that the areas where the Palipehutu-FNL was most active or had its strongholds during the rebellion supported the political party during the 2010 elections. Would the opposition to the CNDD-FDD in 2005 mirror in some way the electoral support

¹namely the FNL, UPD and MSD

to the FNL in 2010? If this is the case, we can reasonably use the ENPV in 2005, since the share of the opposition to the CNDD-FDD in 2005 would be similar to that one in 2010. The strongest opposition to the CNDD-FDD in 2005 was constituted by the Frodebu, which obtained 22% vote shares at the national level. In 2010 Frodebu obtained only a bit over 5%, while FNL scored 15%. Statistically, Frodebu in 2005 explains perfectly the vote shares of FNL in 2010. The R^2 , which indicates how much variation in the FNL vote shares across communes is explained by the variation of the Frodebu's support, equals a remarkable .68 with no other covariates, a results which is not obtained with any of the other Hutu parties in 2005. The coefficient and R^2 are even stronger in the province of Bujumbura Rural, the historic stronghold of FNL (respectively $\beta = .78$ and $R^2 = .71$). Relevant figures of the movement also confirmed this inference²

Table A.1: FNL vote share in 2010 explained by Frodebu 2005

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
frodebu2005_sh	0.619**	(0.057)
Intercept	-1.112	(1.060)

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. † $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$.

²“The FNL did not tell its supporters for whom they had to vote; however, in order to express their disagreement with the CNDD-FDD, FNL supporters often voted for the Frodebu. They did not necessarily shared the ideas, but it was considered as a way to fight the CNDD-FDD in the elections. It happened massively in Bujumbura Rural, and likely in other provinces” (author’s interview with FNL senior member, Bruxelles, August 2011).

Appendix B

Bibliography

- Aalen, L. and Tronvoll, K. (2009). The 2008 ethiopian local elections: The return of electoral authoritarianism. *African Affairs*, 108(430):111–120.
- ADC-Ikibiri, Alliance des Démocrates pour le Changement au Burundi (2010). Memorandum sur les irregularités et fraudes massives des élections communales du 24 mai 2010. Bujumbura, Burundi.
- Afrobarometer Round 4 (2009). The quality of democracy and governance in 20 african countries, 2008-2009. Unpublished manuscript.
- Amatora mu Mahoro (2010a). Burundi 2010. manuel de formateur. Avril 2010.
- Amatora mu Mahoro (2010b). Système de monitoring des principes démocratiques et de prévention de la violence électorale. premier rapport.
- Amatora mu Mahoro (2010c). Système de monitoring des principes démocratiques et de prévention de la violence électorale. rapport final.
- Anselin, L., Le Gallo, J., and Jayet, H. (2008). Spatial panel econometrics.

- In Mátyás, L. and Sevestre, P., editors, *The Econometrics of Panel Data*. Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg.
- Arriola, L. and Johnson, C. (2012a). Election violence in democratizing states. Working paper.
- Arriola, L. and Johnson, C. (2012b). Insurgents, institutions and post-conflict elections. Unpublished manuscript.
- Association Dushirehamwe (2010). Communiqué de l' association dushirehamwe sur l' observation des élections communales du 24/5/2010.
- Bates, R. (1983). Modernization, ethnic competition and the rationality of politics in contemporary africa. In Rotchind, R. and Orusola, V., editors, *State versus ethnic claims. African policy dilemmas*, pages 113–130. Westview Press, Boulder.
- Beck, N., Gleditsch, K. S., and Beardsley, K. (2006). Space is more than geography: Using spatial econometrics in the study of political economy. *International Studies Quarterly*, 50(1):27–44.
- Bekoe, D. (2010). Trends in electoral violence in sub-saharan africa. *United States Institute for Peace Brief*, (13).
- Bekoe, D. A. and Burchard, S. M. (2013). The contradiction of electoral violence: The effects of violence on voter turnout in sub-saharan africa. Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Conference, Chicago, IL, April 2013.
- Bekoe, D. E. (2012). *Voting in Fear*. United States Institute of Peace.

- Belloni, R. (2004). Peacebuilding and consociational electoral engineering in bosnia and herzegovina. *International Peacekeeping*, 11(2):334-353.
- Ben Hammouda, H. (1995). *Burundi*.
- Bensel, R. (2003). The american ballot box: Law, identity, and the polling place in the mid-nineteenth century. *Studies in American Political Development*, 17(01):1-27.
- Bensel, R. F. (2004). *The American Ballot Box in the Mid-Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge University Press.
- Bentley, K. A. and Southall, R. (2005). *An African Peace Process. Mandela, South Africa and Burundi*. HSRC Press, Cape Town, South Africa.
- Berckmoes, L. (2013). Elusive tactics: Urban youth navigating the aftermath of war in burundi. Ph.D. Dissertation.
- Birabuza, A. (1999). *Le mal burundais. Ou l'involution historique d'une veille nation*. Editions de la Renaissance, Bujumbura, Burundi.
- Boone, C. and Kriger, N. (2010). Multiparty elections and land patronage: Zimbabwe and cte d'ivoire. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 48(2):173-202.
- Booth, K. (2001). Introduction: Still waiting for the reckoning. In Booth, K., editor, *Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions*, pages 1-23. Frank Cass, London.
- Boyle, M. J. (2009). Bargaining, fear, and denial: Explaining violence against civilians in iraq 2004-2007. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 21(2):261-287.

