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## **Domestic institutions and export performance: evidence for Cambodia**

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## 1. Introduction

The effects of institutions have recently attracted substantial attention of both academics and practitioners of economic growth and development as they have reportedly played an increasingly important role in enhancing overall long-run economic performance. Aghion and Howitt (2009) indicate that poor countries could catch up rapidly with more advanced countries by introducing relevant, reliable institutions that are growth-enhancing.

Institutions are literally difficult to define as they refer to many different things (Acemoglu, 2009). Douglass C. North (1989, 1990, 1991) defines institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that shape political, economic, and social interaction.” They include both formal rules, such as constitutions, laws, regulations, property rights protection, and informal constraints, including a set of beliefs, ethics, and code of conduct. Anderson (2004) defines formal institutions as rules and procedures for enforcing the rules.

Acemoglu (2009) makes three important notes on the notion of institutions. First, institutions are about how societies make own choices with respect to their economic destinies. Second, they impose constraints on human behaviour; that is, laws and regulations, and policies set ‘traffic’ rules for economic agents to follow. Third, constraints imposed upon the behaviour of individuals shape their interactions and incentivize their exchanges. These rules of the game tend to reduce uncertainty in economic exchange, thus lowering the costs of transactions to economic agents concerned.

A number of studies have documented the positive effects of institutions on economic performance and development (North, 1990, 1991, 2005; Dollar and Kraay, 2003; Acemoglu, 2009; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005, 2006, 2012; Rigobon and Rodrik, 2005; Rodrik, 2007; Aghion and Howitt, 2009; Efendic et al., 2011; Boubakri et al., 2015; Góes, 2016). These studies consistently establish that institutions are more important in enhancing economic growth and development than government policies. Aghion and Howitt (2009) indicate that countries with better institutions tend to grow faster at the initial stage of development, but may also continue to do so at a slower rate at the later stage.

Relatively less attention has been devoted to establishing theoretically and empirically the links between institutions and international trade. Recent work, however, suggests that institutions are instrumental to increasing international trade flows (Levchenko, 2007, 2011; Yu, 2010; Araujo et al., 2016). Intuitively, weak domestic institutions tend to hinder trade flows as they exert higher costs of transactions upon economic agents (Söderlund and Tingvall, 2014) and adversely affect the comparative advantage of countries with low quality of institutions (Nunn, 2007).

Using contract enforcement as a proxy for institution, Nunn (2007) shows that institutions explain more of the global trade patterns than the physical and skilled labour combined do. Similarly, Ranjan and Lee (2007) find that contract enforcement affects the volume of trade in general, but larger impact is detected for trade in differentiated goods. Depken and Sonora (2005) show that exports of the United States are positively affected by the improved economic freedom of the rest of the world. Using the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators as proxies for institutions, Briggs (2013) confirms for the United States that stronger domestic institutions of U.S. trading partners are associated with an increase of U.S. exports to the markets of its partners.

The present paper contributes to the existing literature on the crucial importance of institutions, especially for the developing and transitional economies, in a number of ways. First, we use a broader set of institutional quality to test their individual effects on Cambodia's export performance. Second, in contrast to many previous empirical studies that used a fixed-effects model to address the heterogeneity bias,<sup>3</sup> we also employ the Hausman-Taylor method that provides consistent estimates of both time-varying and time-constant explanatory variables (McPherson and Trumbull, 2008; Wooldridge, 2010; Greene, 2012). Third, for robustness checks we use the Correlated Random Effects (CRE) approach proposed by Mundlack (1978) that allows for correlations between the individual specific fixed effects and the regressors (Wooldridge, 2010).

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the nexus between institutions and international trade, followed by some stylized facts of Cambodia's revolution of institutions and international trade in Section 3. Section 4 presents our econometric specification, the data, and the estimation techniques. Section 5 provides estimation results and a discussion of these results. Section 6 concludes and offers policy implications.

## 2. Institutions-Trade Nexus

In the neoclassical trade theory, countries trade because they are different. The Heckscher-Ohlin model, for instance, suggests that a country tends to export the products that in their production use relatively intensely the production factor the country is relatively well endowed with and to import the products that use relatively intensely the relative scarce factor. Thus, different resource endowments will give rise to the sources of comparative advantage and trade.

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<sup>3</sup> The fixed-effects model effectively deals with the heterogeneity bias, but it removes all time-invariant variables such as geographical distance, border effects, and the like that have been reported to be important determinants of trade flows among countries.

The new trade theories, on the other hand, explain trade between countries on the basis of the increasing returns to scale and similarities in terms of resource endowments and technology. Countries benefit from international trade with each other even if they have identical tastes, technology, and factor endowments. Helpman and Krugman (2002) show that international specialization and trade would persist even though countries have identical relative factor endowments. When each country specializes in producing one or a few varieties of goods, larger-scale production may take place, giving rise to specialization as a result of the use of more specialized labour and other inputs. This will lead to an increase in factor productivity and in trade of each country.

The source of comparative advantage is also affected by domestic institutions (Nunn, 2007). It has been shown that institutions are quantitatively at least as important sources of comparative advantage as the traditional sources such as factor endowments or technology (Levchenko, 2007; Ferguson and Formai, 2013; Nunn and Trefler, 2014). Levchenko (2007) is probably the first to model theoretically the interactions between domestic institutions and trade performance. Based on the incomplete contracts literature, his model predicts that countries with the highest quality of institutions which are the source of their comparative advantage tend to benefit the most from international trade. This is an expected result as the production of goods and services requires good institutions that support the production process (Nunn and Trefler, 2014).

