Inter-ethnic trust in the aftermath of mass violence: insights from large-N life histories

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Abstract

We study the changes in inter-ethnic trust in Rwanda, in the period 1989-2011, bracketing genocide and other forms of violence. We rely on a combination of quantitative and narrative analysis of over 400 individual life histories in which inter-ethnic trust was systematically coded. We show that a huge decline in inter-ethnic trust at the time of violence was followed by a gradual recovery. We find the recovery to be nonlinear, thus not simply a matter of time, but responsive to three phenomena: major political events, policies that have a profound impact on the social tissue, and shifts in the societal narrative. The life story narratives indicate that these events, policies and shifting public discourse affect inter-ethnic trust by triggering affective and cognitive processes, i.e. a change in emotions or the updating of information and expectations. We compare the results with findings from Burundi where an identical research design was used.

1. INTRODUCTION

> "I don't trust them. They are all the same. They can kill us like they did in the past" (Tutsi, genocide survivor, 56 years old, female)

Does mass inter-ethnic violence permanently reduce inter-ethnic trust (IET), or does IET (fully) recover? If so, when and through which mechanisms? These questions are at the heart of this paper. We study the case of Rwanda, where ethnic violence occurred on a massive scale - culminating in the 1994 genocide against Tutsi, and was to a great extent "intimate" - with neighbors killing neighbors. We present a comparison with Burundi, characterized by a similar ethnic cleavage and a history of large-scale violence.

Violent conflict kills and maims people, destroys physical capital and reduces human capital. These effects are well documented, also for Rwanda (see e.g. Verpoorten, 2009; Verpoorten, 2012a; Serneels & Verpoorten, 2015). Much less is known about the effects on less tangible factors, e.g. risk and time preferences, civic and political participation, altruism and collective action, trust and trustworthiness. These factors are often captured under the umbrella term "(informal) institutions", and some relate to so-called "prosocial preferences", or the inclination to behave in the best interest of another individual (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1995). Our focus is on trust, which can be defined as "a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another" (Rousseau et al. 1998: 395). Trust is a prosocial attitude by excellence, as it is one of the strongest predictors of cooperation, and positively influences other concrete expressions of prosocial behavior, such as civic engagement, political participation, and membership in voluntary organizations (Brehm & RaIm, 1997; De Cremer & Stouten, 2003; Parks & Hulbert, 1995; Stolle, 1998; Sullivan & Transue, 1999).

Understanding the impact of wartime violence on trust, and the related institutional and social processes, is key for our understanding of a society's postwar recovery and transformation. Blattman & Miguel (2010: 46), writing from an economic perspective, argue that "progress on these issues is critical for crafting appropriate postwar recovery policies, a major economic policy issue in conflict-prone regions". Wood (2008: 540), adopting a more anthropological point of view, emphasizes that the social processes of war, e.g. political mobilization and the polarization of (social) identities, can have enduring legacies. She points out that little is known about whether and to what extent these processes are lasting and whether and why there is variation depending on context. To fill this gap, we turn to a mixed methods analysis of micro-level data. In general, researchers of all kinds are increasingly expected to adopt mixed methods approaches to answer complex questions. Olivier de Sardan, a social anthropologist, (2008: 68) states that a researcher needs "to tinker and to invent appropriate techniques for his own use in accordance with the novelty of his object and approach."

While the object of our study is relatively novel, it is rapidly gaining field in the literature on violent conflict, but results are not converging. Cassar et al. (2013) find that exposure to violence in the Tajik war undermines trust, as measured through behavioral experiments and surveys more than a decade after the end of violence. Gilligan et al. (2013) also report results from a lab-in-the-field experiment, conducted in Nepal three years after its ten-year civil war, but find instead higher levels of trust in communities more exposed to violence. Rohner et al. (2013) show that civil conflict in Uganda reduces survey-based measures of trust, three years after the end of violence. Studying the impact of the same violence, but another four years ahead, De Luca & Verpoorten (2015a) find a complete recovery of trust. Besides these four studies, there

are several ones that look at other prosocial attitudes, most prominently political and civic engagement (e.g. Adhvaryu & Fenske, 2013; Blattman, 2009; De Luca & Verpoorten, 2015b), and altruism and cooperation (e.g. Bauer et al. 2014; Bowles, 2006; Gneezy & Fessler, 2012; Voors et al. 2012). A recent meta-analysis concludes that these studies seem to point to an increase rather than a decrease in levels of cooperation and civic engagement (Bauer et al., 2016), but at the same time warns that "further research should focus on establishing the reach and generality of this finding, including a sharper focus on behaviors towards outgroup members that belong to the antagonistic group in the war (which is not the case in existing studies)" (p. 25).

While not converging in terms of results, or consistently making the explicit distinction between in-group and out-group trust, the above mentioned studies on trust converge on two points. First, they rely on standardized survey questions or lab-in-the-field experiments for the measurement of their outcome of interest at a limited number of points in time, e.g. one observation after violence has ended, and sometimes – in the case of survey data – one observation prior to the onset of violence. Second, they focus heavily on causal identification, i.e. the attribution of changes in the outcome variable to the exposure to violence. But, the data and methods that are well suited for causal identification, do not lend themselves well to the uncovering of pathways and underlying mechanisms. To fill this gap, we take a different approach: we rely on a dataset of more than 400 life histories, in which IET as well as the reasons for changes in IET were systematically reported and coded throughout a person's life history. Relying on this life history dataset, we shift the focus from establishing causality to providing insights into the pathways of IET and the mechanisms underlying its recovery. In addition, we make an explicit comparison between IET and *intra*-ethnic trust. We belief that this shift in focus is a timely and useful contribution. As the empirical evidence is building up, mixed results emerge, raising the need for a better understanding of contextual and mediating factors. We believe that our approach responds to this need, by uncovering the pathways of IET and the factors that are salient for its recovery and merit further study. Besides giving hints for the understanding of past results and direction to future work, our analysis is also valuable in and of itself, as it adds a case study to the literature on social and institutional legacies of violence.

