

**Failure of rebel
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the CNDD-FDD in Burundi:**
an issue of balance between change
and continuity

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ABSTRACT

Since its accession to power following the 2005 elections, the CNDD-FDD has been continuously criticized for Burundi governance setbacks while its leaders' behavior suggested a maquis practice continuity. This study contributes to understand the relationship between the inability of this former rebel party to succeed the democratic transition process and some key elements of its history which played against a real rebel movement-to-political party transformation. Rivalries with pre-war existing political formations, leadership discontinuity, political origin-based identity and exclusion politics, intellectual marginalization and the conditioning of fighters to commit cruelty acts were the main historical factors that have marked the evolution of CNDD-FDD movement and thus shaping its current stature. There are several evidences showing that the CNDD-FDD leadership has transferred armed movement practices from the maquis era to a post-conflict political party, leading to the conclusion that the CNDD-FDD rebel movement-to-political party transformation has completely failed.

1. INTRODUCTION

Non-state armed groups (NSAGs)¹ have shaped or influenced the political scene in many countries around the world, and particularly in the African Great Lakes Region, during and after armed conflict.² Whatever way they are described (as guerrillas, freedom fighters, liberation movement, militias, rebels, negative forces, terrorists or bandits), the most important issue is whether and how they should spearhead profound institutional changes, though their fate broadly depends on the manner the war is ended. There are three main options to end a war involving NSAGs: (i) a complete NSAGs' defeat or marginalization by state forces with or without foreign forces intervention (M23 in Democratic Republic of Congo in 2013, LRA in Uganda in 2013, among others), (ii) a complete state defeat by NSAGs (NRM/NRA in Uganda in 1986, RPF in Rwanda in 1994, AFDL in Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997, FRCI in Côte d'Ivoire in 2011, among others) and (iii) a negotiated peace agreement between parties involved in the conflict (ANC in South Africa in 1991, FMLN in El Salvador in 1992, RENAMO in Mozambique in 1992 and CNDD-FDD in Burundi in 2003, among others). For both the second and third categories, the NSAGs transformation into non-violent political parties is an important indicator of the end of war and of their commitment to adapt to the post-war political arena. Particularly for the third category, succeeding such transformation is a decisive factor determining their survival, their weight in the political arena and the domestic and international audience.³ It determines also their role in the post-war state building and stability, as in some countries, former NSAGs have evolved as opposition political parties, like the Revolutionary United Front Party (RUF) in Sierra Leone⁴ and the *Front National de Libération* (FNL) in Burundi, while in others, NSAGs have emerged as ruling parties, like the *Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces de Défense de la Démocratie* (CNDD-FDD) in Burundi. However, researches aimed to understand how the legacy of armed mobilization at wartime and the nature of conflict endings affect the

[1] For the definition, see for instance: Poliezer, P. 2005. *Neither terrorists nor freedom fighters*. Paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference, Honolulu, Hawaii, 3-5 March.

[2] Hofmann, C. and Schneckener, U. 2011. *Engaging non-state armed actors in state- and peace-building: options and strategies*. International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93 no.883, 603-621.

[3] See the review by Curtis, D. and de Zeeuw, J. 2009. *Rebel Movements and Political Party Development in Post-Conflict Societies*, Working Paper for the Program on States and Security.

[4] Ogunmola, D. 2014. From civil war to political parties : a comparison of insurgent movements in West Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d'Ivoire, and their metamorphosis into political parties. Global Journal of Human-Social Science, vol. 14 no. 1, 4-10.

dynamics of political parties that emerged from armed groups are missing.⁵

Some studies have reported on the CNDD-FDD transformation from armed movement into a political party. Most of them were focused on the analysis of internal and external factors that had enabled this transformation⁶. In accordance with the peace agreements and the Burundian law as well, indicators of this change have been officially accomplished. These included what several studies have reported as successful FDD integration into the new defense and security forces (DSF), the disarmament and demobilization of combatants with disabilities⁷ as well as the registration of the political wing as a political party and its participation in state institutions, first in the transitional government and then as ruling party after winning the 2005 elections.⁸

However, since the beginning of exercise of power after the 2005 elections, the CNDD-FDD has been continuously criticized for its inability to properly run the country. Like numerous African ruling parties,⁹ it transformed progressively into a dominant authoritarian party subjecting the Burundian society to a totalitarian regime.¹⁰ Numerous voices were raised to denounce governance setbacks including serious human rights violation, disrespect for the rule of law, restriction of political rights and civil liberties, low level of freedom of the press, non-independent judiciary, scandals of corruption, neopatrimonial practices, cronyism and politicization of public sector recruitment, among others. Some analysts saw these undemocratic practices as results of the maquis reflexes within the current leadership in the management of state affairs¹¹ or of a deficient CNDD-FDD rebel movement - to - political party transformation.¹² Globally, Burundi was referred to as a success story.¹³ The shift of intermittent political tensions into the crisis which marked the 2015 electoral process leads us to consider that what was referred to as “reflexes of maquis” was in reality a maquis practices continuity,¹⁴ which meant that the CNDD-FDD transformation had failed. This failure has compromised the democratic transition process despite the international community investment in peace and democracy consolidation turning Burundi (as well as Sierra Leone) into an exemplary test-case for UN Peacebuilding

[5] Sindre, G. M. and Söderström, J. 2016. Understanding armed groups and party politics. *Civil Wars*, vol. 18, no. 2, 109-117.

[6] Burihabwa, N.Z. 2014. The transformation of the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Force pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) from rebel movement to governing political party in Burundi. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs supplement*, pp.18-31; Nindorera, W. 2012. The CNDD-FDD in Burundi : the path from armed to political struggle. Berghof Transitions Series no. 10. Berghof Foundation, Berlin.

[7] Willén, N. 2016. From Foe to Friend? army integration after war in Burundi, Rwanda and the Congo. *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 23 no.1, 79-106.

[8] Hajayandi, P. The integration of former rebels in Burundi’s national Defenses Forces—a step to reconciliation. The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cap Town. <http://www.ijr.org.za/publications/pdfs/Integration%20of%20ex-rebel%20in%20BNDF.pdf>; Vircoulon, T. 2015. Insights from the Burundian crisis (I) : an army divided and losing its way. ICG. <http://blog.crisisgroup.org/africa/burundi/2015/10/02/insights-from-the-burundian-crisis-i-an-army-divided-and-losing-its-way/>, visited on 21 June 2016.

[9] Kura, S.B. 2008. African ruling political parties and the making of ‘authoritarian’ democracies: extending the frontiers of social justice in Nigeria. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 8 no. 2, 63-102.

[10] International Crisis Group. 2006. Burundi: democracy and peace at risk. *Africa Report N°120 – 30 November 2006*; Palmans, E. 2012. Burundi’s 2010 elections: Democracy and peace at risk? Brussels, ECES. http://www.eces.eu/images/documents/Burundi_Elections_Eva_Palmans.pdf, visited on 11 June 2016.

[11] Agence France Presse. 2015. Crise politique burundaise : un pouvoir de plus en plus isolé mais prêt à tout. <http://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/crise-politique-burundaise-un-pouvoir-de-plus-en-plus-isol-mais-pr-t-tout>, visited on 29 June 2016.

[12] Nindorera, W. 2008. Burundi : the deficient transformation of the CNDD-FDD. In de Zeew, J. (Ed). From soldiers to politicians. Transforming rebel movements after civil war. Boulder, Lynner Rienner Publishers, Inc., pp. 103-130.

[13] El Abdellaoui, J. 2010. Burundi : overview of the 2010 elections and observations on the way forward. Situation report, Institute for Security Studies.

[14] Wittig, K. 2016. Politics in the shadow of the gun : revisiting the literature on ‘rebel-to-party transformations’ through the case of Burundi. *Civil Wars*, Vol. 18 no. 2, 137-159.

Commission.¹⁵ In fact, apart from donors' classical support, Burundi was a recipient of the UN Peacebuilding Commission funds. Moreover, several donors funded programs implemented by international organizations, such as the Burundi Leadership Training Program, the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, the Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa, the Inter-Parliamentary Union and others, were set up for leadership capacity building in political parties, state, DSF and civil society organizations. Therefore, the failure of the real expected CNDD-FDD transformation should be blamed on historical factors which have played a critical role in hindering that transformation.

The aim of this paper is to understand the relationship between this inability of the CNDD-FDD party to manage the state in a modern way and some key elements of its history which played against a real rebel movement-to-political party transformation. After this introduction, Section 2 recalls briefly the origin and evolution of the CNDD-FDD movement. Section 3 indicates some organizational developments (such as rivalries vis-à-vis pre-war political organizations and the leadership discontinuity) and individual behaviors or collective practices (such as exercise of power by violence, the political-based identity and marginalization of intellectuals) at the time of the maquis which have marked the most the history of the movement, shaped its organization and which continue to characterize the current behavior of its leadership. Section 4 identifies some key factors which have enabled the CNDD-FDD rebel movement-to-political party transformation. It points out also some elements indicating that this transformation did not stem from a genuine desire for real change, but that it was rather motivated by the strategical adjustment to achieve objectives. In Section 5, several indicators of the continuity of maquis practices are discussed before moving to the last section of conclusions. The content of this article is very pertinent. It is based primarily on my knowledge/eyewitness evidence given the different responsibility positions I occupied within the CNDD-FDD while a rebel movement and a political party¹⁶, as well as within the State¹⁷, enriched by discussions with some political and military personalities including ex-FDD officers and other data from literature.

2. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE CNDD-FDD ORIGINS: FROM A SPONTANEOUS POPULAR UPRISING TO THE BIRTH OF A REBEL MOVEMENT

Unlike other political parties known in Burundi that emerged from the initiative of individuals who became their founding presidents, the birth of CNDD on September 24, 1994 has its origins in a spontaneous uprising of the people against the military coup of October 1993. In June 1993, Burundi had successfully organized multiparty democratic elections (after those of the 60s) which brought to power the *Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi* (FRODEBU), a Hutu-dominated party, and its candidate Melchior Ndadaye became the first (democratically elected) Hutu president of Burundi. This victory was appreciated differently by the two main ethnic groups. The Hutu in general (and some Tutsi convinced of democratic values as well) considered that a page in the history of military dictatorship decades and domination by a minority in power was turned. For Christian Sendegeya (Tutsi and former member of FRODEBU National Executive Committee), “*the election of Ndadaye and the FRODEBU victory was a victory for all those thirsting for*

[15] United Nations. 2006. Letter dated 20 December 2006 from the Chairman of the Peacebuilding Commission addressed to the President of the Security Council. Security Council, S/2006/1050.

