

SPECIAL DATA FEATURE

INSTITUTIONS IN BURUNDI AND RWANDA: A 20-YEAR DATA OVERVIEW (1995-2016)

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Résumé

Depuis sa première édition de 1996-1997, *L'Afrique des Grands Lacs : Annuaire* inclut des annexes sur l'identité de divers détenteurs du pouvoir au Burundi et au Rwanda. Les institutions suivantes sont considérées : le gouvernement, l'administration provinciale, la justice, les forces de sécurité et la diplomatie. Les détenteurs de pouvoir sont identifiés avec leur nom, leur ethnicité, la région dont ils sont originaires et leur affiliation politique. À l'occasion du vingtième anniversaire de l'*Annuaire*, les informations recueillies sont présentées de façon synthétique. Le présent éditorial décrit les dynamiques structurelles entre 1995 et 2016 dans les différentes branches du pouvoir au Burundi et au Rwanda.

1. INTRODUCTION

The annexes of the *Annuaire* cover the government, provincial administration, judiciary, security forces, and diplomacy. In what follows we will provide statistics on (1) the identity of power-holders in the *executive*, comprising the president, vice-presidents, ministers and – in the case of Rwanda - secretaries of state¹. In addition, we address (2) the provincial *governors*; (3) the *military and police*; (4) the *judiciary*; and (5) the *diplomatic corps*.

Identity is defined in terms of five dimensions:

- (a) Ethnicity
- (b) Gender
- (c) Political party
- (d) Region of origin
- (e) Returnees from exile

Regarding ethnicity, we consider Hutu and Tutsi. According to the CIA World Fact book, both Burundi and Rwanda count around 85% Hutu, 14% Tutsi and 1% Twa. The sex ratio is estimated at 0.99 for both countries, i.e. 99 men per 100 women. Currently, Burundi's dominant political party is the CNDD-FDD (National Council for the Defense of Democracy–Forces for the Defense of Democracy), while Rwanda's dominant political party is the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front). Burundi is currently divided into 18 provinces, but in identifying regions of origin, we refer to the 17 provinces that existed prior to the creation of the new Rumonge province in 2015. Rwanda currently is divided into 5 provinces. However, in the Rwandan case, we continue referring to the former 11 *préfectures* as region of origin, because the new provinces

¹ In the case of Rwanda, information on the permanent secretaries and the directors of cabinet was also systematically collected. But this information is absent in the case of Burundi.

have no historical depth. Since a sizeable share of the Rwandan political elite (mostly of the RPF) has its roots in exile, rather than in a Rwandan prefecture, we added a separate dimension “Exile”. In the case of Burundi, returnees (mostly of the CNDD-FDD and the FNL) left the country in the not so distant past and maintained their province of origin as part of their political identity.

In order to clarify the context, the next section provides an overview of the main events and institutional changes in Burundi and Rwanda since 1990. Section 3 describes the data collection and compilation process. Section 4 presents a series of figures that sketch the evolution of the institutional landscape in Burundi and Rwanda, while section 5 offers a brief description of these graphs.

2. EVENTS AND INSTITUTIONS IN BURUNDI AND RWANDA, 1990-2016

Tables 1 and 2 provide a chronology of events and institutional changes in Burundi and in Rwanda, starting in the year 1991 and 1990, respectively. Tables 3 and 4 provide an overview of quotas for the composition of different institutions in Burundi and Rwanda.

Table 1: Events and institutional changes in Burundi, 1991-2015

5 February 1991	Adoption by referendum of the Charter of National Unity, drafted by the National Commission in charge of studying the question of national unity which was put in place by the government of President Buyoya (UPRONA, Tutsi) after the events of Ntega and Marangara (August 1988).
13 March 1992	Promulgation of the new Constitution. Introduction of multi-partyism.
June 1993	Presidential and legislative elections. Electoral victory of the party FRODEBU and its presidential candidate Melchior Ndadaye (Hutu).
21 October 1993	Assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye, followed by large scale massacres.
June 1994	Establishment of the CNDD-FDD rebel movement.
6 April 1994	Assassination of President Cyprien Ntaryamira (FRODEBU, Hutu) in Kigali.
10 September 1994	Government Convention (power-sharing agreement).
30 September 1994	Sylvestre Ntibantunganya (FRODEBU, Hutu), new President of the Republic.
25 July 1996	Coup d'Etat by Pierre Buyoya (UPRONA, Tutsi).
June 1998	Start of the peace process and adoption of the Constitutional Act of Transition.
28 August 2000	Signature of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi by the Buyoya government, the national assembly and 17 political parties (seven predominantly Hutu, ten predominantly Tutsi, and all exclusively male).
1 November 2001	Establishment of a transitional government under President Buyoya.

1 May 2003	Domitien Ndayizeye (FRODEBU, Hutu), President of the Republic for the second part of the transition.
16 November 2003	Signature of the Global Ceasefire Agreement between the transitional government and the CNDD-FDD.
18 March 2005	Promulgation of a new post-transition constitution.
June-August 2005	General elections. Electoral victory of the party CNDD-FDD.
26 August 2005	Pierre Nkurunziza (CNDD-FDD, Hutu), new President of the Republic, indirectly elected.
7 September 2006	Comprehensive Cease-fire Agreement between the government and the Palipehutu-FNL rebel movement.
26 August 2010	Second term of President Pierre Nkurunziza, reelected by 91.6% of the vote.
2015	Electoral, institutional, security and humanitarian crisis.
20 August 2015	Third term of President Pierre Nkurunziza, reelected by 69.4% of the vote.

