Sustained protest activism and protest cycles: Protest against the Iraqi war in Belgium, Greece and Japan (2003-2004)

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Stefaan Walgrave, University of Antwerp, Belgium
Iosif Botetzagias, University of the Aegean, Greece
Daishiro Nomiya, Sophia University, Japan
Joris Verhulst, University of Antwerp, Belgium
Moses Boudourides, University of Patras, Greece

Word count: 10 091

Abstract: This paper explores the reasons *why* some people continue to participate in contentious political events. Whereas most available studies have yielded interpretive and often case-specific findings, little is known about sustainers' sources of commitment and their characteristics *in general*. This study, using data from protest surveys covering three countries and five anti-war protest events at two different time points, aims to reveal the dynamic nature of sustained activism in more general terms. Our findings suggest that sustained activism is associated with different types of commitment to a movement, with continuance commitment (the cost of leaving the movement) and normative commitment (ideological attachment resulting from longer term socialization processes) being rather strong, followed by affective commitment (belief that benefits outweigh the costs of participation). At the same time, differences in political culture across nations lead to different patterns of sustained activism.

Acknowledgements: The Greek team would like to thank Nikos Diamantopoulos, Dimitris Kallamaras, Gerasimos Mafredas and Yiorgos Papaheliou for voluntarily assisting with the distribution of the 2004 Greek team's questionnaires. We are also grateful to Tania Vavitsa for voluntarily assisting with the questionnaire's coding. The Japanese team would also like to thank Hidehiro Yamamoto, Taisuke Fujita, and Yohei Katano, for their assistance in conducting surveys in Japan.

Primary Contact:

Prof. dr. Stefaan Walgrave
University of Antwerp
Department of Political Science
Media, Movements & Politics (M²P)
Sint Jacobstraat 2
2000 Antwerpen
Belgium
Tel: ++32 (0)3 275 57 25
e-mail: stefaan.walgrave@ua.ac.be

Sustained protest activism and protest cycles.
Protest against the Iraqi war in Belgium, Greece and Japan (2003-2004)

Stefaan Walgrave
Iosif Botetzagias
Daishiro Nomiya
Joris Verhulst
Moses Boudourides

Although we start to know quite a lot about the reasons why people participate in contentious political events and why they display their anger via political protest, our knowledge about the reasons why people *continue* to participate or, in contrast, *stop* participating is rather limited. If we want to understand protest politics, this matter is important: an overwhelming majority of protest participants, many studies show, are no first- or one-timers but recurring protesters. Recently, the literature on sustained activism has grown but the number of studies empirically assessing enduring commitments has remained modest. Most studies are interpretative and few dispose of more easily generalizable quantitative evidence. A second frailty of the available studies is their focus on the micro side of protest activism: which individual features determine whether a certain individual becomes a one-time participant or remains active for a longer period of time? Protest activism and its duration, however, not only depend on an individual's characteristics. It depends on the supply side of protest events too. When no protest events are staged protest activism withers and disappears. When, in contrast, during a protest cycle a lot of protest events are organized, chances are higher that participation will be more enduring. Individual features, hence, must be contextualized and integrated in the broader political context. Third, most studies are single case studies dealing with movements in one country only. Yet, protest participation differs extensively across countries. General differences in political culture between nations lead to different protest participation levels and protest repertoires. This affects the patterns of sustained activism as well. Therefore we need comparative evidence allowing for comparisons between countries to develop more robust tests of hypotheses and explore their general applicability.

This paper attempts to fill some of these gaps in our knowledge of sustained activism. It relies on data about the anti-war movement and anti-war activists. The peace movement, probably more than any other social movement, is determined by processes of ebb and flow. Short spells of mass mobilization alternate with long periods of latency. Empirically, the study draws upon protest survey evidence covering three countries and five protest events in a time span of more than a year. Using a similar questionnaire, in the spring of 2003, at the very peak of the worldwide protest wave against the war on Iraq, we surveyed two protest demonstrations: one in Belgium and one in Japan. At the end of the protest cycle, in March 2004, we surveyed three protest demonstrations: in Belgium, Japan, and Greece. By that time, protest against the war had withered considerably. Protesting against the war had become a lost cause and nobody believed that the Iraqi conflict could be stopped soon. Referring to the 'protest cycle' concept, we hypothesize that the dynamics and attractiveness of the protest at the peak of a protest cycle lead to other types of participants than at the end of the cycle. So we expect our 2003 demonstrators (peak of protest cycle) to be different from our 2004 demonstrators (end of protest cycle). Our 2004 survey also contains evidence about participation in the earlier 2003 anti-war events. This allows us to compare sustained anti-war activists, people that have been active since at least a year (since 2003), with people that are new to the cause and have just joined the movement (in 2004). The paper thus draws on a double comparison: (1) protest activists early in the protest wave (2003) are compared with protest activists late in the protest wave (2004); (2) among the 2004 participants, newcomers are compared with longer-term activists.

We start this study with developing a theoretical argument about sustained activism and deriving operationalized hypotheses from three commitment types: affective commitment, continuance

commitment, and normative commitment. Next, we present our data and methods introducing our protest survey methodology. Then, we move over to analyzing the evidence, first bivariately and than multivariately, and systematically test the hypotheses weighing up the three commitment types against each other. In the final conclusion and discussion section, we summarize our results and put them in perspective.

SUSTAINED ACTIVISM AND PROTEST CYCLES: OPERATIONALIZATION AND HYPOTHESES

Movements and their protests proceed in cycles {Tarrow, 1991 #69}. Sometimes, they gain support and manage to attract new participants; then, they loose momentum and their mobilization power dwindles. Individuals' commitment to movements reflects and affects this cyclical pattern. Individuals step in and out of movements. Sometimes they do so with a good many at the same time and this explains the movement's mobilization cycle; sometimes they do so haphazardly - instream and outstream compensate each other - leading to a steady state of the movement. Individual participation and disengagement are affected by features of the *movement* and by characteristics of *individuals*. In terms of movement features, different movements attract different kinds of supporters. The well-known distinction between the new social movements on the one hand - attracting younger, more female and especially higher-skilled participants – and the old social movements - attracting older blue-collar workers - on the other hand, is emblematic. But not only movement type matters. At times, the same movement can be very topical and surf on the waves of general dissatisfaction; its mobilization power reaches an apex and the movement gets lots of media and public attention. But then again, the movement looses its momentum and virtually disappears from the public scene. At the peak moment of a protest cycle, not only the number but also the kind of participants most likely differs from less successful periods when the movement goes underground and retreats into abeyance structures. We can expect, for example, that the average participant at high times is less committed and more inspired by the general wave of enthusiasm while the participant at low times is the true movement activist glued to his movement and its cause. In terms of individual features, some people are more inclined to join a movement and to stay engaged for a longer time period than others, irrespective of the movement type or the stage in a protest cycle.

