CHAPTER 9 PATTERNS OF MOBILISATION

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For a long time the literature on political participation was dominated by approaches that explained differences in participation through individual characteristics such as gender, age, or education. Rosenstone & Hansen (1993) criticized such approaches which only paid attention to what they called "push factors". They emphasized the importance of pull factors, the aspects of social life that make people accessible and amenable to appeals of mobilizing agencies. "The key to understanding who takes part and who does not, when they take part and when not, is mobilisation," these authors state (p. 7). Social movement scholars, on the other hand, have since long left explanations in terms of characteristics of the participants behind and adopted mobilisation as the key process in movement participation (see, for example: McAdam, McCarthy & Zald 1988).

Mobilisation, however, is only one side of the demand, supply, and mobilisation triangle that accounts for the ebb and flow of social movements (Klandermans 2004). Demand refers to the reservoir at a specific point in time in a society of people prepared to take part in political protest regarding a specific cause. It is related to grievances that have developed among the members of a society at a specific moment. Ever since resource mobilisation literature began to argue that grievances are always present in a society (Oberschall 1973; Zald & McCarthy 1976), social movement literature tends to neglect the demand-side of protest — that is the generation of grievances — as a separate process in the dynamics of protest participation. In a similar manner, the literature tends to neglect the supply-side of protest. Supply factors refer to the possibilities to participate in protest offered by social movement organisations. It concerns such matters as the set of organisations that belong to the social movement sector involved in the protest, the characteristics of these organisations, their history, their action repertoires, the general protest repertoire in a given country, in short, all those features that make social movements and the events they are staging more or less appealing to people.

Demand and supply would remain potentialities, if not processes of mobilisation were to bring the two together. This makes it understandable why so much of the literature on social movements is devoted to mobilisation processes. After all, mobilisation is the process that gets the movement going and that links a certain demand for protest among the population in a country to a supply or offer on the protest market in that country. Yet, it would be a mistake to neglect demand or supply factors. Mobilisation is only possible on the basis of some demand and supply being developed in the course of time. If neither demand nor supply exist in a society, mobilisation would be inconceivable and in vain. In this book we take an approach that does justice to both demand and supply, and to mobilisation. Several chapters concentrate on the demand or supply side of protest against the war in Iraq. Chapter 3 presents evidence about public opinion and media coverage in all eight nations under study and sketches the demand side: there was indeed a considerable demand for anti-war protest in almost every society around the world. In terms of the supply side, Chapter 1 describes the organisational backbone of the movement, Chapter 4 addresses the history of the peace movement in the eight nations, while Chapter 10 deals with the organisational networks underlying the protest. These organisational networks yielded the same opportunity to protest in each country, namely a mass demonstration in every country's capital on February 15th. After a theoretical introduction developing two mobilisation

typologies, we will focus on the assessment of mobilisation patterns in the eight nations studied. Next, we will assess to what extent mobilisation patterns make a difference and affect the features of the demonstrators. Finally, we will attempt to account for these differences in mobilisation patterns by associating them to diverging patterns of supply and demand in the eight countries.

STRONG & WEAK TIES; OPEN & CLOSED MOBILISATION

According to Klandermans, social movements face two separate mobilisation challenges: consensus mobilisation, that is, persuading people of the good cause, and action mobilisation, that is, actually bringing people to the streets (Klandermans 1984; Klandermans 1997). Public support for the anti-war voice, as discussed in Chapter 3, can be seen as the outcome of consensus mobilisation by the anti-war movements, at least partially. After all, movement organisations have been disseminating their views for quite time. Chapter 6 elaborates further on the beliefs and attitudes of the participants. As such, the chapter offers more insight into the process and outcomes of consensus mobilisation. Our focus here will be on action mobilisation. What can we learn about action mobilisation for the demonstrations of February 15?

Action mobilisation is a funnelling process with different stages in which *generalized* preparedness to act in support of a cause must be transformed into *specific* preparedness to participate in a particular protest event, and finally into *actual* participation (Oegema and Klandermans 1994). This activation process has three aspects: getting in touch with people to get the message about the event across (informing them about what, where, and when), motivating people to participate (making sure that the pros of participation outweigh the cons), and helping motivated participants to overcome barriers to participation (Klandermans and Oegema 1987; Oegema and Klandermans 1994). The specific question we want to tackle in this chapter concerns the first aspect mentioned: how were people informed and targeted by mobilizing agencies for the upcoming demonstration?

The protests of February 15 were staged by a whole range of social movement organisations, political parties, associations, and NGOs. In Chapter 1 we described the organizers in each country. Obviously, the organisational make-up of the anti-war coalition impacted on the process of mobilisation, if only because organisations differ in how they mobilise. Our goal here, however, is not a comparison of mobilisation strategies employed by the various organisations in the countries of our study. In this chapter, we are interested in the very other end of the mobilisation chain — the people targeted. As we only interviewed people who actually showed up for the demonstration, we are not able to contrast successful with unsuccessful mobilisation attempts but can only sketch action mobilisation attempts, that succeeded as it was participants who reported back. In that context our focus is on information dissemination. Certainly, being targeted with information is not a sufficient precondition for participation, but for obvious reasons it is a necessary condition. For example, research by Klandermans and Oegema (1987) showed that simply *none* of those who a movement organisation failed to target participated in the event. Our respondents were necessarily reached one way or another by information about the demonstration. Our core question in this chapter is how they were reached: *which people were successfully targeted for mobilisation through what kind of information channels*?

Since the first formulation of resource mobilisation theory (Zald & McCarthy 1976), social movement literature acknowledges the organized character of mobilisation. Numerous studies have since documented the crucial significance of social networks for understanding mobilisation and differential recruitment (see Diani 2002, Diani and McAdam 2003; Gould 1993; Kitts 2000; Tindall 2004). However, most of the available research does not focus on the specific information channels but rather on the general socio-structural embededness of mobilisation. Resource mobilisation theory, for example, emphasized the necessity of formal organisations for mobilisation (McCarthy and Zald 1977). People have to be more or less integrated in social movement organisations to enable large and successful mobilisation processes. Via learning processes that develop participatory skills, via the generation of social networks reducing information costs and expanding weak ties, and via intentional mobilisation does membership in formal associations foster protest participation (Morales 2003; Tindall 2004). Movement organisations are professional mobilisation machines specialized in helping people to overcome the barriers that lie between willingness to participate and actual participation. Some scholars, in contrast, claimed that informal networks could do the mobilisation job as well and that, rather, informal pre-existing networks are the social-structural requirement for collective action. Especially McAdams's concept of micromobilisation context proved to be influential in this respect (McAdam 1988; McAdam, McCarthy et al. 1998).

