The February 15 Worldwide Protests against a War in Iraq: An Empirical Test of Transnational Opportunities. Outline of a Research Programme.

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On February 15 2003, mass protests against an imminent war on Iraq mobilized millions of people throughout the world. More than seven million people took to the streets, in more than 300 cities and 60 countries throughout the world[1]. These were by far the largest peace protests since the Vietnam War, and that on one single day. February 15th was, to our knowledge, even the biggest protest event ever to have been held on the same day, as well in sheer numbers of demonstrators as in number of places where people demonstrated. On that day, an international team of social movement scholars surveyed the Feb 15 demonstrators in eight Western countries (USA, UK, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain, Germany and Belgium)[2]. Applying a same survey method and nearly identical questionnaires, this collaborative effort provided them with a large-scale, international comparative database on the protesters' level.

Building on a previous paper, where we tried to make sense of the Feb 15 protests through the dichotomy transnational social movements versus national opportunity structures, we will now examine these protests through another, more appropriate contrasting hypothesis: are the Feb 15 protests a result of an optimal transnational opportunity climate, and thus to be considered as more than a simple addition sum

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[1] These numbers are to be considered as very moderate estimates: other sources speak of 600 cities (Simonson, 2003; Chrisafis et al, 2003), and of 30 million protesters, of which one fifth in Europe alone (Chrisafis et al, 2003).

[2] National coordinators are: Lance Bennet (USA); Michelle Beyeler (Switzerland); Donatella della Porta & Mario Diani (Italy); Manuel Jiménez (Spain); Bert Klandermans (the Netherlands); Wolfgang Rüdig (the U.K.); Dieter Rucht (Germany); Stefaan Walgrave (Belgium).

of different national protests, or are they, in the first place, to be explained by the different national contexts, and thus a sum of separable (though interrelated) protest events?

The idea of this hypothesis is quite straightforward: when protest trigger, aims, timing & action repertoires (and thus international mobilization climate) of the protests are the same in different countries, as was the case with the Feb 15 protests, we could expect a same kind of protesters taking to the streets in the different Western countries, thus supporting the transnational opportunities these. However, different national opportunity structures (e.g. national official standpoints towards a (then eventual) war) may empirically divide the protesters, supporting the preponderant importance of national opportunities in international protest events. In short: do transnational opportunities result in a 'transnational protester' taking to the streets, or not?

NATIONAL versus TRANSNATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES

In the late 90s transnationalism became a key field in the study of social movements (see among many others: Tarrow, 1998; Smith et al, 1997, 2002; Della Porta et al, 1999). This new field of study is still in motion and no dominant paradigm has turned up yet. All kinds of social movement-like phenomena are presently studied under the transnational movements label: Smith et al.'s (1997, 2002) transnational social movement *organizations* (e.g. Greenpeace), NGOs lobbying directly within international or supranational institutions are not the same as Keck & Sikkink's (1998) transnational *advocacy networks* who typically do not engage in collective action, but find their core activities in the dense exchange of information. The transnational social movement *networks* where Tarrow (2002), Della Porta (et al., 1999) and Koopmans & Duyvendak (1995) are referring to, is yet another phenomenon. These are primarily rooted in and confined to their national political contexts, but coordinate their actions to bring about transnational collective action. Their transnational character lies in "… *the links among non-state actors – most notably, in this context, mobilization by contentious social movements that crosses borders*" (Tarrow, 2002: 4). Some of these networks are stable and durable, others are ephemeral and ad hoc staging only one or a short series of protest events in a temporarily action campaign (Smith et al., 1997: 65). Yet they are all meant to share technical and strategic information, to coordinate parallel activities and sometives even to mount transnational collective action. Being a network of national movements (networks), these TSMNs are not hierarchical, have no central office or secretariat, and are thus, in a way, social movements without social movement organizations. The core argument of all transnational movement scholars is that, in contemporary globalizing and globalized society, national states increasingly yield political power to supranational authorities, multinational business and media.

Global economic integration weakens the states' capacity to cope with global economic trends, rendering it unsuitable as targets of collective action. National opportunities for collective action become less relevant in a world of global television, computer mediated communications and cheap worldwide mobility. These make it much easier to link up with like-minded groups and individuals throughout the world. Global television, email and internet are able to translate local events into global issues, which in turn can become triggers for global grievances that are dealt with transnationally. (Hooghe et al., 2000; Castells, 1997; Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1991; Kriesberg, 1997). As a consequence, idiosyncratic national political contexts are giving way to transnational political opportunities as determinants of collective action and social movements. In short; in globalized/-ing society, national opportunities may give way for transnational opportunities, uniting transnational networks of social movements.

Yet, long before that, in the early 80s, another approach of social movements had conquered the social movements' scene by storm. The political opportunity structure approach of social movements asserted, challenging the previously dominant deprivation and resource mobilization theory, that social movements and their mobilizations are foremost determined, not by the presence of grievances and claims nor by the availability of resourceful organisations and skilful movement entrepreneurs, but rather by the political opportunity structure (POS) offered by their national political contexts. Main constitutive factors of the POS are: country-specific political cleavage structures, the formal institutional structure of the political system, the prevailing informal strategies of political authorities towards social movements, and the availability of influential allies (Tarrow, 1998; Kriesi et al., 1995)[3]. These elements are the key determinants of successful mobilization. In spite of the fact that the POS is a valuable instrument to establish cross-country differences between social movements on a meso-level explaining differences in the amount of protests, the numbers of protesters and the collective action repertoires, it is far less capable to highlight cross-country differences between the micro-level of the protesters' profiles. Instead, McAdam et al (1996: 11-12) write that "… *type of opportunity may dictate the broad category of movement, but the formal and ideological properties of the movement are apt to be more directly influenced by the organizational form and ideological templates available to insurgents. And these, in turn, are largely a product of the mobilizing structures in which insurgents are embedded on the eve of the movement.*" The POS theory was designed to highlight national differences focussing on the macro level, not on the micro-level. But most micro-level social movement accounts handling individual participant profiles (e.g. new social class theory) are less suited for international comparative research. Nonetheless, participant's socio-demographical characteristics, their political attitudes and behaviour, and their social features are highly relevant for testing the transnational movements thesis. An analysis of this individual features could help us determining whether these demonstrators belong

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[3] Our POS account is drawn largely from Kriesi et al, 1995.

to the same transnational movement or whether they seem to be rather part of a series of mere national movements. The POS approach allows us to make a few derivational assumptions. In countries where the traditional class-cleavages have been pacified, the mobilization potential for new social movements based on post-materialist values and typically mobilising a 'new middle class' constituency are increasing. We would expect this to happen in the countries under study too. Differences in prevailing strategies of political authorities in the countries might also help us to clarify the differences between the movement's constituencies. The more a country has a history of repression of social movements, the more protesters can be expected to be radical. Moreover, since repression diminishes the chances of movement success non-organized citizens will not decide to take part in those actions. Where movements are facilitated, however, and the costs of actions lowered, more diverse protesters might be showing up. Furthermore, on the 'ends' side, the concept of reform (benefits are expected when no action is undertaken) and threat (benefits only when action is taken on) are important variables. Finally, POS scholars strongly emphasized the presence (or absence)of left wing political actors as determinants of successful mobilization by new social movements. The (new) left has been traditionally close to the peace movement, and they share (at least a part) of their constituencies. We expect our demonstrators to have leftist political leanings (social democrat and green), especially in countries with a broad left electorate, especially where the left is in the opposition.