Nunn and Trefler (2014) provide a comprehensive review of the relationships between domestic institutions and the sources of comparative advantage. They conclude that institutions play a critical role in shaping the patterns of comparative advantage and international trade, and that the causation may run bi-directionally.

Inspired by the pioneering work of Levchenko (2007) and Nunn and Trefler (2014), Araujo et al. (2016) develop a theoretical model to explain how the dynamics of exporting firms are affected by the institutional differences. They show that firms tend to start with a higher volume of exports and serve the destination countries with better institutions for a longer period. However, firms' export growth is higher to the destinations with weaker institutions.<sup>4</sup> This suggests that the dynamics of exporters are affected by the differences of the quality of institutions, export experiences, and the marginal cost of exporting that tends to change over time (Araujo et al., 2016).

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<sup>4</sup> With export experience gained over time, exporters may seek to mitigate the problem of incomplete information by building private relationships with the importers (Araujo et al., 2016)

There is a growing body of empirical literature on the effects of institutions on international trade. Using a gravity model and a data set from 48 countries, Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) reported that, quantitatively, international trade flows were adversely affected by weak institutions as much as tariffs did. Inadequate institutional quality reduced exports. Likewise, Anderson (2004) indicated that imperfect contract enforcement negatively affect trade as it may serve as tariffs on trade flows. Using a panel data set from almost 60 countries over 1990-2000, Méon and Kerkat (2008) employed six aspects of governance as proxies for institutional quality to assess the impacts of these institutional factors on exports. They made a distinction between the exports of manufactured goods and non-manufactured goods. Their estimation results suggested that defective institutions significantly reduce exports of manufactured goods. However, no evidence was found with regards to the associations between institutions and non-manufactured goods.

Söderlund and Tingvall (2014) used firm-level data from Swedish exporters to analyze how institutions in destination countries affect exports by Swedish firms. They found that weak institutions in destination countries hampered the Swedish firms' exports to these countries. Their results also revealed that, through learning experience, exports were less dependent on the quality of institutions in the destination economies over time. This finding suggests that exporters are less affected by the institutions in the destination countries as they successfully establish relationships with their importing partners in the foreign markets.

Söderlund and Tingvall's results are confirmed by a recent study by Araujo et al. (2016). Using firm-level data of Belgian exporters that served foreign markets over 1995-2008 to test their theoretical model, Araujo et al. (2016) find strong support for the predictions of their theoretical model that firms enter into a new export market with higher sales, the stronger the institutions in the importing country, and that a firm's export growth to a foreign market is higher, the lower the effectiveness of the institutions of the foreign destination.

### 3. Some Stylized Facts of Cambodia's Institutions<sup>5</sup> and Trade

Cambodia, a highly open economy, experienced dramatic regime changes brought about by the French colonial rule of 90 years and later by *coups d'état*.<sup>6</sup> The country was also dragged into the French-Indochina war (1947-1954), was subsequently severely affected by the U.S. bombardments during the U.S.-Vietnam war (1955-1975). More recently, Cambodia suffered dramatically from the genocidal *Khmer Rouge* regime (1975-1979) during which time nearly two million people were killed or died of starvation, forced overwork or disease. This brutal *Khmer Rouge* rule and the enduring civil wars caused enormous destructive damage, not only to the

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<sup>5</sup> This section draws largely from Soeng et al. (2016).

<sup>6</sup> Cambodia was briefly at peace and stability, and enjoyed a fair share of prosperity brought about by economic development during the *Sangkum Reastr Niyum* (People's Socialist Community), the post-independence period of 1953-1969 (Slocumb, 2010). Unlike during the French colonial administration, *Sangkum Reastr Niyum* spent heavily on the most two important sectors, health and education, as these sectors were believed to be the key to modernization and healthy economy (Tully, 2005; Slocumb, 2010).

Kingdom's basic infrastructures, many institutions, and financial and health systems, but, more importantly, to the country's human capital and human resources,<sup>7</sup> which are indispensable for the post-conflict reconstruction and development of the conflicts-ridden country.


After the demise of the *Khmer Rouge* regime, Cambodia continued to suffer from the international imposition of embargo and isolation. This came to an end after the conclusion of the 1991 Paris Peace Accord which paved the way for the arrival of the United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTAC). The Kingdom held its first general election in 1993 under the auspices of the United Nations, with the formation of a legitimate coalition government with two prime ministers.<sup>8</sup> Since then, Cambodia has widely liberalized its economy by adopting a highly open outward-oriented policy towards trade with the rest of the world, making Cambodia one of the most open economies in the Asia-Pacific region (Hill and Menon, 2014). Cambodia's volume of international trade as the percentage of GDP reached almost 150% in 2015.

Cambodia's merchandise trade has increased substantially since the very early 1990s. Merchandise exports, measured in current U.S. dollars, has risen by more than 300-fold over just two and half decades (International Monetary Fund, 2017). Similarly, total merchandise imports from the rest of the world have also increased sharply, to almost a 300-fold over the same period. Figure 1 depicts the total international flows of trade in goods and services over 1993-2015. In percentage terms, total exports of Cambodia have increased over time, from around 16% of GDP in 1993 to almost 62% in 2015. Over the same period, its imports have risen from around 33% in 1993 to more than 66% in 2015. Like many other countries, Cambodia experiences chronic deficits in its external balance in goods and services, despite decreased decrease over time to about 4.43% of GDP.