Unlike these strands that describe the whole mobilisation process — targeting, motivating, overcoming barriers — our interest lies with the first aspect only. It is indeed plausible that some kind of social network is needed to motivate people. In these networks, people share opinions, beliefs, and values with friends, family and loved ones creating motivation (Tindall 2004). Helping people to overcome barriers cannot happen in a social vacuum either: people agree on how they will travel to a demonstration, they buy tickets, or hire a coach. Yet, it is perfectly conceivable that the actual targeting and information dissemination are *not* embedded in a social network. Research in Belgium, for example, showed that it were the media, either formal organisations nor informal networks that brought the demonstration message across playing a central role in the making of the White March, the biggest demonstration ever held in Belgium. At least in targeting the population, but probably even in motivating potential participants and lowering the barriers for participation in the White March, the mass media played a major role (Walgrave and Manssens 2000). Thus: mobilisation, and certainly the information dissemination aspect of it, can happen outside, or better: reach out beyond organisational networks. Based on this general idea, we propose two different dimensions of mobilisation: strong vs. weak ties and open vs. closed mobilisation.

The idea of the strength of ties was first launched by Granovetter in a seminal article (1973) elaborating the importance of strong and weak ties for social movement mobilisation. The strength of weak ties, so Granovetter, is that they connect cliques (that is, groups with strong ties). Therefore, it is the weak ties that are crucial in the spreading of information between cliques. Without weak ties, information would not travel beyond group boundaries. Strong ties on the other hand, not being very effective in disseminating information, are more effective than weak ties when it comes to activation rather than spreading of information (McAdam, 1986; see also Marwell and Oliver 1993). Klandermans and Oegema (1987) discern four routes to target individuals for mobilisation: mass media, direct mail, ties with organisations, and friendship ties. They distinguish between formal and informal mobilisation attempts, the first being all deliberate mobilisation efforts of the movement (via flyers, posters, stands, advertisements, and so on) and the second being

personal links with someone who planned to participate in the upcoming demonstration. In line with Granovetter's basic argument, they conclude that although more people are reached by formal channels, especially the informal links are crucial to breed actual participation, since they yield much more participation motivation than formal information channels (see also Gould 1991, 1993). The first defining characteristic of mobilisation patterns, then, is the strength of the link between the organizers and the potential protest participants.

Snow and colleagues distinguish face-to-face dissemination from mediated dissemination (Snow, Zurcher and Ekland-Olson, 1980). Face-to-face dissemination requires the physical presence of a source of information while mediated dissemination implies the use of media - like newspapers, television, mail, the Internet, and telephone. Furthermore, Snow and colleagues discern 'private' channels for mobilisation and recruitment from 'public' channels. Snow et al.'s taxonomy of recruitment channels suggests that some channels can reach the public at large, while other channels only reach certain segments of the population. Elaborating on that idea, we propose to distinguish as a second distinguishing feature of mobilisation patterns their openness vs. closeness. The characteristic that defines the openness or closeness of a communication channel is whom is being targeted. Open mobilisation channels have no restriction regarding whom they target, while closed mobilisation channels only target people with certain characteristics, for instance members of an organisation. The broader the target groups, the less specific personal characteristics, the more open the mobilisation channel. An organisation that primarily targets its own members when it comes to mobilisation is an example of closed mobilisation. Labor union demonstrations provide typical examples of recruitment via closed channels. As a rule, such demonstrations are crowded with labor union members and hardly any non-members show up at these protests. Closed channels are typically employed in so-called 'en-bloc recruitment' (McAdam, 1986), where members of a group or organisation are recruited as a whole. The mass media, on the other hand, are probably the best example of an open mobilisation channel. Although there are some notable biases in media use - coinciding largely with organisation membership - mass media can be considered as a ubiquitous mobiliser, because a vast majority of the population is confronted with mass media outlets. As a consequence no specific features are required to become a target of mobilisation via the media. Naturally, some preceding decisions have to be taken – reading a newspaper, switching on the TV – but unlike the decision to become a member of an organisation, these decisions most of the time are unrelated to protest mobilisation.

Hence, we decided to employ two dimensions to discern processes of mobilisation, namely, the strength of ties with movement organisations and the openness vs. closeness of the mobilisation channels. Theoretically, the two dimensions are independent from one another as they refer to different facets of the mobilisation process. Strength of ties refers to the links that an individual has with the mobilizing organisations. Such present links do not automatically imply that these links are actually activated and that a 'tied' individual is in fact mobilised via these links. In a certain sense, strength of ties refers to organisational potential. Mobilisation, in contrast, refers to the real mobilisation process: what were the channels that in reality steered a person into the mobilisation process and were these channels open, aimed at the whole population, or closed, only targeting a segment? Organisational channels are but one of a whole array of channels that can 'pull' an individual into participation. So in principle, any mobilisation channel can coincide with any type of ties. This is not to say that they are not correlated in practice. Obviously, membership of an organisation (strong tie) makes it more likely to be targeted by

mobilisation attempts from that organisation (closed channel) and we expect both dimensions to be associated to some extent. As we will see the two dimensions are often more a matter of degree than of mutually exclusive patterns.

To complicate matters further, the same channel might function differently in different countries and under different circumstances. For example, we considered newspapers as being open mobilisation channels, but newspapers can be explicitly partisan, owned and controlled by a social organisation or political party. Hence the readership of that newspaper probably tends to be selective, having certain social and political features. The decision to read this specific newspaper most likely stems from ideological reasons. As a consequence, mobilisation via this newspaper is less open than it would be the case via more neutral newspapers. In a similar vain, friendship networks or links with colleagues are more an open type depending on the issue. For work-related and bread-and-butter issues colleagues act as closed channels referring to specific interests. Yet, for universal issues as the protest against the war on Iraq colleagues are more likely to act as an open mobilisation channel. Let us give another example of the contingent nature of mobilisation channels: some people are informed about a demonstration by flyers, ads, or posters. Are these open or closed mobilisation mechanisms? The answer depends on the strategy of the organizers. If they decide to distribute flyers in train stations or on the streets, this technique is fairly open. If they, in contrast, focus their flyer distribution on political meetings, obviously not the whole population is targeted but only some specific groups. The same applies to posters: are they suspended on the streets or rather in specific places like universities, schools, and clubs?