The POS theory's emphasis on the crucial role of the national state is mirrored by an ongoing debate within transnational contention[4] scholars. For some scholars, the originality of the present day transnational contention is exactly that it can bypass national political opportunities. Gathering resources, membership and even mobilization can be truly transnational activities (Smith, 1997). All movements have "… *both a domestic and an international political environment*" (Oberschall, 1996: 94). In our contemporary global village the national opportunity structures, these scholars claim, are paralleled by international opportunity structures (foreign national states providing opportunities for transnational social movements)(Della Porta et al, 1999), and even supranational opportunity structures (opportunities created by intergovernmental organizations)(Passy, 1999; Martens, 2001). But according to other transnational contention students, in contrast, "… *nation states are still the principal actors in international relations, and the national political context continues to constitute a crucial filter which conditions the impact of international change on domestic politics*" (Della Porta & Kriesi, 1999: 4), and "… *national political opportunity structures affect the variable likelihood of transnationalism*" (McCarthy, 1997: 256).

Hence we have two opposing claims: transnational mobilization is nothing more than an accumulation of several nationally determined and essentially different local

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[4] Tarrow (2002: 7) defines transnational contention as "*the coordinated struggle of actors and organizations from more than one society against a state, international economic actors, or international institutions.*" And, more specifically, transnational social movement mobilization can be defined as mobilization by contentious social movements that crosses borders.

protest events; or, transnational mobilization is possible and is caused by genuine transnational political opportunities leading to more or less integrated and largely similar mobilizations in different countries. These transnational opportunities have to be understood as: all the transnational/international "*signals to social and political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements*" (Tarrow, 1998), or to set up transnational mobilization. In short (and more open): all those signals external to a (transnational) social movement (network) that create a positive (or negative) mobilization climate on a transnational scale.

The February 15th antiwar peace protest offers us an ideal case to weigh these assertions off against each other. On the one hand, the different waves of worldwide, or at least European-wide, peace protest in the past have been strongly determined by the specific national political contexts (Ruzza & Bozzini, 2003). More than, for example, the environmental movement or the third world movement that might be somewhat more able to set their own agenda, the peace movement has always been a reactive movement and more POS-sensitive than its new social movements colleagues. So the track record of the peace movement suggests that we would find considerable differences between the protesters in the eight countries. On the other hand, based on different characteristics of the Feb 15 protests and of their set-up and organization, might lead us to find the opposite to be true.

THE FEB 15 PROTESTS AS THE RESULT OF NATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS

The February 15th protest was carefully planned by an international network of national social movement organisations and was preceded by multiple and elaborate inter- and transnational contacts. The idea to set up an international (then European) day of demonstrations against an impending war on Iraq was conceived at the European Social Forum (ESF) in Florence, Italy, in November 2002. Here also the first European protests against the war took place. On the ESF, an anti-war call was issued[5], calling on the movements and citizens of Europe to: "*organizing massive opposition to an attack on Iraq starting now*" and "*to start organizing enormous anti-war demonstrations in every capital on February 15*". This antiwar call was further elaborated in an ESF preparatory meeting in Copenhagen, one month later:

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[5] See: http://www.fse-esf.org

delegates of several European peace movements, and also the newly founded US umbrella peace organization United for Peace were present. The decision to protest on February 15th was confirmed. The platform text reads: "*To this end we have decided to continue our coordination at a European level, to set up a European wide antiwar website, and to have a common banner on each of our demonstrations demanding No War on Iraq. We are committed to spreading antiwar coordination both inside and beyond Europe, and to holding another enlarged meeting after the February 15 demo. We will continue to campaign until this war is stopped. We urge the movements in countries not represented at our meeting to join in our initiatives. We urge every organization that opposes this war to work for a massive mobilization on February 15. Together we can stop the war.*" On January 23-27, the antiwar call was effectively conveyed to an international public at the third World Social Forum in Porto Allegre, in a specific Feb-15 preparatory workshop. With some 5000 organizations present in Porto Allegre, the call would now spread quickly throughout the world. After the ESF in Copenhagen, an intensive e-mail circuit was set up, connecting all European, and eventually also the US peace movements. In all countries, temporary national coalitions were set up containing a whole range of organisations and national social movements. In Belgium it was the *Anti Oorlogsplatform Irak*, in the UK *Stop the War Coalition*, in Switzerland *Pas en Notre Nom*; in Italy *Fermiamo la Guerra all'Iraq*, in Germany *Netzwerk Friedenskooperative*, in the Netherlands *Platform tegen de Nieuwe Oorlog*, and in Spain *No a la Guerra*. In the US, four anti-war coalitions were set up, of whom the most active international participant was the newly founded *United for Peace and Justice*. All national peace groups and umbrella organizations set up a website, linking to each other. A missile crossed out by the words 'Stop the war' was the worldwide symbol of the protests (see figure). The intense international contacts that organized the protest were reflected in identical slogans to be heard and read worldwide: 'No war in Iraq', 'Not in my Name' and, referring to the previous Gulf war 'No Blood for Oil'. We can safely conclude that the coalition that set up the February 15th protest was indeed a good example of a transnational movement network. Different national organizations agreed to stage protests on 15 February. They sought broad support in their own nation's civil society, resulting in large national coalitions. These national coalitions would then further engage on an international level, thus establishing a large transnational coalition network of national coalition networks.

TRANSNATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES ON FEB 15

The evidence for a transnational social movement network to be the engenderer of the Feb 15 protests is made obvious by the previous account, and already seems to be linked with and supported by a few important characteristics of a positive transnational opportunity structure:

Firstly, the protests were organized on the same day (Feb 15). A same protest *timing* in all countries means that all possible protesters (the mobilization potential) in the different countries would have nearly-identical previous information on the Iraqi conlict, certainly when taking into account global TV and CMC. Furthermore, the conflict itself, the *triggering event* of the protests, was of course in an identical stage for all countries: in early February 2003, a US/UK-initiated military offensive on Iraq was forthcoming; a war seemed inevitable. By January 2003, the US and the UK had already sent several thousands of marines and soldiers to the Gulf; Saddam Hussein was given a final deadline for total disarmament. Early February, Belgium, France, and Germany, withheld from any cooperation, regarding military action too premature, and still believed in diplomatic success. In contrast, ten days earlier the UK, Italy and Spain, among others, had formally affirmed their unanimous support to the United States. On February 14, chief weapon inspector Hans Blix reported to the UN Security Council that many questions still remain unanswered, but that Iraq started cooperating. On February 15, mass protests against this imminent war mobilized millions of people throughout the world, and all these people (certainly in the Western countries under study) were liable to an identical international political climate. Next to an identical timing of protest, the transnational network of social movements had agreed on a same action repertoire (peaceful protest marches), and a same 'common master frame (Koopmans, 1999; Snow et al., 1986; Snow & Benford, 1988). Concerning the first: shernobyl, Vietnam & Gulf War (Della Porta & Kriesi, 1999: 8). Furthermore; the same *unifying slogans* were chanted in all major cities in the Western world on February 15th showing the connection and solidarity between the different protests in the different countries. 'No War in Iraq' was chanted in hundreds of cities worldwide, a slogan uniting all protesters, and combining their issues, claims and goals. A very simple, straightforward slogan, unifying all kinds of people throughout the world. Ruzza & Bozzini (2003) systematically analysed the official discourses of the major February 15th movements in most of the countries under study here and established clear and strong similarities between the organisers' issues and goals, mainly consisting out of a new form of moral and legalistic anti-Americanism.

