

# Who takes to which Streets?

## **Internal Diversity of Protest and the Worldwide Demonstrations Against War in Iraq**

---

Stefaan Walgrave

Joris Verhulst

University of Antwerp UA  
Dep. Political Science  
Media, Movements & Politics M2P

Work in Progress

Very, very first draft: all comments welcome

Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops,  
Workshop 8: 'The Changing Structure of Civil Society'  
April 13-18, 2004-04-06 Uppsala, Sweden

## INTRODUCTION

There are reasons to believe that more and more people from increasingly diverse segments of society are gradually engaging in political protest. The thesis of the normalization of protest has been around for a while and holds that, thresholds for protest gradually going down, virtually all groups in society show their discontent and take to the streets - demonstrations being probably the most important action repertoire - to defend their interests and/or display their anger. Studies over time have established indeed that in a period of just a few decades the traditional predictors of protest participation - mainly sex, age and education – are withering and that protest behaviour has pervaded Western-societies to encompass quasi all societal groups (Norris et al, 2004; Walgrave & Van Aelst, 1999). Policemen, employers, manual workers, university professors as well as doctors: all engage in non-conventional political behaviour, a well-known political scientist's term to refer to contentious collective action. Consequently, self-reported protest participation, especially when it comes to classical and non-violent types of action, is consistently on the rise in as good as all Western democracies. In practical terms, the normalization of protest, people from all corners of society gradually participating in protest events, could mean two things: more diverging groups stage *separate* specific events to defend their individual interests leading to a fragmentation of interest representation just like individualization and functional differentiation theory would expect; or, some protest events are able to attract more dissimilar groups *at the same time*. The first normalization track leads to *external* diversity: more different people on the streets but not together. The second track is the *internal* diversity track: very different people join forces for a common cause simultaneously. In this article we focus on this second path leading to the normalization of protest and, more specifically, on the explanation of internal diversity. Our basic quest is thus: why are some contentious gatherings more heterogeneous than others? But before we tackle this central research question, another question arises: what are the reasons that make internal diversity worth studying?

Apart from being a mechanism driving the normalization of protest and the protester, internal diversity might be important for society as a whole and for the mobilizing agencies themselves. The first argument has been developed by Robert Putnam who coined the influential concepts of bonding vs. bridging social capital (Putnam 2000). According to Putnam both kinds of social capital are considered necessary, but the bridging variant is rarer, more difficult to develop and more fragile. Social networks connecting people with different characteristics and as such building bridges between dissimilar groups in society are considered as paramount for the

functioning of society. Putnam's distinction between bonding and bridging social capital has been adopted by other scholars who proved empirically that the heterogeneity has positive effects on socialization and that organizational segregation, in contrast, leads to less benign socialization (Elchardus, Hooghe et al. 2001; Elchardus et al., 2000). The argument is, hence, that diversity and heterogeneity are assets that yield positive consequences for society as a whole.

Yet, the diversity argument has a second strand. A diverse constituency is an important asset for social movements themselves. Most social movements try - at least rhetorically - to broaden their support and to reach beyond the groups whose specific interests they defend. Naturally, this applies more to movements pursuing universal goals or goals with diffuse benefits that are not allocated in specific population segments, like for example peace movements. Yet specific interest movements too (e.g. sectoral labor unions) always claim a kind of representativeness. Why do they do that? Diversity of supporters not only yields access to a whole range of diverse resources, but demonstrable diversity of the protest itself may enhance the potential impact of it. All other action features being equal, the socio-demographic (and political) diversity of the demonstrators codetermines the reaction of the target of the protest: giving in, repressing or just ignoring it. Consequently the heterogeneity of the demonstrators may be the stake of an interpretation struggle: the reluctant target of the protest generally tries to downplay the diversity of the protest and points to 'special interests', while the protest organizers attempt to frame their protest as being carried by a representative sample of people, drawn from all segments, layers and beliefs in society. Surely, the potential impact of a protest event does not solely depend on the diversity of its social composition: e.g. the sheer amount of people showing up, as well as the self-imposed costs involved in taking part (e.g. signing a petition vs. a hunger strike) play a role as well. But the importance of diversity is obvious, both on a movement-instrumental level as well as on the level of democracy and society as a whole, which renders its study useful and important on both levels.

In the first section of the paper we develop a few hypotheses why some protest demonstrations might be more internally diverse than others. Next we introduce our case: the worldwide antiwar demonstrations on February 15<sup>th</sup>, 2003. Apart from being massive, these demonstrations were above all widely described as extremely diverse and encompassing a broad sample of society. That is why we will compare the internal diversity of the demonstrations in eight countries, which we are able to do since we collaboratively surveyed the participants in these protest events in eight countries, as will be laid out in the third section. The fourth section contains the heart of

our argument as it tests our hypotheses by comparing the demonstrations' internal diversity in the countries under study. The paper closes with a conclusion and discussion section.

## POTENTIAL CAUSES OF INTERNAL DIVERSITY

Not hypothesizing the possible increase of the occurrence of internal protest diversity, but rather on the reasons why such diversity should occur in some cases rather than in others, we will provide with several theoretical possibilities.

### ***H1: Protest size***

The larger the amount of people taking to the streets, the larger their internal diversity will be. In our case concretely, this intuitive and merely quantitative relation would lead us to assume that internal diversity would be highest in Spain and Italy, followed by the UK and the US and eventually Germany, Belgium Switzerland and the Netherlands (table 1).

TABLE 1: Mobilization levels of February 15<sup>th</sup> mobilizations

	Sp	It	USA	UK	B	De	CH	Nl
# February 15th demonstrators (in 1000s)	1,500	1,500	2,500	1,000	72	500	45	70
Population (in million)	40,2	58	290,3	60,1	10,3	82,4	7,4	16,2
Mobilization level (in %)	3,7	2.6	0.9	1.6	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.4

### ***H2: Public opinion***

Another straightforward argument: the more favourable public opinion stands towards the cause of the protest, i.e. the rejection of the possibility of war, the more diverse the demonstrating crowd will be. Roughly, this hypothesis would predict the highest protest participants' diversity in those countries where war opposition was the largest (in our case beginning with Germany, 80%, cf. infra); whereas this would have been the smallest in the UK, and certainly the US (50%). We will compare the different national Feb 15 protesters with the different national mobilization potentials, i.e. that part of the population most firmly opposing to war. That way, we can assess if it takes certain distinctive characteristics to distinguish between people opposing to this war, and those actually taking to the streets to engage in protest.

### ***H3: Political participation tradition***

The more widely spread the political protest participation in general in a country (external diversity (and/or the higher a country finds itself in a protest cycle), the larger the membership of societal groups/organizations, the more diversity will be found among the protesters on this specific event (internal diversity). Once again, we will put the Feb 15 protesters side by side with the relevant active subpopulation, and try to figure out if participatory history and/or organizational memberships make a difference, and to which degree they do.

### ***H4: The largeness of the country***

The vaster the country, the less representative the demonstrators because they have to travel from far (thresholds going up) and the region is never representative for the country as a whole), whereas those actually surpassing the distance threshold will show a more activist profile.

### ***H5: Political opportunity structure***

Of course, we cannot discard the most established country-comparing social movement theory, that of political opportunity structures (POS). However in this paper we will make use of a tailored concept of POS, because of the succinctness of this paper, and because of the peculiarity of the subject under study: first of all, the peace movement has always been a mobilization movement with different types of organizations uniting on the idea of peace. And secondly, the protests under study are a peculiar internationally comparative case study, because of the exact same protest timing (February 15), aims (peace, no war) and frames ('*no war on Iraq*', '*no blood for oil*', '*not in my name*'). Thus, the differences that might be found would be able to show that all movements have "... *both a domestic and an international political environment*" (Oberschall, 1996: 94). For these two reasons, we will confine ourselves to an issue-specific concept of POS:

- ▶ Differences in the stance of the particular government (in favour, initiating or against an upcoming war): the more the national government has a pro-war stance, protest participation is less obvious (and possibly even more risky) and the least diverse the protesters will be. This is linked to the
- ▶ Efficacy or usefulness of the protests, related to the stakes involved. The higher these stakes, the higher the diversity of the protesters will be.
- ▶ Left parties in government or opposition. When left parties are in opposition, they will be an important mobilizer for protest, which will be reflected in the protesters' profiles.

## ***H6: Mobilization channel***

Keeping in mind that “*The key to understanding who takes part and who does not, when they take part and when not, is mobilization.*” (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993: 7), we should try to establish (national differences in) internal heterogeneity through differences in the mobilization channels through which people were mobilized to take part in protest demonstrations.