[16] Representative of the movement in Belgium from 1996 until 2003, Deputy Commissioner for Administration and Legal Affairs from 2004 until 2005, member of the Council of Elders of the party from 2007 until 2015.

[17] Speaker of the Senate between 2005 and 2010 and Second Vice-President of the Republic between 2010 and 2015.

peace, freedom, and justice”.¹⁸ However, some Hutu were openly pessimistic about the chances of success of FRODEBU to exercise the political power while the Tutsi who had the military and economic powers were opposed to it. The fate of the “Tutsi army” was a major concern. Its main rival, the *Union pour le Progrès National* (UPRONA), a Tutsi-dominated party in power for over thirty years as party-state, poorly digested the defeat. It had on its side the Burundian armed forces (*Forces armée burundaises*, FAB) known to be almost mono-ethnic Tutsi. The assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye along with some of his close collaborators in October 1993 triggered the longest and most devastating civil war that Burundi has experienced since independence. Since the announcement of this terrible news, (Hutu) people - recalling the bloody events of the past (particularly the massacre of 1972 - were frightened and agitated throughout the territory, erected barriers on roads or destroyed bridges to block the movement of soldiers in rural areas.¹⁹ These acts marked the first signs of a spontaneous popular resistance against the coup. It was in this climate of anger, panic and agitation that inter-ethnic massacres were committed. Locally, the Hutu population was organized to better cope with military repression.

Faced with insecurity and growing threats that FRODEBU members suffered constantly, the Political Bureau of this party decided in November 1993 the organization of a self-defense with the objective of «*protecting legal authorities at all levels who become targets of the creeping coup leaders, help the people to protect themselves from ravages of the army and defend the democratic process that obviously this army was trying to bury for good.*»²⁰ The organization of this popular force was entrusted to Leonard Nyangoma, the then Minister of Public Service, Labor and Refugees Repatriation. That was on 24 September 1994 that a rebellion was officially established following the classic organizational scheme of liberation movements which were structured into political and military wings as were for instance the National Resistance Movement with its military wing the National Resistance Army in Uganda²¹ and the African National Congress with its military wing the Umkhonto we Sizwe in South Africa.²² Likewise, in Burundi, the political rebel movement was named *Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie* (CNDD) and its armed wing *Forces de Défense de la Démocratie* (Intagoheka FDD). Although in its beginning few Tutsi joined the CNDD, its leadership was ethnically inclusive, as argued by its Vice President Christian Sendegeya.²³

3. HISTORICAL FACTORS SHAPING THE CNDD-FDD POST-WAR DEVELOPMENT

Since its accession to power following the 2005 elections, the CNDD-FDD has been continuously criticized for governance setbacks of Burundi. Worrying governance trends included the scaling-up of authoritarian and big-man-rule characteristics. The power management system has been marked by two dictatorship types evolving side-by-side, the military

[18] Executive Intelligence Review. 1997. What it will take to bring peace and development to Burundi. EIR, Vol. 24 no. 49, 64-70. http://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/1997/eirv24n49-19971205/eirv24n49-19971205-064-what_it_will_take_to_bring_peace.pdf, visited on 4 July 2016.

[19] Elias, M. 1994. Burundi : les fruits vénéneux du coup d’Etat. In : Politique africaine, Vol. 54. Paris, Karthala, pp. 145-150.

[20] Burundi: Histoire de la lutte armée du CNDD. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TCPlwpYcm-4>, visité le 28 février 2016.

[21] Prunier, G. 1986. Le phénomène NRM en Ouganda : une expérience révolutionnaire originale. Politique africaine no. 23, 102-111.

[22] African National Congress. A brief history of the African National Congress. <http://www.anc.org.za/content/brief-history-anc>, visited on 1st July 2016.

[23] Executive Intelligence Review, *op. cit.*

dictatorship exercised by ex-FDD Generals and the one-party dictatorship since the CNDD-FDD has gradually positioned as a *de facto* one-party or party-state.²⁴ And not surprisingly, a look back showed the CNDD-FDD movement had established itself as a *de facto* “movement-State” during the wartime. Indeed, although it didn’t fully control any specific territory, it nevertheless established a self-governing authority with its shadow and parallel administration, judiciary and socio-economic systems. This suggests that this section focuses on the identification and analysis of some events that have marked the most the CNDD-FDD history and which would have shaped its development and behavior in the post-conflict period.

3.1. Breakdown of ties between CNDD and other pre-war political organisations

During the period preceding the formal establishment of the CNDD, the tentative coordination structure of the popular resistance was a coalition of all (mainly Hutu) political forces opposed to the military coup of October 21, 1993.²⁵ The political organizations that took part in the initiative were FRODEBU, the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (French: *Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu* - PALIPEHUTU), the National Liberation Front (French: *Front de Libération Nationale* - FROLINA), the Movement for Peace and Democracy (French: *Mouvement pour la Paix et la Démocratie* - MPD), the People’s Party (French: *Parti du Peuple* - PP) and the Workers Party of Burundi (French: *Parti des Travailleurs du Burundi* - UBU).²⁶ This initiative resulted in a pluralistic organization provided that of a collective leadership team was established in which tightly-knit and complementary roles are shared between member organizations.

PALIPEHUTU and FROLINA with their armed wings were for instance expected to play a key role in military operations given their guerilla expertise. Thus, one of the PALIPEHUTU members, Donatien Misigaro (founder of the armed wing of PALIPEHUTU), occupied the responsibility of Chief of General Staff (CGS) of the tentative collective military organization called «FDD-Intagoheka» (who do not sleep). But as reported by Denis *et al.*,²⁷ collective leadership is fragile. Especially in this case, each party seemed to have its own agenda while seeking to take advantage of the others. For example, on one hand, FRODEBU which sought to regain the power it had lost by the coup wanted to take advantage of the fighting experience and capacity of “old armed groups”, i.e. PALIPEHUTU and FROLINA, for guerrillas operations. On the other hands, for their part, these old armed groups wanted to take advantage of the situation to become more powerful. Then, they expected to receive from FRODEBU financial resources that would allow them to increase their guerrilla capacity and to position themselves as new alternative political forces on the Burundian political scene.

After about three months of collaboration, the removal of Donatien Misigaro (accused of being too old compared to the physical requirements for leading a guerrilla) from the

[24] Ruyikiri, G. 2016. Grand Corruption in Burundi: a collective action problem which poses major challenges for governance reforms. Working Paper, IOB, University of Antwerp. <https://www.uantwerpen.be/images/uantwerpen/container2673/files/Publications/WP/2016/08-Ruyikiri.pdf>

[25] International Crisis Group. 2002. The Burundi rebellion and the ceasefire negotiations. Africa Briefing Paper, Nairobi, 6 August 2002.

[26] The great figures mandated by their political organizations to set up the initial coordination structure of popular resistance that led to the creation of the CNDD were mainly Léonard Nyangoma, Christian Sendegeya, Augustin Nsanze and Richard Nimbeshu on behalf of FRODEBU; Etienne Kana, Donatien Misigaro, Leon Manwangari and Népomucène Mbanzamihiho for PALIPEHUTU; Dr Kajekera for FROLINA; Charles Nahigombeye for MPD; Sylvestre Marora for PP; and Melchior Wagara and Séverin Ntibatingeso for UBU (source: personal communication with Richard Nimbeshu).

[27] Denis Jean-Louis, Lise Lamothe and Ann Langley. 2001. The dynamics of collective leadership and strategic change in pluralistic organizations. *Academy Management Journal*, vol. 44 no. 4 : 809-837. doi: 10.2307/3069417.

post of CGS created a break with PALIPEHUTU. But a significant number of PALIPEHUTU combatants and members preferred to remain in the pre-CNDD structure. It was the case of Adolphe Nshimirimana, Radjabu Hussein, Alain Guillaume Bunyoni and others, who became latter the most prominent figures of the movement.²⁸ Although the FNL (Palipehutu's armed wing) and the FDD have participated in joint military operations, especially in 1995-1996²⁹ and engaged in more coordinated operations in 2000-2001,³⁰ their rivalries have been characterized since then by armed clashes, particularly in the provinces of Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural in 1997 and 1999.³¹

A misunderstanding on financial issues also pushed FROLINA to withdraw from the pre-CNDD organization.

While initially FRODEBU supported the pre-CNDD structure through secret networks, the two organizations separated very quickly because it was becoming almost impossible for FRODEBU leaders under surveillance of the Tutsi politico-military apparatus to assume simultaneously official state responsibilities and the leadership of an armed opposition movement against the same state. Two weeks before the formal establishment of the CNDD, a *Convention of Government* was adopted as new power-sharing pact between FRODEBU on one side and UPRONA and the army on the other. This event marked the split of FRODEBU thereby plotting two separate paths for its members, either a struggle path under the umbrella of CNDD to be born shortly or a negotiated arrangements path following the "Agreement of Kigobe". Since then, FRODEBU and CNDD evolved as rivals particularly in the development of their relationship with the population for the purpose of member recruitment and retention, especially within the Hutu community from which most of their members originated. Contacts between Jean Minani (FRODEBU's President in exile in Tanzania) and Jean Bosco Ndayikengurukiye (President of the CNDD movement) in an effort to unite the two political organizations took place in March 1998 but ended without substantial result.