It is clear that the Feb 15 protesters were subject to a same transnational mobilization climate, a same transnational opportunity structure. Triggering event, protest timing, issues, claims and goals were the same in all protest countries. A very unique situation, maybe the most unique ever, to test if transnational mobilization climates can get people into the streets, regardless of the country that street is in, or if, on the contrary, the mobilization potential and the eventual protesters are primarily to be defined through the country they march in.

Starting in December 2002, when war was still far away, a group of social movement scholars began forging a network in order to survey the expected antiwar-demonstrations to be staged in the next few months. They agreed on a common questionnaire and a field work method elaborated before by Walgrave & Van Aelst (1999; Norris, Walgrave & Van Aelst, 2003). The surveys cover a random sample of demonstrators engaged in eleven different events in eight countries involving 5,182 respondents in total[6]. Interviewing participants at protest demonstrations is not a common research technique. Favre and colleagues even speak of 'a strange gap' in the sociology of mobilizations (Favre et al, 1997). To the best of our knowledge, few studies have used this approach. Most elaborate is the work of the French research team including Favre, Mayer and Fillieule, who developed a method designed to offer all participants an equal opportunity of being interviewed later refined by the Belgian scholars. In all eight countries but Italy the actual survey process to establish a random survey of demonstration participants was twofold. First, fieldwork supervisors counted the rows of participants, selecting every Nth row, to ensure that the same number of rows was skipped throughout. Then a dozen interviewers selected every Nth person in that row and distributed questionnaires to these individuals during the actual protest march. The selected participants were asked to complete the questionnaire at home and to mail it back. The questionnaire maintained a large common core, including the participants' profile, the mobilisation context, and the political attitudes and values of the demonstrator, with only a few specific items adapted slightly for each country. In addition to the mail-survey, in some countries (Netherlands and Belgium) a random sample of other demonstrators was interviewed in person before the demonstration's departure. The gathering crowd before the demonstration's departure was divided into sectors, and the interviewers each randomly selected a fixed number of respondents in 'their' sector. These (shorter) face-to-face interviews were only used as a crosscheck to evaluate how far response to the mail-survey generated a representative random sample of demonstrators and will not be used in this contribution. Confidence in the surveys' reliability is strengthened by the fact that hardly anyone refused a face-to-face interview, and by the absence of significant differences between the two types of interviews. The overall response rate for the postal survey was more than 53%, with no country's response rate lower than 37%, which is more than satisfactory for an anonymous survey without any reminders, which also increases confidence in the procedure.

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[6] The demonstrations covered all took place in the country's capital, that is Madrid for Spain, Berlin for Germany, London for the UK, Amsterdam for the Netherlands, Bern for Switzerland, Rome for Italy, Washington for the US and Brussels for Belgium. In the UK a demonstration in Glasgow (Scotland) was covered too. And in the US, apart from Washington, demonstrations in Seattle and San Francisco were surveyed too. The mutual differences between the demonstrator's profiles participating in the different events in the same countries appeared to be negligible and that we simply merged the data of these different demonstrations in the US and the UK.

TABLE 1: Response rates of postal survey in eight covered countries

	Distributed	Completed	Response rate
USA	1,500	705	47%
UK	1,400	547	39%
Italy	1,025	1,025	100%
Spain	1,200	443	37%
Netherlands	1,000	542	54%
Germany	1,500	781	52%
Belgium	1,100	510	46%
Switzerland	1,200	637	53%
Total	9,925	5,182	53%

In contrast to the field method described above, the Italian team followed another track and decided to interview participants on trains on their way to the demonstration in Rome. In a later study, we will carefully compare the outcome of the Italian field method with the results of the other country's approach. In the UK two different questionnaires were distributed: a normal (10 pages) and a long version. Elsewhere we will enquire whether the length of the questionnaire is associated with response rate and demonstrator's profile. More generally, surveys of demonstrations raise important questions about reliability and the representativeness of sampling procedures. Three elements might be considered problematic. First, if the demonstration is large and fairly static, and if all the streets become congested with people, it becomes difficult for the interviewers to cover the whole of the march since they are also immobile. This was the case in some of the covered demonstrations. Second, it is impossible to get a good sample of respondents in violent and/or irregular demonstrations, although these kind of protest events are usually small in number. Third, in some exceptional cases extremist groups of demonstrators *within* a peaceful event refuse to accept the questionnaires. Yet again, this is rare and demonstrators, like many other types of political activist, are usually highly collaborative.

Our central research question is whether the national political context makes a difference, or not. To make some sense of these diverging national contexts we will, for this preliminary paper, split up the eight countries in three rough types based on the country's stance on the (imminent) Iraqi war: initiators, supporters and opponents. The US gained explicit support from Italy, Spain, and especially the UK, this latter already having sent marines to the Gulf at the time of the survey and would fully engage in the war; The Netherlands were also supportive by only tacit consent because its government was resigning and elections were being called. Germany and Belgium were unambiguously against any act of war at that time, just as was Switzerland, though implicitly and all but conspicuous. So we discern three types of political stances: initiators (USA and UK), supporters (Italy, Spain and to a lesser degree the Netherlands) and opponents (Germany, Belgium and to a lesser degree Switzerland). In more strict POS-terms, these differences can be linked with the idea of reform and threat: in case of reform, collective benefits are expected

when no collective action is undertaken, so collective action will not be necessary. On the contrary, "in case of threat, where established actors are threatening to implement policies that considerably worsen a challenger's chances to get what he wants, the costs of collective action decrease relative to the now costly path of inaction. Mobilization becomes more attractive, even if it's expected to accomplish little more than a continuation of the present situation (Kriesi et al, 1995)". With such strong opposing views about the war in these countries, and with such dramatic dissimilarities in the official dominant discourses in our eight countries, the national political opportunity structure approach would expect considerable differences between the antiwar mobilizations in these countries. If national contexts played an important role in the February 15th protests, we would expect that this would be reflected in diverging profiles of the three type's demonstrators. The national context thesis would be fully confirmed if British and American protesters looked alike, if Italian, Spanish and Dutch demonstrators had much in common and if German, Swiss and Belgian demonstrators were roughly the same, *and* if these three types mutually differed a lot. However, if we do not find any noticeable differences between the countries, the transnational opportunities' claim would be strongly endorsed. Of course, the POS is not the only potential explaining theory and other independent variables must be taken into account in further research. Yet the POS is a good first step for our comparative analysis since it is the (only?) social movement theory especially focusing on explaining differences and similarities between the same movements in different countries and as such designed for international comparative research.