The available research literature suggests that movement or context characteristics and individual micro features together determine continued activism. Probably the most systematic effort to tackle persistent activism has been undertaken by Downton and Wehr in their study of peace activists in the US based on in-depth interviews with thirty activists {Downton, 1997 #829;Downton, 1991 #825;Downton, 1998 #618}. Also Hannon (1990) and Klandermans (1997) studied persisting activism among peace activists. Klandermans {, 1997 #115: 93} showed that the commitment level, and the subsequent continued participation, depended on the episodic strength of the movement. At the end of the Dutch peace movement's mobilization cycle in the 1980s, commitment goes down. Yet, people that identify strongly with their *local* peace group manage to stay on board longer than those that did not have strong local bonds. So, local embeddedness (micro) can compensate for a disadvantageous political context (macro). Downton and Wehr confirm that the local aspect of peace activism is paramount to explain peace activism persistence. The presence of local 'targets of resistance' (e.g. military installations) contributed to persisting {Downton, 1998 #618}. But at the same time, "… *national and international political forces and events shape local projects and opportunities*" {Downton, 1998 #618: 12}. Not only engaging in a social movement but also *dis*engaging from it entails costs. These costs depend on, among others, the kind of activism at stake. Sometimes, disengagement implies simply doing nothing: there is no social control that urges people to keep engaging. An example of this is signing a petition {Oegema, 1994 #117}. Yet, sometimes disengagement is more expensive. The more radical the action undertaken and the higher the costs involved, the more difficult it is to quit once a certain activist behavior and a subsequent life-style have been adopted {Della Porta, 1995 #179}. In the case under study here, participating in street demonstrations against the war, the social costs of defecting might in fact be relevant as most people do not demonstrate on their own but attend with others {Walgrave, 2005 #619}.

Following Allen and Meyer {, 1990 #826}, Klandermans (1997: 30) distinguishes three different reasons for movement commitment: "*Individuals may feel affectively attached to a movement; they may fear the cost of leaving; or they may feel morally obliged to remain*." So, there are affective, continuance and normative commitment types. From these types we can derive concrete hypotheses about who will continue to participate and who will not.

Affective commitment means that people continue to participate because they believe benefits outweigh costs. The most valued *collective* benefit for a social movement participant probably is that the goal of the movement is reached {Olson, 1965 #833}. Hence, the more participants think that chances are high that the battle will eventually be won, the more they stay on board. Downton and Wehr (1997) found that their persistent activists all held the perception that their actions made a difference and resulted in at least modest success. Applied to the protest against the 2003-2004 Iraqi war, efficacy perception probably is strongly associated with time. In spring 2003 war had not broke yet and could, in theory, still be prevented. The chances that the no-war goal could be reached were higher than in March 2004 when the main war effort was over but war was lingering on. In March 2004, chances that massive protest could change the war countries' opinion were minimal. So, we expect marked differences in efficacy perception comparing the aggregate 2003 and 2004 demonstrators. Among the 2004 protesters, we expect the long-standing activists, those that declared to have also participated in the 2003 protests, to be more pessimistic than the newcomers. Recurring activists, we suppose, must have noticed that their previous participation has not brought about the wanted outcomes; but the diminishing (collective) utility of their participation may have been compensated by *selective* benefits {Olson, 1965 #833}. We expect them, in particular, to be more integrated in personal networks that support the anti-war protest. In other words: they do not *need* optimism about the cause because their personal network supports them. Klandermans {, 1994 #827}, similarly, showed that people without social cross pressures, that is people whose personal network is not divided in a pro and contra camp, stayed on board more easily and continued to participate in the Dutch peace movement. In a similar vein, Downton and Wehr {, 1998 #618: 18} stated that "… *an enduring commitment needs wholehearted backing from those close to the activist. Our persisters were encouraged by spouses, children, parents, and friends*". So, persistent activists not only participate because of the goals of the movement; their participation has social reasons too: social control and the pleasure to attend protests with friends and co-members.

Continuance commitment is defined as the cost of leaving the movement. This cost is closely associated with the investments in the movement one has made in the past. The more someone has invested, the smaller the chance that he/she will defect. Investments can be measured in many ways; we will operationalize these costs in two ways. First, we expect that a track record of past peace protest activism will make the cost of leaving the movement higher. If one has (frequently) participated in the past it is unlikely that one will disengage. Consequently, we anticipate the 2004 demonstrators, those that remain active although the mobilization level has dwindled considerably, to be long-standing peace activists more than the average 2003 protester. The 2004 newcomers, we hypothesize, are less experienced when it comes to peace protest than the 2004 longer-standing activist. Second, specific movement membership too can be considered as a cost and as a past investment. More in general, the protest participation supportive nature of social networks and memberships has been widely substantiated in numerous studies {Verba, 1995 #138;Rosenstone, 1993 #110}. Downton and Wehr, for example, found that, what they call, shifters and dropouts have weaker bonds with their peace organizations than persisters {Downton, 1998 #618}. Similarly, we expect our 2003 peace protesters to be, on average, less member of peace movements compared to the continuing 2004 protesters. Among the 2004 participants, the ones that have demonstrated in 2003 should report more memberships in peace organizations than the ones that did not participate in 2003. Apart from the costs related to past investments, continuance commitment also depends on the availability of alternatives. If an individual has attractive alternatives to attend to and to engage in, chances are higher that, when the original engagement is withering, he/she will defect and switch to another allegiance. This is precisely what Klandermans (1997:106) found among his 'switchers' who left the Dutch peace movement to become active in other movements: they had more other movement engagements than the ones that stayed on board. So, we hypothesize that the 2004 protesters are more specifically

dedicated to the peace movement while the 2003 protesters will have a more general commitment to several social movements. Similarly, we anticipate the stayers among the 2004 demonstrators to be more specialized peace activists than the new demonstrators.

