Friction and Party Manifesto Change in 25 Countries, 1945–98

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Political processes are affected by "friction." Due to cognitive limitations and institutional delays, political agendas do not adapt smoothly to real-world impulses; political agendas either ignore them or overreact. The first question this article tackles is whether the same punctuated change process can be observed in party manifestos. Secondly, it examines whether there are differences across political systems and across party lines. Thirdly, the study tries to account for differences in the degree of "punctuatedness" of party manifestos. Drawing on the vast dataset of the Manifesto Research Group, the article shows that party manifestos are indeed characterized by friction and resistance to change; it also establishes that there are considerable differences in frictional patterns between parties and political systems; and it finds that electoral fragmentation, government participation, and electoral volatility are key to understanding these differences.

In a democracy, policy output is expected to reflect the popular will and policies should react to changing demands. If policies are unable to respond to shifts in voter preferences or if policies are not responsive to new challenges, democracy is in trouble. If society changes, politics must change too. In agenda-setting terms: the political agenda, i.e., the issues that get political actors' attention, must react to the societal agenda, i.e., the things people care about. However, the capacities of most political systems to respond to (changing) societal demands are severely limited. Most of the time, political agendas are not entirely in tune with the outside world. In *The Politics of Attention*, Jones and Baumgartner (2005) developed the notion of "friction" to account for this. They claim that all political institutions are affected by resistance to change leading to a routine situation of limited change or incrementalism alternating with short bursts of intense and dramatic changes.

Jones and Baumgartner make their point for the United States and draw on evidence on U.S. budgets, hearings, bills, media coverage, etc. In most polities, society and politics are kept together and linked by political parties. Parties connect citizens with the state. They act as conveyor belts which send information from society to political decision makers and vice versa. When parties fail, linkage fails (Lawson and Merkl 1988). Because of electoral competition, one would expect parties to be flexible at picking up signals from society and injecting them into the political system. This study focuses on the adaptation process of party preferences and tackles three questions: (1) to what extent do party preferences change over time? (2) are there any differences between parties in the way they adapt to changing demands? (3) what determines these change pattern differences? More concretely, the study gauges the frictional character of party manifesto change across countries and parties and tries to explain differences between parties regarding the punctuated character of their party program shifts.

In terms of empirical evidence, the article draws on the party manifesto data produced by the Manifesto Research Group (Budge et al. 2001). This team collected an impressive array of party manifesto data covering more than 50 years and 25 countries. In line with the agenda-setting tradition, the Manifesto Research Group focused foremost on issue attention (e.g., mentions of "welfare" in programs). However, their issue attention measures were complemented with a few directional codes tapping directional preferences of parties (e.g., favouring more or less welfare spending). The article focuses entirely on issue attention changes in party programs and ignores directional

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preference changes altogether. In sum, the study examines to what extent the emphasis of party manifestos on policy issues changes between elections and identifies the features of parties and party systems that account for differences between parties.

The first section sketches the agenda-setting approach of policy change and explains the notions of cognitive and institutional friction delaying or blocking adaptation. It argues that parties are paramount to keep society and politics attuned to one another and makes the case that party programs are an important part of this process. Then, the article turns to the literature on party manifesto change and develops seven hypotheses predicting different friction levels in party program change. Next, the data are presented and the dependent variables (L-Kurtosis) grasping party manifesto change are introduced. The penultimate section contains the empirical analysis testing our hypotheses. Finally, the article concludes, putting the results in perspective and sketching avenues for further research.

Political Parties and Party Manifestos, Change and Friction

In most democracies, parties are central political actors. One of their crucial functions is linking citizens' preferences with policies. Parties legitimize democracies and their political decisions. Political parties are the main brokers intermediating between society and politics. In this brokerage process, party manifestos play an important role. When elections are called, parties draft a program, a list of policy preferences, and present this list to the electorate. When they get enough support from the electorate they may enter government and start implementing their party manifesto. Although manifestos are not well known to the electorate at large, they form the core of a party's plans and ideas and contain the promises that parties will later be held accountable for. Using longitudinal evidence covering 40 years and 10 democracies, Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge (1994) demonstrated that party manifestos matter for policymaking. Parties keep their manifesto promises: when parties devote attention to a particular issue in their manifesto, chances are high that government spending on policies related to that issue will go up during the next legislature. Others have shown in single country studies that not only budgeting, but also legislation is affected by electoral program promises (Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; Walgrave, Varone, and Dumont 2006). The point is this: party manifestos matter because they affect the political agenda and steer policy attention towards certain issues.

Party programs make a difference in the representation process in at least two ways (McDonald and Budge 2005; McDonald, Budge, and Pennings 2004). On the one hand, parties try to convince the electorate while holding on to their policy position encapsulated in their program (leadership). They do not adapt their stances according to the public's preferences but enter the electoral competition with a continuous and highly stable offer. It is electoral change that causes policy change and the adaptation of policy to popular demand: parties that get more votes have a higher chance of getting office, leading to subsequent policy changes moving towards the popular will. On the other hand, parties can shift positions and try to get closer to the public's preferences themselves (responsiveness). They change their program in the hope of getting more votes to be able to implement their (changed) program. In this article, we focus on the second track: parties changing their program. The electoral path has been investigated extensively elsewhere (e.g., McDonald and Budge 2005).

Flexible and adaptive programs lead to "dynamic representation" (Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995). As circumstances change—new demands, new issues, new popular preferences, and new challenges—party manifestos are expected to follow and change as well. Electoral competition may lead to constant and smooth adaptation of parties' preferences, as Downs (1957) has argued. Other scholars followed Downs, but maintained that parties only change their manifesto when they see elections as competitive and when they need extra votes to win. If winning or losing is perceived as a certitude, they would not need to win votes and parties would not need to adapt their programmatic preferences (Robertson 1976). In contrast, Budge argued that parties have no, or only imperfect, information about whether they will win or lose the elections, nor about the median voter's position, and thus they move little or incrementally because they do not want to lose the votes they have (Budge 1994). Hence, Budge, as opposed to Downs, expects no smooth adaptation but hardly changeable and incremental party manifestos.

Empirical research tends to confirm Budge's argument: party preferences are quite stable. Although parties' programmatic left-right positions, for example, do change, big changes are uncommon (Budge and Klingemann 2001). Parties do not change opinion all the time and do not jump haphazardly from one issue to another. In the 18 countries studied between 1945 and 1998, Budge and Bara found that regarding some compound measures

of party position, party positions remained remarkably stable "*. . . which may tell one something about the rigidity of party ideology and their lack of responsiveness either to external problems or electoral concerns*" (Budge and Bara 2001, 48).