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<sup>7</sup> Tully (2005) reports that many Cambodian intellectuals abroad were lured by *Khmer Rouge* leader Thioung Mumm to return home, with a promise of a role in the reconstruction of the country. They were executed upon their arrival in Cambodia. In 2004, a hybrid court, known as the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, was established between the Royal Government of Cambodia and the United Nations to bring the top *Khmer Rouge* leaders to justice for their crimes against humanity committed during the *Khmer Rouge* regime which killed an estimated 1.7 million people.

<sup>8</sup> Prince Norodom Ranariddh, President of FUNCINPEC Party, served as the first Prime Minister and the second prime ministerial position went to Samdech Techo Hun Sen, the current Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia.



The improvements in its external balance may be attributed to several factors. First, Cambodia's export products and markets have been diversified. The share of its exports to the U.S. market has declined over time from 66.5% of total exports in 2001 to about only 24% in 2015, while its exports to the European Union, ASEAN, Japan and other markets have expanded (Ministry of Economy and Finance and Asian Development Bank, 2016). Thus, it is less affected by external shocks in the world economy. Second, Cambodia is beneficiary of the EU's preferential treatment of its export products under the EU's *'Everything But Arms (EBA)'* and in addition it has signed bilateral trade agreements with other developed countries and emerging economies including Japan and China. Third, being a member of the WTO, Cambodia has undergone far-reaching trade reforms and streamlined as well as improved the effectiveness of customs operations to facilitate international trade flows (Baker, 2016). Time to exports has also fallen noticeably by more than 15 days to around 21 days in 2014 (Baker, 2016).

Table 1 reports for CLMV (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam) the governance quality, which is often used as proxy for institution quality. Since 1996, global governance indicators have been assessed for the World Bank's member countries, covering six aspects of governance, namely control of corruption, regulatory quality, governance effectiveness, rule of law, political stability and absence of violence or terrorism, and voice and accountability. Each country is ranked, using percentile, for each governance dimension.

**Table 1: Governance Indicators for CLMV (Percentile Ranks, %)**

	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012	2013	2014	2015
<b><i>Cambodia</i></b>								
Control of Corruption	17	21	14	7	14	16	13	13
Government Effectiveness	19	19	18	16	23	20	25	25
Political Stability	14	20	30	32	41	40	45	44
Regulatory Quality	50	43	32	37	41	40	37	35
Rule of Law	14	19	9	12	17	15	18	17
Voice and Accountability	21	24	23	21	20	21	18	19
<b><i>Lao PDR</i></b>								
Control of Corruption	36	25	9	6	15	20	25	20
Government Effectiveness	28	20	13	18	22	27	39	37
Political Stability	54	26	26	45	47	49	60	60
Regulatory Quality	11	7	9	14	23	23	22	24
Rule of Law	18	21	14	22	23	26	27	25
Voice and Accountability	20	16	7	5	6	5	4	4
<b><i>Myanmar</i></b>								
Control of Corruption	3	4	1	1	11	12	17	17
Government Effectiveness	6	8	4	3	3	5	9	10
Political Stability	10	7	18	14	18	13	11	10
Regulatory Quality	4	3	0	0	2	5	6	7
Rule of Law	7	10	3	4	6	10	9	8
Voice and Accountability	1	0	0	0	4	7	9	13
<b><i>Vietnam</i></b>								
Control of Corruption	40	32	24	26	36	36	38	39
Government Effectiveness	35	39	41	47	45	46	52	55
Political Stability	58	58	51	50	55	55	44	49
Regulatory Quality	28	22	30	30	28	29	30	34
Rule of Law	37	42	38	41	39	40	45	46
Voice and Accountability	17	12	9	8	9	12	10	11

Note: The data are each country's percentile ranks, with a score of 100% being the highest.  
Source: World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators.


According to the percentile rankings, CLMV on average scored below the 50% percentile rank for almost all dimensions over 1996-2015. Cambodia has improved in terms of political stability, rule of law, and government effectiveness. For political stability, Cambodia's percentile ranks have steadily increased from 14% in 1996, to 20% in 2000, to 32% in 2008, reaching 44% in 2015. Compared to CLMV, Cambodia enjoyed far more political stability relative to Myanmar that was ranked well below the CLMV average for all dimensions, but less than its Indochina neighbors, Lao PDR and Vietnam. Similarly, in 1996 Cambodia's percentile rank for rule of law was 14% and 19% for government effectiveness and its percentile ranks increased to 17% and 25% for these two dimensions respectively, in 2015. Interestingly, the rankings for voice and accountability for Cambodia have not improved over 1996-2015, but the Kingdom was ranked



well above Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam, but below the more advanced ASEAN member states. Singapore was ranked the highest among the World Bank's memberships for all dimensions, except voice and accountability.

Figure 2 depicts the evolution of Cambodia's institutional quality over 1996-2015. The estimated score for each dimension ranges from -2.5 to +2.5, with a score of 2.5 representing the strongest institutions. Although Cambodia scored below the median score of -2.5 to 2.5 for all aspects of governance indicators, it has performed better on some of the governance dimensions—political stability, rule of law, and government effectiveness—during the period under investigation. However, regulatory quality and control of corruption experienced downward trends over 1996-2015, with the latter being identified as the most problematic factor for doing business (Hill and Menon, 2013, 2014; World Economic Forum, 2016, 2017).