The question whether mobilisation for February 15 relied on weak ties or strong ties, on open or closed channels is an empirical matter that will be tackled in the next section. During a mobilisation campaign, a movement organisation minimally tends to target its own members. This is the pattern of mobilisation via closed channels and through strong ties that Marwell and Oliver (1993) identify as the pattern most likely to be adopted by organizers. Yet unless an organizer minds to stay within the boundaries of the organisation's constituency, weak ties and open channels must be employed as well as they are the only way to reach out. After all, not every citizen has strong ties or any ties at all to the organisations that are staging the events. We expect most organizers, in principle, to try to maximize open mobilisation via weak ties since it increases the chances of a large and diverse turnout. But whether this broadening strategy succeeds is largely beyond the control of the movement. If the movement fights for special interests, for example, chances are small that non-constituents get the demonstration message accross. If the movement is engaged in a battle for universal values – such as the anti-war demonstrations of February 15th – chances are greater to manage to get the message across to a broader segment of the population. In this process, the mass media play a crucial role. Although their normal role is not a mobilizing one and the media seldom take sides in a controversy and urge people to participate in any protest, they do convey the message that there will be a protest event, certainly when it is a large-scale event such as a topical mass demonstration in the country's capital. Therefore, we expect open channels to have played a substantial role in the making of February 15th.

PATTERNS OF MOBILISATION

What kind of links did people have to the organisations that were staging the demonstration? We asked our respondents whether they were a member of one of those organisations or whether they knew people who were a member. If the answer to either question was affirmative, we asked them how they maintained contact with this organisation — indirectly through such media as the Internet or newsletters or direct by attending meetings. We used the answers to these three questions to construct an indicator of the strength of the ties that an individual has with relevant movement organisations. People without membership or acquaintances in any movement organisation were considered as having no ties. If people personally knew a member of an organisation or personally were members of an organisation, we constructed a scale that indicated the strength of their ties to the organisation weighing for the extent to which they maintained contact with the organisation. We distinguished four levels of strength — weak, moderate, strong, and very strong.[1] Table 9.1. shows the findings with regard to the five different levels of connectedness for the eight countries.

Table 9.1 Ties to organisations that stage the demonstration (in %)

	US	UK	SP	IT	NL	SW	BE	GE	Total
No ties	61,9	62.2	44.9	26.9	58.5	49.6	49.5	58.4	50.8
Weak ties	7.6	14.1	33.0	20.9	13.3	11.9	13.1	16.0	16.4
Moderate ties	11.2	6.9	15.3	14.9	7.1	11.7	12.1	9.0	11.3
Strong ties	5.7	5.3	5.6	10.5	6.6	9.6	8.6	5.1	7.2
Very Strong ties	11.5	11.5	1.1	26.8	14.5	17.2	16.7	11.5	14.2

Chi-square 1086.47, df 28, p<.001

Half of the participants had no ties with organisations that staged the respective demonstration. The remaining half had ties ranging from weak to very strong. Overall, we observed considerable variation in the strength of ties between countries. For example, in the U.S. and the U.K. — the two countries that went to war — close to two thirds of the demonstrators had no ties to anti-war organisations. Also in the Netherlands and Germany, relatively few participants were tied to the mobilizing organisations. In Belgium and Switzerland, the degree of embeddedness was almost identical and, by contrast, tilted towards stronger ties. Spanish demonstrators predominantly had weak or moderate ties. In Italy, no less than seventy percent of the participants had some ties to anti-war organisations, while more than one third even had strong or very strong ties. The very strong organisational ties of Italian respondents deserve a special commentary. We suspect that this is an artifact of the sampling procedure employed in Italy. In Italy, respondents to the survey were approached during the train ride to Rome from the North of the country. As a consequence one might expect these participants to be mobilised more in advance and to take part in a more organized way than those from the other countries who were surveyed on the demonstration venue. This is what our data show[2].

[1] Weak ties imply that someone only knows people who are members of a movement organisation. Moderate, strong and very strong ties imply an increasingly dense combination of knowing someone, being a member oneself, and maintaining contact with movement organisations.

[2] The Italian respondents were mobilised much more in an organisationally embedded manner: they traveled much farther than their colleagues in other countries, they most frequently mentioned organisations as their main source of information for the demonstration, they attend the demonstration more frequently in the company of other organisation members or colleagues, and they took the decision to participate comparatively early.

Being tied or not tied to mobilizing organisations does not necessarily establish the openness vs. closeness of a mobilisation campaign. In order to compare the degree of openness of the mobilisation in the various countries, we asked our respondents how they came to know about the demonstration. We recoded their answers into four categories: via (1) television, radio and newspapers, (2) family, friends, school and work, (3) website, ads/flyers, mailing lists and posters, and (4) organisations. Categorized as such, mobilisation channels are increasingly closed. Tables 9.2 presents our findings regarding these channels.

Table 9.2 Most important information channel

	All	US	UK	Sp	It	Nl	Sw	Be	Ge
Radio/television/newspapers	30.0	18.3	10.4	**55.8**	**33.9**	**34.6**	26.4	26.2	**33.8**
Family/friends/school/work	29.4	**36.8**	16.1	24.3	**30.6**	26.9	**37.8**	**30.2**	**32.7**
Adds/flyers/posters/etc	31.6	**37.0**	**69.1**	15.0	19.2	**30.3**	27.0	**30.6**	24.8
Organisation	9.0	7.9	4.5	4.9	16.3	8.0	8.8	12.9	8.7
N	5661	666	1116	448	1002	528	629	503	769

Close to one tenth of the participants learned about the demonstration via some organisation, while the remaining nine tenths were equally distributed over the three other types of channels. The utilised mix of channels varied per country. In the U.S., interpersonal networks and ads, flyers, etc. were equally important and more important than the other channels. The same holds for Belgium, though less prominent. In the U.K., the vast majority of the participants was reached by ads, etc. while in Spain, the mass media served that purpose. In Italy and Germany, equal proportions of the participants were informed by either mass media or interpersonal networks. Italy also was the country with the highest proportion of the participants informed via organisational networks. In the Netherlands, mass media and ads, etc. were roughly equally prominent. Switzerland was the only country where interpersonal networks were the most important. In terms of openness vs. closeness of mobilisation channels, our data suggest that Spain experienced the most open campaign, followed by Germany and the Netherlands. whereas the campaign in the U.S., U.K., and Belgium seems to have been the most closed.