- Bratton, M. (2008). Vote buying and violence in nigerian election campaigns. *Electoral Studies*, 27(4):621 – 632.
- Brubaker, R. and Laitin, D. D. (1998). Ethnic and nationalist violence. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 24:pp. 423–452.
- Buyoya, P. (1998). *Mission Possible*.
- Cameron, A. C. and Trivedi, P. K. (1998). *Regression Analysis of Count Data*. Cambridge University Press.
- Caspersen, N. (2009). *Contested Nationalism: Serb Elite Rivalry in Croatia and Bosnia in the 1990s*. Berghahn Books, Oxford.
- Cecelski, D. and Tyson, T. (1998). *Democracy Betrayed: The Wilmington Race Riot of 1898 and Its Legacy*. University of North Carolina Press.
- Centre for Monitoring Election Violence (2002a). Final report on election-related violence. general election, 2000. Technical Report July, Centre for Policy Alternative, Colombo, Sri Lanka.
- Centre for Monitoring Election Violence (2002b). Final report on election-related violence. general election, 2001. Technical Report July, Centre for Policy Alternative, Colombo, Sri Lanka.
- Centre for Monitoring Election Violence (2004). Final report on election-related violence. general election, april 2004. Technical Report November, Centre for Policy Alternative, Colombo, Sri Lanka.
- Chandra, K. (2004). *Why ethnic parties succeed : patronage and ethnic head counts in India*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

- Chandra, K. (2005). Ethnic parties and democratic stability. *Perspectives on Politics*, 3(2):235–252.
- Chandra, K. (2009). A constructivist dataset on ethnicity and institutions (cdei). In Abdelal, R., editor, *Measuring identity: A guide for social scientists*. Cambridge University Press.
- Chandra, K. (2011a). Do ethnic parties threaten democratic stability? UCLA Comparative Politics Workshop.
- Chandra, K. (2011b). What is an ethnic party? *Party Politics*, 17(2):151–169.
- Chaturvedi, A. (2005). Rigging elections with violence. *Public Choice*, 125:189–202.
- Cheeseman, N. and Ford, R. (2010). Ethnicity as a political cleavage. Working Paper No. 83, November 2007.
- Chrétien, J.-P. (1983). *Burundi, L'histoire retrouvée*. Khartala, Paris.
- Chrétien, J.-P. and Mukuri, M. (2002). *Burundi, la fracture identitaire - Logiques de violence et certitudes " ethniques "*. Éd. Karthala, Paris.
- Christensen, M. M. and Utas, M. (2008). Mercenaries of democracy: The politricks of remobilized combatants in the 2007 general elections, sierra leone. *African Affairs*, 107(429):515–539.
- Chua, Y. T. and Rimban, L. R. (2011). *Democracy at gunpoint : election-related violence in the Philippines*. The Asia Foundation, Makati City, Philippines.

Coalition de la Société Civile pour le Monitoring Electoral (2005a). Rapport de l'observation de la campagne électorale des partis politiques. BUJUMBURA, Août 2005.

Coalition de la Société Civile pour le Monitoring Electoral (2005b). Rapport de l'observation de l'élections communales du 3 juin 2005. BUJUMBURA, Juin 2005.

Coalition de la Société Civile pour le Monitoring Electoral (2005c). Rapport synthese du deroulement des élections burundaises de 2005. Décembre 2005.

Coalition de la Société Civile pour le Monitoring Electoral (2010a). Rapport d'observation des élections communales du 24 mai 2010. Bujumbura, Juin 2010.

Coalition de la Société Civile pour le Monitoring Electoral (2010b). Rapport d'observation des lections communales du 24 mai 2010. BUJUMBURA, Juin 2010.

Collier, P. and Vicente, P. C. (2010a). Violence, bribery, and fraud: The political economy of elections in sub-saharan africa.

Collier, P. and Vicente, P. C. (2010b). Votes and violence: Evidence from a field experiment in nigeria.

Commission Episcopale Justice et Paix (2009). Rapport de monitoring sur la sotuation des droits civils et politiques pendant la période pre-électorale au burundi (novembre-décembre 2009). Bujumbura, Avril 2010.

Commission Episcopale Justice et Paix (2010). Mot liminaire de s. e l'

archevêque de bujumbura, président de la cecab et de la cejp, lors di point de presse sur l' observation électorale.

Commonwealth Observer Group and Commonwealth Secretariat (1980). *Southern Rhodesia Elections, February, 1980: The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group on Elections Leading to Independent Zimbabwe*. Election Observer Group Reports. Commonwealth Secretariat.