As mentioned before, the POS-theory is not very explicit in predicting individual level characteristics, the micro level we want to focus on, but focuses more on the level of mobilization, a traditional macro variable. Following the POS we would expect that there is a higher level of mobilization with more people taking to the streets in countries which supported or initiated the war than in countries in which government clearly disagreed with war. In TABLE 2 we present some raw figures about the mobilization level in our eight countries[7].

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[7] Establishing the numbers of protesters is by far a sinecure (Rucht & Neidhardt, 1998; Koopmans, 1998). First, the figures are always estimates. Furthermore, there are always different estimators, mostly the organisers on the one hand who systematically seem to overestimate the turnouts, and on the other hand mostly the police, who always seem to make more moderate estimates. Furthermore, there is the bias based on the source in which the estimates are mentioned. However, all this does not have to be problematic, *"… as long as we are not interested in any 'absolute' truth and as long as the bias is systematic"* (Koopmans, 1998: 93). It is not our intention to present these numbers as being absolute truths, but instead, merely to give an indication of relative country differences. Furthermore, assuming that a bias is inevitable, we assume that it is equally present in all countries. The reported numbers are an average of the figures mentioned in three quality newspapers (De Standaard, Le Monde and The Guardian) in the week following February 15. Organizers and many other media sources mentioned sometimes much higher numbers, so the above mentioned figures are to be considered as conservative estimates.

TABLE 2: Mobilization level of February 15th mobilizations

	# February 15th demonstrators (in 1000s)	Population (in millions)	Mobilization level (in %)
USA	2,500	290,3	0.9
UK	1,000	60,1	1.6
Italy	1,500	58	2.6
Spain	1,000	40,2	2.5
Netherlands	70	16,2	0.4
Germany	500	82,4	0.6
Belgium	72	10,3	0.7
Switzerland	45	7,4	0.6
Total	6,687	564.9	1.2

Although February 15th was a huge mobilization success with massive demonstrations in all eight countries, the table makes it clear that there where considerable differences between countries. In some of the countries under study the mobilization level was five times as high than in other countries. The POS expectation is more or less validated. Initiating and especially supporting countries witnessed more protest than opposing countries. In Germany, Belgium and Switzerland the mobilization level was considerably lower. Most protest seemed to be generated by a war supporting stance and not so much by initiating and participating in the war effort. However, in table 2 we also find that the Netherlands are highly underrepresented in their category: presumably, this is due to the tacit position of its government. For methodological reasons, we have decided to remove the Netherlands from the following research, as well as Switzerland, since its official position on a war was also far less pronounced than was the case for the other countries. This leaves us three categories of two countries each:

TABLE 3: country types

Initiating	USA & UK	Anglo-Saxon countries
Supporting	Italy & Spain	Southern-European countries
Contra	Germany & Belgium	Northern-European countries

Now we have three types of countries, each reflecting a different official national standpoint towards a war, and each type also reflecting a certain type of country with alike political systems, social climates,…: Anglo-Saxon countries, Southern-European and Northern-European countries. Nonetheless, our basic assumption is the division based on the different official national stances on possible war, and that is the logic of reasoning that will be applied throughout the following text.

The logic of the further analysis is simple and straightforward: the more transnational opportunity structures (very loosely defined as all those signals external to a (transnational) movement (network) that create a positive (or negative) mobilization climate on a transnational scale) are at work, the more the protesters

in the different countries will show similarities in their social & political profiles, on their claims, goals, frames, etc. Oppositely, when national political opportunities are strong and diverging through the lines of our three types, we should be able to discern three 'types' of protesters, each accorded to a country type.

ANALYSIS

Starting from this country-type keynote, we carried out three binary logistical regressions, whereby each time two types of countries are compared. For this, we created three new dichotomic variables that served as the dependent variables: 'Initicon', (initiating countries = 1, contra countries = 2); 'Initsup' (initiating = 1, supporting = 2), and 'Supcon' (supporting = 1; contra =2). Each of these dependent variables were placed in a regression model using the same independent variables. If we can establish significant regression models, we can establish significant differences between country types, and thus endorse the national POS-hypothesis. If not, and thus if there are no significant differences to be found between the country types, we can cautiously acknowledge the transnational opportunity these. Of course, this procedure is a bit artificial, regarding country as a dependent variable; however, it has to be regarded as a phase in the research, working towards more integrating analysis. Furthermore, all outcomes can be substantiated with bivariate evidence. The main purpose of this analysis is to see if these theoretical models are significant, and on which variables; the bivariate results being far more comprehensible to explain these differences and to seek for further explanations.

The three different regression models are all significant, and account for a variance between 29 & 38% (Table 4)

TABLE 4: Significance and goodness-of-fit of the three regression models

	Model 1:*INITCON* (US&UK vs BE&DE)	Model 2: *INITSUP* (US&UK vs IT&ES)	MODEL 3: *SUPCON* (IT&ES vs BE&DE)
Model significance	0,000	0,000	0,000
R-Square Cox & Schnell	0,574	0,623	0,519
R-Square Nagelkerke	0,766	0,834	0,695
Homer & Lemeshow Test	0,884	0,587	0,150

The three models, all using the same independent, but different dependent variables, seem to be highly significant, they have a large explaining power and all fit the data very well. Immediately, our POS-division seems to have made sense, and seems to have a strong explaining power: the different types of countries show a strong internal coherence as well as a strong distinction between them. However, immediately, the lower values of the measures of the third model, juxtaposing the supporting and the disapproving countries, catch the eye: although these values are still abundantly high, the explaining power and explained variance of this model is obviously smaller as compared with the two other. This could lead us to assume that the difference between initiating countries and the others is larger and more significant that the difference between the supporting and the disapproving countries. Or, when only referring to the official war stance: protesters in a war-initiating country differ more from those from supporting and contra-countries, than these latter do from each other. On limitation hereby is of course the difficulty that these country types may show substantial differences between them on the level of their populations. That way, several differences might be ascribed to overall country type protesters, but are in fact overall country type population disparities. To be able to rule out this problem, further analysis will have to include some kind of country-specific yardsticks, whereby all variables in the dataset are weighed per country to their overall country importance. This is quite doable for socio-demographic variables, but more complicated for more attitudinal ones, wherefore we will need very specific social surveys.

Taking a look at the different independent variables in the different models, far more and interesting features come to light. In the tables below, the different models are placed side by side, and the results are broken up into different thematically coherent tables. The exp (B)'s have to be regarded as odd ratios: they are the odds that a category of the dependent variable can be assigned to the second category of the dependent variable, with regard to the/another (reference) category of that independent variable.

In the following table, we see the models' outcomes on several demographic characteristics.