The Rwandan case is interesting for two reasons. First, genocide is a worst case scenario in terms of impact on IET, as the extermination attempt signals that one does not foresee future interactions with the targeted group (Straus, 2015: 25). This attempted destruction of future relationships is an utmost attack on societal trust between members of opposing social categories. Second, Rwanda launched what is probably the most ambitious transitional justice program to date, in the form of the *gacaca* process, a modernized version of a longstanding dispute resolution mechanism (Clark, 2010; Ingelaere, 2008; forthcoming; Waldorf, 2006). In 2005, a countrywide program of community level courts presided by lay judges was decentralized to the most remote corners of the country with the objectives, among others, to hold participants in the genocide accountable and facilitate reconciliation and social cohesion between local inhabitants. Therefore, besides massive intimate violence, Rwanda also presents us with a case of massive intimate justice, with neighbors putting on trial neighbors.

The next section provides a brief background to the Rwandan case. Section 3 explains our data and method. Section 4 presents our results. Section 5 gives a comparison with Burundi, where an identical research design was implemented. Section 6 concludes.

2.   BACKGROUND

Rwanda was colonized by Germany but later passed on to Belgium as a United Nations Trust Territory. In line with the anthropological ideas of the time, the Belgians believed in the classification of races according to superior and inferior beings. They judged the Tutsi 'race' to be more fit to rule than the Hutu, who were considered to be inferior creatures only apt to be governed and do manual labor. They used the Tutsi rulers to implement their colonial policies. Racial identity – ethnicity - became institutionalized, for example, through the introduction of the ethnic identity card. A spirit of independence made its way through Africa and touched Rwanda at the end of the 1950s. In a wave of successive events between 1959 and 1962 local Tutsi rulers were ousted from their communities and replaced through elections by 'burgomasters', predominantly of Hutu origin. Grégoire Kayibanda, a Hutu, became the first president of Rwanda. These events were accompanied by violence against the Tutsi rulers and their families and a first wave of Tutsis sought refuge in neighboring countries. A second and larger wave followed in 1963–4 when the Tutsis of the first wave had regrouped and attacked Rwanda from Burundi and Tanzania. A significant number of Tutsis were killed in reprisal attacks and even more left the country as refugees.

The descendants of these refugees formed the bulk and backbone of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and its military wing the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) that attacked Rwanda in October 1990, seeking an armed return to their country. This led to a period of intermittent hostilities and negotiations with the Rwandan government until a peace agreement was reached in 1993. But, in April 1994, the plane carrying the Hutu President Habyarimana was shot down over the skies of the capital Kigali. This signaled the start of a campaign of genocidal violence against the Tutsi minority. Tutsi living inside Rwanda were stigmatized as 'enemies from within,' 'cockroaches' (inyenzi) and 'accomplices' (ibyitso) of the RPF (Des Forges, 1999: 76-78). They were ordered to be killed. Within a few days from the shooting down of the plane, extremist Hutu militia groups, the Rwandan Armed Forces and Rwandan police forces mobilized the civilian Hutu population to massacre the Tutsi minority and, to a lesser degree, Hutus who opposed the extremists.[1] The civil war between the RPF and the Rwandan government, which had been halted the year before, restarted and intensified. By the end of June 1994, the RPF had taken control of the country and had put an end to the ethnic cleansing of Tutsis. Relative peace was established, although the RPF engaged in reprisal killings, and the defeated 'old regime' security forces and militias who had fled across the border to DR Congo engaged in insurgencies in the North-West till the late nineties (African Rights, 1998; Verpoorten, 2012b).

During the nineties Rwanda thus experienced distinct forms of violence: civil war, genocide, reprisal killings, insurgency and counter-insurgency operations. No corner of the small country was spared from the violence and all aspects of life were affected. It is estimated that the total death toll of all conflict events in the nineties amounts to more than one million – about 10% of the population (Verpoorten, 2012b), with the highest direct death toll caused by the 1994 genocide against Tutsi (Verpoorten, 2005). The violence also triggered the displacement of approximately two million people, and led to the imprisonment of more than 100,000 civilians for crimes related to the genocide against Tutsi (Tertsakian, 2008). Most of the externally displaced resettled in Rwandan in the course of 1997-1998 (UNHCR, 2000). Rwandans who lived in exile prior to the genocide also returned to their country of origin after the genocide, when the RPF seized power.

The post-genocide Rwandan regime is characterized by "transformative authori-

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[1]   Comprehensive accounts of the genocide can be found in Des Forges (1999) and Straus (2006).

tarianism" (Straus & Waldorf, 2011: 5). President Paul Kagame has repeatedly indicated that he 'wants to build a new country'——a wish that needs to be taken literally. A bold social engineering campaign has been instituted in the post-genocide period in order to translate into practice a vision that incorporates a clearly articulated policy on inter-ethnic relations. Building or (re-) establishing the unity of Rwandans based on a national identity of Rwandanicity instead of ethnicity begun to dominate the post-1994 ideological framework by the end of the 1990s. Since the year 2000, virtually every policy initiative has been couched in terms of unity and numerous initiatives were taken to enforce this new order through speeches by national-level politicians, meetings with local authorities, the regular schooling system (King, 2013; Duruz & Ingelaere, 2014) and re-education camps (Thomson, 2011; Purdékova, 2015).