Now that we have presented our focal variables grasping the two dimensions of mobilisation, let us assess the relationship between the two. We argued that both dimensions, although probably statistically associated, are theoretically independent from one another. We expect to find each possible pattern between the five levels of ties and the four levels of openness. This turned out to be the case, as can be observed in Table 9.3. The moderate correlation (Pearson r = .27) suggests that - although correlated - the two factors are not identical.

Table 9.3 Patterns of mobilisation: Percentages

	Tv/radio/ Newspapers	Family/friends/ school/work	Adds/flyers/ Posters/etc.	Organisations	Total
No ties	**18.8**	**17.2**	**12.7**	2.1	50.8
Weak ties	5.5	6.5	4.1	0.6	16.6
Moderate ties	3.1	3.5	2.9	1.8	11.2
Strong ties	2.2	1.9	**2.1**	**1.0**	7.3

Very strong ties	2.6	2.6	**4.5**	**4.3**	14.5
Total	32.2	31.7	26.3	9.8	100.0

A look at Table 9.3 reveals that the dominant pattern is people without ties to movement organisations who have learned about the demonstration via open communication channels (be it mass media or interpersonal networks). Interestingly, substantial proportions of the participants without any ties to any movement organisation learned about the demonstration through closed channels such as ads, flyers, posters, and the Internet. Apparently, these closed channels are not exclusive to the extent that they exclude those who are not tied to the organisations which that are the sources of information. To a certain extent this is understandable. Ads, flyers, and posters may be exclusive, but chances are that other people than those connected to the senders come to see and read them. Participants who have strong ties to movement organisations are more likely to have learned about the demonstration through closed channels, the more so if they have very strong ties. In fact, among those with very strong ties are participants who mostly used closed channels.

Is this general pattern present in all countries? Apparently not, as evidenced by the figures in Table 9.4. This table presents the country breakdowns for the bold-figured cells in Table 9.3.The breakdowns reveal interesting differences in mobilisation patterns. On the one hand, there are countries such as Spain, the Netherlands, and Germany which display a relatively open pattern of mobilisation with an emphasis on mass media channels. On the other hand, in countries such as the U.S., the U.K., and Switzerland mobilisation is relatively open as well, but the emphasis is on interpersonal communication channels. Finally, Italy and Belgium are the two countries with the highest proportion of participants mobilised via closed patterns of mobilisation. In a separate row, we included the percentages of participants who were mobilised by more closed channels such as ads, flyers, websites and the like, although they did not have any ties to movement organisations. As mentioned, substantial proportions of the participants were mobilised in this manner, especially in the U.S. and the U.K., as the country breakdown reveals. This underscores that the boundaries between open and closed patterns of mobilisation are not drawn very sharply.

Table 9.4 Mobilisation patterns: percentages

	All	US	UK	Sp	It	Nl	Sw	Be	Ge
Open: No ties +									
Mass media	18.8	15.0	15.7	**27.2**	10.1	**25.3**	14.1	16.5	**24.6**
Interpersonal channels	17.2	**23.5**	**22.6**	11.8	11.1	17.2	**20.9**	14.9	18.5
Ads, flyers, etc.	12.7	19.8	22.0	5.2	4.6	14.1	13.5	15.3	12.5
Closed: (Very) strong ties +									
Organisations, ads, flyers, etc.	11.9	12.6	10.3	1.5	**18.4**	12.8	13.5	**15.4**	9.5

The previous discussion confirms that mobilisation patterns are context-dependent. Obviously, the mobilisation campaign in one country has been more open than in the other. It is equally interesting to know whether the mobilisation campaigns for this demonstration have been more open or closed than those of other demonstrations. Comparative evidence for all eight countries is lacking, but we dispose of comparable data involving six other demonstrations staged in Belgium (Brussels) between 1999 and 2002 (Van Aelst &

Walgrave, 2001, Norris, Walgrave & Van Aelst, 2004). This Belgian evidence was gathered in an identical manner, but covers strongly diverging issues and movements: from typical new social movement events like anti-racist and anti-globalist demonstrations, over classic bread-and-butter actions staged by trade unions (non-profit, social sector, and education) to a new right demonstration against tolerant Belgian drug abuse laws. For our Belgian survey, we constructed an indicator of openness of mobilisation identical to the one employed in these other studies. Table 9.5 provides the comparison.

Table 9.5 Mobilisation openness of seven demonstrations in Belgium: Percentages[1]

	Iraq war	Drugs	Anti-global	Antiracism	Education	Non-profit	Social sector
Open	48.9	17.9	21.2	15.0	2.7	1.2	0.8
Rather open	25.3	37.3	30.3	28.2	20.5	12.2	13.2
Rather closed	11.9	21.4	15.4	20.3	33.8	43.8	23.2
Closed	13.9	23.4	33.1	36.6	43.0	42.9	62.8

[1] For this comparison we constructed identical measures of openness for the various demonstrations. This measure combines the strength of ties and the degree of openness of mobilisation channels into one single measure of openness.

The differences between the seven Belgian demonstrations are striking. The variance between issues is certainly much larger than that found between countries. Protest staged by new social movements was characterised by a substantially more open mobilisation process than that staged by the other social movements. Apparently, issues matter a lot, much more than country differences. In terms of the protest against the upcoming war on Iraq, the figures in the table make it absolutely clear that the anti-war protest in Belgium was an evident case of open mobilisation. In fact, the anti-war protest was by far the most open mobilisation of the seven demonstrations covered. Of course, this is no conclusive proof that the February 15th demonstrations in general, and not only in Belgium, were characterised by open mobilisation. But since the Belgian anti-war demonstration, compared to the seven other February 15th demonstrations, by no means was an extremely open case — in fact, Belgium ranked among the more closed mobilisations — it is at least plausible to assume that the mobilisation processes leading up to February 15th were relatively open.

