



**USAID**  
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

# ELECTORAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT

BURUNDI

**Contract No: AID-DFD-I-00-05-00197**  
**Task Order No: AID-OAA-TO-II-00055**

November 2012

This report was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Creative Associates International.



## **Burundi Electoral Security Framework Electoral Security Assessment**

### **Table of Contents**

<b>Executive Summary .....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>I. Electoral Security Assessment.....</b>	<b>15</b>
A. Contextual Analysis .....	15
B. Historical Conflict Factors .....	21
C. Stakeholder Analysis.....	29
<b>II. Electoral Security Planning: Program Objectives and Planning.....</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>III. Electoral Security Programming.....</b>	<b>42</b>
<b>IV. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&amp;E).....</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>V. Conclusion.....</b>	<b>53</b>

### **Annexes**

Annex I – Schedule of Meetings

Annex II – List of Acronyms

Annex III – February - September 2010 – Map of Electoral Incidents

This report was made possible by the American People through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The Contents of this report are the sole responsibility of Creative Associates International and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.

## Executive Summary

The Electoral Security Framework, employed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), provides policy-makers, electoral assistance providers, and electoral and security practitioners with a toolkit to profile electoral conflict as well as to plan and program for preventing, managing or mediating these conflicts. In July and August 2012, Jeff Fischer and Patrick Quirk of Creative Associates International (Creative) and Dr. Carol Sahley of USAID used the Framework to conduct an assessment in Burundi that included an evaluation of electoral conflict since the signing of the Global Ceasefire Agreement between Burundi and the National Council for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) in 2003 with a special focus on the 2005 and 2010 cycles to recommend strategies and programmatic approaches for an electoral security framework for the 2015 electoral cycle. The following Problem Statement and Development Hypothesis arose from this assessment:

**Problem Statement:** Electoral violence between the ruling party and opposition parties escalated between the 2005 and 2010 electoral cycles, continuing into 2011. These political divisions remain obstacles to democratic consolidation and create on-going tensions which could trigger electoral violence early in the 2015 electoral cycle. Without a meaningful political dialogue, institutional capacity for protection and enforcement, and assessing penalties for perpetrators, the logic of electoral violence remains viable as a means to suppress opposition or retaliate against unsatisfied grievances.

**Development Hypothesis:** The employment of electoral violence can become illogical for potential perpetrators if genuine political dialogue and space for competition is fostered, the capacities of institutions to protect electoral targets are strengthened, and penalties for committing acts of electoral violence are imposed.

The Electoral Security Framework includes the following four components:

- **Assessment:** This step is divided into three major analytical pieces: a) Contextual Analysis; b) Historical Conflict Factors; and c) Stakeholder Analysis;
- **Planning:** Examine donor constraints, United States Government (USG) priorities, local capacity limitations, and other planning elements;
- **Programming:** Determine specific areas of programming objectives and associated activities;
- **Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E):** Illustrative indicators.

### Electoral Security Assessment

Three major elements were studied during the course of the assessment: 1) Contextual Analysis; 2) Historical Conflict Factors; and 3) Stakeholder Analysis. Based on this analysis and key assessment findings and considerations of local planning restraints, programming recommendations are provided.

## 1) Contextual Analysis

From 1993 to 2005, Burundians endured a bloody civil war based predominantly on inter-ethnic tensions between the country's two main tribal affiliations—Hutu and Tutsi. The conflict began following the assassination of Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye – elected in 1993 as part of the Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) party platform – during a coup attempt by Tutsi-affiliated forces. In retaliation, the Hutu government orchestrated repression and mass killings of Tutsis and their affiliates, setting off and feeding into the civil war which ensued. With the aim of curbing Tutsi control of the country in general and demanding that the Tutsi-controlled army be reformed, in particular,<sup>[1]</sup> the principal actors in the conflict were Hutu rebel groups on one side – primarily the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD), the armed wing of CNDD; and, the National Forces of Liberation (FNL), which was formerly the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU) – and the government on the other.<sup>1</sup>

During the 12 years of fighting, an approximate 300,000 lives were claimed.<sup>2</sup> In June 1998 two sides began negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania, eventually yielding a peace and reconciliation agreement, which the sides signed in 2000. Three years later, the CNDD-FDD and the then transitional government signed a series of ceasefire agreements, which enabled the country to proceed in implementing the terms and associated reforms contained in the Arusha Peace Agreement. In 2005, as outlined in the Peace Agreement, Burundi held its first post-conflict elections, which were viewed by the international community as largely free and fair. The CNDD-FDD won the contest convincingly, cementing its control over the levers of power. The period following the official 2005 electoral period witnessed a marked increase in politically-motivated violence occurring outside what is generally considered to be the electoral period. This violence carried into the 2010 electoral cycle, which experienced a significant increase in violent attacks as compared to 2005.

This post-conflict environment in Burundi fuels electoral violence through various means—lingering tensions between parties to the conflict as well as a continued and embedded tendency to solve disputes via violence (as opposed to still underdeveloped, formal institutional channels). This is in part enabled by widespread availability of firearms leftover from the civil war and the Burundi National Police (PNB) force that was formed through Arusha and intended to be integrated but remains nascent and fragmented; competing loyalties and varying degrees of professionalism render PNB staff as active perpetrators of violence or as passive enforcers who selectively enforce the law.

---

<sup>1</sup> Displeased with FRODEBU's negotiations regarding government post allocations following Ndadaye's assassination (and that of other high-level government officials) with the predominantly Tutsi opposition parties (UPRONA), a faction of FRODEBU broke away to form a new party, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD), as well as an armed wing of the party, the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD).

<sup>2</sup> Estimates of total number of casualties vary.

The country's political party system is weak and comprised of a dominant party in government, CNDD-FDD, and an opposition bifurcated into 'hard' and 'soft' elements. Events surrounding the 2010 electoral cycle served to further weaken the opposition and cement the ruling party's control over legislative seats and state resources. The decision by many 'hard' opposition parties to boycott the post-communal 2010 elections – in particular the Alliance for Democrats for Change (ADC-Ikibiri), an informal, unregistered coalition of opposition parties – fragmented the opposition. The self-exile of some prominent opposition party leaders created leadership vacuums which the CNDD-FDD have exploited by creating “wings” within their hard opposition parties, possessing largely the same name as their original namesake but with a much softer stance against the ruling party; hence, the term “soft opposition parties.” With absolute control over state agencies, the ruling party has been able to more easily employ tactics of violence and intimidation against the opposition with impunity for their actions. The CNDD-FDD regularly employs its party “youth wings” to harass, intimidate, and coerce opposition party activists, members, supporters, and their affiliates. These youth were among the most prominent perpetrators of violence in the 2010 electoral cycle (in particular in the Pre-Election and Post-Election Phases), intimidating CNDD-FDD rivals or their party operatives. The unregulated nature of political finance in Burundi facilitates vote buying as well as payment to youth wings and other enforcers in exchange for acts of violence.

Contours of the political and administrative system also incentivize or enable the use of violence in the political sphere to varying degrees. The inter-ethnic power sharing arrangements embedded in Burundi's electoral system, including provisions for allocations of government positions, seem to have diminished inter-ethnic tensions between the majority Hutu and minority Tutsi populations on the one hand, but heightened intra-ethnic conflict within the Hutu population on the other. The guaranteed winning stakes for Hutus seem to have heightened competition within that community. Additionally, the electoral calendar, which mandates five elections within an approximately four month period, creates a sustained period of intense political competition in which national and subnational posts are in play. As a result, political tensions and stakes are heightened over an extended period of time and geographic spread, making it difficult for state enforcement authorities to manage simultaneously.

Further incentivizing violence, and other factors that enable it, is a weak system for investigating and prosecuting electoral malpractice. The Independent National Election Commission (CENI) is said to lack the human resources and skills to fulfill this mandate. Aggrieved parties lack an effective mechanism to satisfy their claims and may choose to pursue their grievances outside of formal channels through confrontation or violence.

## **2) Historical Conflict Factors**

The 2005 electoral cycle in Burundi was largely peaceful, free, and fair, although different phases were punctuated with isolated incidents of violence. Events following the 2005 contest, however, served as the basis for increased violence and a shift from the inter-ethnic conflict which characterized the civil war (although tensions and associated animosities have by no means completely dissipated) to the intra-Hutu power struggle for political control that characterized the 2010 cycle and persists to the time of this writing.

As compared to the 2005 process, the 2010 electoral cycle was characterized by increases in violence before, during, and after Election Day. Between April 26 and September 12, 2010, there were 519 recorded incidents of violence, with three forms being most prominent—intimidation of party operatives or associates and voters (155 incidents), physical clashes between groups of supporters (76 incidents) and destruction of property (62 cases). During the same period, 20 murders and 47 attempted murders were recorded. Of the 519 total incidents, 53 percent involved intimidation of the electorate with the motive to manipulate their ballot choice or deter them from voting. Geographically, 75 percent of the murders occurred in two provinces—Bujumbura Mairie and Bujumbura Rural.<sup>3</sup> Altogether, electoral violence was concentrated in four provinces, with 48 percent of recorded incidents occurring in Bujumbura Mairie, Bujumbura Rural, Gitega, and Ngozi. Violence within these provinces was concentrated in specific communes.

The Pre-Election Phases for both the 2005 and 2010 electoral cycles experienced incidents of violence; though to some extent similar in profile, the latter comprised a marked increase in the intensity of violence as well as expansion in tactics and perpetrators. The Pre-Election Phase for the 2005 contest was relatively peaceful, yet prior to each of the individual contests, political parties intimidated and threatened voters as well as threatened and, in some cases, physically harmed rival party members, supporters, or activists. The Pre-Election Phase for the 2010 elections (in particular the run up to the communal and presidential contests) experienced the highest number of recorded incidents of electoral violence for this cycle. Violence during this period took two principal forms—intimidation of and physical harm onto rival parties (supporters, activists, or candidates) and intimidation of or physical harm onto voters. In each case, political parties in general and the CNDD-FDD and FNL in particular were the main perpetrators. Parties employed their operatives in general and youth supporters in particular to intimidate or physically harm their counterparts in rival parties. When targeted on rival parties (as opposed to the electorate) the motive behind employing such tactics was to force the withdrawal of rival candidates from the race as well as weaken the resolve of and hamper operations of party militants. These forms of violence occurred in the campaign periods for the commune as well as presidential elections. The second principle form of violence in the Pre-Election Phase of 2010, representing 53 percent of all recorded incidents, was political parties verbally threatening and harassing as well as physically harming (with fists, rocks, sticks, or in some cases machetes) voters, with the aim of preventing them from voting or manipulating their ballot choice.

Election Day in Burundi has generally been peaceful. In both 2005 and 2010, however, there were some reported incidents and disturbances that ranged from harassment of voters to grenade attacks. Election Days during the 2005 cycle were largely peaceful. The March 1 Referendum was largely free and fair,<sup>4</sup> witnessed high voter turnout, and the FNL abided by its promise not to disrupt the poll. However, verbal abuse of election

---

<sup>3</sup> Statistics from Final Report of the Amatora Mu Mahoro (AMM) Project, Implemented by COSOME, with support from IFES.

<sup>4</sup> According to reports from the Coalition of Civic Society for the Monitoring of Elections in Burundi, which distributed 740 observers across the country for the referendum.

workers from the Independent Provincial Election Commissions (CEPI) occurred in some polling stations. Election Days throughout the 2010 cycle were also largely peaceful and according to the European Union (EU) observation mission experienced only a few isolated incidents. However, coercion and intimidation occurred in the three day period between postponement of the May Communal elections and the eventual Election Day.

The Post-Election Phase in 2010 was also more violent than that of the 2005 cycle and was characterized by three forms of violence. First, the CNDD-FDD youth wing continued to harass opposition party supporters. Second, the government increasingly harassed civil society actors and the media. Reflecting a continuing closure of political space since 2010 and motivated to suppress dissent as well as cement CNDD-FDD control over levers of power and associated state resources, the ruling party has continued to harass, intimidate, arbitrarily arrest and imprison, and, in some cases, physically harm representatives of civil society organizations (CSOs) and the media. Third and finally, Burundi has witnessed a marked increase in extrajudicial killings of opposition party members, in particular the FNL. Whereas youth wings were the CNDD-FDD's primary enforcers before the 2010 contest, the government increasingly employed its national security forces (in particular the National Intelligence Service [SNR] and the police) to intimidate, harass, arrest and imprison, as well as kill rivals in the Post-Election Phase. Politically-motivated killings have increased markedly since 2010 and throughout 2011, tracing a pattern of targeted assassinations followed by reprisals from those associated with the victims. Estimates of the number of these killings vary, with the United Nations (UN) counting 61 in a 2011 report while Human Rights Watch and local human rights CSOs putting the total number from the 2010 cycle onward at approximately 300. As a result, media reports claim that on September 3, 2012, Rwaswa issued a statement rebuking the government for its attacks against FNL supporters and issuing a declaration of war on the government by the former rebel group. In part, the statement read, "FNL party members are tired of killings, persecution and torture orchestrated against them by the CNDD- ruling party."<sup>5</sup>

### 3) Stakeholder Analysis

State stakeholders can be considered in the categories of regulatory, security, and judicial while non-state stakeholders include political parties, CSOs, and media organizations. The principal regulatory stakeholder is the CENI, the body mandated to administer the presidential, legislative, communal, and colline elections.

Stakeholders across sectors believed that the CENI performed effectively on Election Day in 2010, but some opposition figures doubted CENI's impartiality due to the appointment process for CENI board members, and leveraged this to claim that fraud occurred during the communal ballot. The PNB and National Army are the two main providers of security related to the electoral process. The PNB secures polling stations as well as the transport of election commodities and ballots, where the Army provides

---

<sup>5</sup> Reuters, September 3, 2012 - <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/03/us-burundi-rebellion-idUSBRE8820HP20120903>

perimeter security and positions quick reaction forces (QRF) to respond to security-related requests. While there was coordination between the PNB and Army on electoral security planning, the mechanism did not appear to be robust and CENI seemed to be isolated from decisions related to election security. The security concept employed in 2010 established three cordons of protection for the polling station. In general, individuals across sectors indicated that the performance of the security services in 2010 was positive. Fundamentally, this approach to Election Day security functioned well and is a tested division of labor that has been effectively employed in other cases. Reports indicate that the third element of Burundi's security sphere, the SNR, however, was involved in orchestrating intimidation and violence in the Pre- and Post-Election Phases of the 2010 electoral cycle.

In an electoral context, CSOs and faith-based organizations (FBOs) have played a positive role in monitoring and reporting on electoral violence. Domestic groups such as *Coalition de la Société Civile pour le Monitoring Electoral* (COSOME) and the Truth and Justice Network have conducted electoral monitoring. With international funding and USAID playing a lead role in this regard, these organizations have created a strong baseline of information on and reporting regarding electoral conflict that can be used to project patterns of potential conflict for the 2015 electoral cycle. Given the absence of a formal opposition, FBOs, religious leaders, and CSOs have in part assumed this role (if by default) and therefore begun to serve as channels of expression for otherwise silenced opposition supporters.

Burundian political parties can be grouped into three broad categories—ruling party, 'hard' opposition, and 'soft' opposition—while noting that it is not always clear into which category parties fit at a given point in time. The hard opposition includes those parties whose structures and leadership have remained generally coherent and have not fragmented into splinter wings due to ruling party efforts. Parties in this grouping should be further disaggregated between parties which boycotted in 2010, now operating under a coalition banner of the unregistered ADC-Ikibiri coalition, and the Union for National Progress (UPRONA), an opposition party which did participate. The soft opposition includes those professedly opposition groupings that have splintered into various entities that are reportedly under the control or at least influence of the CNDD-FDD (though it is impossible to confirm). Three trends in the development and potential trajectory of the political party system, as related to electoral violence, can be identified. First, the ruling party has become increasingly hegemonic in position and control of nation-wide support, utilizing its cemented position in power to access those state resources at its disposal as a financial platform to fund youth wings and vote buying schemes. Linked to this increased power is more prevalent use by the CNDD-FDD of their youth wings as perpetrators of electoral violence. Although other parties were said to use such youth as agents of violence, those associated with the CNDD-FDD called the *imbonerakure* — “people who see into the future”—were the most widely cited culprits. Second, the hard opposition is weakening and increasingly prone to errors in political judgment. Third, with the emergence of soft opposition parties (with 44 official parties in total), the opposition's voice compared to that of the ruling party will be confusing and contradictory.