Conroy-Krutz, J. (2009). African cities and incumbent hostility: Explaining opposition success in urban areas. Manuscript.

Cox, A. W. (2009). Swing voters, core voters, and distributive politics. In Shapiro, I., editor, *Political Representation*, pages 342–357.

Crost, B., Felter, J., Mansour, H., and Rees, D. I. (2013). Election fraud and post-election conflict: Evidence from the philippines. IZA Discussion Papers 7469, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

Crowe, B. L. (1969). The tragedy of the commons revisited. *Science*, 166:1103–1107.

Cunningham, D. E., Gleditsch, K. S., and Salehyan, I. (2009). It takes two: A dyadic analysis of civil war duration and outcome. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53(4):pp. 570–597.

Daxecker, U. E. (2012). The cost of exposing cheating: International election monitoring, fraud, and post-election violence in africa. *Journal of Peace Research*.

De La O, A. L. (2013). Do conditional cash transfers affect electoral behavior?

- evidence from a randomized experiment in Mexico. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(1):1–14.
- de Saint-Martin, V. and Schrader, F. (1937). *Atlas Universel de Géographie*. Librairie Hachette., Paris.
- De Silva, K., Centre for Policy Research (New Delhi, I., and for Ethnic Studies, I. C. (1993). *Sri Lanka, problems of governance*. Governing South Asia. Konark Publishers.
- de Zeeuw, J. (2008). *From soldiers to politicians: transforming rebel movements after civil war*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Della Porta, D. and Vannucci, A. (1999). *Corrupt Exchanges: Actors, Resources, and Mechanisms of Political Corruption*. Social Problems and Social Issues. Aldine de Gruyter, New York.
- Department de la Documentation (1993). *Deuxième Conférence de Presse du Président Melchior Ndadaye*. Direction Générale des Publications de Presse Burundaise, Bujumbura, Burundi.
- deSilva, K. M. (2002). Elections and after: Opportunity to restore stability. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 37(9):pp. 838–843.
- DeVotta, N. (2002). Illiberalism and ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. *Journal of Democracy*, 13(1):84–98.
- Devotta, N. (2003). Sri Lanka's political decay: Analysing the October 2000 and December 2001 parliamentary elections. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 41(2):115–142.

Dhattiwala, R. and Biggs, M.

Diamond, L., Linz, J. J., and Lipset, S. M. (2007). Introduction: What makes for democracy? In Diamond, L., Linz, J. J., and Lipset, S. M., editors, *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy*. Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO.

Donno, D. (2013). Elections and democratization in authoritarian regimes. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(3):703–716.

Eiffert, B., Miguel, E., and Posner, D. N. (2007). Political sources of ethnic identification in africa. *Afrobarometer Working Paper*, (89).

EISA (2008). Eisa election observer mission report. the zimbabwe harmonized elections of 29 march 2008. presidential, parliamentary and local government elections. EISA Election Observer Mission Report, No 28.

El Abdellaoui, J. (2010). Burundi: Overview of the 2010 elections and observations on the way forward. *Institute for Security Studies, Situation Report*.

Ellman, M. and Wantchekon, L. (2000). Electoral competition under the threat of political unrest. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 115(2):499–531.

Embassy Bujumbura (2009a). Frodebu youth are talking tough - how far will they go? U.S. Embassy confidential cable, November 2009 (Accessed through WikiLeaks).

Embassy Bujumbura (2009b). Guide to burundi political parties. U.S. Embassy confidential cable (Bujumbura 000416), November 2009 (Accessed through WikiLeaks).

- EU Election Observation Mission (2001). Final report of the european union's observation mission to sri lanka's december 5, 2001 parliamentary election.
- Falcone, G. and Padovani, M. (1991). *Cose di Cosa Nostra*. Saggi italiani. Rizzoli.
- Fearon, J. D. (2003). Ethnic and cultural diversity by country. *Journal of Economic Growth*, 8(2):195–222.
- Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l'Homme (2010). Burundi, les Élections de 2010: un test à ne pas rater pour consolider la paix. Mai 2010, No.539F.
- Ferree, K. (2012). How fluid is fluid? the mutability of ethnic identities and electoral volatility in africa. In Chandra, K., editor, *Constructivist theories of ethnic politics*. Oxford University Press.
- Figueroa, M. and Sives, A. (2002). Homogenous voting, electoral manipulation and the 'garrison' process in post-independence jamaica. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 40(1):81–108.
- Fisher, J. (2002). Electoral conflict and violence. a strategy for study and prevention. IFES White Paper 2002-01, February 5, 2002.
- Fjelde, H. and Nilsson, D. (2012). Rebels against rebels: Explaining violence between rebel groups. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 56(4):604–628.
- Gahama, J. (1980). Le burundi sous administration belge : La période du mandat 1919-1939. Thèse, Lettres, Paris I.