TABLE 5: Demographic independents in the three models

INDEPENDENT	MODEL 1 INITCON		MODEL 2 INITSUP		MODEL 3 SUPCON	
	sig	Exp(B)	sig	Exp(B)	sig	Exp(B)
Sex (m-f)	0,000	2,240	0,126	1,501	0,972	1,007
Age (against 65+)	0,103		0,061		0,051	
1: 0-24	0,045	2,564	0,038	4,087	0,806	1,134
2: 25-44	0,013	3,056	0,009	5,081	0,139	0,477
3: 45- 65	0,033	2,585	0,055	3,263	0,297	0,601
diploma (against university)	0,000		0,001		0,002	
1: none/primary	0,162	2,941	0,564	1,851	0,267	2,156
2: lower secondary	0,039	3,347	0,356	0,561	0,000	4,252
3: higher secondary	0,000	6,173	0,001	4,176	0,121	1,478
4: higher non- university	0,325	1,320	0,181	0,617	0,038	0,267
professional situation (against non-active)	0,000		0,000		0,000	
1: manual	0,001	0,205	0,002	3,628	0,000	0,116
2: office	0,087	1,583	0,090	1,852	0,751	0,922
3: professional	0,000	0,104	0,000	0,183	0,956	1,025
4: manager	0,001	0,171	0,077	0,219	0,094	3,621
religion (against 'other')	0,005		0,000		0,000	
1: none	0,002	2,426	0,001	7,492	0,000	0,123
2: catholic	0,013	2,968	0,000	53,765	0,000	0,022
3: protestant	0,002	3,573	0,033	5,498	0,187	0,445

Table 5 reveals which demographic variables are significant, and thus give us an idea on the demographic break lines between our three models. Whereas *sex* significantly discerns the members of initiating and contra countries, indeed respectively 60/40 against 50/50 % of women and men, this does not go for the other two models (see table 6). The same goes for *age*: the models 1 and 2 seem to give us the idea that the protesters in the initiating countries are proportionally older. Again, this is supported by the bivariate results: in the initiating countries 50,5 % of protesters were older than 45, whereas this is respectively 31 and 40% for the supporting and contra countries. All models are significantly divided on diploma, professional situation and religion. Although the protesters in all countries are relatively highly *educated*, this reaches a height among the US-UK protesters: nearly 75% has a university diploma, whereas this is respectively 46 and 56 % for IT-SP and DE-BE. The difference between these latter country types is also significant on this education variable: respectively 55 and 69 % of the respondents has a higher degree, either non-university or university.

TABLE 6: Demographics per country type, in %

Variable	Categories	INITIATING	SUPPORTING	CONTRA
Sex	*Male*	39,4	49,3	50
	Female	60,6	50,7	50
Age	*0-24*	13,4	22,3	22,9
	25-44	35,9	46,8	37,2
	45-56	41,6	28,6	33,3
	65+	9,1	2,3	6,7
Diploma	*None/primary*	0,9	2,1	1,4
	Lower secondary	3,6	9,5	7,2
	Higher secondary	8,4	32,9	22,4
	Higher non-university	13,7	9,8	13,3
	University	73,4	45,8	55,7
Professional Situation	*Manual worker*	6,9	18	4,2
	Office worker	17,7	30,1	37,9
	Professional	36,4	9,8	8,4
	Manager	7,2	1,3	2,4
	Not active	31,7	40,8	47,1
Religion	*None*	57,8	63,2	66,8
	Catholic	8,0	29,6	9,6
	Protestant	7,9	2,9	14,3
	Other	26,3	4,3	9,3

Furthermore, we found interesting differences on the *professional situation*; the US-UK countries show a high degree of professional workers, followed by non-actives. The highest two categories for the other two types are in order of magnitude the non-actives and the office workers. However, both numbers are surely much lower for the supporting countries, which have also a fair deal of manual workers present on the streets. *Religious* affiliation is also a significant variable in all countries; we find more alternative religions in the initiating countries, more Catholics in the supporting ones, and the most non-religious and Protestants in Germany. This distinction however is a bit artificial, since almost all of these Protestants can be ascribed to Germany.

Conclusively, we can say that the distinction between the initiating and the contra countries makes sense on practically all these demographic variables. A difference found in a downward tendency of significance regarding the distinctions assumed in model 2 and 3. The difference between the initiating countries and the others is to be found on more variables than the difference between those other two. The protesters in the initiating countries are higher educated, somewhat older, more women and more professional workers. Those in the two other countries are more resembling, although we find that the Southern countries show a bit lower educational level, and more manual workers.

Can we also find the models to fit with regards to the political attitudes of the protesters? Table 7 gives us an initial clue:

Table 7: Political attitudinal independents in the three models

INDEPENDENT	MODEL 1 INITCON		MODEL 2 INITSUP		MODEL 3 SUPCON	
	Sig	Exp(B)	sig	Exp(B)	sig	Exp(B)
voted for (against 'other')	0,000		0,000		0,000	
1: green	0,061	2,575	0,145	0,317	0,000	14,938
2: social democrat	0,074	0,412	0,071	3,236	0,007	0,196
3: liberal democrats	0,037	0,262	0,318	2,362	0,179	0,339
4: christian democrats / conservative	0,844	0,872	0,002	13,899	0,000	0,075
5: far left	0,005	5,339	0,000	18,680	0,031	0,269
left-right position (against right)	0,790		0,548		0,048	
1: left	0,968	1,016	0,307	0,596	0,134	1,860
2: neutral/no position	0,649	1,220	0,309	0,555	0,015	3,066
interest politics (against not)	0,016		0,456		0,006	
1: interested	0,253	0,531	0,241	2,396	0,025	0,313
2: neutral/no position	0,728	1,218	0,217	2,665	0,434	0,660
System Support (y/n-neutral)	0,000	7,391	0,202	1,467	0,010	1,748
External Political Efficacy (against -)	0,051		0,168		0,476	
1: +	0,016	0,530	0,061	0,557	0,232	0,755
2: neutral	0,214	0,686	0,331	0,680	0,531	0,832
Internal Political Efficacy (against -)	0,000		0,000		0,000	
1: +	0,000	0,299	0,000	0,095	0,000	3,538
2: neutral	0,024	0,434	0,000	0,195	0,210	1,443
Satisfaction Own Democracy (y/n)	0,000	5,896	0,033	2,037	0,000	4,512
info politics websites (against daily)	0,061		0,026		0,000	
1: never	0,011	2,425	0,405	1,423	0,018	0,446
2: monthly	0,038	2,192	0,051	0,346	0,003	3,168
3: weekly	0,043	1,951	0,485	0,743	0,519	1,248
info politics mailinglists (against daily)	0,664		0,758		0,154	
1: never	0,909	0,958	0,524	1,338	0,034	2,163
2: monthly	0,352	1,540	0,324	1,839	0,089	2,185
3: weekly	0,930	0,966	0,412	1,488	0,407	1,398

Voting behaviour is significant in all three models, in other words, it is an internal breakpoint between all three models. The members of the initiating countries having a clear voting preference for social democrats (60%), and to a lesser degree for the Greens (22%) (table 8). Those taking to the streets in Italy and Spain also favour the social democrats (52%), but their green preference (2,5%) is neglectable with regards to the other two countries, whereas far left parties are very popular (35%). In the contra countries, the social democrats can also count on the support of 33% of the protesters, however, here the Greens beat the lot with 42%.