Media remains independent and provides coverage of elections in general and related violence in particular, but faces acute challenges to its survival. Although the independent media has faced some repression from the government as a result of covering politically-motivated killings in 2011, financial instability and insolvency is seen as the primary threat to Burundi's media sector.

### **Electoral Security Planning**

Planning must take into account the potential outcome of various pivotal political processes that are set to transpire in the run up to the 2015 electoral contests. Pivotal processes are those events or issues that can become either mitigating factors or triggers for violence depending upon their management and outcomes and include, in the context of Burundi's 2015 cycle, the following: (1) political dialogue between opposition parties and the ruling party; (2) return of self-exiled political leaders to Burundi and their re-integration into the political process; (3) electoral reform; (4) establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC); (5) appointment of new CENI commissioners; and, (6) decision by the president regarding whether he will seek a third term. As outlined in the body of the report each of these issues and associated processes could transpire in a range of manners, each with distinct implications for fueling or mitigating conflict and violence surrounding Burundi's 2015 elections. In designing programming interventions, USAID should take into account the current political context as it relates to recent developments for each of the aforementioned six areas.

Based on the profile outlined above and taking these issues into account, programming that falls under the following five strategic objectives should be considered to prevent, mitigate, mediate or manage violence for the 2015 electoral cycle:

1. Build the Capacity of State Stakeholders in Electoral Security Administration;
2. Foster Dialogue Among Political Parties to Assure their Participation in the 2015 Electoral Cycle and their Acceptance of Results;
3. Demobilize the Youth Wings of Political Parties and Integrate Them into the Electoral Process;
4. Engage Civil Society/Faith-Based Organizations and Media in Peace-building and Accountability for Violence;
5. Reduce the Culture of Impunity for Electoral Violence.

USAID should be interested in pursuing these programming objectives because electoral conflict and malpractice cut across nearly all democracy and governance (DG) programming areas for the Burundi Mission and could affect investments in other areas. Programming should build upon the effective assistance provided by USAID during the 2004 and 2010 cycles, in particular by leveraging existing data on incidents of electoral conflict to inform state- and non-state-led efforts to prevent, manage, or mediate violence. USAID should also further coordinate its electoral security-related efforts—and those tied to the broader political context—with other donors in Burundi; for example, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland, which convened a workshop on

political reconciliation (amongst the self-exiled opposition, with invitations extended to the ruling party) in Caux under the auspices of Initiatives for Change.

### **Electoral Security Programming**

Based on these strategic program objectives, Creative recommends the following programming in the associated five areas. Proposed activities listed are illustrative. The comprehensive list for each objective, organized by implementation sequence, can be found in the body of the report.

#### **1) Build the Capacity of State Stakeholders in Electoral Security Administration**

##### **CENI**

- Provide support and technical inputs to the CENI to enhance its profile in oversight and provision of electoral security, to ensure that it plays the leadership role in electoral security planning and conflict-prevention. This can be achieved through specific alterations within and additions to CENI's organizational structure:
  - First, the CENI should designate one commissioner with electoral security as their area of focus;
  - Second, CENI should create a staff position that serves as the point of contact on electoral security operational issues and the liaison with the PNB and military on electoral security planning and operations;
  - Third, CENI should assume the lead role in organizing the Joint Electoral Security Task Force, composed of CENI, Ministry of Public Security/PNB, and Department of Defense/military. A sub-national structure for the Task Force should also be set up during the electoral cycle.
- Assist the CENI to develop a one-day training for poll workers in conflict mediation. While polling stations have not been the traditional scenes of violence, minor disputes can arise which must be contained and not escalated. Introducing a one-day training session on conflict mediation skills for poll workers would provide the CENI with thousands of mediators at the grassroots levels.
- Provide assistance to the CENI to develop a strategic communications plan so that its efforts in establishing a credible and transparent electoral process are known to the public. A specific focus of the strategic communications plan should be directed at the management of election results announcements in order to reduce the triggers produced by delay and opaque practices.
- Provide technical support to the CENI and other authorities to develop a viable resolution to the issue of the stipend payment to political party agents so that either all agents receive an equal amount or none are paid the stipend.
- Foster CENI's involvement in regional Electoral Management Associations (EMAs) and continue USAID's support of CENI members attending the training program at the University of South Africa. Such exposure to peer review can provide a sustainable mechanism for performance and accountability of domestic electoral administration to a regional audience of fellow practitioners.

**PNB**

- Develop and deliver training in electoral threat assessment to PNB staff. This training can be introduced into existing police training programs conducted by the international community.

**The National Independent Human Rights Commission (CNIDH)**

- Assist the CNIDH to develop a training program focused on enhancing institutional ability to monitor and gather evidence for investigation of crimes of electoral violence. A capacity building program relevant to electoral violence can be initiated with the human rights commission (HRC).

**2) Foster Dialogue among Political Parties to Assure their Participation in the 2015 Electoral Cycle and their Acceptance of Results**

While there is wide agreement that the ruling and opposition parties need to meet and resolve certain differences, the conceptual approach to the dialogue varies among stakeholders (there is also disagreement on those issues that should be discussed). Rather than conceptualizing the dialogue as a grand meeting in a retreat setting, the strategic approach should be organized less symmetrically. Such an approach recognizes that political trust must be established between parties, and is another objective of the dialogue along with examining specific issues of political division.

As a result, the notion of “political dialogue” should be disaggregated among different hosts and different foci. Among the hosts, CSOs such as the Conflict Alert and Prevention Centre (CENAP) and Initiatives for Change as well as the Netherlands Institute for Multi-Party Democracy (NIMD) are already conducting initiatives that approximate political dialogue. Other such dialogue initiatives can be hosted by the UN, EU, and the African Union (AU) from the international community and through other CSOs and religious groups domestically. From a topical standpoint, the dialogue events can be modest in scope and deal with what has been termed “innocent issues” in order to assure a successful working relationship among the participants. The issues need not be specifically on elections and can include economic, social, environmental, and international issues. Further, within this program group the issue of the political party agent stipend (as discussed above) can be addressed. Without the financial resources from the government to cover the stipend, international relief organizations could request to provide food and water (two meals) to political party agents on Election Day.

After traction for the political dialogue has been generated by these series of events, the Political Party Forum can be convened for the purposes of promulgating and adopting a Political Party Code of Conduct, the provisions of which are enforced by the CENI or by a new electoral court, if it is established.

**3) Demobilize the Youth Wings of Political Parties and Integrate Them into the Electoral Process**

- Support efforts to press the government of Burundi to stop employing or sanctioning activities of youth wings as perpetrators of violence. Work with other international partners to press the government to de-mobilize these youth as well as prosecute their

crimes. The international community should press the ruling party to make party leaders accountable for violence perpetrated by their youth cadres.

- Initiate grass-roots efforts to shift youth away from violence and toward assuming a constructive role in society in general and the electoral process in particular. CENI can also consider recruiting youth to serve as poll workers; however, the personal records of violence must be taken into account when making such appointments.
- Support programming that employs anti-gang methodologies to create alternative forms of constructive engagement by youth, such as sports, employment, and educational activities. Examples of best practices can be drawn from the USAID-funded Youth Alliance Program that Creative Associates implements in Guatemala and Honduras.

#### **4) Engage Civil Society/Faith-Based Organizations and Media in Peace-building and Accountability for Violence**

- Support CSOs so they may compile incident monitoring data from 2010 and 2011 into a master database and map to establish a countrywide profile on electoral violence which could be employed by CENI, PNB, and other stakeholders in future electoral security planning. In its reporting structure, the profiles should reflect a singular methodology so that state and non-state groups can share consistent incident reporting content. Such incident reporting can be used to discern patterns of electoral violence which can be leveraged to focus security resources on protecting identified victims, securing identified locations, and creating surges during phases which may be more vulnerable to violence than others.
- Provide support to CSOs, FBOs, and the media so they may play a de-conflictive role in managing expectations on electoral outcomes. For example, opposition parties need to have a better understanding of the level of support they command within the population so that they may, in turn, have realistic expectations about probability of victory in 2015. Such expectations can be managed by CSOs, FBOs, and the media through conducting focus groups, public opinion surveys, voting behavior workshops, and Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) exercises.
- Support initiatives to conduct peace education campaigns, peace rallies, pacts, and other mechanism by CSOs, FBOs, and religious leaders to reduce tension among political contestants and the perpetrators of violence.
- Provide medical, counseling, and legal services for victims of electoral violence and their families.
- Provide funding for logistics so that media outlets can repeat the Media Synergies program in 2015. Programs such as Media Synergies, which provided donor support and media coordination to provide un-biased coverage of the 2010 elections, can be considered as a vehicle to assure independent coverage of the 2015 elections.

## **5) Reduce the Culture of Impunity for Electoral Violence**

- Support and encourage initiation of the Truth and Reconciliation process (to the extent possible). Among the relevant dynamics in play, the TRC will play a prominent role in identifying perpetrators, giving victims a forum to tell their stories, and offer a possible platform for further prosecution or compensation to victims.
- Support CNIDH efforts to monitor human rights abuses in general and those specifically driven by election-related motives before, during, and after Election Day in 2015.
- Provide training to Judiciary Police in investigative methods.

### **Monitoring and Evaluation (M & E)**

The baseline data collected are intended to measure the level of incidents of conflict in order to both profile the nature of the conflict and assess whether its intensity is responsive to program strategies and activities. With this data, a second level of M & E can be employed to examine the impact of electoral security programming on governance, rule of law, and civil society sectors.

### **Conclusion**

Despite positive developments in Burundi's overall transition away from civil war, the problem of electoral violence remains acute and should not be understated. If confirmed, the recent declaration by Rwasa, as reported by the media, to return to violence creates a new set of unknowns in conflict dynamics for 2015. State-led efforts in electoral security administration, enforcement, and adjudication remain uneven, lack a comprehensive coordination mechanism, and have been primarily focused on Election Day rather than the entire electoral cycle.

Taking into account the security and political factors which create the underlying vulnerabilities for electoral violence, the logic to employ these tactics is outcome-based, that is, violence is used in political competition to influence or determine the outcomes of the election (while some retaliatory violence also occurs). While political impasses can be stubborn obstacles to reconciliation and democratic consolidation, such impasses may be responsive to outside mediation to resolve circumstances where the perpetrators of electoral violence are criminal or insurgents. However, as the Development Hypothesis asserts, while political dialogue is an important factor in the prevention of further electoral violence, institutional capacity will be required to administer and enforce protective measures, and judicial capacity will be required to prosecute and penalize the perpetrators.

Each of these three areas – political, institutional, and judicial – can be addressed through programming as described above. CSOs and FBOs, along with the international community, can sponsor an array of political dialogue events to build confidence and trust among the parties over the next 24 months. Electoral security administration and conflict mediation training can be provided to the CENI, PNB, and Army. A standardized methodology for reporting of incidents of electoral violence as human rights violations can be developed with the CNIDH. Judicial programming should focus on the Office of

the Prosecutor General and enforcing standards of punishment for perpetrators of electoral violence.

While the sequencing of such program interventions has been chronologically divided into the Pre-Election, Election Day, and Post-Election Phases, there are crosscurrents of three pivotal processes that comprise both a singular and blended impact on the political campaign. First, the process of political dialogue as described above will be a critical factor that defines whether the non-parliamentary opposition participates in the next cycle of elections. In a related context, electoral and constitutional reform as considered by the parliament will also have a bearing on the perceptions of election fairness and a third term for the incumbent president could, in itself, be a trigger to violence. Finally, the Truth and Reconciliation process will be unfolding during the preparations for elections. As political contests in the 2015 elections are likely to be the subjects of Commission's investigation, safeguards must be taken to prevent the politicization of the process.

As a result, a coordinated approach to electoral security programming should be adopted by the international community (Electoral Security Donors Group – ESDG). A major bilateral donor to Burundi, with experience providing electoral assistance, should serve as the chair of this group. Through such a coordination mechanism, communication among donors can be facilitated to ensure that the multi-dimensional approach that addresses all areas of need with regard to prevention, management, and mediation is employed.

The 2015 electoral cycle for Burundi can be viewed as a kind of “crossroads” set of elections. On the one hand, if elections can be conducted peacefully and credibly, they may serve to foster democratic consolidation and national reconciliation. However, as the new Rwasa “wild card” shows, if media reports regarding his statement are confirmed, the elections continue to possess the risk for violence and, unless special measures are taken to prevent and manage this violence, these elections could set back the cause of national unity and the viability electoral governance in Burundi.

## Introduction

From July 25 through August 11, 2012, Creative Associates International (Creative) conducted an electoral security assessment in Burundi under funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) through its Elections and Political Processes Indefinite Quantity Contract. The team members were Dr. Carol Sahley from USAID's Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance, and Jeff Fischer and Patrick Quirk from Creative. The objective of the assessment was twofold: 1) to establish a profile on the forms of electoral conflict experienced in Burundi since the signing of the Global Ceasefire Agreement between Burundi and the National Council for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) in 2003 with a focus on the 2005 and 2010 electoral cycles; and 2) to put forward a framework in planning, programming, and evaluation to prevent, manage, and mediate electoral conflict in the 2015 electoral cycle. The assessment was conducted through desk research and meetings with electoral security stakeholders in Bujumbura as well as the provinces of Bujumbura Rural, Bubanza, Kayanza, Ngozi, Muyinga and Gitega. The schedule of meetings is shown as Annex I. A list of acronyms is shown in Annex II.

This assessment seeks to address the following Problem Statement and Development Hypothesis:

***Problem Statement:*** Electoral violence between the ruling party and opposition parties escalated between the 2005 and 2010 electoral cycles, continuing into 2011. These political divisions remain obstacles to democratic consolidation and create on-going tensions which could trigger electoral violence early in the 2015 electoral cycle. Without a meaningful political dialogue, institutional capacity for protection and enforcement, and assessing penalties for perpetrators, the logic of electoral violence remains viable as a means to suppress opposition or retaliate against unsatisfied grievances.

***Development Hypothesis:*** The employment of electoral violence can become illogical for potential perpetrators if genuine political dialogue and space for competition is fostered, the capacities of institutions to protect electoral targets are strengthened, and penalties for committing acts of electoral violence are imposed.

There are four sections to this Framework.

1. **Assessment:** This step is divided into three major analytical pieces: a) Contextual Analysis; b) Historical Conflict Factors; and c) Stakeholder Analysis.
2. **Planning:** Examine donor constraints, United States Government (USG) priorities, local capacity limitations, and other planning elements.
3. **Programming:** Determine specific areas of programming objectives and associated activities.
4. **Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E):** Establish illustrative indicators for recommended programming.

The structure and context of the Electoral Security Framework for Burundi will be guided by USAID's *Electoral Security Framework – Technical Guidance Handbook for Democracy and Governance Officers* (2010).

## I. Electoral Security Assessment

### A. Contextual Analysis

From 1993 to 2005, Burundians endured a bloody civil war based predominantly on inter-ethnic tensions between the country's two dominant tribal affiliations—Hutu and Tutsi. The conflict began following the assassination during a coup attempt by Tutsi-affiliated forces of then Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye, elected in 1993 as part of the Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) party platform.

This event led to Hutu government-orchestrated repression and mass killings of the Tutsis and those affiliated with the ethnic group, setting off and feeding into the civil war which ensued. The principal actors in the conflict were the government and mainly Hutu rebel groups—primarily the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD), the armed wing of the National Council for Defense of Democracy (CNDD) party—who aimed to curb Tutsi control of the country in general and demanded that the Tutsi-controlled army be reformed, in particular.<sup>6</sup> During this time the National Forces of Liberation (FNL), which was formerly the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU), was another major armed actor representing the Hutus.

