GOVERNMENT STANCE AND INTERNAL DIVERSITY OF PROTEST. A Comparative Study of Protest against the War in Iraq in Eight Countries

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GOVERNMENT STANCE AND INTERNAL DIVERSITY OF PROTEST

A Comparative Study of Protest against the War in Iraq in Eight Countries

The study tackles the question to what extent the composition of a protest event is determined by the stance of the government. Although the social movement literature is largely focused on the political context in which protest is staged, these contextual theories do not formulate propositions on how context affects individual protesters. The paper engages in empirically testing, in eight countries, whether the macro-context affects the internal diversity of the crowds that took to the streets on February 15, 2003, the massive day of protest against the upcoming war on Iraq. Drawing upon an innovative method of surveying 6,753 individual demonstrators in the eight countries, we find that the composition of the marches is determined by the stance of the government and the opposition in the countries at stake. Apart from government stance, also the support in public opinion and the type of mobilization (media support) matter for internal diversity. If the political establishment concurs with the protest's aim, public opinion will support the protest's goal and mobilization will take place via open channels.

To what extent is the composition of a protest event determined by the stance of the government? This basic question has not received a clear answer yet. To be sure, social movement scholars have tackled the question whether and how social movements and protest events are affected by the political context. The basic tenet of probably the most influential of all social movement theories, the political opportunity structure (POS) approach, is precisely that social movements are determined by their political environment. POS emerged more than two decades ago, stating that social movements are dependent upon the political environment in which they operate (Kitschelt 1986; Tarrow 1998). Devised to comparatively account for the strength of social movements—their constituency, organizational structure, mobilization level, turnout, militancy etc.—the POS does not make claims, however, regarding the features of individual activists or demonstrators. Moreover, the classic POS-approach focuses on permanent and stable arrangements that structurally mould general protest behavior in a given country; it is not meant to explain variable traits of specific protest events or campaigns, let alone to account for the traits of individual protesters. So, POS, and the other contextual social movement theories as well, fail to formulate clear propositions of how the macro context in which a protest event is staged affects the micro features of individual demonstrators attending the event. Arguably, the micro-macro bridge is one of the least developed strands in the literature on protest and social movements, and the same applies to the whole of the social sciences as Giddens (1987) states.

In this study, we take up the challenge and empirically examine the macro-micro bridge between political context and the individual-level composition of protest events. More concretely, we test empirically whether the stance of the government vis-à-vis the war on Iraq in eight countries in 2003 measurably affected the composition of the massive anti-war marches—part of the largest worldwide protest wave ever-- staged on February 15th, 2003.

We operationalize the individual-level composition of the marches into one clear-cut dependent variable: the internal diversity of the protesters—that is: the socio-demographic, attitudinal, and behavioral heterogeneity of the protesting crowds. We argue that internal diversity of protest events like February 15th is important, for the movements as well as for society as a whole. So, in concrete terms, we examine *to what extent the internal diversity of the people who took the streets in the eight countries under study is affected by the support for or the resistance against the, then, upcoming war of the government and the opposition in their country*.

We start with discussing internal diversity and show that it is a relevant dependent variable. Next, we introduce our case, the February 15, 2003, demonstrations and we explain the protest survey method we used to assess the dependent variable. Then, we put forward hypotheses about the macro-level causes of internal diversity focusing on our target variable government stance. Next, comes the analysis followed by a summary and a discussion of our findings.

WHY INTERNAL DIVERSITY?

Studying the internal diversity of protest is relevant for at least three reasons. There are, first, good reasons to believe that, nowadays, more different segments of the population engage in political protest than before. The thesis of the normalization of protest has been coined a while ago. It holds that, thresholds for protest gradually going down, virtually all groups in society show their discontent and take to the streets to defend their interests or display their discontent (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Dalton 1993; Dalton 1996; Norris, Walgrave et al. 2004). Although some resilient inequalities persist, studies over time have established that in a period of just a few decades the traditional predictors of protest participation--mainly sex, age and education--are withering and protest behavior has pervaded Western societies to encompass quasi all groups (Topf 1995; Verba, Schlozman et al. 1995). Police

men, employers, manual workers, university professors, doctors etc all engage in contentious behavior. More concrete, normalization of protest could mean two of things. First, distinct groups could stage more *separate* events to defend specific interests leading to a fragmentation of interest representation just like individualization and functional differentiation theory would predict. If this were true, we would expect to see an increase of smaller protest events each defending the interests of specific groups and attended by specific beneficiary groups. Second, protest normalization could also be produced by a rise in protest events able to attract dissimilar groups *at the same time*. Here, we would hypothesize an increase in large protest events with general goals appealing to different population categories. The first normalization path leads to *external* diversity: more different people take the streets but not to the same streets at the same time. The second track is the *internal* diversity track: a heterogeneous group of people joins forces for a common cause by participating in the same action event. In this paper we focus on the latter potential mechanism underlying the normalization of the protester. We fully acknowledge that by only concentrating on internal diversity we deal with only a part of the mechanisms underlying protest normalization. Yet, the point of increased external diversity of protest has been made many times before. In fact, most scholars discussing protest normalization implicitly equate normalization with external diversity--with the fact that increasingly different kinds of people take to the streets in separate events (e.g. Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001; Dalton and Van Sickle 2005). Hardly any author, to our knowledge, deals with internal diversity. The reason for that is, quite simply, that good evidence to tackle the matter of internal diversity was not available. We believe our innovative evidence can partly cure that weakness.

Second, internal diversity of protest is not only significant for the protest normalization thesis. Following Gittell and Vidal (1998), Robert Putnam uses the concepts of bonding vs. bridging social capital in his seminal *Bowling Alone* (Putnam 2000). According to Putnam, both kinds of social capital are needed, but the bridging variant is rarer, more difficult to develop and more fragile (see also: Nelson, Kaboolian et al. 2002). Internal diversity is a form of bridging social capital. Social networks connecting people with different characteristics and as such building bridges between dissimilar groups are considered as paramount for the functioning of society since they are sources of collective action (Granovetter 1973; Larsen, Harlan et al. 2004). Putnam's distinction between bonding and

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bridging social capital has been adopted by other scholars who proved empirically that internal heterogeneity bears positive effects on socialization and that organizational segregation, in contrast, leads to less benign types of socialization (Elchardus, Hooghe et al. 2001; Hooghe 2002). The argument of social capital scholars is, hence, that internal diversity and heterogeneity are assets for society and that societies with lots of internally diverse connections are in a better state.

Finnaly, internal diversity is an important asset for social movements as well. Most social movements try, at least rhetorically, to broaden their support and to reach beyond the specific groups whose interests they defend. Even very specific movements pursuing particular goals and interests benefiting specific population segments (only) always claim some kind of representativity. Why is that? Diversity of supporters not only yields access to a diverse range of resources, but demonstrable diversity of a protest event may enhance its potential impact. All other things being equal, the socio-demographic (and political) diversity of the demonstrators codetermines the reaction of the protest target: giving in, repressing or ignoring. Consequently, the heterogeneity of the demonstrators at hand is often the stake of an interpretation struggle: the reluctant target of the protest generally tries to downplay the diversity of the protest and points to "special interests" driving the protest, while the protest organizers attempt to frame their protest as being carried by a representative sample of people, drawn from all segments, layers and beliefs in society. Of course, the potential impact of a protest event does not solely depend on the diversity of its social composition (Giugni, McAdam et al. 1999). But diversity may be an important persuasive device because it resembles the core of liberal democracy and its main electoral institution: all people irrespective of their position participate and have the same voting weight. Moreover, a diverse constituency suggests broad support among the population which endangers the reelection of office holders (Burstein 1999).