Despite the withdrawal of all main political organizations from the pre-CNDD structure, the CNDD movement emerged as a council capable of welcoming members with different agendas according to various historical and political origins but individually sharing a common objective to resist together against the creeping coup.³² The fact that the CNDD-FDD developed as a fully independent organization from pre-war existing political formations during the period of the war might explain its strained relationships with other political parties in the post-war period. This maquis-inherited solitary behavior of CNDD-FDD is particularly a major obstacle to consociationalism-based power-sharing formula introduced by the Arusha Peace Agreement signed in 2000 and the Constitution of 2005.³³

[28] ICG. 2002. The Burundi rebellion and the ceasefire negotiations. Nairobi/Brussels : ICG Africa Briefing Paper, 6 August 2002. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/burundi/Boo9%20The%20Burundi%20Rebellion%20and%20the%20Ceasefire%20Negotiations.pdf>, visited on 7 May 2016.

[29] Guichaoua, André. *Exilés, réfugiés, déplacés en Afrique centrale et orientale*. Paris : Karthala, 2004, p.1045.

[30] International Crisis Group. 2001. Burundi : Breaking the deadlock. The urgent need for a new negotiating framework. Africa Report No. 29, Brussels/Nairobi.

[31] Ligue Burundaise des Droits de l'Homme. 2003. Burundi-Sécurité: Les combats entre Palipehutu- Fnl et Cndd-Fdd provoquent un exode de la population. Report published on 17 September 2003. <http://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/burundi-s%C3%A9curit%C3%A9-les-combats-entre-palipehutu-fnl-et-cndd-fdd-provoquent-un-exode-de>, visited on 2 May 2016;

[32] Twagiramungu, N. 2014. Two rebel roads to power explaining variation in the transition from genocidal violence to rebel governance in contemporary Rwanda and Burundi. A PhD Thesis, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

[33] Vandeginste, Stef. *Théorie consociative et partage du pouvoir au Burundi*. IOB, Antwerp University, Cahier/2006.04. <http://www.ua.ac.be/objs/00152971.pdf>, visited on 29 April 2016.

3.2. Leadership discontinuity

Since its creation, the CNDD has been going through turbulent periods caused by strong internal tensions and crises of regionalism and managerial character (see Figure 1). Few politician and military leaders who participated in its creation have managed to remain members of the movement until the end of the war. Internal divisions have already resulted in up to six dissident factions whose leaders were forced to leave the country and currently live in exile. The last faction (wing 6) initially consisted of the “*frondeurs*” (CNDD-FDD members opposed to the third presidential term of Nkurunziza) who created later in February 2016 a new political party, the Patriotic Party for the Development (PPD-Girijambo). During the war, three teams have succeeded one another by force following the protest against the movement’s leadership twice: Nyangoma team, Ndayikengurukiye team and Nkurunziza team.




Figure 1. Storyline of the CNDD-FDD evolution

During the first team period from 1994 to 1998, the CNDD’s political leaders established their base in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), so that they were absent from the battlefield. As a consequence, the FDD combatants dealt daily needs and war related issues on their own. This led them to gradually developed a sense of independence vis-à-vis politicians whose leadership was also weakened by internal intrigues.³⁴ Indeed, the Executive

[34] FDD. 1998. Décision no. 001/98 du 20 mars 1998 portant restructuration et réorganisation définitive du Conseil national pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD). Etat-Major Général politico-militaire, FDD. https://www.uantwerpen.be/images/uantwerpen/container2143/files/DPP%20Burundi/Partis%20politiques/CNDD-FDD/D%C3%A9cision_du_20_mars_1998_portant_cr%C3%A9ation_du_CNDD-FDD.pdf

Committee of the CNDD was suspended in November 1997 by its President Léonard Nyangoma creating a power vacuum in the movement coordination. Nyangoma was overthrown in May 1998 by the FDD Chief of General Staff, Jean Bosco Ndayikengurukiye.³⁵ On the one hand, members of the management team have eclipsed together with Nyangoma to form a small wing (CNDD Nyangoma), and on the other hand, new figures emerged alongside Ndayikengurukiye (Commander-in-Chief and General-Coordinator) to lead the movement. These were particularly Prime Ngowenubusa and Laurent Kabura appointed as Deputy Chiefs of General Staff and Hussein Radjabu promoted to functions of Secretary-General. At the same time, relations between the political and military branches were redefined, military claiming more visibility in the decision-making organs. The movement was restructured in March 1998 setting up in fact a military preeminence on civilians in decision-making in the restructured politico-military organization, the CNDD-FDD,³⁶ in which the political leadership was subordinated to the military leadership in the combined command structure.

Ndayikengurukiye was also ousted from power in October 2001 for the same charges as for his predecessor³⁷, although for him, his dismissal was the result of an international conspiracy because he had refused to participate in the ongoing peace negotiation process in Arusha.³⁸ The CNDD-FDD split up into two factions, Ndayikengurukiye becoming the leader of the small one which will later become Kaze-FDD party, while Pierre Nkurunziza became head of the main faction. His closest collaborators included Radjabu continuing as General-Secretary and Adolphe Nshimirimana promoted as new Chief of Military Staff. The preeminence of the military on the civilians was attenuated but remained until the introduction of a fourth team during the congress of 7-8 August 2004 which proclaimed the mutation of the CNDD-FDD movement to a political party.³⁹ This team always led by Nkurunziza was composed of civilians, including former political mobilizers at the time of the maquis. The Nkurunziza team was consensually replaced at the congress of February 2005, which elected him as a presidential candidate for 2005 elections and nominated Radjabu Hussein as his successor.

The dynamic of leadership team construction, deconstruction and reconstruction over time is indicative of how the CNDD-FDD's organizational management was unstable. As consequences of this leadership discontinuity, fundamental reasons for the fight (saving Ndayaye's democracy heritage), experience and know-how were not transmitted from old teams to new ones. Thus, the capacity building was a constant re-starting. What is important to remember and which certainly and remarkably influenced the stature and behavior of the current CNDD-FDD leadership is that during its tumultuous development, its leadership was sieved resulting in phasing out of intellectuals and FRODEBU members (for details, see points 3.3 and 3.4). In the final phase of the armed struggle, the most influential core of the CNDD-FDD

[35] CNDD-FDD. 1998. Décision du 6 mai 1998 de destitution de Léonard Nyangoma, signée Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, Coordinateur Général. https://www.uantwerpen.be/images/uantwerpen/container2143/files/DPP%20Burundi/Partis%20politiques/CNDD-FDD/D%C3%A9cision_Destitution_nyangoma_060598_Jean_Bosco.pdf

[36] *Op. cit.*

[37] CNDD-FDD. 2001. Déclaration n° 001/1/CNDD-FDD. https://www.uantwerpen.be/images/uantwerpen/container2143/files/DPP%20Burundi/Partis%20politiques/CNDD-FDD/Declaration_Destitution_JeanBosco_151001_Adolphe.pdf.

[38] ICG. 2000. L'effet Mandela : Evaluation et perspective du processus de paix burundais. Rapport ICG Afrique centrale N° 13, Bujumbura. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/burundi/French%20Translations/The%20Mandela%20Effect%20Prospects%20for%20Peace%20in%20Burundi%20FRENCH>, visited on 6 May 2016.

[39] The preeminence of military on civilians in party decision-making bodies has been reintroduced gradually since 2007, particularly with the participation of some ex-FDD Generals in Council of Elders' meetings.

movement was mainly comprised of former PALIPEHUTU members,⁴⁰ i.e., Pierre Nkurunziza, Hussein Radjabu, Adolphe Nshimirimana, Alain Guillaume Bunyoni and others. These leaders, who emerged from nonconsensual practices of succession to the movement direction during the wartime and obviously lacking transformational leadership skills,⁴¹ were unable to devise intra-party democratic policy, to respect the rule of law and to rule the state following fundamental democratic principles such as democratic succession to power. The 2015 election of president Nkurunziza for a third term in violation of the Constitution and the Arusha Agreement was an illustrative case.

3.3. Political origin-based identity and exclusion politics

Under Nyangoma (and to a lesser extent at the time of Ndayikengurukiye) leaderships, FRODEBU-origin members dominated the CNDD-FDD political leadership while fighters who had deserted the FAB (especially students of the Higher Institute of Military Cadres-ISCAM) dominated the FDD command ranks. These ex-FAB fighters had higher regards because they were more disciplined and organizers. They were also ahead of others in training on conventional warfare technics. Those from Palipehutu felt frustrated, as they considered themselves the best experienced in guerrilla warfare. Since 1996, they consolidated themselves maliciously by preferential recruitment of PALIPEHUTU members, taking advantage of the position occupied by Hussein Radjabu as Commissioner for mobilization and propaganda. It was also in this wave that Pierre Nkurunziza (also member of PALIPEHUTU) was recruited in September 1996 by Hussein Radjabu and presented to Ndayikengurukiye (Chief of General Staff) to be accepted as CNDD member. On the other side, FRODEBU-origin members were forced to resign following the abuse they suffered. It was in such circumstances that Jean-Marie Nduwabike and Noël Batungwanayo left the CNDD for instance. This was the beginning of the split between FRODEBU-origin members and PALIPEHUTU-origin members. The trends were completely reversed with the overthrow of Ndayikengurukiye in 2001. It was at this time that political officers from other political organizations, especially those from UBU party,⁴² were expelled from the movement. Since then, PALIPEHUTU-origin members have monopolized for ever both the political and military bodies of the CNDD-FDD forming a new “CNDD-FDD system”⁴³. This crisis of confidence between FRODEBU- and Palipehutu-origin members of CNDD-FDD might take roots in remote causes. Already before the start of the 1993 war, Pierre Nkurunziza had confided to one of his friends that «*as President Ndadaye has not appointed Ngozi natives as Ministers, we must strengthen the PALIPEHUTU*»⁴⁴. And indeed, references to the name of Ndadaye (hero of democracy) were rare in his speeches compared for example to Rwagasore’s

[40] PALIPEHUTU had, since its creation in 1980, ethnocentric ideology mobilizing its followers on ethnic background based on radical antagonistic visions between Hutu and Tutsi (see for instance: Sentamba, E. 2008. Burundi: Un processus de négociation entre le gouvernement et le Palipehutu-Fnl dans l’impasse. *Journal of African Conflicts and Peace Studies*, Vol. 1 no. 1, 30-51.)

[41] For definition, see for example : Aga, D.A., Noorderhaven, N. and Vallejo, B. 2016. Transformational leadership and project success: The mediating role of team-building. *International Journal of Project Management*, Vol. 34 no.5, 806–818.