- Gahama, J. (1992). Organisation territoriale du burundi. Cours en première licence, Département d'Histoire.
- Gahama, J. (2001). *Le Burundi sous administration belge*.
- Gambetta, D. (1993). *The Sicilian Mafia. The Business of Private Protection*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
- Garrigou, A. (1992). *Le vote et la vertu; comment les Français sont devenus électeurs*. Presses de la FNSP, Paris.
- Gartner, S. and Regan, P. (1996). Threat and repression: The non-linear relationship between government and opposition violence. *Journal of Peace Research*, 33(3):273–287.
- Gelman, A. and Hill, J. (2006). *Data analysis using regression and multi-level/hierarchical models*. Cambridge University Press, Paris.
- Gilligan, M. J., Mvukiyehe, E. N., and Samii, C. (2012). Reintegrating rebels into civilian life: Quasi-experimental evidence from burundi. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.
- Golder, M. and Wantchekon, L. (2004). Africa: Dictatorial and democratic electoral systems since 1946. In Colomer, J., editor, *Handbook of Electoral System Design*. Palgrave, London.
- Golder, S. N. (2006). Pre-electoral coalition formation in parliamentary democracies. *British Journal of Political Science*, 36(02):193–212.
- Greene, W. (2008). Functional forms for the negative binomial model for count data. *Economics Letters*, 99(3):585–590.

- Gumbel, A. (2005). *Steal this vote*. Nation Books, New York.
- Hafner-Burton, E. M., Hyde, S. D., and Jablonski, R. S. (July 2012). When governments use elections to stay in power. ILAR Working Paper No.14.
- Haid, C. (2010). Gunmen and graft: A network model of electoral violence and clientelism. Unpublished manuscript.
- Harding, R. (2010). Urban-rural differences in support for incumbent across africa. Working Paper 120, Afrobarometer.
- Harding, R. (2012). One for the road: Voting for public goods in ghana. Working paper, NYU.
- Hibbs, D. (1973). *Mass political violence: A cross-national causal analysis*. Wiley, New York.
- Hislope, R. (1996). Intra-ethnic conflict in croatia and serbia: Flanking and the consequences for democracy. *East European Quarterly*, 30.
- Höglund, K. (2005). Violence and the peace process in sri lanka. *Civil Wars*, 7(2):156–70.
- Höglund, K. (2009). Electoral violence in conflict-ridden societies: Concepts, causes, and consequences. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 21(3):412–427.
- Höglund, K. and Piyarathne, A. (2009). Paying the price for patronage: Electoral violence in sri lanka. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 47(3):287–307.
- Hoppen, K. T. (1994). Grammars of electoral violence in nineteenth-century england and ireland. *The English Historical Review*, (432):597–620.

- Horowitz, D. L. (1985). *Ethnic groups in conflict*. University of California Press, New Haven.
- Human Rights Watch (1998). Proxy targets. civilians in the war in burundi. *Report*.
- Human Rights Watch (2005). Afghanistan on the eve of parliamentary and provincial elections. Human Rights Watch, September 15, 2005.
- Human Rights Watch (2008a). All over again. human rights abuses and flawed electoral conditions in zimbabwes coming general elections. March 2008 Volume 20, No. 2(A).
- Human Rights Watch (2008b). “bullets for each of you” state-sponsored violence since zimbabwes march 29 elections. June 2008.
- Human Rights Watch (2008c). Zimbabwe: End violence before june runoff. six presumed opposition supporters die under torture during re-education meeting. Press release, May 16, 2008.
- Human Rights Watch (2008d). Zimbabwe: Surge in state-sponsored violence. security forces raid opposition headquarters. Press release, April 25, 2008.
- Human Rights Watch (2009). Pursuit of power. political violence and repression in burundi. A service of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, published on 20 November 2009, retrieved at <http://www.irinnews.org/fr/report/87132/>.
- Human Rights Watch (2010a). Closing doors? the narrowing of democratic space in burundi. November 23, 2010.

- Human Rights Watch (2010b). “we’ll tie you up and shoot you”. lack of accountability for political violence in burundi. May 2010.
- Human Rights Watch (2005). Suppressing dissent. human rights abuses and political repression in ethiopia's oromia region. Human Rights Watch, May 2005 Vol. 17, No. 7 (A).
- Humphreys, M. and Weinstein, J. M. (2007). Demobilization and reintegration. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 51(4):531–567.
- Ihl, O. (1993). La civilité électorale : vote et forclusion de la violence en france (partie 1). *Cultures & Conflits*, (9-10):75–87.
- International Crisis Group (17 December 2008). Palestine divided. *Middle East Briefing, Brussels: International Crisis Group*, 25.
- International Crisis Group (2005a). Élections au burundi: Reconfiguration radicale du paysage politique. Briefing Afrique N31, Nairobi/Bruxelles, 25 août 2005.
- International Crisis Group (2005b). Zimbabwe’s operation murambatsvina: the tipping point? Africa Report N97 – 17 August 2005.
- International Crisis Group (2010). Burundi: garantir un processus electoral credible. Briefing Afrique N155, 12 février 2010.
- International Displacement Monitoring Center, N. R. C. (2011). Burundi: Secure tenure and land access still challenges for long-term idps. a profile of the internal displacement situation. Working paper.