The finding that party manifestos, from a rationalist perspective and to maximize voters, are expected to change smoothly but, in reality, are not flexible and changeable, fits very well with Jones and Baumgartner's (2005) idea of friction in political institutions. Their basic idea is that political institutions in general are limited in their ability to respond to external stimuli. Due to cognitive and institutional limitations, political institutions hardly react proportionally to signals that reach them from their environment. Institutions tend to neglect these signals altogether and either do not change at all, or tend to overreact and change dramatically, much more than the external signal "requested." Friction stalls change until change is often completely blocked. As stimuli from the outside world enter the system, they are filtered and ignored. Consequently, policies slowly drift away from reality. They lose their adequacy to deal with real-world problems and are no longer attuned to popular preferences. Policies get locked into closed policy subsystems with a monopoly and are immune to matters outside the closed circle of policy insiders (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). This is the phase of incrementalism: policies hardly change. However, since policies increasingly lose touch with changing reality, accidents are bound to happen; or at least, certain events or evolutions suddenly reveal the inadequacy of the ongoing policy. This is when dramatic and sudden policy shifts happen. The political institution at stake engages in a kind of catch-up operation and tries to devise a fundamentally new policy to deal with the changed situation. Policy monopolies are broken down, and new policy monopolies are installed. This process of lagging behind and catching up, say Jones and Baumgartner (2005), characterizes *all* political institutions in the United States (Jones, Sulkin, and Larsen 2003). Congress, the president, the federal budget, mass media, etc., are all subject to this punctuation pattern with long periods of incrementalism, with hardly any moderate change and with exceptional, but very powerful bursts of extreme change. The central idea underlying this article is that this punctuated pattern of political change applies to political parties and their programs as well. The study argues that party manifestos display the same pattern of incrementalism and no change combined with short catching-up periods in which parties fundamentally attune their party programs. This idea fits well with the empirical finding mentioned above that most of the time, party programs are remarkably stable.

Why would parties display the same disproportionate reaction pattern as other political institutions? Jones and Baumgartner (2005) put forward two reasons why political institutions are constantly lagging behind and catching up in large bursts. Political institutions have severe cognitive and institutional limitations. Both these limitations apply fully to political parties. First, the cognitive architecture of institutions only allows them to deal with one (important) problem at a time. Organizations suffer from an inevitable bottleneck of attention. Dealing with normal issues, most of the time, organizations can rely on parallel processing. But when really important things crop up, the organization's leadership has to devote attention to it. As the time, energy, and resources of these human beings are limited, they tend to neglect most issues, for most of the time. They try to manage their scarce time whilst constantly juggling issues, checking whether anything has changed and, if not, confirming previous decisions and stances. Basically, people have a short attention span and can only attend to things one after another while serial processing. One of the mechanisms triggering attention is emotion. Emotions are shortcuts indicating priorities and leading to immediate attention (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). Political parties are organizations as well, and, like any other political institution, the cognitive limits of parties and their leaders confine their reaction to incoming signals. Parties simply cannot attend to every piece of information available in the outside world. They neglect signals all the time and are forced to catch up later when it turns out that these neglected signals were important. Moreover, what emotions are for human beings is ideology for parties: it shows what they care about and believe in. Parties, therefore, tend to devote more attention to issues that can easily be linked with and framed within their ideology and tend to overlook other issues. Not only does their ideology restrict the scope of their attention and the issues they regularly monitor for changing information, but their ideology also severely limits their capacity to react. Parties are not value-free organizations that can move in any direction, as suggested by Downs. Their ideology is their *raison d'être*, and they cannot change that easily, even if outside signals suggest that the party should steer away from its basic values. In other words, parties are rooted in long-standing cleavages and cannot float around freely (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Ideology therefore fundamentally affects parties' cognitive responsiveness. Parties are also identified by the outside world with particular issues that are anchored in the cleavages that created them. So, even if parties wanted to betray their past and fundamentally change their stances or issue attention, they would not be believed by the electorate if they tried to (Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994).

Second, parties are institutions and institutions are often severely limited in terms of responsiveness. Party programs are the only authoritative policy statement made on behalf of the whole party. As party programs bind all members of a party, they are often approved by party conventions or at least by a representative body within the party (Budge and Klingemann 2001). This approval process takes time and deliberation. Internal decision rules, for example, hamper the immediacy of the responsiveness of party programs. Convincing the parties' rank-and-file of the need to change the party manifesto is often a cumbersome and difficult process, delaying and slacking change. While party leaders are considered to be more office oriented—they want to be part of government and are prepared to adapt the party program to maximize the chances of office—party members and activists are more policy (ideology) oriented and less prepared to make programmatic sacrifices (Müller and Ström 1999). All kinds of institutional costs are implied when parties draft and decide upon their manifestos. Jones and Baumgartner (2005) discuss decision costs (actors trying to come to an agreement), transaction costs (costs of implementing and ensuring compliance), and information costs (costs of obtaining relevant information). Especially decision and transaction costs are sensitive to particular internal functioning rules. Internal procedures are not designed to be fully efficient and responsive to external information flows. Required majorities and voting procedures in different rounds, for example, hinder proportionate reaction. If parties are linked with like-minded social groups—unions, associations, social movements—their programmatic autonomy is further constrained as party leaders do not want to jeopardize these electorally advantageous alliances. All these institutional brakes on change are designed to preserve internal party cohesion. Rendering internal change more difficult is a way of ensuring that the party does not get split up vertically or horizontally.

In a nutshell, this study maintains that changes in party manifestos are hindered by cognitive and institutional checks just like any other political institution. If this is true, it is anticipated that manifesto change will display the typical punctuated pattern: long periods of incremental change, exceptional periods of extreme change, and few moderate changes. Compared to other political institutions and actors, however, party program changes are expected to be only moderately punctuated. Jones and Baumgartner contend that the further one moves through the policymaking cycle, the more one finds punctuated change: U.S. budgets are much more punctuated than U.S. House hearings, for example. It is much more difficult to change the budget than to hold a hearing on a topic. Distinguishing policy input, policy process, and policy output series they found that, at least in the United States, policy output series systematically display higher friction than policy input series (Jones, Sulkin, and Larsen 2003). Parties acting as brokers between society and politics are definitely situated at the input rather than at the output side of the political system. Consequently, their change pattern should be more similar to organising hearings, for example, than to voting budgets. Moreover, parties have very strong incentives for adapting swiftly to incoming signals. In contrast to political institutions that are not immediately threatened in their subsistence if they are out of tune with their environment, a party's existence is threatened every few years it stands for election. Constant adaptation is simply a matter of survival for parties. We can therefore expect to find a frictional and punctuated change pattern in party manifestos, but much less than among political agendas further down the policy cycle.