CONSEQUENCES OF MOBILISATION PATTERNS

Do mobilisation patterns make a difference? Do they influence the behaviour of the participants? When they take their decision to participate, in whose company do they attend, how far the participants travel, and so on? Equally relevant is the question of whether mobilisation patterns are associated with other features of demonstrators: age, gender, education, their political attitudes and opposition to war. In other words: do different patterns of mobilisation produce different demonstrations? Oegema and Klandermans (1994: 705) believe that mobilisation processes make a difference: "*Mobilisation attempts, incentives and barriers do not occur randomly throughout a population, but coincide with characteristics of movement organisations, campaign characteristics, specific actions, characteristics of individual communities, and social categories.*" Most of the factors associated with different mobilisation patterns are held constant in this study: it concerns

the same movement, the same campaign, and the same action form. This gives us the opportunity to focus entirely on the characteristics of the participants possibly associated with mobilisation patterns as such. Basically, in this section, we will compare the characteristics of people mobilised through the six different mobilisation patterns. We will do so by means of multivariate analyses of variance with the strength of ties, the degree of openness, and country as factors. Such analyses enable to disentangle the main effects of ties, channels, and countries and the interaction of these factors.

Going to the demonstration

When people go to a demonstration, they may go alone or with family, friends or acquaintances. They may decide to participate long before the actual demonstration takes place or at the very last moment. The decision to take part in a demonstration is, of course, also influenced by how far someone lives from the actual venue of the demonstration. In all these matters it is conceivable that people are affected by the process of mobilisation as it takes place. To be able to investigate this matter we asked our interviewees with whom they came to the demonstration, when they decided to participate, and how far they travelled. Tables 9.6 through 9.7 give the relevant figures.

Table 9.6 Company attending

	All	US	UK	Sp	It	Nl	Sw	Be	Ge	Chi-square
Alone	10.2	13.9	11.1	5.1	4.6	17.2	12.1	9.3	10.0	192.224***
Family	42.1	42.7	48.0	55.3	34.7	39.9	34.5	48.3	38.4	221.392***
Friends	57.8	58.7	57.5	51.3	64.9	46.9	65.5	50.9	58.0	182.087***
Colleagues	13.2	13.6	13.6	0.0	17.1	11.1	14.9	14.6	14.1	258.670***
Co-members	14.5	15.9	12.5	8.6	21.2	11.3	10.2	19.3	11.9	165.990***
N	5765	705	1129	452	1010	542	637	509	781	

***df 7, p<.001

Table 9.7 Participation decision

	All	US	UK	Sp	It	Nl	Sw	Be	Ge
Today	4.5	4.6	2.5	1.1	3.4	7.1	6.9	8.5	4.1
Last week	38.6	28.8	25.2	46.4	33.6	50.1	45.1	47.1	49.2
Few weeks ago	35.8	43.8	41.0	38.2	34.8	26.1	33.8	30.6	32.9
Month+	21.1	22.8	31.3	14.3	28.1	16.0	14.3	13.8	13.9
N	5726	698	1128	44.8	993	536	63.7	507	779

Chi-square 735.596, df 21, p<.001

Table 9.8 Distance traveled

	All	US	UK	Sp	It	Nl	Sw	Be	Ge
-5 km	22.5	35.0	24.6	-	4.6	33.3	14.4	15.6	29.7
6-10 km	8.4	13.6	10.7	-	1.2	6.1	3.2	6.7	16.6
11-20 km	7.3	13.8	7.4	-	0.9	5.5	3.5	8.1	12.0
21-50 km	15.6	12.5	18.7	-	1.2	18.5	12.8	34.2	9.0
51-100 km	15.0	10.7	16.5	-	1.5	18.7	28.7	25.1	2.2
101-200 km	12.8	7.3	17.0	-	0.9	13.4	33.6	9.5	5.1

201-500 km	10.1	5.7	5.2	-	33.6	4.6	3.9	0.8	20.3
501 + km	8.3	1.5	0.1	-	56.2	-	-	-	5.1

Chi-square 8182.664, df 42, p<.001

In all countries the majority of the participants came with family or friends. Much smaller proportions of the demonstrators came in the company of colleagues and co-members of movement organisations. One tenth of the participants came on their own. Although the patterns in the eight countries are very similar, we observe some interesting variation. In the Netherlands, for example - compared to the other countries - almost twice the number of participants came alone. In Spain, more than anywhere else, the demonstration resembled a family fair. In Italy and Germany on the other hand, friends were the most common companions. Members of movement organisations relatively frequently were accompanying participants in Italy, Belgium, and the U.S.

As for when people decided to take part, many more participants in Italy, the U.S. and the U.K. decided at an earlier stage than in other countries. Belgian and Dutch participants made up their minds late; most frequently only in the last week or even at the very last day before the demonstration. The farthest distance travelled was in Italy. In all other countries, we found the typical pattern of a relatively large proportion from within a few kilometres, smaller numbers from intermediary distances and again larger numbers from longer distances.

Were such matters as someone's company, the moment when the decision to participate was taken, the distance people travelled to the demonstration related to the way in which people were mobilised? In order to sort that out, we conducted two multivariate analyses of variance with the strength of ties and the openness of mobilisation channels as factors. In the first analysis, the dependent variables concerned with whom people attended the demonstration and in the second the timing of the decision to take part and the distance travelled to the site of the demonstration. As we observed significant differences between the eight countries on each of these variables, we included 'country' as a control factor in the analysis. In addition to main effects, multivariate analysis of variance also estimates the interaction of the independent variables. Moreover, as it includes sets of dependent variables, the analysis controls for the overlap between the dependent variables. The following manovas estimate the main effects and interaction of ties and mobilisation channels net of country variation. They provide an answer to the question to what extent company, decision timing, and distance travelled are affected by the strength of ties and the openness or closeness of mobilisation channels on its own and in interaction net of the variation between countries.

Table 9.9 presents the result from the first analysis with company as the dependent variable: no one, family, friends, colleagues, or co-members of movement organisations. Respondents could give more than one answer, hence the five could vary independently, except going alone, of course.[3]

[3] We ran the same analyses with and without Italy and we ran separate analyses on the Italian sample, in order to assess whether the diverging sampling strategy in Italy has biased the conclusion. As this wasn't the case, we included Italy in the analyses.