Snow and colleagues discern ‘private’ from ‘public’ channels for mobilization and recruitment: “... *most spatial settings or domains in life can be conceptualized in terms of a continuum ranging from public to private places.*” (Snow, Zurcher et al. 1980). Implicitly Snow and colleagues develop a typology of targeting channels based on the idea that some channels may reach large groups, while others are confined to certain segments of the population. Elaborating that idea we distinguish between *open and closed mobilization processes* and will analyze the peace protest accordingly. In an open mobilization process the public as a whole, and not only people with certain social features, is the target of mobilization efforts. The mass media are probably the best example of an open mobilization channel. Although there are some notable biases in media use - coinciding largely with organization membership - mass media can be considered as a ubiquitous mobilizer because a vast majority of the population is confronted with its outlets. As a consequence no specific features are required to become a target of mobilization via the media (cf. Walgrave & Manssens, 2000). On the other hand, we can consider mobilization through organizations as being of the closed type: people need to have certain features, in this case membership, to become the target of mobilization efforts; or they need to have made certain specific decisions in the past, in this case the decision to become a member of that specific organization. In many cases the decision to become a member of any kind of social movement can be considered as intentionally putting oneself at the disposal for any mobilization of this organization. Members are on standby and ‘demonstrate’ their preparedness to be at least targeted by mobilization efforts of that organization. These two examples of typical open and closed mobilizers – media vs. organizations - refer to macro level agencies. Yet open and closed mobilization types can be traced back to the micro level as well. On a micro level family, friends, acquaintances and neighbours could be considered as mobilizers able to touch upon the whole population, with some exceptions. Within the closed mobilization type too, micro level equivalents are available: co-members of an organization and colleagues/classmates. A lot of people have neither colleagues nor fellow students and consequently mobilization running through these micro

channels is not of the open but of the closed type, only able to reach a specific cross section of the population.

To conclude: people that were mobilized for action through open mobilization processes will significantly show a higher internal diversity than those that were mobilized through closed mobilizing contexts. Or, somewhat mitigating the argument: when people are mobilized through *both* kinds of channels, their internal heterogeneity will be higher.

### **DESCRIBING THE CASE: THE WORLDWIDE ANTIWAR DEMONSTRATIONS ON FEBRUARY 15TH, 2003**

On February 15 2003, millions of people took to the streets in worldwide protests against an upcoming war in Iraq. In sum about 10 million people took to the streets in at least 600 cities throughout the world (Simonson 2003); these were the largest transnational anti-war protests in human history (Epstein 2003: 109), and that on one single day. In some countries however, like Belgium and the Netherlands, protest turnouts were rather moderate, also when compared to the early 1980s protests against nuclear armament (Rochon, 1988). But in other countries, especially in Italy and Spain, literally millions of people took to the streets. In spite of this huge variance in protest size, the protesters in the different countries shared the same action repertoire, the same protest motivation and the same mobilizing frames. *'Not in my name'*, *'No war on Iraq'* and *'No blood for oil'* could be heard in the streets of cities in all continents. In the entire world, national and international media, commentators, politicians as well as movement members and leaders themselves were startled by the unforeseen magnitude of the protest. According to many of them, a new 'peaceful superpower (Cortright, 2004)' had come into play; a new superpower that could not be disregarded by the war-mongering world leaders. This new challenging power however was not referred to as such only because of the size of its demonstrative externalization, but also because of the characteristics of the people present at these demonstrations. In the entire world, media wrote about the protesters as being a cross-section of the population:

“Groups representing their local churches and mosques, university students, parents with young children... People who have never been on a demonstration before ... the grandmothers, ranging in age from later 40s to a frail 86. Cooks, teachers, doctors, computer programmers and grandmothers. Virgin Marchers, elderly, the young, families: people from all walks of life. (The Times, 15/02/03)”

“People of all ages and all professions were on the streets, expensive designer coats marched side by side with worn-off parkas. (Die Zeit, 20/02/03)”

“Protesters came from a wide range of the political spectrum: college students, middle-aged couples, families with small children, older people who had marched for civil rights, and groups representing labor, the environment and religious, business and civic organizations. (New York Times, 16/02/03)”

“Demonstration veterans, but also ordinary a-political citizens (NRC Handelsblad, 17/02/03)”

“Barbie dolls, doctors, lawyers, students, farmers, unemployed (Le Matin, 22/02/03)”

Another reason to consider the Feb 15 as an ideal test case to do an inter-country comparison for differences in the level of protesters' heterogeneity is its aforementioned uniqueness on several levels. The issue (peace), timing (Feb 15) as well as the organizations are more or less constant for all countries under study, making these variables not, or less able to significantly influence inter-country differences.

Starting in December 2002, when war was still far away, a group of social movement scholars began forging a network in order to survey the expected antiwar-demonstrations to be staged in the next few months. They agreed on a common questionnaire and a field work method elaborated before by Walgrave & Van Aelst (1999; Norris et al. 2004). The surveys cover a random sample of demonstrators engaged in eleven different events in eight countries involving 6,753 respondents in total<sup>1</sup>. This is an exceptionally source of comparative information on the

---

<sup>1</sup> The demonstrations covered all took place in the country's capital, that is Madrid for Spain (by Manuel Jimenez), Berlin for Germany (by Dieter Rucht), London and Glasgow for the UK (by Wolfgang Rüdiger), Amsterdam for the Netherlands (by Bert Klandermans), Bern for Switzerland (by Michelle Beyeler), Rome for Italy (by Mario Diani & Donatella della Porta), Seattle, New York and San Francisco for the US (by Lance Bennet et al) and Brussels for Belgium (by Stefaan Walgrave et al). The mutual differences between the demonstrator's profiles participating in the different events in the same countries appeared to be negligible and that we simply merged the data of these different demonstrations in the US and the UK. Interviewing participants at protest demonstrations is not a common research technique. Favre and colleagues even speak of 'a strange gap' in the sociology of mobilizations (Favre et al, 1997). To the best of our knowledge, few studies have used this approach. Most elaborate is the work of the French research team including Favre, Mayer and Fillieule, who developed a method designed to offer all participants an equal opportunity of being interviewed later refined by the Belgian scholars. In all eight countries but Italy the actual survey process to establish a random survey of demonstration participants was twofold. First, fieldwork supervisors counted the rows of participants, selecting every Nth row, to ensure that the same number of rows was skipped throughout. Then a dozen interviewers selected every Nth person in that row and distributed questionnaires to these individuals during the actual protest march. The selected participants were asked to complete the questionnaire at home and to mail it back. The questionnaire maintained a large common core, including the participants' profile, the mobilisation context, and the political attitudes and values of the demonstrator, with only a few specific items adapted slightly for each country. In addition to the mail-survey, in some countries (Netherlands and Belgium) a random sample of other demonstrators was interviewed in person before the demonstration's departure. The gathering crowd before the demonstration's departure



protest participants of a very exceptional protest event. The overall response rate for the postal survey was more than 53%, with no country's response rate lower than 37%, which is more than satisfactory for an anonymous survey without any reminders, which also increases confidence in the procedure.

### **WHAT IS DIVERSITY AND HOW TO MEASURE IT?**

Relative to other protest issues that directly or even physically concern specific social groups, the peace issue is an issue that affects people basically in moral terms without having immediate consequences on their daily lives. Hence, in general, we could expect that protesters are relatively heterogeneous in terms of age, sex, education, social class, religious affiliation, and so forth. Nevertheless, some specifications lay at hand when considering past peace protests in general and the issue of war against Iraq in particular. From many studies on peace movements and peace protests in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century we know that the participants tend to be younger and better educated than the rest of the population. As far as the period since the student revolt in the Sixties is concerned, peace protesters in Western countries basically share the features of what generally characterizes the activists and constituents of the so-called new social movements: young, well-educated people from the human service sector with liberal or leftist attitudes are strongly overrepresented (e.g. Fuchs and Rucht 1994, Klandermans 1997, ...). We will try to measure if this is also the case for the Feb 15 protesters, and if differences are to be found between countries. Therefore, we will take a look at two different indexes of heterogeneity or diversity. First there is the *social profile* of the protesters, reflected by gender, education, age, profession and religion. The second heterogeneity index is made out of several *behavioral variables*:

---

was divided into sectors, and the interviewers each randomly selected a fixed number of respondents in 'their' sector. These (shorter) face-to-face interviews were only used as a crosscheck to evaluate how far response to the mail-survey generated a representative random sample of demonstrators and will not be used in this contribution. Confidence in the surveys' reliability is strengthened by the fact that hardly anyone refused a face-to-face interview, and by the absence of significant differences between the two types of interviews. In contrast to the field method described above, the Italian team followed another track and decided to interview participants on trains on their way to the demonstration in Rome. In a later study, we will carefully compare the outcome of the Italian field method with the results of the other country's approach. In the UK two different questionnaires were distributed: a normal (10 pages) and a long version. Elsewhere we will enquire whether the length of the questionnaire is associated with response rate and demonstrator's profile. More generally, surveys of demonstrations raise important questions about reliability and the representativity of sampling procedures. Three elements might be considered problematic. First, if the demonstration is large and fairly static, and if all the streets become congested with people, it becomes difficult for the interviewers to cover the whole of the march since they are also immobile. This was the case in some of the covered demonstrations. Second, it is impossible to get a good sample of respondents in violent and/or irregular demonstrations, although these kind of protest events are usually small in number. Third, in some exceptional cases extremist groups of demonstrators *within* a peaceful event refuse to accept the questionnaires. Yet again, this is rare and demonstrators, like many other types of political activist, are usually highly collaborative.

organization membership, movement and protest activism, ideological self placement,... When possible, both kinds of protesters heterogeneity indicators will be benchmarked to the national population (using data from the European Social Survey), or even to the war-opposing segment of the population (Gallup International poll).