Fighting between belligerents and the government took an approximate 300,000 lives<sup>7</sup> and continued through negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania, which began in June 1998 and eventually yielded a peace and reconciliation agreement that the sides signed in 2000. Three years later, the CNDD-FDD and then-transitional government signed a series of ceasefire agreements, which enabled the country to move forward with implementation of the terms and associated reforms contained in the Arusha Peace Agreement. Among other steps, the Agreement called for elections to be held as well as re-integration of all former armed combatants and political movements into Burundi's security agencies and associated forces.

In 2005, and as outlined in the Arusha Peace Agreement, Burundi held elections that were viewed by the international community as largely free and fair. The CNDD-FDD won the contest convincingly, cementing its control over the levers of power. The months following the official 2010 electoral period (as further detailed in sections below) witnessed a marked increase in politically-motivated violence occurring outside what is generally considered to be the electoral period. Because of the linkage between victims

---

<sup>6</sup> Displeased with FRODEBU's negotiations regarding government post allocations following Ndadaye's assassination (and that of other high-level government officials) with the predominantly Tutsi opposition parties (UPRONA), a faction of FRODEBU broke away to form a new party, CNDD, as well as an armed wing of the party, the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD).

<sup>7</sup> Estimates of total number of casualties varies.

and perpetrators of this violence with the 2010 electoral cycle, however, these extra-judicial killings and other politically-motivated forms of violence are considered in this assessment as a form of electoral violence. These incidents conform to the generally accepted definition of electoral violence as offered by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP): “in which actors employ coercion in an instrumental way to advance their interests or achieve specific political ends...”<sup>8</sup> The specific profile of violence also fits with specific forms of electoral violence as set forth by UNDP, including “acts such as assassination of opponents or spontaneous fistcuffs between rival groups of supporters – and threats, coercion and intimidation of opponents, voters, and election officials.”<sup>9</sup>

UNDP divides the electoral threat calendar into the five phases:

**Phase 1** - The long run-up to electoral events (18 months to three months prior)

**Phase 2** - The campaign’s final lap (three months prior to Election Day)

**Phase 3** - Polling day(s)

**Phase 4** - Between voting and proclamation

**Phase 5** - Post-election outcomes and their aftermath.<sup>10</sup>

In keeping with the *Framework* methodology, this assessment distills these five phases into three electoral periods of time - Pre-Election Phase, Election Day, and Post-Election Phase. For the purposes of this assessment, incidents occurring in 2011 are defined as Post-Election in nature.

With this clarification in place, the following Contextual Analysis identifies those security, political, economic, and election-specific factors which create vulnerabilities for electoral violence to occur.

### **1. Security Factors: Parties Incompletely De-Mobilized**

The 2010 elections were conducted in the context of a post-conflict environment. While post-conflict elections were conducted in 2005, the 2010 elections were the first to include de-mobilized combatants from the National Forces for Liberation (FNL) and its transformation into a political party. As a result, aspects of electoral politics, particularly with regard to the logic of violence by the perpetrators, were not completely demilitarized in 2010. The September 3, 2012 statement by Rwasa, as claimed by media, that the military wing of the FNL forces were returning to war against the government can, if confirmed, be cited as further evidence of this vulnerability and poses a substantial risk for electoral violence in 2015.

Incentives for violence are translated into acts of violence at least in part due to the widespread availability of firearms, which remain the weapons of choice. Kalashnikov

<sup>8</sup> *Elections and Conflict Prevention: A Guide to Analysis, Planning Programming*, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 4.

<sup>9</sup> UNDP, 4.

<sup>10</sup> UNDP, 20-21.

rifles are reported to cost no more than 200,000 BF (\$140.00 USD). In the 2010 Post-Election Phase, perpetrators also used hand grenades to terrorize the public and intimidate political rivals. These hand grenades were not, however, thrown at specific human or facility targets. The availability of arms enables individuals to commit acts of violence within and outside of the electoral process.

## **2. Security Factors: Unconsolidated Elements of the National Police (PNB)**

Under the terms of the Arusha Peace Agreement, the National Police of Burundi (PNB) was established as a “constellation” of entities, each of which possesses a different culture, set of qualifications, and level of de-mobilization since the ceasefire. These contingents include the former gendarme or national constabulary force; security police employed in community patrolling and protection; judiciary police performing investigative functions; and ex-combatants. By some accounts, these four contingents have not been harmonized into a unified force. Some ex-combatants are not considered as fully de-mobilized from the former rebel fighter roles. Such a scenario creates vulnerabilities for electoral violence because divisions create diverse political loyalties, particularly at the provincial and commune levels. The fragmented and nascent character of the PNB creates both active and passive vulnerabilities for electoral violence. Competing loyalties and varying degrees of professionalism render PNB staff susceptible to manipulation by political actors to serve as active perpetrators of violence or as passive enforcers who selectively enforce the law depending upon the identity of victims and perpetrators.

## **3. Security Factors: External Threats from Terrorism**

The assessment focused on the primary and historical profile of electoral conflict as inter-party and domestic in nature. However, it is worth noting a potential external threat in the form of attacks on electoral targets by Al Shabab. The terror group has issued blanket threats against countries participating in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping operation. Burundi has contributed approximately 4,400 troops to the Mission out of a total deployment of 7,650. While Al Shabab could attempt to attack soft targets at any juncture, elections are target-rich due to the multiple events and facilities vulnerable to attack. As a result, the potential threat of increased Al Shabab activity should be monitored as the election season approaches. However, this threat must be qualified by the current plan to dissolve AMISOM before 2015. If this occurs, the value to Al Shabab of hitting electoral targets may diminish or disappear.

## **4. Political Factors: Electoral System and Calendar of Elections**

The inter-ethnic power sharing arrangements embedded in Burundi’s electoral system seem to have diminished inter-ethnic tensions between the majority Hutu and minority Tutsi populations (which defined the combatants of the 1993 conflict), but heightened intra-ethnic conflict within the Hutu population. For example, constitutional arrangements require that Burundi’s two Vice-Presidents be of different ethnic groups

and different political parties (Article 124) and that the National Assembly be comprised of 60 percent Hutu and 40 percent Tutsi (Article 164), with three additional deputies from the Twa ethnic minority, who are also allocated three senators. Additionally, the 2005 constitution and a subsequent law on political parties prohibit parties that promote “ethnic exclusion.” At this juncture, the power sharing features of the electoral system appear to have contributed positively to dampening inter-ethnic conflict.

At the same time, the system seems to have contributed to intensification of intra-Hutu competition due to the guaranteed winning stakes within that community. Similar intra-ethnic tensions are not found in Tutsi political competition. One explanation offered for the latter has been that the electoral system creates lower electoral stakes for Tutsis and therefore has not yielded similar incentives for electoral violence.

The multiple ballot system employed in Burundi also has implications for electoral conflict. Under this system each party retains its own ballots, with the voter making their selection by placing the ballot for their candidate or party of choice into an envelope and disposing of the remaining ballots. By some accounts, however, some actors have taken advantage of this system to develop specialist vote buying schemes that represent a variant of “chain voting” practices. Perpetrators give payments or goods to voters if they can show their un-voted ballots (which must be smuggled out of the polling station) as evidence that they did not vote for a particular candidate or party. The presence of vote buying schemes suggests an environment of voter coercion—voters may be the targets of vote buying (representing “carrots”) but also of voter intimidation to influence selections or turnout (representing “sticks”).

The constitution establishes an electoral calendar which mandates that five levels of elections (communal, presidential, senate, national assembly, and colline or “hill”) be conducted within roughly a four-month period of time. This condensed and demanding calendar (both for technical and logistical preparation and implementation) can create various factors that can contribute to electoral violence. In particular, the calendar creates a sustained period of intense political activity in which national and subnational posts are in play. As a result, political tensions and stakes are heightened over an extended period of time and geographic spread, making it difficult for state enforcement authorities to simultaneously manage tensions and the associated potential for violence on all fronts.

Therefore, the electoral calendar creates vulnerabilities for electoral violence by creating a situation that facilitates legitimate administrative difficulties which can be portrayed as deliberate manipulation by disgruntled losers; and, providing perpetrators with a relatively concise timeframe in which they can sustain the intensity of their violent acts in an environment where the resources of state enforcement agencies are spread thin.

##### ***5. Political Factors: Political Party System and Political Finance***

Though political parties exist in Burundi they lack the capacity and degree of institutionalization to fill the traditional “Western” role of aggregation of opinion and interest articulation between citizens and government. Ruling and opposition parties are

viewed as instruments to aggregate and distribute rents to vast patronage networks with few if any parties putting forth actionable or realistic platforms or policies. The CNDD-FDD retains a dominant position at the national and subnational levels as solidified through land-slide victories in 2005 and 2010.

The opposition is fragmented between ‘hard’ opposition and ‘soft’ opposition parties. The fragility of Burundi’s opposition parties was both enabled and exacerbated by the decisions of many hard opposition parties, including the Alliance for Democrats for Change (ADC-Ikibiri), an informal and unregistered coalition of opposition parties, to boycott the post-communal elections in the 2010 cycle. This absence had profound political consequences as it further consolidated the CNDD-FDD’s control over legislative seats and state resources. This absence also permitted the ruling party to employ tactics of violence and intimidation against the opposition with impunity for their actions. The self-exile of some prominent opposition party leaders has created leadership vacuums which have been exploited by the CNDD-FDD through the creation of “wings” within hard opposition parties or soft opposition parties possessing largely the same name as their original namesake. For example, there are currently four entities bearing the letters of FNL. By fragmenting individual opposition parties into separate entities, their resources and focus are further diluted creating further political advantage for the FNDD-FDD.

Another factor relevant to political parties and electoral violence is the engagement of youth wings as agents of violence and intimidation against political rivals. The CNDD-FDD reportedly used its youth wings during the 2010 electoral cycle (in particular in the Pre-Election and Post-Election Phases) to intimidate rivals or their party operatives. During the Pre-Election Phase, these wings acted with the motives of forcing candidate withdrawal or disrupting campaign activities, as well as aiming to suppress or alter citizens’ votes. Post-Election motives were mainly retribution.

Burundian elections occur in an unregulated political finance environment that lacks any requirement to disclose campaign contributions or expenditures as well as prohibitions on sources or limits to spending. This lack of regulation and associated infrastructure creates vulnerabilities for monies to be used to fund violence and intimidation—hired perpetrators (including and in particular the youth wings) must be paid or at minimum equipped with weapons, both requiring sources of non-traceable cash. In addition to enabling violence, this opaque political finance system facilitates widespread use of vote buying schemes, which require gifts and cash to distribute. This lack of infrastructure negatively affects the integrity of Burundi’s politics in general and electoral process in particular aside, and at this time, there seems to be a scant interest in addressing political finance reform. Coupled with this lack of desire to push reforms is a cynicism across sectors that even if such regulations were established the government would not enforce them.

Accordingly, the political party system creates vulnerabilities for violence as a result of the structural and financial barriers to legitimate competition that it erects for the opposition and the resources it frees up to fund violence, in particular by the youth wings.

## **6. Political Factors: Electoral and Criminal Justice**

Electoral disputes are adjudicated by the CENI on the national and communal levels. Though few stakeholders expressed concern about the impartiality of CENI in adjudicating these disputes, individuals across sectors voiced concern that CENI lacks the human resources, investigative and adjudicative framework, and focus of mandate to administer electoral justice in addition to its operational role in conducting the election. Concerns were also raised about the general conflict of interest in CENI making judgments about grievances to which it is a party; yet, at the same time, stakeholders did not view assigning electoral dispute to the ordinary courts as a viable option, given the lack of capacity and judicial independence of these bodies.

As a result, the system of electoral disputes poses vulnerabilities for violence because aggrieved parties lack an effective mechanism to satisfy their claims. Accordingly, they may choose to pursue their grievances outside of formal channels including through confrontation or violence.

There is also a weakness in the system of criminal justice surrounding electoral violence whereby few perpetrators are arrested and prosecuted for their crimes. This failure to assign penalties for acts of violence creates a *de facto* impunity for the perpetrators to be held accountable for their actions. However, the notion of impunity can also be extended to state security forces, particularly the PNB and the National Intelligence Service (SNR), which have been accused of committing arbitrary arrests and detentions of opposition supporters. While proving impunity can be an elusive task, two interviews provided evidence that such practices indeed exist. First, reports of such practices are documented by human rights monitoring groups such as the Burundian Association for the Protection of Human Rights and Detained Persons (APRODEH), which claims that judges are also targets of political intimidation. And second, when discussing the prosecution of such cases with the Prosecutor General of Burundi, no such specific cases were identified.

The security and political factors cited above represent structural vulnerabilities. However, the following vulnerabilities specific to 2010 electoral cycle (which include issues in 2011) also contributed to violence.

## **7. Election-Specific Factors: Expectations, Boycotts, and Conflict**

In the run up to the 2010 elections, opposition parties believed that their support among the population was high, which was not the reality on the national and subnational level, and therefore, they thought that they would win large portions of the vote across contests. Without public opinion polls, few tools existed that could check these unrealistic views and associated expectations held by the opposition parties. After winning far fewer seats than expected (for example, the FNL garnered only 14.15 percent of the total communal vote),<sup>11</sup> opposition elements claimed that the election was rigged.

---

<sup>11</sup> Africa Elections Database - [http://africanelections.tripod.com/bi\\_2010communal.html](http://africanelections.tripod.com/bi_2010communal.html)

The belief that ballot fraud was committed led several opposition parties to boycott the parliamentary and presidential contests. After withdrawing from the 2010 contests, many opposition political party leaders sought exile to ensure their personal safety. Stakeholders across sectors indicated that these self-exiled leaders will return to Burundi only if their personal safety can be assured; at the time of this writing, these same stakeholders report that the self-exiled leaders feel that such security cannot be guaranteed. Personal harm to any of these returning leaders could spark retaliatory violence from party militants. Their absence created a political vacuum which the CNDD-FDD quickly filled through violence, intimidation, and the closing of political space for the boycotting parties to re-organize.

## B. Historical Conflict Factors

The 2005 electoral cycle in Burundi was largely peaceful, free, and fair, although different phases were punctuated with isolated incidents of violence. On the heels of this largely peaceful balloting, however, election-related violence increased in the run-up to and immediately following the 2010 contests. Divergent political contexts surrounding each cycle can account for much of the disparity in level of violence between the two sets of electoral events.

The 2005 elections represented the final step in the transitional plan put forward in the 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement. With the exception of the FNL, in 2003 and 2004, the majority of rebel groups signed ceasefire accords with the transitional government, and many of these groups engaged in a Disarmament, De-Mobilization, and Reintegration

(DDR) program for ex-combatants. Coupled with a populace largely tired of conflict and its negative effects, the presence of international forces in the form of United Nations Operation in Burundi (UNOB) dampened incentives and opportunities for conflict. The pledges from the army to play a neutral role also removed a potential spoiler. Combined with other variables, these factors contributed to a 2005 electoral cycle which served as a largely peaceful milestone in Burundi's history.

Events following the 2005 contest, however, served as the basis for increased violence and a shift from the inter-ethnic conflict which characterized the civil war (although tensions and associated animosities have by no means completely dissipated) to the intra-Hutu power struggle for political control that characterized the 2010 cycle and persists to the time of this writing. Hostilities between the CNDD-FDD and FNL heightened in the immediate period following the 2005 elections. Despite ongoing talks between the two sides to formally bring the FNL into the political arena, the ruling party employed state institutions to carry out (or ensure impunity for) attacks onto the FNL, with the FNL

### The 2005 electoral cycle:

- Referendum (February 28)
- Communal (June 3 and 7)
- National Assembly (July 4)
- Senatorial (July 29)
- Presidential (August 19)
- Colline [district or "Hill"] (September 23).

### The 2010 electoral cycle:

- Communal (May 24)
- Presidential (June 28)
- National Assembly (July 23)
- Senatorial (July 28)
- Colline [district or "Hill"] (September 7).

retaliating in kind. Government-orchestrated or sanctioned repression then spread to other elements of the opposition, as part of the CNDD-FDD's efforts to position for the 2010 contests. As part of its efforts targeted at winning in 2010, and in addition to leveraging state resources to curry favor with the populace, the government (starting in 2007) began a campaign of political repression in order to weaken and fragment the opposition. Although suppression of the FNL was specifically acute—in particular following its formal integration and recognition as a party—other opposition forces including the Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) and the Movement for Solidarity and Democracy (MSD) also experienced repression.<sup>12</sup> With the complicity of state officials and security forces in the years leading up to 2010, the ruling party carried out harassment, intimidation, beatings, and even killings of the opposition. Investigations of such incidents have been few and far between.