To summarize, we argue that internal diversity is important for participation students because it is one of the two potential normalization mechanisms; it is relevant for social capital scholars too since it resembles the bridging social capital variant; and it is significant as well for social movement scholars since internal diversity functions as a persuasive device convincing protest targets to take protest claims serious.

OUR CASE: FEBRUARY 15TH, 2003, ANTI-WAR DEMONSTRATIONS IN EIGHT COUNTRIES

On February 15, 2003, millions of people took to the streets in worldwide protests against an upcoming war in Iraq. Globally, about 10 million people demonstrated in at least 600 cities throughout the world, in many countries breaking attendance records previously held by the early 1980s protests against nuclear armament (Rochon 1988). February 15th was the largest transnational anti-war protests in human history (Rochon 1988; Epstein 2003; Simonson 2003). The media, politicians as well as movement members were perplexed by the unforeseen magnitude of the protest (Cortright 2004). Protest size varied but in all countries, protest repertoire[1] (protest marches through the country's capital) and timing (February 15th) were identical. Claims, slogans, and organizers were very similar. The slogans *Not in my name* and *No blood for oil* could be heard worldwide, of course with local variations and additions. The national organizers were all part of the network of the European Social Forum (ESF) that, on its meeting in November 2002 in Florence, initiated the worldwide action day. The ESF coordinated the national campaigns in Europe and developed strong links with *United for Peace and Justice*, a US umbrella organization that would organize February 15th in the US agreeing on the same claims and slogans (Verhulst, forthcoming).

Not only the protests' size but also the February 15 crowds' features were puzzling. In many countries, observers emphasized the internal diversity of the turnout and the representativity of the protest. *The Times*, for example, described the London marches with these words: "*Groups representing their local churches and mosques, university students, parents with young children [...] People who have never been on a demonstration before [...] the grandmothers, ranging in age from later 40s to a frail 86. Cooks, teachers, doctors, computer programmers and grandmothers. Virgin Marchers, elderly, the young, families: people from all walks of life*."(The Times, February 15th, 2003). The German *Die Zeit* did the same concerning the Berlin marches: "*People of all ages and all professions were on the streets, expensive designer coats marched side by side with worn-off parkas.*" (Die Zeit, February 20th, 2003). As did the US *New York Times*: "*Protesters came from a wide range of the political spectrum: college students, middle-aged couples, families with small children, older*

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[1] In all eight countries under study, demonstrations were peaceful. In hardly any country in the world violence was recorded on the F15 marches. Only in Greece, we know of violent clashes between the police and demonstrators.

people who had marched for civil rights, and groups representing labor, the environment and religious, business and civic organizations."(The New York Times, February 16th, 2003). The Dutch *NRC Handelsblad* asserted similarly reporting about the F15 Amsterdam march: "*Demonstration veterans, but also ordinary a-political citizens*."(NRC Handelsblad, February 17th, 2003). The French *Le Matin* made exactly the same point referring to the F15 protest in Paris: "*Barbie dolls, doctors, lawyers, students, farmers, unemployed*."(Le Matin, February 22nd, 2003).

In general, there are reasons to expect that peace demonstrations, indeed, attract a more diverse crowd than many other kinds of demonstrations. In comparison to other protest issues that directly or even physically concern specific social groups, peace is an issue that affects people basically in moral terms without having immediate consequences for their daily lives. Hence, we could expect that peace protesters are relatively heterogeneous in terms of age, sex, education, social class, religious affiliation, and so forth. Nevertheless, some specifications lay at hand when considering past peace protests in general and the issue of war against Iraq in particular. From many studies on peace movements and peace protests in the second half of the 20th century we know that peace protest participants tend to be younger and better educated than the rest of the population. Peace protesters in the West basically share the features of what, more generally, characterizes activists of the so-called new social movements. Young, well-educated people from the human service sector with liberal or leftist attitudes are strongly overrepresented (Fuchs and Rucht 1994; Klandermans 1997).

Crucial for the key question of this paper—to what extent is the composition of a protest march determined by the stance of government regarding the issue—is that government stance in 2003 vis-à-vis the war on Iraq is strongly varying between the countries at stake. As we will show in the next section, in the eight countries where we surveyed demonstrators—the US, UK, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium and Germany—governments diverged largely on the issue. Some of the countries covered initiated the war and sent troops to the Gulf, others were among the most staunch allies of the war-mongering nations, some doubted and took a halfhearted position, while still others opposed the war with all means in their power. At the same time, an obvious alternative explanation for the diverging composition of the protest events in the eight countries—issue type—can

be completely ruled out. In all eight countries, protesters were protesting for exactly the same issue: stop the imminent war.

In December 2002, war was still far away, a group of social movement scholars in eight nations began forging a network in order to survey the expected antiwar demonstrations. They agreed on a common questionnaire and a field work method elaborated before by Van Aelst & Walgrave (1999; Norris et al. 2004). The International Peace Protest Survey (IPPS) carried out on February 15th, 2003 covered a random sample of demonstrators engaged in eleven different demonstrations in eight countries involving 6,753 respondents in total. The overall response rate for the postal survey was more than 53%, with no country's response rate lower than 37%, which is satisfactory for an anonymous survey without reminders. The covered demonstrations all took place in the country's capital, that is Madrid for Spain, Berlin for Germany, London and Glasgow for the UK, Amsterdam for the Netherlands, Bern for Switzerland, Rome for Italy, Seattle, New York and San Francisco for the US, and Brussels for Belgium. The differences between the demonstrator's profiles participating in the different events in the same country appeared to be negligible and we simply merged the data of the different demonstrations in the US and the UK resulting in 8 country cases.

Because of space constraints, we can not go in detail into the sampling method or the procedures we followed. We refer to other publications containing detailed descriptions and tests of the protest survey method (Walgrave and Verhulst forthcoming; Walgrave and Wagemann forthcoming). We suffice here to very briefly summarize what we have done. In all eight countries but Italy[2] the actual survey process to establish a random sample of demonstration participants was twofold. First, fieldwork supervisors counted the rows of participants, selecting every Nth row, to ensure that the same number of rows was skipped throughout. Then a dozen interviewers selected every Nth person in that row and distributed questionnaires to these individuals during the actual protest march. The selected participants were asked to complete the questionnaire at home and to mail it back. The questionnaire maintained a large common core, including the participants' profile, the mobilization context, and the political attitudes and values of the demonstrator, with only a few

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[2] In contrast to the field method described above, the Italian team followed another track and decided to interview participants on trains on their way to the demonstration in Rome.

specific items adapted slightly for each country. In addition to the mail-survey, in some countries (the Netherlands and Belgium) a random sample of other demonstrators was interviewed in person before the demonstration's departure. The gathering crowd before the demonstration's departure was divided into sectors, and the interviewers each randomly selected a fixed number of respondents in 'their' sector. These (shorter) face-to-face interviews were only used as a crosscheck to evaluate how far response to the mail-survey generated a representative random sample of demonstrators and is not used in this contribution. Confidence in the surveys' reliability is strengthened by the fact that hardly anyone refused a face-to-face interview, and by the absence of significant differences between the two types of interviews.