Another important policy choice was the introduction of the *gacaca* court system. *Gacaca* is a community court system that operated nationwide between 2005 and 2012 with the objective to judge alleged participants in the 1994 genocide. Over 11,000 courts processed 1,958,634 cases of alleged participation in the genocide.[2] The *gacaca* courts procedure was loosely modelled on the traditional *gacaca* – a longstanding customary conflict resolution mechanism - with lay persons presiding as judges and the (active) involvement of the entire adult population as a "General Assembly". *Gacaca* trials took place not with evidence gathered by police and judicial authorities but through the testimonials of perpetrators, victims and bystanders during the trials. The system was designed to facilitate confessions in order to increase the amount of evidence and available information. The confession procedure was supposed to give the *gacaca* process a distinctively restorative dimension: defendants were supposed to receive a reduction in sentence in return for revealing the truth about crimes. In practice, a significant number of the defendants on trial were accused, pleaded not-guilty, and were convicted (Chakravarty, 2015; Ingelaere, forthcoming).

3. DATA AND METHOD

In its most basic sense, a life story is "the story a person chooses to tell about the life he or she has lived, told as completely and honestly as possible" (Atkinson, 1998: 8). Life stories differ from life histories to the extent that the latter term takes into account the aspect of collection, editing, interpretation and (re)presentation by the researcher (Roberts, 2002). Life history analysis has proven to be a useful method when social change is under investigation (Thompson, 1982: 289-306; Varshney, 2002). Anthropologists value life histories because "the life history reveals, like nothing else can, the subjective realm" (Plummer, 2001: 20). By analysing the personal narratives over time, we explore the evolving experiences of inter-ethnic social relations in order to inductively discover the nature and drivers of IET.

The quantitative part of our analysis also relies on life histories. This is made possible because of three unique features: a large number of life history respondents, their stratified sampling, and the systematic coding of IET. While our qualitative approach gives due attention to contextual factors and processes, subjectivity and meaning, our quantitative approach allows us to identify wider patterns and trends in (changes in) IET. Such a systematic life history approach – combining an anthropological and statistical analysis – has hardly been used: those who collect oral histories rarely sample their respondents, while those who sample rarely collect oral histories (Varshney 2002: 20). We briefly discuss the three features that make our life history dataset unique. A fuller account of the data collection can be found in the Supplementary

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[2] It remains unclear how many people were actually convicted. Following a closing ceremony in 2012, the overseeing government body communicated that 1,003,227 individuals stood trial during the 7 years that *gacaca* was operational (Republic of Rwanda 2012).

Appendix.

(i) A large panel study. The first author on this paper designed the life history approach and performed the fieldwork, collecting 471 life histories in a first round in 2007 and 412 stories (of the same respondents) in a follow-up round. The first wave of interviews was conducted between January and April 2007. The second wave was organized between January and June 2011, and in 2015, for those not traced in 2011. The objective was to re-trace the same people in order to complete their life histories. In the second wave, the respondents were not asked to continue their life history where they left it in 2007, but to start in 2000. As a result, we have an overlapping period of life story years, 2000-2007, which allows us to assess recall bias (to which we turn later).

(ii) Stratified random sampling. The sample of respondents was stratified geographically across seven communities in four different provinces, and across five ethnic subcategories. Research locations, indicated in Figure 1, were chosen based on the idea of attaining maximum variance in conflict and post-conflict experiences. Since the use of ethnic markers is sensitive in post-genocide Rwanda, the stratification across ethnic subcategories was based on alternative markers that underlie ethnic categories, and are commonly used by Rwandans to identify themselves and others.[3] Tutsi inhabitants are divided into 'genocide survivors' and 'old caseload returnees'. In the latter case they, their parents or even their grandparents fled Rwanda after 1959 and returned to Rwanda after the RPF take-over in 1994. Hutu inhabitants are described as 'released prisoners', those 'accused in gacaca' and those who are 'not accused and have never been imprisoned'. All respondents were over 30 years old, since they needed to have lived through periods of mass violence consciously. Table 1 gives an overview of the number of respondents and the category they belong to: the 2007 sample included 154 Tutsi (101 genocide survivors and 53 returnees) and 317 Hutu (144 non-accused, 99 accused, and 74 liberated prisoners).[4]

(iii) Self-rankings and systematic coding. The life history interviews were structured around five themes, among which IET and intra-ethnic trust.[5] In addition to narrating his/her life history the respondent was asked to rank IET on a scale from -5 to + 5, for every year in his/her life story. This ranking was first asked for the year of the interview, and the first year of adulthood of the respondent (or the respondent's year of marriage, if it preceded adulthood). Then, the interviewer moved forward, asking the ranking for each year in between. For example, a female respondent of 36 years old, interviewed in 2007, would first give the ranking in 2007, then for the year she turned 18 (1989), or earlier, e.g. 1987 if she married at 16. Then, all years in between would be ranked consecutively. In addition, for the more recent years 2001-2011, narratives of change in IET were systematically coded. Inductively, we constructed a codebook with over 150 recurring topics aggregated into a set of 45 categories (see Table A3 in the Supplementary Appendix). These categories were then systematically used to code the narratives of change and the latter codes were further aggregated into seven major themes during the analysis: citizen life; social interactions; gacaca; the end of gacaca; habituation, private life and emotions. For instance, a 51-year old woman, belonging to the subcategory 'Hutu, not accused', explains her increase in IET in 2003 as follows "After the election of president Kagame, the

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[3]   Although ethnicity is a sensitive topic in contemporary Rwanda, Rwandans do speak about ethnicity in private settings. All interviews were conducted in the house of the respondent without onlookers present in order to avoid reservation in response.