[42] Under Ndayikengurukiye’s leadership, members of UBU party were among the most influential political cadres of the movement.

[43] In this context, ‘system’ is a term that CNDD-FDD leaders used in reference to the political-ideological mainstream conveyed by members of the central core of the movement (or party) organization and decision-making. The ‘system’ members formed a unified group sharing common thoughts and history. During Ndayikengurukiye team, the ‘CNDD-FDD system’ referred to ex-FAB officers’ vision while since his overthrow, it referred to ex-PALIPEHUTU leaders, among them Pierre Nkurunziza, Hussein Radjabu, the late Adolphe Nshimirimana, Alain Guillaume Bunyoni, Godefroid Niyombare, Evariste Ndayishimiye and Etienne Ntakarutimana (alias Steve).

[44] Personal communication with that person.

name (hero of independence) he often quoted.

One of the consequences of this political origin-based identity politics was the CNDD-FDD isolationism and exclusion practices against those who were different. This seemed to be the main reason that led to the 2005 post-electoral marginalization of FRODEBU members by the ruling party. For instance, only three ministerial posts were attributed to FRODEBU out of five it was legally entitled to⁴⁵ and its officials were almost systematically sacked from management posts in state institutions and parastatal companies.⁴⁶ It was also reported that patronage and the politicization of civil services heightened under the CNDD-FDD regime as never before.⁴⁷

3.4- Marginalization of intellectuals

The CNDD-FDD movement was gradually cleansed of intellectuals as a result of regionalism (Bururi province against the rest), bad cohabitation between members according to their political origin (FRODEBU versus PALIPEHUTU) but also between university-educated and non-university graduate members, the latter suffering from inferiority complex. The majority of intellectuals deserted because of political and regional-based solidarity when Nyangoma and Ndayikengurukiye (both from Bururi province) were dismissed in 1998 and in 2001, respectively. They were mainly natives of Bururi or former FRODEBU members. Others have been killed by their comrades in arms (see in point 3.5) while others were forced to leave the CNDD-FDD, because they felt useless, as long as it was repeated that it was useless “to reason” in CNDD-FDD. The concurrency in occupying responsibility positions during the time of the rebellion and in the prospects for post-conflict period opportunities was also “*diploma war*” motivations leading non-university graduate members to mistreat, expel and even kill university-educated members.

At the end of the maquis, the CNDD-FDD was devoid of officers with technical marketing skills and experience in public administration. Although it has accelerated the recruitment of graduate and experienced members, mainly attracted from FRODEBU for Hutu and UPRONA for Tutsi, long party membership outweighed skills and merit criteria when assigning responsibility for both technical and political positions. I argue, like other opinions,⁴⁸ that in short, intellectuals were not at all accepted in the CNDD-FDD, but that they were rather tolerated by the circumstance of needs (human resources reserve, to empty opposition parties of their members, to use officials for mobilization of members in their native villages) and provided they did not interfere with the private interests of historic members.

3.5- Exercise of power by violence

During the rebellion period, when leaders gave orders, no one was allowed to ask questions like «why» in connection with the execution of the order which could nuance the order or challenge the leader’s ambition. Only questions requesting clarifications such as «where» and «when» were permitted. There were also some order principles predisposing and legitimating collective violence practices within the CNDD-FDD movement. Those were for instance these principles “*first, execute the order and ask after*” or “*unqualified leader may impose his authority on qualified members by using the whip, while he can physically eliminate those who refuse to submit*”.

[45] ICG. Burundi: democracy and peace at risk. Africa Report N°120 – 30 November 2006.

[46] Nindorera, W., *op cit.*

[47] Palmans, E., *op cit.*

[48] Jeune Afrique. 2016. Le Burundi au bord de la guerre civile ? Plongée au cœur du Burundi parano. <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/298288/politique/plongee-coeur-burundi-parano/>, visited on 23 Jun 2016.

Violence practices were also related to the degree of individual wickedness of fighters.

So many fighters were summarily killed by their comrades in arms. For example, in 1997, while Martin (FDD officer) was carried on the back by a militant combatant to cross Mpanda river in the Western region of Burundi, misfortune was that he fell into the water with his «passenger» after slipping on a stone. Another militant combatant took over and put Martin on his back. He also slipped slightly, and Martin dipped his feet in water. After crossing, the first militant combatant was immediately shot dead by Martin, while for the second, he ordered the other militant combatants in his team to bury him alive upright. Such upright partial burial alive was commonly practiced to prolong the punishment, some sentenced to death being buried in holes which were then plugged up the neck, and the victim left in agony for days before his death. Luckily for this combatant, he was rescued later by the commander of the Northwest region, Cdt Léonidas Hatungimana. Incriminated for this act (and attempt) of arbitrary execution, Martin also ended up being killed on the order of the Prevention and fight against crime service (equivalent of the Military Police with criminal appearance) that was led by Silas Ntigurirwa (currently at the grade of General in the army).

Eleven FDD combatants were also suddenly killed in 1997 in Bubanza under the order of Antoine Mbarushimana (alias Mbawa) accused of insurrection or desertion. It was for similar desertion charges (because they stayed faithful to Ndayikengurukiye) that Dr. Marc Nahimana (former member of FRODEBU), Capt. Donatien Nshimirimana and Commander Joseph Nduwayo (former student at the Higher Military Academy Institute–ISCAM–) were killed in 2002. In 1999, following an act of poisoning of some high ranks members of the movement, believed to have been organized by some fighters from Bururi to try to reduce the numbers of combatant officers from other provinces, about 70 fighters (almost all from Bururi) accused of participating in the act were executed.

Torture and other inhumane treatments were also perpetrated to punish the guilty fighters. These were often sequestered in a kind of «gunners' dugouts», locally known as «*ihandagi*», inadequately ventilated and often humid. The prisoners were subjected to a regime of up to 50 lashes three times a day for weeks or months. Melchior Wagara (currently Deputy Governor of the Bank of the Republic of Burundi) was among the CNDD-FDD members who endured such ordeal during over a year between 2001 and 2002.⁴⁹ Worse, many combatants suffered and died from cruel torture particularly in cases of upright partial burial alive as described above. I can deduce that in wartime, the enemy concept is very subjective. Indeed, for the CNDD-FDD, several sources claim that internal conflicts have caused more FDD officers death compared to those who were killed by the opposing camp.

For the CNDD-FDD movement dynamic, this intra-group violence had resulted, on one hand, in positive side effects like the discouragement of desertions and the imposition of discipline among combatants, and on another hand, in negative side effects like the reduction in fighting human resources and the enthusiasm decrease for voluntary membership of youth towards FDD during the war time. The movement's domestic audience and support base in society decreased as well. Over time, fighters have been conditioned to violence. The most zealous have inherited nicknames such as *Ndakugarika* (I kill you) for Gervais Ndirakobuca (currently Chief commissioner of police and chief of police staff at the President's office), *Gafuni* (worn hoe serving as cudgel) for Dismas Sindaye (currently Lieutenant-Colonel and commander of Muzinda

[49] FRODEBU. Les exploits du porte-parole de Nkurunziza. <http://www.frodebu.be/archives.php?date=1233080906&PHPSESSID=4e576540b3b21a6da9ad80c2fbb03040>, visited on 23 May 2016.

military camp) and *Vurumayi* (disorder) for Godefroid Bizimana (currently Chief commissioner of Police and Deputy Director General of Police). What is worrying today is that some former combatants admit that it is difficult to give up the rebellion-acquired habits. It is therefore not surprising that names of some ex-FDD fighters promoted to key positions in the National Intelligence Service (as Adolphe Nshimirimana – before his death – Gervais Ndirakobuca and Etienne Ntakarutimana) and the Police (as Alain Guillaume Bunyoni and Godefroid Bizimana) are systematically cited in reports on dirty affairs, particularly as vicious instigators and supervisors of serious human rights violation acts committed in tracking down opponents. The recurrence of violent behavior which was still pending in the post-war period in both demobilized⁵⁰ and former fighters integrated into the DSF was exacerbated during the violence that marked the 2015 crisis.⁵¹

4. CHANGING THE STATUS FROM A POLITICO-MILITARY MOVEMENT TO A POLITICAL PARTY

Since 2002, Nelson Mandela-mediated negotiations between CNDD-FDD and the government of Burundi accelerated resulting in the signing of a global ceasefire agreement in 2003⁵² followed a few months later by the CNDD-FDD rebel movement-to-political party transformation. This section examines some internal and external factors which have simultaneously contributed to this transformation.

4.1. Advantage of a structured organization

The CNDD-FDD was a clearly structured movement with a strong internal organizational discipline. Thus, it shared with former or existing structured “resistance or liberation movements” key intra-group features influencing their dynamics particularly the fluency of horizontal and vertical communication within the group. Therefore, orders and instructions were easily transmitted from the top to the bottom and decidedly enforced by the whole group. This feature was a great asset especially to succeed the peace process which follows the classical transition scheme of which the milestones are: negotiations, signing of peace agreement, demobilization, disarmament and democratic institutionalization. Structured organization enabled a collective ownership of all these steps of emerging from violent conflict to a peaceful transition, as it was reported for many armed movements around the world.⁵³

[50] Ndimubandi, A. 2012. Après-guerre et violence d'ex-combattants au Burundi. *Cahiers de Psychologie Clinique* 2012/2 no. 39, 185-207.

[51] Human Rights Watch. 2015. Burundi : Riposte meurtrière par la police aux manifestations. <https://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2015/05/29/burundi-riposte-meurtriere-par-la-police-aux-manifestations>, visited on 31 July 2016.