ACCOUNTING FOR INTERNAL DIVERSITY: HYPOTHESES

The main idea this paper set out to test is that government stance determines the composition of protest events. Our main claim, hence, concerns the relationship between government stance on Iraq and the internal diversity of the February 15 events. However, we do not think that the relationship between what government thinks about the war—did it initiate, support or resist the war—is entirely straightforward. We anticipate that there is a causal chain departing from government stance but that two other factors act as intermediary variables: public opinion and type of mobilization. Figure 1 graphically grasps our causal argument.

<Figure 1 about here>

Government/opposition stance, public opinion and type of mobilization, we contend, are all closely related and we expect them to all affect internal diversity. Government stance is the prior variable affecting public opinion and mobilization type. It is obvious that mobilization cannot be the prior variable: it "happens" chronologically after the other two factors and is dependent on them. The political stance of incumbents and challengers vis-à-vis imminent war is the key factor. Governments and challengers make up their minds about the war long before public opinion starts worrying about it. As mainstream public opinion theory holds, differences of opinion among elites *precede* differences of

opinion among the public that follows partisan elite leads (Zaller 1992). Numerous more specific studies focusing on war and about the interaction between coverage, public opinion and government policy have made the same point over and over again. Bennet's indexing theory (Bennet 1990; Bennet and Paletz 1994) and Entman's cascading activation (Entman 2003; Entman 2004) state that media follow cues of political elites. Public opinion, in turn, follows the tone and direction of the news stories and, thus, indirectly gets its preferences from political elites. Hence, we think it is safe to argue that the initial stance of the main political actors about potential war determines public opinion (via the media): politics comes first. Media, finally, also serve mobilization purposes if they adopt the same supportive or unsupportive perspective leading to an open or closed type of mobilization. In sum: we claim the primary causal path goes from government/opposition over public opinion and mobilization process to protest diversity. In case of unanimity among political elites, public opinion will not be divided which encourages the mass media to adopt the same perspective leading to an open mobilization process and, ultimately, to diversity on the streets (full lines in graph). Of course, there is a feedback mechanism at work too, when political elites mould their policy stands anticipating public opinion's reaction (dotted lines in graph).

Let us elaborate our three hypotheses in some more detail. Social movements, and thus their protest events, are determined by the political context in which they operate. Our first hypothesis, then, states that *the internal diversity of the demonstrations in the eight nations is affected by the stance of the respective governments and opposition parties vis-à-vis the war* (H1). If government and opposition both support war, we expect war-opposing demonstrators to be political radicals from the fringes of the political spectrum, very committed and well-organized. As they are rowing against mainstream politics, we expect demonstrators in these countries to be socio-demographically stronger groups too, especially in terms of education. If, in contrast, government and opposition agree that war on Iraq is not a good idea, we expect a more "normal" sample of the population to take the streets and, hence, a more internally diverse protest crowd. Fortunately, the eight countries and their government and opposition stance configuration cover the whole spectrum of political positions on the war, from the US and the UK on the one hand, till Belgium and Germany at the other. Table 1 contains the evidence. It is difficult to quantify a country's political position. Therefore we simply rank-ordered the

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countries from politically most war-supporting on the left-hand side of the table to most war-opposing on the right-hand side; in the analyses below we will draw on these simple country rank-orders.

<Table 1 about here>

Government and opposition stance not only directly affects a protest's composition; it also does *via* public opinion. Since social movements, more than other kinds of political actors, depend on public opinion (Rochon 1988) we hypothesize that large support for a social movement in public opinion leads to diverse protest gatherings. Again, the logic is straightforward: the more anti-war attitudes are dispersed among the population, the more people with different features will hold these anti-war beliefs and the higher the chance that also the demonstrators expressing these beliefs on the streets will be diverse. Table 2 presents comparative evidence[3] on European public opinion vis-à-vis the war recorded just before February 15th. Respondents were confronted with seven statements about the war. In order to construct one scale, we simply added the anti-war answers and divided them by seven yielding a rough measure of anti-war sentiments in the European countries. Concerning the American public, it is safe to assume that they supported war to a much larger extent than any European population. Numerous polls carried out in the US in the same period displayed net war support among American citizens[4]. That is why we, somewhat arbitrarily, also attributed an anti-war score to the American public (30.0). The second hypothesis goes as follows: *in countries where public opinion opposed the war stronger than in others, the internal diversity of the protesters will be larger* (H2).

<Table 2 about here>

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[3] Figures are based on a comparative EOS Gallup Poll carried out in all European countries between January 21st and 27th, 2003, just before the February 15th protests, covering 15,080 people aged 15 years and older. See: www.eosgallupeurope.com/int_survey/index.html. All public opinion data are derived from this study, unless mentioned otherwise.

[4] For an excellent source about US polling about Iraq see: www.pollingreport.com/iraq.html

Mobilization lies at the heart of contemporary social movement research (Klandermans 1997). "*The key to understanding who takes part and who does not, when they take part and when not, is mobilization.*"(Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) If we want to account for differences in demonstrators we must consider mobilization as an independent, or intermediary, variable. Some dimensions of mobilization might be associated with internal diversity. Especially "open" vs. "closed" mobilization processes could lead to different degrees of internal diversity. What do we mean with open and closed mobilization? In an open mobilization process the public as a whole, and not only people with certain social features, is the target of mobilization efforts. The mass media are the best example of an open mobilization channel (Walgrave and Manssens 2000). Although there are some notable biases in media use, the mass media can be considered as an ubiquitous mobilizer because a vast majority of the population is confronted with it. As a consequence no specific features are required to become a target of mobilization via the media. Mobilization through organizations, in contrast, is of the closed type: people need to have certain features, in this case membership, to become the target of mobilization efforts; or they need to have made certain specific decisions in the past, in this case the decision to become a member of that specific organization. These two examples of typical open and closed mobilizers--media vs. organizations--refer to macro level agencies. Yet, open and closed mobilization types can be traced back to the micro level as well. On a micro level family, friends, acquaintances and neighbors can be considered as mobilizers able to touch upon virtually the whole population. Within the closed mobilization type too, micro level equivalents are available: co-members of an organization and colleagues/classmates. A lot of people have neither colleagues nor fellow students and consequently mobilization via these micro channels is not of the open but of the closed type, only able to reach a specific cross section of the population. Based on our survey of February 15th demonstrators and on a number of questions tapping mobilization, we constructed a scale (factor scores) of open vs. closed mobilization. For a detailed description of this scaling process involving six variables--among which the company with whom the march was attended, the way people found out about the demonstration, the participation decision moment, the distance traveled to the demonstration's venue etc.--we refer to the appendix. As could be expected, some people attending the events were mobilized via open mobilization channels while others were activated via closed channels. The aggregate country

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averages (factor score) in Table 3 tell us to what extent the demonstrators in a country went through an open or through a closed mobilization process. Our third hypothesis is: *we expect more internal diversity in demonstrations characterized by open mobilization channels* (H3).