Normative commitment, finally, results from long-term socialization processes that produce beliefs closely associated with those held by the movement. People feel close to the movement because of ideological reasons; they identify with the movement, its goals and ideology. As a consequence of ideological congruence, participants consider it to be their moral duty to continue to participate. In this study, we will test three indicators of normative commitment. First, we hypothesize that *general* political attitudes of political distrust and dissatisfaction will be associated with sustained activism. As social movements are most of the time challenging the government and the power holders, we expect that people who are critical towards politics and government identify more with the movement and stick to their engagements. We expect the 2003 protesters to be less dissatisfied with politics than the 2004 protesters. Similarly, we think that, among the 2004 protesters, the ones that participated in the 2003 anti-war protests will be more dissatisfied. Second, we will tap normative commitment by gauging the *specific* beliefs protesters hold about the war. The stronger the anti-war views of the participants the more, we speculate, they identify with the peace movement and the more they feel obliged to continue to engage in the movement. The more people are dissatisfied with the Iraqi policy of their government, the more they feel morally obliged to maintain their activism. Again, we hypothesize that the average 2004 protester will be more opposed to (the Iraqi) war and more angry about government policy than the average 2003 protester; the sustained 2004 activist should be more outspoken against war and more critical about government policy than the 2004 newcomer. Third, we speculate that identification with the movement will lead to continued activism. We did not ask the demonstrators whether they identified with the peace or with the anti-war movement but we did ask them how they felt about the global justice movement, as the 2003 and 2004 peace protests were co-organized by the global justice movement {Verhulst, forthcoming #621}. Thus, we think we can use this as a proxy to gauge peace movement identification. 2004 protesters should feel closer to the global justice movement than 2003 protesters; persistent 2004 activists are expected to identify more with the global justice struggle than new 2004 activists. All three measures of normative commitment – general political attitudes, specific political attitudes, and identification - implicitly refer to the same underlying mechanism: movement decline leads to movement radicalization {Kriesi, 1995 #151}. Since our study does not have a true panel design following the same demonstrators across time, we are not able to establish whether the average protester at the end of the protest cycle has *become* more radical than at the climax of the protest wave, or rather, that the less radical demonstrators left the movement while the more radical ones *continued* to participate.

Table 1 summarizes the hypotheses that will guide our empirical enquiry. The table suggests that the three commitment types are distinguishable phenomena. This is, of course, not entirely true. Moreover, the three types of commitment can partially compensate for each other. Diminishing affective commitment - because chances that the goals are reached clearly decrease – can, for example, be compensated by a still very strong normative commitment, the feeling that it is a moral duty to remain engaged. Klandermans (1997: 99) notes that affective commitment is the least stable of the three types of commitment, while normative commitment is the most stable form.

Table 1: Three types of commitment (sustained activism), subsequent operationalizations and hypotheses

Commitment type	Hypotheses	Aggregate 2003-2004 comparison	Old vs. new activists
Affective commitment	1. Perceived chance reaching goals	2003>2004	old<new
	2. Supportive personal networks	2003<2004	old>new
Continuance Commitment	3. Past peace protest activism	2003<2004	old>new
	4. Peace movement membership	2003<2004	old>new
	5. Alternative engagements	2003>2004	old<new
Normative commitment	6. General political attitudes	2003<2004	old>new
	7. Specific (Iraq) political attitudes	2003<2004	old>new
	8. Identification with global justice movement	2003<2004	old>new

In the multivariate analyses, we will also control for standard socio-demographics. In fact, we think that sustained activists may also be different in terms of their socio-demographic features. Authors claim that activism, especially sustained activism, thrives in social circles with a large 'biographical availability' {McAdam, 1989 #828;McAdam, 1988 #611}. Biographical availability means that activists tend to be people that are freer to engage because they do not have a fix job, they do not have children, are not married, have flexible working hours… They organize their lives around their activism and lead different lives. Young people, for example, are freer to engage in longer-standing militant careers. Thus, if mobilization levels decline, only people whose lives do not impose too many constraints on their activism continue to engage. People who are biographically less available experience more counterpressures and alternatives in their lives and turn to ordinary business as the general mobilization enthusiasm fades. Downton and Wehr confirmed that dropouts and shifters have more 'competing responsibilities'; compared to persistent activists, they could no longer manage their complex lives {Downton, 1998 #618}.

DATA AND METHODS

The study covers protest activism in three countries: Japan, Belgium and Greece. Practical reasons determined the choice for those countries, but from a theoretical perspective as well comparing these three countries is a useful design. In comparative terms, our study has a most-different-systems-design. Political and cultural differences between the three countries are huge. Greece is a small south-European country, Belgium a small north-European country, and Japan is a large East Asian nation. There simply are too many differences between our three countries to sum them up here; we will limit ourselves to mentioning four relevant differences. First, their *political system* differs extensively. All are postindustrial, parliamentary democracies. Belgium is an archetypical consociational democracy with many strong parties. It is a plural society always governed by an extensive coalition government while Greece and Japan are much less plural societies. {Lijphart, 1999 #38}. If we follow Lijphart and his classification of political regimes, Belgium and Greece are most different systems with Japan in between but closer to Belgium. The three nations also differ in terms of the level and the dominant type of *protest activism* and action repertoires. According to Norris {, 2002 #126} drawing upon the 1990 World Values Study, demonstration activism is a typical Belgian habit while the Japanese take much less to the streets but display their political anger by signing petitions. A quick scan into the European Social Survey 2004 covering Belgium and Greece learns that Belgians, at least during the last year, took more part in petitions (22% vs. 3%) and participated more in public demonstrations (6% vs. 4%) than Greeks. Third, and more concretely linked with the topic of this study, the political configuration and the *stance of the incumbent government* vis-à-vis war on Iraq was very different. In Belgium, the liberal-socialist-green coalition of Guy Verhofstadt strongly opposed war in 2003 and it kept doing so in 2004. Belgian opposition parties agreed with the government and did not support war either. In Greece, the socialist government of Kostas Simitis did not support the war effort, although it turned a blind eye to the use of USA military bases in Greece. Greek opposition parties, from the

vociferous Communist Greek party to the less sanguine Conservative party, were similarly opposed to the war. The Japanese government, despite overwhelming anti-war sentiments expressed by the majority of the electorate, supported the US military deployment in Iraq on the basis of the long-term US-Japan alliance relationship; in addition, it sent 'self-defense forces' to a southern region in Iraq. Finally, *protest against the war* in the three countries under study differed a lot. Verhulst (forthcoming) estimating turnout figures for the massive and worldwide demonstrations against war on February 15th, 2003, found that, among our three countries, mobilization against the war was far largest in Greece. About 200,000 people took to the Greek streets on that single day which represents 1.2% of the entire population. In Belgium, 75,000 people demonstrated on February 15th, which is 0.7% of the Belgian population. The Japanese turnout was more modest with 25,000 people and a very low mobilization rate of 0.02%. So, in Greece protest was widespread, in Japan it was not widespread at all, and Belgium lies in between but closer to the Greeks. Wrapping up, we can safely state that our three nations differ extensively in many respects. This should imply large differences between the demonstrators in the three countries. Hence, if we would find similarities in the determinants of (non-)sustained activism in countries so diverse, this would yield strong evidence that we are dealing with quasi universal and generizable mechanisms of (non-)sustained activism.