Wrapping up, this study explores whether party programs are characterized by the same pattern of punctuated change that has been established to be so typical for the output of the main political institutions in the United States. As Jones and Baumgartner's (2005) theory and findings are based on and rooted in the United States, we examined whether the same patterns of irregular change can be found in other political systems. Moreover, parties have been almost completely neglected by Jones and Baumgartner, as they are considered to be less important in the U.S. political system. For their "general punctuation hypothesis" to be really general, more evidence covering more countries and different polities, and regarding different types of political institutions, is needed.

Causes of Party Manifesto Change

This article not only aims to test whether parties, as stated above, change their publicly uttered preferences in a punctuated way; it also wants to account for differences in responsiveness between parties. Why are some parties capable of responding smoothly and moderately to changing incoming information while others do not react at all and then overreact? What is it about these parties or about the political system in which they operate that makes their change patterns proportionate or punctuated? Although, as Rohrschneider (2002) maintains, scholarly knowledge about how parties elaborate their program and what factors influence this process is limited, the literature on party manifesto change gives us a few clues that can be turned into concrete and testable hypotheses.

The basic hypothesis on manifesto change comes from Downs (1957). He argues that parties tend to

maximize votes. The maximum of votes lies in the middle of the ideological spectrum, around the median voter. Consequently, parties on both the left and the right tend to move to the center position to seduce the center voter, leading to a constant convergence of party programs. As the median voter moves to the right or to the left, parties tend to follow and adjust their programmatic pledges accordingly. Downs therefore hypothesizes a constant, but smooth adaptation of party programs staying as close as possible to the median voter. However, Downs's expectations apply to a two-party competition situation only. In a multiparty setting, things are different and parties do not move to the center but keep their distance. This affects their change pattern. Thus, the first hypothesis follows:

H1: in a two-party system or in a system with limited party system fractionalization, party manifesto changes will be less characterized by friction and punctuations than in a multiparty system.

Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge (1994) affirm that opposition parties more than government parties have strong reasons for drafting innovative and alternative programs. As they have only their program to attract attention and not their deeds, the manifestos of opposition parties tend to be more changeable than government party manifestos trying to maximize votes. Moreover, incumbents run the risk of being confronted with their pledges afterwards while opposition parties cannot be held accountable for the fact that their program has not been carried out. The second hypothesis is, therefore:

H2: opposition parties' manifestos adapt smoother and are less characterized by friction and punctuations than government party programs.

Apart from its government or opposition position, a party's ideological position may play a role too. The ideological position of center parties is less outspoken; their position on the deep cleavages dividing societies is less clear. They often switch government partners and alternate left-wing with right-wing government partners. Their ideological manoeuvring space is probably more extended than parties positioned at the extremes of the ideological spectrum. This allows center parties to adapt more easily. The third hypothesis follows this idea:

H3: parties with a central ideological position adapt smoother and their program changes are less characterized by friction and punctuations than ideologically extreme parties.

Another hypothesis can be derived from Janda and colleagues' work. One can expect that parties that lost the previous elections tend to change their program more easily than parties that won the previous electoral competition. Electoral loss often severely shakes parties: party leaders resign, parties reorganize their structures, and the party reconsiders its party manifesto. This is precisely what Janda et al. (1995) found in their analysis of party manifesto change in Britain, Germany, and the United States. We expect this to be a general pattern and hypothesize:

H4: parties losing elections change their program more smoothly and in a less punctuated way than parties winning elections.

Does party size determine the changeability of party programs? On the one hand, small parties may, on average, have a lighter organizational structure which probably entails less cumbersome procedures for adapting the program. All other things being equal, smaller parties then adapt more smoothly because institutional friction is smaller. On the other hand, small parties often have a clear ideological position at the edge of the political system. As we stated above, strong ideology blocks party change due to cognitive limitations. Unsure about what to expect in terms of party size, one may assume that institutional friction outweighs cognitive friction and:

H5: small parties change their manifestos more smoothly and are less hindered by friction than large parties.

There are reasons for assuming that the polarization of a party system affects a party's changeability. In a polarized party system—with a large ideological gap between the extreme left and the extreme right parties—parties tend to target specific groups of voters. Parties have their niche of more or less loyal voters and they especially try to serve them. Consequently, the expectation follows:

H6: party system polarization leads to more friction and punctuations in manifesto changes while less polarized party systems are characterized by smooth and nonfrictional adaptation.

Finally, the party and electoral literature states that citizens' electoral behaviour has changed fundamentally. Party alignments wither and voters are gradually distancing themselves from their parties. Voters have lost their loyalty and have become more volatile. From the end of the 1960s onwards they gradually started switching parties between elections and even within an electoral campaign they proceeded to split ticket voting, they made their voting decision later, etc. (McAllister 2002). This process of voter dealignment may have affected the programmatic behaviour of parties too. They are to some extent "liberated" from their loyal constituency and can move around

more freely searching to capture the volatile electorate. The final hypothesis states:

H7: manifesto change in the first half of the postwar era is characterized by a punctuated pattern while manifesto change from the 1970s onwards is a smoother and less frictional process.

Data and Methods

The hypotheses will be tested drawing on the dataset provided by the Manifesto Research Group (MRG; Budge et al. 2001). This impressive dataset covers almost all party manifestos issued in 25 countries during more than 50 years (1945–98). The countries are all (Western) European democracies complemented with the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, Turkey, and Israel. The codebook used by MRG contains 56 different issue codes. Some of these codes do not only imply issue information, but also directional info: the codebook distinguishes, for example, negative and positive mentions of the military. As this study is only interested in issue salience and not in directional information, the categories containing positive and negative mentions of the same issue were simply collapsed. This resulted in 43 distinct issue codes.

The total number of parties covered in the dataset is 288, and it covers 364 different national elections. The entire 1945–98 period was split up in two subperiods and hypotheses are tested for both periods separately. Fifty years is a long time in politics, and it cannot be excluded that the dynamics of party manifesto change have evolved from the postwar period to today. The authors of MRG also split their dataset up in a pre-1970 and a post-1970 period. They state that "*. . . the second half of the 1960s formed the great watershed of the post-war era in terms of society and economies as well as parties*" (Budge and Bara 2001, 53). Following their suggestion, two periods are distinguished: 1945–70 and 1971–98.

Interested in party manifesto change, two adjacent party manifestos are systematically compared. In order to have enough cases to draw robust conclusions, only parties that participated in at least four subsequent elections were kept on board. In theory, if parties devote attention to all possible issues in their party program, this yields a minimum of $3 \times 43 = 129$ observations per party. Many parties did not pass the four elections test: they merged with other parties, split up into two parties, or simply disappeared over the years. In total, the analyses below include 166 parties, all participating in at least four successive elections.