<Table 3 about here>

ASSESSING DIVERSITY

Before assessing internal diversity, we succinctly present the data on which we will draw. Tables 4, 5, and 6 contain the bivariate evidence on respectively socio-demographic, attitudinal and behavioral features of the respondents. Technical information about the scaled variables can be found in the appendix.

<Table 4, 5, and 6 about here>

Despite the remarkably common profile across the eight countries under study, some notable differences catch the eye: in the US, we counted 20% more female demonstrators than in Belgium. The US protesters were older and, especially, higher schooled but Swiss demonstrators were lower schooled and much younger than average. In Spain, nearly one in three protesters was a manual worker, which is about 4 times as much as in the other countries. Being 'very interested' in politics varies a lot from 53% in Belgium to 94% in the US. The own political skills were thought of much higher in the US (76%) than in Italy (31%), whereas the responsiveness of the system is estimated much higher in Spain and Italy than in the Netherlands and Switzerland. Italian demonstrators showed hardly any confidence in their political system at all while almost half of the Swiss displayed high system support. Active organization membership varied from 54% (Spain) to 85% (US). Italian demonstrators define themselves much more to be positioned far left-wing than the other demonstrators. Protest frequency, finally, contains maybe the most remarkable discrepancy: of all Dutch demonstrators, 54% were demonstration first-timers; in Italy more than 90% had taken part in one or more demonstrators before. Some of these inter-country differences, no doubt, are due to the

fact that certain measures do not have a constant meaning across all nations (see for example: Harkness, Van de Vijver et al. 2003). Left and right, obviously, may mean different things in different political systems. The same applies to variables like education level. The Americans in our sample are far more educated than the others, but this may be primarily caused by differences in the educational system. As we are, in this paper, above all interested in internal diversity, which implies, as we will explain later, first comparing demonstrators *within* countries and only afterwards across countries, we believe that the cross-cultural meaning problem is not jeopardizing our quest.

How can internal diversity be assessed? Diversity has many faces. We will consider three kinds of diversity: socio-demographic diversity, attitudinal diversity and behavioral diversity. Although socio-demographics, attitudes and behavior are probably associated, we treat them separately as we think they might be affected by distinct independent variables. For example, the political behavior of the demonstrators (e.g. voting behavior) might be more affected by the political configuration of government and opposition on the issue, while their socio-demographics might be more associated with the national protest level. Diversity not only has different faces. Since it is a feature of a group and not of an individual, it is difficult to measure statistically. Therefore we will assess the internal diversity of a country's demonstrators as a whole and will test the hypotheses on an aggregate level only. Our survey covers 11 different demonstrations in 8 countries. Still, we opted for countries and not for demonstrations as cases: tests showed that demonstrators in different cities in the same country were very similar; moreover the independent variables are situated on country level and do not vary between demonstrations in the same country. Consequently, with only eight country-cases the analytical strength of our design will be limited.

Diversity can be tapped in different ways. The most straightforward form of diversity measurement is calculating so-called fractionalization-indexes (FI). The index (between 0 and 1) measures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals belong to different categories of a variable: the higher the FI value the more diversity, the lower the FI value the lower the diversity[5]. FIs grasp the spread of the demonstrators over different categories of a variable. This means that equality

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[5] The formula of the fractionalization index is as follows: $FI = 1 - \sum S^2_{ki}$ Each term S_{ki} is the proportion of demonstrators with a certain feature.

of categories yields highest FIs. Since FIs depend on a variable's number of categories, they can only be used to compare variables with the same amount of categories. Table 7 contains all FIs for all dependent variables in the eight nations in the study.

<Table 7 about here>

FIs grasp the *absolute* diversity of a sample: are the records maximally spread over the different categories of a variable? If the educational variable, for example, has four potential values the highest diversity is reached when the proportional distribution is 25-25-25-25. Yet, if in the population the real distribution would be 40-25-25-10 it would be hard to argue that a 25-25-25-25 sample configuration is the most diverse since it, obviously, is not representative for the population as a whole but is tilted towards the high education categories. In order to take the respective populations into account, we complement the absolute diversity measures with a second measure of diversity, which we baptize *relative* diversity. This is a demonstration's internal diversity as compared to the population as a whole. For example, American protesters are higher schooled than all other demonstrators. Yet, Americans *in general* are, probably because of differences in educational system, higher educated and so it is no wonder that, compared to demonstrators drawn from less schooled societies, American protesters are educationally less diverse and predominated by university graduates. In other words: to assess relative diversity we need to calibrate our national diversity measures with national population data. Such national benchmarking can make the internal diversity measures of our eight samples of protesters more comparable. Our relative diversity measures are included in Table 8. They capture to what extent the peace protesters in a country resemble their respective populations. The table contains the available comparative evidence drawing upon several sources. We tried to maximize comparability of variables which explains why some variables were restructured and differ from those in the previous Table 7.

<Table 8 about here>

TESTING THE HYPOTHESES

Carrying out statistical analyses with an N of eight cases is tricky. Such a low N demands very high correlations to be significant. A single outlier can obliterate a relationship. Moreover, we decided to exclude the Italian case for analyses with mobilization type which reduces the number of cases for some of our analyses to only seven cases. In fact, as mentioned, in Italy the sample was not, as in the other countries, drawn at the demonstration but in trains transporting protesters to the Rome venue. This procedure most probably lead to an overrepresentation of Italian demonstrators mobilized via organizations and thus to an overestimation of the closedness of the Italian mobilization process. Systematic comparison of the Italian demonstrators with the other demonstrators showed that the most substantial sample bias remains probably confined to organizational embeddedness. That is why we decided to keep the Italian case on board for all other analyses (N=8) but skipped Italy with regard to mobilization type analyses (N=7). We calculated simple Pearson correlations between the 3 independent and 3 dependent variables for our 8 (7) cases. Table 9 contains the evidence for the *absolute* internal diversity measures.

<Table 9 about here>

Notwithstanding the small N which limits the statistical strength of our analyses considerably, many correlations in Table 9 are substantial and a good deal of them passes the conventional significance thresholds (see the shaded box in the table). By and large, the results confirm the hypotheses. The government and opposition stance variable clearly and significantly affects socio-demographic and attitudinal diversity which confirms our chief hypothesis (H1). The more the political establishment univocally supports the goal of the demonstration and opposes war, the more social and attitudinal diversity we find among the demonstrators in that country. Public opinion, an intermediary variable affected by government and opposition stance is even more closely associated with the composition of the protest events, again in particular with social-demographic and attitudinal diversity, corroborating the second hypothesis (H2). The more widespread opposition against war in a country, the more socio-demographic and attitudinal diversity among the anti-war demonstrators The

mobilization process seems to matter too but only for socio-demographic diversity which is significantly associated with an open mobilization type. The correlations of mobilization type with attitudinal and behavioral diversity are substantial, go in the expected direction, but are not significant which, more or less, also supports the third hypothesis (H3). If people are mobilized via open mobilization processes, their diversity increases.