Table 2: Events and institutional changes in Rwanda, 1990-2015

24 September 1990	Putting into place of the National Synthesis Commission for political reform.
1 October 1990	Invasion by the RPF; beginning of the civil war.
10 June 1991	Promulgation of a new constitution; multi-partyism reintroduced.
July 1991	Registration of several opposition parties.
16 April 1992	Formation of a coalition government; Prime Minister from the opposition.
July 1992	Start of Arusha talks between the government and the RPF.
4 August 1993	Signing of the Arusha peace accord.
6 April 1994	Assassination of President Habyarimana; resumption of the civil war; start of the genocide against the Tutsi; RPF also commits massive crimes.
18 June 1994	Military victory of RPF; a government of national union is put in place.
29 August 1995	Government of national union dismissed; beginning of taking of full control by the RPF.
16 May 2003	Last opposition party, the MDR, banned.
26 May 2003	Constitution adopted by referendum.
25 August 2003	Kagame elected by 95% of the vote.
9 August 2010	Kagame re-elected President by 93% of the vote.
18 December 2015	A referendum approves by 98% of the vote a constitutional amendment allowing Kagame a third seven years term in 2017 and two additional five year terms.

Table 3: Constitutional requirements, including quota, concerning the composition of the Burundian Institutions, under the Constitution of 18 March 2005

	Ethnicity	Gender	Political party	Region
President and vice-presidents	The two vice-presidents must belong to a different ethnic group (art 124).	none	The two vice-presidents must belong to a different political party (art 124).	none
Ministers	The government is composed of no more than 60% of Hutu ministers and no more than 40% of Tutsi ministers (art 129). The minister of defense and the minister in charge of the national police are of a different ethnic group (art 130).	A minimum of 30% of ministers must be women (art 129).	All parties obtaining 5% of the votes at the legislative elections are entitled to a proportionate number of ministerial positions (art 129).	none
Parliament – National Assembly (NA)	The NA is composed of at least 100 directly elected MPs, of which 60% are Hutu and 40% are Tutsi. In addition, 3 MPs are Twa (art 164).	A minimum of 30% of MPs must be women (art 164)	none	none ³
Parliament - Senate	The Senate is composed of 50% Hutu and 50% Tutsi members, in addition to 3 Twa senators and the former Heads of State (art 180).	A minimum of 30% of Senators must be women (art 180).	none	Each province is represented by two senators, one Hutu, one Tutsi.
Provinces	none	none	none	A provincial governor must be born or reside in his province (art 139).
Communes	The commune council must generally respect the ethnic diversity of the population in the commune. Not more than 67% of the commune administrators shall be of the same ethnic group (art 266).	none	none	none
Defense and Security Forces	For a period to be determined by the Senate, the defense and security forces are not composed of more than 50% of their members of the same ethnic group (art 257).	none	Members are not allowed to be a member of a political party (art 244).	none

²While no such requirement is laid down in the constitution, the electoral code provides that provinces are the electoral circumscriptions for the legislative elections and that the number of MPs elected per province is proportionate to the population.

Judiciary	The judiciary is structured in such a way as to reflect, in its composition, the diversity of the population. Recruitment and appointment must seek to promote a regional, ethnic and gender balance (art 208).			
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Table 4: Constitutional requirements, including quota, concerning the composition of the Rwandan Institutions, under the Constitution of 2003, as amended

	Ethnicity	Gender	Political party	Region
President	none	none	none	none
Ministers	none	Women are granted at least 30% of posts in decision making organs (art. 9).	a political organization holding the majority of seats in the Chamber of Deputies may not exceed 50% of all the members of the Cabinet (art. 116)	none
Parliament	none	Women are granted at least 30% of posts in decision making organs (art. 9).	none	none
Provinces	none	none	none	none
Districts	none	none	none	none
Defense and Security Forces	none	none	none	none
Judiciary	none	none	none	none

3. DATA COLLECTION AND COMPILATION

3.1. Data collection procedure

The information in the institutional annexes of the *Annuaire* was collected each year based on publicly available information, complemented by input from sources in both countries. Particularly with regard to ethnic affiliation, this is a difficult exercise in Rwanda, due to the legal and political taboo surrounding ethnicity. Where there is doubt, we have omitted ethnic identification. A caveat concerns the period covered by these data. They are a snapshot generally relating to the month of May each year. Data may have changed between two of these moments (e.g. through a cabinet reshuffle). Intermediary situations are therefore not captured, but they are minor and have no significant impact on the broad patterns that emerge.

3.2. Data compilation procedure

The compilation of this dataset occurred in seven steps:

1. All information in the institutional annexes of the *Annuaire* was entered in Excel, then in the software program STATA;
2. Each entry received a unique number (the variable 'number' in the dataset), corresponding to the order in which it appeared in the annexes of the *Annuaire*;
3. Each individual received a unique identifying code (the variable 'IDindiv' in the dataset);
4. The snapshots of the institutional composition were assigned to their corresponding year³;
5. Inconsistencies were resolved (e.g. different orthographies of names), and data gaps were filled (missing ethnicity, party, origin) - to the extent possible, by the authors of this survey and their contacts;
6. A 'gender' variable was added to the dataset, on the basis of a screening of first names, and – in case of doubt – on the basis of a Google search of the full name of the individual (first name and family name);
7. A 'prestige of ministry' variable was added, i.e. the different ministries were ranked as low, medium, or high prestige, relying on an existing classification⁴ that was adapted to the context of Rwanda and Burundi (as detailed in Table 5)..