We covered five demonstrations against the Iraqi war. In Belgium we surveyed the major demonstration on February 15th, 2003, in Brussels with 75,000 participants and the much smaller demonstration in Brussels on March 20th, 2004, mobilizing 7,000 people. In Greece we surveyed mainly the major demonstration in on March 20th, 2004, in Athens with over 7,000 participants[1], while we conducted a handful of face-to-face interviews with people protesting at the same day on similar demonstrations in Patras and Agrinio. In Japan, we covered the demonstration in Tokyo on April 5th, 2003, and on March 21st, 2004, with respectively around 50,000 and 8,000 participants. The turnout figures clearly show that mobilization levels were much lower in March 2004 than they had been in the spring of 2003: the protest cycle was nearing its end.

All data were collected relying on an innovative *protest survey* methodology consisting of directly questioning participants at demonstrations. Interviewing participants at protest demonstrations is not a common research technique. Favre and colleagues even speak of 'a strange gap in the sociology of mobilizations' {Favre, 1997 #148}. To the best of our knowledge, protest surveying has only been used in a few studies {see among others: \Waddington, 1988 #534;Jasper, 1995 #714}. Most elaborate is the work of the French research team including Favre, Mayer and Fillieule, who developed a method designed to offer all participants an equal opportunity of being interviewed {Fillieule, 1997 #622}. Their method was further refined by Van Aelst and Walgrave (2001). The actual survey process used in this study to establish a random survey of demonstration participants was twofold. First, fieldwork supervisors counted the rows of participants, selecting every Nth row, to ensure that the same number of rows was skipped throughout. Then a dozen interviewers selected every Nth person in that row and distributed questionnaires to these individuals during the actual protest march. Elsewhere, we describe the field work process in more detail {Norris, 2005 #127}. The selected participants were asked to complete a questionnaire at home and mail it back. The main weakness of this distribution method is that we do not know for sure that the respondents that send back their questionnaire are representative for the demonstrators as a whole. In previous protest surveys in Belgium and elsewhere, in addition to the mail-survey, we therefore took a random sample of other demonstrators that were interviewed in person before the demonstration's departure. The gathering crowd before the demonstration's departure was divided into sectors, and the interviewers each randomly selected a fixed number of respondents in 'their' sector[2]. These (shorter) face-to-face interviews were used as a crosscheck to evaluate how far response to the mail-survey generated a representative random sample of demonstrators. Confidence in the surveys' reliability was strengthened by the fact that hardly anyone refused a face-to-face interview, and by the absence of significant differences between the two types of interviews. In this study we only have respondents from the postal surveys at our disposal. The overall response rate for the postal survey was 40.5% which is satisfactory for an anonymous survey without any reminders, which also increases confidence in the procedure (see Table 2).

Table 2: Protest survey evidence and response rate in Japan, Belgium and Greece (2003 and 2004 demonstrations)

	Japan		Belgium		Greece		Total	
	Response Rate %	N	Response Rate %	N	Response Rate	N	Response Rate %	N
2003	44.0	308	46.4	510	/	/	45.2	818
2004	45.4	235	32.7	262	29.2	122	35.7	619
Total	44.3	543	39.6	772	29.2	122	40.5	1437

The questionnaires in the three countries maintained a common core - including the participants' profile, the mobilization context, and their political attitudes and behavior - with some items adapted for each demonstration. Especially in 2003, the questionnaires in Japan and Belgium were not really identical. In 2004, in contrast, we managed to field an almost perfectly identical questionnaire in the three countries under study. These questionnaire dissimilarities limit the comparability somewhat. That is one of the reasons why we will analyze the several countries' data separately. Moreover, theoretically, dealing with the three countries separately leads to much tougher tests whether associations are generalizable as they hold across nations.

Before proceeding with the analyses, a final remark is in order. As mentioned above, we will consider two dependent variables: the year of the demonstration, 2003 vs. 2004, and the type of 2004 activist, sustaining or not-sustaining. Regarding the second dependent variable, strictly speaking, we cannot talk about sustaining vs. non-sustaining activists since we do not really compare persisting with non-persisting activists; we do no have evidence about people that *dis*engaged. Rather we compare sustaining with *new* activists and we consider these as non-sustaining although these people might perfectly maintain their activism in the time to come. These newcomers joined the movement at a stage in the protest cycle when we expect, according to the first dependent variable, that only sustaining activists would remain engaged. The way we tap sustained activism among the 2004 protesters is by asking the simple question whether they had participated in the large anti-war protests on February 15th, 2003. Although February 15th, 2003, was a major event other anti-war events were staged in the same period. Hence, we cannot exclude that some 2004 activists that we classified as newcomers were, in fact, not new to the movement at all; they just did not participate in the February 15th, 2003, event.

ANALYSES

Affective commitment

To what extent do sustaining activists, compared to dropouts, believe that the benefits of participation outweigh the costs? In 2003, we did not ask the participants whether they thought chances were high or low that the demonstration would reach its goals. Yet, in 2004 we did ask this question and can compare long-term activists with newcomers (for precise question wordings, see technical appendix). Our hypothesis that long-standing activists would be more pessimistic is not confirmed for the general efficacy perception. Among our 2004 demonstrators, in none of the countries, we find a significant relationship between efficacy perception and participation in the major February 15th, 2003 event. Spearman correlation coefficients making this point are presented in Table 3. Apart from measuring efficacy perception directly and in general, we confronted our respondents with two statements about effects of the demonstration on public opinion and on political leaders. These more specific questions about efficacy perception did yield many significant results. Quite some coefficients in the table are significant and go in the expected direction: the 2003 participants are more optimistic about the outcomes of the protest than the 2004 participants, especially when it comes to public opinion; sustained activists are more pessimistic than newcomers, especially when it comes to the demonstration's political impact. This confirms the hypothesis.

Regarding supportive personal networks, we put forward the hypothesis that sustaining activists would be more embedded in supportive personal networks, they would experience more support for the movement's goals in their immediate, most intimate environment. This turns out to be the case in all three countries. The more partners, families and friends agree, the higher the chance that one will continue to participate. More formal networks of neighbors, colleagues and co-members do not seem to play the same supportive role: none of the coefficients are significant.

Overall, affective commitment hypotheses are confirmed rather than falsified by the data (Table 3). Most of our indicators of affective commitment yield significant coefficients going in the expected direction. Efficacy perception definitely is bivariately associated with sustained activism and so are supportive social networks.