The comparison between two adjacent party manifestos on which this article builds is straightforward. We first calculated, per issue code, percentage differences in proportional attention from election to election. For each party, there are a number of difference scores calculated as percentage changes from the previous observation (program). If there is consistently no attention for an issue, the issue is skipped as percentage difference scores cannot be calculated. Per party, combining all these percentage difference scores yields a frequency distribution. This distribution is then analyzed and produces the data for calculating the further mentioned summary statistics. Naturally, some parties have on average more "complete" programs than other parties: in their manifestos, they devote attention to more different issues than other parties do. In the appendix, we give a complete overview of the number of percentage difference scores that were used per party. Here, we suffice by stating that, on average and over the whole period, per party in the analysis, we drew on 180 percentage difference scores and that the total N of all difference scores is 30,505.

The dependent variable of the study is party manifesto change pattern. Jones and Baumgartner (2005) rely on the so-called "kurtosis" scores to account for frictional change patterns. In fact, statistically estimating whether change is punctuated—with many incremental changes alternating with a few dramatic changes and very few moderate changes—is not easy. Assessing issue attention change across an array of 43 issues is a distributional exercise: for some issues attention increases or decreases incrementally, for other issues it may oscillate wildly. All these changes, calculated as percentage differences per issue, are incorporated in a frequency distribution. The kurtosis score grasps whether this distribution is normally distributed or not: if change is punctuated the kurtosis will be high, if change is not punctuated the kurtosis score will be low. The problem with the classic kurtosis statistic is that it is not normalized, it needs big numbers to be reliable, and it is extremely vulnerable for outliers (Breunig 2006; see also Hosking 1990). That is why, following Breunig, the alternative L-kurtosis statistic based on the fourth moments of a distribution was opted for. This measure is more robust and is less affected by outliers. Its value lies between 0 and 1, with scores approaching 1, indicating a leptokurtotic distribution (high center, low shoulders, high tails) pointing towards a punctuated pattern.[1]

[1] A normal distribution has an LK of about 0.125. An LK between 0 and 0.125 indicates the opposite of leptokurtosis being platikurtosis: a relative "flat" distribution with fat shoulders (in our case, overrepresentation of moderate changes).

Most of the independent variables are directly derived from the MRG dataset.

1) Party system fractionalization is gauged at country level by averaging traditional fractionalization scores based on seats won in parliament over all elections in one of both given periods (Laakso and Taagepera 1979). Among our countries, scores range from 5.28 in Switzerland to 1.95 in the United States (entire period average).
2) Opposition versus government position cannot be calculated in the MRG dataset. Therefore the data delivered by Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge (2001) were used covering 48 democracies in exactly the same time frame (1945–98). Two measures were extracted from that database: the total number of days the party was in government in the 1945–98 period and the year/month/day entry date of its first government participation. The LP (Labour Party) in New Zealand was in office 17,970 days; the Danish FK party (Common Course) was part of government for only 267 days.
3) The ideological position of a party was assessed in two ways. First, the MRG dataset identifies socialist, communist, liberal, etc., parties. Second, MRG also provides a score of the left-right position of a party based on earlier work by Laver and Budge (1992). The MRG left-right variable is mainly based on the earlier mentioned directional preference coding of the party manifestos (e.g., negative or positive vis-à-vis protectionism). However, the MRG left-right variable also contains a limited amount of issue saliency measures (e.g., mentioning "freedom and human rights" in the manifestos). The left-right score ranges, theoretically, from −100 (left) to +100 (right). In practice, the RAKAH (New Communist Party) in Israel scored most leftist with −51.9 while the religious SHAS (Heritage Party), also in Israel, scored most right-wing with 68.97. The left-right placement was recoded so as to reflect the hypotheses that radical parties are less flexible.[2]
4) The electoral fate of a party, whether it is losing or winning elections, is tapped, first, by simply subtracting a party's vote share (in %) at the beginning of a given period from the same party's result (in %) at the end of the period. Negative scores point towards a downward electoral trend; positive scores indicate an upward trend. The Christian-democrats of DC in Italy lost the most votes (they disappeared) and have a score of −28.39 while the AP, the Popular Alliance in Spain, grew most with 30.63. Electoral outcomes, second, are also tapped by calculating the average absolute difference in percentual vote share in two adjacent elections: the higher the score the more volatile a party's results.
5) Party size is the average share of votes (in %) a party gets in a given period: the maximum average in 1945–98 was recorded by the Democrats in the United States with 52.37 and the minimum by the Spanish PAR party (Aragonese regional party) with 0.37.
6) Party system polarization, finally, is assessed by simply calculating the average distance on the left-right scale between the most leftist and the most rightist party in a given period: the Israeli party system (31.06) was most polarized while the Japanese party system (11.40) was least polarized.

[2]Recodes: above 40 and below −40 = 5; between 40 and 30 and between −40 and −30 = 4; between 30 and 20 and between −30 and −20 = 3; between 20 and 10 and between −20 and −10 = 2; between 10 and −10 = 1.

Analysis

To start with, are there any differences between parties in terms of the adaptability of their party manifestos? L-Kurtosis (LK) measures for the whole period (minimum four successive party manifestos) were calculated and also mean LKs per country and per party type. Tables 1 and 2 show the results. It uses (averages of) single LK scores per party, each measuring the peakedness of the change score distributions between this party's adjacent manifestos; note that each LK per party draws on often several hundreds of observed issue attention changes as documented in the third column. Remember that LK scores range from 0 to 1 where 1 means that the distribution of changes is strongly leptokurtotic with many cases in the middle of a distribution (incremental change), many cases in the tails of the distribution (many extreme changes), and few cases in the shoulders of the distribution (moderate changes). The closer the LK comes to 1 the more we have a punctuated and frictional change pattern. An LK closer to 0.125 indicates that the distribution of changes is more normally distributed and that change is smooth and proportionate.

A first conclusion is that party manifesto change is indeed punctuated. The average LK score (0.41) is way above 0.125, indicating a nonnormal, leptokurtotic distribution. Parties do not change their manifestos smoothly. They tend to stick to the status quo and shift their programmatic issue attention only incrementally; once in

TABLE 1 Mean L-Kurtosis Values for Party Program Changes in 25 Countries (1945–1998)

Country	Friction (L-Kurtosis)	# of Parties	# of Observed Issue Attention Changes	Std. Deviation
Portugal	0.28	7	872	.101
Ireland	0.31	6	956	.258
Canada	0.31	4	1,159	.036
Germany	0.32	3	884	.066
Greece	0.33	4	599	.055
Iceland	0.34	5	976	.070
Netherlands	0.35	8	2,118	.071
Sweden	0.35	7	1,248	.093
Austria	0.35	4	896	.059
Turkey	0.37	3	560	.080
Israel	0.38	15	637	.128
United States	0.38	2	703	.042
Japan	0.38	7	776	.226
Denmark	0.38	12	1,909	.120
Norway	0.40	8	2,416	.066
Australia	0.41	4	1,096	.051
Great Britain	0.43	3	1,025	.069
New Zealand	0.44	3	1,034	.127
France	0.44	8	1,601	.233
Italy	0.46	9	1,241	.120
Luxemburg	0.47	4	806	.052
Belgium	0.47	15	2,686	.158
Finland	0.48	9	1,137	.210
Spain	0.54	8	1,489	.213
Switzerland	0.55	8	1,684	.238
Total/mean	0.41	166	30,505	.157

The ANOVA comparing means is significant ($p = .07$) and the $Eta^2 = .207$.