Subjective left-right positioning shows to be no significant diving variable between the protesters of the initiating countries and the others: about 75% of the protesters in all countries position themselves on the left side of a 10-point left-right scale. A slightly significant difference can be found however between those in supporting and contra-countries: the first indicating themselves more (14,5%) to be rather rightist, against 5% of the latter.

TABLE 8: Political attitudes per country type, in %

Variable	Categories (%)	INITIATING	SUPPORTING	CONTRA
Voted for	*Green*	22,1	2,4	42,3
	Social democrats	60,3	52,0	33,1
	Liberal democrats	5,3	2,6	2,6
	Christian demo/conservatives	4,8	6,2	2,8
	Far left	3,5	35,4	16,9
	Other	3,9	1,4	2,3
Left-right	*Left*	72,1	75,8	74,3
	Neutral/no position	17,3	9,7	20,6
	Right	10,6	14,4	5,1
Interest in Politics	*Interested*	87,0	80,5	71,2
	Neutral	8,7	13,3	23,6
	Disinterested	4,3	6,2	5,2
System Support	*High/intermediate*	36,3	24,0	59,8
	Low	63,7	76,0	40,2
Internal pol Efficacy	*High*	69,5	33,4	55,8
	Neutral	13,0	19,2	14,6
	Low	17,6	47,4	29,7
Satisfaction Democracy	*Yes*	36,3	24,0	59,8
	No	63,7	76,0	40,2
Info politics Websites	*Never*	34,7	49,9	44,7
	Monthly	11,6	10,7	18,8
	Weekly	23,4	18,6	18,7
	Daily	30,4	20,8	17,8
Info politics Mailinglists	*Never*	52,1	57,8	65,8
	Monthly	6,9	8,9	10,8
	Weekly	17,8	13,6	12,0
	Daily	23,2	19,7	11,3

In models 1 and 3, *interest in politics* is a significant variable; in all country types, most protesters find themselves to be a very interested political individual. However, a downwards interest is find throughout the country types 87% of the US-UK protesters, 80,5% of those in the supporting countries, and 71% of those in the third country type. An interest which is also translated in the *use of the Internet (websites) as source(s) of political information.* Whereas one in three of the US/UK protesters indicates to never consult websites for this purpose, this number is nearly one in two of the other countries. Conversely, the first using it daily for 30%, compared to (less than) 20% in the other two types.

The difference in interest in politics is also partly reflected in the difference in *internal political efficacy* of the protesters in the different country types (people's own political efficacy perception; see appendix): 70% of the initiating country protesters are of the opinion that they are well-aware of the political process, and do have an influence on politics. This contrasts sharply with those in the supporting countries:

here only 33% is of that opinion. In the third type, 56% confirms its own internal political efficacy.

Lastly, *system support*, and of course *satisfaction with the functioning of the own democracy* are very strong predictive variables: System support is the strongest for people who took to the streets in war-disapproving countries (60%), followed by those in the initiating (36%) and supporting countries (24%). The same rank order, but with even stronger numbers can be found with the satisfaction of the functioning of the own democracy, with respectively 60%; 21% and 16%.

Conclusively, we could say that again, the three types are confirmed by the analysis, although we find a few differences on several variables. While all countries' protesters are leftist voters, we see that the Southern-European protesters vote more on far-left parties, and have no affiliation with the Green parties. All are very interested in politics, but the UK-US demonstrators to the highest degree, which is also reflected in a more frequent use of web resources for political info, as in their very high internal political efficacy. Concerning system support and satisfaction with the own democracy, they are of course far less positive than those in the contra countries, but are surpassed in negativity by the Southern-European protesters.

Finally, table 9 gives us an idea of the models' explaining force regarding the activism profile of the protesters in the different country types.. First thing that is revealed by the table, is the significance of more variables in the first two models, with regards to the third one.

TABLE 9: Social activism independents in the three models

INDEPENDENT	MODEL 1 INITCON		MODEL 2 INITSUP		MODEL 3 SUPCON	
	Sig	Exp(B)	sig	Exp(B)	sig	Exp(B)
member NSM (n/y)	0,000	3,191	0,001	2,553	0,148	0,706
conventional action (y/n)	0,558	1,433	0,338	2,087	0,828	1,129
use internet for any kind of **action** (y/n)	0,584	0,867	0,098	0,600	0,146	1,417
protest frequency (against 11+)	0,000		0,000		0,010	
1: first time	0,000	0,081	0,000	0,016	0,002	2,905
2: 2-5	0,002	0,301	0,000	0,091	0,014	2,023
3: 6-10	0,145	0,540	0,009	0,268	0,006	2,371
participation decision (against month+)	0,000		0,000		0,934	
1: today	0,254	1,810	0,571	1,474	0,640	1,314
2: last week	0,000	7,392	0,000	6,493	0,863	1,054
3: few weeks	0,140	0,543	0,124	1,670	0,865	0,952
member organizing org (n/y)	0,000	0,210	0,001	0,280	0,392	1,239
info demo websites (y/n)	0,485	0,817	0,770	1,124	0,745	0,899
info demo mailinglists (y/n)	0,044	1,989	0,029	2,606	0,044	0,467
For me, this **anti-war protest** is another way to express my **feelings against neo-liberal globalization** (against disagree)	0,008		0,123		0,307	
1: agree	0,008	1,950	0,046	1,875	0,130	0,692
2: neutral	0,790	0,932	0,562	1,221	0,546	0,847
War is always wrong (against - disagree)	0,000		0,000		0,000	
1: +	0,000	6,157	0,000	19,782	0,000	0,217
2: neutral	0,058	1,877	0,270	1,842	0,905	1,064

Being a *member of a new social movement* is significant in the first two models; looking at the bivariate numbers (table 10), that is obvious; in the initiating countries, 45% of the respondents were a member of an NSM, compared with 25% in the supporting, and 23% in the contra countries. The proximity of both last numbers explains why this variable has no explaining significance in the third model. On the contrary, the protesters in the supporting (27,6%) and contra countries (19,1%) are more likely to be a *member of an organization that organized the protest*, than those from initiating countries (12,3%). *Protest frequency* is significant in all three models; the UK-US (38,2%) protesters are by far the most new to protest (first timers), followed by respectively the BE-DE (22,6%) first time protesters, and the IT-SP (12,9 %) respondents, who count the most frequent protesters (28,9 % more than 10 times). This line of fracture clearly divides all three country types. Respondents in the initiating countries are distinguished by the other two country types by the time of their *decision to participate in the protest*: they had decided to participate more in advance than the protesters in the contra and supporting countries. They were also more engaged in a virtual mobilization network: 18,6 % of the Anglo-Saxon

protesters said to have received demonstration info through *e-mail lists*, followed by 8,3% of the BE-DE-protesters, and nearly 5% of the IT-SP demonstrators.