³ The exact date of the institutional snapshot is provided in the annexes of the *Annuaire*. For Burundi, there were some missing years (1999, 2001, 2004 and 2012), but also some years with two snapshots (1997, 1998, 2000 and 2003). The second snapshot of the years 1998, 2000 and 2003 were assigned to the consecutive years 1999, 2001 and 2004, as these were years without a single snapshot. The second series of 1997 was dropped.

⁴ KROOK M. L., O'BRIEN D. Z., "All the President's Men? The Appointment of Female Cabinet Ministers Worldwide". *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 74, No. 03, July 2012, pp. 840-855.

Table 5: classification of ministries by prestige

	Classification as in Krook & O'Brien, and maintained in this survey	Removed from classification	Added to classification
High prestige (weight: 3)	Defense, Military & National/Public security Finance and Economy Foreign Affairs Government/Interior/Home Affairs		Minister of Local Administration (MINALOC) in Rwanda (deals with Interior Affairs); Justice Ministers in Rwanda and Burundi; President in both countries and vice-Presidents in Burundi
Medium prestige (weight: 2)	Agriculture, Food Safety, Enterprise Fisheries, & Livestock Housing Civil Service Industry and Commerce Communications and Information Construction and Public Works Labor Correctional Services/Police Planning and Development Education Parliamentary Affairs Energy Religious Affairs Environment and Natural Resources Public Works Health and Social Welfare Transportation	Justice	Ministry of Human Rights in Burundi
Low prestige (weight: 1)	Aging/Elderly Reform Children and Family Science & Technology Culture & Sports Displaced Persons & Expatriates Tourism Heritage & Women's Affairs Minority Affairs Youth Regional Affairs	Minority Affairs ('Human Rights') for Burundi	State secretaries (in Rwanda)


Notes: Given the importance of the post-conflict transitional justice programmes in both countries, 'Justice' was re-classified as 'high' instead of 'medium' prestige. Furthermore, we re-classified the Ministry of Human Rights in Burundi as medium prestige (instead of low) because of its role in representing Burundi on the international scene. Finally, we also included presidents and vice-presidents as "high-prestige".

The data set can be consulted online: <https://www.uantwerpen.be/en/rg/iob/centre-great-lakes/l-afrique-des-grands/>. The do-files used to compile the dataset can be requested from the authors of this special data feature.


4. DATA OVERVIEW

Below, we present the most important figures that result from the analysis of the data. Section 5 describes the results.

Figure 1a. Ethnicity of Burundian Executives, 1998 – 2016.




Notes. Executives are President, Vice-Presidents and Ministers. Cabinet Directors (until 2002), Vice-Ministers (2008) and General Secretaries are omitted from the analysis as well as observations before 1998 due to missing values. The y-scale reflects percentages, ranging from 30% to 70%. “Low prestige” positions are multiplied by value 1, whereas “medium prestige” positions are multiplied by value 2 and “high prestige” positions by value 3.

Figure 1b. Ethnicity of Rwandan Executives, 1996 – 2016.



Notes. Executives are President, Ministers and State Secretaries (*Sécrétaires d'Etat*). Cabinet Directors (*Directeurs de Cabinet*), General Directors (*Directeurs Généraux*) and Permanent Secretaries (*Sécrétaires Généraux*) are not included in the analysis. The y-scale reflects percentages, ranging from 30% to 70%. “Low prestige” positions are multiplied by value 1, whereas “medium prestige” positions are multiplied by value 2 and “high prestige” positions by value 3. State Secretaries are coded as “low” prestige.

Figure 2a. Distribution of executive positions by political party in Burundi, 1995 – 2016.




Notes. Executives are President, Vice-Presidents and Ministers. Cabinet Directors (until 2002), Vice-Ministers (2008) and General Secretaries are omitted from the analysis. FNL includes FNL, FNL Rwaswa, FNL-ICANZO & PALIPEHUTU. The category “Other” includes, among many others, ABASA, ANADDE, FAB, FROLINA, PRP, PSD, RADDES and VERT-INTWARI. They are taken together given their low incidence. The y-axis represents the total number of positions in a given year. The analysis does not take into account the prestige of executive position.

Figure 2b. Distribution of executive positions by political party in Rwanda, 1996 – 2016.





Notes. Executives are President, Ministers and State Secretaries (Sécretares d’Etat). Cabinet Directors (*Directeurs de Cabinet*), General Directors (*Directeurs Généraux*) and Secretary Generals (*Sécretares Généraux*) are not included in the analysis. The y-axis represents the total number of positions in a given year. The analysis does not take into account the prestige of executive position.

Figure 3a. Distribution of executive positions by political party in Burundi (as percentage of all Executive Positions), 1995 – 2016.




Notes. Executives are President, Vice-Presidents and Ministers. Cabinet Directors (until 2002), Vice-Ministers (2008) and General Secretaries are omitted from the analysis. FNL includes FNL, FNL Rwasa, FNL-ICANZO & PALIPEHUTU. The category “Other” includes, among many others, ABASA, ANADDE, FAB, FROLINA, PRP, PSD, RADDES and VERT-INTWARI. They are taken together given their low incidence. The y-axis represents the percentage of all executive positions in a given year. The analysis does not take into account the prestige of executive position.

Figure 3b. Distribution of executive positions by political party in Rwanda (as percentage of all Executive Positions), 1996 – 2016.




Notes. Executives are President, Ministers and State Secretaries (Sécretsaires d’Etat). Cabinet Directors (*Directeurs de Cabinet*), General Directors (*Directeurs Généraux*) and Secretary Generals (*Sécretsaires Généraux*) are not included in the analysis. The y-axis represents the percentage of all executive positions in a given year. The analysis does not take into account the prestige of executive position.