Table 3: Affective commitment and sustained activism: Spearman correlations and significance

	Japan		Belgium		Greece	
	2003 vs. 2004	Old vs. new	2003 vs. 2004	Old vs. new	2003 vs. 2004	Old vs. new
Efficacy perception						
General efficacy perception	/	-.066	/	-.025	/	.001
Effect on public opinion	.100*	.045	.134***	-.042	/	.040
Effect on political leaders	.003	.025	.232***	-.134*	/	-.231*
Supportive personal network						
Partner, family, friends agree	/	.120*	/	.103*	/	.164*
Neighbors, colleague., co-members agree	/	.094	/	-.076	/	.119

Significance: * .10<p<.50; ** p<.10; *** p<.01

Continuance commitment

Is there any evidence that for sustaining activists the costs of leaving the movement would be higher? We operationalized these costs, on the one hand, as the past investments activists made in the movement and, on the other hand, as the alternative movement engagements claiming spare time. We asked both the 2003 and 2004 protesters whether they had participated in peace protests before the Iraqi crisis broke. Past peace movement activism, indeed, turns out to be a fairly strong predictor of continued participation: in Belgium and Greece the sustaining 2004 activists had, in the past, been much more active in peace demonstrations than their newcoming 2004 colleagues. Overall, 2004 participants (in Belgium) had more peace protest experience than 2003 participants (no figures available for Japan and Greece). This firmly underscores the idea that activism tends to be sustained when people are integrated in protest milieus that support and nurture their activism. People that dropout or attend for the first time, have been less active in the past.

The same logic applies to peace movement membership. Peace organization membership is significantly correlated, in all three countries, with sustained activism. At the end of a movement cycle, the Belgian data suggest, the remaining die hard activists tend to be members of the movement staging the event. Similarly, sustaining activists are more members of peace organizations than newcoming activists. This hypothesis, hence, is corroborated too.

The expectation, however, that alternative movement engagements - alternative protest activism and alternative active movement memberships - would reduce sustained activism, as these people have many alternative engagements claiming their spare time, is not at all supported by the evidence, quite the contrary. Many coefficients are significant and they have a *positive* sign, while our expectation was that they would have a negative one. It seems that alternative engagements in non-peace protests and non-peace movements buttress continued activism instead of decreasing it.

By and large, two of the three continuance commitment hypotheses receive strong confirmation from the evidence (Table 4). Past peace activism and peace movement membership are strongly associated with sustained activism. This especially applies to Belgium and Greece, less to Japan. Yet, alternative engagements in other movements are not affecting sustained peace activism negatively, on the contrary. The more people are active in other protests or movements, the more they remain active as peace activists as well. It seems as if competing claims from other movements are not threatening peace activism. So, we must reject the alternative movement engagement hypothesis.

Table 4: Continuance commitment and sustained activism: Spearman correlations and significance

	Japan		Belgium		Greece	
	2003 vs. 2004	Old vs. new	2003 vs. 2004	Old vs. new	2003 vs. 2004	Old vs. new
Past peace activism						
Participation peace (anti-war) demonstration	.043	.038	.357***	.409***	/	.492***
Peace movement membership						
Membership peace organization	/	.208**	.292***	.191**	/	.195°
Alternative movement engagements						
Alternative protest activism	/	.076	.183***	.384***	/	.352***
Alternative movement memberships	/	.068	.227***	.119	/	.346***

Significance: °p<.10 (Greece only); * .10<p<.50; ** p<.10; *** p<.01

Normative commitment

This kind of commitment is based on ideological identification with the movement and its cause. Consequently, one feels morally obliged to sustain participation. Since we do not dispose of direct measures tapping identification with the peace (anti-war) movement, we can only draw upon indirect measures of normative commitment. First, we use a series of measures of general political attitudes expressing dissatisfaction with politics. We hypothesized that radical attitudes indicate anger and dedication and, thus, foster loyalty to the movement and its actions. Many general political attitude coefficients go in the expected direction and many of them turn out to be strongly significant, especially in Belgium and, to a somewhat lesser extent, in Japan. In Greece, ideological differences between sustaining and newcoming activists remain modest: sustaining activists were only considerably more left-wing than newcomers. In terms of distrust with the national government, we notice a strange contradiction between Belgians and Japanese. While the Belgian 2004 activists - perfectly according to our expectations - distrusted their government more than the Belgian 2003 activists, the opposite was the case in Japan: Japanese 2004 activists trusted their government *more* than the Japanese 2003 activists. The reason may be the timing of the first Japanese survey. The 2003 Japanese survey was done right after the war on Iraq had started, and people's distrust toward the Japanese government was exceedingly high. In the year 2004, when the war had become less of a politically important issue in Japan, the government started to regain its support which they had lost in the year 2003. Regarding general dissatisfaction with democracy in their country, sustaining activists are less satisfied with the functioning of democracy in their country than the other activists. Regarding general political dissatisfaction we found that, in Belgium, sustaining activists are *more* satisfied with the political system and think higher of their personal political capacities. So, in general, sustaining activists may be more dissatisfied with specific political actors and specific policies, but they are more satisfied with the political system in general. Sustaining activists, in Belgium, Japan, and Greece tend to be more left-wing than other activists.

Second, we asserted that specific Iraqi-related political attitudes may be associated with (non-)sustained activism. We stated that the intensity of anti-war beliefs may be associated with sustained

activism. The activists that stay on board would be more radical than the others. In only one country did we find evidence that underpins this hypothesis: only in Japan long-term activists are more radically opposed to the war and more critical towards the US (for exact question wording and scale construction, see technical appendix). Dissatisfaction with the specific Iraqi policy of the national government, however, is strongly associated with sustained activism both in Japan and Belgium, as we expected.

Third, we use sympathy for and identification with the global justice movement as a proxy for identification with the peace movement. Only in Belgium did we have a good scale of identification with the global justice movement and this scale yielded the expected result: as expected activists that have been participating for a longer time identify more with the global justice movement than new activists.

Coming to an intermediary conclusion concerning the normative commitment hypotheses, it is clear that we cannot falsify any of these hypotheses at this stage (Table 5). The evidence suggests that general and specific political beliefs and identification with the movement play a role in maintaining activism. This does not apply to all countries to the same extent, but the evidence seems compelling enough to maintain that normative commitment does play a role in keeping activists on board. Interestingly enough, specific ideas about the war do not seem to produce particularly loyal participants; it is rather attitudes and opinions about politics and government in general that seem to yield loyalty or disloyalty.