Table 9.9 At the demonstration with….by ties, mobilisation channel, and country: manova, F-values					
	Alone	Family	friends	colleagues	co-members
Main effect ties	2.20^{ns}	2.26^{ns}	1.39^{ns}	7.32***	92.42***
Main effect mobil. channel	16.81***	7.83***	50.16***	19.37***	149.29***
Main effect country	11.08***	16.44***	13.63***	8.96***	7.95***
Ties x mob. channel	2.53**	2.05*	1.19^{ns}	1.51^{ns}	9.68***
Ties x country	1.48*	2.42***	3.02***	2.67**	3.80***
Mob. channel by country	3.36***	2.34***	3.48***	2.69***	5.00***
Ties x mob. channel x country	2.32***	2.15***	2.22**	2.49***	3.58***
R-square	.07	.06	.10	.08	.24

* p<.05; ** p<.01, *** p<.001

On the whole, one can conclude that company is influenced by mobilisation patterns. However, the influence is not the same for each type of company. The analyses reveal a main effect of ties for colleagues and co-members only. Stronger ties more often make people come to the demonstration with colleagues and co-members of movement organisations. The strength of ties does not have an influence on whether people come with family or friends, or on their own. The mobilisation channel used has a significant impact on all five possible social arrangements. Follow-up analysis shows that people who are mobilised via closed channels are more likely to come with co-members, while people who are mobilised through open channels are more likely to come alone or with family or friends; the latter two especially if they are mobilised by family or friends. The size of the F-values indicate that the impact of channels of mobilisation on company at the demonstration is much larger than that of the strength of ties. The significant interaction of ties and mobilisation channels implies that the two factors reinforce each other. Especially in the case of coming alone or with co-members, we found significant interactions: having no ties to movement organisations *and* being mobilised via mass media makes it much more likely for people to come alone, while having strong ties *and* being mobilised via organisations makes it much more likely for people to come with co-members of movement organisations. Obviously, these effects do not exhaust the country variation. First, the modest but significant country interactions suggest that some variation exists between the eight countries in how ties and mobilisation channels influence companionship at the demonstration. However, the patterns are too unsystematic to interpret,. Finally, the size of the main effects of a country implies that substantial proportions of the variation in company between the countries is due to other factors than mobilisation patterns.

In Table 9.10, a similar analysis is reported with the time of decision and the distance travelled as dependent variables. Again, mobilisation patterns have a substantial impact, especially on the timing of the decision to participate. The main effect of ties implies that people with strong ties decided earlier to participate and travelled farther than people with weak ties; the same holds for people with weak ties compared to people with no ties. The main effect of degree of openness of mobilisation channels means that people who were mobilised through closed channels decided earlier. Mobilisation channels did, however, not have an influence on the distance travelled. The interaction of ties and channels means that the two reinforce each other. People who were mobilised through strong ties and closed channels decided to participate much earlier and travelled much farther than people with any ties and mobilised through open channels. Some variance in the dependent variables is

due to the differential impact of mobilisation patterns in the various countries. The significant main effects for a country again signify that factors other than mobilisation patterns are responsible for the variance between the countries.[4]

Table 9.10 Participation decision and distance traveled by ties, mobilisation channel and country: Manova, F-values		
	Participation decision	Distance travelled
Main effect ties	64.97***	11.81***
Main effect mobil. channel	62.75***	1.94^{ns}
Main effect country	27.44***	406.07***
Ties x mob. channel	2.22**	2.30**
Ties x country	1.81**	3.89***
Mob. channel by country	3.90***	4.49***
Ties x mob. channel x country	2.29***	2.05***
R-square	.18	.40

* p<.05; ** p<.01, *** p<.001

In sum, diverging mobilisation patterns did, indeed, generate diverging patterns of participation. Depending on their links to the organisations that staged the demonstration and depending on which channels were employed to mobilise, participants varied in company at the demonstration, how long ago they decided to take part, and how far they traveled. Open channels and weak ties or the absence of ties bring more people to the demonstration on their own or with family and friends. These people decided to attend more recently and traveled less far. Those who came with co-members, who decided longer ago and traveled far, are much more tied into an organisational field that staged the demonstration and are more often mobilised via the organisations.

Differential recruitment

Did such diverging patterns result in differential recruitment, that is to say, were the people who showed up different depending on the mobilisation pattern through which they were recruited. Our answer to this question begins with the distribution of demographics. With regard to gender, age, and education we found main effects of the strength of ties and the openness of channels for all three variables. Male were more often mobilised through ties and open channels than female. As for age, we found a curvilinear relationship: people without ties or with strong ties were older than those with weak ties. Similarly, we found that people mobilised through mass media channels and people who were mobilised through closed channels were older than those mobilised through interpersonal channels. Finally, with regard to education, we did not find any systematic pattern.

Not only demographics such as age or gender were influenced by patterns of mobilisation. In terms of ideology and social and political participation, the various mobilisation patterns resulted in differential recruitment as well. We assessed whether participants differed in terms of involvement in civil society organisations, interest in politics, protest frequency,

[4] The large main effect of 'country' is due to the Italian sample. If we omit Italy, the F-value reduces to 28.24. In this analysis, the remaining F-values barely change.

left-right self-placement and voting behaviour. The results in Table 9.11 are fairly straightforward: main effects of ties and channels on all variables. Follow-up analyses reveal the following: participants with stronger ties are more often involved in civil society organisations, are more interested in politics, have more frequently participated in protest and are more leftist-oriented both in terms of self-placement and past vote. Mobilisation channels have less impact, while the effect is limited. Being mobilised via radio etc., family and friends, or ads etc., did not make a difference. Only mobilisation via organisations had an impact on these social political attitudes and behaviour: participants mobilised this way are more actively involved in civil society organisations and protest, are more interested in politics, and more leftist-oriented. As for the interaction of ties and channels, we found the same pattern for all five variables: the effect of mobilisation channels was the largest among people without ties or with weak or moderate ties. Among people with strong and very strong ties, it did not matter through which channels they were mobilised.