**Figure 2: Evolution of Cambodia's Institution Quality, 1996-2015**



#### 4. Specification, estimation techniques and data

In the light of the conceptual discussion presented above, the institution-augmented gravity equation to investigate the relationship between exports and domestic institutions in Cambodia is modelled as follows:

$$L EXP_{cit} = \beta_0 + \beta L(institution)_{ct} + \sum_i \alpha_i L(control\ variables)_{cit} + \varepsilon_{cit} \quad (1)$$

where  $i = 1, 2, 3, \dots, N$  and  $t = 1, 2, 3, \dots, T$  (1996 to 2015, inclusive)

The subscripts  $c$ ,  $i$  and  $t$  refer to Cambodia, trading partner and time, respectively.  $\varepsilon_{cit}$ , denoting a composite error term, is equal to  $\alpha_i + u_{cit}$ , where  $\alpha_i$  is country-specific, accounting for the unobserved heterogeneity among trading partners, and  $u_{cit}$  is a white noise error term. Variables in logarithms are denoted by  $L$ .

Due to the inappropriateness and inefficiency of estimation with time series and cross-sectional estimation alone, it was decided to opt for a panel data set, i.e. the data containing time series of a number of individuals, in the estimations of econometric specification (1). Panel data have several advantages over the usual cross-sectional or time series data (Hsiao, 2003, 2005, 2007; Plasmans, 2006). Plasmans (2006) has shown that panel data are more efficient with respect to random sampling and ease of identification, present less multicollinearity and are better for aggregation as the aggregation may vary over time. Similarly, Hsiao (2005) has indicated that an important advantage of panel data is that it allows to control for the effects of omitted variables and contain information on the inter-temporal dynamics, and also that the individuality of the entities allows the effects of missing or omitted variables to be controlled for. Wei and Liu (2001) have argued that the use of panel data takes into account the diversity and the specificity of unobservable behaviours of different trading partners, which are not shown in the specification (1).

Panel data sets allow us to use three estimation procedures: pooled OLS, fixed-effects (FE), or random effects (RE) estimations. If the assumption holds that the unobservable individual country-specific effects are not very different, pooled OLS estimations are the most efficient and simplest method. The FE estimator takes into account the unobservable country heterogeneity, and is always less efficient than the RE estimator, but the latter may suffer from endogeneity bias (based on the Hausman test) so that the FE estimator is preferred in that case. However, the use of a fixed-effects model will drop the time-invariant variable, and will make FE estimations less preferred to the RE estimation alternative. Like the FE model, RE estimations take into consideration the unobservable heterogeneity effects, but incorporate these effects into the error terms, which are assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables.

To choose the most appropriate model for the panel data set from these three competing models, three statistical tests are available (Plasmans, 2006): the F-test, the Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978), and the Lagrange multiplier test (LM test) (Breusch and Pagan, 1980). The F-test is used to carry out a test for the FE model against the pooled OLS. The null hypothesis of the F-test is that all individual effects are equal (pooled regression), or algebraically,  $H_0: \alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = \alpha_3 = \dots = \alpha_N = \bar{\alpha}$ , with the F-test statistic for the joint significance of the individual effects. The rejection of the null hypothesis will be in favour of the FE model. The Hausman test is for testing the appropriateness of the FE model against the RE model. The Hausman test statistic is computed as follows (Verbeek, 2004):

$$\psi_H = (\hat{\beta}_{FE} - \hat{\beta}_{RE})' [\hat{V}\{\hat{\beta}_{FE}\} - \hat{V}\{\hat{\beta}_{RE}\}]^{-1} (\hat{\beta}_{FE} - \hat{\beta}_{RE}) \quad (2)$$

where  $\hat{V}_s$  denote estimates of the true covariance matrices. Under the null hypothesis that the explanatory variables and  $\alpha_i$  are uncorrelated, the Hausman test statistic  $\psi_H$  is asymptotically  $\chi^2$  distributed with  $K$  degrees of freedom, where  $K$  is the number of slope coefficients in the random effects model. A large value of  $\psi_H$  leads to the rejection of the null in favour of the fixed effects model. To choose pooled the OLS model against the RE model, the Breusch and Pagan (1980) test is carried out. A large value of the LM test statistic will reject the null hypothesis in favour of the RE model.

The alternative approach to either FE or RE models is the Hausman-Taylor (H-T) method, which was proposed by Hausman and Taylor (1981). The H-T method combines the FE and RE estimation strategies and allows the estimations of both time-varying and time-constant explanatory variables in our econometric specification (1). The method is an instrumental variable technique that uses only information already contained in the above specification (McPherson and Trumbull, 2008). The H-T approach was used in a number of previous studies on international trade flows (McPherson and Trumbull, 2008; de Jong and Bogmans, 2011). A competing approach is the correlated random effects (CRE) model which is the alternative to the fixed effects model and allows the correlation between the unobserved effects and the observed explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2010). The CRE strategy is also applicable to the estimations of models with both time-variant and time-invariable variables.

The econometric specification (1) is estimated by using a panel data set covering 1996-2015. Data for the dependent variable (exports) are taken from the IMF's direction of trade statistics, while data on population and GDP per capita are from the United Nations. Institution data are from the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators database online.<sup>9</sup> GSP data are from the Cambodia's Ministry of Commerce.

The World Bank's worldwide governance indicators provide six dimensions of governance, covering more than 200 countries and territories since 1996.<sup>10</sup> The six aspects of good governance include voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. Kaufmann et al. (2010) define the six governance indicators as follows: *voice and accountability (VA)*, measuring perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and free media; *political stability and absence of violence (PS)*, measuring perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means,

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<sup>9</sup> The global governance index is between -2.5 and 2.5, with a higher score indicating better governance quality. Since the logarithm of a negative value is not defined, we transform the index to one on a 0-10 scale.