Table 5: Normative commitment and sustained activism: Spearman correlations and significance

	Japan		Belgium		Greece	
	2003 vs. 2004	Old vs. new	2003 vs. 2004	Old vs. new	2003 vs. 2004	Old vs. new
General political attitudes						
Distrust government	-.135**	.139*	.188***	.99	/	.130
Dissatisfaction democracy	.205***	.022	.159***	.135*	/	-.004
General political dissatisfaction	.023	-.084	-.095**	-.133*	/	.084
Left-right placement	-.009	.037	-.217***	-.161*	/	-.260**
Specific (Iraq) political attitudes						
Intensity anti-war beliefs	/	-.170**	-.068	.015	/	-.076
Dissatisfaction with Iraqi policy	.123**	.152*	.515***	.040	/	.057
ID global justice movement						
Identification/agree GJ movement	/	-.012	.075	.204**	/	-.070

Significance: * .10<p<.50; ** p<.10; *** p<.01

Multivariate analyses

Above we showed that, at least when analyzed bivariately, all three types of commitment – affective, continuance, and normative commitment – can to some extent be considered as factors that affect sustained activism. The question remains, however, which of the three types of commitment is the most important to explain sustained activism. Therefore, we proceed with multivariate analyses confronting all hypotheses and variables. We work in two steps: first we compare the aggregate 2003 and 2004 demonstrators in the two countries for which we have 2003 data (Belgium and Japan); next, we compare, among the 2004 protesters in all three countries, the ones that demonstrated before with the ones that did not. We draw upon classic OLS regression models to predict participation year (2003 or 2004) and sustaining or newcoming activism (in 2004). We control for standard demographics and for political interest.

The aggregate 2003-2004 analyses' explained variance differs strongly between Belgium and Japan (Table 6). Our models are much better capable of grasping why 2003 and 2004 activists differed from

each other in Belgium than in Japan (see adjusted R^2). First of all, the results show that the 2004 demonstrations were attended by younger people than the 2003 demonstrations both in Belgium and Japan. This underpins the idea of biographical availability. For younger people with less competing demands on their spare time, sustaining activism is easier. Other control variables are not significant but in Japan 'political interest' comes close to significance: in 2004 more politically interested Japanese seem to have taken to the streets than in 2003.

In terms of the affective commitment indicators, in Belgium, perceived effects on both public opinion and on political leaders are associated with the year of participation: 2004 participants are more pessimistic about the impact of the demonstration on public opinion and on politics than 2003 participants.

Regarding continuance commitment, again, only the Belgian data yield significant results. Past participation in peace protest actions is an excellent predictor of 2004 participation; the same applies to peace organization membership. Hence, chances to stay on board and to sustain one's activism increase strongly when one has been active on peace issues in the past.

Finally, concerning normative commitment, we do find some significant parameters both in Belgium and Japan. Yet, these parameters are not the same and they even partially contradict each other. Belgian 2004 demonstrators are much more dissatisfied with their government's Iraqi policy than Belgian 2003 demonstrators. Japanese sustaining activists display more trust in their government, a weird finding we also noted in the bivariate analyses above and which could probably be attributed to the timing of the 2003 survey. In terms of dissatisfaction with democracy, the Japanese and Belgian data contradict each other. While sustaining activists in Belgium are more satisfied with democracy than the others, sustaining activists in Japan are less satisfied with the functioning of democracy in their country. The normative commitment results show that attitudinal parameters and motivators for sustained activism are strongly context-dependent. In some countries and in some political contexts, certain attitudes foster sustained activism, in other contexts the same attitudes seem to do exactly the opposite: they make people defect.

Overall, the aggregate 2003-2004 comparison gives us some clues about which of the commitment types is the best predictor of sustained activism. All commitment types perform more or less satisfactory but –comparing the standardized Betas - the explanatory power of the continuance and, especially, the normative commitment variables tends to be superior to that of the affective commitment variables. Do the disaggregate analyses confirm this tendency?

Table 6: Affective, continuance and normative commitment and sustained activism; OLS regression predicting participation year (2003 or 2004)

	JAPAN		BELGIUM	
	St. Beta	Sign.	St. Beta	Sign.
CONTROL VARIABLES				
Age	-.365	.000	-.168	.000
Sex	.004	.934	.036	.309
Education	-.043	.350	-.028	.413
Interest in politics	-.093	.052	-.016	.674
AFFECTIVE COMMITMENT				
Efficacy perception				
General efficacy perception	/	/	/	/
Effect on public opinion	.083	.132	0.78	.023
Effect on political leaders	-.024	.666	.076	.043
Supportive personal network				
Partner, family, friends agree	/	/	/	/
Neighbors, colleagues, co-members agree	/	/	/	/
CONTINUANCE COMMITMENT				
Past peace activism				
Participation peace (anti-war) demonstration	.035	.444	.226	.000
Peace movement membership				
Membership peace organization	/	/	.157	.000
Alternative movement engagements				
Alternative protest activism	/	/	-.047	.258
Alternative movement memberships	/	/	.033	.410
NORMATIVE COMMITMENT				
General political attitudes				
Distrust government	-.176	.000	.014	.746
Dissatisfaction democracy	.152	.001	-.078	.073
General political dissatisfaction	-.017	.718	.030	.046
Left-right placement	.022	.634	.007	.845
Specific (Iraq) political attitudes				
Intensity anti-war beliefs	/	/	-.055	.101
Dissatisfaction with Iraqi policy	.014	.765	.392	.000
ID global justice movement				
Identification/agree GJ movement	/	/	.001	.972
Adjusted R^2	.180		.368	
N	553		772	

The disaggregate analyses comparing the 2004 sustaining with the 2004 new activists yield more complex results but, globally, they confirm the previous findings (Table 7). For one, the small number of cases in Greece (and Japan) forced us to use not entirely similar statistical procedures (see footnote under Table 7). First of all, the explained variance of the models for the three countries differs a lot. Again, the Japanese model performs far poorest (see adjusted R^2 scores). Somehow, we have difficulties getting a good grip on the behavior of the Japanese (non-)sustaining activists. Quite some control variables are significant in the models. Age, for example, is a good predictor of sustained activism in Japan and in Greece. In both countries, the returning activists having participated as well in the 2003 protests are somewhat older than the newcomers. Sex plays a role in Belgium: sustaining activists are more male. Interest in politics works different in Belgium and Greece. Among the affective commitment variables, efficacy perception works in Japan and in Greece. Returning activists in Japan are more pessimistic about the chances that the demonstration will reach its goal; Greek returning activists consider their impact on public opinion to be smaller than non-returning activists.