[4]   Through our stratification procedure, we oversampled some population categories (Tutsi and liberated prisoners), since we wanted to include a fair number of each of the five subcategories.

[5]   The other themes are the perception of one's economic situation, feelings of security, and perception of political representation.

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Tutsi changed their behavior towards the Hutu. They would no longer beat the Hutus without reason, but would enter into dialogue with the Tutsi". This narrative of change received two codes: (1) Citizen life, and (2) Social interactions. Narratives could receive up to three different codes, yielding a total of 1206 codes for the entire sample of respondents.

Figure 1. The location of research sites in Rwanda

Source: Compiled in ArcGIS. The locations correspond to small administrative sectors.

Table 1. Sample observations by ethnic subgroup, and across interview rounds

	Round 1	(2007)		Round 2	(2011 and 2015)		Attrition
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	(%)
Tutsi – survivor	38	63	101	36	57	93	7,9%
Tutsi – old-caseload returnee	28	25	53	23	22	45	15,1%
Hutu - not accused /no prison	81	63	144	70	61	131	9,0%
Hutu - accused in *gacaca*	86	13	99	66	12	78	21,2%
Hutu - released prisoner	73	1	74	65	0	65	12,2%
All respondents	306	165	471	260	152	412	12,5%

Our unique data could suffer from three common threats: recall, attrition, and social desirability bias. To explore whether systematic recall bias is a serious concern or not, we exploit the overlapping recall period of our two interview rounds, 2000-2007. Figure 2 shows the sample averages of IET over time, as reported in round 1 (solid line) and round 2 (dashed line). The difference is minimal (0.21 units), reducing concerns of serious recall bias. To investigate attrition bias, we compare characteristics between the drop-outs (12.5 % of the sample) and the

traced respondents. Figure 2 shows that IET levels across these two subsamples for the period 1989-2007 are not far apart, 0.51 units on average. In our baseline results, we rely on the subsample of 412 respondents that could be traced. Using instead the full unbalanced sample gives very similar results (not reported but available on request).   Finally, our self-reported measure of IET shares the lack of incentive compatibility with standard survey-based measures. In the absence of incentives for responding truthfully, other motives may take the upper-hand, most importantly social desirability. On the other hand, in our case, the reporting is imbedded in the respondent's life history, imposing a 'consistency constraint', namely the reported IET at time t needs to be compatible with other events in the life story and its IET-related narratives.

A fuller account and more detailed analysis of these potential data caveats is presented in the Supplementary Appendix.

Figure 2. Assessing average recall and attrition bias

Notes: the pathways connect the levels of IET as given by respondents for each year in their life story, restricting our focus to the period 1989-2011. The traced subsample includes 412 respondents; the sample of dropouts includes 59 respondents.

4.   RESULTS

We present our results in three parts. First, we describe the pathway of IET throughout the period 1989-2011, and show how it differs from the pathway of *intra*-ethnic trust. Second, we demonstrate the nonlinearities in the post-genocide trajectory of IET, and their relation to macro-level events and policies. Third, to provide further insight into the exact mechanisms through which these events and policies affect IET, we look at the narratives of change in IET .

4.1.   The pathway of inter- and intra-ethnic trust, 1989-2011

The solid lines in Figure 3 give the pathways of IET by ethnic subcategory, for all life story years from 1989 onwards; 1989 is a natural starting point for our analysis, as it is the year before the outbreak of the civil war. The figure reveals that IET, as recalled by our respondents, declined already from 1990 onwards when the RPF attacked Rwanda, reached a low point at the time of the genocide against Tutsi (only decreasing further in 1995 for the subcategory of imprisoned Hutu), and gradually recovered in the post-genocide years. In sharp contrast, intra-ethnic trust – given by the dashed lines - remained high for Tutsi (and relatively high for imprisoned

Hutu), resulting in an increased gap between in-group and out-group trust, a finding that is indicative of the parochial nature of the impact of inter-ethnic violence on trust.

Table 2 gives the levels of inter- and intra-ethnic trust across four points in time: our baseline year 1989, the genocidal year 1994, and our two data collection years 2007 and 2011. In 1989, we find IET to be lowest for Tutsi returnees (2.9), who were targeted in the past and – in 1989 – were living in exile, and also relatively low for Tutsi genocide survivors (3.5), who – at that time – did not face overt physical targeting but saw their opportunities crippled by a policy of ethnic quotas. IET reported by Hutu was higher, with only small differences across different groups of Hutu: 4.3 for non-accused, 4.4 for accused, and 4.1 for liberated prisoners. The difference between IET and intra-ethnic trust is quite high for Tutsi returnees (2.9 compared to 4.6), considerably smaller though still significant for genocide survivors (3.5 compared to 4.1), but statistically indistinguishable from zero for Hutu, revealing that – in their recollection of 1989 - Hutu didn't make a distinction between trust in their own ethnic category and in Tutsi. In 1994, both Hutu and Tutsi recall reaching a low point in IET: close to -4.5 for both groups of Tutsi, -2 for liberated prisoners, and around 0 for the other two groups of Hutu. Intra-ethnic trust remained almost unaltered for Tutsi, but declined considerably for Hutu (as politically moderate Hutu were also targeted). In retrospect, Tutsi survivors in Rwanda remember they regained IET only very slowly, and certainly not completely, with IET in 2011 still far below its 1989 level (0.7 compared to 3.5). In contrast, recovery as recollected by Tutsi returnees is much more swiftly. By 2011, they even report higher levels of IET than in 1989 (3.2 compared to 2.9). IET for Hutu recovers gradually, but not fully, even by 2011. While above 4 units in 1989, IET in 2011 hovers around 3 for all Hutu subgroups.