As small N-analyses can be heavily influenced by single outlying cases, we printed scatter plots of the significant positive correlations in Table 9 to check visually whether correlations were an artifact of the presence of a single outlier. As Figure 2 below shows, this was not the case. All graphs seem to confirm that the correlations we found are not produced by a single case. This further strengthens confidence in our finding that government/opposition stance, public opinion, and mobilization type are valid predictors of the composition of protest events.

<Figure 2 about here>

What about *relative* diversity? Are the same explaining devices significant when we associate them with relative diversity measures? Relative and absolute diversity are different things their measures are different and only weakly mutually associated, so we expect different results. Table 10 contains a similar correlation matrix but now based on the relative diversity figures tapping the differences between the demonstrators and their respective populations.

<Table 10 about here>

The relative internal diversity measures confirm the role of government/opposition stance (H1) and also corroborate the importance of public opinion (H2). Both are strongly associated with socio-demographical and attitudinal diversity, again less with behavioral diversity. The more the political establishment rejects war and the more anti-war feelings prevail among the public, the more demonstrators resemble the total population in their country (in terms of social and attitudinal features). These results strengthen confidence that both variables are vital factors affecting internal

diversity. The effect of mobilization channels (H3), only timidly present in the previous absolute diversity analyses, is now more strongly underpinned by the relative diversity correlations. The more open the mobilization process, that is: the more mass media take up the role of organizers, the more the people taking to the streets resemble their population socio-demographically and attitudinally. Similar scatter plots of the significant positive correlations in Table 10 associating relative diversity and the independent variables show that these parameters are not artifacts of single outliers (results not shown in graph).

What do these analyses tell us about the macro-level determinants of the individual-level composition--in this case: internal diversity--of a protest event? The most important finding is, put generally, that who shows up is primarily a function of the political context in which the protest is staged. Movements depend to a large extent (1) on political opportunities, (2) on public opinion and (3) on mobilization patterns, all of which lie for the most part beyond their control. Their internal composition seems to be determined by the context, not by the movements themselves (Tarrow 1991; Tarrow 1992; Kriesi, Koopmans et al. 1995; Della Porta and Kriesi 1999). The present analysis also confirms Imig and Tarrow's claim that social movements--even if they are addressing international issues, have international targets and are apparently transnationally organized--remain predominantly determined by their *national* context (Imig and Tarrow 1999; Imig and Tarrow 2001). In spite of globalization processes, political chances and threats for social movements are still essentially situated at the national level.

A challenge to our findings is the bivariate character of the present correlational analysis. The different independent variables probably affect each other mutually and they co-determine the dependent variable *together*. Bivariate analyses do not disentangle this causal interplay, nor do they give us a clear idea of net effects or of complex interactive effects. Conjunctive causation models as developed by Charles Ragin (1987) could help us forward here, but these analyses require a different set-up of the evidence and a completely dissimilar, non-probabilistic way of dealing with the data which would make for an entirely different paper. Yet, as classic multivariate tests cannot be carried out with only eight or seven cases the precise causal path affecting internal diversity remains unclear. But we believe our model with government and opposition stance affecting public opinion and mass

media, which then sparks a specific type of mobilization, to be a plausible explanation for what we found. Moreover, the associations among the independent variables presented in Tables 9 and 10 suggest that government and opposition stance, public opinion, and mobilization type are closely associated. When government and opposition are supporting war, public opinion, compared to other countries, is too and the mobilization for the anti-war protest is of a closed type, it mostly depends on organizations and not on mass media support.

So, there seem to be two encompassing contextual "syndromes" in which protest can be staged: favorable conditions with supportive politics, public opinion and media and unfavorable conditions with hostile politics, public opinion and media. The first context leads to a different type of protesters: they are the usual suspects that come from the fringes of the political spectrum, with distinctive social and political characteristics. The favorable context produces a different type of protest: more internally diverse and more resembling the population at large.

DISCUSSION

We found that the composition of a protest event—the people who participate in it—is affected by political opportunities, public opinion and mobilization processes. Our results thus establish that the macro-context, the political and social circumstances in which the protest takes place, does directly impact who shows up and who does not. This may at first sight seem to be a rather trivial finding, but according to our knowledge, this study is a first to empirically substantiate the relationship between macro opportunities and micro features of protest participants. We managed to bridge the micro-macro gap and made a plausible argument, based on innovative data, that context matters for individual behavior. Therefore we further the ideas formulated by a wealth of political opportunity approach scholars who argued that context matters for movements and protest. We showed that context matters not only for movements but for individual protest and movement participants as well.

The study raises doubts, however, about what can be considered as protest and, ultimately, whether the composition of a protest event really matters. In three countries covered in this study-- Switzerland, Germany and Belgium--national government and opposition were uniformly opposed to

war. How can we consider the antiwar demonstrations in these countries as "protest" as they were not criticizing or opposing their government or any other domestic political actor, but, rather, supporting the political stance of their authorities? Naturally, protest does not always target the national state. In many countries, protest is aimed against foreign powers or "imperialists". In Iran, for example, protesting against the state is forbidden and students frequently take the streets to protest against the US or the West in general. Is this protest? It probably is, although it is staged by the power holders. Returning to our case, even in the countries whose governments opposed war demonstrators had an enemy--big bad wolf George Bush and America on the warpath--but this target was far away and chances that their message was communicated to the Bush administration, let alone influence Washington's decisions were extremely slim. Demonstrations in war-opposing countries were symbolic; they were foremost an expression of anger and disgust, a powerless outcry. Paradoxically, exactly these "aimless" demonstrations proved to be most internally diverse, while demonstrations in the US, the UK, Italy and Spain in contrast, aiming for a clear domestic target and with more chances of "success", or at least more chances to communicate the anti-war message to relevant decision-makers, were much less diverse. Somewhat ironically we could summarize as follows: the least potential impact a protest event has and the more symbolic its nature, the more internally diverse it will be. Internal diversity of protest, we stated in the introduction, may be an asset for protest as it shows the challenged power-holders that support for the movement is broad and widespread. But our findings challenge this simple equation. When communication with the authorities *really* matters--that is when it comes to an issue that is divisive and conflictual, and when this communication could make a difference and affect political decision-making--there appears to be *no* internal diversity. Only when the message is trivial and "toothless" diversity is within reach. Or in other words: the more protest is *real* protest, the less diverse it is.

Our results are perhaps most puzzling for social movements themselves. Movements try to impress policy makers by pointing at their diversity: all other things being equal, the more diverse the protest is, the larger its impact. However, our analysis boils down to the fact that it are, ultimately, the political elites who shape protest diversity. When government and opposition concur with a movement's claim, this provides a supportive public opinion and leads to open mobilization fostered

by the media. Yet when a movement, in contrast, challenges government this will cause a rift in public opinion and tone down the media's coverage of the issue resulting in less protest diversity. The political origin of diversity considerably limits the possibilities of social movements to play out the diversity argument. Only when government supports the protest will it be diverse, in which case the protest organizers do not really need diversity to impact government since government already agrees with their claims.