Returning activists in Belgium think their neighbors, colleagues, and co-members are less supportive for the demonstration's aims than the non-returning Belgian activists. The continuance commitment indicators perform satisfactory. Previous participation in peace protests (in Belgium), membership of a peace organization (in Japan), protest activism for other than peace issues (in Belgium), and active membership in other than peace organizations (Greece) all function as significant predictors of sustained activism. Normative commitment variables as well seem to catch some of the variance in (non-)sustained activism. The best predictor is left-right self-placement: left wing people maintain their activism, or return as activists, much more than right-wing people (Belgium and Greece). The more one identifies with the global justice movement, the higher the chance that one will maintain his/her activism (Belgium and Greece). In Belgium, returning activists are less dissatisfied with politics in general. In Japan they are more dissatisfied with their own government's Iraqi policy.

Comparing the explaining power of the indicators of our three types of commitment suggests, yet again, that continuance commitment and normative commitment are the better bet. They seem to be able to grasp the (non-)sustained nature of activism better than the affective commitment variables. Finally, by and large, the Belgian and Greek activists display more or less the same underlying structure of (non-)sustained activism: the explained variance of both models is satisfactory; more or less the same variables prove to be significant while they go in the same direction. The Japanese demonstrators are most different: significant variables predicting (non-)sustained activism in Japan are often different from the ones in Belgium and Greece. Once more this emphasizes the importance of context. Different types of commitment play a different role in sustaining activism in different countries.

Table 7: Affective, continuance and normative commitment and sustained activism; OLS regression predicting new versus sustained activism (2004)

	JAPAN*		BELGIUM**		GREECE***	
	St. Beta	Sign.	St. Beta	Sign.	St. Beta	Sign.
CONTROL VARIABLES						
Age	.174	.035	.089	.313	.179	.113
Sex	ns	ns	-.176	.042	ns	ns
Education	ns	Ns	-.097	.269	ns	ns
Interest in politics	-.096	.246	-.274	.004	.227	.084
AFFECTIVE COMMITMENT						
Efficacy perception						
General efficacy perception	-.135	.100	.089	.340	ns	ns
Effect on public opinion	Ns	Ns	.045	.602	.185	.105
Effect on political leaders	Ns	Ns	.046	.619	-.166	.170
Supportive personal network						
Partner, family, friends agree	.099	.226	.068	.424	ns	ns
Neighbors, colleagues, co-members agree	Ns	ns	-.202	.020	ns	ns
CONTINUANCE COMMITMENT						
Past peace activism						
Participation peace (anti-war) demonstration	Ns	ns	.208	.021	.460	.000
Peace movement membership						
Membership peace organization	.216	.008	.144	.144	ns	ns
Alternative movement engagements						
Alternative protest activism	Ns	ns	.314	.003	ns	ns
Alternative movement memberships	Ns	ns	-.142	.137	.298	.020
NORMATIVE COMMITMENT						
General political attitudes						
Distrust government	Ns	ns	-.018	.866	ns	ns
Dissatisfaction democracy	ns	ns	.132	.229	ns	ns
General political dissatisfaction	ns	ns	-.149	.082	ns	ns
Left-right placement	.102	.203	-.186	.056	-.210	.090
Specific (Iraq) political attitudes						
Intensity anti-war beliefs	-.109	.187	-.001	.992	ns	ns
Dissatisfaction with Iraqi policy	.131	.098	-.101	.321	ns	ns
ID global justice movement						
Identification/agree GJ movement	ns	ns	-.204	.037	-.162	.136
Adjusted R^2	.112		.341		.364	
N	235		262		122	

Because the number of cases is relatively small for such large regression analyses with so many variables we put the significance threshold at $p<.10$ (for Greece at $p<.15$) and not at the usual $p<.05$.

* Japan: because the simple enter model performed really bad with all variables (model's total significance was .172) we used the backward procedure and present the model with the largest adjusted R^2.

** Belgium: normal simple enter model.

*** Greece: because the simple enter model really performed bad with all variables probably due to the very small number of cases (the model's total significance was .182) we used the backward procedure and present the model with the largest adjusted R^2.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

What have we learned? The most important lesson is that sustained activism is to some extent associated with different types of commitment to a movement and its actions. To summarize our results, we recapitulate the table with hypotheses adding whether they were confirmed or not (Table 8). Most hypotheses receive confirmation in one or two countries. Only the hypothesis that alternative, competing movement engagements draw people away from sustaining their original engagement can be rejected and must, in fact, even be reversed. Comparing both the aggregate and the disaggregate analyses' results suggests that especially efficacy perception, past protest activism and general political attitudes are the best predictors of sustained activism. Sustainers are *not* more optimistic about the outcomes of their actions, even on the contrary (they can compensate adverse political situations); they have been active in previous protest actions around the same issue; and, attitudinally, they are more radical and critical towards government and the workings of democracy.

Table 8: Three types of commitment and sustained activism. Hypotheses and results.

Commitment type	Hypotheses	2003 vs. 2004	Sustaining vs. new activists
Affective commitment	1. Perceived chance of reaching goals	+	++
	2. Supportive personal networks	/	-
Continuance Commitment	3. Past peace protest activism	+	++
	4. Peace movement membership	+	+
	5. Alternative engagements	-	-
Normative commitment	6. General political attitudes	++	++
	7. Specific (Iraq) political attitudes	+	+
	8. Identification with global justice movement	-	++

/=no data to test this hypothesis; -=hypotheses rejected (not one single indicator significant in the multivariate analyses); ±=hypothesis pending (contradictory results between countries); +=hypothesis confirmed (at least one significant indicator in one country); ++=hypothesis strongly confirmed (at least one significant indicator in two countries); +++=hypothesis very strongly confirmed (at least one significant indicator in three countries).

Probably, sustained activism is a function of affective, continuance and normative commitment at the same time. People's estimation of the chances of success, their experience with and embeddedness in protest milieus, and their attitudes and beliefs, *together*, determine whether they persist or disengage. This is not to deny that some types of commitment could be more important than others. If we simply consider the (aggregate) values of the standardized Beta's in our models (figures not in table), it is obvious that some variables contribute much more to explaining sustained activism than others. By and large, continuance commitment seems to be the strongest determinant of (non-)sustained activism, closely followed by normative commitment. Affective commitment, our models suggest, affects continued activism to a lesser extent.

Of course, we must be very cautious with such conclusions as we did not always have the relevant indicators to tap the different forms of commitment. Affective commitment, the rational weighing of pros and cons of participation, in fact, was probably gauged least effective, while continuance and normative commitment were tapped more adequately in our surveys. Moreover, some of our indicators of a certain commitment type can also be considered as an indicator of another commitment type. Supportive personal networks, for example, were classified under affective commitment while it might also be considered as an indicator of continuance commitment. The specific political attitudes regarding the Iraqi war, to give another example, could also be considered as an indicator of affective commitment. Thus, our data suggest that continuance and normative commitment are most important, but this is not a definitive statement.