Compared to the 2005 process, the 2010 electoral cycle was characterized by increases in violence before, during, and after Election Day. Between April 26 and September 12, 2010, there were 519 recorded incidents of violence, with three forms being most prominent—intimidation of party operatives or associates and voters (155 incidents), physical clashes between groups of supporters (76 incidents) and destruction of property (62 cases). During the same period, 20 murders and 47 attempted murders were recorded.

Of the 519 total incidents, 53 percent involved intimidation of the electorate with the motive to manipulate their ballot choice or deter them from voting. Geographically, 75 percent of the murders occurred in two provinces—Bujumbura Mairie and Bujumbura Rural.<sup>13</sup> Altogether, electoral violence was concentrated in four provinces, with 48 percent of recorded incidents occurring in Bujumbura Mairie, Bujumbura Rural, Gitega, and Ngozi. Violence within these provinces was concentrated in specific communes. In Bujumbura Rural, violence was most prevalent in Kabezi (16 incidents), Kanyosha (10 incidents) and Mubimbi (10 incidents), where in Bujumbura Marie violence occurred principally in Kamenge (17 incidents) and Musaga (16 incidents). These communes are characterized by a high number of ex-combatants and de-mobilized individuals. In Gitega province violence occurred mostly in Bugendana (15 incidents) and Giheta communes (13 incidents), whereas in Ngozi province the communes of Kiremba (14 incidents), the home of then FNL party chairman Rwaswa, and Mwumba (10 incidents), the home of the President, were most affected. Observers and local stakeholders including APRODH and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the United Nations Integrated office in Burundi reported several cases of seemingly arbitrary arrests (and incarcerations) by the PNB and SNR throughout the electoral period, totaling approximately 294 cases across the FNL, Union for Peace and Development (UPD), MSD, and the Union for National Progress (UPRONA).<sup>14</sup>

---

<sup>12</sup> Reports also indicate that the ruling CNDD-FDD party attempted to infiltrate and create fissures in opposition parties. Some claim this resulted in the formation of various “wings” of opposition parties.

<sup>13</sup> Statistics from Final Report of the Amatora Mu Mahoro (AMM) Project, Implemented by COSOME, with support from IFES.

<sup>14</sup> European Union – Election Observation Mission (EOM) – Final Report – 2010 Elections in Burundi, 4.

Due to the short time period in which Burundi holds five successive elections, for the purpose of this analysis the Pre-Election Phase will be considered the time period leading up to National Referendum (for the 2005 cycle) and the Communal elections (for the 2010 cycle) whereas the Post-Election Phase will be the time period following the Colline (“Hill” or district) level elections (for both 2005 and 2010). Where appropriate, trends and incidents specific to particular ballots—that is, the Pre-Election, Election Day and Post-Election Phase of each contest—will be noted.

### **Pre-Election Phase**

The Pre-Election Phases for the 2005 and 2010 electoral cycles both experienced incidents of violence; though to some extent similar in profile, the latter comprised a marked increase in the intensity of violence as well as expansion in tactics and perpetrators.

The Pre-Election Phase for the 2005 contest was relatively peaceful, yet prior to each of the individual contests political parties intimidated and threatened voters as well as in some cases physically harmed rival party members, supporters, or activists. In the run up to the Referendum, political parties reportedly made threatening declarations that instilled fear among rural populations and returning refugees. In Bujumbura Rural province, for example, CNDD-FDD and the Armed Forces of Burundi (FAB) reportedly abused some civilians due to their purported ties to the FNL and in an attempt to sway their voting. Political parties engaged in intimidation of voters. In Makamba province and prior to the Commune elections, for example, FRODEBU reportedly went house-to-house threatening individuals to provide proof on Election Day of a ballot cast for their party. Confrontations also occurred between supporters and activists of rival parties. Prior to the Commune elections, activists of FRODEBU and CNDD-FDD in Ngozi and Rutana attempted to disrupt each other’s campaign meetings. Threats between opposing parties (FRODEBU and CNDD-FDD) continued during the run up to the National Assembly elections. In some cases violence escalated from verbal abuse and confrontation to physical harm—in Kayanza, three family members of a presidential guard were killed; and in Bururi, FRODEBU activists reportedly attacked a female activist of CNDD-FDD.

The Pre-Election Phase for the 2010 elections (in particular the run up to the communal and presidential contests) experienced the highest number of recorded incidents of electoral violence for this cycle. During the first week of campaigning for the communal elections, 66 incidents were reported, with an additional 80 reported the week immediately prior to Election Day. This trend continued for the Pre-Election Phase of the presidential election, when approximately 100 incidents were recorded.<sup>15</sup> The campaign period for legislative elections was calmer but still punctuated by some incidents.

Violence during this period took two principal forms—intimidation of and physical harm onto rival parties (supporters, activists, or candidates) and intimidation of or physical

---

<sup>15</sup> Statistics from Final Report of the Mu Amatora Mahoro (AMM) Project, Implemented by COSOME, with support from IFES.

harm onto voters. In each case, political parties in general and the CNDD-FDD and FNL in particular were the main perpetrators. Ongoing tensions between the CNDD-FDD and opposition in general and the widespread use of these forms of violence in 2010 makes it highly probable that these forms of violence will be repeated during the 2015 cycle. Accordingly, counter-measures should be planned in anticipation of these trends.

First, parties employed their operatives in general and youth supporters in particular to intimidate or physically harm their counterparts in rival parties. When targeted on rival parties (as opposed to the electorate) the motive behind employing such tactics was to force the withdrawal of rival candidates from the race as well as weaken the resolve of and hamper operations of party militants. These forms of violence occurred in the campaign periods for the commune as well as presidential elections.

Although various parties engaged in this form of violence the primary perpetrator was reportedly the ruling CNDD-FDD, which employed its youth wing (referred by some as a ‘militia’) to harass, intimidate, and in some cases physically harm supporters, members, or activists of opposition parties—in particular those of the FNL. The CNDD-FDD was responsible for 125 acts of such intimidation, mainly against supporters of the FNL (111 incidents involved FNL supporters as the victim).

The tactics included what one interviewee defined as forms of “psychological” and “physical” violence—the former comprised of using verbal threats of violence or chanting aggressive slogans, in unison, while walking through or near known opposition locales, to intimidate rival supporters. In Kayogoro, of Makamba (South) province, and Busoni of Kirundo province, for example, members of the CNDD-FDD youth wing reportedly engaged in what they termed “sports” during the night-time—marching in streets with sticks/clubs and threatening opposition political parties (in particular the FNL).

Physical violence included assaults using weapons ranging from fists, sticks and shoes to machetes, firearms (mainly pistols) and grenades. In January 2010, for example, 200 youth affiliated with the CNDD-FDD youth wing assaulted opposition party members in the province of Kirundo. In addition to employing youth, the CNDD also reportedly employed National Police forces to disrupt campaign rallies. The FNL was the CNDD’s primary target for both psychological and physical violence, though repression of ADC-Ikibiri coalition activities (in particular via use of police forces) was particularly acute. The CNDD-FDD youth wing also reportedly arbitrarily arrested opposition candidate supporters (without sanction from state authorities). In the Pre-Election Phase for 2010 the FNL also used such tactics, principally against the CNDD-FDD, whose supporters or activists were the victims of pressure or physical harm in 124 recorded cases of electoral violence.

During the period of June 11 – 13, 2012 which followed the 2010 Commune elections and in the campaign period for the Presidential contest several CNDD-FDD party offices were set on fire. Four grenade attacks, also targeted at the CNDD-FDD as the party in power, occurred in the capital or surrounding areas during the same time period. Together

with burning of party offices these incidents marked an escalation in tensions and associated violent tactics between the opposition and government.

The government used the attacks as justification for suppressing the main opposition parties and targeting their leaders, employing security forces (again, mainly the police) to arrest said leaders. During a three-month period from May to July 2010, the government arrested 242 opposition party members or supporters, according to APRODH.

Aside from the clear implications for suppressing opposition activity, attempted arrests also fueled clashes between government forces and opposition supporters. For example, in June 2010, following the reported intent of the government to arrest FNL leader Agathon Rwasa in Bujumbura Rural, party supporters and FNL sympathizers massed around his home to protect him and prevent the arrest. This led to clashes with the police, and ten FNL supporters were arrested and 50 were injured. Rwasa eventually fled the country citing security concerns.

The second principle form of violence in the Pre-Election Phase of 2010, representing 53 percent of all recorded incidents, was political parties verbally threatening and harassing as well as physically harming (with fists, rocks, sticks, or in some cases machetes) voters, with the aim of preventing them from voting or manipulating their ballot choice. Again, political parties were the primary perpetrators of violence onto the electorate, with the CNDD-FDD as the primary offender; the party committed 42 percent of all incidents attributed to political parties, with the majority of these occurring in the provinces of Bujumbura Mairie, Bujumbura Rural, Bururi and Ngozi. These threats included those of physical violence and future retribution as it relates to employment opportunities. For example, on June 24 in Bugarama (Bujumbura Rural Province) CNDD-FDD supporters told individuals that those who do not vote for the CNDD-FDD in the Presidential election “will be ordered to leave the country” and if they refuse to leave “will be beheaded.” Threats of physical violence were matched with intimidation related to livelihood and employment, with CNDD-FDD threatening to deprive voters of jobs or promotions and select transfers should they not vote for the ruling party candidate. The CNDD-FDD, however, was not the sole perpetrator of intimidation against voters—other parties also served as perpetrators, with the FNL responsible for 15 percent of recorded acts. For example, On May 21 FNL in Ruhororo (Ngozi Province) went door-to-door threatening individuals with punishment should they not vote for the FNL. The UPD and FRODEBU reportedly perpetrated 16 and 11 incidents of voter intimidation, respectively.

### **Election Day Phase**

Election Day in Burundi has generally been peaceful. In both 2005 and 2010, however, there were some reported incidents and disturbances that ranged from harassment of voters to grenade attacks. Election Days during the 2005 cycle were largely peaceful. The March 1 Referendum was largely free and fair,<sup>16</sup> witnessed high voter turnout, and the

---

<sup>16</sup> According to reports from the Coalition of Civic Society for the Monitoring of Elections in Burundi, which distributed 740 observers across the country for the referendum.

FNL abided by its promise not to disrupt the poll. However, verbal abuse of election workers from the Independent Provincial Election Commissions (CEPI) occurred in some polling stations, including in Bubanza province. Representing a form of coercion, cases of voting by proxy were reported in Bubanza, Bujumbura Mairie, Cankuzo, and Karuzi. The June 3 Communal elections were also largely peaceful, though they experienced more incidents than the Referendum Election Day. Incidents of fraud and violence in five locations—Mpanda (Bubanza Province), Kabezi, Kanyosha, Muhuta and Mutimbuzi (Bujumbura Rural Province)—resulted in rescheduling of balloting in these areas, with four grenade blasts wounding 16 individuals and killing one. As a result of these violent incidents, 260 (of 6,000) polling stations closed by mid-day. The 2005 Parliamentary elections also witnessed high voter turnout (77.23 percent) and according to one observation group balloting and counting went well, though there were problems with adherence to voter ID protocols.<sup>17</sup> Verbal abuse and intimidation of voters was reported in some areas, such as Rutana, as was theft of ballots, in Ngozi province. Throughout each of the 2005 contests, reports indicate that voters attempted to leave polling stations with their ballots, purportedly as a means to show party members how they voted (either to thwart threats or in exchange for money or goods).

Election Days throughout the 2010 cycle were also largely peaceful and according to the European Union (EU) observation mission experienced only a few isolated incidents. However, coercion and intimidation occurred in the three day period between postponement of the May Communal elections and the eventual Election Day. During this time, the CNDD-FDD reportedly engaged in vote buying throughout the country. Attempted coercion of voters by party representatives was also reported, as was verbal abuse of election workers.

### **Post-Election Day Phase**

The period immediately following the 2005 contest was relatively calm, but as the 2010 contest approached (in particular beginning in 2007) the Pre-Election Phase violence increased, particularly the violence that perpetrated by political party youth wings. The Post-Election Phase of the 2010 cycle witnessed a marked increase in violence. The form and intensity of this violence changed from the period immediately following Election Day to the months afterward. Regarding the former, in the immediate aftermath of the 2010 elections (in particular the commune elections), opposition parties filed grievances with the CENI and contested the results. Perceptions of fraud or mismanagement led to some minor protests and verbal abuse of election workers. Unclear and by some accounts inadequate election dispute mechanisms fueled discontent among the opposition and led to some protests and verbal abuse of election workers. Without clear dispute mechanisms—or proper function of the systems in place—political parties felt their concerns were not adequately addressed. What the opposition perceived to be irregularities in the May commune elections, led to tensions following the day of balloting and the ADC coalition's subsequent decision to boycott the four subsequent contests.

---

<sup>17</sup> According to report released by NORDEM.

In the period extending after Election Day, three forms of violence dominated the Post-Election Phase for 2010—(1) harassment of opposition party supporters by the CNDD-FDD youth wing (with some changes in form, as described below); (2) increased harassment of civil society actors and the media; and (2) extrajudicial killings of opposition party members, in particular the FNL. Individually and collectively, these three forms of post-election violence represent government-orchestrated efforts to intimidate the population in general and opposition in general in order to ensure continued control over government resources and cement their victory in 2015. Should these forms of violence continue, the integrity of the 2015 electoral cycle will be tainted with associated implications for Burundi's transition to democracy more broadly.

As the first form of post-election violence, youth wings of the main parties continued to harass and intimidate their rivals with tactics similar to those employed during the Pre-Election Phase. However, stakeholders indicated that it seemed, as of early 2012, these youth wings had morphed in operational form from entities generally under the control of their respective party structures into two distinct forms—one controlled by the party leadership and other, more independent and entrepreneurial groups. Both groups are said to have continued to harass and physically harm opposition supporters and operatives, yet the latter form has by some accounts shifted to more general extortion and harassment of citizens writ-large and in key areas. This shift is in part motivated by a need to fulfill basic needs, and the youth intimidate citizens to extort payment or goods. It remains possible that the latter form of intimidation is also coordinated by party leadership. At the same time, this shift in form of intimidation should be noted.

The second form of post-election violence involves intimidation of civil society actors and media and must be viewed in the context of the ADC coalition's boycott and subsequent self-imposed-exile from the country. Without a formal opposition, non-governmental actors—if for no other reason than by default—assumed the mantle of informal opposition, at least as perceived by the ruling party. Reflecting a continuing closure of political space since 2010, and motivated to suppress dissent as well as cement CNDD-FDD control over levers of power and associated state resources, the ruling party has continued to harass, intimidate, arbitrarily arrest (and imprison) and in some cases physically harm representatives of CSOs and the media. The government imprisoned journalists, allegedly due to their unfavorable coverage, and harassed one of the radio stations most critical of its rule. Additionally, two journalists of the IWACU newspaper were imprisoned for three days, reportedly as a result of their unfavorable coverage of or reporting on CNDD-FDD. The executive editor of this newspaper was threatened with a year in prison on seemingly baseless charges. Leaders of prominent CSOs were also targeted. One CSO reported allegations from the government of unpaid back-taxes. In 2011, journalists and civil society activists were harassed, intimidated, or brought in by the police or intelligence forces for questioning after they published coverage of extrajudicial, politically motivated killings (discussed below).