<sup>10</sup> The worldwide governance indicators have been made available on a biannual basis over 1996-2002, and from 2003 onwards on an annual basis.

including politically motivated violence and terrorism; *government effectiveness (GE)*, measuring the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies; *regulatory quality (RQ)*, capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development; *rule of law (RL)*, capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence; and *control of corruption (CC)*, measuring perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 'capture' of the state by elites and private interests. Following Ranjan and Lee (2007), we exclude *voice and accountability* from our analysis as it mainly captures the democratic character of the political process through which those in power are chosen and replaced.

Geographical distance between Cambodia and its trading partners and WTO membership data are from the *CEPII's GeoDist* database and the *CEPII's gravity* database, respectively<sup>11</sup>. The definitions of all included variables and descriptions of the data, as well as their sources are provided in Appendix A. Trading partners included in our sample are given in Appendix B.

## 5. Empirical Results and Discussion

Table 2 presents basic statistics for all variables and the results of collinearity checks. The average scores for all institutional variables over the period under study are well below the median score of 5 on the 0-10 scale. The variance inflation factor (VIF) values for some institutional variables are relatively high, indicating that there is high multicollinearity among the included variables<sup>12</sup>. These high inter-correlations affect the estimation results as they pose difficulty in identifying statistically the influence of specific institutional factors on Cambodia's exports. To circumvent this high correlation issue, we include the institutional variables one by one in our estimations.

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<sup>11</sup> The data are available at <http://www.cepii.fr>

<sup>12</sup> It is often accepted that  $VIF > 5$  indicates the severity of multicollinearity (Studenmund, 2014).

**Table 2: Basic statistics and VIF values for Explanatory Variables**

Variable Name	VIF	Mean	Minimum	Maximum
LPOP	1.42	16.32	12.50	21.04
LGDP CAP	2.05	9.02	4.85	11.67
LDIST	2.10	8.85	6.28	9.89
Border	1.47	0.033	0	1
WTO_C	12.78	0.71	0	1
WTO_B	4.56	0.64	0	1
GSP	1.73	0.21	0	1
ASEAN	2.26	0.09	0	1
CC	4.83	2.84	2.54	3.31
GE	3.36	3.25	2.87	3.64
RQ	5.66	4.21	3.83	4.90
RL	3.24	2.84	2.50	3.16
PS	13.11	3.98	2.39	4.94

*Notes: LPOP is log of population of trading partners; LGDP CAP is log of GDP per capita of trading partners; LDIST is log of distance between Cambodia and partner countries; Border refers to a land border between Cambodia and partners; WTO\_C is Cambodia being member of WTO; WTO\_B represents Cambodia and trading partners both being members of WTO; GSP is generalized systems of preferences; ASEAN denotes trading partners being members of ASEAN; RQ denotes regulatory quality; PS represents political stability and absence of violence or terrorism; CC is control of corruption; GE is government effectiveness; RL is rule of law.*

Before discussing the empirical results, we summarize the statistical tests to choose the most appreciate method for the estimations of our econometric specification. The test results are reported along with the estimates of the included explanatory variables, presented in Tables 3-7. Tests for heteroskedasticity show that the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is strongly rejected at the 1% level. This suggests that heteroskedasticity is present in the data set. Likewise, the autocorrelation test statistics are also significant, indicating the presence of autocorrelation issues. Therefore, our econometric specification above is estimated with serial correlation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.

The LM statistics are highly significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the random-effects model is statistically superior to the pooled OLS approach. By excluding the time-invariant variables, we also carried out the Hausman test to choose between fixed-effects vs. random-effects models. The Hausman statistics are highly significant at the 1% significance level, providing evidence that there is correlation between the explanatory variables and the error terms. The fixed-effects technique, therefore, appears to be statistically more appropriate than the random-effects model.

As discussed in the section 3, the use of the fixed-effects approach will drop all the time-constant variables, such as distance and border effects variable. To retain these variables, we report the estimates by the Hausman-Taylor method, the instrumental variable technique that

reduces or removes the correlation between the composite error terms and the included variables. For robustness checks, we also present the estimation results of the corrected random-effects technique.

**Table 3: Estimation Results for Control of Corruption**

Variable	RE	FE	H-T	CRE
Constant	-23.57*** (3.30)	-40.31*** (11.51)	-28.33*** (3.95)	5.12 (43.48)
Institution	1.52*** (0.20)	1.44*** (0.21)	1.49*** (0.22)	1.47*** (0.22)
LPOP	1.25*** (0.07)	1.57** (0.72)	1.38*** (0.12)	1.05*** (0.10)
LGDPCAP	1.95*** (0.13)	2.69*** (0.27)	2.26*** (0.10)	2.72*** (0.13)
LDIST	-0.64*** (0.24)	—	-0.62* (0.33)	-0.38 (0.26)
Border	4.67*** (0.79)	—	5.46*** (1.31)	3.42*** (0.84)
WTO_C	1.75*** (0.45)	1.07** (0.46)	1.48*** (0.26)	1.10*** (0.27)
WTO_B	-0.68 (0.45)	-0.59 (0.46)	-0.63*** (0.24)	-0.59** (0.25)
GSP	0.24 (0.26)	0.35 (0.30)	0.22 (0.18)	0.34* (0.19)
ASEAN	-0.75** (0.33)	-1.51*** (0.35)	-1.08*** (0.39)	-1.47*** (0.42)
No. of Observations	1,438	1,438	1,438	1,438
Overall R <sup>2</sup>	0.6820	0.5238		0.7120
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation	46.57***			
Wald test for heteroskedasticity	4884.88***			
Breusch-Pagan test	1382.43***			
Hausman test	FE vs. RE: 117.74***			

Notes:

1. L denotes values in logarithm.
2. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote that the slope parameter estimates are statistically significant at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
3. Standard errors are serial correlation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.