A second lesson to retain is that the determinants of sustained activism depend strongly on the larger cultural and political context. Although we surveyed, at about the same time, similar participants in very similar protest events around the same issue and with the same goals and targets in three postindustrial parliamentary democracies, we do find substantial differences across countries in

underlying mechanisms producing (non)sustained activism. Sometimes, the same indicator even yielded contradictory results buttressing continued engagement in one country while stimulating disengagement in another. Only more comparative studies can further our knowledge of sustained activism and test whether our findings are generalizable and apply to other countries and movements as well.

NOTES

1. On February 16th, 2003, at the highpoint of the worldwide protests against the war, 100,000 protesters marched in Athens according to the organisers. Police figures are much lower at 40,000 (Greek daily ELEFTHEROTYPIA 16/2/2003).
2. In the Greek case, this distribution method was used for distributing the postal questionnaires which the participants were asked to fill in at home.

TECHNICAL APPENDIX: VARIABLES AND SCALES

GENERAL VARIABLES	
Country	1=Japan; 2=Belgium; 3=Greece
Old vs. new participants	'Last year, did you take part in the large demonstration against war in Iraq on February 15?' (0=no; 1=yes)
2003 vs. 2004 participants	Survey year (1=2003; 2=2004)
Age	'What is your year of birth?' (Recalculated to age).
Sex	1=male; 2=female
Education	'What is the highest educational qualification you gained? If you are still a student, please indicate your future qualification after having finished your current studies' (1=none; 9=PhD)
Interest in politics	'How interested are you in politics?' (1= very much; 5=not at all)
AFFECTIVE COMMITMENT	
General efficacy perception	'How high do you estimate the chance that this demonstration will help to achieve the above mentioned goals?'(from 1 till 10; recoded in three categories: 1=low chance (0-3); 2=intermediate chance (4-6); 3=high chance (7-10))
Effect on public opinion	This demonstration increases the public opinion's understanding of our demands (1=totally agree till 5=totally disagree)
Effect on political leaders	'Political leaders will take into account the demands voiced at large demonstrations like this' (1=totally agree till 5=totally disagree). Different questions wording in Japan: 'Demonstrations such as this one put political leaders under pressure to take action on our demands' (1=totally agree till 5=totally disagree).
Partner, family, friends agree	'Do you think people in your environment would agree on the demands of this demonstration?'(dummy variables: partner, family, friends (0=no; 1=yes); recoded into additive scale from 0 (none supportive) till 3 (all supportive))
Neighbors, colleagues, co-members agree	'Do you think people in your environment would agree on the demands of this demonstration?'(dummy variables: neighbours, colleagues, co-members (0=no; 1=yes); recoded into additive scale from 0 (none supportive) till 3 (all supportive))
Nobody agrees	'Do you think people in your environment would agree on the demands of this demonstration?'(dummy variable: nobody (0=no; 1=yes))
CONTINUANCE COMMITMENT	
Participation peace (anti-war) demonstration	'If this is not the first time you engage in a demonstration or public protest, could you indicate which one(s) you have engaged in before?' (peace demonstration (Greece: anti-war demonstration): 0=no; 1=yes)
Membership peace organization	'Could you indicate in the list below which kinds of organizations you are either an active, inactive or former member of?' (peace organization: 1=no member; 2=former member; 3=passive member; 4=active member).
Alternative protest activism	'If this is not the first time you engage in a demonstration or public protest, could you indicate which one(s) you have engaged in before?' (anti-racism, human rights, third world, social issues (unions), environmental, anti-globalization, women demonstration (0=no; 1=yes); all added in an additive scale 0 till 7)
Alternative movement memberships	'Could you indicate in the list below which kinds of organizations you are either an active member of?' (active member of anti-racist organization, student association, trade union or professional organization, political party, women's rights association, environmental organization, neighbourhood association, global justice organization (not Japan), third world organization, human rights organization (0=no; 1=yes); all added in an additive scale 0 till 8)
NORMATIVE COMMITMENT	
Distrust government	'Below you find a list of institutions. Could you indicate for each of these institutions how much trust you have in them?' (the national government; 1 till 5; 1=complete trust; 5=complete distrust)

Satisfaction with democracy	'In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy in your own country?' (1till 5; 1= completely satisfied; 5: completely dissatisfied)
General political dissatisfaction	'I don't see the use of voting, parties do whatever they want anyway.' Most politicians make a lot of promises but do not actually do anything.' 'I admire the way our political system is organised.' 'In politics, a lot of things happen that are undisclosed.' 'Political parties are only interested in my vote, not in my ideas and opinions.' 'For people like myself, politics is far too complicated; you have to be a expert to understand it.' 'Most of our politicians are very competent people who know what they are doing.' 'When people like myself voice opinions to politicians, these are taken into account'. (1=totally agree; 5=totally disagree; all 8 statements were integrated in a scale based on factor scores (3,096 Eigenvalue and 38.69% explained variance) raging from 1=low degree of political dissatisfaction till 6=high degree of political dissatisfaction).
Left-right placement	'In politics, one can hear about "the left" and "the right". In the scheme below, "0" stands for someone who is situated completely "on the left", en "10" for someone who is situated completely "on the right". When you consider your own opinions, where would you place yourself on this scale?'(1=extremely left till 10=extremely right)
Agreement anti-war statements	Belgium 2003-2004: 'The USA want(ed) to invade Iraq to secure national oil supply' 'War is always wrong' (1= totally agree; 5=totally disagree; simple additive scale of two measures; 2=strongest anti-war beliefs; -9=weakest anti-war beliefs). Belgium, Japan, and Greece 2004: 'Even though the war against Iraq was waged for the wrong reasons, the world is a better place without Saddam Hussein (reversed)' 'Israel's politics is the reason that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Middle East lasts this long.' 'The war in Iraq has increased terrorism threat in stead of reduced it' 'The USA wanted to invade Iraq to secure national oil supply.' War is always wrong.' 'International terrorism cannot be fought with war.' 'Iraq is heading for a better future without Saddam Hussein (reversed).' (1= totally agree; 5=totally disagree; simple additive scale of two measures; 6=strongest anti-war beliefs; -19=weakest anti-war beliefs).
Dissatisfaction with Iraqi policy	'To what extent are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the efforts made by the government to prevent a war against Iraq?' (1 till 5; 1=completely satisfied; 5=completely dissatisfied)
Identification/agree GJ movement	Japan and Greece: 'Do you sympathize for the movement against neo-liberal globalisation?' (1=yes; 2=no). Belgium: 'How much do you identify yourself with the movement against neo-liberal globalization?'(1=not at all; 5=very much).

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