These pathways suggest that *the inter-ethnic violence left communities divided along ethnic lines, but that – at the same time – substantial recovery took place from the extreme low point in 1994,* especially for Tutsi returnees, who - living (again, or for the first time) among their Hutu countrymen - experienced an increase in IET compared to their starting point in 1989. The pathways also hold lessons for limited data point studies. First, they reveal that the particular year that is used as an end-line point heavily influences the estimated impact of conflict on IET: *the more peace years that precede the end line point, the lower will be the estimated impact of violence on IET.* Second, they show that *similar end line IET across subcategories may hide very different pathways, and vice versa.* For instance, whereas IET of Hutu accused and Hutu liberated prisoners converge in 2007 and 2011, their pathways are very different prior to 2005. Conversely, both categories of Tutsi move in parallel up to 2000, but then diverge and end up at very different IET-levels in 2007 and 2011. These observations probably influence results of conventional limited-data point studies, partly underlie their mixed results, yet remain largely hidden in those studies.

Figure 3. Pathways of inter- and intra- ethnic trust, 1989-2011, by ethnic subcategories

Notes: the pathways connect the levels of IET as given by the traced subsample of 412 respondents for each year in their life story, restricting our focus to the period 1989-2011. The lines for the overlapping period across rounds, 2000-2007, are based on the data collected in the second round, because for this round we also systematically collected and coded reasons for changes in IET, which are intensely used in other parts of our analysis. Using instead data from the 2007 round for the period 2000-2007 leaves the figure largely unaltered.

Table 2. inter- and intra-ethnic trust in 1989, 1994, 2007 and 2011

	Inter-ethnic trust				Difference with baseline (1989) inter-ethnic trust			Intra-ethnic trust				Difference between Intra- and Inter-ethnic trust			
	1989	1994	2007	2011	1994	2007	2011	1989	1994	2007	2011	1989	1994	2007	2011
Tutsi – survivor	3,47	-4,55	-1,09	0,71	-8,01 ***	-4,55 ***	-2,76 ***	4,05	3,88	3,15	2,86	0,59 ***	8,43 ***	4,24 ***	2,15 ***
Tutsi – old-caseload returnee	2,87	-4,59	1,76	3,20	-7,45 ***	-1,11 ***	0,33	4,60	4,56	3,29	3,58	1,73 ***	9,15 ***	1,53 ***	0,38
Hutu - not accused /no prison	4,27	-0,02	2,24	3,11	-4,29 ***	-2,03 ***	-1,16 ***	4,28	0,85	2,82	3,35	0,01	0,88 *	0,58 *	0,24
Hutu - accused in gacaca	4,38	-0,18	1,05	2,96	-4,56 ***	-3,33 ***	-1,42 ***	4,38	0,47	2,59	3,17	0,00	0,65	1,54 ***	0,21
Hutu - released prisoner	4,06	-1,98	1,49	3,08	-6,04 ***	-2,57 ***	-0,98 ***	4,27	1,45	2,37	3,14	0,21	3,43 ***	0,88 **	0,06
All respondents	3,92	-1,86	1,09	2,55	-5,78 ***	-2,83 ***	-1,37 ***	4,28	1,94	2,83	3,20	0,36 ***	3,80 ***	1,74 ***	0,65 ***

*Notes: We make use of the subsample of 412 respondents who were interviewed in both rounds (2007 and 2011/15). For 1989 we have however only 303 observations on IET, instead of 412, because a share of respondents did not turn 18 or did not marry before 1990, and therefore started telling their life story in a later year. In 1990, we have 398 observations, which is close to our full sample. We chose nevertheless to take 1989 as a baseline because, from 1990 onwards, IET is affected by the outbreak of civil war. The stars indicate whether results are different from zero at *10%, **5%, and ***1%.*

4.2.　The post-genocide trajectory of IET

Figure 3 reveals that the post-genocide trajectory of IET is highly nonlinear, suggesting that recovery is influenced by macro-level events and policies. Figure 4 better visualizes the nonlinearities, by taking as the metric on the vertical axis changes in IET, instead of levels. The dark grey bars show the negative changes in IET, the light grey bars the positive changes, and the black line gives the net-change. It is now clear that the further small decline of IET in 1995 is the net effect of a large rise and an even larger fall in IET. The period 1996-1999 is uneventful in terms of changes in IET. The same is true for the years 2001, 2002, and 2004, but these years fall amidst two clear peaks in IET-recovery, in 2000 and in 2003. The years 2005 and 2006 are characterized by considerable upward and downward movements, but the upward movements have the upper hand. The period 2007-2010 is characterized mostly by upward movements. Based on our knowledge of post-1994 events, we put forward following hypotheses to

explain these patterns:

(i)   the further decline in trust in 1995 is due to the power switch, with Tutsis taking over, and engaging in revenge killings and the large-scale imprisonment of Hutus;

(ii)   the lack of recovery in IET in 1996-1999 is due to the continuation of warfare in the Northwest, and of massive (often arbitrary) arrests;

(iii)   the peak in 2000 is driven by the end of the insurgency war in the Northwest and the start of a comprehensive reconciliation and unity narrative in public discourse;

(iv)   the peak in 2003 relates to the largely peaceful (yet unfree) presidential elections, and the first large-scale release of prisoners;

(v)   the mixed movements in 2005 and 2006 reflect the social turbulence caused by the start of the *gacaca* information round;

(vi)   the robust recovery in 2007-2010 relates to the unfolding and ending of the *gacaca* process.