#### WHO TOOK TO WHICH STREETS ON FEB 15?

In table 2, the basic socio-demographic features of the February 15 protesters in the different countries are to be found.

TABLE 2: Basic socio-demographic features of February 15<sup>th</sup> demonstrators in 8 countries (IN %)

		<b>US</b>	<b>GB</b>	<b>I</b>	<b>SP</b>	<b>NL</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>SW</b>	<b>Tot.</b>
<b>Sex</b>	Male	37	46	50	48	45	47	<b>57</b>	49	47
	Female	<b>63</b>	54	50	52	55	53	43	51	53
<b>Age</b>	0-24	11	16	27	13	19	26	23	<b>31</b>	21
	25-44	35	38	46	48	36	36	38	<b>39</b>	39
	45-64	<b>43</b>	39	25	36	38	31	35	26	34
	65+	<b>11</b>	7	2	3	7	7	5	4	6
<b>Education</b>	None & primary	0	2	2	2	3	1	2	<b>9</b>	3
	Lower secondary	1	7	11	7	6	10	5	<b>23</b>	9
	Higher secondary	6	15	<b>41</b>	15	31	25	21	26	23
	Non university higher	15	9	6	18	23	3	<b>27</b>	13	13
	University	<b>78</b>	67	40	58	37	61	46	30	52
<b>Profession</b>	Manual worker	6	8	9	<b>31</b>	5	4	4	7	8
	Office/ professional worker	50	49	33	41	48	36	<b>53</b>	42	43
	Manager	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	2	0	4	2	3	3	3
	Not working	15	13	11	12	16	<b>18</b>	17	13	14
	Student	12	20	32	10	21	32	22	<b>35</b>	24
	Other	10	4	<b>14</b>	6	7	7	2	1	7
<b>Work sector</b>	Industrial	17	12	<b>18</b>	-	11	13	12	17	15
	Private services	21	11	14	-	23	<b>25</b>	19	14	18
	Health, educ., care, research	42	<b>47</b>	27	-	43	44	37	33	38
	Government	6	5	16	-	11	12	<b>20</b>	9	11
	Charity	<b>12</b>	11	6	-	10	4	10	8	9
	Other	2	14	<b>19</b>	-	0	2	2	19	9
<b>Religion</b>	None	38	<b>68</b>	33	8	65	57	35	42	48
	Freethinker	20	1	32	27	12	9	<b>34</b>	-	14
	Christian	15	15	2	28	13	25	13	<b>35</b>	17
	Roman Catholic	9	9	32	<b>37</b>	7	7	14	20	16
	Hindu, Buddha, Jew, Muslim	<b>16</b>	6	1	-	4	2	4	3	5
	Other	2	1	-	-	-	-	0	-	1

We begin with analyzing the composition of the 15 February demonstrators with regard to a number of standard variables. Concerning *gender*, we see that both men and women were almost equally present in the anti-war demonstrations. In most countries women were slightly in the majority. The Belgian demonstrators differ from this overall image with a striking overrepresentation of men. Right on the other side of the spectrum, the US counted two-thirds of female protesters. In terms of *age* there are some clear differences between the countries. In Italy, Germany and especially Switzerland the number of youngest demonstrators (below 25) is much above the average. In these countries about one-third of the participants were students. In Spain and, most clearly, in the US the youngest category is underrepresented. In these countries only one out of ten participants was a student. The US demonstration counted as much youngsters as people over 65 years old, what is quite unusual for a protest march. The average peace protester is highly *educated*. In almost every country the category of participants with a university degree is the biggest one. Again, Switzerland and the US are the most extreme cases. Switzerland has a higher percentage of demonstrators with lower educational degrees, partly caused by a higher number of youngsters without high school diploma. The US, on the other side, counted a spectacular proportion of 93% of higher non-university or university education. The *professional* categories are harder to compare. The Spanish protesters differ clearly from the other countries in including far more office and manual workers. The *work sector* of the demonstrators was overwhelmingly in health, education, care and research, and to a lesser extent in private services. A modest amount of people worked in the industrial sector (ranging between 11 and 18 percent). In terms of *religion* people considering themselves as a-religious form almost half of the protesters. Roman Catholics, non-Roman-Catholic Christians and freethinkers are present too, but the other world religions are only weakly represented, not really a surprise when taking into account that the eight countries in our sample are all Western-democracies with Christian-roots. The differences between countries are huge, with, for example, a large share of Roman Catholics in Spain and Italy, a big amount of non-religious people in the Netherlands and the UK, and doubtlessly the greatest religious diversity in the US, just as we expected it to be.

To test whether these socio-demographic differences between the countries hold in a multivariate analysis, we undertook a series of binominal logistic regressions in which a country's demonstrators were contrasted with the sum of the other countries' participants.

TABLE 3: differences in socio-demographic profiles of demonstrators in eight countries

	<b>US</b>	<b>GB</b>	<b>IT</b>	<b>SP</b>	<b>NL</b>	<b>GER</b>	<b>BEL</b>	<b>SWI</b>
<b>Gender (female)</b>	<b>,478 ***</b>	<b>,217 *</b>	-,101	,087	,111	-,009	<b>-,450 ***</b>	-,013
<b>Age</b>	<b>,025 ***</b>	,005	<b>-,022 ***</b>	<b>,011 ***</b>	<b>,008 **</b>	,003	-,001	<b>-,016 ***</b>
<b>Education</b>	<b>,782 ***</b>	<b>,294 ***</b>	<b>-,229 ***</b>	<b>,337 ***</b>	<b>-,139 ***</b>	<b>,095*</b>	<b>,121 ***</b>	<b>-,528 ***</b>
<b>Profession</b>	<b>,349 ***</b>	<b>,344 ***</b>	-,077	<b>-,816 ***</b>	,078	<b>-,219 ***</b>	-,002	<b>,130 **</b>
<b>Religion</b>	<b>,354 ***</b>	<b>-,258 ***</b>	<b>-,569 ***</b>	,084	-,115	<b>-,681 ***</b>	<b>,372 ***</b>	<b>,567 ***</b>
<b>N</b>	619	486	817	419	591	715	687	801
<b>R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.18	0.06	0.08	0.09	0.01	0.05	0.03	0.15

The coefficients represent unstandardized betas (B) and their significance in binominal logistic regression analysis models predicting participation in one country (versus the pooled sample of the other seven countries) as the dependent variables. Sig. \*\*\*=.001 \*\*=.01 \*=.05. The variables were entered in the order of the table. Collinearity statistics were checked for the tolerance of all variables. See the technical appendix for coding details of all the items. (*The data are NOT weighted so that every demonstration has an unequal number of respondents in the analysis*)

These analyses confirm the most important findings of the bivariate analysis. Concerning gender only the Belgian and US demonstrators vary significantly from the average, yet in opposite directions. The age differences encompass more countries, with the US, Spain and the Netherlands having older protesters and Italy and Switzerland having significant younger participants. All countries differ from the average on education. The US, the UK, Spain and to a lesser degree Belgium and Germany have higher educated participants than the Netherlands, Italy and especially Switzerland. Regarding profession the US, UK, and Swiss demonstrators displayed a significantly higher class profile, while especially Spain strongly, and Germany less outspoken, have been recruiting more among manual workers and non-active citizens. Religious inter-country differences, although substantial, are difficult to interpret.

Overall the US protesters are largely most distinctive from the other demonstrators, which is illustrated by the US regression's highest R<sup>2</sup>. Only the British peace protesters have more or less the same profile, with the exception of the tricky religious variable. Both countries are characterized by more female protesters, with higher ranking professions, and higher educated participants. Protesters of these initiating countries, because of their stronger societal position, probably are more capable to oppose their political leaders and to challenge a broad pro war opinion in society.

Demonstrators in all countries seem to be diverse, with all major groups in society being represented to some extent. Yet it is obvious that the *internal diversity* of the demonstrations

differed a lot. To scrutinize this further we calculated fractionalization indexes for each country and variable. The higher the index the more diversity. Since the index is dependent upon the number of categories it cannot be used to compare between variables but only between countries.

TABLE 4: Fractionalization index for socio-demographic features of anti-war demonstrators in 8 countries

	US	GB	I	SP	NL	G	B	SW	TOTAL
<b>Sex</b>	0.47	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.49	0.50	0.50
<b>Age</b>	0.67	0.67	0.65	0.62	0.69	0.70	0.68	0.68	0.68
<b>Education</b>	0.37	0.52	0.66	0.60	0.71	0.55	0.67	0.76	0.65
<b>Profession</b>	0.80	0.78	0.80	0.72	0.77	0.78	0.70	0.74	0.81
<b>Work sector</b>	0.73	0.72	0.81	/	0.73	0.71	0.76	0.79	0.77
<b>Religion</b>									
<b>TOTAL</b> (average)	0.61	0.64	0.68	0.61	0.68	0.65	0.66	0.69	0.68

The formula to calculate fractionalization is as follows:  $1 - \sum S_{ki}^2$ . The index measures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals belong to different categories of the variable. Each term  $S_{ki}$  is the proportion of demonstrators with a certain feature.