- Jaeger, D. A. and Paserman, D. (2006). Israel, the palestinian factions, and the cycle of violence. *The American Economic Review*, 96(2):45–49.
- Jarstad, A. and Sisk, T. D. (2008). *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Kagwanja, P. M. (2003). Facing mount kenya or facing mecca? the mungiki, ethnic violence and the politics of the moi succession in kenya, 1987-2002. *African Affairs*, 102(406):25–49.
- Kalyvas, S. N. (2006). *The logic of violence in civil war*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Kasambala, T. (2008). Zimbabwe police: 'you'll never take mugabe out of power'. no wonder people have no faith that saturday's elections will be free. *The Independent (UK)* March 23, 2008.
- Kasara, K. (2012). Electoral geography and conflict in kenya: Examining the local-level incidence of violence in rift valley province after the 2007 election. Working paper.
- Keefer, P. and Vlaicu, R. (2008). Democracy, credibility, and clientelism. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 24(2):371–406.
- Kimenyi, M. and Ndung'u, N. (2005). Sporadic ethnic violence: why has kenya not experienced a full-blown civil war? In Collier, P. and Sambanis, N., editors, *Understanding Civil Wars (Volume 1: Africa)*, pages 123–156. World Bank, Washington, D.C.
- Kimenyi, M. S. and Romero, R. G. (2008). Tribalism as a minimax-regret

- strategy: Evidence from voting in the 2007 kenyan elections. Working papers 2008-35, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Kitschelt, H. and Wilkinson, S. (2007). *Patrons, Clients, and Policies*. Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Klopp, J. M. (2001). "ethnic clashes" and winning elections: The case of kenya's electoral despotism. *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des tudes Africaines*, 35(3):pp. 473–517.
- Kousser, M. J. (1974). *The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880-1910*. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT.
- Kraetzschmar, H. and Cavatorta, F. (2010). Bullets over ballots: Islamist groups, the state and electoral violence in egypt and morocco. *Democratization*, 17(2):326–349.
- Kramon, E. J. (2013). Vote buying and ethnic mobilization. Unpublished manuscript.
- Kruger, N. (2003). War veterans: Continuities between the past and the present. *African Studies Quarterly*, 7(2 & 3).
- Kruger, N. (2005). Zanu(pf) strategies in general elections, 1980-2000: Discourse and coercion. *African Affairs*, 104(414):1–34.
- Kuenzi, M. and Lambright, G. M. S. (2011). Who votes in africa? an examination of electoral participation in 10 african countries. *Party Politics*, 17(6):767–799.

- Kumar, K. (2004). *Postconflict Elections, Democratization, and International Assistance*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder & London.
- Kydd, A. H. and Walter, B. F. (2006). The strategies of terrorism. *International Security*, 31:49–80.
- Laakso, M. and Taagepera, R. (1979). effective number of parties: A measure with application to west europe. *Comparative Political Studies*, 12(1):3–27.
- Laitin, D. D. (1994). The structure of protracted conflict: the case of sri lanka. *Humboldt J. Soc. Relat.*, 20(2):121–47.
- Laitin, D. D. (1995). National revivals and violence. *European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, 36(01):3–43.
- Lehoucq, F. (2003). Electoral Fraud: Causes, Types, and Consequences. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 6(1):233–256.
- Lehoucq, F. (2007). When does a market for votes emerge? In Schaffer, F. C., editor, *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*, pages 152–171. Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO.
- Lemarchand, R. (1972). Political clientelism and ethnicity in tropical africa: Competing solidarities in nation-building. *The American Political Science Review*, 66(1).
- Lemarchand, R. (1994). *Burundi. Ethnic conflict and genocide*. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
- Levy, A. L. (2011). Le chemin devant nous. l'état desprit des citoyens du burundi après les lections de 2010. les résultats des focus groups avec des hommes et

- des femmes du burundi. 20-30 septembre, 2010. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Fvrier 2011.
- Ligue des droits de la personne dans la région des Grands Lacs (2009). Rapport sur les grandes tendances au burundi sur la situation des droits de l'homme : Mois de février-mai 2009.
- Lilja, J. and Hultman, L. (2011). Intraethnic dominance and control: Violence against co-ethnics in the early sri lankan civil war. *Security Studies*, 20(2):171–197.
- Lindberg, S. I. (2012). Have the cake and eat it: The rational voter in africa. *Party Politics*.
- Lindberg, S. I. and Morrison, M. K. C. (2005). Exploring voter alignments in africa: core and swing voters in ghana. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 43:565–586.
- López-Pintor, R. (2006). Post-conflict elections and ethnic divides measures to encourage participation. *Electoral Insight*, 8(2):245–262.
- Machiavelli, N. t. W. K. M. (1948). *The Prince*. Everyman's library: Essays and belles-lettres. J.M. Dent.
- Makoba, J. W. and Ndura, E. (2006). The roots of contemporary ethnic conflict and violence in burundi. In Santosh, S., editor, *Perspectives on contemporary ethnic conflict: Primal violence or the politics of conviction?*, pages 295–310. Lexington Books, Lanham.
- Malkki, L. H. (1995). *Purity and exile : violence, memory, and national cosmology among Hutu refugees in Tanzania*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