[52] Accord-Global de Cessez-le-feu du 16 novembre 2003 entre le Gouvernement de Transition du Burundi et le Mouvement Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD). https://www.uantwerpen.be/images/uantwerpen/container2143/files/DPP%20Burundi/Paix/Accords%20de%20paix/GOB_CNDD-FDD_fr_GCA_161103.pdf

[53] Dudouet, V. 2012. Intra-party dynamics and the political transformation of non-state armed groups. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* vol. 6 no. 1, 96-108; Nissen, A and K. Schlichte. 2006. From guerrilla war to party politics: the transformation of non-state armed groups in El Salvador and Nicaragua. Oslo Forum, Background Papers, pp. 44-48. <https://www.osloforum.org/sites/default/files/FromGuerrillaWartoPartyPoliticsElSalvadorandNicaragua.pdf>

4.2. Conflict ripeness, mutually hurting stalemate

According to Zartman⁵⁴ conflicting parties commit to acceptable negotiated agreement when they feel that they are in an uncomfortable, costly and risky predicament to continue unilateral alternative to achieve the goal of their struggling by a military victory. On the ground, the CNDD-FDD leaders were increasingly convinced of the near impossibility of winning the war militarily. The armed struggle had exhausted everybody, including in the ranks of the fighters. Shortly before signing the Global Cease-fire Agreement in November 2003, in some localities, the belligerents had agreed to end attacks, a kind of local cease-fire.⁵⁵

The population was increasingly annoyed by FDD presence for two main reasons. First, it was abused by repeated money and food collections, sometimes by force in the form of looting or kidnappings for ransom, in order to fund the struggle's daily needs or for the leaders' personal interest.⁵⁶ Second, the presence of FDD in a given locality was felt by local people as a threat to their security by the fact that FDD attacks to military positions were followed by repression/vengeance on the local people. For example, after FDD combatants engaged in combat operations with the government army on certain hills of Itaba commune in Gitega province on 5 September 2002 and retreated afterwards, the government army proceeded in massacres of around 200 unarmed Hutu civilians of these same hills on 9 September 2002.⁵⁷ The resulting consequence was a gradual decrease of population sympathy towards the CNDD-FDD movement.

On the other hand, the CNDD-FDD had exercised enough pressure on the government forces to the point that they had also understood that they could not wipe out the rebels and win the war militarily. This equilibrium of military forces between the belligerents was thus a common factor in favor of negotiations between the CNDD-FDD and the incumbent government. Therefore, as did other political-military movement like FMLN in El Salvador⁵⁸, it sounded reasonable to strategically engage in the negotiation process while it still had a considerable social backing, but also to avoid the risk of a military defeat.

The CNDD-FDD was also confident in the ability of its parallel administration to mobilize people all over the country and to position itself as the principal Burundian political actor in the perspective of winning the elections that would mark the end of the war. This political force on the ground was for the CNDD-FDD the only guarantee, that without a military victory, it could take control of the state by the way of ballot boxes. On the other hands, the Tutsi-dominated government power and forces had a good reason to negotiate with the CNDD-FDD in order to conclude cease-fire agreements allowing to implement the Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation signed in August 2000.⁵⁹ This agreement provided for arrangements in

[54] Zartman, I. W. 2000. Ripeness: The hurting stalemate and beyond. In National Research Council. *International conflict resolution after the cold war*. Committee on International Conflict Resolution. Stern P.C. and D. Druckman, Eds. Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, pp. 225-250.

[55] International Crisis Group. 2004. End of transition in Burundi: the home stretch. Nairobi/Brussels: Africa Report No. 81.

[56] International Crisis Group. 2002. The Burundi rebellion and the ceasefire negotiations. Africa Briefing.

[57] Amnesty International UK. 2002. Burundi: No justice for victims of the Itaba massacre. <https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/burundi-no-justice-victims-itaba-massacre>; République du Burundi. 2002. Burundi-Sécurité: Déclaration du Gouvernement sur les tueries survenues à Itaba le 9 sept 2002. Le Ministre de la Communication et Porte-Parole du Gouvernement. <http://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/burundi-s%C3%A9curit%C3%A9-d%C3%A9claration-du-gouvernement-sur-les-tueries-survenues-%C3%A0-itaba-le-9>

[58] Álvarez, Alberto Martin. *op. cit.*

[59] République du Burundi. 2000. Arusha peace and reconciliation agreement for Burundi. Arusha, 28 August 2000.

the power sharing that guaranteed the interests of the Tutsi minority.

The balance of powers achieved predisposed the parties to (temporarily) tolerate the past abusive behavior, most importantly crimes committed by both sides, and therefore to commit to peace.

4-3- Unfavorable geopolitical situation and pressure from international community

The international community exercised pressure on the CNDD-FDD leaders to force them to accept the path of negotiations.⁶⁰ Otherwise, the CNDD-FDD would risk to be treated as a negative force. Indeed, the CNDD-FDD was less trustful of DRC and Tanzania as rear bases, as the mediation threatened to influence neighboring countries (particularly DRC) to cut its rear bases and whenever necessary to arrest CNDD-FDD leaders in case they refused to adhere to the Arusha agreement. The presence of FDD on Congolese territory became also uncertain in the context of the DRC peace process dynamic which resulted in the 2002 Pretoria Agreement.⁶¹ Tanzania for its part had taken measures (including the imprisonment of FDD fighters) to force the CNDD-FDD to join the Arusha peace process, while Kenya threatened CNDD-FDD members transiting through its territory.⁶² Also, the fact that mediation had given a financial return package relatively consistent to the leaders of other rebel groups who had accepted to join the Arusha agreement (CNDD Nyangoma, CNDD-FDD Ndayikengurukiye, FROLINA and FNL Mugabarabona) posed a threat to internal cohesion of CNDD-FDD, of which some members would consider the package as an opportunity. The CNDD-FDD leaders feared risks of internal fracture.

4-4- Did the CNDD-FDD adhere to the letter and to the spirit of Arusha agreement?

The preparatory process for the abandonment of armed struggle by the CNDD-FDD and adherence to the peace process was marked by the signing between October 2002 and November 2003 of agreements and protocols with the Transitional Government. A ceasefire agreement signed on 2 December 2002 announced that “upon signature of the Ceasefire Agreement and upon the promulgation by the Transitional Government of Burundi, the CNDD-FDD will become a political party under a new law governing political parties”.⁶³ This new law on political parties, enacted on 26 June 2003, provided in article 25 that “serving members of the defense and security bodies (...) are not allowed to adhere to political parties” and in article 34 that “no political party can develop any military or paramilitary organization”.⁶⁴ In subsequent agreements, both parties agreed that “as soon as the process of cantonment begins, that action will indicate that the armed wing of the CNDD-FDD is being integrated, and would mean that they qualify to register as a political party”.⁶⁵

[60] Nantulya, P. 2015. Burundi: why the Arusha accord are central. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. <http://africa-center.org/spotlight/burundi-why-the-arusha-accords-are-central/>

[61] DRC. 2002. Global and inclusive agreement on transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CD_021216_Global%20and%20Inclusive%20Agreement%20on%20Transition%20in%20DRC.pdf, visited on 16 May 2016.

[62] ICG. 2002. The Burundi rebellion and the ceasefire negotiations. Nairobi/Brussels : ICG Africa Briefing Paper, 6 August 2002.

[63] Ceasefire agreement between the Transitional Government of Burundi and the National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), signed in Arusha on 2 December 2002. <https://www.issafrika.org/cdburundipeaceagreements/No%203%20Ceasefire%20agreement.pdf>.

[64] République du Burundi. 2003. Loi no. 1/006 du 26 juin 2003 portant organisation et fonctionnement des partis politiques. http://www.assemblee.bi/IMG/pdf/N°1_6_26%20juin_2003.pdf.

[65] Communiqué of the Regional consultative meeting on Burundi, 20 July 2003 (<https://www.issafrika.org/Af/profiles/Burundi/sumcomjul03.pdf>); The Pretoria protocol on outstanding political, defense and security power sharing

The signature of the Global Ceasefire Agreement on November 16, 2003 marked the end of negotiations between the transitional government and the CNDD-FDD movement and the end of hostilities between the two parties. Article 2 indicated that “*the Global Ceasefire Agreement is an integral part of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi*”. Formally, this meant that CNDD-FDD accepted at the same time to adhere to the Arusha Agreement, although it strongly criticized its content. The CNDD-FDD was particularly opposed to the institutionalization political life ethnicization in Burundi because this agreement established ethnic quotas between Hutu and Tutsi as the fundamental basis of the power-sharing.⁶⁶ Specifically, it criticized the predominantly Hutu parties for having signed an imbalanced text which guaranteed a strong representation of the ethnic minority at the expense of the majority ethnic group. Particularly, the Arusha agreement imposed that each ethnic group should have a 50% representation in the national defense forces (FDN) and of the national police (PNB), frustrating the CNDD-FDD members who would have preferred a representation percentage based to that of ethnic proportions of the Burundi population, i.e. 85% for Hutu, 14% for Tutsi and 1% for Twa. Most recently, CNDD-FDD, through a statement, strongly criticized the Arusha Agreement which it considered to have originated from arrangements between intellectuals to share leadership positions in the government, without the mandate of the people and without the worries of bringing about the truth.⁶⁷

Based on the above, it is obvious that the CNDD-FDD’s leaders adhered to the “letter” of the Arusha agreement as a matter of form as a result of the internal and external heavy pressure. It means that they didn’t integrate the “spirit” of the Arusha agreement – i.e. political compromises, power-sharing, ethnic tolerance and national reconciliation – into the CNDD-FDD’s ideology and politics. Then, the strategy was to adhere to the Arusha Agreement for the record in the perspective to change it progressively once on power with a hope to achieve the objectives of the fight it had not been able to attain by force of arms. It is a matter of rationality between costs and benefits of the continued use of force. Inspired by the success of other armed movements that managed to take power by force in the African Great Lakes region, namely NRM / NRA in Uganda in 1986, RPF in Rwanda in 1994 and AFDL in DRC 1997, the CNDD-FDD has not given up its main objective of total control of power. It has not changed its goal, but method. If it has renounced armed struggle, it considered it would be more sure to reach its goal through the political channel. Its strategy was therefore to join the Arusha Agreement in form, with a view to gradually change it once installed in power. But this was the most difficult: the Arusha Agreement, with its principles of «consociationalism» that the CNDD-FDD was forced to comply with while it had not participated in their negotiation, was finally the great hindrance to achieve this initial goal of total control of power. That’s why it bypassed and eventually ignored it (although it refers to the agreement whenever it can serve its interests).