The table shows notable differences between countries. The US, for example, is least diverse concerning gender and education. Spain is least diverse in terms of age, Belgium in terms of profession, while protesters in Germany are most likely to come out of the same economic sector. Internal diversity is more or less similar across countries, as shown by the overall fractionalization index. Switzerland, Italy and the Netherlands seem to exhibit a somewhat more internally diverse protesting crowd than the US and the UK; the Belgian and German sample situating itself somewhere in-between.

What we could demonstrate is that considerable amounts of all population segments were present on the streets on February 15<sup>th</sup>. However, none of the results presented so far, including the fractionalization indexes, tell us anything about the representativeness of the protesters against the backdrop of the population at large. This is why, in the next paragraph, we turn to a comparison of our protesters with the population in general.

#### **WERE THE FEB 15 PROTESTERS A CROSS-SECTION OF THEIR POPULATION?**

To better and more correctly interpret the differences between the countries it is important to compare the socio-demographic characteristics of the protesters with those from the population in general. The US protesters, for example, might be higher educated simply because US citizens in general are more schooled than their European counterparts. We therefore use the

demographic statistics published by the OECD and the UN, but we only have some gender, age and education data at our disposal.

TABLE 5: Over- and underrepresentation for gender, age, and education: subtraction of share (in%) of protesters with share of population in the same category

		US	GB	I	SP	NL	G	B	SW	TOT. (avg.)
<b>Sex</b>	Male	-12	-3	+1	-1	-4	-2	<b>+8</b>	-1	-1.8
	Female	<b>+12</b>	+3	-1	+1	+4	+2	-8	+1	+1.8
<b>Age</b>	15-24	-7	+1	+13	-5	+4	+13	+8	<b>+17</b>	+5.5
	25-44	-4	+1	+10	+11	-3	-1	+2	+2	+2.3
	45-64	+16	+10	-4	+10	+9	+0	+6	-4	+5.4
	65+	-4	-12	<b>-19</b>	-17	-10	-12	-15	-15	-13.0
<b>Education</b> (25-64)	Lower sec. or lower secondary	-12	-31	-45	<b>-53</b>	-28	-5	-36	+12	-24.8
	Higher secondary	-47	-28	+10	+1	-13	-44	-14	-42	-22.1
	Tertiary	<b>+59</b>	<b>+59</b>	+36	+52	+41	+49	+50	+29	+46.9
<b>TOTAL</b> (standard deviation)		28.4	26.2	22.6	27.5	18.9	24.2	23.6	20.3	21.03

Gender and Age population data are based on the Demographic Yearbook (2002) of the United Nations. The education data are based on OECD statistics for the population between 25-64 years old.

Although the US had significant more *women* among the protesters and Belgium more men than in the population, we can conclude that large proportions of both man and women protested against the war. The distribution of sex is rather normal, with a slight overrepresentation of the women. The general conclusion of the classic SES model, that man more than women participate in lawful demonstrations, is not confirmed. This is not a surprising finding. Jennings et al. showed earlier that in the course of the 1970s women started to catch up with their male counterparts in terms of protesting (Jennings and Van Deth 1990). The SES model also predicts that younger people demonstrate more than older people. In terms of *age*, all but the oldest age categories were overrepresented. The younger people, however, are not more overrepresented than both other, young adult and adult, groups. Younger groups are most overrepresented in Italy and Switzerland while the older categories seemed to be most present in the US. Reasons for the enduring under-representation of older people on the streets are multiple: people in their 70s have probably less protest experience (generation effect), but have to overcome more physical barriers as well to join a protest march (age effect). The comparison between the protesters on the level of *education* has to be done quite roughly because of the rudimentary population data of the OECD. We can only compare the differences in education levels

regarding three very general categories and only for people between 25 and 64 years old. The results show unmistakably that the protesters of all countries were much higher educated than the average citizens of their country. Especially individuals with tertiary (university and non university) education degrees were strongly overrepresented among the demonstrators. In Italy and Spain the people that achieved only higher secondary degrees too were slightly more present in the demonstration. In terms of education the anti-war protesters can hardly be labelled normal or representative, and least so in the US and the UK.

To summarize the population representativeness of the protesters in the different countries, we calculated standard deviations of the differences between the demonstration and corresponding population categories in every country: the lower the standard deviations, the higher the representativeness. These figures are shown in the last line of Table 5. Apart from, again, the outlying position of Italy, it is obvious that countries with war opposing governments witnessed more representative protests. Although more people took to the streets in most of these countries, protesters in the US, the UK and Spain were less representative of their respective population at large than the protesters in The Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland, who showed up in much smaller numbers.

#### **WERE THE FEB 15 PROTESTERS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE WAR OPPOSING SEGMENT OF SOCIETY?**

Apart from the distribution of sexes (in most countries), protesters were not representative of the population in their countries, albeit with considerable differences between the countries. This is hardly surprising. Since social movements defend certain interests, and are rooted in certain groups, movements that are able to mobilize a cross-section of the population are truly exceptional. Because movement support is not evenly present in all population segments, it is no revelation that movement participation is not either. Movements can only mobilize people who agree with the movement's goals. Klandermans coined the distinction between consensus and action mobilization specially to highlight the difference between movement support in attitudes and in deeds (Klandermans 1984). Drawing on our hypothetical reflections presented above, we expect that the mobilization potential was probably skewed and indeed mostly present among younger and higher educated people. Thus, were the demonstrators representative of the war opposing segments in their respective populations?

To test this hypothesis, we draw upon a survey carried out by EOS Gallup Europe between the 21<sup>st</sup> and the 27<sup>th</sup> of January 2003, that is just two to three weeks before the February 15<sup>th</sup> protests<sup>2</sup>. All seven European countries in our sample are included in the poll, only the US is lacking. Although only some 500 people were surveyed in these countries, which makes for a rather large random errors, the survey is extremely useful to put the socio-demographic features in perspective and to compare them with the people opposing the Iraqi war. Respondents' answers to the most relevant questions are shown in Table 6.

Table 6: Anti-war attitudes in seven countries (EOS Gallup Europe)(in%)

	<b>B</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>SW</b>	<b>SP</b>	<b>GER</b>	<b>US</b>	<b>UK</b>	<b>IT</b>	<b>TOT</b>
Do you consider that it would be justified or not that our country participates in a military intervention in Iraq? If the US intervenes militarily in Iraq without a preliminary decision of the UN (unjustified)	84	84	90	78	89	-	68	81	82
The US should intervene militarily even if the UN does not give its formal agreement (disagree)	78	80	86	77	87	-	68	79	79
Oil is the main motivation for which the US wants to intervene militarily in Iraq (agree)	72	74	75	79	72	-	60	73	72
Do you consider that it would be justified or not that our country participates in a military intervention in Iraq? If the Iraqi regime does not cooperate with United Nations inspectors (unjustified)	55	47	73	56	64	-	32	49	54
Do you consider that it would be justified or not that our country participates in a military intervention in Iraq? If the UN security council decides on a military intervention in Iraq (unjustified)	40	29	66	43	52	-	15	33	40
Do you consider that it would be justified or not that our country participates in a military intervention in Iraq? If the UN inspectors discover weapons of mass destruction in Iraq (unjustified)	39	30	67	41	46	-	15	37	39
Iraq represents a threat to world peace (disagree)	37	33	43	35	34	-	23	28	33

We rank ordered the questions in the table based on the share of the population that agreed with the anti-war stances and, therefore, could be considered as supporting the anti-war case. An enormous majority of the populations considered participation of his/her country in the war unjustified without UN resolution (82%). At the opposite side of the spectrum, a much smaller amount (33%) *disagrees* with the statement that Iraq represents a threat to world peace (and that intervention is thus not justified) (33%). To be able to compare antiwar support in the population with movement participants we must make a choice of how to determine movement support. What was the “official” stance of the peace movements? Hard to say. Peace movement officials would probably reject war in any case. Since many questions in the table are highly hypothetical

<sup>2</sup> [www.EOSgallup.com/int\\_survey/en\\_press.htm](http://www.EOSgallup.com/int_survey/en_press.htm)



as they refer to a country's participation, which was clearly out of the question for most of the respondents, and since the oil and threat questions are about motives for war and not about the justness of it, we believe that especially the question about US intervention without UN resolution captures the stake and aim of the anti-war protest best. Yet probably this very large group of 79% rejecting war without resolution differs not much from the population in general. Therefore we decided to compare our demonstrators with the segments of the seven populations that *completely* disagreed with intervention without UN green light. We consider this group of 54% (not in the table) as the mobilization potential of the movement and we regard the resistance against war without UN approval as the core of the movement's claims. Who were those people?