Figure 4a. Distribution of executive positions by political party in Burundi (as percentage of all Executive Positions and weighted), 1995 – 2016.




Notes. Executives are President, Vice-Presidents and Ministers. Cabinet Directors (until 2002), Vice-Ministers (2008) and General Secretaries are omitted from the analysis. FNL includes FNL, FNL Rwaswa, FNL-ICANZO & PALIPEHUTU. The category “Other” includes, among many others, ABASA, ANADDE, FAB, FROLINA, PRP, PSD, RADDES and VERT-INTWARI. They are taken together given their low incidence. The y-axis represents the percentage of all executive positions in a given year. The analysis takes into account the prestige of executive position. “Low” prestige positions are multiplied by factor 1, whereas “medium” prestige positions are multiplied by factor 2 and “high” prestige positions by factor 3.

Figure 4b. Distribution of executive positions by political party in Rwanda (as percentage of all Executive Positions and weighted), 1995 – 2016.




Notes. Executives are President, Ministers and State Secretaries (*Sécrétaires d'Etat*). Cabinet Directors (*Directeurs de Cabinet*), General Directors (*Directeurs Généraux*) and Secretary Generals (*Sécrétaires Généraux*) are not included in the analysis. The y-axis represents the percentage of all executive positions in a given year. The analysis takes into account the prestige of executive position. “Low” prestige positions are multiplied by factor 1, whereas “medium” prestige positions are multiplied by factor 2 and “high” prestige positions by factor 3. State Secretaries are coded as “low” prestige.

Figure 5a. Distribution of Hutu executives in Burundi by political party, 1998 – 2016.





Notes. Executives are President, Vice-Presidents and Ministers. Cabinet Directors (until 2002), Vice-Ministers (2008) and General Secretaries are omitted from the analysis. FNL includes FNL, FNL Rwsa, FNL-ICANZO & PALIPEHUTU. The category “Other” includes, among many others, ABASA, ANADDE, FAB, FROLINA, PRP, PSD, RADDES and VERT-INTWARI. They are taken together given their low incidence. Observations before 1998 are not included because of missing values. The y-scale represents the total number of executive positions for Hutu in a given year. Unweighted results.

Figure 5b. Distribution of Tutsi executives in Burundi by political party, 1998 – 2016.





Notes. Executives are President, Vice-Presidents and Ministers. Cabinet Directors (until 2002), Vice-Ministers (2008) and General Secretaries are omitted from the analysis. FNL includes FNL, FNL Rwasa, FNL-ICANZO & PALIPEHUTU. The category “Other” includes, among many others, ABASA, ANADDE, FAB, FROLINA, PRP, PSD, RADDES and VERT-INTWARI. They are taken together given their low incidence. Observations before 1998 are not included because of missing values. The y-scale represents the total number of executive seats for Tutsi in a given year. Unweighted results.

Figure 6a. Distribution of Hutu executives in Rwanda by political party, 1996 – 2016.




Notes. Executives are President, Ministers and State Secretaries (*Sécrétaires d'Etat*). Cabinet Directors (*Directeurs de Cabinet*), General Directors (*Directeurs Généraux*) and Secretary Generals (*Sécrétaires Généraux*) are not included in the analysis. The y-scale represents the total number of executive positions for Hutu in a given year. Unweighted results.

Figure 6b. Distribution of Tutsi executives in Rwanda by political party, 1996 – 2016.




Notes. Executives are President, Ministers and State Secretaries (*Sécretsaires d'Etat*). Cabinet Directors (*Directeurs de Cabinet*), General Directors (*Directeurs Généraux*) and Secretary Generals (*Sécretsaires Généraux*) are not included in the analysis. The y-scale represents the total number of executive positions for Tutsi in a given year. Unweighted results.

Figure 7a. Distribution of executive positions in Burundi by region, 1995 – 2016.




Notes. Executives are President, Vice-Presidents and Ministers. Cabinet Directors (until 2002), Vice-Ministers (2008) and General Secretaries are omitted from the analysis. Region of origin is stacked in alphabetical order to facilitate interpretation. Y-scale reflects the total number of executive positions in a given year. Unweighted results.

Figure 7b. Distribution of executive positions in Rwanda by region, 1996 – 2016.




Notes. Executives are President, Ministers and State Secretaries (*Sécretaires d'Etat*). Cabinet Directors (*Directeurs de Cabinet*), General Directors (*Directeurs Généraux*) and Secretary Generals (*Sécretaires Généraux*) are not included in the analysis. Region of origin is stacked in alphabetical order to facilitate interpretation. Exiles are placed at the bottom of the graph (in red) and refer to ex-refugees. The y-scale represents the total number of executive positions in a given year. Unweighted results.

Figure 8a. Distribution of Hutu executive positions in Burundi by region, 1998 – 2016.




Notes. Executives are President, Vice-Presidents and Ministers. Cabinet Directors (until 2002), Vice-Ministers (2008) and General Secretaries are omitted from the analysis, as well as observations before 1998 due to missing values for ethnicity. Region of origin is stacked in alphabetical order to facilitate interpretation. Y-scale reflects the total number of Hutu executive positions in a given year. Unweighted results.

Figure 8b. Distribution of Tutsi executive positions in Burundi by region, 1998 – 2016.




Notes. Executives are President, Vice-Presidents and Ministers. Cabinet Directors (until 2002), Vice-Ministers (2008) and General Secretaries are omitted from the analysis, as well as observations before 1998 due to missing values for ethnicity. Region of origin is stacked in alphabetical order to facilitate interpretation. Y-scale reflects the total number of Tutsi executive positions in a given year. Unweighted results.