Some of these hypotheses imply differences in changes in IET across ethnic subcategories and geographic location. Panel A of Figure 5 gives the net changes in IET by ethnic subcategory. Looking at the purple line of Hutu liberated prisoners, we see a marked decline in 1995, the year of most imprisonments, and a recovery period that kicks off in 2003, the year of the first of a series of large-scale releases of prisoners. Looking at the Tutsi survivors, we note that the recovery of IET remains modest throughout the period, featuring small peaks in 2000 and 2003, and only takes off as *gacaca* progresses and ends. Panel B performs the same exercise, but by region: North, South and East. Noteworthy is the distinct pattern of the North (comprising two of our seven research locations), which clearly suffers further declines in IET throughout 1996-1999, when it was ravaged by the (counter-)insurgency war, and then enjoys the largest peace dividend in 2000.

We can verify the hypotheses above in a much more direct way, by looking at the coded narratives of change, available for the period 2001-2011. Our database contains 599 narratives for upward movements in IET, and 126 narratives for downward movements. The upward movements received a total of 984 codes, for which the frequency distribution is as follows: Social interactions (38.9%), *Gacaca* (25.5%), Citizen life (12.5%), Emotions (9.4%), End of *gacaca* (7.5%), Private life (3.2%) and Habituation (3.0%). Among the 222 codes of downward movements, the frequency distribution is as follows: *Gacaca* (42.5%), Social interactions (32.2%), Emotions (7.5%), Citizen life (5.9%), Private life (4.8%), End of *gacaca* (0.0%) and Habituation (0.0%). Figure 6 sets out these codes over time, clearly showing that *gacaca*, social interactions, citizen life, and emotions determine much of the post-genocide trajectory of IET, with citizen life taking an important positive role in the year of the elections (2003), and *gacaca* starting off with both a positive and negative role in its beginning years (2005-6), to turn more positive later on. Figure 7 gives the frequency distribution of the coded narratives across ethnic subcategory. *Gacaca* features prominently across all subgroups, even among Tutsi returnees who were not

among its main actors, but - as expected – weighs most for 'Hutu accused in *gacaca*'. The general message is that *recovery is nonlinear, and highly responsive to policy and events.*

Figure 4. Negative, positive and net- changes in IET, 1995-2011

Notes: We make use of the subsample of 412 respondents who were interviewed in both rounds. The data for the overlapping period across rounds, 2000-2007, are based on the data collected in the second round. Using instead data from the 2007 round leaves the figure largely unaltered. To prevent the IET change in 2000 from picking up the transition across the two data waves in 2000, we add an intercept to the pre-2000 data series for the first wave, lifting it to the 2000 level of the second wave. This operation only corrects the change in 2000, and does not affect the figure in any other way.

Figure 5. Net changes in IET, 1995-2011, by ethnic subgroup and by region

Notes: We make use of the subsample of 412 respondents who were interviewed in both rounds. The data for the overlapping period across rounds, 2000-2007, are based on the data collected in the second round. Using instead data from the 2007 round leaves the figure largely unaltered. To prevent the IET change in 2000 from picking up the transition across the two data waves in 2000, we add an intercept to the pre-2000 data series for the first wave, lifting it to the 2000 level of the second wave. This operation only corrects the change in 2000, and does not affect the figure in any other way. The 'North' and 'East' each comprise two research locations; the 'South' three. For details about the research locations, see the Supplementary Appendix.

Figure 6. Coded narratives of change in IET, across 2001-2011

Notes: Narratives of change were systematically asked from 2001 onwards. The narratives are coded using the coding categories of the legend, which correspond to more disaggregated categories, as explained in the Supplementary Appendix.

Figure 7. Coded narratives of change in IET, across ethnic subgroup

Notes: The figure gives the percentage distribution of narratives of change, aggregated for the period 2001-2011, across ethnic subcategories. The narratives are coded using the coding categories of the legend, which correspond to more disaggregated categories, as explained in the Supplementary Appendix .

4.3.   Narratives of change

The actual narratives of change, rather than their codes, can help uncover how exactly policy and events influence IET. Figure 6 showed that, especially the start of *gacaca* nationwide– when a shift occurred from a system designed to facilitate confessions to a process driven by accusations – is characterized by a negative effect on IET. As a Tutsi genocide survivor explains: "[Inter-ethnic] trust decreased dramatically due to *gacaca*. I testified and they [Hutu] started to threaten me like never before".[6] A liberated prisoner who stood trial in his village refers to the decrease in IET in the context of *gacaca*: "The genocide survivors organized themselves as a group with the objective to invent false testimony and to strategically target the rich with their accusations in order to have someone convicted who could reimburse them for the crimes committed."[7] Thereafter, the upward *gacaca*-driven movements in IET outweigh the downward one. The grassroots justice process managed to increase IET through, among others, a process of differentiation. Exemplary is the explanation that was found in the life story narra-

[6]   Interview Southern Rwanda, March 31, 2011. Female, Tutsi, Genocide Survivor, born in 1961.