Table 7: Socio-demographic features of segment of the population *completely* disagreeing with the statement that 'The US should intervene militarily even if the UN does not give its formal agreement' (EOS Gallup Europe)(in%)

		<b>BEL</b>	<b>NL</b>	<b>SW</b>	<b>SP</b>	<b>GE R</b>	<b>U S</b>	<b>UK</b>	<b>IT</b>	<b>TO T.</b>
Gender	Man	46	45	53	51	48	-	50	46	48
	Women	54	55	47	49	52	-	50	54	52
Age	15-24	15	11	11	22	11	-	10	22	15
	25-39	26	29	32	28	26	-	21	29	27
	40-54	25	29	31	20	22	-	32	20	26
	55&+	34	31	26	30	41	-	37	29	33
Education (age 15 & - end)		7	9	4	19	21	-	20	34	16
	16-20	47	36	37	31	58	-	50	32	42
	21&+	30	48	49	33	14	-	25	19	31
Profession	Self employed	5	15	10	9	6	-	6	10	9
	Employee	36	33	49	25	30	-	40	27	34
	Manual worker	10	10	7	12	12	-	13	14	11
	No profession	49	41	34	54	49	-	40	49	45
Religion	Christian	73	56	71	81	58	-	55	89	69
	Non believer	22	25	14	17	29	-	24	7	20
	Other	-	-	7	-	6	-	18	0	10
Total in %		53	59	66	48	64	-	43	45	54
N		267	297	337	242	319	-	214	223	1899

The overall figures adding up the seven mobilization potential in the seven countries show a slight overrepresentation of women, a remarkably older composition with the 55+ group being the largest, a definitely higher educated segment although not hyper schooled, relatively small shares of professionals and manual workers, especially high shares of non-active citizens (students?), and a clearly left leaning political self positioning. At first sight, the antiwar

supporters resemble the profile of the actual protest participants we presented before. Table 8 contains the differences between both groups based on the subtraction of their proportional presence. A negative figure means that this group is underrepresented among the actual protesters: this category was more present among the antiwar supporters than among actual movement participants. Negative figures point towards deficits in the course of the action mobilization process: more people of this category supported the movement’s claim than actually showed up at demonstrations. A positive sign means the opposite: relatively more activists than supporters.

TABLE 8: Mobilization deficit: comparison of protest potential (=segment of the population *completely* disagreeing with the statement that ‘The US should intervene militarily even if the UN does not give its formal agreement’) and participants at the February 15<sup>th</sup> protests

		<b>BEL</b>	<b>NL</b>	<b>SW</b>	<b>SP</b>	<b>GE R</b>	<b>US</b>	<b>UK</b>	<b>IT</b>	<b>TO T.</b>
Gender	Man	11	0	-5	-3	-1	-	-4	4	-1
	Woman	-11	0	5	3	1	-	4	-4	1
Age	15-24	8	8	19	-10	15	-	5	4	6
	25-39	1	1	1	11	0	-	8	9	4
	40-54	10	-1	-9	13	5	-	-2	6	3
	55&+	-18	-8	-11	-14	-20	-	-12	-20	-14
Education	15 & -	-3	-3	21	-16	-11	-	-15	-28	-7
	16-20	-39	-11	-21	-20	-46	-	-44	5	-25
	21&+	42	12	1	36	57	-	59	24	33
Profession	Self employed	4	-1	3	-7	6	-	39	6	12
	Employee	12	8	-17	17	-2	-	-28	-3	-5
	Manual worker	-6	-5	0	21	-7	-	-4	-3	-2
	No profession	-9	-2	14	-31	3	-	-6	0	-4
TOTAL (standard deviation)		13	4,6	10	16	13		18	9	9

Interpreting the results in table 8 must be done with caution, since some categories used by the Gallup pollsters did not completely match our categorizations. In addition, the Gallup poll samples were small and therefore prone to random errors. Only large differences merit our attention. The general picture is candid and confirms all literature about mobilization biases and political participation thresholds. Advanced *age* seems to be a very tough barrier for mobilization to overcome: mobilization in the oldest groups was not successful. Low education too, except for

specific labour union demonstrations, is a formidable barrier for mobilization by new social movements. Higher schooled people are strongly overrepresented and all other categories are underrepresented. Since the profession categories were recoded on a less reliable base and the differences do not seem that dramatic, we must be extremely careful with interpreting the profession results.

The most striking mobilization deficit in the table is to be found among right-wing leaning people: a considerable amount of them supported the anti-war claim the movements make. Yet these people are dramatically underrepresented at the actual protest events. This strongly suggests that mobilization targeted mostly left-wing people and that right-wing supporters simply could not be mobilized. Mobilization happened mainly via left-wing parties, organizations and movements and, subsequently, did not reach the right-wing opponents to an Iraqi war. This is not surprising in the light of the fact that peace demonstrations in the past too have always been closely associated with left-wing politics. Klandermans and Oegema found exactly the same in their study about antinuclear weapons demonstrations in the 1980s in The Netherlands: extremely broad support for the central claims of the movement but only effective mobilization among people sharing features ascribed to typical new social movement activists (Klandermans and Oegema 1987: 526). The antiwar protest of February 15<sup>th</sup> was another exquisite chance for the peace movement to reach beyond its usual constituency because support for the cause did exist even in non-left segments of the public. Apparently chances to mobilize in these segments that were previously mostly inaccessible by the movement were missed, thereby causing a large mobilization deficit among right-wing categories. Our assumption that the reason for underrepresentation of right-wingers is mobilizational is suggested by significant correlations between subjective right-left placement of the demonstrators and their organizational embeddedness: right-wing demonstrators were less informed about the demonstration by organizations, were to lower degree members of organizing organizations, and knew less

members of mobilizing organizations. The demonstrators are thus a distinct and specific part of the very broad war-opposing segment in Western populations.

### **WERE THE FEB 15 PROTESTERS THE TYPICAL PROTEST PARTICIPANT?**

We claimed above that differences between supporters and participants may be attributed to a mobilization deficit, the movement not being able to reach its whole constituency. An alternative account might be that all groups in society were effectively equally targeted and successfully reached, but that only people with previous demonstration experience actually took the step to participate. Demonstrating is a habit that can be learned, and participation of first-timers needs the passing of more thresholds than for people who demonstrate frequently. If this were the case, we would expect the February 15<sup>th</sup> demonstrators to resemble the part of the public in the eight countries that had previous demonstration experience and to differ from these countries' non-demonstrating publics. To test this hypothesis we draw upon the first round of the European Social Survey carried out just before February 15<sup>th</sup>, 2003 (September-December, 2002) asking respondents about their participation in a "lawful demonstrations during the last 12 months." Due to the limited time frame of the question (last 12 months), the number of people responding affirmative is modest and definitely much smaller than answering questions about demonstration participation "ever" or "during the last five years" as in the European/World Values Studies. Yet, the people stating having demonstrated during the last year are more likely committed activists and not only occasional demonstrators, although their tiny number in a few countries imperils the statistical soundness of the figures. The limited time frame in the question wording may also distort the answers in the sense that it makes them more vulnerable for haphazardly changing mobilization cycles of different movements in the different countries. As mentioned in Chapter 2, protest participation differs largely between the seven European countries at stake. In five of our countries - Spain, Italy, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland – recent demonstration activism

is considerable higher than in the UK and The Netherlands. What about the socio-demographic profile of the recently demonstrating public? Figures are displayed in Table 9.

Table 9: Participants (+) in lawful demonstrations during the last 12 months vs. non-participants (-) in seven European countries (in %)

	BE		NL		SW		SP		GER		UK		US		IT		TOT	
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
Gender	58	51	54	46	50	50	53	46	52	48	48	49	-	-	55	44	52.9	47.7
Woman	42	49	46	54	50	50	47	54	48	52	52	51	-	-	45	56	47.1	52.3
Age																		
15-24	23	16	16	13	22	15	27	14	25	12	14	14	-	-	23	12	21.4	13.7
25-44	33	36	34	36	37	36	39	34	33	36	39	34	-	-	38	37	36.1	35.6
45-64	34	30	40	37	35	34	27	28	35	33	33	33	-	-	34	34	34.0	32.7
65+	11	18	10	14	6	16	8	24	6	19	13	19	-	-	5	17	8.4	18.1
Education																		
No & prim.	9	16	11	10	6	3	15	40	0	2	0	1	-	-	7	25	6.9	13.9
Lower secondary	15	20	32	33	17	18	18	22	14	14	24	56	-	-	36	34	22.3	28.1
Higher secondary	42	37	21	29	48	54	27	19	54	57	21	13	-	-	40	33	36.1	34.6
Non university higher	15	14	9	6	8	11	10	7	4	5	12	9	-	-	2	1	8.6	7.6
University	19	13	27	21	21	14	30	12	28	21	43	22	-	-	16	6	26.3	15.6
N	159	1728	6989	2289	1618	1868	29809	1409	30811	2611	9119	1961			13210	69	1218	12935

Source: European social survey 2002

The figures, by and large, confirm the since long established ‘iron laws’ of protest participation: in general demonstrators include more men than women, they are on average younger, and they are particularly higher schooled than non-demonstrators. This raw outline applies to all seven countries in our sample. In some countries, though, we notice some exceptions: lower schooled people are apparently more mobilized in The Netherlands and Switzerland, and in the UK women are more willing to demonstrate. Since the number of demonstrators in the UK and The Netherlands is extremely low, we should be careful with too foregone a conclusion. Apart from sex, high schooling and younger age were also the features that distinguished the February 15<sup>th</sup> demonstrators from the populace at large and from the war opposing parts in the West-European publics (see above). So we expect antiwar demonstrators to resemble these demonstrating publics. The systematic comparison is contained in Table 10.

Table 10: Differences (in %) between categories of participants (+) in lawful demonstrations during the last 12 months and non-participants (-) AND categories of participants in February 15<sup>th</sup> demonstrations in seven European countries.