Tables 3-7 present the estimates of individual effects of the institutional variables on export performance of Cambodia. We estimated the impact of each institutional variable, controlling for other determining factors that may affect exports, by using different but related estimation approaches, namely random-effects, fixed-effects, corrected random-effects and Hausman-Taylor estimators, to check the robustness of our results. The control variables include population of trading partners, GDP per capita of trading partners, distance between Cambodia and partner countries and a set of binary variables, which are widely used in the empirical literature to study trade flows between countries (Rose, 2005; Söderlund and Tingvall, 2014). The empirical results for the institutional variables—control of corruption, government

effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, and rule of law—are reported in Tables 3-7, respectively.

The estimates on gravity variables have the expected signs and are highly significant. Population and GDP per capita of trading partners both have positive, significant impacts on Cambodia's exports while geographical distance is, as expected, negatively correlated with trade flows. The model explains the data variation quite well, with  $R^2$  being well above 50%. The estimated coefficient of the common border variable is positive and retains both high statistical and economic significance. This implies that countries sharing land borders trade more with each other.

We are also interested in the effects of Cambodia's membership in international organizations, such as ASEAN and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Our estimates suggest that Cambodia's membership of the WTO did promote the country's exports. The impact is strong both statistically and economically (Tables 3-7). A somewhat surprising result is found with respect to the binary variable ASEAN. Our estimation result suggests that, controlled for differences in control of corruption, Cambodia exported less to ASEAN member states over the period under investigation. This finding is confirmed by the data on Cambodia's exports. Over the past decades, the top five foreign markets for Cambodia's exports were the United States, Hong Kong, United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada (Asian Development Bank, 2016; International Monetary Fund, 2017). A tentative explanation that can be suggested is that Cambodia's producers and exporters are only poorly participating in international production sharing networks and have weak linkages to the industrial value chains that ASEAN-5 countries are deeply involved in (Chen et al., 2011).

Our main interest in the present paper is in the individual effects of different aspects of the institutional variables on Cambodia's export performance. Table 3 reports the result for control of corruption. It is highly significant at the 1% level for all different estimation strategies. This confirms that the improvement in the control of corruption will enhance exports as better control of corruption tends to reduce the costs associated with trade. Our result is consistent with a number of previous empirical studies on the effects of institutions on international trade (Méon and Sekkat, 2004, 2008; de Jong and Bogmans, 2011; Faruq, 2011; Briggs, 2013; Francois and Manchin, 2013).

The estimate on government effectiveness, another proxy for institutional quality, is positive and retains very high statistical significance for all estimators (Table 4). This finding is expected, as better quality of public services, policy formulation and implementation, as well as government's commitment to these policies creates a better environment for business transactions and exchanges, leading to a reduction in trade costs. This result is also in line with the previous empirical studies by Méon and Sekkat (2008) and Briggs (2013). Political stability, which is

indispensable for the development for many countries, is also found to be an important determinant of Cambodia's exports (Table 5).

**Table 4: Estimation Results for Government Effectiveness**

Variable	RE	FE	H-T	CRE
Constant	-24.44*** (3.24)	-27.15** (11.31)	-26.66*** (3.78)	10.28 (45.65)
Institution	2.47*** (0.19)	2.29*** (0.21)	2.38*** (0.20)	2.26*** (0.21)
LPOP	1.19*** (0.07)	0.75 (0.70)	1.25*** (0.12)	1.01*** (0.10)
LGDP CAP	1.82*** (0.12)	2.36*** (0.26)	2.02*** (0.10)	2.35*** (0.13)
LDIST	-0.68*** (0.24)	—	-0.69** (0.32)	-0.40 (0.25)
Border	4.53*** (0.76)	—	5.09*** (1.26)	3.41*** (0.84)
WTO_C	1.28*** (0.42)	0.89** (0.43)	1.13*** (0.23)	0.88*** (0.25)
WTO_B	-0.75* (0.42)	-0.68 (0.43)	-0.72*** (0.23)	-0.68*** (0.24)
GSP	0.17 (0.26)	0.15 (0.29)	0.11 (0.18)	0.16 (0.19)
ASEAN	-0.93*** (0.33)	-1.59*** (0.34)	-1.25*** (0.38)	-1.60*** (0.41)
No. of Observations	1,438	1,438	1,438	1,438
Overall R <sup>2</sup>	0.6962	0.4126		0.7210
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation	46.30***			
Wald test for heteroskedasticity	5857.30***			
Breusch-Pagan test	1543.14***			
Hausman test	FE vs. RE: 85.59***			

Notes:

1. L denotes values in logarithm.
2. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote that the slope parameter estimates are statistically significant at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
3. Standard errors are serial correlation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.