Figure 9a. Distribution of Hutu executive positions in Rwanda by region, 1996 – 2016.




Notes. Executives are President, Ministers and State Secretaries (*Sécretsaires d'Etat*). Cabinet Directors (*Directeurs de Cabinet*), General Directors (*Directeurs Généraux*) and Secretary Generals (*Sécretsaires Généraux*) are not included in the analysis. Region of origin is stacked in alphabetical order to facilitate interpretation. Exiles are placed at the bottom of the graph (in red) and refer to ex-refugees. The y-scale represents the total number of Hutu executive positions in a given year. Unweighted results.

Figure 9b. Distribution of Tutsi executive positions in Rwanda by region, 1996 – 2016.




Notes. Executives are President, Ministers and State Secretaries (*Sécrétaires d'Etat*). Cabinet Directors (*Directeurs de Cabinet*), General Directors (*Directeurs Généraux*) and Secretary Generals (*Sécrétaires Généraux*) are not included in the analysis. Region of origin is stacked in alphabetical order to facilitate interpretation. Exiles are placed at the bottom of the graph (in red) and refer to ex-refugees. The y-scale represents the total number of Tutsi executive positions in a given year. Unweighted results.

Figure 10a. Ethnic distribution by department in Burundi, 1998 – 2016.




Notes. Executives are President, Vice-Presidents and Ministers. Cabinet Directors (until 2002), Vice-Ministers (2008) and General Secretaries are omitted from the analysis. Executives (weighted) includes weighted positions for executives: “low prestige” positions are multiplied by value 1, whereas “medium prestige” positions are multiplied by value 2 and “high prestige” positions by 3. Military and police are top two positions in the army, the police and the intelligence service. Judiciary includes presidents of the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, the Courts of Appeal and the Prosecutor General of the Republic. Missing values are imputed by inserting information from other years and remain limited (n = 1 in 2000 and 2016 for the Judiciary). Tribunaux de Grande Instance are excluded from the analysis due to missing values. The y-scale represents the total % of all department positions by ethnicity.

Figure 10b. Ethnic distribution by department in Rwanda, 1996 – 2016.




Notes. Executives are President, Ministers and State Secretaries (*Sécrétaires d'Etat*). Cabinet Directors (*Directeurs de Cabinet*), General Directors (*Directeurs Généraux*) and Secretary Generals (*Sécrétaires Généraux*) are not included in the analysis. Executives (weighted) includes weighted positions for executives: “low prestige” positions are multiplied by value 1, whereas “medium prestige” positions are multiplied by value 2 and “high prestige” positions by value 3. Military and police are top two positions in the army, the police and the intelligence service. Judiciary includes (Vice-) Presidents of the Supreme Court, the High Court and the Prosecutor General of the Republic. Missing values are imputed by inserting information from other years and remain limited (n = 2 in 1999 for the Judiciary). The y-scale represents the total % of all department positions by ethnicity.

Figure 11a. Percentage Hutu by department in Burundi, 1998 – 2016.


Notes. Executives are President, Vice-Presidents and Ministers. Cabinet Directors (until 2002), Vice-Ministers (2008) and General Secretaries are omitted from the analysis. The y-scale represents the total % of all positions by department.

Figure 11b. Percentage Tutsi by department in Rwanda, 1996 – 2016.




Notes. Executives are President, Ministers and State Secretaries (*Sécrétaires d'Etat*). Cabinet Directors (*Directeurs de Cabinet*), General Directors (*Directeurs Généraux*) and Secretary Generals (*Sécrétaires Généraux*) are not included in the analysis. The y-scale represents the total % of all department positions.

Figure 12a. Gender distribution by department in Burundi, 1995 – 2016.




Notes. Executives are President, Vice-Presidents and Ministers. Cabinet Directors (until 2002), Vice-Ministers (2008) and General Secretaries are omitted from the analysis. Executives (weighted) includes weighted positions for executives: “low prestige” positions are multiplied by value 1, whereas “medium prestige” positions are multiplied by value 2 and “high prestige” positions by value 3. Military and police are top two positions in the army, the police and the intelligence service. Judiciary includes presidents of the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, the Courts of Appeal and the Prosecutor General of the Republic. Missing values are imputed by inserting information from other years and remain limited (1 in 2000 and 1 in 2016 for the Judiciary). Tribunaux de Grande Instance are excluded from the analysis due to missing values. The y-scale represents the total % of all positions by department according to gender groups.


Figure 12b. Gender distribution by department in Rwanda, 1996 – 2016.



Notes. Executives are President, Ministers and State Secretaries (*Sécrétaires d'Etat*). Cabinet Directors (*Directeurs de Cabinet*), General Directors (*Directeurs Généraux*) and Secretary Generals (*Sécrétaires Généraux*) are not included in the analysis. Executives (weighted) includes weighted positions for executives: “low prestige” positions are multiplied by value 1, whereas “medium prestige” positions are multiplied by value 2 and “high prestige” positions by value 3. Military and police are top two positions in the army, the police and the intelligence service. Judiciary includes (Vice-) Presidents of the Supreme Court, the High Court and the Prosecutor General of the Republic. Missing values are imputed by inserting information from other years and remain limited (2 in 1999 for the Judiciary). The y-scale represents the total % of all positions by department according to gender.


Figure 13a. Percentage women by department in Burundi, 1995 – 2016.