The third form of post-election violence involves imprisonment and political killings of opposition militants or leaders, in particular members of the FNL. The primary perpetrator of this violence is the government. Whereas youth wings were the CNDD-

FDD's primary enforcers before the 2010 contest, the government increasingly employed its national security forces (in particular the police and intelligence services) to intimidate, harass, arrest, imprison, and even kill rivals in the Post-Election Phase. Politically-motivated killings have increased markedly since 2010 and throughout 2011, tracing a pattern of targeted assassinations followed by reprisals from those associated with the victims. Estimates of the number of these killings vary, with the United Nations (UN) counting 61 in a 2011 report while Human Rights Watch and local human rights CSOs putting the total number from the 2010 cycle onward at approximately 300. The victims included members and former members of political parties and their family members as well as other individuals associated with a given party. According to reports, the politically-motivated killings have taken three core forms: (1) killings of opposition groups (principally the FNL); killings of CNDD-FDD members; and (3) attacks by armed gunmen. The majority of these attacks occurred in Bujumbura Marie and Bujumbura Rural, though similar killings have been reported in Gitega and Kayanza provinces.

FNL supporters have been the principal targets of opposition killings, though other parties such as the MSD and FRODEBU have also been targeted. Killings of FNL supporters and in particular higher-level leaders increased from July to October 2011. For example, Edouard Ruvayanga, a former FNL commander who had since enlisted in the National Police and deserted, was killed during this period. In September 2010, various bodies (identified to be FNL supporters) were found in the Rusizi River (adjacent to Lake Tanganyika). These killings have been increasingly brutal, involving multiple (up to 30 or 50) gun shots to a given victim as well as dismemberment of limbs following death. For example, a member of the MSD (identified as Léandre Bukuru) was killed and his head then removed and placed in a different location from the remainder of his body.<sup>18</sup> On December 2, 2010, a local official and FRODEBU party member was killed by armed men in his home in Ruziba of Bujumbura Mairie province.

The brutality of these acts seems to be a tool to sow fear and intimidation amongst victims and their supporters. Stakeholders across sectors believe that CNDD-FDD controlled intelligence services or police (or in some cases the party's youth wing) are responsible for the killings. When government officials are not directly involved in the acts, they are said to ensure the impunity of trigger men by not pursuing investigation or prosecution. Such government-initiated repression is said to have led to a cycle of violence whereby opposition supporters carry out reprisal acts of violence and kill ruling party sympathizers. For example, on April 6, 2011, two lower-level CNDD-FDD party officials were assassinated in a bar in Isale commune in Bujumbura Rural province. Both the ruling party and opposition writ large have largely refused to engage in political dialogue to settle their differences, leaving extra-institutional avenues (including violence) as the preferred and actionable means by which to pursue political advantage.

In tandem with the aforementioned extrajudicial killings during this period, armed clashes between the government and "armed bandits" in the Western part of Burundi also

---

<sup>18</sup> These examples from Human Rights Watch, "You Will Not Have Peace While You are Living, - The Escalation of Political Violence in Burundi," (Washington, DC: 2012).

increased. The groups are reportedly comprised principally of FNL supporters who have returned to the ‘bush’ out of frustration with the current political climate. The armed groups have targeted assets affiliated with the ruling party as well as companies with known affiliations to the president. For example, armed men murdered nine employees of a sugarcane plantation in Gihanga in Bubanza province in September 2010. The Tanganyika Business Company, the company that owns the plantation, is operated by a close friend of President Nkurunziza. Armed groups have also increasingly targeted government installations in general and police stations in particular.

### Electoral Incident Coding<sup>19</sup>

Code Level	Description
0	No reported electoral violence before or after a vote
1	The first level of violence is violent harassment, indicated by police breaking up rallies, party supporters fighting, street brawls, opposition newspaper being confiscated, and limited short-term arrests of political opponents
2	The second level of violence is violent repression, as indicated by long term high-level arrests of party leaders, the consistent use of violent intimidation, limited use of murders and assassinations, and torture
3	The third level is a highly violent campaign, in which there are repeated, coordinated physical attacks leading to 20 or more deaths

Based upon this method of rating electoral violence intensity, the 2010 electoral cycle would be a Code Level 3.

## C. Stakeholder Analysis

The purpose of this section is to describe the operational responsibilities of stakeholder institutions with respect to electoral security and highlight some key issues surrounding the roles.

### 1. State Stakeholders

#### a. Electoral Security Administration (CENI)

The CENI is the lead organization mandated to conduct presidential, legislative, communal, and colline elections. It is a constitutional body, which implies that it possesses some degree of structural independence from the government. The CENI has been the beneficiary of electoral assistance programs from UNDP and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), which used funding from USAID. Stakeholders across sectors believed that the CENI performed effectively on Election Day in 2010. In addition to administrative effectiveness, the presence of clergy members on the electoral

<sup>19</sup> Scott Straus and Charlie Taylor, “Democratization and Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2007,” 2009, 9 - 11.

boards at the national, provincial, and communal levels lent additional confidence to the process.

In an atmosphere of opposition mistrust of instruments of government, the CENI remains vulnerable to attacks from the opposition aimed at its ‘self-serving character’ and degree of competence. In 2010, despite such claims of fraud from the opposition, CSOs, Faith-Based Organizations (FBOs), and international observer delegations such as the European Union, did not observe electoral fraud in any widespread or systematic manner and gave passing marks to the process. However, the observations about Election Day notwithstanding, obstacles to a genuinely free and fair election, not found in the Election Day Phase, include restricted political space and exclusion, imbalances in campaign resources, and opposition intimidation

Despite overall positive marks, interviewees across sectors cited three principal criticisms of CENI’s performance—(1) failure to make available or post copies of the polling station minutes or result sheets; (2) delaying the announcement of some results; and (3) announcing on the eve of the communal elections that balloting would be postponed by three days. The first two issues speak to the need for improved election result announcement management, so that seeds of suspicion about the outcomes are not triggered by information gaps. Although assumed not to be a partisan act, delaying the communal elections, according to some, enabled the ruling party to implement a vigorous campaign of vote buying. Many perceived circumstances surrounding the postponement to primarily benefit the ruling party. According to the CENI, however, the postponement was necessary due to a delay in delivery of final ballots, which it then had to review, and its subsequent determination that the names and symbols of two parties (on the new ballots) were almost identical and would confuse the voter. As a result, CENI ordered a reprint of these ballots to reflect a distinguishable difference for the voter.

#### **b. Electoral Security Administration (PNB and Army)**

The PNB and Army are the two main providers of security related to the electoral process. The PNB secures polling stations as well as transport of election commodities and ballots, where the Army provides perimeter security and positions quick reaction forces (QRF) to respond to security-related requests.

The PNB is comprised of several groups that represent a range of security stakeholders including the gendarmes, judicial police, security police, and ex-combatants. The structure was created following the Arusha Peace Agreement in order to establish a consolidated and unified national police with a single mandate. However, many stakeholders indicated that this process of consolidation is ongoing and not yet complete. Coupled with this lack of unified loyalty is a fragmented organizational structure: at the headquarters level, five individuals hold the title of Directors General (thus confusing reporting relationships), and, at the local level, the authority is decentralized to the communal and provincial levels (which also muddles reporting streams). PNB’s primary function throughout the electoral process is securing polling stations. Reports related to the PNB’s performance in this act were mixed—some indicated the PNB performed

adequately and more or less impartially, where others noted that police were perpetrators of electoral conflict and intimidation before, during, and after Election Day. Unevenness in protection creates vulnerabilities for electoral conflict by incentivizes its use and can dissuade individuals from going to vote.

The Army is the other security force partner in electoral security administration. The primary mission of the Army is territorial integrity, with an Election Day focus on protecting incursions across Burundi's borders. While maintaining this outer-ring focus, though, the Army remains available to respond to requests from the Ministry of Public Security in the event that there is a shortage of police or from the CENI to provide logistical support. However, it received no such requests during the 2005 and 2010 cycles. In Burundi, soldiers have the right to vote and cast their ballots alongside civilian voters on Election Day.

Despite coordination between the PNB and Army on electoral security planning, this mechanism did not seem institutionalized or robust. Moreover, and despite its central role in organizing the election, the CENI seems to have been sidelined from decisions related to electoral security. This is an area that must be addressed for the 2015 elections, to ensure continuity in electoral security planning. The security concept employed in 2010 established three cordons of protection for the polling station. Electoral security planning was primarily focused on Election Day and securing polling stations. The outer cordon was provided by the Army, which aimed to maintain a peaceful environment for elections through patrols and QRFs available upon request. The middle cordon was provided by fixed and mobile police units protecting polls and voters. The inner cordon was led by the polling station chief with direct communications with the police outside. Fundamentally, this approach to Election Day security functioned well and is a tested division of labor that has been effectively employed in other cases. Nevertheless, the PNB-Army coordination mechanism can be strengthened and expanded to include CENI and potentially additional non-state stakeholders engaged in electoral conflict monitoring or mediation.

The German development assistance agency *Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* (GIZ) is providing training through participation in workshops to the PNB in professionalism, democratic principles, conflict resolution and human rights, legal use of constraint in public order management, and negotiated management of public space (comprehension, communication, cooperation, conflict, and confrontation). This program is relevant to electoral conflict in so far as it may instill in PNB staff a sense of responsibility to more effectively and evenly provide electoral security.

### **c. National Intelligence Service (SNR)**

Reports indicate that Burundi's National Intelligence Service (SNR) has been involved in orchestrating intimidation and violence in the Pre- and Post-Election Phases of the 2010 electoral cycle. In the former, members of the SNR reportedly orchestrated efforts by ruling party youth wings to harass, intimidate, threaten, and in some cases physically harm opposition supporters, members, activists, and their associates. In the Post-Election

Phase, members of the intelligence service reportedly continued to assist the youth wing, but shifted to more direct involvement in opposition repression. In particular, its operatives arbitrarily arrested opposition party activists as well as arrested (or threatened detention) civil society leaders and media staff.

#### **d. Provincial Administrations**

Provincial governors are influential stakeholders in local security and policing with human and financial resources under their control for the purposes of security and development. For example, in Bujumbura Rural province, the governor claims that youth wings have been de-mobilized through UNDP-funded public works projects employing them to perform road work, water projects, and general clean-up work. Such focus on employment of youth wings is important to note because in each province visited, youth wings of political parties were cited as the main perpetrators of electoral violence. The office of the governor also serves as a sub-national “bully pulpit,” and governors from each province visited described liaison mechanisms from their public administration to CSOs, religious groups, and political parties. Security, development, and social cohesions seem to be the civic themes that the governors espoused.

#### **e. National Independent Human Rights Commission (CNIDH)**

The National Independent Human Rights Commission (CNIDH) was established after the 2010 elections and only recently initiated planning related to the 2015 elections. Strategically, the CNIDH seeks to distinguish itself from CSOs, which monitor for human rights violence, and from state institutions, charged with citizen protection. Although collaborating with CSOs or the police as required, the CNIDH was created to specifically address human rights violations. The CNIDH has received requests from CSOs and political parties to provide training on human rights values and principles.

The CNIDH intends to develop a human rights monitoring program, which would be active during the 2015 electoral cycle and have structures at the provincial level. The objective of the monitoring program will be to document the human rights cases and to compile bodies of evidence for the prosecution of perpetrators and their leadership.

#### **f. Office of the Prosecutor General**

The Office of the Prosecutor General (Prosecutor) is the lead agency in developing cases for and prosecuting the trials related to offences against Burundian national law. Accordingly, incidents of electoral violence should fall within the Prosecutor’s mandate, unless deemed electoral disputes and therefore assigned to the CENI. As a result, the case for reform of the electoral disputes mechanism and electoral violence intersect in this jurisdictional issue. It can be surmised that this prosecutorial uncertainty generated by the assignment of a crime to one jurisdiction or another reinforces the environment of impunity. An additional factor contributing to impunity includes the lack of a formal witness protection program so that offering personal testimonies may be risky. But, the

final indicator of a climate of impunity is that officials could not cite any cases of prosecution for electoral violence occurring in 2010 or 2011 when asked.

## **2. Non-State Stakeholders**

### **a. Political Parties**

Burundian political parties can be grouped into three broad categories—ruling party, ‘hard’ opposition, and ‘soft’ opposition—while noting that it is not always clear into which category parties fit at a given point in time. The hard opposition includes those parties whose structures and leadership have remained generally coherent and have not fragmented into splinter wings due to ruling party efforts. Parties in this grouping should be further disaggregated between parties which boycotted in 2010, now operating under a coalition banner of the unregistered ADC-Ikibiri coalition, and UPRONA, an opposition party which did participate.

The soft opposition includes those professedly opposition groupings that have splintered into various entities that are reportedly under the control or at least influence of the CNDD-FDD (though it is impossible to confirm). For example, there are four variant parties using the acronym FNL. The ruling party is generally coherent and loyal to the President but also not without its internal divisions (by one account, there are four factions within the CNDD-FDD).

Three trends related to development and potential trajectory of the political party system, as related to electoral violence, can be identified. First, the ruling party has become increasingly hegemonic in position and control of nation-wide support, utilizing its cemented position in power to access those state resources at its disposal as a financial platform to fund youth wings and vote buying schemes. Linked to this increased power is more prevalent use by the CNDD-FDD of their youth wings as perpetrators of electoral violence. Although other parties were said to use youth as agents of violence, those associated with the CNDD-FDD called the *imbonerakure* — “people who see into the future”—were the most widely cited culprits. Second, the hard opposition is weakening and increasingly prone to errors in political judgment. Third, with the emergence of soft opposition parties (with 44 official parties in total), the opposition’s voice compared to that of the ruling party will be confusing and contradictory.

All parties interviewed expressed the desire to engage in a ruling party/opposition party political dialogue; however, actors held divergent preferences on the forum and modality that should be used in holding the dialogue and discussing associated issues. For example, the CNDD-FDD expressed its desire to employ the Political Party Forum (under the auspices of the Ministry of Home Affairs) as the vehicle for dialogue, where most opposition parties viewed this instrument with suspicion. The CNDD-FDD portrays the opposition as only wanting to engage in discussion so as to seek and obtain positions in power, where opposition parties such as the MSD refute this claim and indicate their main objective in pushing for dialogue is to discuss and move forward on concrete issues related to Burundi’s future.

The relevant issues of concern to the opposition are the following. First, all opposition parties complained that there is insufficient political space (citing, for example, difficulty associated with obtaining meeting permits) and their belief that freedom of assembly is compromised. The MSD views intolerance between political rivals and leaders (as opposed to rank-and-file party operatives) as the root of electoral violence. Second, the opposition largely believes that the president should not be eligible to contest for a third term of office. Opposition party representatives argue that such an action would be seen as a provocative ploy by the president and could trigger violent protests in response. Different parties point to particular issues on which their participation in the dialogue is contingent—the ADC and FRODEBU cited the third-term as a “red line” issue, while the MSD, by contrast, did not express any conditions required for their participation (simply the enforcement of existing constitutional guarantees).

**b. Domestic Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Faith-Based Organizations (FBOs), and Religious Leaders**

Civil society organizations (CSOs), Faith-based organizations (FBOs), and religious leaders are stakeholders in electoral peace-building in two ways. First, because the political opposition has become weak and inarticulate, CSOs and FBOs represent opposition interests and serve as channels of expression for otherwise silenced opposition supporters. The second reason is that these groups serve mitigating roles in electoral conflict through their efforts to monitor electoral violence, provide civic and electoral education, and organize peace advocacy campaigns.

One of the primary areas in which CSOs and FBOs have been engaged in efforts to prevent, manage, or mitigate electoral violence is in the tracking of related incidents before, during, and after Election Day. As a result of these efforts, several sources of election-related monitoring data exist. *Coalition de la Société Civile pour le Monitoring Electoral* (COSOME), a domestic CSO, leads the effort which provided the most comprehensive monitoring of electoral violence of those conducted. In conjunction with the Peace and Justice Network and with support from USAID-funded IFES (which provided an Ushahidi on-line mapping platform to translate reports into maps), COSOME deployed a robust field presence with five representatives in each province and two monitors in each commune. A representative of the efforts was stationed in each local parish, and monitors sent incident reporting disaggregated by location and type of violence via SMS to a central location in Bujumbura. Individuals housed at this central location then confirmed, to the extent possible, that the incidents occurred and then, following confirmation, uploaded data to the on-line Ushahidi platform. This incident data provides both state and non-state stakeholders with patterns of electoral violence so that planning and prevention programming can be directed with particular victims, locations, and timings in mind.