5. MOVEMENT-TO-PARTY TRANSFORMATION: CHOICE BETWEEN CHANGES AND CONTINUITY

The cantonment of combatants that followed the Global Ceasefire Agreement a

issues in Burundi, signed on 2 November 2003 (<http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Bur%2020031102.pdf>).

[66] CNDD-FDD. 2000. Déclaration du CNDD-FDD sur l’Accord de paix d’Arusha signé le 28 août 2000. https://www.uantwerpen.be/images/uantwerpen/container2143/files/DPP%20Burundi/Partis%20politiques/CNDD-FDD/Declaration_170900_Arusha_agreement.pdf, visited on 17 April 2016.

[67] CNDD-FDD. 2016. Communiqué no. 011/2016 du parti CNDD-FDD du 30 juin 2016. <https://www.uantwerpen.be/images/uantwerpen/container2673/files/Burundi%20DPP/partis%20politiques/CNDD-FDD/300616.pdf>

few weeks later marked the “formal” separation between the armed wing (FDD) and the political wing of the CNDD-FDD, although in reality, both wings maintained quiet tight relations. On 18 February 2004, the number of disarmed and cantoned FDD fighters was estimated at 18,000 out of an estimated 27,000 combatants in total.⁶⁸ The decision to transform the CNDD-FDD movement into a political party was made during the third Congress of the CNDD-FDD movement held on 7 to 8 August 2004 in Gitega⁶⁹ in which the CNDD-FDD members committed to continue the political struggle. Two important texts were adopted on that occasion: a political program and the statutes of the party. It was registered as a political party in January 2005.

According to Article 10 of the statutes of the party, «*the founding members are all activists of the CNDD-FDD Movement until the eighth day of August 2004, when the movement became a political party*». This provision has an important significance and a camouflaged logic for the CNDD-FDD. Officially, it aimed to allow an automatic return to the party for integrated FDD fighters after their jobs in the DSF. However, it also implicitly allowed all ex-combatants (demobilized or integrated in the new DSF) to be *ex officio* members of the party thus violating the 2003 law on political parties⁷⁰ and later article 82 of the 2005 Constitution. This fact did not seem like a small detail but a major strategy for the CNDD-FDD which opted for a superficial transformation keeping on its side all ex-FDD including those who were active in the DSF.

5-1. Continuation of politico-military command structures

Informal practices referred to as *maquis reflexes*⁷¹ or *maquis inherited influence*⁷² lead to suggest that the “real” rebel movement-to-political party transformation did not occur. While the 2003 law on political parties and the 2005 Constitution prohibited members of the DSF from joining a political party and political parties to develop military or paramilitary organizations, signs of their violation by CNDD-FDD party were obvious. First, since 2007, five ex-FDD Generals were, together with six civilians, members of the Council of Elders of the party at the national level.⁷³ But this combined civilian-military structure did not last long, since the Generals eventually refused to sit with civilians. Although they justify this withdrawal as a strategy to participate in the organization and activities of the party while remaining in the shadow, it is likely that they were rather uncomfortable to share this decision-making space with civilians. They often struggled to impose their views when faced with civilian arguments. For example, when the Council had to decide on options to manage political tensions, the Generals prioritized the use of force when civilians suggested the way of dialogue and compromise. They thus constituted a parallel Council of Elders, certainly informal but more powerful compared to that of

[68] AFP. Quelques 18.000 ex-combattants rebelles désarmés et cantonnés. <http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5678~v~Quelques.18.000.ex-combattants.rebelles.desarmes.et.cantonnes.pdf>. Visited on April 14, 2016.

[69] CNDD-FDD. 2004. Le 3^{ème} Congrès du mouvement CNDD-FDD tenu à Gitega du 7 au 8 août 2004. Documents publiés, Bujumbura, Décembre 2004.

[70] Loi n°1/006 du 26 Juin 2003 portant organisation et fonctionnement des Partis Politiques. B.O.B. n°6 bis/2003. <https://www.uantwerpen.be/images/uantwerpen/container2143/files/DPP%20Burundi/Partis%20politiques/Loi.260603.partis.politiques.pdf>

[71] AFP. 2015. Crise politique burundaise : un pouvoir de plus en plus isolé mais prêt à tout. <http://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/crise-politique-burundaise-un-pouvoir-de-plus-en-plus-isole-mais-pr-t-tout>, visited on 23 Jun 2016.

[72] Hirschy, Justine, and Camille Lafont. “Esprit d’Arusha, es-tu là ? La démocratie burundaise au risque des élections de 2015.” *Politique africaine* 1 no. 137 (2015): 169-189. doi: 10.3917/polaf.137.0169

[73] In February 2007, the party statutes were amended in order to allow the President Nkurunziza to be the president of the Council of Elders, an internal party body that decides on the orientations and functioning of the party. As it was provided for in article 39, the Council of Elders was composed of 11 members but only six of them had to be approved by the Congress. The remaining five were ex-FDD Generals, namely the late Adolphe Nshimirimana, Alain Guillaume Bunyoni, Godefroid Niyombare, Guillaume Nabindika et Evariste Ndayishimiye.

civilians who became only extras to create the illusion of democracy within the party. Also, some ex-FDD officers were influential members in provincial organs of the party. The military leadership successfully managed to dominate the civilian leadership in the decision-making arena, as was during the period of maquis. If some ex-FDD fighters were propelled to leadership levels during the war thanks to their skills in organizing and carrying out the armed struggle, it didn't mean necessarily that they were equally suitable for leading the organization when it entered the arena of peaceful politics. For instance, if more a fighter is violent and brutal towards the enemy more he is considered stronger and more likely he is to be promoted, the same characters are deficiencies in times of peace. It is an issue of political leadership capable of taking over the role of leader in time of peace which has been reported to be the main challenge for significant policy changes during the transformation from the rebel movement to political party and during the post-conflict political party development.⁷⁴

Second, the CNDD-FDD celebrates the combatant's day on 16 November of each year. Participants include CNDD-FDD members together with ex-FDD fighters whether demobilized or integrated into the DSF. This activity is proof that strong ties were maintained between the party members and all ex-FDD fighters, resulting in excessive socialization between civilians and former FDD-origin members of DSF. The political neutrality of these forces was thus challenged while their familiarity with ordinary citizens made them inefficient in their mission, which partially explains most of governance setbacks like the widespread corruption in Burundi.⁷⁵

The last example concerns the Imbonerakure (CNDD-FDD youth) militarization creating a pro-Government militia for political intimidation of members of opposition parties and civil society organizations.⁷⁶ These examples indicate that the movement's politico-military networks have been informally transferred to the current party structures.

5.2. Difficult companionship and socialization between ex-FDD and ex-FAB

Several studies have reported that the integrated DSF had good reputation and were – until the 2015 electoral crisis – the symbol of Arusha compromises for the power-sharing between ethnicities in Burundi.⁷⁷ Some key variables of integration were used by those studies' authors to conclude that Burundi has achieved a successful integration process. Furthermore, the fact that Burundi has become an important troop-contributing country to AU and UN peacekeeping missions in Africa⁷⁸ was valued internally. On one side, several national goals were pursued, including military's professionalization, prestige, individual financial opportunities for military and the economic interests for the state. This allowed to hide the weak side of the integration. On the other side, on the international level, Burundi contribution to peacekeeping missions helped to paint a positive image of Burundi, leading to a globally positive appreciation of the integration process by the international community. However, a thorough analysis shows that, contrary to these conclusions, the integration of the FDD fighters with the FAB had seemingly resulted in a new integrated, unified and homogenous body by its uniform (like a mixture

[74] Khadiagala, M. G. and Lyons, T. 2006. The challenges of leadership in postconflict transitions: Lessons from Africa. *Conflict Trends* 2006/4, 9-15.

[75] Ruyikiri, *op. cit.* ; Twagiramungu, *op. cit.*

[76] Human Rights Watch. 2009. La quête du pouvoir: violences et répression politiques au Burundi. <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burundios09frwebwcover.pdf>, visited on 16 May 2016.

[77] Samii, C. 2013. Perils or promise of ethnic integration? Evidence from a hard case in Burundi. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 107, no. 3, 558-573; Willén, N. 2016. From Foe to Friend? army integration after war in Burundi, Rwanda and the Congo. *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 23 no.1, 79-106.

[78] Wilén, N., Ambrosetti, D. and G. Birantamije. 2015. Sending peacekeepers abroad, sharing power at home: Burundi in Somalia. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, vol. 9, no. 2, 307-325.

of two miscible liquids whose elements are no longer distinguishable) while it remained rather heterogeneous through some behaviors of ex-FDD fighters. For instance, they rarely attended common entertainment places such as officers' mess, non-commissioned officers' mess and canteens for troops. It is not pure random but could be explained by two reasons. Firstly, before joining the institutions after the signing of the Global Cease-fire Agreement, a moral standards session was organized during which the combatants were advised to keep their vigilance vis-à-vis their adversary. The message was released as follow: «you go out of the maquis to live with people that you were fighting. Beware, they could kill you by poisoning, or weaken your consciousness and conquer you by offering their pretty girls as decoys».⁷⁹ Secondly, most of ex-FDD officers were embarrassed by their low training levels resulting in inferiority complex while they were entrusted positions of responsibility. Then, fearing a shortage of arguments while discussing, they preferred to limit conversations with their colleagues from ex-FAB only to office colleagues. Yet, despite their high levels of training, professional skills and experience, the ex-FAB militaries had a responsible and high critical spirit and were relatively open to integration. They even passed their know-how to the FDD-origin militaries and policemen.

As a result, the ex-FDD fighters organized their own socialization and mentoring frameworks. Refreshment places were created for this purpose as meeting and entertainment places. This was the case of «144» in Kinindo neighborhood, «Iwabo w'abantu» and «Iwabo w'abasigaye» in Kamenge neighborhood, all owned by late General Adolphe Nshimirimana⁸⁰ and regularly attended by high ranked ex-FDD, senior CNDD-FDD officials and pro-government officials; «Bel-Air» owned by Chief commissioner of police Gabriel Nizigama in Carama neighborhood attended by all categories of ex-FDD and pro-government officials; «Mpirindi» in Kamenge for low ranks of ex-FDD and pro-government citizens.