APPENDIX: VARIABLES AND SCALES

SOCIO-DEMOS	
Sex	Male, Female
Age	4 categories: 0-24, 25-44, 45-65, 65+
Education	5 categories: none & primary, lower secondary, higher secondary, non university higher, university
Profession	5 categories: manual worker, office-professional worker, manager, not working, other
Work sector	6 categories: industrial, private services, health-education-research-care, government, charity, other
POLITICAL ATTITUDES	
Political Interest	"How interested are you in politics? Very interested, interested, more or less interested, little interested, not interested at all"
Left-Right	"In politics, people sometimes talk about "left" and "right". In the scheme below "0" stands for someone whose views are entirely to the "left"; "10" for someone whose views are entirely to the "right". Of course, there are intermediary positions to the degree that one's views are more or less to the "left" or to the "right". When you think about your own ideas on this, where would you place yourself on this scale?"
War Opposition	"The USA are conducting a crusade against Islam." "A war is justified to bring down a dictatorial regime" "A war against Iraq is justified when authorized by the UN Security Council" "The USA want to invade Iraq to secure national oil supply" "This is a racist war" "Saddam Hussein and the Iraq regime are a threat to world peace" "War is always wrong" "The Iraqi regime must be brought down to end the suffering of the Iraqi people" (8 agree/disagree 5-point scales). Factor analysis (min: -2.29; max: +4.9). -1> 'slight'; -1> >+1 'moderate'; +1< 'strong'.
External political efficacy	"I don't see the use of voting, parties do whatever they want anyway." "Most politicians make a lot of promises, but do not actually do anything." "Political parties are only interested in my vote, not in my ideas and opinions."(3 agree/disagree 5-point scales). Average: 1-2.75='low'; 2.76 -3.24='intermediate'; 3.25-5='high'.
Internal political efficacy	"People like myself do have an influence on what the political authorities do" "For people like myself, politics is far too complicated; you have to be an expert to understand it." "When people like myself voice opinions to politicians, these are taken into account." "I do not think that I am better informed than other people on matters of politics and the government."(4 agree/disagree 5-point scales). Average: 1-2.75='low'; 2.76 -3.24='intermediate'; 3.25-5='high'.
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR	
Active organization member	"Could you indicate in the list below which kinds of organizations you are an either active, inactive, former or no member of? Church; anti-racist organization; student organization; labor union/professional organization; political party; women organization; sport/recreational organization; environmental organization; art/music/educational organization; neighborhood organization; charitable organization; antiglobalist organization; 3rd world organization; human rights organization; peace organization; any other organization" "Yes"= active member of at least one of these organizations; "No"= not active member of any of these organizations.
Political action	"There are many different ways in which people can make an effort for societal change. Did you, in the past twelve months

	engage in any of the activities below?" A respondent is categorized as having taken part in "conventional" participation, when he has indicated to have engaged in at least one of the following activities: contacted a politician; contacted an organization or association; contacted a local or national civil servant; worn a pin or hung a flyer/poster/sticker of a political campaign; signed a people's initiative or referendum; signed a petition; taken part in a product boycott; bought a product for political, ethical or ecological reasons; made a donation; contacted or appeared in the media. A respondent is categorized as having taken part in "non-conventional" participation, when he has indicated to have engaged in at least one of the following activities: participated in a lawful demonstration; set up a petition or gathered signatures for a petition; take part in a strike; raise funds. A respondent is categorized as having taken part in "radical" action when he has indicated to have engaged in at least one of the following activities: engaged in a sit-in; engaged in the occupation of a public building/school/university; engaged in the squatting of houses/abandoned areas; engaged in violent forms of action.
Protest frequency	"Can you estimate how often in the past five years you took part in a local, national or international demonstration or public protest? This is the first time, between 2 and 5 times, between 6 and 10 times, between 11 and 20 times and more than 20 times".
Party member	Same question as above: "political party?"
Vote behavior	"If national elections were to be held tomorrow, which party would you vote for? (list of national parties)"
Mobilization pattern	Result of a two stage factor analysis. "How did you learn about today's manifestation? Via radio or TV, via newspapers, via advertisements, via posters, via family, friends acquaintances, neighbors, via school or work, via an organization or association, via a website, or via a mailing list" "Are you a member of an organization that is (co-)organizing this demonstration?" "Do you know anyone who is a member of one of the organizing organisations?" These three variables point towards openness or closedness of mobilisation on the *input* side: they tap mobilization occurring *before* actual participation. All these three variables loaded strongly on a latent open vs. closed mobilization input factor. Most important info channel demo (rank-ordered: (1) media, (2) family, friends, acquaintances, or neighbors (3) advertisements or posters; (4) website or mailing list; (5) school or work; (6) association or organization members) loaded .591. Know member (no; yes) loaded .719. Member organization (no; yes) loaded .792. Second, we analyzed the *output* side of the mobilization process: the resulting behavior of participants, indicating how they were mobilized also based on three questions: "Do you attend this demonstration: alone, with family, with friends acquaintances or neighbors, with colleagues or fellow students, with members of an organization or association you are member of, or with others?"; "When did you decide to take part in this demonstration? The day of the demonstration, the past few days, a few weeks ago, or more than a month ago?"; "How many kilometers have you traveled approximately from your home to take part in this demonstration?" Here too, one latent factor came out with all three variables loading on it: company (rank-ordered: (1) alone, (2) friends, family, acquaintances or neighbors, (3) colleagues or fellow students, (4) co-members of an organization): loaded .751 on the mobilization output side. Distance traveled (exact amount of kilometers) loaded .524. Participation decision ((1) day of the demonstration, (2) the past few days, (3) a few weeks ago, (4) more than a month ago), loaded .652. Finally, both the input and output factors loaded strongly on one factor tapping the overall open vs. closed mobilization dimension (.824). Note: Since the Spanish questionnaire did not contain a question on the distance traveled, we calculated the Spanish output mobilization factor relying only on two of the three output variables.

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Table 1: Political stance vs. the Iraqi war of government and opposition (parties) in eight nations

	War participating countries		War supporting countries			War opposing countries		
	(1) US	(2) UK	(3) SP	(4) IT	(5) NL	(6) SW	(7) BEL	(8) GE
Government	PRO	PRO	PRO	PRO	PRO	CONTRA	CONTRA	CONTRA
Government Parties	right/cons	centre left	right/cons	right/cons	right/cons	centre left	centre left + liberal	centre left
	PRO	DIVIDED	PRO	PRO	PRO	CONTRA	CONTRA	CONTRA
Opposition Parties	Centre left	Cons. pro Liberals con	centre + far left	centre + far left	Centre + far left	Left (greens)	right/cons	right/cons
	PRO/CON	PRO/CON	CONTRA	CONTRA	CONTRA	CONTRA	CONTRA	CONTRA

Table 2: Anti-war attitudes among populations in eight nations (%)