		BEL		NL		SW		SP		GER		UK		IT		T O T	
		+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
Gender	Man	-1	6	-9	-1	-1	-1	-5	2	-5	-1	-2	-3	-5	6	-	-
	Woman	1	-6	9	1	1	1	5	-2	5	1	2	3	5	-6	5.9	0.7
Age	15-24	0	7	3	6	9	16	-14	-1	1	14	2	2	4	15	-	7.3
	25-44	5	2	2	0	2	3	9	14	3	0	-1	4	8	9	2.9	3.4
	45-64	1	5	-2	1	-9	-8	9	8	-4	-2	6	6	-9	-9	0.0	1.3
	65+	-6	-13	-3	-7	-2	-12	-5	-21	1	-12	-6	-12	-3	-15	-	-
																2.4	12.1
Education	No & prim.	-7	-14	-8	-7	3	6	-13	-38	1	-1	2	1	-5	-23	-	3.9
	Lower secondary	-10	-15	-26	-27	6	5	-11	-15	-4	-4	-17	-49	-25	-23	-	10.9
	Higher secondary	-21	-16	10	2	-22	-28	-12	-4	-29	-32	-6	2	1	8	-	19.1
	Non university higher	12	13	14	17	5	2	8	11	-1	-2	-3	0	4	5	13.1	11.6
	University	27	33	10	16	9	16	28	46	33	40	24	45	24	34	4.4	5.4
Standard deviation	12.4	15.0	11.5	11.9	9.0	12.6	13.1	21.5	14.2	17.3	10.0	21.6	12.1	17.3	10.6	14.8	

Sources: European social survey 2002 and International Peace Protest Survey 2003.

The table contains distribution differences (in %) between demonstrators and non-demonstrators on the one hand and antiwar protesters on the other hand in the seven countries. The smaller the figure, the more underrepresented this category among the February 15<sup>th</sup> publics in comparison with the (non)demonstrating publics in general, and vice versa. The -6 figure on the sixth line of the first column, for example, reads as follows: the age 65+ antiwar demonstrators in Belgium were underrepresented with 6% compared to the Belgian public that demonstrated in the year before the war. As stated, we expect the peace demonstrators to more resemble the demonstrating than the non-demonstrating publics. This claim is largely confirmed. In general, differences between the 15 February demonstrators and the demonstrating publics are substantially smaller when compared to the non-demonstrating publics. This is shown by the smaller standard deviations in every single country, though the overall difference in The Netherlands is tiny. This does *not* mean, however, that peace protesters resemble general

demonstrators a lot. An antiwar demonstrator is a pointed version of *the* demonstrator in a country, and his or her profile exacerbates the general biases in demonstration activism: antiwar demonstrators are even higher schooled than the average demonstrator, with a staggering overrepresentation of university graduates; they are on average also somewhat younger, with an especially small amount of old people. Antiwar demonstrators, in contrast, do *not* include more men but substantially more women than the average protester. Thus: February 15<sup>th</sup> participants resemble the demonstrating public much more than the non-demonstrating public, but they are still very different from the average demonstrator in the countries under study. In a nutshell: if February 15<sup>th</sup> did not bring a representative sample of the population on the streets, it did not exemplify the average demonstrator in our countries either, though the latter came closer to 15<sup>th</sup> February protester.

Considering the differences between countries, the sketched general pattern exists in all countries. Discrepancies in demonstration representativeness do exist, but are limited as shown by the fairly small divergences between the standard deviations. The Swiss demonstrators represented their demonstrating compatriots best, while the German peace demonstrators were least representative of German protesters in general. Within this general picture some country figures do strike the eye. The most notable exception on all what has been said so far is the large *under*representation of young people in Spain: in all countries but Spain the youngest cohort is overrepresented. One way or another, the Spanish demonstration failed to mobilize among people under 24 years old. Another exceptional figure is the relatively strong presence of lower schooled people in Switzerland.

### **WERE THE FEB 15 PROTESTERS TYPICALLY ORGANIZATIONALLY EMBEDDED?**

In these next two paragraphs, we will elaborate on the idea touched upon in the previous paragraph. Since protest participation is not only dependent on people's socio-demographic characteristics, but also on the level and nature of their political socialization, we will now take a further look at the Feb 15 protesters' membership levels and their ideological self-placement on a left-right scale.

In the two countries with relative significantly low national membership levels, Spain and Italy, the overall Feb 15 protest participation levels were however the highest. This smaller embeddedness manifests itself both in lower membership rates of unions and professional

organizations, as in lower memberships of ‘new social movements’ as peace, environmental or humanitarian groups. In the table below, we see the organization membership level of the Feb 15 protesters: here we see again that in Italy, Spain, and also Germany, more than half of the people marching along is no member of any organization of any kind. Here, the streets will have been the least filled with typical labour union and NSM members. On the other side of the membership spectrum are Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands where thus the highest movement members could be expected to have taken to the streets; somewhere in between are the two Anglo-Saxon countries.

TABLE 11a membership levels population (ESS) and Feb 15 protesters

	UK F15	UK ESS	IT F15	IT ESS	NL F15	NL ESS	BE F15	BE ESS	DE F15	DE ESS
0 org.	41	31	51	66	33	17	38	29	54	30
1-2 org.	37	46	33	27	36	47	38	48	38	47
3-4 org.	15	17	10	6	22	26	18	17	6	18
5-6 org.	4	5	3	1	6	9	5	5	1	4
7-10 org.	3	1	2	0	3	2	1	2	0	0
11 + org.	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

ESS. The %ages are the average of the memberships of 11 different organization types in the last 12 months<sup>3</sup>; Feb 15 these are 16 organizations<sup>4</sup>. Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

TABLE 11b differences in membership levels ESS-F15

	UK	SP	IT	NL	BE	DE	TOTAL
0 org.	10	-8	-15	16	9	24	14
1-2 org.	-9	3	6	-11	-10	-9	8
3-4 org.	-2	4	4	-4	1	-12	5
5-6 org.	-1	0	2	-3	0	-3	2
7-10 org.	2	1	2	1	-1	0	1
11 + org.	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
TOTAL   S	24	17	30	35	21	48	30
average	4	2,8	5	5,8	3,5	8	5

<sup>3</sup> Variables are: member in the last 12 months of: sports/outdoor activity club; cultural/hobby/activity organization; trade union; business/professional organization; consumers organization; humanitarian organization etc; environmental/peace/animal organization; religious/church organization; political party; science/educational organization; social club etc.; other voluntary organization.

<sup>4</sup> Variables are active member in the last 12 months of: political party, labour union/professional organization; church/religious organization; student association; anti-racist/immigrant rights organization; women's rights organization; sport/recreational organization; environmental organization; art/music/educational organization; neighbourhood organization; charitable organization; global justice organization; third world organization; human rights organization; peace organization; any other voluntary association.



Tables 11 a & b show the membership levels of the Feb 15 protesters compared to those of the national populations. Interestingly, here again the Spanish numbers catch the eye, though not in the same way we would expect: the Spanish protesters' organizational embeddedness fits the most that of its population. And, in contrast, the Dutch protesters seem to be more diverging from their population than we would expect from the above.

**WERE THE FEB 15 PROTESTERS IDEOLOGICALLY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PUBLIC**

Lastly, we take a swift look at the ideological differences in the different protesters crowds. Table 12 a shows that in all countries the protesters considered themselves to be very leftist, which becomes clear in table 12b, where they are compared to the overall populations. Here again, the Spanish protesters take a remarkable position, as being the least different from their national population, which also holds true when we compare the Feb 15 protesters with the war-opposing part of the population. This can however be explained by the mere fact that exactly this overall population is the most leftist of all, and that peace activism has always had a strong left-wing sympathy and even foundation.

TABLE 12a: self placement on a left-right scale ESS & F15

		UK F15	UK ESS	SP F15	SP ESS	IT F15	IT ESS	NL F15	NL ESS	SW F15	SW ESS	BE F15	BE ESS	DE F15	DE ESS
Left	0-1	13	3	18	8	38	8	16	4	25	4	13	6	35	5
	2-3	59	11	54	26	40	21	61	15	55	18	57	17	52	22
	4-6	21	67	17	52	6	48	16	52	12	59	18	59	7	59
	7-8	1	15	1	11	1	16	2	25	1	18	3	14	0	12
Right	9-10	0	3	0	3	1	7	0	5	0	2		3	0	2

TABLE 12b: differences in left-right self placement, ESS & F15

	UK	SP	IT	NL	SW	BE	DE	TOTAL
0-1	10	10	30	12	21	7	30	17
2-3	48	28	19	46	37	40	30	35
4-6	-46	-35	-42	-36	-47	-41	-52	43
7-8	-14	-10	-15	-23	-17	-11	-12	15
9-10	-3	-3	-6	-5	-2	-3	-2	3
TOTAL   S	121	86	112	122	124	102	126	113
average	24	17	22	24	25	20	25	23

TABLE12c: differences in left-right self-placement, Gallup Poll International

	UK	SP	IT	NL	SW	BE	DE	TOTAL
Left	24	23	43	22	34	30	25	30
Right	-27	-17	-28	-34	-13	-37	-34	-28
Center	2	-6	-13	12	-21	7	9	-2
TOTAL   S	53	46	84	68	68	74	68	60
average	18	15	28	23	23	25	23	20

## CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

In the beginning of this paper, we assessed that the overall Feb 15 protesters were highly educated people, working in ‘softer’ sectors, but important country differences in the degree of internal diversity in the different Feb 15 protesters’ crowd catch the eye, which become clear when we take a look at table 4 again:

TABLE 4: Fractionalization index for socio-demographic features of anti-war demonstrators in 8 countries

	US	GB	I	SP	NL	G	B	SW	TOTAL
<b>Sex</b>	0.47	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.49	0.50	0.50
<b>Age</b>	0.67	0.67	0.65	0.62	0.69	0.70	0.68	0.68	0.68
<b>Education</b>	0.37	0.52	0.66	0.60	0.71	0.55	0.67	0.76	0.65
<b>Profession</b>	0.80	0.78	0.80	0.72	0.77	0.78	0.70	0.74	0.81
<b>Work sector</b>	0.73	0.72	0.81	/	0.73	0.71	0.76	0.79	0.77
<b>Religion</b>									
<b>TOTAL (average)</b>	0.61	0.64	0.68	0.61	0.68	0.65	0.66	0.69	0.68

The formula to calculate fractionalization is as follows:  $1 - \sum S_{ki}^2$ . The index measures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals belong to different categories of the variable. Each term  $S_{ki}$  is the proportion of demonstrators with a certain feature.

However, these country differences tell us nothing about the diversity of the protesters as compared to their population: when the US participants share a similar educational profile – in this case the hyper-educated- the degree of this overrepresentation can be revealed by introducing a country-specific yardstick. And, we also introduced the idea of political representativeness, by comparing several behavioral and ideological characteristics of the Feb 15 protesters with that of their populations.

In table 13, we will take a look at the Feb 15 protesters within the different benchmarked diversity indices, as laid out in the paper above. In this case, diversity is interpreted as the degree

of resemblance to, and thus the representativeness to the national (sub)population by which the protesters become benchmarked.

1. In the first place, we compared the socio-economic profiles of our protesters with that of their national populations. Now the highest diversity, or a protesters crowd that is the most comparable to its national population can still be found in Switzerland and the Netherlands, the two countries with the lowest mobilization levels (table 1). Thus, the first hypothesis, theorizing that larger protests bring about a more diverse demonstrators crowd has to be rejected. On the other hand, it becomes clear that the three countries of which the governments were the most favoring war, the US, UK and also Spain, the protests were the least internally diverse (table 4) , and the protesters were the least representative of their population.

TABLE 13: overview benchmarked representativeness

	US	GB	IT	SP	NL	GER	BEL	SWI
1. Socio-demo' compared with UN/ OECD data (table 5)	28.4	26.2	22.6	27.5	18.9	24.2	23.6	20.3
2. Mobilization deficit: socio- demo's compared with Gallup public opinion poll war opposers (table 8)	/	18	9	16	4,6	13	13	10
3. Socio-demo's compared with ESS taken part in protest past 12 months (table 10)	/	10,0	12,1	13,1	11,5	14,2	12,4	9,0
4. Membership levels compared to ESS (table 11b)	/	4	5	2,8	5,8	8	3,5	/
5. L-R self placement compared to ESS (table 12b)	//	24	22	17	24	25	20	25
6. L-R compared to war opposing part public opinion Gallup poll (table 12 c)	/	18	28	15	23	23	25	23

2. Could this diversity then be due to differences in the war-opposing segments of the different societies? Obviously, in all countries the protesters are much more similar to this subpopulation than to the population as a whole. However, again we find some striking differences: whereas we

found that the Spanish and British demonstrators were dissimilar to their population, we would expect them to more fit the profile of their most fierce war-opposing countrymen. Surprisingly however, the protesters in the three countries scoring the lowest on the previous index, and thus showing the highest diversity, are even more fitting this segment of society, whereas the mobilization deficit between the protesters and the war-opposing segment of society is the largest in Spain and the UK.

3. So, we can start to assume that in both the UK and Spain (the US not further being explored) the protesters were the most experienced of all. When we compared the Feb 15 protesters with that segment of society that had already taken part in a lawful demonstration that same year, this seems to make sense for the UK demonstrators: to a relatively large degree they are indeed fitting that of the typical national demonstrator. The Swiss demonstrators also fit that profile, which is however close to that of the war-opposing part of society, whereas in the Netherlands, the Feb 15 protesters seem to be part of that societal segment, but are not real activists. This is not surprising at all, seeing the enormously high amount of first-time protest participants in this country: 55 % (!) of the Feb 15 protest participants had never engaged in a demonstration before, reinforcing the argument that the Dutch protest has mobilized the most representative representation of the population. The Spanish protesters however, share the activist profile a bit more than that of the mobilization potential as a whole, but this likeness is still relatively low.

Taking a look at membership levels and self-placement on a left-right scale, again we find some peculiar results. The UK activist protesters profile is confirmed here: they are more members of organizations and are more leftist than their population. The same goes of course for all countries, the most in the German case, but the difference with the Spanish demonstrators is striking: their organizational membership and left-right placement come closest to that of the national population, which is to the largest part due to the relatively high amount of non-

members in both samples, whereas membership is a typical predictor of protest participation. Furthermore, the Spanish protesters are ideologically relatively similar to their population: they are, of course relatively, the least leftist of all. This is however also due to the relatively highest amount of leftist people in the Spanish population.

4. In Switzerland and the Netherlands, the protesters crowds were the most diverse, meaning that they resemble their national populations the most. And, together with Italy, in these countries the protests were able to mobilize a relatively considerable part of the national mobilization potential. In the UK, the protesters can be regarded as the typical protest participant; the same going to a large degree for Belgium and Germany, where the mobilization deficit was relatively high. In Spain however the protesters seem to not really fit with the population, not with the national war-opposers and not with the national activists. Their profile seems to be more that of an activist when compared to their national population, but less activist when compared to the activist portion of their population. The fact that Belgian and German protesters have a more activist profile can be explained by the usefulness of taking part in a protest in those countries: because their national governments were opposing to war, this was very low in both countries. These were symbolic demonstrations, of which the costs to take part in were much higher than the (non-existing instrumental) benefits. In the UK the usefulness of the protest was much higher, but people here had to already fight with some 'our boys in the Gulf' feelings that started to spread by the time of the demonstration, which might account for their more experienced profile. But then why exactly the Swiss and Dutch demonstrations are more diverse, and the Spanish demonstrators are not really part of a distinct societal category, we cannot really account for applying the above made hypotheses.

5. Apart from affecting internal diversity, which is a characteristic of a *group*, mobilization could also be expected to be associated with demonstrators' *individual* features. Mobilization patterns

could help us to make sense of differences between the countries in socio-demographics, political attitudes and political behaviour. Above, we mentioned the existence of a mobilization deficit. Comparison of our demonstrators with public opinion in the European countries in our sample showed that not all groups opposing war on Iraq showed up to the same extent at the February 15<sup>th</sup> protests. Some groups were overrepresented compared to their size among war-opposers (young, higher schooled, left-wing) while others were underrepresented compared to their size among war-opposers. We speculated that these divergences might have been due to the movement not being able to reach some segments in the population that supported its claim. This mobilization deficit might be associated with mobilization type, as described in this chapter. The overrepresentation of left-wing people, for example, might be due to the fact that these people, being to a larger extent member of demonstration supporting associations, were simply better reachable for the mobilizing agencies. More than right-wing people they became the target of mobilization attempts and, hence, showed up on February 15<sup>th</sup>. The same applies to education and age: maybe those higher schooled and younger people were overrepresented because they belonged more than the others to social circles connected with closed mobilization channels for February 15<sup>th</sup>. Summarizing, we hypothesize that mobilization type is associated with certain political and socio-demographic features of demonstrators: people mobilized via open channels are *different* from people mobilized via closed channels. To test this, we ran a number of linear regression analyses predicting features of the demonstrators including mobilization type factor score as independent variable. We estimated models for classic sociodemographic, but also for political attitudes and political behaviour. TABLE 9.5 contains the results.