FIGURE 1 Distribution of All Observed Issue Attention Changes (Percent Change) Across Parties and Countries (1945–1998) (N = 30,505)



a while they thoroughly revise their programs. How do these LKs compare to the stickiness of other institutions? Systematic comparative evidence is not available, but Breunig (2006) compared budget changes in Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Denmark and found LK scores ranging from 0.37 to 0.47. Knowing that budgets are generally considered as being extremely punctuated, these party manifesto LKs seem to be surprisingly high. Together with collaborators, Breunig also calculated LK scores for a range of political institutions in Denmark (Breunig, Green-Pedersen, and Mortensen 2005). For all institutions, except for the budget, they recorded lower LKs than the ones we found here for political parties: parliamentary questions (0.36), interpellations (0.31), and laws (0.28) in Denmark all seem to react more efficiently to new incoming signals than party programs.

An alternative way of documenting the stickiness of party manifestos is plotting all observed changes across all parties and countries into a bar chart with the Normal curve included (N = 30,505; LK = 0.41). This is what Figure 1 shows (we deleted +1500% changes from the graph).

The figure clearly documents the punctuated character of party manifesto change. Compared to the Normal curve, there is a very high central peak (frequent no change), weak shoulders (infrequent moderate change), and long tails (frequent extreme change; due to the graph's scale, these long tails, and especially the tiny blips above the Normal curve in the extreme right tail, are difficult to observe). So, most of the time, parties hardly adapt their

Table 2 Mean L-Kurtosis Values for Party Program Changes Across 10 Party Types in 25 Countries (1945–1998)

Type of Party	Friction (L-Kurtosis)	# of Parties	# of Observed Issue Attention Changes	Std. Deviation
Agrarian parties	0.28	8	1,489	.173
Ethnic, regional, and alliance parties	0.35	6	1,631	.096
Christian-democrat parties	0.37	25	4,122	.135
Communist parties	0.39	20	2,929	.119
Socialist parties	0.40	43	8,895	.121
Liberal parties	0.40	23	5,330	.133
Conservative parties	0.43	23	4,139	.153
Nationalist parties	0.50	4	751	.342
Special interest parties	0.55	8	747	.246
Ecological parties	0.57	6	472	.229
Total/mean	0.41	166	30,505	.157

The ANOVA comparing means is significant ($p = .006$) with the $Eta^2 = .136$.

attention to issues; if they change their manifesto they do it dramatically; parties unusually adapt moderately.

Table 1 also shows that differences between countries are substantial and significant. In some countries, parties seem to adapt their programs much more flexibly and smoothly than in other countries. Portugal, Ireland, and Canada have parties with the least punctuated programs. Spain and Switzerland jump out at the other end of the scale: their party programs hardly change and when they do, change comes in big bursts.

Table 2 shows that the differences between party types are even bigger than between the countries (see more significant ANOVA). At first sight it may be difficult to interpret the table but on closer examination one notices that mainstream parties that are present in most of the 25 polities (see the high Ns) have an average LK; more exceptional parties that are not present in all countries (see lower Ns), in contrast, on average have a high or low LK. Mainstream parties, belonging to the traditional party families, therefore have party programs that behave moderately punctuatedly. Smaller and nontraditional parties sometimes issue extremely punctuated party programs (e.g., ecological parties) or their party program change pattern is hardly punctuated at all (e.g., agrarian parties). Of the traditional parties, it is interesting to note that, as expected, the Christian-democrat parties occupying the center position in many polities in Europe indeed display the least punctuated change pattern. As they are center parties with a less outspoken ideology they are able to adapt their programs more easily. How can one make sense of this pattern?

A possible explanation might be that nontraditional parties tend to be more fundamentalist. They stick to their program and are reluctant to change it. When change does happen though, it is drastic. This image seems to apply nicely to ecological or green parties that aim for fundamental reforms of Western societies and that are strongly ideologically inspired. Moreover, most ecological parties are organized according to direct democratic principles which make it even more difficult to change their programs when the fundamentalist rank-and-file can veto any change. It is therefore plausible that ecological parties are indeed characterized by the highest degree of cognitive (ideological) and institutional (decision rules) friction leading to a typical punctuated pattern. In contrast, some of the nontraditional parties are only concerned with a limited number of issues and do not bother about others; they are genuine one-issue parties. This applies, for example, to agrarian parties. As a consequence, these parties are free to change any part of their program as long as it does not touch the core interest and values they are defending. Fighting for partial interests, they can be lenient and adapt smoothly regarding all other issues.

Bivariate Analyses

One of the hypotheses (H7) put forward was that, in more recent years, party manifestos have become more flexible. Due to voter dealignment, parties are forced to adapt more often and more proportionally, whereas, when they still had loyal voters, they could be more rigid and neglect external signals. What do the data in Table 3 show?

The evidence shows that the opposite is true. In the most recent period, party manifestos are *more* punctuated and characterized by friction than before. In the past, parties reacted more flexibly to external stimuli. This is a remarkable result. Parties seem to have become more

TABLE 3 Mean L-Kurtosis Values for Party Program Changes in 25 Countries in Two Periods (1945–1998)

	# Parties	Friction (L-Kurtosis)	# of Observed Issue Attention Changes	Std. Deviation
Period 1945–1971	98	0.35	10,300	0.13
Period 1972–1998	143	0.41	17,798	0.17

TABLE 4 Correlation Matrix (Pearson) of L-Kurtosis Values (Friction) and Party (System) Features in Three Postwar Periods[a]

	1945–1998 N = 166 (parties)	1945–1971 N = 98 (parties)	1972–1998 N = 143 (parties)
Electoral fragmentation (H1)	**.129***	.066	**.162***
Government entry (H2)	**.274****	.070	**.223****
Government duration (H2)	.039	**.343****	*−.132*$^{+}$
Ideological centrality (H3)	.029	**.257****	−.068
Electoral loss-victory (H4)	**.129***	.047	*.130*$^{+}$
Electoral volatility (H4)	**.177***	−.028	**.206****
Party size (H5)	**.167***	.039	**.145***
Party system polarisation (H6)	.052	*.155*$^{+}$	*−.135*$^{+}$

**Correlation significant at the .01 level (1-tailed); *correlation significant at the .05 level (1-tailed); +correlation significant at the .10 level (1-tailed).