TABLE 10: social activism profiles per country type in %

Variable	Categories %	Initiating	Supporting	Contra
NSM member	*No*	54,9	74,9	76,6
	Yes	45,1	25,1	23,4
Protest frequency	*First time*	38,2	12,9	22,6
	2-5	44,7	39,3	49,7
	6-10	9,3	19,0	14,2
	11+	7,9	28,9	13,5
Participation Decision	*Today*	3,5	2,7	5,8
	Last week	27,3	37,5	48,4
	Few weeks	42,4	36,0	32,0
	Month+	26,8	23,9	13,8
Member organizing Organization	*No*	87,7	72,4	80,9
	Yes	12,3	27,6	19,4
Info demo Mailinglists	*No*	81,4	95,1	91,7
	Yes	18,6	4,9	8,3
Against neo-liberal Globalization	*Agree*	30,9	61,0	45,1
	Neutral	26,6	19,1	24,1
	Disagree	42,5	19,9	30,7
War is always wrong	*Agree*	42,0	87,6	76,6
	Neutral	21,1	5,7	10,7
	Disagree	36,9	6,7	12,6

Another division between the three types is the answer on the question '*War is always wrong*'. Demonstrators on the US-UK streets are not all that sure about that proposition; only 42% of them agree on it. Contrarily, 87, 6% of the supporting country demonstrators are convinced of the fact that war is always wrong, closely followed by 76,6% of the contra-country protesters. Another division which significantly internally divides the models 1 and 2, is the *anti-neo-liberal globalization dimension* that is given on the anti-war *protest* by the different protesters. For 61% of the Italian and Spanish demonstrators, that is the case indeed, followed by 45% of the contra country protesters, and by 31% of those in the initiating countries – or half of those in the supporting countries).

Conclusively, we could say comparatively that while the Anglo-Saxon protesters are more likely to be a member of a New Social Movement, they were no member of the organizing organizations. They were a lot of first timers, but had decided to take to the streets long before Feb 15, and comparatively, many of them were subscribed to mobilizing mailing lists. Reversely, the Southern-European protesters were the most a member of an organizing organization, and have the highest protest frequencies. They are also the most convinced of the fact that all war is wrong, and interpret the most their presence also as an act against neo-liberalism

CONCLUSION & DISCUSSION OF THE DATA-ANALYSIS

The following table gives an all-comprising overview of the past analysis. It is a comparative overview, so the content has to be regarded as relative interpretations between the three country types, and does not represent the numbers above. E.g.; of course, 30 % of voters for social democrats in the contra countries is a high quantity, but compared to the 60% in the initiating countries, they are not. Repeating the most remarkable partly conclusions, we can make a few important conclusions.

TABLE 11: Comparative overview of the results

	Initiating	Supporting	Contra
Sex	more ? than ?	# ? = # ?	# ? = # ?
Age	older	younger	younger
Education	+++	-	+
Professional situation	Prof workers Non-actives	Non-actives Office workers Manual workers	Non-actives Office-workers
Social democrats	+++	++	-
Green	-	---	+++
Far left	---	++	+
Left – Right	LL(R)	LL(RR)	LL
Interest in politics	+++	++	+
Websites for info politics	++	+	-
Internal political efficacy	+++	-	++
System support	-	--	+++
Satisfaction own democracy	-	---	+++
NSM member	++	-	-
Organizing org. member	-	++	+
Protest Frequency high	---	++	-
Early participation decision	+++	+	-
Mailing list for info demo	+	---	-
War is always wrong (agree)	---	+++	++
Anti neo-lib. globalization	-	+++	+

The three types of countries are clearly divided towards each other by the demographic variables; the initiating type contrasting the most with the two others. Its protesters are comparatively older, are very highly educated, are more women, and are more professional workers; it seems that this is a classic example of the 'new class citizen' (Kriesi, 1987-9, 1993). The same seems to more or less go also for the contra country protesters, but is more or less paralleled by a high amount of young people. The Southern countries are significantly less educated (although still far more than average), and there are significantly more manual workers present, which leads us to assume a strong presence of labour unions in the demonstrations.

Political attitude seems to fit the initiating countries' protesters' profiles of new class citizens; they position themselves consequently as being leftist; vote for green

or social democratic parties; are highly interested in politics, which is also translated in a relatively frequent use of the internet as political information resource, as well as in their internal political efficacy. They are highly interested, political demonstrators. Again, the northern-European countries seem to position themselves moderately in-between both types, except for their interest in politics, which is the lowest of all. The Southern-European countries' protesters however again seem to show a few important differences: they vote more for far left parties. Again, this could be an indication for a strong union affiliation. Concerning the variables on system support and satisfaction with national democracies, it is clear that a national stance towards the war can be considered a very important determinant. However, we also see that the Southern-European protesters also seem to show a more radical positioning than those from the war-initiating countries, leading us to assume that an additional determinant should maybe be sought in national discontents apart from the government's position on a possible war.

Finally, we have established important differences among the country types concerning the protesters' social activism profile.

The Anglo-Saxon protesters are significantly more a member of a New Social Movement than the others: again, this can be connected to their new class profile. Indeed, they are often found in (the avant-garde of) NSMs, and are frequently characterised by overlapping memberships (Kriesi et al, 1995), which is to a certain extent reflected by the fact that they join the manifestation that was not organized by the organization(s) of their membership. Conversely, the most members of protest organizing organizations can be found in the supporting countries' demonstrations. Furthermore, this latter type of countries shows a far more experienced protester, compared to the contra-, and certainly the initiating countries, which show the most first-time protesters, but which are, by contrast, the protesters who had decided on attending the protest the longest time in advance, and were relatively more mobilized through electronic communication. This all leads us to assume that many protesters of both the initiating as the contra-countries are part of a social movement network, but that the first ones are embedded more in new social movement networks that are occupied with non-direct action, but that have decided to take to the streets; the latter ones being imbedded more in more radical, direct action social movement networks. Linked to the previous results, the union thesis seems to be supported.

Lastly, we found important differences on the last two variables: the fact that war is always wrong, and the interpretation of the own presence as an act against neo-liberal globalization, were both met with the strongest agreement by the protesters in supporting countries, and the least by those from the Anglo-Saxon countries. The waging of war seems to be met with more repugnance on the European Continent. The Continent's protesters considering themselves far more being on

the streets also as an utterance against neo-liberal globalization, could maybe be regarded as a sort of anti-Americanism and anti-Anglo-Saxons?