It was also for that purpose that sports associations were created for ex-FDD and CNDD-FDD members. President Nkurunziza created and supervised the «Alleluia FC» (in which he was also key player) and a football academy that trained and mentored many football clubs, called «Le messenger FC».⁸¹ The association «Amicale pour la Promotion du Sport (Amipros-Nonoka)» was created as a gathering of all ex-FDD officers (in its initial phase, but open to others in next phases) who were active in the DSF. It benefited from President Nkurunziza's support for financial needs for its activities which included sports and social gathering.

These civil war-inherited differences and partisan affiliations were bearers of the virus of division. They resulted in the development of parallel chains of command within the DSF whose divisions were prominent during the 2015 crisis management. This crisis indicated that the ancient politico-ethnic hatred which was ultimately only dormant has been reignited by politico-military leaders (one can refer to the speech of the President of the Senate, Révérien Ndikuriyo, of October 29, 2015),⁸² although its magnitude was smaller compared to what it was in previous crises.

[79] Testimony of an ex-FDD officer.

[80] Since the CNDD-FDD integrated state institutions, the late General Adolphe Nshimirimana have been successively appointed for the following official duties: Deputy Chief of General Staff of the FDN, General Director of the National Intelligence Service and finally, Senior adviser Chargé de Mission at the presidency. He was the most feared, powerful and influential person of the Nkurunziza's regime until the date of his assassination in a rocket attack on his convoy on August 2, 2015.

[81] République du Burundi. Réalisations du gouvernement Nkurunziza de 2005 à 2010. <http://www.presidence.bi/spip.php?article1523#>, visited on 20 April 2016.

[82] Jeune Afrique. 2015. Burundi : les États-Unis dénoncent « un langage de l'horreur que la région n'a plus connu depuis 20 ans ». <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/277403/politique/burundi-etats-unis-denoncent-langage-de-lhorreur-region-na-plus-connu-20-ans/>.

5-3- Violence and confrontational approach

In the exercise of its power, the CNDD-FDD leadership lacked the will and real commitment to involve all the different citizen categories in the state management. From the beginning of the CNDD-FDD power, winner-take-all wartime mindset was noted as one of basic political challenges.⁸³ The categorization policy of the Burundian society into two camps (friend camp including all Burundians who supported their activities and enemy camp for others) that characterized the movement on the battlefield has continued even during the post-conflict period. Opposition or rival political parties were identified as “*abakeba*”.⁸⁴ The image of FRODEBU and UPRONA as former inseparable tandem remained in their relationship with the CNDD-FDD ruling party. More specifically, FRODEBU (as well as FNL) was seen as a potential threat that could compete for the political space with the CNDD-FDD because both parties share the same electorate (the Hutu majority). UPRONA was considered as a potential threat for peace and security because of suspicions that it would maintain strong ties with ex-FAB in the newly integrated DSF. However, FRODEBU and UPRONA had given positive signals predisposing them to collaborate under the CNDD-FDD leadership, particularly by backing it through voting for its candidate Pierre Nkurunziza during the indirect 2005 presidential elections.

The refusal to share power with such political adversaries has characterized the CNDD-FDD regimes, in violation of laws. It was in this spirit that the first Nkurunziza’s government was unconstitutional against the rights of FRODEBU and UPRONA⁸⁵ while a partnership with new satellite parties was initiated by the inclusion in the same government of small political parties MSP-Inkinzo, MRC and PARENA although they did not fulfill the constitutional requirements to be in the government.⁸⁶ The ultimate goal was to weaken the rival political parties. This same principle resulted in maintaining strained relations between the CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL. Indeed, the CNDD-FDD dominated government dragged to commit to negotiating with the PALIPEHUTU-FNL against which he led rather fierce fighting for its weakening. For the CNDD-FDD, an agreement with the PALIPEHUTU-FNL still relatively strong would have cost, in the short term, responsibility positions to yield to «newcomer» (except for elected posts) while integrating high FNL effective into the defense and security forces would dilute the weight and influence of FDD in the bodies in which the Hutu-Tutsi parity must be maintained. For the medium and long term, the strategy of the CNDD-FDD was to delay the recognition of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL as a political party while activating the disturbance or even dismantling of its political structures, in order to protect or extend its influence on the (Hutu) electorate.

The CNDD-FDD leaders often favored confrontation, brutality and forcing instead of compromise and dialogue, in their relations with political and non-political actors as well. While they held up national sovereignty in order to dismiss partners from accompanying and monitoring mechanisms of the peace process, the CNDD-FDD decision-makers have proven to be politically immature to manage the entire nation throughout its diversity. There have been few occasions where institutions from the CNDD-FDD have taken the initiative of dialogue with Burundian actors as partners. To appease political tensions, face-to-face dialogue workshops involving political actors were finally organized under pressure and under the patronage of development partners. As the CNDD-FDD participated rather for formality than for

[83] Wolpe, H. and McDonald, S. 2006. Burundi’s transition: training leaders for peace. *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 17 no. 1, 132-138.

[84] The term “*Abakeba*” refers rivalries between co-wives in polygamous families.

[85] ICG. Burundi: democracy and peace at risk. Africa Report N°120 – 30 November 2006.

[86] Vandeginste, *op. cit.*

a real commitment for dialogue and compromise, these workshops have often ended with high principles declarations which were rarely followed by concrete actions. This was the case, for example, of the roadmap on the 2015 electoral process adopted at the workshop organized in March 2013 for political actors under the auspices of the United Nations Office in Burundi.⁸⁷ The points concerning the creation of a conducive environment for peaceful and inclusive elections received less attention in the follow-up.⁸⁸ Another example was the workshop organized by Parliament in December 2013 on the amendment draft of certain provisions of the Constitution. Even though it was closed with many points of divergence,⁸⁹ the CNDD-FDD power attempted to force the amendments through. Its plans were flawed, on one hand, by the refusal of members of FRODEBU Nyakuri and UPRONA to cooperate despite large sums of money they were promised to corrupt them⁹⁰ and on the other hands, by the courageous refusal of the President of the National Assembly Pie Ntavyohanyuma to declare false results of the vote.⁹¹ This revision whose main objective was to enable President Nkurunziza to seek a third presidential term in 2015 elections was rejected during the meeting of March 21, 2014 in the National Assembly. Rather than learning from this failure, President Nkurunziza decided to still run by forcing for an illegal third term, against the Constitution and the Arusha Agreement⁹² and despite domestic and international community protests.

5.4- Deficient intra-party democracy

Political parties are known to play a crucial role in modern representative democracy⁹³. They formulate public policies and programs, raise public awareness through their propaganda, recruit administrative managers and members of parliament, present political alternatives and control governments, depending on whether they are in the ruling majority or opposition. They represent citizens and their opinion in a democracy. However, it is essential that internal party organization and functioning be based on basic democratic principles. The absence of legal codified guidelines on the guarantee of intra-party democracy is a common major challenge for political parties in Africa⁹⁴ including Burundi. And intra-party democracy is not merely the fact that the word ‘democracy’ is mentioned in the name of the party, or is proclaimed in slogans, hymns, songs and dances of the party, as is the case for the CNDD-FDD. According to National Democracy Institute,⁹⁵ a party that practices internal democracy is characterized in

[87] RFI. 2013. Atelier sur “Le Processus Électoral au Burundi: Enseignements et Perspectives”. Éléments d’une Feuille de Route vers 2015. Bujumbura 11-13 mars 2013. <http://bnub.unmissions.org/Portals/bnub-french/Atelier%20sur%20le%20processus%20%C3%A9lectoral%20au%20Burundi%20-%20Feuille%20de%20Route%20-%20FR.pdf>, visited on 30 May 2016.

[88] CNDD. Négociations de Kayanza : Attention au somnifère savamment entretenu. <http://www.cndd-burundi.com/actualites/processus-electoral/65-negociations-kayanza-somnifere>, visited on 31 May 2016.

[89] Assemblée Nationale du Burundi. Clôture de l’atelier d’échange sur le projet d’amendements de certaines dispositions de la Constitution de la République du Burundi. <http://www.assemblee.bi/Cloture-de-l-atelier-d-echanges>, visited on 30 May 2016.

[90] The Chief of the National Intelligence Service proposed a bribe of two billion BiF to the President of FRODEBU Nyakuri Jean Minani (personal communication)

[91] Personal communication with Pie Ntavyohanyuma

[92] Reyntjens, F. Scenarios for Burundi. Analysis & Policy Brief n° 11, University of Antwerpen. <https://www.uantwerpen.be/images/uantwerpen/container2143/files/Publications/PolicyBriefs/APB/11-Reyntjens.pdf>

[93] Catón, Matthias. Effective Party Assistance: Stronger Parties for Better Democracy. Stockholm: IDEA, Policy Paper. http://www.idea.int/publications/effective_party_assistance/loader.cfm?csmodule=security/getfile&page-id=24235.

[94] Adejumbi, Said. 2007. Political Parties in West Africa: The Challenge of Democratization in Fragile States. Stockholm: IDEA. http://www.idea.int/publications/pp_west_africa/loader.cfm?csmodule=security/getfile&page-id=22423

[95] National Democracy Institute. 2003. L’organisation interne des partis politiques. Programme d’appui aux partis politiques en Haïti, Module 2. Port-au-Prince. https://www.ndi.org/files/2279_ht_manual.PoliticalParties.fr_040308.

particular by the free opinion expression of its members, the equitable participation of members, a tolerance for different ideas and respect of rules and procedures established to facilitate the decision-making process.