Table 9.5: Openness of mobilization patterns and participants' social and political features

		Sex	Age	Educa tion	Intere st	Left- right	Voting	Protes t	Mobiliza tion
<b>Socio- demos</b>	Sex	/	-0.068 ***	0.04 7**	0.154 ***	-0.043 **			0.044 **
	Age	-0.070 ***	/		-0.069 ***	0.061 ***			
	Education	0.056 **		/	-0.104 ***				-0.047 **
<b>Political attitudes</b>	Political Interest	0.211 ***	-0.083 ***	-0.108 ***	/	0.158 ***		-0.122 ***	-0.150 ***
	Left-right	-0.043 *	0.087 ***		0.141 ***	/	0.291 ***	-0.140 ***	-0.117 ***
<b>Political behaviour</b>	Voting left- right					0.286 ***	/	-0.081 ***	-0.041 **
	Protest frequency				-0.114 ***	-0.152 ***	-0.086 ***	/	0.276 ***
<b>Country</b>	Belgium	0.051 **	-0.044 *	- 0.051 *	-0.221 ***	-0.071 ***	0.077 ***	-0.119 ***	
	The Netherlands		-0.096 ***	0.042 *	-0.199 ***		0.276 ***	0.114 ***	
	Switzerland		0.066 **	0.235 ***	-0.096 ***	0.085 ***	-0.043 *	-0.056 **	0.091 ***
	Spain		-0.049 **	-0.061 **	-0.111 ***		0.066 **	-0.056 **	0.031 *
	Germany	-0.035 *				-0.104 ***	0.216 ***	-0.065 **	0.142 ***
	US	-0.121 ***	-0.209 ***	-0.251 ***	0.124 ***				
	UK	-0.058 **	-0.116 ***	-0.115 ***			-0.133 ***	0.064 **	
Italy			0.068 **		0.055 **	0.114 ***	-0.203 ***	-0.124 ***	
<b>Mobiliza tion</b>	Open - closed	<b>0.043</b> *		<b>-0.054</b> **	<b>-0.143</b> ***	<b>-0.116</b> ***	<b>-0.043</b> **	<b>0.267</b> ***	/
	Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.047	0.079	0.192	0.275	0.250	0.254	0.298	0.260

The coefficients represent unstandardized betas (B) and their significance in backward linear regression analysis models. All parameters in the table are significant. Sig. \*\*\*=.001 \*\*=.01 \*=.05.

Does mobilization channel makes any difference at all? It certainly does. Demonstrators recruited via an open process differ in many aspects significantly from participants mobilized via a closed pattern. In fact, overall mobilization pattern is one of the most relevant variables: apart from in the age predicting model, mobilization is *always* a significant predictor even controlling for a whole bunch of other variables. In general, country differentiation soaks up a lot of the variance but mobilization pattern stays upright as relevant variable. Only political interest matches mobilization as recurring significant factor. What are the differences between subjects of open vs. closed mobilization processes? First, in terms of the social characteristics, it appears that open mobilization is foremost a male thing: men were more mobilized via an open process than women. This is not caused by the fact that men are more interested in politics than women, because this factor is held constant. Age seems to be unrelated to mobilization pattern but

education is not: the higher educated people are, the greater the chance that they went through an open mobilization process. This confirms the idea that 'weaker' groups in society, are more dependable on organizations for their mobilization than stronger groups who are better mobilizable via open and non-targeted mobilization efforts. To get lower schooled people on the street asks for more organizational embeddedness. Second, regarding political attitudes, mobilization is strongly associated with political interest. People with more political interest tend to be mobilized via open channels compared to people mobilized closedly. This makes sense, since we expect that only citizens with interest in politics are susceptible for more subdued and subtle mobilization stimuli in an informal environment. Self-placement on a left-right scale too, proved to be associated with mobilization pattern: the more demonstrators defined themselves as left-leaning, the more they were mobilised through closed recruitment channels. Demonstrators who situated themselves more on the right-wing side of the spectrum were substantially more mobilized in an open way. Analysing the mobilization deficit in Chapter 4 we pointed out that right-wing people, although many of them opposing the war, were probably not reached by mobilization attempts because only left-wing organizations were vigorously mobilizing. The present analysis confirms this idea. Third, concerning political behaviour, we related voting behaviour and protest frequency with mobilization. Both were strongly associated. Concurring with the left-right placement above, the more demonstrators voted for left-wing parties the more they displayed a closed mobilization pattern. And, finally, the more frequent people had protested in the past, the more likely they showed closed mobilization features. Frequent protest goes hand in hand with closed mobilization, implying that open mobilization tends to be an exceptional phenomenon since it does not lead to repeated participation or, vice versa, that people who protest a lot are prone to become organizationally more embedded as a consequence.

The plausibility of these aggregate associations would, of course, strongly been reinforced if they did not only apply to the demonstrators aggregated over all countries but also *within* all countries and if country-specific models would yield the similar (sign and strength) parameters. Is this the case? To a certain extent. Both socio-demographic associations are absent in most of the eight countries, yet in no country the opposite relationships apply. Hence, we can cautiously maintain the hypothesis that sex and schooling are (weakly) connected to mobilization pattern. The political attitudinal and the behavioural associations in TABLE 9.5, in contrast, are recurring and significant in almost all countries and can be considered as robust and strongly corroborated findings.



## EPILOGUE

Several questions have been raised in this paper, some of them have been answered, others have raised even more questions. But the fact that diversity is an important topic and very worthwhile studying is beyond dispute. First of all, the more 'normal' people hit the streets, the more protest gets normalized, the more it becomes an established democratic tool for people to raise their voices and make clear their demands. And the more those 'normal' people from different segments of society unite and take part in the same protests, the stronger they can take their stands, the louder their voices will be heard, and the larger the potential impact of their joint efforts might be.

Although in countries like the UK, the protesters fitted the profile of the traditional protest participant, they surely do so much less than let us say 20 years ago. And, in some countries, the people hitting the streets resemble their population very much, as was the case in the Netherlands. Many different reasons can be hypothesized upon. Earlier research (Walgrave & Stouthuysen, 1998; Walgrave & Verhulst, 2004) has shown that people increasingly engage in political and protest activities out of reasons of emotions, rather than solely based on a costs-benefits calculus. They identify with the victims of society, the victims of war,... in short: emotions mobilize people, and since such emotions are inherent to people from all segments of society, they will mobilize people from all those segments. Another reason could be the 'event'-calibre of certain protests: when a protest is announced to be enormous, this will engender a flywheel mechanism, mobilizing people that want to be there because of this predicted largeness, thus producing it. Yet another reason could simply be the diminishing thresholds for protest participation (costs, time,...), making it easier for everyone to participate, also the weaker ones. Also, the social movement scene itself is transforming, which could lead to more diverse demonstrations: movements, and certainly large, inter-/ transnational movements are increasingly coalitional in nature, and operating more and more in networks, thus enhancing internal diversity.

## REFERENCES

- Cortright, D. (2004), *A Peaceful Superpower, the Movement against War in Iraq*, Indiana, Fourth Freedom Forum.
- Epstein, B. (2003), *Notes on the Antiwar Movement*, "Monthly Review 55, no. 3 (July–August 2003).
- Elchardus, Hooghe & Huyse (2001): 'Het maatschappelijk middenveld van Vlaanderen' *Tijdschrift voor Sociologie*, 22 (3):319-320.
- Elchardus, M., Huyse, L. & M. Hooghe (2000), *Het maatschappelijk middenveld in Vlaanderen*, Brussel, VUBPress.
- Favre, P, O. Fillieule & N. Mayer (1997) 'La fin d'une étrange lacune de la sociologie des mobilisations: L'étude par sondage des manifestants: fondements théoriques et solutions techniques'. *Revue Française de Science Politique*, 47, 3-28.
- Fuchs, D. and D. Rucht (1994). *Support for New Social Movements in Five Western European Countries*. In: Chris Rootes and Howard Davis (eds.), *A New Europe? Social Change and Political Transformation*. London: UCL Press, pp. 86-111.
- Jennings, M. K. and J. W. Van Deth (1990). *Continuities in Political Action. A Longitudinal Study of Political Orientations in three Western Democracies*. Berlin, Walter De Gruyter
- Klandermans, B. and D. Oegema (1987). "Potentials, networks, motivations and barriers: steps towards participation in social movements." *American Sociological Review* 52: 519-531.
- Klandermans, B. (1997), *The Social Psychology of Protest*, Cambridge, Blackwell Publishers.
- Norris Pippa., S. Walgrave en P. Van Aelst (2004), *Who demonstrates? Anti-state rebels or conventional participants? Or everyone?*, Forthcoming in *Comparative Politics*.
- Oberschall, Anthony, 1996, 'Opportunities and framing in the Eastern European revolts of 1989', in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p 93-121.
- Putnam, R.D. (2000), *Bowling Alone. The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, New York, Simon & Schuster.
- Rochon, T.S. (1988), *Mobilizing for Peace. The Antinuclear Movements in Western Europe*. London, Adamantine Press.
- Rosenstone, S. J. and J. M. Hansen (1993), *Mobilization, participation and democracy in America*, New York, Macmillan.
- Simonson, K. (2003), *The Anti-War Movement. Waging Peace on the Brink of War*, Geneve, CASIN. Online at: <http://www.casin.ch/pdf/The%20Anti-War%20Movement.pdf> (last viewed on 01/04/'04).
- Snow, D. A., L. A. Zurcher, et al. (1980). "Social networks and social movements: a microstructural approach to differential recruitment." *American Sociological Review* 45: 787-801.

Walgrave, S. and Manssens, J. 2000. "The Making of the 'White March': The Mass Media as a Mobilizing Alternative to Movement Organizations." *Mobilization* 5:217-239.

Walgrave, S. & Stouthuysen, P. 1998. "Van tranen naar gebalde vuisten. Over de politisering van privé-verdriet: de zaak Dutroux." *Tijdschrift voor Sociologie* 19:347-376.

Walgrave S. & Van Aelst, P. (1999) "Who is that (Wo)man on the Street"

Walgrave S. & Verhulst, J. (forthcoming), "Towards New Emotional Movements? A Comparative Exploration into a Specific Movement Type."