These efforts were undertaken in collaboration with the Peace and Justice Network which also deployed observers but whose structures conform to existing diocese and parish boundaries. However, where religious authorities are involved with monitoring, one admonition must be put forward. As earlier described, clergy are involved in the

administration of elections on the national, provincial, and communal levels. As such, they are the objects of monitoring programs. Steps must be taken to “firewall” religious observer groups so that it does not appear that such groups are fundamentally monitoring themselves.

The second monitoring effort was conducted by the human rights group APRODH, which collected photographic evidence, including related to killing and beheading of five opposition party supporters. These photographs were published in an effort to identify them. The group claims to have documented 700 political prisoner arrests, with 90 percent to those arrests having some affiliation with the Rwaso FNL. This monitoring approach and incident reporting is relevant to documenting cases where electoral violence becomes a human rights violation. As discussed in the section with the CNIDH, high level conspiracy may be one factor in determining that an incident of electoral violence is a human rights violation. If the discernible pattern of victimization involves FNL supporters, then a conspiracy can be implied with its consequent implications on human rights violation.

Education about governance performance is conveyed by such CSOs as the *Observatoires de l'Action Gouvernementale* (OAG). OAG participated in the COSOME monitoring mission but is also engaged as a kind of think tank on a broad spectrum of elections and governance issues including electoral reform, CENI performance, and system of balloting among others. And, other groups such as the Anti-Corruption and Economic Malpractice Observatory (OLUCOME) have an educational focus on economic corruption in government and commerce. While not directly related to electoral violence, the educational efforts by groups such as these provide information for the seminal policy discussions on political finance reform, the use of state resources, for political purposes, and the subsequent relationship of money and electoral violence.

The Conflict Alert and Prevention Centre (CENAP) has facilitated political dialogue and peace advocacy through the conduct of surveys on expectation for governance and developing strategies to see these policies publicly enacted. It has conducted focus groups and one topic has been transitional justice. CENAP seeks to play a mediation role in 2015 through interventions to de-conflict political dialogue. The Synergy for Political Participation by Women intends to field blended monitoring and peace advocacy teams providing peace messaging, mediation, and monitoring of incidents of electoral violence. The group also seeks gender reform in the PNB with more gender-sensitive policies and practices and an increase in the number of female officers. Some of those interviewed stated that women can play a more prominent role in fostering political dialogue and such groups could be the platforms for these initiatives. It was remarked that because of women's role in Burundian society, they are culturally positioned to address issues in a manner which may turn conflictive for men. Additional training for women in CSO in Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) techniques could reinforce and build more skills to be applied to electoral contexts. It should also be noted, that women have not been the targets of electoral violence because they are women and no incidents of election-related sexual assaults were reported to the assessment team.

### c. Media Organizations

Although the independent media has faced some repression from the government as a result of covering politically-motivated killings in 2011, financial instability and insolvency is seen as the primary threat to Burundi's media sector. Burundi's weak economy supports few if any businesses that can pay for advertising, and individuals, given poverty levels and other factors, do not regularly purchase newspapers. Lack of these revenues places independent media at risk of financial failure. As a result, many of these outlets rely on international support to supplement their operating budget.

Independent media provided widespread and balanced reporting of the 2010 election in general and violent incidents in particular. The quality and geographic spread of coverage improved from 2005 to 2010, at least in part as a result of international funding to the Media Synergies project. Through this effort, media outlets cooperated to deploy teams into the field. Funding underwrote logistics costs related to field reporting. On covering incidents of electoral violence, media organizations did not present any explicit editorial policy—for example, how they report on such violence and when they consider it to be election-related. However, it was stated that victims may choose anonymity or not in reporting their individual stories.

Journalists have been the targets of violence, yet with the exception of those perpetrated in the post-election period and linked to coverage of extrajudicial killings these attacks appear to be episodic. Before and during the election, there seems to be no orchestrated campaign by the government or others to silence media through violence.

Aside from SMS texting, social media is not widely used inside Burundi, but there is a diaspora audience for it. One newspaper website reports 7,000 visitors per day, 60 percent of which are from outside Burundi

During the election, most media organizations offer electoral education programming. For example, Renaissance Radio has produced public service messages explaining the basic who, what, and whys of elections. The other TV stations recorded peace-building messages by political party leaders. Under funding from GIZ, there was also a program to avoid and address rumors and misinformation. For the next elections, Renaissance Radio wants to organize thematic debates. As radio reaches more Burundians than any other media, these kinds of programs can be valuable platforms for peace advocacy messages and education campaigns.

## II. Electoral Security Planning and Program Objectives

This programming seeks to address the following Problem Statement and Development Hypothesis.

**Problem Statement:** Electoral violence between the ruling party and opposition parties escalated between the 2005 and 2010 electoral cycles, continuing into 2011. These political divisions remain obstacles to democratic consolidation and create on-going

tensions which could trigger electoral violence early in the 2015 electoral cycle. Without a meaningful political dialogue, institutional capacity for protection and enforcement, and assessing penalties for perpetrators, the logic of electoral violence remains viable as a means to suppress opposition or retaliate against unsatisfied grievances.

***Development Hypothesis:*** The employment of electoral violence can become illogical for potential perpetrators if genuine political dialogue and space for competition is fostered, the capacities of institutions to protect electoral targets are strengthened; and penalties for committing acts of electoral violence are imposed.

### **A. Mitigating Factors**

Mitigating factors are those which can be leveraged in programming to reduce the vulnerabilities for electoral violence to occur.

**Civil Society is engaged in Monitoring Violence, Promoting Peace** – A diverse and active civil society sector provides education, monitoring, and advocacy which can be further leveraged to prevent and report on incidents of electoral violence. While religious authorities and FBOs are discussed in a separate section, religious and civil society objectives and activities are often similar and sometimes performed in tandem through umbrella groups. The first organizational grouping is with those which have monitored elections and violence. These include COSOME and elements of the Episcopal Church, among others. The methodology employed by COSOME was that of IFES’s Electoral Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) Program. This kind of focused monitoring capacity first emerged during the 2010 elections, making patterns of incidents and conflict available for the first time. Further factors to consider with this monitoring data are discussed below. The presence of this data and domestic capacities can be leveraged to harmonize approaches among state and non-state stakeholders in order to allow comparative examination of patterns and deepen the understanding of these patterns. The second category of CSO is those engaged in advocacy. In this context, advocacy is aimed to encourage peaceful elections. Such organizations include Synergy for Political Participation of Women. Their activities include advocating for a more prominent role for women in politics, in addition to monitoring electoral violence.

**Religious Authorities and FBOs are Actively Engaged** – As put forward in the section on civil society, many FBOs such as the Episcopal Commission for Justice and Peace also engage in monitoring and advocacy. . The added advantage in their reach and depth of programming is that FBOs may leverage the existing ecclesiastical hierarchy, such as parishes and diocese in the Roman Catholic Church. Institutional religious leaders may take different approaches on engagement in elections and conflict. Advocating for peaceful elections may be through pastoral messages conveyed in outreach activities to civil society and others inside and outside of their particular religious community. If there are issues within a given religious community, the approach may be more personal and direct with the perpetrators or victims who are community members.

**Burundi's Media is Independent and Active** – Independent electronic and print media exist and are largely permitted to cover events and report stories. While journalists have been targeted with violence and imprisoned for their stories, the violence is on a scale less intense than that between political party rivals. The independent media can continue to be leveraged as a way to bring attention to and coverage of violence, which international actors may then use to pressure the government to stop orchestrating or condoning such violence.

**CENI has a Robust Foundation Capacity** – The CENI maintains a credible foundation of capacity, laws, and institutions that represent a solid platform upon which to build further capacity and independence. The presence of the clergy in the electoral administration is a further confidence-building measure.

**Military Training for AMISOM will Build Army Professionalism** – The Burundian Army has contributed troops to the African Union peacekeeping operation in Somalia. The training and experience for the troops emerging from this assignment can serve as a mitigating factor in the following ways. First, the troops receive special training on human rights, use of force, and community relations which provides public order management skills and tolerant behaviors that may be required in some electoral security crisis situations. Second, as these troops engage in the UN system, they may have opportunities to participate in other UN missions. Of the current peace operations administered by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, nine of them possess or possessed an electoral mandate.

**The Government is Open to Dialogue** – The current administration appears open to dialogue with the international community, which provides a Track I channel for negotiation on matters pertaining to electoral violence. Domestic and international actors can leverage this openness to engage and press the administration to curb use or sanctioning of violence.

**Baseline Incident Data Exists** – CSOs have developed a body of field reporting and data on incidents of electoral violence which can be compared, combined, and then placed in a standardized analytical format. Such a format would allow both state and non-state stakeholders to organize and conduct electoral security planning and conflict prevention with knowledge about the nature of the threat.

## **B. Pivotal Processes**

In addition to the profile factors outlined above, specific pivotal issues and associated processes can also have implications for electoral conflict to occur. In designing interventions to mediate, manage, or prevent such conflict, these pivotal processes must also be evaluated. Pivotal processes are those events, or issues that can become either mitigating factors or triggers for violence depending upon their management and outcomes and include, in the context of Burundi's 2015 cycle, the following: (1) political dialogue between opposition parties and the ruling party; (2) return of self-exiled political leaders to Burundi and their re-integration into the political process; (3) electoral reform;

(4) establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC); (5) appointment of new CENI commissioners and; (6) decision by the president regarding whether he will seek a third term.

The way in which the pivotal issues outline below transpire will yield one of three scenarios for the 2015 electoral cycle, in particular as it relates to the participation of opposition parties in the contest. Each scenario will present distinct implications for the probability of violence throughout each phase of the electoral cycle. In the first scenario, the non-parliamentary opposition is assumed to be participating in the election, although recognizing it is unlikely that their coalition will capture a majority of seats. The second scenario is that the non-parliamentary opposition first participates in the process, but then establishes a grievance against the electoral process and boycotts the balance of the electoral cycle. And the third scenario is that the non-parliamentary opposition extends its boycott through the entire 2015 electoral cycle.

With regard to implications for electoral conflict, and related to the first scenario, if hard opposition parties genuinely contest for seats, ruling party militants may target candidates in an effort to intimidate the opposition and suppress turnout for their candidates. Under the second scenario, opposition parties may press those grievances underlying their boycotts through street actions or other forms of protest. And, if the hard opposition is absent throughout the entire cycle of elections, supporters left without a group to support may be the targets of coercion or inducements by soft opposition parties to join their efforts. Also, because of their diminished political clout resulting from the boycott, opposition leaders may become the targets for arrest and harm in order to remove them from the political landscape altogether.

### **a. Political Dialogue**

All political party representatives interviewed and many interlocutors from the civil society and religious communities spoke to the need for political dialogue between opposition parties and the ruling party.

The conceptual approach to political dialogue should be developed with the following three objectives in mind: 1) to gain agreement on the rules of the electoral “game;” 2) to provide a forum for ADR among political parties; and 3) to obtain agreement by all major political parties to peacefully participate in the election and accept the ultimate outcomes. Failing these objectives, the election rules can be disputed, violence employed to settle disputes, and the potential for boycotting and the resulting tensions as seen in 2011.

While the government has established a Political Party Forum which is ostensibly intended as an institutional base for such dialogue, opposition parties mistrust the mechanism as a government ploy to promote itself and to obfuscate differences between the opposition and ruling parties. While it is popular to advocate for political dialogue, there is a lack of consensus on a conceptual approach to what political dialogue will involve and how it will be structured.

How this dialogue process is managed and implemented will have substantial consequences for participation in the 2015 election. If the process is poorly managed or the government pushes for a partisan arena or mediator, the political dialogue will risk failure with the consequent potential for conflict.

### **b. Return of Political Self-Exiles**

The relevance and political impact of the return of political self-exiles will vary with the prominence of personalities involved. However, the recent declaration by Rwasa, as claimed by the media, to renew FNL conflict with the government makes his return and re-integration into the 2015 electoral process now more difficult to achieve. At the same time, the return of other opposition leaders is also crucial for the 2015 election fairness factor—without their return, the opposition must quickly fill the leadership gap and may not possess the skills and experience to mount effective nationwide campaigns.

If personal security of returning leaders is ensured through a combination of national and international guarantees, the issue of their return as a potential trigger for violence may vanish and attention can be turned to addressing other vulnerabilities for violence.

### **c. Electoral Reform**

Stakeholders across sectors state the need for electoral reform, yet there is no clear consensus for which issues need to be addressed. Those issues most frequently cited, however, included changing from a multiple ballot to a single ballot system and changing the sequencing of elections on the electoral calendar. However, the prospect for any reforms to occur is linked directly to the legislative agenda of the CNDD-FDD in the National Assembly, where it holds 81 of 106 total seats and in the Senate where it holds 32 of 41 seats. If electoral reform is stalled or neglected, it is likely to be a reflection of the political will of the ruling party to pursue such reforms. While the failure to adopt many of these reforms may not be a significant trigger for violence, the political failure to reach a consensus and reform some aspects of the process may solidify divisions among parties and reduce their incentive to peacefully negotiate disputes.

### **d. Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)**

The model, membership, calendar, and activities of the TRC will influence the process of political reconciliation. The current calendar for the term of the TRC largely coincides with the political dialogue process, return of self-exiles, electoral reform, and the election preparations. Such an alignment of pivotal processes creates vulnerabilities of politicizing the transitional justice process because figures standing for election will be involved with the cases being heard. However, postponing the formal reconciliation process until after 2015 will only exacerbate the perceptions of impunity for those responsible for human rights violations. While the process can be initiated at the end of this calendar year as discussed, its activities could be suspended in calendar year 2013 until after the election.

### **e. CENI Appointments**

The consensus which is established in the appointment of a new CENI will be a significant factor in opposition confidence in its impartiality. While the CENI possesses some structural independence in the constitution and law, its attachments to the Ministry of Home Affairs and appointment by the president, places burdens on its abilities to exhibit behavioral independence from the government. Therefore, the informal process of consensus and confidence building in the nomination of the new Commissioners can be a critical step in de-conflicting the “confidence gap” trigger for opposition-based tensions.

### **f. Third Presidential Term**

There is a possibility that the current president will seek a third-term, and there are two predominant opinions about the legality of such a development. On one side, the President contends that his first term was via indirect election by the Parliament and therefore does not count against the limit on popularly-elected terms. By contrast, the opposition contends that, regardless of this fact, the constitution stipulates that no one shall be president for more than ten years. Burundi lacks a judiciary sufficiently independent to serve as the ultimate arbiter on this question. The outcome of this decision could determine whether the second or third electoral scenarios as described above are realized and could serve as an additional trigger for hard opposition pushback to the government.

The planning should take into account the outcomes of these pivotal factors and the impact on the scenario option eventually playing out. Planning should identify the existing electoral and security sector programming being conducted where an electoral security linkage may be introduced or expanded.

There are several major international interventions which are relevant to the topic of electoral violence. First, there is electoral assistance. UNDP managed a \$44 million (USD) “basket fund” to provide assistance to the CENI. Contributors to that fund included Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, European Commission (EC), Germany, France, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. UNDP continues its relationship with CENI and examining the issue of the most appropriate model of electoral dispute resolutions for the Burundian context.

USAID has been engaged in providing electoral assistance in Burundi. Prior to the 2010 election, USAID funded IFES to implement its Electoral Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) program in partnership with COSOME and CENI. This assistance helped establish domestic capacity to monitor electoral violence and, as a result, made available patterns of baseline data on conflict dynamics. The USG through Department of Justice is slated to deploy a technical advisor to provide case management capacity building to the Office of the Prosecutor General.

Under funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland, a workshop on political reconciliation was held in Caux under the auspices of Initiatives for Change, a

seminal political dialogue held between the ruling and many opposition parties. Although not all opposition figures were present, the workshop has been regarded as successful in starting the dialogue through a combination of international and domestic mediation. Further activities being taken by Initiatives for Change in Burundi include political dialogue initiatives intended to build trust over time among political party stakeholders.

The Netherlands Institute for Multi-Party Democracy (NIMD) provides assistance to political parties through programming to support both the leadership and the rank-and-file members. It is currently working with 13 parties on such activities as Democracy Schools, Women's leadership programs, and other technical workshops at the national and sub-national levels. NIMD's Democracy Schools are also being offered to police training programs.