[a]We (re)arranged all the signs of the parameters in the table such that positive signs confirm the hypotheses while negative signs falsify the hypothesis at stake.

rigid and firm of principle while voters have become less rigid and more free-floating. This outcome is not due to the fact that the new parties entering the fray during the last few decades are on average more rigid (see, e.g., the ecological parties discussed above). Performed on traditional parties only—socialists, communists, liberals, Christian-democrats, and conservatives—the same calculation yields the same result: programs changed more smoothly before 1971 than after.

The correlation matrix in Table 4 bivariately tests the other hypotheses for the total 1945–98 period and for both partial periods separately.

First of all, there are differences between both periods—compare columns 2 and 3 in the table. Party program change dynamics in the first half of the postwar era seem to have followed a somewhat different logic than in the second half of the postwar period. Distinguishing both periods, therefore, is useful, although tendencies recorded in the most recent period also seem to hold for the entire period.

In terms of electoral fragmentation (H1) the data confirm the hypothesis that in two-party systems party manifestos adapt more smoothly and in a less punctuated way than in multiparty systems. In the latter case, all of them retreat to their own niche and remain immune for external signals. Downs is therefore right that parties behave differently in different electoral competition settings.

By and large, the figures in the table demonstrate that government participation (H2) plays a role. The more parties tend to be government parties with a long track record of government participation, the less they change their party manifesto and the more frictional and punctuated their program change patterns. Indeed, adapting one's party program when in office seems to be difficult. Opposition parties have less difficulty shifting their priorities. Both measures of government/opposition, though, do not seem to work the same way in the different periods. For the overall period and the most recent period, the government entry date is most strongly associated with the L-Kurtosis. In contrast, for the immediate postwar era, government participation duration is strongly correlated with punctuated change patterns (and for the most recent period it is even slightly negative).

Ideological centrality (H3) only plays a role in the first postwar period. Between 1945 and 1971, extremist parties either did not adapt their program at all, or in large shifts only, while center parties changed their manifesto more smoothly and gradually. This effect completely disappears in the post-1971 period.

The electoral loss hypothesis (H4) can be confirmed too. Both measures are significant and go in the expected direction. Parties that systematically lose elections change their manifestos more smoothly, while parties that tend to register electoral increases change their programs less or more dramatically. Parties confronted with more volatile electoral results—going up and down again—manage to adapt their programs more easily. Stimuli to change seem

to have been bigger, confirming the findings of Janda and his colleagues (1995).

With regard to party size, the hypothesis (H5) is rejected. Small party manifestos are more difficult to change than big party manifestos, while the hypothesis said exactly the opposite. Yet, as mentioned above, we were unsure about what to expect in terms of party size because cognitive friction is probably highest in small parties, while institutional friction is highest in big parties. The evidence suggests that for party manifestos to change, overcoming the cognitive (ideological) friction may be more important than overcoming institutional (organizational) friction.

Finally, results with regard to party system polarization (H6) are mixed and contradictory. In both periods (weak) opposite tendencies seem to be at work. In the 1945–71 period, as expected, friction was higher and change more punctuated in strongly polarized party systems than in less polarised ones. This changed after 1971, contradicting the hypothesis: in more polarized party systems change became more smooth and gradual.

Table 5 OLS Regression of L-Kurtosis Values (Friction) and Party (System) Features in 1945–1998[a]

	Stand. Beta	Stand. Error
Electoral fragmentation (H1)	**.233****	.019
Government entry (H2)	**.208****	.000
Ideological centrality (H3)	.067	.012
Electoral loss-victory (H4)	.062	.002
Electoral volatility (H4)	**.236*****	.009
Party size (H5)	.003	.001
Party system polarisation (H6)	.176	.003
Agrarian party (dummy)	**.157****	.059
Conservative party (dummy)	**−.200***	.043
	Adj. $R^2 = .162$	N = 166 (parties)

***Parameter significant at the .01 level; **parameter significant at the .05 level; *parameter significant at the .10 level.
[a]We (re)arranged all the signs of the parameters in the table such that positive signs confirm the hypotheses while negative signs falsify the hypothesis at stake.

Multivariate Analyses

Overall, the bivariate analyses above seem to confirm most of the hypotheses at least in one of the periods under consideration, except for the party system polarization hypothesis, which gets corroborating *and* falsifying evidence at the same time. However, sometimes we stumbled onto differences between the two periods under study. This indicates that time makes a differences and that parties have adopted different strategies over the years. Are there any robust patterns of party manifesto change that apply to the whole postwar period? And can we disentangle the causal mechanism and gauge the net impact of the different explaining variables? Drawing on the whole period—Ns were too small to run reliable models for both periods separately—a number of simple OLS regressions were estimated predicting parties' L-Kurtoses. Results of these models can be found in Table 5.

The model in Table 5 is significant but its explained variance is rather low. This means that while it manages to grasp some of the variation in the frictional pattern of the manifestos, much is still not captured. On top of the variables gauging the hypotheses, party-type dummies are also added, catching differences between party types. Only two of all the dummies turn out to be significant (agrarian party and conservative party); all other party-type dummies are not significant and are deleted from the final model. The fact that hardly any party dummies are significant indicates that the theoretical variables in the model manage to suck up most of the differences between party types discussed above. As government entry date and duration of government participation are very closely associated (r = .791), both cannot be put in the same regression as independent variables (multicollinearity). Since the government entry date works best, this is the variable we included in the estimation.

Three of the hypotheses are clearly confirmed by the multivariate analysis: the more the party system in a country is fragmented, the more party program changes in that country are punctuated (H1); the more a party is a typical government party that first entered government a long time ago, the more its programmatic changes are punctuated (H2); the more a party's electoral fate is characterized by stability and constant results, the more its program hardly changes or changes only punctuatedly (H4). Although party growth/decay (H4) and party size (H5) yielded significant results in the bivariate analyses, these variables do not pass the multivariate test. Changes in agrarian party manifestos are significantly less punctuated; conservative parties' programs are characterized by strong friction and incremental changes. Maybe that is one of the reasons they are called "conservative"?

Conclusion and Discussion

This article first explored whether party program changes display the punctuated change pattern that seems to be so typical for political institutions. It found that party programs do indeed change incrementally or dramatically and that moderate changes are exceptional. Compared to other political institutions, party program changes are even *strongly* punctuated. Their change pattern resembles that of emblematic institutions at the end of the policy cycle and not that of typical input streams. This is an important finding. Parties are affected by strong friction. There is a tremendous resistance to change among all political parties in updating their agendas and platforms. Due to cognitive and institutional friction, parties do not adapt their manifesto at all or they do so in large spikes. Although one might expect parties to adapt smoothly to changes in society they are not adapting to incoming signals in a proportionate way but neglect the signals altogether or overreact to them.