**Table 5: Estimation Results for Political Stability**

Variable	RE	FE	H-T	CRE
Constant	-19.94*** (3.21)	-23.08* (11.75)	-21.76*** (3.67)	-12.63 (18.05)
Institution	1.19*** (0.11)	1.12*** (0.14)	1.17*** (0.10)	1.11*** (0.11)
LPOP	1.21*** (0.07)	0.78 (0.72)	1.26*** (0.11)	1.01*** (0.10)
LGDP CAP	1.82*** (0.13)	2.29*** (0.28)	1.98*** (0.10)	2.28*** (0.13)
LDIST	-0.73*** (0.25)	—	-0.76** (0.30)	-0.40 (0.25)
Border	4.64*** (0.75)	—	5.12*** (1.22)	3.39*** (0.84)
WTO_C	-0.02 (0.44)	-0.28 (0.44)	-0.12 (0.25)	-0.28 (0.26)
WTO_B	-0.68 (0.42)	-0.61 (0.43)	-0.65*** (0.23)	-0.61** (0.24)
GSP	-0.04 (0.27)	-0.11 (0.30)	-0.12 (0.18)	-0.10 (0.19)
ASEAN	-1.25*** (0.35)	-1.97*** (0.36)	-1.59*** (0.39)	-1.98*** (0.42)
No. of Observations	1,438	1,438	1,438	1,438
Overall R <sup>2</sup>	0.6904	0.4026		0.7192
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation	45.48***			
Wald test for heteroskedasticity	9447.62***			
Breusch-Pagan test	1519.43***			
Hausman test	FE vs. RE: 91.57***			

Notes:

1. L denotes values in logarithm.
2. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote that the slope parameter estimates are statistically significant at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
3. Standard errors are serial correlation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 6 presents estimation results for regulatory quality, which measures the government's ability to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations. As is the case for other aspects of institutions, regulatory quality is statistically different from zero at the 1% significance level, implying that an increase in regulatory quality tends to enhance exports. The institutional factor that is the largest contributor to increasing exports of Cambodia is, as expected, the rule of law. It has the largest estimated coefficient and retains very high statistical significance at the 1% level for all estimation strategies. A unit increase in the score for the rule of law is estimated to result in an increase of exports by almost 300% (Table 7).

To summarize, our empirical results show that all institutional aspects have a positive, significant impact on the export performance of Cambodia. According to our estimations, rule of law is the most significant contributor followed by government effectiveness, control of corruption, political stability and regulatory quality. These findings provide evidence that

domestic institutions have played a critically-important role in enhancing Cambodia's exports to its trading partners' markets.

**Table 6: Estimation Results for Regulatory Quality**

Variable	RE	FE	H-T	CRE
Constant	-23.14*** (3.31)	-42.89*** (11.43)	-28.30*** (4.13)	4.71 (36.47)
Institution	0.95*** (0.21)	0.74*** (0.22)	0.85*** (0.20)	0.76*** (0.20)
LPOP	1.22*** (0.07)	1.82** (0.72)	1.38*** (0.13)	1.07*** (0.10)
LGDPCAP	1.90*** (0.13)	2.63*** (0.27)	2.23*** (0.10)	2.68*** (0.13)
LDIST	-0.55** (0.23)	—	-0.52 (0.34)	-0.39 (0.25)
Border	4.45*** (0.79)	—	5.28*** (1.37)	3.46*** (0.84)
WTO_C	1.65*** (0.46)	0.88* (0.47)	1.31*** (0.26)	0.92*** (0.28)
WTO_B	-0.72 (0.46)	-0.62 (0.47)	-0.67*** (0.24)	-0.61** (0.25)
GSP	0.48* (0.26)	0.58* (0.31)	0.47** (0.19)	0.58*** (0.20)
ASEAN	-0.31 (0.34)	-1.04*** (0.36)	-0.62 (0.40)	-0.97** (0.43)
No. of Observations	1,438	1,438	1,438	1,438
Overall R <sup>2</sup>	0.6844	0.5580		0.7085
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation	46.67***			
Wald test for heteroskedasticity	3206.80***			
Breusch-Pagan test	1358.15***			
Hausman test	FE vs. RE: 97.69***			

Notes:

1. L denotes values in logarithm.
2. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote that the slope parameter estimates are statistically significant at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
3. Standard errors are serial correlation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.

**Table 7: Estimation Results for Rule of Law**

Variable	RE	FE	H-T	CRE
Constant	-21.14*** (2.94)	-9.63 (11.30)	-20.03*** (4.69)	-33.80 (30.05)
Institution	2.96*** (0.24)	2.98*** (0.27)	2.90*** (0.19)	2.83*** (0.20)
LPOP	1.08*** (0.07)	-0.07 (0.70)	1.02*** (0.15)	0.98*** (0.10)
LGDP CAP	1.56*** (0.12)	1.77*** (0.26)	1.66*** (0.11)	1.76*** (0.14)
LDIST	-0.62*** (0.22)	—	-0.71* (0.40)	-0.42 (0.25)
Border	4.08*** (0.74)	—	4.43*** (1.63)	3.40*** (0.84)
WTO_C	1.41*** (0.40)	1.38*** (0.41)	1.36*** (0.23)	1.30*** (0.25)
WTO_B	-0.90** (0.40)	-0.90** (0.42)	-0.90*** (0.23)	-0.89*** (0.24)
GSP	0.52** (0.25)	0.41 (0.27)	0.44*** (0.17)	0.42** (0.18)
ASEAN	-0.66** (0.32)	-1.07*** (0.33)	-1.00*** (0.37)	-1.16*** (0.40)
No. of Observations	1,438	1,438	1,438	1,438
Overall R <sup>2</sup>	0.7179	0.2299		0.7297
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation	41.33***			
Wald test for heteroskedasticity	5826.33***			
Breusch-Pagan test	1709.85***			
Hausman test	FE vs. RE: 50.38***			

Notes:

1. L denotes values in logarithm.
2. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote that the slope parameter estimates are statistically significant at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
3. Standard errors are serial correlation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.

## 6. Concluding Remarks

This current paper examines the impacts of domestic institutions on trade flows between Cambodia and its trading partners, using the institution-augmented gravity model with a panel data set from 1996 to 2015, inclusive. We controlled for the widely-used gravity masses, such as market size proxied by population in partner countries, income per capita, geographical distance, and a set of binary variables that are believed to affect Cambodia's exports to the rest of the world.