GIZ conducts a major program of police training. In its first phase of training programs from 2008 to 2011, GIZ undertook a wide range of activities. First, it built 21 police stations in four provinces so that officers had a facility out of which to operate. In 2010, police received some election-related training on human rights principles, conflict resolution, and developing more public trust. During a second phase in 2011 and 2012, the program undertook a special focus on women and policing. Although only two percent of the 18,000 police officers are women, the program established a national policewomen's network so that they can share experience and skills development. The governments of Belgium and the Netherlands also conduct training for police.

### **III. Electoral Security Programming**

#### **Strategic Program Objectives**

Based on the profile outlined above, programming that falls under the following five strategic objectives should be considered to prevent, mitigate, mediate or manage violence for the 2015 electoral cycle:

1. Build the Capacity of State Stakeholders in Electoral Security Administration;
2. Foster Dialogue Among Political Parties to Assure their Participation in the 2015 Electoral Cycle and their Acceptance of Results;
3. Demobilize the Youth Wings of Political Parties and Integrate Them into the Electoral Process;
4. Engage Civil Society/Faith-Based Organizations and Media in Peace-building and Accountability for Violence;
5. Reduce the Culture of Impunity for Electoral Violence.

Programming options are presented by implementation sequence as designated by Pre-Election, Election Day, or Post-Election activities.

#### **1. Strategic Objective One – Build the Capacity of State Stakeholders in Electoral Security Administration**

The purpose of programming under this objective is to strengthen the capacity within Burundi to prevent conflict and protect electoral stakeholders, events, materials, and facilities by CENI, PNB and CNIDH. In support of the fulfillment of this objective, the following program activities can be considered, as disaggregated by stakeholder:

**a. CENI**

**Pre-Election Phase**

- Provide support and technical inputs to the CENI to enhance its profile in oversight and provision of electoral security, to ensure that it plays the leadership role in electoral security planning, conflict-prevention, and mediation. This can be achieved through specific alterations within and additions to CENI's organizational structure:
  - First, the CENI should designate one commissioner with electoral security as their area of focus;
  - Second, CENI should create a staff position that serves as the point of contact on electoral security operational issues and the liaison with the PNB and military on electoral security planning and operations;
  - Third, CENI should assume the lead role in organizing the Joint Electoral Security Task Force, composed of CENI, Ministry of Public Security/PNB, and Department of Defense/military. A sub-national structure for the Task Force should also be set up during the electoral cycle.
  - Fourth, electoral reforms should be introduced to restructure the system of electoral justice either within the CENI or through an separate, independent electoral tribunal
- Provide technical support to the CENI and other authorities to develop a viable resolution to the issue of the stipend payment to political party agents so that either all agents receive an equal amount or none are paid
- Foster CENI's involvement in regional Electoral Management Associations (EMAs) and continue USAID's support of CENI members attending the training program at the University of South Africa. The East African Community (EAC) has established the EAC Forum for National Electoral Commissions. Through this mechanism, the CENI can engage with other EMBs in the region. Further, Burundi is not listed as a member of the Association of African Election Authorities (AAEA), hosted by the Electoral Commission of Ghana. While AAEA activities are limited, a connection with the Association opens up opportunities for collaboration with the largest and most experienced EMBs in Sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, as the African Union (AU) conducts meetings of its continental network of national electoral commission, the CENI should be able to participate. Such exposure to peer review can provide a sustainable mechanism for performance and accountability of domestic electoral administration to a regional audience of fellow practitioners.

### **Election Day Phase**

- Assist the CENI to develop a one-day training for poll workers in conflict mediation. While polling stations have not been the traditional scenes of violence, minor disputes can arise which must be contained and not escalated. Introducing a one-day training session on conflict mediation skills for poll workers would provide the CENI with thousands of mediators at the grassroots levels.

### **Post-Election Phase**

- Provide assistance to the CENI to develop a strategic communications plan so that its efforts in establishing a credible and transparent electoral process are known to the public. A specific focus of the strategic communications plan should be directed at the management of election results announcements in order to reduce the triggers produced by delay and opaque practices. The plan can be implemented through a variety of means including open houses, staff visits to schools and churches among others. A special focus should be placed on election results announcement management so that any delays are explained and accepted and result sheets from each station are available to each political party agent.

#### **b. PNB/Army**

### **Pre-Election Phase**

Develop and deliver training in electoral threat assessment to PNB staff. This training can be introduced into existing police training programs conducted by the international community. This training would provide police with the skills and tools to evaluate the prospects for electoral violence to occur, project the profile of the violence, take effective prevention or management measures, and investigate incidents of electoral violence if they occur.

#### **c. CNIDH**

### **Pre-Election Phase**

Assist the CNIDH to develop a training program focused on enhancing institutional ability to monitor and gather evidence for investigation of crimes of electoral violence. A capacity building program relevant to electoral violence can be initiated with the human rights commission (HRC) with two objectives in mind. First, the HRC needs to adopt a monitoring methodology with respect to election-related violence and when such violence becomes a human rights violation. Second, the HRC requires training on collecting evidence under the relevant rules so that criminal cases can also result from their monitoring and investigations.

## **2. Strategic Objective Two – Foster Dialogue Among Political Parties to Assure Their Participation in the 2015 Electoral Cycle and Their Acceptance of Results**

### **Pre-Election, Election Day, and Post-Election Phases**

The purpose of programming under this objective is to develop and implement a viable approach to ensure political stakeholders engage in dialogue prior to (and are therefore more likely to accept the results of) the 2015 elections.

While there is wide agreement that the ruling and opposition parties need to meet and resolve certain differences, the conceptual approach to the dialogue varies among stakeholders (there is also disagreement on those issues that should be discussed). Rather than conceptualizing the dialogue as a grand meeting in a retreat setting, the strategic approach should be organized less symmetrically. Such an approach recognizes that political trust must be established between parties, and is another objective of the dialogue along with examining specific issues of political division.

As a result, the notion of “political dialogue” should be disaggregated among different hosts and different foci. Among the hosts, initiatives are already being undertaken which approximate political dialogue by CSOs such as CENAP and Initiatives for Change as well as the NIMD. Other such dialogue initiatives can be hosted by the UN, EU, and AU from the international community and through other CSOs and religious groups domestically. From a topical standpoint, the dialogue events can be modest in scope and deal with what has been termed “innocent issues” in order to assure a successful working relationship among the participants. The issues in focus need not be specifically on elections and can include economic, social, environmental, and international issues.

Further, within this program group the issue of the political party agent stipend (as discussed above) can be addressed. As previously noted, either the stipend should be paid to all political party agents or by none of them. The lack of a stipend for opposition party agents has been seen as having ramifications far beyond the fundamental issue of equity. Because opposition agents had no food (because of no stipend) for an extended day, they left the polling stations while the count was occurring casting aspirations of the validity of the outcomes in some cases because the opposition could not confirm the results. Without the financial resources from the government to cover the stipend, an international relief organization could request to provide food and water (two meals) to political party agents on Election Day.

After traction for the political dialogue has been generated by these series of events, the Political Party Forum can be convened for the purposes of promulgating and adopting a Political Party Code of Conduct, the provisions of which are enforced by the CENI or by a new electoral court, if it is established.

## **3. Strategic Objective Three – Demobilize the Youth Wings of Political Parties and Integrate Them into the Electoral Process**

The purpose of programming under this objective is to remove youth wings as perpetrators of electoral violence and integrate them into the electoral process. Reducing electoral violence perpetrated by youth wings, however, requires a two-pronged approach—(1) diplomatic pressure to press the government to cease employing youth; and (2) working with these youth to incentivize them to de-mobilize. Support and assistance should be provided on both tracks, through the following activities:

### **Pre-Election Phase**

- Support efforts to press the government of Burundi to stop employing or sanctioning activities of youth wings as perpetrators of violence. Work with other international partners to press the government to de-mobilize these youth as well as prosecute their crimes. The international community should press the ruling party to make party leaders accountable for violence perpetrated by their youth cadres.
- Initiate grass-roots efforts to shift youth away from violence and toward assuming a constructive role in society in general and the electoral process in particular. In doing so, CSOs could organize mock elections in which youth engage so that they experience voting in a peaceful context. CENI can also consider recruiting youth to serve as poll workers; however, the personal records of violence must be taken into account when making such appointments.

### **Post-Election Phase**

- Support programming that employs anti-gang methodologies to create alternative forms of constructive engagement by youth. Such as sports, employment, and educational activities. Examples of best practices can be drawn from the USAID-funded Youth Alliance Program that Creative Associates implements in Guatemala and Honduras.

## **4. Strategic Objective Four – Engage Civil Society/Faith-Based Organizations and Media in Peace-building and Accountability for Violence**

The purpose of programming under this objective is to work through CSOs and FBOs to reduce violence in 2015 by promoting peace-building activities that support peaceful behavior and accountability for violence. The mitigating leverage of these organizations as cited above can be expressed through further programming in education, monitoring, and advocacy. The on-going or past programming which has been described above retains their relevance and value for the 2015 cycle. In support of the fulfillment of this objective, the following program activities can be considered:

### **Pre-Election and Election Day Phases**

- Support CSOs so they may compile incident monitoring data from 2010 and 2011 into a master database and map to establish a countrywide profile on electoral

violence which could be employed by CENI, PNB, and other stakeholders in future electoral security planning. In its reporting structure, the profiles should reflect a singular methodology so that state and non-state groups can share consistent incident reporting content. Such incident reporting can be used to discern patterns of electoral violence which its predictive insights can be leveraged to focus security resources on protecting identified victims, securing identified locations, and creating surges during phases which may be more vulnerable to violence than others.

- Provide support to CSOs, FBOs, and the media so they may play a de-conflictive role in managing expectations on electoral outcomes. Opposition parties need to have a better understanding of the level of support they command within the population so that they may, in turn, have realistic expectations about probability of victory in 2015. Such expectations can be managed by CSOs, FBOs, and the media through conducting focus groups, public opinion surveys, voting behavior workshops, and Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) exercises in order to reinforce the veracity of the official results through several validation mechanisms before and after the voting.
- Support initiatives to conduct peace education campaigns, peace rallies, pacts, and other mechanism by CSOs, FBOs, and religious leaders to reduce tension among political contestants and the perpetrators of violence.
- Provide funding for logistics so that media outlets can repeat the Media Synergies program in 2015. As observed above, while the independent media has not been systematically targeted for censorship or intimidation over story content, these companies are under financial threat of going out of business. As a result, programs such as Media Synergies, which provided donor support and media coordination to provide un-biased coverage of the 2012 elections, can be considered for a vehicle to assure independent coverage of the 2015 elections.

### **Post-Election Phase**

- Provide medical, counseling, and legal services for victims of electoral violence and their families.

### **5. Strategic Objective Five – Reduce the Culture of Impunity for Electoral Violence**

The purpose of programming under this objective is to address the political and technical drivers of Burundi's culture of impunity and thereby increase investigation and prosecution of incidents of electoral violence. The political drivers include government favoritism or protecting of certain individuals and interests from prosecution, corruption, and a lack of judicial independence. Technical drivers are those skills in enforcement, investigation, and case management which would provide the relevant state stakeholders with the tools and skills to combat impunity.

To address these drivers, the following activities can be considered:

### **Pre-Election Phase**

- Support and encourage initiation of the Truth and Reconciliation process (to the extent possible). Among the relevant dynamics in play, the TRC will play a prominent role in identifying perpetrators, giving victims a forum to tell their stories, and offer a possible platform for further prosecution or compensation to victims.
- Support CNIDH efforts to monitor human rights abuses in general and those specifically driven by election-related motives before, during, and after Election Day in 2015. In Guatemala, the Human Rights Ombudsman conducts special electoral violence monitoring programming during election season. Support could include assisting CNIDH to establish this form of programming for the 2015 electoral cycle, the first where CNIDH will be operational.
- Provide training to Judiciary Police in investigative methods. From a technical perspective, training programs in the investigation of incidents of electoral violence and building a case can be provided to the Judiciary Police within the PNB and working for the Prosecutor Generals' Office.
- Reform electoral justice mechanisms because electoral fraud and violence are not unconnected as tools of intimidation and manipulation by perpetrators and as triggers for violence as victims conclude that the electoral process has been rigged against them.

### **Post-Election Phase**

- Assist the Office of the Prosecutor General in evidence collection, caseload management, and prosecutions of cases of electoral violence.

These programming options are summarized in the Program Matrix below.

**Program Matrix**  
**Electoral Security Framework for Burundi**

<b>State Stakeholder</b>	<b>Prevention (Pre-Election Phase)</b>	<b>Management (Election Day Phase)</b>	<b>Mediation (Post-Election Phase)</b>
<b>CENI</b>	During the electoral cycle, establish a CENI-led electoral security coordination committee involving the PNB, Army, and SNR	Provide conflict mediation training for poll workers	Strategic communications planning in the management of election results announcements to maximize on transparency and confidence in the accuracy of the reports
	Establish a focal point for electoral security administration and related services on the commissioner and staff levels		

	Institutionalize a new electoral justice mechanism		
	Provide a resolution to the political party agent stipend payment issue		
	Foster CENI participation in associations of EMBs as sponsored by the EAC, AAEA, and AU		
<b>PB/Army</b>	Provide training on the <i>Electoral Security Framework</i> for the Judiciary Police		
<b>CNIDH</b>	Assist in developing a training program for human rights monitors to document and analyze incidents of electoral violence as human rights violations		
<b>Prosecutor General</b>	Provide training on the <i>Electoral Security Framework</i> and human rights for staff investigators		Provide assistance in caseload management for the prosecution electoral violence and malpractice
<b>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</b>	Support the efforts to establish the Commission and conduct international monitoring of the process as a checkpoint against politicizing the process		
<b>Non-State Stakeholder</b>	<b>Prevention (Pre-Election Phase)</b>	<b>Management (Election Day Phase)</b>	<b>Mediation (Post-Election Phase)</b>
<b>Political Parties</b>	Initiate and coordinate a series of thematic dialogues between hard opposition and the ruling parties in order to obtain general agreement on the ground rules for the 2015 election, the agreement for peaceful campaign, and the agreement to accept the results		
	Convene a capstone meeting of the official Political Party Forum to promulgate a Code of Conduct to be enforced by the CENI or new electoral tribunal		
	Through combined diplomatic efforts and domestic grassroots, establish the de-mobilization and disarming of the youth wings of political parties as a priority concern		Organize anti-gang employment and de-mobilizations for livelihoods options to youth other than in political party wings
<b>CSOs, FBO, Religious Authorities, and the Media</b>	Support the consolidation and harmonization of electoral incident data by CSOs, and human rights monitoring groups so that the patterns of violence can be consistently mapped and provided to state and non-state security stakeholders	Conduct PVT	Support ADR mechanisms

Conduct electoral incident monitoring and documentation	In order to manage expectations, conduct public opinion survey and focus groups so that electoral trend lines are known		Provide medical, counseling, and legal services for victims of electoral violence and their families
	Support the organization of peace campaigns, pacts, and advocacies or violence-free elections to take place		
	Provide funding for logistics to independent media to facilitate their coverage of the 2015 election		

#### IV. Monitoring and Evaluation (M & E): Evaluation Framework for USAID Program

The development of an M & E framework for the evaluation of electoral conflict prevention programs can consist of three basic components: baseline data; program targets; and custom indicators.

##### A. Baseline Data

In order to measure the overall program impact on the levels of violence, the following baseline data can be derived from election observation reports in 2010.

- Date of Incident (Electoral Cycle Phase);
- Time of Day of Incident;
- Targets or Victims – political candidates, their family members and supporters, election official, police, journalists, voters, or others;
- Number of Victims Involved by each Tactic (Disaggregated by Gender);
- Spoilers or Perpetrators – political candidates, family members or supporters, criminals, police, voters, or others;
- Type of Incidents/Tactics – multiple homicides, individual homicide, physical assault, sexual assaults, kidnapping, destruction of physical property, destruction of sensitive electoral materials, riots and street actions; and
- Location – Province, Commune, Colline, and Conflict Venue.