[7]   Interview Central Rwanda, Februari 23, 2011. Male, Hutu, Released Prisoner, born in 1962.

tive of a male genocide survivor: "*Gacaca* clarified things. We noticed that some of them [Hutu] are innocent and therefore I stopped fearing the entire [Hutu] group."[8] This process of differentiation was also felt by Hutu, e.g. a Hutu respondent testifies: "*Gacaca* facilitated contact, the appreciation and esteem between me and the Tutsi. I did not have any problems with them [during *gacaca*] and, above all, this time the Tutsi judged the criminals according to their actions and not based on the prejudice that all Hutu had been somehow involved in the genocide."[9] Nevertheless, the end of *gacaca* comes with considerable relief, as can be derived from the high frequency of '*Gacaca* end' in the top part Figure 6. A Tutsi man, who returned to Rwanda after the genocide and a lay judge in the *gacaca* court system recounts: "It was the end of *gacaca*, the Hutu changed their behavior towards Tutsi. When I was a member of the *inyangamugayo* [*gacaca*'s lay judges], Hutu were not very welcoming since they did not trust Tutsi judges. But after the trials, they noticed I had not done any wrong to the Hutu."[10] A Hutu explains the increase in IET as follows: "It was the end of *gacaca* and therefore no more disputes between me and the genocide survivors of our sector [village]."[11]

The remarkable spikes in the years 2000 and 2003 can also be brought to life by the life story narratives. We hypothesized that the spike in the year 2000 reflects the end of a decade-long period of violence, and the introduction of the notions of reconciliation and unity in public discourse. One of our respondents recounts: "The Government adopted policies that favor rapprochement and raise awareness on living together in harmony."[12] This change in the public narrative coincides with the take-over of power by Paul Kagame, the former leader of the RPF rebellion, in the year 2000 followed by his 'official' election in 2003. The code 'Citizen life' reaches a high frequency in this period and refers to themes such as elections, governance, government, Kagame, and sensitization. Exemplary is the reason of reported increase of IET in the year 2003 evoked by a Hutu respondent: "After the elections of authorities [in 2003], [inter-ethnic] trust increased since the authorities continued to sensitize us to live in peace without segregation".[13] The narrative of another Hutu respondent very clearly demonstrates the impact of the massive attempt to reconfigure Rwanda's societal master narrative: "Trust in them [Tutsi] returned after we realized that all that happened to us [such as mistrust] are the consequences of the war. They continued to teach us by telling us that we are the same. Before the war, the state thought us that the people outside the country [Tutsi refugees] were not the same as us, that they had tails and long ears but, now, that hatred ended."[14]

Thus: *IET is influenced not only by major political events and policies, but also by shifts in the societal master narrative*. And, the narratives listed above also suggest how social interactions and emotions fit in. As can be seen from the narratives, more often than not, a narrative of change contains a combination of inter-related reasons. It therefore can receive multiple codes, up to three. Figure 8 shows the frequency distribution of reasons that were given as the only reason, as the first reason in combination with others, or as the second or third reason. Interestingly, social interactions and emotions are more often mentioned as a second and third reason than as the only or first reason. Table 3, in which the combinations of reasons is detailed,

[8]   Interview Central Rwanda, March 11, 2011. Male, Tutsi, Genocide Survivor, born in 1952.
[9]   Interview Central Rwanda, March 16, 2011. Male, Hutu, Never Imprisoned, Not Accused in *Gacaca*, born in 1961.
[10]   Interview Northern Rwanda, April 23, 2011. Male, Tutsi, Old Caseload Returnee, born in 1961.
[11]   Interview South-Eastern Rwanda, March 24, 2011, Male, Hutu, Never Imprisoned, born in 1962.
[12]   Interview South-East Rwanda, March 16, 2011, male, Hutu, never imprisoned, not accused in *gacaca*, born in 1961.
[13]   Interview Northern Rwanda, April 24, 2011. Male, Hutu, Accused in *Gacaca*, Born in 1953.
[14]   Interview Northern Rwanda, April 20, 2011. Female, Hutu, never imprisoned, not accused in *gacaca*, born in 1950.

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shows they often occur as by-products of policies and events, in particular *gacaca* and the sensitization campaign. *These policies and events act as catalysts for cognitive and affective processes – the updating of expectations through social interactions, and the triggering of emotions.*

Figure 8. Single and multiple reasons within the narratives of change in IET

Notes: The figure gives the frequency distribution of the number of narratives of change for the period 2001-2011, occurring alone or in combination, as first, second or third reason. The narratives are coded using the coding categories of the legend, which correspond to more disaggregated categories, as explained in the Supplementary Appendix .