Second, the results established that differences between parties are substantial: some parties have more smoothly shifting manifestos, whereas other party manifestos hardly change at all. Ecological and conservative parties, for example, stick to their programs and hardly change them at all (or change them radically). In contrast, agrarian parties have more flexible programs efficiently adapting to changing signals. Substantial differences between countries were also found; a country like Portugal has rather "efficient" parties while Swiss parties are programmatically most rigid.

Third, party manifesto changes are affected by features of the party and of the political system in which the party operates. A party's change pattern is patterned. The three most important determinants of parties' capability to more efficiently adapt their programs are electoral fragmentation, government participation, and electoral results. Parties operating in a political system with many competing parties, parties that have a long history of government participation, and parties whose electoral results are stable adapt their programs to a lesser extent than other parties. Party size seems to play a role too—the bigger the party the more it changes smoothly—but this finding did not pass the multivariate test.

The present study is explorative. Many more hypotheses about party change can be formulated. They were not incorporated here, as the necessary evidence to test them was missing at this stage. Parties' internal functioning rules, for example, may affect their manifesto efficiency. Parties that are organized democratically with more internal checks and balances, one may hypothesize, have more difficulties reacting to incoming signals because internal institutional friction is higher. The rank-and-file has to be convinced; overcoming this friction takes times and probably external shocks. Another interesting variable is party leadership change. Parties with long-standing leadership can be expected to be characterized by a punctuated manifesto change pattern. However, if a party's leadership has a high turnover rate, there may be more efficient manifesto shifts. Political system features may also make a difference. Lijphart's (1999) consociational-majoritarian continuum may affect party change, for example. In a consociational system with many cleavages and constant negotiations between parties, party programs are probably less changeable.

An important caveat is that our analysis supposed a causal link between the independent (party and party system features) and dependent variables (party change). Yet, taking a closer look at our independent variables, the causal direction may be questioned. Party size, for example, may be a cause of party program change but it might also be a consequence of it: if parties do not manage to adjust their programs they will start losing voters and get smaller. The same, of course, applies to the losing and winning elections variable. Winning or losing may be a consequence of party change, not only a cause. Even the fragmentation of the party system may be a consequence of the adaptive strategies of parties. If existing parties in a country are unable, or unwilling, to adapt to new demands and changing preferences, chances are high that new parties will spring up to fill in the gaps, which leads to an increased fragmentation of the party system. Consequently, almost all associations found in this article can be turned upside down. Party change or nonchange is not only a consequence of specific features of the party and of the party system, but also a cause of party and party system characteristics. We leave it to subsequent research to disentangle these elusive interactions.

One of the most intriguing findings of the study is that party programs are *not* flexible at all. Rather, they show a typical strongly punctuated pattern as indicated by high L-Kurtosis scores. Parties are quite rigid institutions in terms of their party program: they tend to stick to the status quo and hardly change their manifesto. Sometimes, they seem to realize that they have lost touch with reality and dramatically adapt their program. This pattern applied to almost all 166 parties across 25 nations and seems to be very robust. Of course, differences

between polities were ascertained, but the overall pattern is a pattern of rigidity and stickiness. These findings support previous research stressing the continuity of parties' programmatic offer. However, it raises questions about Jones and Baumgartner's (2005) assertion that input agendas are on average more flexible than policy agendas. They state that further down the policy cycle, friction—especially institutional friction—increases, thus leading to more punctuated change. However, political parties must be considered as typical *input* institutions and still they appeared to be rigid and stable. Of course, for parties themselves, their manifesto is not an input, but rather an (ultimate) output product. It is the result of an often lengthy and difficult internal process, and they do not care that what they produce is only the raw material for subsequent policy processes. Yet, from a policy point of view, parties are clearly input actors. Thus, what gets fed into the political system by political parties is not a reliable representation of incoming signals but a heavily distorted one. The inputs have been filtered through parties. Real policy decisions simply cannot be efficient because one of the most important institutions nurturing the political agenda is not functioning efficiently. Indeed, in many polities, parliament and government, the core policymakers, are dominated by political parties. Their decisions mirror parties' interests and values as codified in their party programs. The most important reason for this frictional character of party change is probably that parties are first and foremost ideological vehicles. They do not *want* to adapt to the environment most of the time since their first concern is their ideology and the implementation of their values and interests. The fact that parties lag behind is therefore probably more a matter of cognitive than institutional friction.

Ultimately, the findings of this study raise some questions about parties' roles in democracies. The analyses show that parties do not adapt smoothly to changes in their environment or to new incoming signals. They are not efficient translators converting popular wishes into party programs and, eventually, into policy measures. Parties play their intermediary role only partially via adaptation; ideology functions as a tremendous brake. This is probably the way it should be. Parties, indeed, have to offer choices to the electorate; that is part of their function in a democracy (McDonald, Budge, and Pennings 2004). To be able to offer choices, they must differ, and to differ they must hold on to their ideology. Only by offering stable choices to the electorate can an on average inattentive and weakly informed electorate make reasonably correct choices. If parties constantly adjusted their stance, voters would be confused; they would not be able to single out the party that roughly corresponds to their beliefs.

Appendix: Data Description

	Number of Subsequent Elections in Which Party Participated	Number of Observed Issue Attention Changes per Party
SWE: Greens	4	23
SWE: Vp Communists	17	219
SWE: SdaP Social Democrats	17	189
SWE: FP Liberals	17	252
SWE: KdS Christian Democrats	4	40
SWE: MSP Conservatives	17	210
SWE: CP Centre Party	17	315
NOR: NKP Communists	4	45
NOR: SV Left Socialists	10	268
NOR: DNA Labour	14	407
NOR: V Liberals	14	402
NOR: KrF Christian Peoples Party	14	335
NOR: H Conservatives	14	401
NOR: SP Centre Party	14	395
NOR: FrP Progress Party	7	163
DEN: VS Left Socialists	8	50
DEN: DKP Communists	17	167
DEN: SF Socialist Peoples Party	16	261
DEN: SD Social Democrats	22	244
DEN: CD Centre Democrats	11	121
DEN: RV Radicals	22	209
DEN: V Liberals	22	240
DEN: DU Independents Party	6	48
DEN: KrF Christian Peoples Party	12	128
DEN: KF Conservatives	22	190
DEN: FP Progress Party	11	115
DEN: RF Justice Party	17	136
FIN: VL Greens	4	26