##### B. Program Targets

###### 1. Rule of Law and Human Rights

###### GJD – 1.1 Constitutions, Laws and Human Rights

**Indicator Title:** Number of Retributive and Restorative Justice Institutions Created or Supported with USG Assistance

<b>Custom Indicators</b>
Enforce international standards for victim's compensation as elements of judgments concerning electoral crimes from Burundi authorities
<b>GJD – 1.1 Constitutions, Laws and Human Rights</b>
<b>Indicator Title:</b> Number of Campaigns Supported by USG to Foster Public Awareness and Respect for Rule of Law
<b>Custom Indicator</b>
Support 10 CSOs and FBOs to develop a coordinated civic education campaign to promote the rule of law by fair and peaceful elections
<b>GJD 1.3 – Justice System</b>
<b>Indicator Title:</b> Number of Communities Assisted in Crime Prevention with USG Support
<b>Custom Indicator</b>
Employing the conflict profile baseline data from CSO/NGO incident reporting in 2010 and 2011 and map the impact of electoral violence prevention programs by type of victim, perpetrators, tactics, location, and phase of the electoral cycle
<b>GJD 1.3 – Justice System</b>
<b>Indicator Title:</b> Number of Individuals/Groups Who Receive Legal Aid or Victim's Assistance with USG Support
<b>Custom Indicator</b>
Program CSOs/FBOs to provide legal, medical, or other counseling services for each victim of electoral violence validly making a claim for such assistance.

## 2. Good Governance

<b>GJD 2.6 – Governance and the Security Sector</b>
<b>Indicator Title:</b> Number of Government Officials Undergoing USG Assisted Security Sector Governance Training
<b>Custom Indicator</b>
Introduction of electoral security administration training into existing PNB and Army training programs.

## 3. Political Competition and Consensus Building

<b>GJD 3.1 – Consensus Building Processes</b>
---

<b>Indicator Title:</b> Number of Groups Trained in Conflict Mediation/Resolution Skills with USG Assistance
<b>Custom Indicator</b>
Introduction of electoral conflict mediation skills training into the existing CENI training programs.
<b>GJD 2.3 – Elections and Political Processes</b>
<b>Indicator Title:</b> Number of Domestic Election Observers Trained with USG Assistance
<b>Custom Indicators</b>
50 trainers of trainers for domestic observers instructed in standardized electoral conflict incident monitoring and reporting
<b>GJD 3.2 – Elections and Political Processes</b>
<b>Indicator Title:</b> Number of People Reached by USG Assisted Voter Education
<b>Custom Indicators</b>
Messages from the CENI to all candidates intended to discourage vote buying and other political campaign malpractice
Majority of voters reached by radio with messages to discourage vote selling and voter complicity in electoral malpractice
<b>GJD 3.2 – Elections and Political Processes</b>
<b>Indicator Title:</b> Number of Laws or Amendments to Ensure Credible Elections Drafted with USG Technical Assistance
<b>Custom Indicators</b>
Legal framework for political finance regulation of political parties is strengthened to include the disclosure of assets by political parties; disclosure of campaign receipts and payments; prohibitions on certain sources of funds; limits on receipts and expenses per election; and sanctions for violations of these statutes.
<b>GJD 3.2 – Elections and Political Processes</b>
<b>Indicator Title:</b> Number of Electoral Administrative Procedures and Systems Strengthened with USG Assistance
<b>Custom Indicators</b>
CENI assigns electoral security as an area of focus for one Commissioner, develops and Electoral Security Coordinator as a senior staff position, and establishes a CENI-led electoral security committee involving the PNB, Army, and other stakeholder Ministries.
<b>GJD 3.4 – Political Parties</b>

<b>Indicator Title:</b> Number of USG-Assisted Political Parties Implementing Program to Increase the Number of Candidates and Members Who are Women, Youth and from Marginalized Groups
<b>Custom Indicators</b>
Develop a 20% increase in the number of women candidates for parliamentary, and communal council offices and political party leadership
<b>GJD 3.5 – Political Parties</b>
<b>Indicator Title:</b> Number of Organizations Receiving USG Support to Promote Development of and Compliance with Political Finance Regulations and Legislation
<b>Custom Indicator</b>
Representatives from every registered political party participates in USG-funded and CENI-hosted workshops on compliance to political party regulations and political finance reforms
<b>GJD 4.1 – Strengthen Democratic Civic Participation</b>

## V. Conclusion

Despite positive developments in Burundi's overall transition away from civil war, the problem of electoral violence remains acute and should not be understated. The declaration by Rwasa, as claimed by the media, to return to violence creates a new set of unknowns in conflict dynamics for 2015. State-led efforts in electoral security administration, enforcement, and adjudication remain uneven, lack a comprehensive coordination mechanism, and have been primarily focused on Election Day rather than the entire electoral cycle.

Taking into account the security and political factors which create the underlying vulnerabilities for electoral violence, the logic to employ these tactics is outcomes-based, that is, violence is used in political competition to influence or determine the outcomes of the election (while some retaliatory violence in response also occurs). While political impasses can be stubborn obstacles to reconciliation and democratic consolidation, such impasses may be responsive to outside mediation to resolve circumstances where the perpetrators of electoral violence are criminal or insurgents. However, as the Development Hypothesis asserts, while political dialogue is an important factor in the prevention of further electoral violence, but institutional capacity will be required to administer and enforce protective measures, and judicial capacity will be required to prosecute and penalize the perpetrators.

Each of these three areas – political, institutional, and judicial – can be addressed through programming as described above. CSOs and FBOs, along with the international community, can sponsor an array of political dialogue events to build confidence and trust among the parties over the next 24 months. Electoral security administration and

conflict mediation training can be provided to the CENI, PNB, and Army. A standardized methodology for reporting of incidents of electoral violence as human rights violations can be developed with the CNIDH. Judicial programming should focus on the Office of the Prosecutor General and to enforce standards of punishment for perpetrators of electoral violence.

While the sequencing of such program interventions has been chronologically divided into the Pre-Election, Election Day, and Post-Election Phases, there are crosscurrents of three pivotal processes that comprise both a singular and blended impact on the political campaign. First, the process of political dialogue as described above will be a critical factor that defines whether the non-parliamentary opposition participates in the next cycle of elections. In a related context, electoral and constitutional reform as considered by the parliament will also have a bearing on the perceptions of election fairness and a third term for the incumbent president could, in itself, be a trigger to violence. Finally, the Truth and Reconciliation process will be unfolding during the preparations for elections. As political contests in the 2015 elections are likely to be the subjects of Commission's investigation, safeguards must be taken to prevent the politicization of the process.

As a result, a coordinated approach to electoral security programming should be adopted by the international community (Electoral Security Donors Group – ESDG). A major bilateral donor to Burundi, with experience providing electoral assistance, should serve as the chair of this group. Through such a coordination mechanism, communication among donors can be facilitated to ensure that the multi-dimensional approach that addresses all areas of need with regard to prevention, management, and mediation is employed.

The 2015 electoral cycle for Burundi can be viewed as a kind of “crossroads” set of elections. On the one hand, if elections can be conducted peacefully and credibly, they may serve to foster democratic consolidation and national reconciliation. However, as the new Rwasa “wild card” shows, if the statement claimed in the media is confirmed, the elections continue to possess the risk for violence and unless special measures are taken to prevent and manage this violence, these elections could set back the cause of national unity and the viability electoral governance in Burundi.

**Annex I – Schedule of Meetings****The Burundi Electoral Assessment: Meeting Schedule  
Creative Associates International****Week 1: July 25-July 28, 2012 (Bujumbura)**

Wednesday, July 25, 2012, Assessment Team arrives in Burundi

\*\_\*

<b>Friday, July 27, 2012</b>	
<b>Time</b>	<b>Meeting</b>
8:00am	Mr. Bonaventure Niyoyankana <b>President, UPRONA Party (Parliamentary)</b>
9:30am	Entry Briefing with Mr. Sam Watson, <b>Chargé d’Affaires a.i., U.S. Embassy</b>
10:30am	Security Brief for Assessment Team
11:30am	Mr. Pierre-Claver Ndayicariye <b>Commission Head, CENI</b>

\*\_\*

<b>Saturday, July 28, 2012</b>	
<b>Time</b>	<b>Meeting</b>
3:00pm	Mr. Pascal Nyabenda <b>President, CNDD-FDD Party (Parliamentary)</b>

**Week 2: July 30 - August 3, 2012 (Bujumbura and Site Visits)**

<b>Monday, July 30, 2012</b>	
<b>Time</b>	<b>Meeting</b>
8:00am	<b>USAID/Burundi Staff Meeting</b>
9:30am	Mr. Terence Mbonabuca <b>Director General of Territorial Administration Ministry of Interior</b>
11:00am	Mr. Léonce Ngendakumana <b>President, FRODEBU Party and ADC Coalition</b>
2:30pm	Mr. Pierre-Claver Mbonimpa <b>Legal Representative, APRODH</b>
4:00pm	Onesphore Nduwayo <b>Executive Secretary, OAG</b>

\*\_\*

Tuesday, July 31, 2012	
Time	Meeting
8:30am	Mr. Antoine Kaburahe <b>Director, IWACU Newspaper</b>
10:00am	Pacifique Nininahazwe <b>Executive Secretary, CONSOME</b>
3:30pm	Mr. Oliver Hoehne <b>Political Advisor, Swiss Embassy</b>
4:30pm	Mr. Innocent Muhozi <b>Director General of Tele Renaissance</b>

\*\_\*

Wednesday, August 1, 2012	
Time	Meeting
8:30am	Mr. Charles Ndayiziga <b>Representative, CENAP</b>
9:30am	Mr. François Nyamoya <b>General Secretary, MSD Party</b>
11:00am	Mr. Vincent Nkeshimana <b>Director, Radio Isanganiro</b>
2:30pm	Mr. Eugène van Kemenade <b>NIMD</b> Mr. Fabien Nsengimana <b>Director, Burundi Leadership Training Program</b>

\*\_\*

Thursday, August 2, 2012 (Bujumbura and Isale Commune)	
Time	Meeting
9:30am	Mr. Oumar Diallo <b>Democratic Governance Officer and Elections Specialist, UNDP</b>
11:00am	Departure for Site Visit Isale Commune
12:00pm	Mr. Jacques Minami <b>Governor, Bujumbura Rural Province</b>
4:00pm	Mr. Emmanuel Ntakarutimana <b>Head, National Independent Commission of Human Rights</b>

\*\_\*

Friday, August 3, 2012 (Bujumbura and Bubanza)	
Time	Meeting
8:30am	<b>Meeting with GIZ</b>
9:20am	Departure for site visit at Bubanza

10:10am	Mr. Serges Nitunga <b>Deputy Governor, Bubanza</b>
11:10am	Mr. Alfred Ndizeye <b>Representative, CEPI</b>
1:00pm	Return to Bujumbura
3:30pm	Ambassador-at-large Stephen J. Rapp <sup>20</sup> <b>Office of Global Criminal Justice, US Government</b>

**Week 3: August 6 - August 10, 2012 (Bujumbura and Site Visits)**

<b>Monday, August 6, 2012 (Kayanza and Ngozi Provinces)</b>	
<b>Time</b>	<b>Meeting</b>
8:00am	Departure for Site Visits to Kayanza and Ngozi Provinces
9:45am	Mr. Jean-Claude Mpawenimana <b>Governor, Kayanza Province</b>
11:00am	Rémy Manirakiza <b>Representative, OLUCOME in Kayanza Province</b>
12:00pm	Depart Kayanza for Ngozi Province
2:30pm	Mr. Dieudonné Hiboneye <b>Deputy Governor, Ngozi Province</b>
3:45pm	Bishop Gervais Banshimiyubusa <b>Chairman, National Council of Catholic Churches</b>

\*\_\*

<b>Tuesday, August 7, 2012 (Muyinga and Gitega Provinces, Bujumbura)</b>	
<b>Time</b>	<b>Meeting</b>
8:00am	Depart for Muyinga Province
9:15am	Mrs. Pétronie Sindabahaga <b>Governor, Muyinga Province</b>
10:10am	Depart for Gitega Province
11:30am	Mr. Sylvestre Sindayihebura <b>Governor, Gitega Province</b>
12:40pm	Depart for Bujumbura
3:30pm	Monsignor Simon Ntamwana <b>Archbishop of the Dioceses of Gitega, Mwaro and Karusi</b>

\*\_\*

<sup>20</sup> Ambassador-at-large Stephen J. Rapp met with government representatives, NGOs and members of the diplomatic community during a four-day visit to Burundi to promote the country's reconciliation and transitional justice efforts.

<b>Wednesday, August 8, 2012 (Bujumbura)</b>	
<b>Time</b>	<b>Meeting</b>
2:00pm	Mr. Jacques Bigirimana <b>Executive Secretary, FNL (new)</b>
3:00pm	Mr. Valentin Bagorikunda <b>General Prosecutor of the Republic of Burundi</b>
4:30pm	Kim Jordan <b>Political Officer, U.S. Embassy in Bujumbura</b>

\*\_\*

<b>Thursday, August 9, 2012</b>	
<b>Time</b>	<b>Meeting</b>
9:00am	Major General Silas Ntigurigwa <b>Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defense and Former Combatants</b>
10:30am	Mr. Chauvineau Mugwengezo <b>General Secretary, UPD Party</b>
12:00pm	Ms. Perpétue Kanyange <b>Coordinator, Synergy for Political Participation of Women</b>
1:30pm	Mr. Freddy Nkurunziza <b>Representative, Episcopal Commission for Justice and Peace</b>

\*\_\*

<b>Friday, August 10, 2012</b>	
<b>Time</b>	<b>Meeting</b>
8:30am	Out-brief with USAID
10:00am	Out-brief with Samuel Watson <b>Chargé d’Affaires a.i., U.S. Embassy in Bujumbura</b>
6:00pm	Assessment Team Departs Burundi

## Annex II – List of Acronyms

AAEA	Association of African Election Authorities
ADC	Alliance for Democrats for Change
ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AMM	Amatora Mu Mahoro
APRODH	Burundian Association for the Protection of Human Rights and Detained Persons
AU	African Union
BF	Burundian Franc
CENAP	Conflict Alert and Prevention Centre
CENI	<i>Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante</i> (Independent National Elections Commission)
CEPI	Independent Provincial Elections Council
CNDD-FDD	The National Council for the Defense of Democracy
CNIDH	National Independent Human Rights Commission
COSOME	<i>Coalition de la Société Civile pour le Monitoring Electoral</i>
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DDR	Disarmament, De-Mobilization, and Reintegration
DG	Democracy and Governance
EAC	East Africa Community
EC	European Commission
EMA	Electoral Management Association


EMB	Election Management Body
EOM	Election Observation Mission
ESDG	Electoral Security Donors Group
EU	European Union
EVER	Electoral Violence Education and Resolution
FAB	Armed Forces of Burundi
FDD	Forces for the Defense of Democracy
FBO	Faith-based Organization
FNL	National Forces of Liberation
FRODEBU	Front for Democracy in Burundi
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIZ	<i>Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</i>
HRC	Human Rights Commission
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MSD	Movement for Solidarity and Democracy
NIMD	Netherlands Institute for Multi-Party Democracy
OAG	<i>Observatoire de l'Action Gouvernementale</i>
OLUCOME	<i>l'Observatoire de lutte contre la corruption et les malversations économiques (The Anti-corruption and Economic Malpractice Observatory)</i>
PALIPEHUTU	Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People
PNB	Burundi National Police
PVT	Parallel Vote Tabulation

---


QRF	Quick Reaction Forces
SNR	National Intelligence Service
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNOB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
UPD	Union for Peace and Development
UPRONA	Union for National Progress
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
USG	United States Government

### Annex III – February-September 2010 – Burundi - Map of Electoral Incidents

#### A. Incidences of Electoral Violence – ALL



#### B. Damage to Body/Physical Harm




### C. Attempted Murder



### D. Destruction of Property



### E. Verbal Harrassment



### F. Murder




### G. Theft



### H. Group Confrontations



### I. Other



### J. Arbitrary Detention