- Mariro, A. (1998). *Burundi*.
- Mason, T. D. (1996). Insurgency, counterinsurgency, and the rational peasant. *Public Choice*, 86(1/2):pp. 63–83.
- Mitchell, P., Evans, G., and OLeary, B. (2006). Extremist outbidding on ethnic parties is not inevitable: Tribune parties in northern ireland. *LSE Working Paper, London*, 6.
- MOE-UE (2010). Burundi. rapport final. elections communales, présidentielles, législatives, sénatoriales et collinaires 2010. Union Européenne, Mission d’ Observation Electorale.
- Molina, I. and Lehoucq, F. E. (1999). Political competition and electoral fraud: A latin american case study. *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 30(2):pp. 199–234.
- Morgan, J. and Vrdy, F. (2011). On the buyability of voting bodies. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 23(2):260–287.
- Mozzafar, S., Scarritt, J. R., and Galaich, G. (2003). Electoral institutions, ethnopolitical cleavages, and party systems in africa’s emerging democracies. *American Political Science Review*, 97(03):379–390.
- Musuva, C. (2009). Chapter 7: Malawi. In Kadima, D. and Booyesen, S., editors, *Compendium of elections in Southern Africa, 1989-2009: 20 years of multiparty democracy*. Electoral Institute of Southern Africa.
- Mworova, E. (1987). *Histoire du Burundi. Des origines à la fin du XiX siècle*. Hatier, Paris.

- Myagkov, M. and Ordeshook, P. C. (2010). Ukraine 2010: Were tymoshenko's cries of fraud anything more than smoke? Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project Working Paper No. 10, 03/01/2010.
- Myagkov, M., Ordeshook, P. C., and Shakin, P. (2009). *The Forensics of Election Fraud: Russia and Ukraine*. Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Nahimana, S. and Hatngimana, J. (2007). *Melchior Ndadaye pour le Burundi Nouveau. Campagne 1992-1993 (édition bilingue Kirundi/français)*. L'Harmattan, Paris.
- National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (1993a). Communiqué de presse. Bujumbura, 19 Mai 1993.
- National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (1993b). International observer delegation post-electoral statement. June 1, 1993 burundi presidential election. Washington DC.
- Ndarubagiye, L. (1999). *Burundi. The origins of the Hutu-Tutsi conflict*. Léonce Ndarubagiye, Nairobi, Kenya.
- Ndarusigiye, M. and Mayoya, M. (2000). *When the pie is too small. Handbook of ethnic conflicts and resource management*. Al-ekbal.
- Ndayisaba, J. (2009). Gratuité de l'enseignement de base : bilan et perspectives. *Observatoire de l'Action Gouvernementale, Bujumbura, Burundi*.
- Nichter, S. (2008). Vote buying or turnout buying? machine politics and the secret ballot. *American Political Science Review*, 102:19–31.

- Nidondera, W. (2008). Burundi: the deficient transformation of the cndd-fdd. In de Zeeux, J., editor, *From soldiers to politicians: transforming rebel movements after civil war*, pages 103–130. Lyenne Rienner.
- Nimubona, J. (2005). La perception de l'identité ethnique dans le processus électoral au burundi. *Ligue des Drots de la personne humaine dans la région des Grands Lacs*.
- Nimubona, J. (2009). Les élections de 2010 dans toutes et quelles têtes? au-delà de l'institutionnalisme, de l'éthico-fonctionnalisme et de l'idéalisme démocratique. Cahier de IIDEC, Vol 3, No. 5.
- Nindondera, W. (2012). The cndd-fdd in burundi: The path from armed to political struggle. Berghof Transition Series No.10.
- Nshimiye, B. (2010). Le cndd-fdd livré à ses propres démons. Fait Bujumbura, le 26 mai 2010.
- Nugent, P. (1999). Living in the past: urban, rural and ethnic themes in the 1992 and 1996 elections in ghana. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 37:287–319.
- Observatoire de l'Action Gouvernementale (2009). Etat des lieux des partis politiques burundais la veille des élections de 2010. rapport final. Bujumbura, septembre 2009.
- Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2005). Enquête sur les populations déplacées au burundi. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 26 May 2005.