Officially, the participation of CNDD-FDD members in deliberation and decision-making is provided through meetings of party bodies, including regular and special congresses. During the first years of CNDD-FDD as a political party, some democratic practices were recorded. These were for instance open competition among members for certain internal positions of responsibility and the secret ballot for major decisions. Thus, for example, Manassé Nzobonimpa was elected General Secretary of the party through secret ballot, beating two other candidates (Pasteur Mpawenayo and Félicien Nduwuburundi) during the extraordinary congress of February 2006.⁹⁶

However, these practices did not last long. Thereafter, votes in the party were done by show of hand or by simple acclamation to avoid that party members disapprove decisions imposed by leaders. The democracy within the CNDD-FDD has been compromised by a strong centralization of decision-making, authoritarian practices and a lack of tolerance of divergent ideas. Decision-making bodies such as congress served as one way transmission channels of messages and orders from leaders to members without debate. Meetings of party bodies were nothing more than simple occasions to endorse decisions made by a small circle of individuals operating in shadow and parallel structures dominated by some ex-FDD Generals.⁹⁷

The weakness of democracy within the CNDD-FDD can be illustrated by the absence of space for open debates. For instance, in March 2015, more than a hundred members signed a petition addressed to the President of the Republic (who was also president of the Council of Elders of the CNDD-FDD party) to express their concerns about the increasing political tension around the likely candidacy of President Nkurunziza to bid a third presidential term. With this act, some members were suspended from party activities while others were excluded. Many of them were also removed from office. My refusal to countersign the dismissal decree of eleven advisers to the second vice-presidency has worsened relations which were already severely strained between me and President Nkurunziza since I had disagreed with him, together with many other members of the Council of Elders, on his third term at the meeting of this Council of March 14, 2015.

This arbitrary exercise of authority, ignoring all advices, leaking contradictory debates and persisting in an action contrary to the interests of the society, was referred to as one of the “pathologies of leadership”.⁹⁸ And yet, a multitude of workshops which should cure such pathology were organized by Burundi’s partners particular by Burundi Leadership Training Program in partnership with Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy for all categories of key actors from state institutions (government, parliament, judiciary, DSF), political parties, civil society organizations and media professionals; by Association of European Parliamentarians with Africa and Inter-Parliamentary Union targeting specifically members of parliament; and

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[96] VOA. Umunyamabanga Mukuru w’umugambwe CNDD-FDD ni Colonel Manassé Nzobonimpa. <http://www.radiyoyacuvoa.com/a/a-18-2006-02-21-voa1-93018434/1264657.html>, visited on 24 May 2016.

[97] CNDD-FDD Section Belgique. Lettre du président de la section du parti CNDD-FDD en Belgique au président du parti CNDD-FDD Radjabu Hussein. http://www.eurac-network.org/web/uploads/documents/20070123_8780.doc, visited on 24 May 2016.

[98] King, Charles. 1997. The structure of civil wars. *The Adelphi Papers*: 37:308, 29-54. Doi:10.1080/05679329708449415; Hurst, D.K. 2012. *The new ecology of leadership: Business mastery in a chaotic world*. New York: Columbia University Press; Kets de Vries, M. F. R. 2009. *Reflections on Character and Leadership*. Chichester, John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

by Netherlands-funded Burundi Security Sector Development program (SSD program) aimed at strengthening the leadership capacity within the army and police bodies. Despite several sessions in which CNDD-FDD leaders and FDD-origin members of DSF participated on various topics including process of consensus and participatory decision-making, intra-party democracy and DSF professionalization, ex-FDD Generals continued to dominate the CNDD-FDD and state decision-making structures. Moreover, authoritarian practices increasingly developed within the party. The effectiveness of actions undertaken by these international organizations was therefore challenged and should be assessed.

5.5. Sovereignty-based arguments used to dodge donors-driven reforms

The Arusha Agreement had provided different guarantee and monitoring mechanisms of its implementation including (i) operational technical support mechanisms such as the Implementation Monitoring Committee and the international peacekeeping force (successively AMIB and ONUB),⁹⁹ (ii) moral and diplomatic guarantees such as the Facilitator and heads of State of the countries of the region and (iii) provider of technical, material and financial assistance namely the international community (Protocol V). Why did all these peacebuilding mechanisms fail to propel Burundi towards a successful democratic transformation? The CNDD-FDD transformation failure which led to an unsuccessful democratic transition seemed to have been favored by the lack of strong, stable and sustainable accompaniment mechanisms of the implementation of the Arusha Agreement. For instance, the UN representative-chaired Implementation Monitoring Committee and the UN mission in Burundi (ONUB) have successfully assisted the DSF integration, the demobilization, the CNDD-FDD participation in state institutions and the organization of the first post-conflict general elections. However, their mandates ended prematurely on insistence of the Government of Burundi putting forward sovereignty arguments despite the fact that many other agreement provisions were not yet implemented. It was certain that the government was hostile to partners' criticisms on governance setbacks and foreigners working in the monitoring structures of the Agreement implementation were embarrassing witnesses of abuse of power. It was also reluctant to implement a number of donors-driven reforms, most of them negotiated or imposed in the form of aid conditionality that it considered as interference practices. By refusing to be accompanied by its partners, the CNDD-FDD leaders overestimated their capacity to lead the peace-and state-building process, considering that it would be easier to run alone state affairs in peacetime compared to the many challenges they faced during 10 years of wartime without any assistance from the international community. Thus, the mandates of these guarantee and monitoring mechanisms were prematurely shortened leaving behind a vast program of unfinished and/or not yet initiated (political and economic) reforms although concerns about the likely sliding of Burundi towards authoritarianism were early expressed.¹⁰⁰ Other support mechanisms designed by the international community such as Burundi Configuration of the UN Peace Building Commission have been ineffective as well given the scaling-up of political tensions culminating in 2015 elections-related crisis. What should have been the best strategy of international peacebuilders to really prevent violence to recur in Burundi? This poses a real dilemma between two options. The first one should be an increased and prolonged presence of foreign peacebuilders with extended missions allowing to promote standards of appropriate behavior and of domestic governance,

[99] United Nations. Burundi - ONUB – Background. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onub/background.html>

[100] ICG, *op. cit.*

as it was for Namibia, Bosnia, Cambodia, Kosovo and East Timor.¹⁰¹ The second one would be a reduced and short-term presence of foreign peacebuilders with a risk of spiraling back into conflict as it happened for Burundi.

6. CONCLUSIONS

This article shows that democratic transition in Burundi was unsuccessful because of the failure of a real CNDD-FDD rebel movement-to-political party transformation while it was entrusted huge responsibilities as ruling party since 2005. Particularly, the persistent political violence, the instrumentalization of the ruling party's youths and state institutions and corruption scandals indicate a continuity of certain practices of the previous dictatorial regimes that the CNDD-FDD has fought during the wartime. Finally, the struggle of the CNDD-FDD, first military during the wartime and then political in the post-conflict period, succeeded in changing state leadership position holders, from the top to the bottom, without any change in governance politics. Bayart has characterized this phenomenon as a "politics of the belly" perceiving the multiparty system as an instrument of "tour de table".¹⁰² The attempted coup of 13 May 2015 was a proof that unconventional and undemocratic changes of power are still likely the only possibility to get rid of authoritarian regimes in a supposedly democratic state.

Notwithstanding its nominal transformation into a political party, the CNDD-FDD continued to operate through parallel networks outside of formal political framework. During the ten years of power, the CNDD-FDD has used its position to obtain a « total victory » it failed to acquire by the armed struggle. Different strategies reproducing some maquis practices, i.e. political origin-based identity and exclusion politics, intellectuals marginalization politics and the use of violence to exercise power, have been used to conquer the political power and to exercise a total control over economic resources of the country. Its political space has been infinitely extended to the detriment of human rights, democratic principles, rule of law, political and civil liberties, corruption control and respect for economic freedom.

If CNDD-FDD leadership's blunders could be interpreted during the first post-conflict years as mere 'teething' problems of a new party struggling for mutation and balancing between change and maquis practices continuity, it is nowadays difficult to find excuses for acts of power abuses that have made the CNDD-FDD power an authoritarian one. The CNDD-FDD leadership finally radicalized itself in its intransigence and uncompromising character which has particularly led the President Nkurunziza (encouraged by his closest entourage) to bid by forcing for a controversial third term in violation of the Constitution and the Arusha Agreement. Even the announced and then eventually implemented economic sanctions by donors failed to influence the behavior of the CNDD-FDD leaders, despite their impacts on the degradation of citizens welfare while Burundi is the world poorest country and heavily dependent on external aid. For instance, real GDP growth, which stood at 4.7% in 2014, dropped to -4.1% in 2015.¹⁰³ Instead, they seemed to adapt well in this atmosphere reminiscent of the period of maquis, when they faced many challenges without assistance from the international community.

The leadership discontinuity and the political origin-based identity and exclusion politics have resulted in 'pirate'-like CNDD-FDD leaders devoid of benchmarks relative to the starting points and finish line of the struggle. Benchmarks should have been (i) the objectives

[101] Paris, R. 2002. International peacebuilding and the 'mission civilisatrice'. *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 28, no. 4, 637-656.

[102] Bayart, J.F. *L'Etat en Afrique : La politique du ventre*. Paris, Fayard, 1989.

[103] IMF, *World Economic Outlook*, April 2016.

of the fight if they had participated in their definition at the time of the creation of the movement, (2) the Arusha Agreement if they had participated in the negotiations that gave birth to it to understand its spirit and (3) the respect of international standards of democratic states governance while they continued to refer to practices developed during the 10 years spent in a closed system of maquis with very limited contact with the international community. Instead, ethno-political paradigm was the referent of political governance. In such a context, they preferred to hunker down fearing and suspecting everyone to be jeopardizing their interests, i.e. intellectuals, church leaders, international community, neighboring countries, civil society organizations and Burundian political actors.

The CNDD-FDD leaders have missed many donors-driven opportunities to adapt the wartime leadership into a post-conflict leadership attuned with the managerial imperatives of peace- and state-building. The personal character of President Nkurunziza as vindictive and ‘born again’ believer¹⁰⁴ has contributed to the failure of the CNDD-FDD transformation. Instead of opening debates on transition-related challenges, he rather used the brainwashing techniques by convincing the population about a divine myth of its power in order to reap a blind submission to his authority. This reminds the monarchical regimes in that the King was placed above law and the public, but only below God.

[104] Braeckman, C. 2016. Le Burundi n’a rien à craindre des médiateurs africains. Le Carnet de Colette Braeckman. <http://blog.lesoir.be/colette-braeckman/2016/02/28/le-burundi-na-rien-a-craindre-des-mediateurs-africains/>