	US	UK	SP	IT	NL	SW	BE	GE	Tot
Do you consider that it would be justified or not that our country participates in a military intervention in Iraq if the US intervenes militarily in Iraq without a preliminary decision of the UN (unjustified)	-	68	78	81	84	90	84	89	82
The US should intervene militarily even if the UN does not give its formal agreement (disagree)	-	68	77	79	80	86	78	87	79
Oil is the main motivation for which the US wants to intervene militarily in Iraq (agree)	-	60	79	73	74	75	72	72	72
Do you consider that it would be justified or not that our country participates in a military intervention in Iraq if the Iraqi regime does not cooperate with United Nations inspectors (unjustified)	-	32	56	49	47	73	55	64	54
Do you consider that it would be justified or not that our country participates in a military intervention in Iraq if the UN security council decides on a military intervention in Iraq (unjustified)	-	15	43	33	29	66	40	52	40
Do you consider that it would be justified or not that our country participates in a military intervention in Iraq if the UN inspectors discover weapons of mass destruction in Iraq (unjustified)	-	15	41	37	30	67	39	46	39
Iraq represents a threat to world peace (disagree)	-	23	35	28	33	43	37	34	33
Overall antiwar score (average)	**30.0**	**40.1**	**58.4**	**54.3**	**53.9**	**71.4**	**57.9**	**63.4**	**57.0**

Source: EOS Gallup poll Europe 21-27 January, 2003

Table 3: Openness of mobilization patterns of anti-Iraqi-war demonstrations in eight nations (%) (N=6,753)

	US	UK	SP	IT	NL	SW	BE	GE	Total
Open	15.5	14.6	20.8	2.8	26.3	16.6	15.2	28.4	16.9
Rather open	41.5	46.1	39.6	21.6	35.7	50.4	49.4	41.3	39.5
Rather closed	27.2	27.1	31.0	49.1	21.2	29.5	25.3	24.6	30.3
Closed	15.7	12.2	8.6	26.5	16.9	3.5	10.1	5.7	13.3
Average factor score	**.039**	**-.050**	**-.103**	**.666**	**-.108**	**-.252**	**-.134**	**-.354**	**0.00**

Source: International Peace Protest Survey (2003). Figures in the table are percentages of categories in each country and average factor scores (the higher the more closed the mobilization process). For more details see Technical appendix B.

Table 4: Socio-demographics of February 15th protesters in eight nations (%) (N=6,753)

		US	UK	SP	IT	NL	SW	BE	GE	Tot.
Sex	Male	37	46	50	48	45	49	57	47	47
	Female	63	54	50	52	55	51	43	53	53
Age	0-24	11	16	27	13	19	31	23	26	21
	25-44	35	38	46	48	36	39	38	36	39
	45-64	43	39	25	36	38	26	35	31	34
	65+	11	7	2	3	7	4	5	7	6
Education	None & primary	0	2	2	2	3	9	2	1	3
	Lower secondary	1	7	11	7	6	23	5	10	9
	Higher secondary	6	15	41	15	31	26	21	25	23
	Non university higher	15	9	6	18	23	13	27	3	13
	University	78	67	40	58	37	30	46	61	52
Profession	Manual worker	6	8	31	9	5	4	4	7	8
	Office/ professional worker	50	49	41	33	48	36	53	42	43
	Manager	6	6	0	2	4	2	3	3	3
	Not working	15	13	12	11	16	18	17	13	14
	Student	12	20	10	32	21	32	22	35	24
	Other	10	4	6	14	7	7	2	1	7
Work sector	Industrial	17	12	-	18	11	13	12	17	15
	Private services	21	11	-	14	23	25	19	14	18
	Health, education, care, research	42	47	-	27	43	44	37	33	38
	Government	6	5	-	16	11	12	20	9	11
	Charity	12	11	-	6	10	4	10	8	9
	Other	2	14	-	19	0	2	2	19	9

Source: EOS Gallup poll Europe 21-27 January, 2003

Table 5: Political attitudes of February 15th protesters in eight nations (%) (N=6,753)

		US	UK	SP	IT	NL	SW	BE	GE	Tot.
Political interest	A lot	94	78	69	86	55	70	53	83	75
	Intermediate	2	17	22	9	38	24	34	16	19
	Few	4	6	9	5	8	6	13	2	6
Left-right	Extreme left	21	14	19	44	17	27	14	14	22
	Left	63	63	61	46	64	58	62	63	60
	Center	15	22	18	8	17	14	20	22	17
	Right	1	1	1	1	2	1	3	1	1
	Extreme right	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
War opposition	Slight	12	8	22	28	6	20	17	15	16
	Moderate	67	67	70	65	67	69	69	71	68
	Strong	22	25	9	7	27	11	13	14	16
Internal political efficacy	High	76	61	38	31	65	70	59	54	56
	Intermediate	11	15	19	20	16	9	14	15	15
	Low	12	24	43	49	19	21	27	31	29
External political efficacy	High	40	48	55	56	18	23	32	40	40
	Intermediate	17	15	14	13	12	12	13	17	14
	Low	43	37	31	31	70	63	55	43	46
System support	High	18	15	34	3	42	45	36	31	26
	Intermediate	20	20	23	6	26	26	27	23	20
	Low	62	65	43	91	32	30	37	43	54

Source: International Peace Protest Survey (2003)

Table 6: Political behaviour of February 15th protesters in eight nations (%) (N=6,753)

		US	UK	SP	IT	NL	SW	BE	GE	Tot.
Active organization member	Yes	85	76	54	71	72	73	74	58	71
	No	15	24	46	29	28	27	26	42	29
Political action	Conventional	99	96	91	94	93	98	94	96	95
	Non-conventional	15	16	28	27	12	28	11	17	20
	Radical	6	6	13	40	6	12	9	9	15
Protest frequency	First time	30	49	21	9	54	26	22	23	27
	2-5	49	39	53	33	36	47	54	43	44
	6-10	12	6	12	22	4	14	14	15	13
	10+	9	6	13	36	5	13	10	19	16
Party member	Active	21	6	6	10	13	14	12	6	11
	Passive	30	7	7	10	12	5	7	4	1
	Former	3	15	9	9	6	5	6	11	8
	No member	46	72	78	71	69	77	75	79	70
Vote behaviour	Far left	0	13	27	45	34	2	6	24	18
	Green	33	11	3	7	39	21	56	37	25
	Social-democrats	65	40	58	44	20	73	26	36	44
	Christian-democrat/conservatives	1	13	12	1	2	2	6	2	6
	Liberals	0	24	0	3	5	2	6	2	8

Source: International Peace Protest Survey (2003)

Table 7: Socio-demographic, attitudinal and behavioural *absolute* diversity of February 15th protesters in eight nations (fractionalization indexes) (N=6,753)