Table 9.11 Left-right self-placement and past voting by ties, mobilisation channel and country: Manova

	Involvement in civil society organisations	Interest in politics	Protest frequency	Left-right self-placement	Past voting
Main effect ties	57.45***	38.09***	73.80***	18.49***	3.23*
Main effect mobil. channel	12.27***	12.52***	41.47***	3.22*	4.63**
Main effect country	59.19***	35.39***	59.25***	24.11***	69.75***
Ties x mob. channel	3.38***	4.22***	1.90*	4.31***	1.94*
Ties x country	4.25***	1.42^{ns}	4.31***	2.47***	3.71***
Mob. channel by country	3.02***	1.05^{ns}	3.50***	1.63*	4.20***
Ties x mob. channel x country	2.29***	2.37***	3.10***	1.58**	1.90***
R-square	.26	.25	.32	.15	.20

* p<.05; ** p<.01, *** p<.001

In a final attempt to allude differences between participants contingent on mobilisation patterns, we discuss the attitudes about the war. Table 9.12 presents the results of a Manova with opposition to war and dissatisfaction with government policy as dependent variables. Net of main effects of country, the table reveals main effects of ties and channels. Participants with ties to movement organisations and/or mobilised through closed channels were more opposed to the war and to their own government's policy regarding the war than participants without such ties or mobilised through open channels.

Overall, the pattern is clear. The organisations that were staging the demonstrations, obviously, were opposed to the war. People who were tied (directly or indirectly) to these organisations and/or were mobilised through closed channels by those organisations were more opposed to the war and their government. This is not to say that others were not opposed to the war in Iraq, but emphasizes that recruitment networks are reproduced in the composition of the body of participants.

Table 9.12 Opposition to war and dissatisfaction w. government policy by ties, mobilisation channel, and country: Manova

	Opposition to war	Diss. w. government policy
Main effect ties	10.44***	20.84***
Main effect mobil. channel	5.09**	6.02***
Main effect country	41.88***	1495.97***
Ties x mob. channel	1.87*	1.21^{ns}
Ties x country	4.38***	2.71***
Mob. channel by country	1.57*	5.68***
Ties x mob. channel x country	1.98***	2.38***
R-square	.13	.74

* p<.05; ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Obviously, mobilisation patterns differed in the eight countries included in our study. In some countries, the demonstrator's ties to organisations that staged the demonstration were much stronger than in other countries; in some countries, people were significantly more mobilised via open channels than in others. Importantly, such differences matter; they resulted in differential recruitment. The various modes of mobilisation brought different people into the streets. People who, depending on how they were mobilised, not only differed in terms of age, gender, and education, but also in terms of political identity, social and political participation. Moreover, someone's company differed contingent upon the mode of mobilisation employed. As a consequence of such differences and because countries varied in terms of mobilisation patterns the configuration of participants in the various demonstration diverged. All this raises, naturally, the question of why mobilisation patterns differ between countries? We will deal with this question in the last section of this chapter.

CAUSES OF MOBILISATION PATTERNS

Mobilisation patterns are not a priori given, nor completely exogenous, but integrated parts of the societal configurations that enable protest events. The aim of this book precisely is to investigate those configurations and to carefully investigate how they have influenced the events of the 15th of February in the eight nations under study. As mobilisation patterns appear to have affected the recruitment of the demonstration, the question arises as to what are the causes of the observed differences in mobilisation patterns. In the introduction to this chapter, we stated that mobilisation is the process that links demand for protest to supply. Protest organisations stage events that offer aggrieved people the opportunity to protest. Mobilisation, we argued, is necessary to bring demand and supply together. It is, so to say, the sales and marketing mechanism of the movement industry. Obviously, mobilisation can only succeed if demand and supply are tuned into each other. For that matter, our study is about mobilisation that successfully managed to match supply and demand. After all, our respondents took part in the demonstration. However, not all these people were mobilised in the same manner. In some countries, mobilisation was more closed than in others. Such differences in mobilisation patterns between countries, we believe, are partly determined by the configuration of demand and supply factors proper to a country and by the extent to which they are in sync.

In terms of demand factors, especially the public opinion in a country vis-à-vis the cause is important. Mobilisation, obviously, is a completely different matter when the majority of the people supports the cause compared to a situation where support is only marginal and goes against the main stream. In the case of a supportive public opinion, dissemination

about the whereabouts of a demonstration suffices to get people to take to the streets. In such a situation, demand for protest is high and people want to vent their anger somehow, so any offer on the protest market will fall on fertile soil. People do not need to be motivated nor do they need help to overcome barriers. Under such circumstances, open patterns of mobilisation can be extremely successful, as the White Marshes in Belgium demonstrate. Indeed, strong ties to movement organisations and en bloc mobilisation of members of organisations are not needed in recruiting participants. Therefore, we expect that in countries where public opinion was prevailingly anti-war, the mobilisation patterns will be more open, that is to say, more frequently employing open channels and less dependent on ties to movement organisations.

Mass media coverage of an issue is related to public opinion. We expect that mobilisation becomes increasingly open the more the mass media sympathize with the cause of a protest campaign. This is due to the mobilizing role of the media themselves. Since media are most effective in spreading the protest message, they contribute to open mobilisation processes. Moreover, media coverage and its tone are associated with public opinion: media might play a part in creating a sentiment among the population and/or they reinforce public opinion. Either way, sympathetic coverage of a protest issue is – we expect - linked to open mobilisation. The same holds for the run-up to the Iraqi war. The more the war is covered, the more the media contest war, and the more they show sympathy for the anti-war protests, the more open the mobilisation will become.

Supply factors refer to the set of organisations staging and supporting protest events and to their number, strength, activity level, history, and action repertoire. In general, we expect closed mobilisation to be more important in countries where the social movement sector is dense. We believe the density of the social movement sector in a country, , accounts for the significance of ties and closed channels in the mobilisation process. Only a limited number of organisations is able to generate massive street mobilisation relying on its own networks. Traditionally, three types of actors belong to this category: labour unions, political parties, and new social movements (including the anti-globalization movement). The anti-war coalition in the various countries differed in scope, composition, and strength of the organisations included and the extent to which these organisations have a track record of being able to organize mass demonstrations. We will use several measures tapping the density and strength of the social movement sector in a country, and employ those in analyses that link density and strength of the movement sector to the openness of the mobilisation process. More specifically, we expect that ties to movement organisations become more important and mobilisation channels become more closed the more the density and strength of the movement sector increases.