- Olzak, S. (1990). The political context of competition: Lynching and urban racial violence, 18821914. *Social Forces*, 69(2):395–421.
- Palmans, E. (2008). *Média et politique en situation de crise: le cas du Burundi*. Universiteit Antwerpen, Antwerpen.
- Pan African Parliament Election Observer Mission. Report of the pan african parliament election observer mission. Republic of Zimbabwe, 27 June 2008.
- Paris, R. (2004). *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Pearlman, W. (2009). Spoiling inside and out: Internal political contestation and the middle east peace process. *International Security*, 33(3):79–109.
- Peel, J. and Ranger, T. (1983). *Past and Present in Zimbabwe*. Manchester University Press.
- People's Action for Free and Fair Elections and the Movement for Free and Fair Elections (2001). Press release–election day communique. 5 December 2001.
- Pézard, P. S. and de Tésières, S. (2009). L'insécurité est une autre guerre. analyse de la violence armée au burundi. *Small Arms Survey, Secrétariat de la Déclaration de Genève*.
- Posner, D. (2004). Measuring ethnic fractionalization in africa. *American Journal of Political Science*, 48(4).
- Posner, D. N. (2006). *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. Cambridge University Press, New York.

- Poulain, G. (1998). *Chasse à l'homme au Burundi. Hournal d'un expatrié.* L'Harmattan, Paris, France.
- Powell, J. D. (1970). Peasant society and clientelist politics. *The American Political Science Review*, 64(2):pp. 411–425.
- Prunier, G. (1994). Burundi, a manageable crisis? Writenet.
- Rabushka, A. and Shepsle, K. A. (1972). *Politics in plural societies : a theory of democratic instability.* Charles E. Merrill, Columbus, OH.
- Rae, D. W. and Taylor, M. (1970). *The Analysis of Political Cleavages.* Yale University Press, New Haven.
- Rapoport, D. and Weinberg, L. (2001). *The democratic experience and political violence.* Frank Cass, London.
- Reif, M. (2009). Making democracy safe: Explaining the causes, rise, and decline of coercive campaigning and election violence in old and new democracies. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Canada, September 2009.
- Reilly, B. (2001). *Democracy in Divided Societies. Electoral engineering for conflict management.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Reilly, B. (2002). Elections in post-conflict scenarios: constraints and dangers. *International Peacekeeping*, 9(2):118–139.
- Reyntjens, F. (1993). The proof of the pudding is in the eating: the june 1993 elections in burundi. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 31:563–583.

- Reyntjens, F. (2000). Burundi: prospects for peace. *Minority Rights Group International Report*.
- Riker, W. (1986). *The art of political manipulation*. Yale University Press, New Haven.
- Robinson, J. A. and Torvik, R. (2009). The real swing voter's curse. *American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings*, 99(2):310–315.
- Rodegem, F. (1961). *Sagesse Kirundi*.
- Rotberg, R. I. (2000). Africa's mess, mugabe's mayhem. *Foreign Affairs*, 79(5):pp. 47–61.
- Rubli, S. (2013). (re)making the social world: The politics of transitional justice in burundi. *Africa Spectrum*, 48(1):3–24.
- Russell, A. (2013). Violence and selection in the northern borderland of burundi, 19611972.
- Rutamucero, D. (2007). *La démocratie du nombre, arme pour le génocide contre les Tutsi au Burundi (1959 2006)*. Editions Intore, Bujumbura, Burundi.
- SADC (2008). Sadc election observer mission (seom) preliminary statement. 27 June 2008.
- Samii, C. (2010). Do quotas exacerbate or reduce ethnic conflict? evidence from burundis military. Working Paper, Columbia University.
- Sberna, S. and Olivieri, E. (2013). “set the night on fire!” mafia violence and elections in italy. unpublished manuscript.

- Schaffer, H. B. (1995). The sri lankan elections of 1994: The chandrika factor. *Asian Survey*, 35(5):pp. 409–425.
- Schedler, A. (2006). Electoral authoritarianism: The dynamics of unfree competition.
- Schedler, A. (2013). *The Politics of Uncertainty*. Oxford University Press.
- Schelling, T. C. (1966). *Arms and influence*. Yale University Press, New Haven.
- Sénat du Burundi (2010). Le sénat et la politique de décentralisation au burundi. août 2010.
- Seymour, C. and Frary, D. P. (1918). *How the world votes: the story of democratic development in elections*. C. A. Nichols.
- Shah, S. K. (2012). Intra-ethnic electoral violence in war-torn, divided societies: The case of sri lanka. Technical report, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California Los Angeles.
- Shakoor, F. (1994). Sri lankan elections 1994: An analysis. *Pakistan Horizon*, 47(4):pp. 77–86.
- Simonsen, S. G. (2005). Addressing Ethnic Divisions in Post-Conflict Institution-Building: Lessons from Recent Cases. *Security Dialogue*, 36(3):297–318.
- Sinunguriza, T. (2004). *Les élections au Burundi. Tout savoir et tirer des leçons de juin 1993*. Éditions Luc Pire, Bruxelles.