Notes. Executives are President, Vice-Presidents and Ministers. Cabinet Directors (until 2002), Vice-Ministers (2008) and General Secretaries are omitted from the analysis. The y-scale represents the total % of all positions by department occupied by women.


Figure 13b. Percentage Women by department in Rwanda, 1996 – 2016.

Notes. Executives are President, Vice-Presidents, Ministers and State Secretaries (*Sécrétaires d'Etat*). Cabinet Directors (*Directeurs de Cabinet*), General Directors (*Directeurs Général*) and Secretary Generals (*Sécrétaires Général*) are not included in the analysis. Governors are governors or prefects of each respective province in Rwanda. Military and police include the “gendarmerie” as well as the National Army and the Police Forces (RNP). Judiciary includes (Vice-) Presidents of the Supreme Court, the High Court and the Prosecutor General of the Republic. The y-scale represents the total % of all positions by department going to women.

Figure 14a. Percentage CNDD-FDD by department in Burundi, 1995 – 2016.



Notes. Executives are President, Vice-Presidents and Ministers. Cabinet Directors (until 2002), Vice-Ministers (2008) and General Secretaries are omitted from the analysis. The y-scale presents the total percentage of all positions by department occupied by CNDD-FDD. We code CNDD, EX-FDD and FDD as part of CNDD-FDD.

Figure 14b. Percentage FPR by department in Rwanda, 1996 – 2016.

Notes. Executives are President, Ministers and State Secretaries (*Sécrétaires d'Etat*). Cabinet Directors (*Directeurs de Cabinet*), General Directors (*Directeurs Généraux*) and Secretary Generals (*Sécrétaires Généraux*) are not included in the analysis. The y-scale represents the total % of all positions by department occupied by FPR.

5. RESULTS

Figures 1a and 1b give the ethnic identity of the Executive, for Burundi (1998 – 2016) and Rwanda (1996 – 2016) respectively. The green (red) dashed lines indicate the percentage of all executive positions taken by Hutu (Tutsi), whereas the green (red) solid lines weigh executive positions by prestige. For Burundi, we find that between 1998 and 2001 executive positions are almost equally shared among the two main ethnic groups (i.e. 52% for Hutu and 48% for Tutsi). This pattern starts to erode from 2002 onwards, with a major change taking place after 2005, in tandem with the rise of the CNDD-FDD. Between 2011 and 2015, for example, 62.5% of all executive positions are occupied by Hutu against 37.5% by Tutsi. The weighted lines reinforce these findings. Before 2005, imbalances between Hutu and Tutsi were compensated by more prestigious positions for Tutsi. After this period, however, the opposite is true, with Hutu not only occupying more, but also more important positions. For Rwanda, we find that ethnic patterns are more erratic. The share of executive positions is highest for Hutu in 1996 – 1999 and 2004 – 2007 and for Tutsi in 2000 – 2004. However, a clearer pattern emerged, with Tutsi gradually obtaining a higher share of and more prestigious executive positions after 2007, reaching about 60% in 2016.

Figures 2a and 2b present the distribution of executive positions by political party in Burundi (1995 – 2016) and Rwanda (1996 – 2016) in total numbers; Figures 3a and 3b plot the same distribution as a percentage of all executive positions; and Figures 4a and 4b weigh these positions according to prestige. The Figures show that before 2005, executive positions in Burundi were shared among many different political parties and actors, but thereafter the CNDD-FDD gradually gained more weight. In 2002, for example, of all 28 executive positions, six positions (21.43%) went to FRODEBU, five (17.86%) to UPRONA, two (7.14%) to PALIPEHUTU, CNDD, PP and RPB, and one (3.57%) to INKINZO, PL, ABASA, ANADDE, VERT-INTWARI, PSD and RADDES. This contrasts with the current situation (2016), where CNDD-FDD holds 17 of 24 executive positions (= 70.83%). The relative dominance of CNDD-FDD in the executive is not compensated by more prestigious positions for other parties. Results for 2016, for example, indicate that the CNDD-FDD hegemony increases when taking prestige into consideration. In Rwanda, the graphs illustrate a dynamic comparable to Burundi. The distribution in the executive (N = 22) is relatively diffuse until about 2000, when the RPF controlled nine positions (40.9%), PSD and PL three (13.64%) PDC one (4.55%), while four positions (18.18%) were occupied by MDR politicians⁵. Over time, the distribution shifted towards RPF hegemony. RPF politicians occupied 17 of all 28 (60.71%) executive positions in 2005, increasing

⁵The remaining seats were held by politicians without political party (= 2 or 9.09%).

their share to 80.64% (25 out of 31 executive positions) in 2016.

Figures 5a – 5b and 6a – 6b plot the distribution of Hutu and Tutsi executives by political party in Burundi (1998 – 2016) and Rwanda (1996 – 2016). The Figures present the total number of executive positions for each ethnic group by their political party affiliation. The patterns in Figures 5a and 5b indicate that political power concentration in Burundi is based on party rather than identity politics. Although Hutu executives are mostly represented by CNDD-FDD members from 2005 onward, the party also incorporated a significant number of Tutsi executives⁶. The CNDD-FDD is therefore ethnically heterogeneous as regards executive positions. This pattern, however, is not constant through time. Between 1998 and 2001 (before the CNDD-FDD participated in political life), for example, Hutu executives mostly came from FRODEBU and Tutsi executives from UPRONA. Between 2002 and 2006, party representation was more diffuse, as shown by the sudden rise of many small parties. A similar logic seems to apply to Rwanda. The dominant political party (RPF) includes both Hutu and Tutsi executives.⁷ In contrast to Burundi, however, ethnic political party affiliation of executives has been clearer cut in Rwanda over time. Tutsi executives, for example, have consistently been members of the RPF. Hutu executives, on the other hand, were politically more scattered before 2005, but increasingly linked to the RPF afterwards.