Table 3. Combinations of reasons within the narratives of change in IET

Coding	Mentioned as						If first reason, then in combination with:						
	only reason		first reason		second or third reason		Gacaca	End of gacaca	Citizen life	Social interactions	Habituation	Private life	Emotions
Gacaca	52	17,0%	117	38,4%	136	44,6%	59	1	3	59	0	0	22
End of *gacaca*	4	5,6%	65	91,5%	2	2,8%	50	0	0	36	0	1	11
Citizen life	38	29,9%	63	49,6%	26	20,5%	11	0	12	45	0	4	10
Social interactions	79	23,2%	60	17,6%	202	59,2%	6	1	11	35	1	9	6
Habituation	14	53,8%	10	38,5%	2	7,7%	2	0	0	5	0	0	4
Private life	2	6,7%	13	43,3%	15	50,0%	1	0	0	10	0	1	1
Emotions	14	16,7%	16	19,0%	54	64,3%	7	0	0	12	1	0	0
Total	203	20,6%	344	35,0%	437	44,4%	136	2	26	202	2	15	54

Notes: The figure gives the frequency distribution of narratives of change associated with upward movements in IET, for the period 2001-2011; occurring alone or in combination, as first, second or third reason. The narratives are coded using the coding categories of the legend, which correspond to more disaggregated categories, as explained in the Supplementary Appendix.

5. COMPARISON WITH BURUNDI

What is the external validity of this study? The findings that we presented are partly specific to Rwanda (e.g. the role of *gacaca*) but part of our findings could be 'stylized facts' of recovery, e.g. the parochial nature of the conflict impact, the nonlinearity of the recovery path and

the importance of policies and events as catalysts for cognitive and affective processes. To tentatively verify this, we repeat the analysis for Burundi, for which we used an identical research design. Due to space constraints, we limit us to the highlights of the comparative exercise, condensed in the Figure 9, which gives the replication of Figures 3, 6 and 8 for Burundi.

Burundi is the twin of Rwanda, displaying the same ethnic divide, but in mirror image. After independence, members of the majority Hutu ethnic group did not take over power, but Tutsi continued dominating the political landscape until the end of the eighties when a processes of political liberalization resulted in multi-party elections in June 1993 (Lemarchand 1994). Melchior Ndadaye became Burundi's first Hutu president, but his reign only lasted a couple of months: he and other high level politicians were killed by Tutsi elements in the army. The news of the assassination of the president resulted in the killing of thousands of Tutsi civilians throughout the country. The killings were a combination of spontaneous anger by ordinary Hutu and incitation by the national and local administrative and political authorities. Retaliation followed by the army, still mono-ethnically Tutsi, and bands of Tutsi youth. The formation of several Hutu dominated rebel groups made the country descend into a civil war that would last over a decade (Reyntjens 2005), with the last rebel group demobilizing in 2008.

Panel A of Figure 10 gives reported IET and *intra*-ethnic trust levels for Burundi for Hutu and Tutsi, across the period 1989-2011. IET takes a dive in 1993, when the President is murdered and heavy inter-ethnic violence erupts. In contrast, intra-ethnic trust is barely affected. In the years following massive violence, IET recovers slowly, and nonlinearly. Panel B visualizes the coded narratives throughout the recovery period 2001-2011, showing a marked peak in the recovery of IET in 2003, with the signing of a ceasefire agreement, but especially in 2005, with the landslide victory of Pierre Nkurunziza and his party during the 2005 electoral process. Finally, Panel C shows that social interactions, and – to a lesser extent than in Rwanda – emotions feature prominently as the second reason in the narratives of change, indicating that the related affective and cognitive processes occur not only independently but also as by-products of events and policies.

Figure 9. Replication of Figures 3, 6 and 8 for Burundi

Panel A. Pathway of inter- and intra-ethnic trust

Panel B. Coded narratives in IET, across 2001-2011, for Burundi

6.   Discussion

The objective of this article is to verify whether IET recovers after ethnically structured violence and, if so, when and through which channels?

The case study of Rwanda was announced as a worst case scenario, because of its intimate and massive inter-ethnic violence. In line with this scenario, we found that self-reported IET sunk to the bottom in 1994, especially for Tutsi, standing in sharp contrast with their persistently high levels of intra-ethnic trust. But we also documented considerable recovery of IET. The recovery process was most noteworthy for Tutsi returnees. For the other ethnic subcategories, and especially for Tutsi survivors, IET did not fully recover by 2011. We found the recovery process to be sensitive to policies that deeply affect the social tissue, and to political events that are accompanied by shifts in the societal master narrative on inter-ethnic relations. Looking at the narratives of change, it was revealed that these policies and events triggered emotions and especially social interactions, and in doing so functioned as catalysts for affective and cognitive processes that in their turn brought about changes in IET. A comparison with Burundi reveals similarities to the Rwandan case.

Our study suggests that even in a worst case scenario, with extra-ordinary levels of (intimate) violence, the recovery of IET does not require extra-ordinary measures, but can be born from something as ordinary as contact, occurring spontaneously or as an unintended by-product of policies and events. This resonates well with the "contact hypothesis", documented first by Allport (1954) in his research on prejudice. Whereas mass (categorical) violence makes bounded groups out of mere categories it is positive contact that unmakes bounded groups and makes real people out of mere categories. What exactly the nature of this contact should be and how it can be stimulated by policies should be the subject of further investigation.

We obtained our findings largely through an inductive process, relying on an original mixed method approach. Yet, we belief that our findings hold lessons for the more conventional quantitative analyses that study the impact of violence on trust and other prosocial attitudes. First, since recovery takes time, the number of peace years preceding these analyses' end line points needs to be taken into account. Second, since recovery is not only a matter of time but receptive to policies and events, due attention needs to be devoted to specific contextual factors. Third, besides the variation across subnational regions and ethnic categories – which is often considered, more consideration is needed for ethnic *sub*categories, which may display very different pathways and end line points of IET. Taking these three points into account will help to make sense of the mixed results.

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