- Sisk, T. D. (2008). Elections in fragile states: Between voice and violence. Paper Prepared for The International Studies Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, California, March 24-28, 2008.
- Sithole, M. (2001). Fighting authoritarianism in zimbabwe. *Journal of Democracy*, 12(1):160–169.
- Snyder, J. (2000). *From Voting to Violence. Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*. W.W. Norton & Company.
- Spencer, J. (2002). *Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict*. Taylor & Francis.
- Sri Lanka Department of Census and Statistics (2001). Sri lanka census population and housing, 2001. Colombo, Sri Lanka.
- Staniland, P. (2012). Between a rock and a hard place: Insurgent fratricide, ethnic defection, and the rise of pro-state paramilitaries. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 56(1):16–40.
- Stokes, S. C. (2005). Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics with evidence from argentina. *American Political Science Review*, null:315–325.
- Stokes, S. C., Dunning, T., Nazareno, M., and Brusco, V. (2013). *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Stokke, K. (2006). Building the tamil eelam state: Emerging state institutions and forms of governance in ltte-controlled areas in sri lanka. *Third World Quarterly*, 27(6):pp. 1021–1040.

- Straus, S. (2006). *The order of genocide: Race, power, and war in Rwanda*. Cambridge Univ Press.
- Straus, S. and Taylor, C. (2012). Democratization and electoral violence in sub-saharan africa, 1990-2008. In Bekoe, D., editor, *Elections and Violence in Africa*. United States Institute for Peace, Washington,DC.
- Taylor, C., Pevehouse, J., and Straus, S. (2013). Perils of pluralism: Electoral violence and competitive authoritarianism in sub-saharan africa. Simons Papers in Security and Development, No. 23/2013, February 2013.
- The Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (2007). “we have degrees in violence.” a report on torture and human rights abuses in zimbabwe. The Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, the Open Society Institute, the Bellevue/NYU Program for survivors of torture. December 2007.
- Timberg, C. (2008). Inside mugabe’s violent crackdown. notes, witnesses detail how campaign was conceived and executed by leader, aides. Washington Post Foreign Service, July 5, 2008.
- Travaglianti, M. (2013). One student, one vote: the electoral returns of public education in burundi. Unpublished manuscript.
- Troxler, H. (2008). Electoral abuse in the late roman republic. Theses and Dissertations, Paper 537.
- Tucker, J. A. (2007). Enough! electoral fraud, collective action problems, and post-communist colored revolutions. *Perspectives on Politics*, null:535–551.
- UNHCR (2008). Number of returnees per commune in 2008. return of long-tem refugees (1972 group). Map as of 31 October 2008.

- Union Européenne, Mission d' Observation Electorale (2010). Déclaration préliminaire. BUJUMBURA, 27 Mai 2010.
- Uvin, P. (2009). *Life after violence: a people's story of Burundi*. Zed.
- Van de Walle, N. (2001). *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- van de Walle, N. (2003). Presidentialism and clientelism in africa's emerging party systems. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41(02):297–321.
- van de Walle, N. (2013). Electoral authoritarianism and multi-party politics. In Cheeseman, N., Anderson, D., and Scheibler, A., editors, *Routledge Handbook of African Politics*. Routledge.
- Vandegiste, S. (2011). Power-sharing as a fragile safety valve in times of electoral turmoil: the costs and benefits of burundis 2010 elections. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 49(2).
- Vorrath, J. (2010). How to put the fragments together? political integration and changing conflict lines in burundis post-war transition. Paper prepared for the 7th Pan-European Conference of the ECPR Standing Group on International Relations, Stockholm.
- Warren, T. C. and Troy, K. K. (2011). The logic of intra-ethnic conflict: Group fragmentation in the shadow of state power. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.
- Wasserman, J. and Jaggard, E. (2007). Electoral violence in mid nineteenth-century england and wales. *Historical Research*, 80(207):124–155.
- Watch, H. R. (2011). World report 2011 (events of 2010). *Human Rights Watch*.

- Watt, N. (2008). *Burundi: biography of a small African country*. Columbia University Press, New York.
- Weghorst, K. R. and Lindberg, S. I. (2013). What drives the swing voter in africa? *American Journal of Political Science*.
- Wilkinson, S. (2004). *Votes and violence : electoral competition and ethnic riots in India*. Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Wilkinson, S. I. and Haid, C. J. (2009). Ethnic violence as campaign expenditure: Riots, competition, and vote swings in india.
- Wilkison, S. (2012). Constructivism and ethnic riots. In Chandra, K., editor, *Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics*. Oxford University Press.
- Williams, K. F. (2011). The evolution of political violence in jamaica 1940-1980. Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 2011.
- Xinhua (2000). Election survey predicts victory for sri lanka's ruling people's. October 9, 2000.
- Zeender, G. (2011). Securing the right to stay: Local integration of idps in burundi. In Ferr, E., editor, *Resolving Internal Displacement: Prospects for Local Integration*, pages 24–40. Brookings Institution - London School of Economics.
- Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2005). Of stuffed ballots and empty stomachs. reviewing zimbabwe's 2005 parliamentary elections and post-election period. July 2005.