Figures 7a and 7b give the distribution of executive positions by region for Burundi and Rwanda. They plot the region of origin of Burundian (1995 – 2016) and Rwandan (1996 – 2016) executives. Most strikingly, Figure 7b reveals that a relatively large share of Rwandan political elites have their roots in exile, rather than in a Rwandan prefecture. Former refugees take up 2 out of 22 (9.01%) executive positions in 1997, 8 out of 28 (28.57%) in 2005, and as many as 15 out of 32 (46.88%) in 2015. Rwandan returnees clearly increased executive power over time. In Burundi, no such ‘regional’ dominance seems to exist (Figure 7a). Although a relatively large share of Burundian executives came from Bururi between 1998 and 2004, there is no indication of any clear trend or pattern. The results rather suggest that Burundian executives are geographically balanced, albeit that some regions have a higher presence than others.⁸

Figures 8a – 8b and 9a – 9b present the distribution of Hutu and Tutsi

⁶ For example: of the 14 executive positions held by Hutu in 2016, 11 (78.57%) belong to CNDD-FDD and 3 (21.43%) to FNL. For 9 Tutsi executive positions, 6 politicians (66.67%) have CNDD-FDD affiliation.

⁷ In 2016, 16 of 18 (88.89%) Tutsi executive positions and 9 of 13 (69.23%) Hutu executive positions are occupied by the RPF.

⁸ Between 1995 and 2016, most Burundian executives came from Bururi (90), followed by Gitega (48) and Kayanza (47). Burundian executives have a lower probability to come from Rumonge (1), Bubanza (9) or Muyinga (11).

executive positions by region. They further refine the regional analysis of the previous paragraph by splitting the data according to ethnicity. Rwanda (1996 – 2016) shows some interesting patterns. The figures not only illustrate that former exiles increase their grip on executive power over time, but that this dynamic also goes in tandem with growing Tutsi control of the executive. Between 2011 and 2014, only one Hutu returnee occupied an executive position. The picture is less straightforward in Burundi (1998 – 2016). The results again indicate the absence of any clear regional dominance in the executive. Furthermore, for each region, Tutsi and Hutu alike have similar representation. One notable exception is perhaps Ngozi. For 2016, four out of the 14 Hutu executives come from Ngozi (28.57%), against just one out of 9 Tutsi executives (11.11%).

Figures 10a and 10b show the ethnic distribution in Burundi (1998 – 2016) and Rwanda (1996 – 2016) for several institutions: in addition to the Executive, we consider additional institutions, i.e. provinces, national defense and security forces, and the judiciary. We limit the discussion here to these additional institutions, as we dealt with the ‘identity content’ of the executive earlier. The exercise allows us to investigate differential identity trends in various domains of political power in both countries. As regards Burundi (Figure 10a), the results show that ethnicity among governors closely matches that within the executive. From 2004 on, the share of Hutu governors clearly increased. Whereas Hutu held 52.94% of governor positions in 2004, this percentage rose to 70.59% in 2011 and 77.78% in 2016.⁹ Before 2004, the dynamic was different, with Tutsi holding a larger share of provincial power than in the executive.¹⁰ Important differences are found regarding the ethnicity distribution of the military and police and the judiciary. While dynamics within the executive and at the provincial level clearly showed increasing Hutu presence, national defense and security forces displayed a balance between ethnic groups from 2005 on, in accordance with constitutional requirements. It should be noted, however, that our data only consider command positions in the national defense and security forces and do not allow for any conclusions on the overall composition of the forces and their conformity with constitutional requirements. Likewise, even though there are signs that Hutu are increasingly present in the judiciary (66.67% between 2006 – 2011), discrepancies are less marked and seem to decline after 2011.

The picture is different for Rwanda (Figure 10b). A large percentage share of Tutsi executives is combined with an even larger percentage share of Tutsi

⁹ There are missing values for some governors. They remain limited however (6.25% in 1998 - 1999; 5.88% in 2005 and 2007 and 11.76% in 2010) and therefore do not undermine the analysis.

¹⁰ In 1998, for example, Tutsi occupied 75% of all governor positions, while Hutu only got 18.75% (this doesn't add up due to one value missing). Within the executive, however, this was respectively 52% (for Hutu) and 48% (for Tutsi).

within the military and police, the judiciary and at the provincial level. First, the results indicate that Tutsi governors have always outnumbered Hutu. Between 1999 and 2000, Tutsi accounted for 75% of all governor positions, while this was 60% between 2006 and 2008 and 80% between 2009 and 2013.¹¹ Only in 2016 does the ethnic balance at the provincial level shift slightly in favour of Hutu (60%). Second, important functions within the military and police are by and large controlled by Tutsi. Despite some heterogeneity before 2000, with Hutu assuming 26.67% (1997), 13.33% (1998) and 6.67% (1999) of important security positions, Tutsi control 100% after 2000. Third, Tutsi dominance also exists within the judiciary, with a peak in 2004. Overall, at present, and contrary to Burundi, one ethnic group controls all major branches of power in Rwanda.