FINAL CONCLUSION

February 15th was the first time in movement history that so many European countries joined their forces to strive for one international action day. Much earlier attempts by the peace movement to merge into a transatlantic effort for nuclear disarmament had failed, "*partly because of the external constraints and opportunities defined by different national political debates and contexts, […] and important differences between the U.S. and European peace groups*"(Cortright & Pagnucco, 1997: 159). A few years ago Koopmans published two studies about the differential reactions in a number of European countries on two triggering events affecting all these countries in more or the less equal way: the 1986 Chernobyl disaster and the 1991 Gulf War. Although the nuclear accident in Chernobyl confronted different countries with the same event, the intensity and content of protest differed widely, from a surge of antinuclear protests in Germany to virtually no reaction in the Netherlands and France. This led Koopmans & Duyvendak (1995) to conclude that "*… the objective extent of the nuclear energy 'problem' was found to be unrelated to the level of mobilization of the antinuclear movement; nor could it explain public attitudes towards nuclear energy (i.e. grievance levels). Grievances, in turn, provided no explanation for levels of mobilization.*" The reasons for the country differences were to be found in the cross-country differences in the dominant discourses in which nuclear energy had been framed: "*the roots for this framing are not in aggrieved communities, but in political power relation*", thus stressing the influence of national political opportunities on the perception and definition of events as grievances. Concerning the 1991 Gulf War, Koopmans (1999) made the same point again asserting that the antiwar-protest showed - in spite of an international trigger leading to near-identical stimuli, Koopmans called it 'the mother of all suddenly imposed grievances', and a common 'no blood for oil' master frame - more differences between the countries than similarities. The nation state remained the principal frame of reference. This was, again, due to different national alliance structures, and different national political opportunities. Thus the Chernobyl and Gulf War mobilizations could not be considered as real transnational movements. Yet Chernobyl and the 1991 Gulf War lie far behind us. Have things changed since then and did we witness in 2003 (for the first time?) a truly transnational opportunity structure, whereby global? Do we have evidence about the 2003 Iraqi war protest that compels us to update Koopmans' conclusions about the national contexts as the single most powerful determinants of social movements?

First of all, we have to be honest, and say that our quite straightforward hypothesis of a transnational POS bringing forth a transnational protester, or national POS's bringing forth national protesters, is of course a product of several assumptions, and look for a "simple [not even-]structural answer to complex political problems (Tarrow, 1994: 91)," in a complex environment. Nonetheless, the above makes clear that our initial division into three country types makes sense on a considerable amount of variables. Immediately, it is obvious that, although Feb 15 was a day of protest with theoretically the most favourable transnational opportunity climate ever, the transnational opportunity these cannot be withheld, in favour of the national opportunities thesis. Does this means we have to conclude that such transnational opportunities simply do not exist, or that they are profoundly surpassed by the national opportunity structures. We are not sure: of course, both opportunities have to be taken in to account, and both will have had their effect on the Feb 15 mobilizations; we can say however that national opportunities, here preliminary and loosely defined as dominant official war discourse, are indeed an explaining tool to explicate the differences in country types' different protesters profiles. Which does not alter the fact that the Feb 15 protests were the largest protests ever to be held on a global scale, and that were set up and coordinated by a transnational social movement network. That in itself makes this day deserve a unique position in social movement studies. Notwithstanding a lot of inter-type similarities, the different types of countries are significantly diverse, and this seems to be due to a large extent to the different types' official discourses on the war. We can say that the protesters in the Anglo-Saxon countries are distinctive from most of their Continental counterparts, than these latter do from each other. On several important variables however, the US-UK demonstrators seem to differ more from those from the Southern-European supporting countries than they do from those in the contra countries. These latter are, of course the most supportive of their own governments, and seem to be the most diverse, and the least organizationally embedded. The Southern-Europeans seem to be the most radical demonstrators, with a seemingly internal link with labour unions. The Anglo-Saxon countries are the most prone to be denominated as new class citizens, with high diploma's, good jobs, believe and interest in politics, and are embedded in a non direct-action movement network.

Further research is necessary. First of all, there is an absolute need for country-specific benchmarks, to filter out the differences in the different countries on population level, rendering it possible to more univocally pronounce on the net differences on the level of the protesters. Next, more profound analyses are needed: in the first place, we need to further establish the inter-type comparability. And finally, we need more encompassing techniques to be able to put the different models into one comparative model.

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TECHNICAL APPENDIX

The <u>internal political efficacy</u> scale was based on the answers on the following survey questions:

- "People like myself do have an influence on what the political authorities do"
- "For people like myself, politics is far too complicated; you have to be an expert to understand it."
- "When people like myself voice opinions to politicians, these are taken into account."
- "I do not think that I am better informed than other people on matters of politics and the government."

They were to be answered on a 5-point scale, and coded accordingly: "completely agree"–"agree"–"neither agree nor disagree"– "disagree"– "completely disagree". Since Q2 and Q4 are negatively posed questions, they were recoded first to mach the scale of the other two. The mean of these four variables made out the new variable 'internal political efficacy, which was recoded into 3 categories:

- 1-2,75, corresponding with 'high';
- 2,76 -3,24, corresponding with 'intermediate';
- 3,25-5, corresponding with 'low'.

The <u>external political efficacy</u> scale was based on the answers on the following survey questions:

- "I don't see the use of voting, parties do whatever they want anyway."
- "Most politicians make a lot of promises, but do not actually do anything."
- "Political parties are only interested in my vote, not in my ideas and opinions."

They were to be answered on a 5-point scale, and coded accordingly: "completely agree"–"agree"–"neither agree nor disagree"– "disagree"– "completely disagree". The mean of these three variables made out the new variable 'internal political efficacy', which was recoded into 3 categories:

- 1-2,75, corresponding with 'low' (since all three questions are negative);
- 2,76 -3,24, corresponding with 'intermediate';
- 3,25-5, corresponding with 'high'.

The <u>system support scale</u> was based on the following survey questions:

- "I admire the way our political system is organised."
- "Most of our politicians are very competent people who know what they are doing."

They were to be answered on a 5-point scale, and coded accordingly: "completely agree"–"agree"–"neither agree nor disagree"– "disagree"– "completely disagree".

The mean of these four variables made out the new variable "system support", which was recoded into 3 categories:
- 1-2,75, corresponding with 'high';
- 2,76 -3,24, corresponding with 'intermediate';
- 3,25-5, corresponding with 'low'.

Respondents that engaged in a <u>New Social Movement</u> demonstration, are those that indicated to have taken part in at least one of the following demonstrations: peace demo; anti-racism demo; human rights demo; 3rd world demo; environmental demo; women demo.

The distinction <u>conventional/non-conventional/radical action</u> is based on the answers on following questions.
- A respondent is categorized as having taken part in conventional action, when he has indicated to have engaged in at least one of the following activities: contacted a politician; contacted an organization or association; contacted a local or national civil servant; worn a pin or hung a flyer/poster/sticker of a political campaign; signed a people's initiative or referendum; signed a petition; taken part in a product boycott; bought a product for political, ethical or ecological reasons; made a donation; contacted or appeared in the media.
- A respondent is categorized as having taken part in non-conventional action, when he has indicated to have engaged in <u>at least one</u> of the following activities: set up a petition or gathered signatures for a petition; take part in a strike; raise funds.
- A respondent is categorized as having taken part in radical action, when he has indicated to have engaged in <u>at least one</u> of the following activities: engaged in a sit-in; engaged in the occupation of a public building/school/university; engaged in the squatting of houses/abandoned areas; engaged in violent forms of action.

Active members of <u>New Social Movements</u> are those respondents who have indicated to be an active member of at least one of the following organizations: anti-racist organization; women organization; anti-globalization organisation; 3rd world organization; human rights organization; peace organization; environmental organization; charitable organization. Active members of recreational organizations are those respondents who have indicated to be an active member of at least one of the following organizational forms: student organization; sport/recreational organization; art/music/educational organization.