Our results provide strong support for the important role of institutions in the case of Cambodia. They provide evidence that Cambodia's exports are positively influenced by all aspects of institutions, namely rule of law, control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, and regulatory quality. Of these institutional quality variables, rule of law is found to be the most significant contributor to shaping Cambodia's total exports. The findings appear to be consistent

with the achievements made by Cambodia in building up and rejuvenating its domestic institutions that were completely destroyed during the more than three years of Khmer Rouge rule. Over the past years, despite having some challenges that need to be addressed, Cambodia has gradually improved many of these institutional factors (see Figure 2). Similarly, the World Economic Forum (2017) reports recently that, among the Asian countries, Cambodia is improving most its global competitive index score from 3.5 to 4.0 since 2007.

Our findings offer some policy implications. Since rule of law is found to have the largest impact on export performance, high priority should be given to the further improvements of the legal environment, such as legal and judicial system, and strong enforcement of property rights and contracts, which is expected to not only positively affect international trade, but also build more private investment confidence. Likewise, more efforts should also be made to further undertake administrative reform to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public services delivery. In addition, as corruption is often identified as the most problematic factor for doing business in Cambodia (Hill and Menon, 2013, 2014; World Economic Forum, 2017), further addressing this issue with the existing anti-corruption law will consequently improve the overall business environment perceptions for Cambodia. Institutional reforms incur short-run costs as indicated by Angkinand and Chiu (2011), their long-run economic impacts, however, are significant for sustaining long-run economic performance and enhancing international trade and private investment, both domestic and foreign.

The constant improvements of all aspects of domestic institutions are also expected to further improve the competitiveness of Cambodia and to enhance its exports that are believed to generate ripple effects on income for the Cambodian people, poverty reduction, and inequality, to mention a few. Successfully addressing poverty and inequality issues has been reported to have played an important part in resolving social issues as well as contributing to social cohesion and harmonization in the globalized society.

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### APPENDIX A: Definitions of variables and their sources

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Definitions</b>	<b>Sources</b>
LEXP	Logarithm of Cambodia's exports to each partner	IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics
LPOP	Logarithm of population of trading partners	The United Nations
LGDPCCAP	Logarithm of GDP per capita of trading partners	The United Nations
Border	Binary variable which is unity if Cambodia and trading partner share a land border	Authors
LDIST	Logarithm of distance between Cambodia and its trading partners. Distance is measured in kilometers and is taken from the Centre D' etudes <i>Prospectives et d' Informations Internationales</i> (CEPII).	<i>CEPII's GeoDist database</i>
WTO	Binary variable which is unity when Cambodia is WTO member at time $t$ and 0 otherwise	CEPII's gravity database
WTO_B	Binary variable which is unity if both Cambodia and a trading partner are members of WTO at time $t$ and 0 otherwise	CEPII's gravity database
GSP	Binary variable which is equal to 1 if Cambodia is the beneficiary of generalized system of preferences of a trading partner at time $t$ and 0 otherwise	Cambodia's Ministry of Commerce
ASEAN	Binary variable which is equal to 1 if a trading partner is a member of ASEAN at time $t$ and 0 otherwise	ASEAN Secretariat
Control of Corruption (CC)	Logarithm of regulatory quality index, which ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with a score of 2.5 representing the strongest institutions. The index is rescaled to between 0 and 10, in order for logarithm to be meaningful.	World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators
Regulatory Quality (RQ)	Logarithm of regulatory quality index, which ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with a score of 2.5 representing the strongest institutions. The index is rescaled to between 0 and 10, in order for logarithm to be meaningful.	World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators
Government Effectiveness (GE)	Logarithm of regulatory quality index, which ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with a score of 2.5 representing the strongest institutions. The index is rescaled to between 0 and 10, in order for logarithm to be meaningful.	World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators.
Rule of Law (RL)	Logarithm of regulatory quality index, which ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with a score of 2.5 representing the strongest institutions. The index is rescaled to between 0 and 10, in order for logarithm to be meaningful.	World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators
Political Stability (PS)	Logarithm of regulatory quality index, which ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with a score of 2.5 representing the strongest institutions. The index is rescaled to between 0 and 10, in order for logarithm to be meaningful.	World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators

**APPENDIX B: Cambodia's Trading Partners in the Sample**

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Afghanistan	Colombia	Israel	Nicaragua
Albania	Costa Rica	Italy	Norway
Algeria	Cote d'Ivoire	Japan	Pakistan
Angola	Croatia	Kazakhstan	Paraguay
Argentina	Cyprus	North Korea	Peru
Armenia	Czech Republic	South Korea	Philippines
Australia	Denmark	Kuwait	Poland
Austria	Dominican Republic	Laos	Portugal
Bahrain	Egypt	Latvia	Qatar
Belarus	El Salvador	Lebanon	Romania
Belgium	Estonia	Lithuania	Russian Federation
Bolivia	Finland	Luxembourg	Saudi Arabia
Brazil	France	Macedonia	Singapore
Brunei	Germany	Malaysia	Slovak Republic
Bulgaria	Ghana	Malta	Slovenia
Cameroon	Greece	Mauritius	South Africa
Canada	Hungary	Moldova	Spain
Chile	Iceland	Morocco	Sweden
Hong Kong	India	Myanmar	Switzerland
Macao	Indonesia	Netherlands	Thailand
China	Ireland	New Zealand	Trinidad and Tobago
Turkey	Ukraine	United Arab Emirates	United Kingdom
United States	Uruguay	Vietnam	Taiwan

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