Figures 11a and 11b shed additional light on these findings. Despite some overlap with the previous graphs, they make the ethnic distribution by department more explicit. This is done by limiting the analysis to each country's politically most dominant ethnic group, i.e. Tutsi in Rwanda and Hutu in Burundi. Figure 11a plots the percentage of Hutu by department in Burundi (1998 – 2016). There is a general upward trend in the graph, indicating that the percentage share of Hutu in each branch of power increases over time. Yet, some important departmental differences remain. The first is that Hutu dominance in executive positions is less extensive than in other departments. This is of course mainly due to constitutional constraints. The second is that Hutu dominance is the strongest at the provincial level, where no constitutional quota applies. In 2016, Hutu hold 77.78% of governor functions, 60.87% of executive functions, and 50% of security and judiciary positions. All these are in line with constitutional provisions, showing that quotas are an effective tool of power sharing in Burundi. The findings illustrate that ethnic quotas tend to be respected in those departments where they exist (e.g. the government and the security forces). Figure 11b plots the percentage Tutsi by department in Rwanda (1996 – 2016). For Rwanda, a general upward trend of Tutsi dominance is less marked, which is unsurprising, given that Tutsi already controlled a large share of power positions before the start of our analysis. The results show that, in 2016, Tutsi hegemony is most pronounced in the security forces and the military (88.89%), followed by the judiciary (75%), the executive (58.06%) and the provinces (40%).¹²

Figures 12a and 12b zoom in on the gender structure for each branch of power in Burundi (1995 – 2016) and Rwanda (1996 – 2016). What becomes

¹¹ Here again, there are missing values, but they remain limited (16.67% between 1997 – 1998 and 8.33% in 1999) and restricted to the early years. As such, they do not undermine the results of the analysis. It should also be noted that the reduction of provinces from 11 to five from 2005 onwards means that a shift of just one governor has a disproportionate impact in terms of percentage.

¹² It must be borne in mind that Tutsi constitute about 15% of the population.

clear is that elite positions in both countries, regardless of the department under study, are male dominated. The results, for example, show that provincial administrations as well as the military and the police and the judiciary have been under almost entirely male control for most of the period under investigation. However, this is more the case in Burundi than Rwanda. In Rwanda, female representation at the provincial level seems to improve from 2004 on, with female governors becoming even more numerous than male ones in 2016. Likewise, a relative gender balance seems to exist in the judiciary, where - since 2005 - women hold between 25% and 33% of all positions. This is different for Burundi. In 2016, for example, we find men taking up 83% of all governor and 100% of all judiciary functions. The gender picture improves for both countries when looking at the executive: resulting from constitutional quotas, women hold around 30% of all available positions in the executive. Figures 13a and 13b, which jointly plot the percentage share of women in the different departments considered, largely resonate the findings above.

Figures 14a and 14b plot the percentage share of dominant parties for each department in Burundi (CNDD-FDD; 1995 – 2016) and Rwanda (RPF; 1996 – 2016). They reflect the degree of hegemony of both parties over different branches of power in both countries. The judiciary is excluded from the analysis, as these officials – at least officially – have no political party affiliation. For Burundi, the results are rather striking. They show the extraordinary rise of CNDD-FDD in the executive (from 17.24% to 56.52%), the provincial administration (from 17.65% to 70.59%) as well as the military and police (from 14.29% to 50%) after 2005. As suggested earlier, CNDD-FDD hegemony after 2005 clearly outscores ethnic hegemony (Figure 11), even though both are, to some extent, interconnected (Figures 5a and 5b). In 2016, CNDD-FDD dominates most clearly the provincial administrations (88.89%), followed by the executive (70.83%) and the military and police (50%). In Rwanda, the rising RPF hegemony is less obvious in the period considered. Above, we suggested this relates to the fact that the RPF already gained power before 1996, the starting year of our analysis. Yet, RPF's total control of the military and security forces from 2000 (100%) on, as well as its dominance of the executive (60%) and the provincial administrations (80% of total in 2016) remains strong.

6. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this special data issue was to give an overview of the 1995 – 2016 trends in the ‘identity-content’ of the most important branches of power in Burundi and Rwanda, i.e. the presidency, ministries, prefectures (provinces), the judiciary and the national defense and security forces. Relying on annexes on the identity of individual power-holders, as published in *L’Afrique des Grands Lacs: Annuaire* since 1996 - 1997, it has identified a number of structural dynamics behind the concentration of political power in both countries. Table 6 below summarizes the most important conclusions of this exercise.

Table 6: Overview of the Main Findings of this Special Data Issue

		Ethnicity	Party	Origin	Gender
<i>Executive</i>	Burundi	Hutu rise after 2005	CNDD-FDD rise after 2005	Geographically balanced	Male dominance, but with quotas respected
	Rwanda	Tutsi rise after 2007	RPF rise for entire period	Prominence of ex-refugees	Male dominance, but women making clear progress
<i>Provinces</i>	Burundi	Hutu rise after 2005	CNDD-FDD rise after 2005	Geographically balanced	Male dominance
	Rwanda	Relative ethnic balance. Hutu majority in 2016	RPF dominance	Geographically balanced	Male dominance, but waning over time
<i>Military and Police Forces</i>	Burundi	Ethnic balance after 2005	CNDD-FDD rise after 2005	Geographically balanced	Male dominance
	Rwanda	Tutsi dominance	RPF dominance for entire period	Ex-refugee dominance	Male dominance

<i>Judiciary</i>	Burundi	Relative ethnic balance, but with Hutu majority after 2005	/	Geographically balanced	Male dominance
	Rwanda	Tutsi dominance, with Hutu inclusion	/	Ex-refugee dominance	Relative male dominance

Note: Findings for the origin of governors and elites within the military, police and judiciary are discussed in this table but are not shown in the analysis due to restrictions of space. These graphs, however, are available upon request from the authors.

Antwerp, July 2016