Table 9.13 contains simple Pearson correlations between the two dependent variables (openness/closeness and strength of ties) and six independent variables at the country level. The two dependent variables are the average strength of ties and the average openness of mobilisation channels used in each country. The independent variables are: a demand-side factor, namely the degree of opposition to the war in the public opinion, and five supply-side factors, namely activity level of new social movements, union membership, and the level of party membership in a country as indicators of the density of the movement sector; the demonstration culture and strike activity levels in a country serve as indicators of the level of contentiousness of the movement sector in a country[5]. Because the number of cases

[5] The degree of opposition to war in public opinion is based on the EOS Gallup poll on the war carried out in Europe just before February 15th. General activity levels of new social movements in countries is derived from

is very small (N=8), coefficients have to be very high to be significant. Therefore, we have taken a lower threshold than usual.

We found support for our assumption that mobilisation patterns are affected by demand and supply factors, but the evidence is complex. First, not all correlations passed the set significance threshold. Moreover, there appears to be a significant variation in the correlation patterns. Sometimes it is the strength of ties that is predominantly affected, sometimes the mobilisation channels used, and sometimes both. We found, indeed, that mobilisation patterns tend to be more open in countries where the opposition to war was stronger: participants in those countries were more often mobilised via open channels. Furthermore, as expected, the more dense the movement sector was in a country, the more closed were patterns of mobilisation. Interestingly, in the case of new social movement activity, this was reflected in the mobilisation channels used, whereas in the case of union and party membership it reflected more in the significance of strong ties for the mobilisation. Finally, if the movement sector in a country was more contentious, mobilisation for the Iraq demonstration tended to increasingly go via open mobilisation channels.

Table 9.13 The influence of demand and supply factors on mobilisation patterns: Pearson correlations

	Demand	Supply: density movement sector			Supply: contentiousness movement sector	
	Opposition to war in public opinion	New social movement activity	Union membership	Party membership population	Demonstration culture	Strike activity
Strength of ties	.24	-.21	**.48**	.50*	.05	.36
Closeness of mobilisation channels	-.53*	.57*	.33	-.19	-.72**	**-.43**

* p<.20; ** p<.05.
Figures in bold come close to the significance threshold of .20.

In conclusion: mobilisation patterns appear to vary between countries. In some countries, the anti-war protest was characterized by an open pattern of mobilisation, in other countries mobilisation was more closed. As we expected, the process of mobilisation is formed by the configuration of demand and supply factors in a country. At least this is what our findings suggest. The pattern of correlations is complex, however. Demand factors appear to influence what channels are used, but not the significance of ties; some supply factors impact on both indicators of the openness of mobilisation, others on what channels are used or on the importance of ties only. The involvement of citizens in new social movements seems to increase the usage of open channels, but not the significance of ties, while involvement in traditional organisations such as labour unions and political parties seems to

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the European Social Survey (no data on the US nor on Switzerland) asking for participation in an activity of a humanitarian or a environmental/peace organisation during the last 12 months. Figures for general union membership are derived from the World Labour Report 1997-1998 of the International Labour Organisation (www.ilo.org). General demonstration culture in a country is based on the World Values Studies answers on questions about participation in a lawful demonstration. Strike activity levels are based on figures of the ILO taking the yearly average of the absolute number of demonstrations recorded in a country between 1998 and 2003 divided by the population size. General partisan membership in a country is based on Peter Mair and Ingrid Van Biezen, 2001, Party membership in twenty European democracies 1998-2000, Party Politics, 7, 1.

generate the opposite. Level of contentiousness of the movement sector again seem to reinforce the use of open mobilisation channels. Obviously, more systematic research is needed to understand the dynamics of supply, demand, and mobilisation, but this much is clear thus far, in a complicated manner they interact to design protest.

CONCLUSION

We concentrated on patterns of mobilisation in this chapter. We distinguished between more open and closed patterns of mobilisation. Openness and closeness of mobilisation were defined both in terms of the communication channels employed as well as of the prominence of strong ties in the mobilisation campaign. Closed patterns of mobilisation depend more on strong ties and exclusive channels of communication; open patterns of mobilisation do not depend on strong ties or ties at all and employ inclusive channels of communication, such as mass media or interpersonal networks.

We demonstrated that the openness or closeness of a mobilisation campaign affects such aspects of the mobilisation process as the companionship of participants at the demonstration, the point in time when they decided to take part, and the distance they travelled. People who were mobilised in a closed rather than an open manner are accompanied by colleagues or co-members of organisations rather than with family or friends, they decide earlier to take part and travel farther distances. Moreover, open versus closed patterns mobilise diverging participants. This holds for such demographics as gender and age, political attitudes and behavior, and for someone's attitude toward the war. We observed several meaningful differences between channels and ties in their impact on these participant characteristics and discerned some meaningful interactions between the two aspects of openness. As for the effects of the strength of ties, we found that on the whole, participants who were tied to organisations that staged the demonstration were more involved in politics and leaning more towards the left. Interestingly, of the mobilisation channels only movement organisations had the same effect. The other channels did not tap into politically specific populations. Regarding the interaction of ties and channels, it is interesting to see that the effects of channels only exists among participants without ties or weak to moderate ties. Among people with strong ties to movement organisations, mobilisation channels did no longer make a difference. This makes sense, of course, as the effect of channels only holds for organisational channels. Chances are, of course, that people who have strong ties to movement organisations are mobilised through those organisations. For obvious reasons people who were tied to movement organisations that were staging a demonstration or who were mobilised directly through those organisations were more opposed to the war and dissatisfied with their government's policy.

We also demonstrated that countries differ in terms of mobilisation patterns employed and that these differences are related to a variation in the configuration of demand and supply factors in a country. Strong demand seems to reinforce open mobilisation patterns, as does a contentious social movement sector, whereas a dense social movement sector - on the other hand - seems to reinforce closed mobilisation patterns. The evidence from our small sample of countries is far from conclusive, but it does suggests that different configurations of demand and supply generate different mobilisation patterns. This is an important finding and certainly worth pursuing in further research, as it alludes to the dynamic relationship between three key factors in emergence of protest events.