continued

Appendix Continued

	Number of Subsequent Elections in Which Party Participated	Number of Observed Issue Attention Changes per Party
FIN: SKDL Peoples Democratic Union	13	151
FIN: SSDP Social Democrats	15	94
FIN: LKP Liberals	12	197
FIN: SKL Christian Union	8	57
FIN: KK National Coalition	15	82
FIN: SK Finnish Centre	15	194
FIN: SMP Rural Party	9	105
FIN: RKP SFP Swedish Peoples Party	15	231
ICE: Ab Communists	16	298
ICE: A Social Democrats	16	235
ICE: Sj Independence Party	16	216
ICE: F Progressive Party	16	153
ICE: Kv Womens Alliance	4	74
BEL: Ecolo Francophone Ecologists	5	135
BEL: Agalev Flemish Greens	5	137
BEL: PSB-BSP Socialists	11	202
BEL: SP Flemish Socialists	6	171
BEL: PS Francophone Socialists	6	154
BEL: PLP-PVV Liberals	8	118
BEL: PVV Flemish Liberals	9	180
BEL: PRL Francophone Liberals	8	172
BEL: PLDP Brussels Liberals	4	36
BEL: PSC-CVP Christian Peoples Party	7	141
BEL: CVP Flemish Christian Peoples Party	10	260
BEL: PSC Francophone Christian Social Party	10	185
BEL: RW Walloon Rally	6	115
BEL: FDF French-Speaking Front	10	223
BEL: VU Flemish Peoples Union	14	291
BEL: VB Flemish Block	6	166
NET: PPR Radical Political Party	6	137

continued

Appendix Continued

	Number of Subsequent Elections in Which Party Participated	Number of Observed Issue Attention Changes per Party
NET: PvdA Labour	16	443
NET: D 66 Libertarians	10	293
NET: VVD Liberals	16	405
NET: CDA Christian Democrats	7	219
NET: KVP Catholic Peoples Party	9	209
NET: ARP Anti-Revolutionary Party	9	239
NET: CHU Christian Historical Union	9	173
LUX: PCL KPL Communists	11	110
LUX: POSL LSAP Social Democrats	12	216
LUX: PD DP Democrats	12	243
LUX: PCS CSV Christian Social Party	12	234
FRA: PCF Communists	14	324
FRA: PS Socialists	14	307
FRA: RRRS Radical Socialists	7	117
FRA: MRP Popular Republicans	5	90
FRA: Gaullists	12	257
FRA: Conservatives	12	344
FRA: UDF	6	79
FRA: FN National Front	4	83
ITA: FdV Greens	4	38
ITA: PCI-PDS Communists	14	278
ITA: PR Radicals	7	77
ITA: PSI Socialists	12	249
ITA: PSDI Social Democrats	10	138
ITA: PRI Republicans	12	147
ITA: PLI Liberals	12	146
ITA: PPI-DC Christian Democrats	14	112
ITA: AN National Alliance	13	56
SPA: PCE-IU Communists	7	212
SPA: PSOE Socialists	7	218
SPA: CDS Centre Democrats	4	93

continued

Appendix Continued

	Number of Subsequent Elections in Which Party Participated	Number of Observed Issue Attention Changes per Party
SPA: AP,PP Conservatives	7	180
SPA: CiU Convergence and Unity	6	178
SPA: EE Basque Left	5	134
SPA: PNV EAJ Basque National Party	7	182
SPA: PAR Aragonese Regionalist Party	5	163
SPA: ERC Catalan Republican Left	6	129
GRE: KKE Communists	6	88
GRE: SAP Coalition Left and Progress	4	81
GRE: PASOK Socialists	9	293
GRE: ND New Democracy	9	137
POR: UDP Popular Democratic Union	7	79
POR: PCP Communists	7	113
POR: MDP Democratic Movement	5	86
POR: PSP Socialists	9	153
POR: PSD Social Democrats	9	189
POR: PP Popular Party	9	185
POR: PPM Popular Monarchist Party	4	67
GER: SPD Social Democrats	14	295
GER: FDP Free Democrats	14	306
GER: CDU-CSU Christian Democrats	14	283
AUT: GA Greens	4	67
AUT: SPO Socialists	15	288
AUT: FPO Freedom Movement	15	276
AUT: OVP Christian Democrats	15	265
SWI: Greens	5	46
SWI: SPS-PSS Social Democrats	13	251
SWI: LdU-ADI Independents	13	249
SWI: FDP-PRD Radical Democrats	13	289

continued

Appendix Continued

	Number of Subsequent Elections in Which Party Participated	Number of Observed Issue Attention Changes per Party
SWI: CVP-PDC Christian Democrats	13	282
SWI: EVP-PEP Protestant Peoples Party	7	137
SWI: SD Democrats	7	156
SWI: SVP-UDC Peoples Party	13	274
UK: Labour	15	359
UK: Liberals	13	260
UK: Conservatives	15	406
IRE: WP Workers Party	5	94
IRE: LP Labour Party	16	245
IRE: PD Progressive Democratic Party	4	61
IRE: Fine Gael	16	255
IRE: Fianna Fail	16	202
IRE: CnP Republican Party	6	80
IRE: CnT Party of the Land	5	19
USA: Democrats	13	345
USA: Republicans	13	358
CAN: NDP New Democratic Party	17	370
CAN: LP Liberals	17	311
CAN: PCP Conservatives	17	282
CAN: Socred Social Credit	11	196
AUL: ALP Labour	22	349
AUL: DLP Democratic Labour	10	116
AUL: LPA Liberals	22	403
AUL: NPA National Party	22	228
NEW: LP Labour	18	371
NEW: NP National Party	18	437
NEW: Social Credit	13	226
JAP: JCP Communists	13	152
JAP: JSP Socialists	13	156
JAP: DSP Democratic Socialists	12	117
JAP: SDF Social Democratic Federation	4	41
JAP: CGP Clean Government	10	106
JAP: LDP Liberal Democrats	13	140
JAP: NLC New Liberal Club	5	64

continued

APPENDIX Continued

	Number of Subsequent Elections in Which Party Participated	Number of Observed Issue Attention Changes per Party
ISR: MAKI Communists	7	64
ISR: HADASH Democratic Front	6	26
ISR: RATZ Citizens Rights Movement	5	18
ISR: MAPAM United Workers Party	7	55
ISR: AMT Ma-arach Alignment	5	51
ISR: Labour Party	4	27
ISR: MAPAI Workers Party	5	78
ISR: Progressive-Independent Liberals	5	41
ISR: General Zionist	4	43
ISR: MAFDAL National Religious Party	12	58
ISR: Agudah Israel	12	57
ISR: SHAS Sephardi Torah Movement	4	13
ISR: Tehiya Renaissance Movement	4	20
ISR: Herut Freedom Party	5	29
ISR: Likud Union	7	57
TUR: CHP Republican Peoples Party	9	206
TUR: AP Justice Party	5	126
TUR: ANAP Motherland Party	4	85
TUR: MHP National Action Party	5	143

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