SOCIO-DEMOS	US	UK	SP	IT	NL	CH	BE	GE	Tot.
Sex	0.412	0.497	0.500	0.499	0.495	0.500	0.49	0.498	0.498
Age	0.668	0.673	0.653	0.622	0.685	0.683	0.678	0.702	0.685
Education	0.365	0.515	0.656	0.603	0.71	0.765	0.669	0.554	0.651
Profession	0.696	0.691	0.708	0.749	0.691	0.729	0.639	0.678	0.726
Work sector	0.732	0.718	-	0,810	0.728	0.711	0.762	0.792	0.772
TOTAL	**0.575**	**0.619**	**0.657**	**0.629**	**0.662**	**0.678**	**0.648**	**0.645**	**0.666**
POLITICAL ATTITUDES	US	UK	SP	IT	NL	CH	BE	GE	Tot.
Political interest	0.114	0.359	0.467	0.25	0.547	0.449	0.587	0.285	0.398
Left-right	0.536	0.535	0.559	0.588	0.532	0.571	0.555	0.535	0.563
War opposition	0.488	0.482	0.454	0.494	0.475	0.472	0.478	0.454	0.486
Int. political efficacy	0.396	0.548	0.635	0.624	0.516	0.458	0.559	0.590	0.58
Ext. political efficacy	0.626	0.61	0.582	0.573	0.463	0.536	0.578	0.626	0.609
System support	0.543	0.515	0.647	0.167	0.654	0.64	0.661	0.666	0.601
TOTAL	**0.451**	**0.508**	**0.557**	**0.449**	**0.531**	**0.521**	**0.570**	**0.526**	**0.540**
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR	US	UK	SP	IT	NL	CH	BE	GE	Tot.
Active organization member	0.255	0.365	0.497	0.412	0.403	0.394	0.385	0.487	0.412
Political action	0.301	0.317	0.470	0.569	0.283	0.447	0.305	0.356	0.429
Protest frequency	0.647	0.601	0.644	0.705	0.575	0.675	0.630	0.704	0.691
Party member	0.653	0.451	0.375	0.468	0.489	0.383	0.415	0.359	0.491
Vote behavior	0.469	0.737	0.575	0.598	0.689	0.422	0.608	0.675	0.702
TOTAL	**0.465**	**0.494**	**0.512**	**0.550**	**0.488**	**0.464**	**0.469**	**0.516**	**0.545**

Source: International Peace Protest Survey (2003)

Table 8: Socio-demographic, attitudinal, and behavioural *relative* diversity of February 15th protesters in eight nations (N=6,753)

SOCIO DEMOS		US	UK	SP	IT	NL	CH	BE	GE
Sex	Male	-12	-3	-1	+1	-4	-1	+8	-2
	Female	+12	+3	+1	-1	+4	+1	-8	+2
Age	15-24	-7	+1	-5	+13	+4	+17	+8	+13
	25-44	-4	+1	+11	+10	-3	+2	+2	-1
	45-64	+16	+10	+10	-4	+9	-4	+6	+0
	65+	-4	-12	-17	-19	-10	-15	-15	-12
Education (25-64)	Lower	-12	-31	-53	-45	-28	+12	-36	-5
	Higher secondary	-47	-28	+1	+10	-13	-42	-14	-44
	Tertiary	+59	+59	+52	+36	+41	+29	+50	+49
TOTAL		19.2	16.4	16.8	15.4	12.9	13.7	16.3	14.2
POLITICAL ATTITUDES		US	UK	SP	IT	NL	CH	BE	GE
Political interest	A lot	+31	+29	+43	+57	-3	+27	+24	+5
	Little	-33	-45	-65	-66	-32	-47	-57	-20
Left-Right	Left	+67	+53	+39	+49	+48	+57	+49	+42
	Center	-39	-28	-22	-34	-20	-33	-11	-4
	Right	-29	-25	-17	-15	-27	-29	-28	-17
Politics too complicated	Agree	-	-53	-66	+6	+34	+40	+14	+16
	Disagree	-	+72	+67	+5	-12	-8	-3	-1
	Neither/nor	-	-18	-2	-11	-21	-32	-17	-5
Politicians only interested in vote	Agree	-	+37	+40	+28	-6	-2	+20	+19
	Disagree	-	-21	-32	-18	+9	+11	-9	-7
	Neither/nor	-	-15	-9	-10	-3	-8	-11	-12
TOTAL		39.8	36.0	36.5	27.2	19.5	26.7	22.1	13.5
POLITICAL BEHAVOR		US	UK	SP	IT	NL	CH	BE	GE
Active organisation member	Yes	-	+10	-8	-14	+16	-	+9	+24
Party member	Active	0	+4	+5	+7	+11	+9	+11	+2
	Inactive	+1	+3	+6	+8	+5	-3	+3	-1
	No member	-1	-7	-11	-17	-16	-5	-13	-1
Signed petition	Yes	+11	+27	+56	+19	+6	+18	+33	+28
Joined strike	Yes	+1	+1	+71	+5	+14	+5	+54	+7
Occupied building	Yes	+1	0	+18	0	+3	0	+3	+2
TOTAL		2.5	8.7	29.2	11.7	11.8	6.7	21.0	10.8

Sources: International Peace Protest Survey (IPPS) and others. Gender and age population data are based on the Demographic Yearbook (2002) of the United Nations. The education data are based on OECD statistics for the population between 25-64 years old. Political interest and left-right placement are based on the most recent available World Values Studies (WVS) which was 1990 for the UK, Belgium, Italy and The Netherlands, 1995 for the US, 1996 for Spain and Switzerland and 1997 for Germany. The political interest variable is a 5-category variable in IPPS whereas it has only 4 categories in WVS (no neither-nor category). Interpretation should be done very cautiously. Left-right was a 0-10 scale in IPPS compared to a 1-10 scale in WVS. In IPPS the recoded middle category was 4-6, whereas this is 5-6 for the WVS. Active organization membership came from European Social Survey (ESS). Questioned organizations were slightly different from the IPPS list (see Technical appendix B): sports/outdoor activity club; cultural /hobby activity organization; trade union; business/profession/farmers organization; humanitarian organization; environmental/peace/animal organization; religious/church organization; consumer/automobile organization; science/education/teacher organization; social club etc.; other voluntary organization. Both attitudinal political alienation statements are based on ESS with an identical wording as in IPPS (see appendix B). The figures in the table are differences (in %) between the share of the respective groups in the population and among the demonstrators. The bigger a figure in the table, the less relative internal diversity of the peace demonstrators in this country. The totals are averaged differences: a sum of all absolute differences divided by the total number of categories.

Table 9: Correlation (Pearson) matrix of dependent (*absolute* diversity) and independent variables in eight countries (N=8 except for analyses with mobilization type were N=7)

	Government/Opposition.	Public opinion	Mobilization.	Socio-demo diversity	Attitudinal diversity	Behavioral diversity
Government/opposition	-	**.807*****	**.875*****	**.670****	**.533***	.025
Public opinion		-	**.849*****	**.914*****	**.548***	.139
Mobilization			-	**.659***	.431	.359
Socio-demo diversity				-	**.692****	.033
Attitudinal. Diversity					-	-.267
Behavioral Diversity						-

***correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; **correlation is significant at the 0.05 level; *correlation is significant at the 0.10 level.

Table 10:   Correlation matrix (Pearson) of dependent (*relative* diversity) and independent variables in eight countries (N=8 except for analyses with mobilization type were N=7)

	Government/opposition	Public opinion	Mobilization	Socio-demo diversity	Attitudinal diversity	Behavioral diversity
Government/opposition	-	**.807***	**.875***	**.684**	**.920***	-.180
Public opinion		-	**.849***	**.735**	**.640**	-.366
Mobilization			-	**.704**	**.787**	-.068
Socio-demo diversity				-	**.776**	.020
Attitudinal diversity					-	-.031
Behavioral diversity						-

***correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; **correlation is significant at the 0.05 level; *correlation is significant at the 0.10 level.

Figure 1: Causal path determining internal protest diversity

Figure 2: Scatter plots of independent variables and *absolute* internal diversity in eight countries