MOBILIZING ISSUES

AND THE UNITY AND DIVERSITY OF PROTEST EVENTS

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Mobilisatie-issues en de Eenheid en Diversiteit van Protest

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Introduction & Research Questions

April 12, 2006. Brussels Central Train Station, rush hour. The arrival hall is the scene of the hectic daily routine of hundreds of people coming and going. Together with a friend, seventeen years old Joe Van Holsbeeck is waiting for another friend to arrive when both are approached by two youngsters, asking them for directions to one of Brussels' main streets. All of a sudden, one of them reaches out forcefully to Joe's MP3-player. Joe refuses to let it go and while standing firm, the other aggressor reacts brutally, stabbing Joe several times in the chest. Joe collapses instantly and dies on the floor of the crowded station hall. Both assailants manage to escape the scene. They will be captured later that month.

Immediately following the events, friends, acquaintances and classmates of Joe calling themselves 'the Friends of Joe' start a petition pursuing the 'right to more safety' and demand 'more dialogue concerning problem youngsters'. When it is handed over to the Belgian prime minister only 3 weeks after the murder, the petition is signed by a quarter of a million citizens. Before that, eleven days after Joe's sudden death, about 80,000 people join together in a silent and 'white', sloganless protest march in the surroundings of the Central Station. The silence of the crowd is deafening. News media report a diversity of people attending the demonstration; youngsters and elderly, couples with children, people from all colors and walks of life.

In that same period of early 2006, Belgian beer giant InBev publicizes an annual profit of over one billion Euros. At the same time, the InBev executive board announces several restructurings which would lead to the loss of 350 fulltime jobs, most of them in Belgium. The two major Belgian labor unions join their forces in obtaining a collective bargaining agreement that applies to the whole of Europe, and decide to set up a demonstration to urge on their demands. They seek and find cooperation from their French and Dutch counterparts, as well as from the European federation of trade unions, and plan a demonstration at the European InBev headquarters in Leuven, Belgium on March 28, 2006. About 2,000 people show up at this demonstration; mostly InBev workers and their families, and several sympathizers; nearly all of them wearing a union jacket. The atmosphere is acquiescent but vibrant with the sounds of whistles and firecrackers giving the pace throughout the entire march.

Unity and Diversity of Protest Events

These are only two examples of protest events taking place about two weeks apart from each other, in the small country of Belgium. And this is probably the most what both events have in common. Without having a clue on many details, both events in fact seem all but the same. One mobilizes about forty times as many people as the other. One is quiet and calm, the other loud and vibrant. One seems to have mobilized a diversity of people, the other seems to be an exhibition of effective union mobilizing efforts. One seems a largely expressive display of solidarity, the other a channel to vent clear-cut demands.

Nonetheless, students of participation treat both as very similar events. When participants of both of these events are surveyed by an interviewer for the European Social Survey or World Values Survey, he or she will tick the 'taken part in a protest demonstration in the last 12 months'-box will, and that is that. The small amount of people who have actually done so will then, for analytical and methodological purposes, all be lumped together to be studied as one dependent variable, which then can hopefully be explained by some very general correlates (or by the strength of several major outliers corrupting the analysis). The two almost random examples above show, however, that protest events do not represent one monolithic truth, nor one empirical reality. Studying them separately within case study designs, then, is not of much use either, since one event is not necessarily akin to another.

And there are many events. Belgium is a true *Demonstration Democracy* (Etzioni 1970). The streets of the Belgian capital city of Brussels alone are a constant platform for social and political claims-making. On average twice a day different groups of people assemble there to engage in protest marches, rallies or gatherings. Sometimes they are a just few dozens of people; at other times hundreds of thousands of people fill the city as human floods of discontent or worry. Altogether, these displays of protest are based on a stunning variety of issues, and involve a diversity of claims and adversaries. With the festive drums of the Togolese community still reverberating, the streets become the still witness of a serene gathering of mothers of soldiers died in battle. Street sweepers clean up pamphlets with union slogans after a march for better working conditions, and similar leaflets with anti-American catchphrases after a demonstration against the ongoing

occupation of Iraq[1]. Every day, new claims are made and different grievances are displayed by different groups of people, very often in very different ways. Protest atmospheres sometimes are very serene; at other occasions they are playful or aggressive. Protest also varies in its colors and sound as well as in the sorrow, grief or discontent that can be read from the participants' faces.

This study is inspired by this witnessing of the broad diversity of protest events, and will assess the role and importance of one of its possible drivers: the issues underlying the different protest demonstrations. It is in this explorative fashion that both claims structuring this dissertation should be understood. These claims are that;

First, the kinds of people that take part in collective action, and especially protest action (who), the motives and motivations which spur them to do so (why), and the ways in which they are mobilized to engage themselves (how), are three dimensions of individual participation which should not be studied as detached and independent variables, but rather as interrelated correlates of protest activism. People's social-economic positions for instance, not only relate to other personal characteristics, but also have an effect on their degree of organizational involvement, and the kinds of motivations they will have to take part in protest action. This is what I refer to as the **unity within** protest events.

And **second**, the logical entwinedness of this *who*, *how* and *why* of individual participation is expected to be thematically structured around the issues that typically motivate and mobilize specific types of individuals. Put otherwise, then, *issues* are the thematic glue that holds together different types of demonstrators. And it is in this way that they are also expected to account for the **diversity between** protest events.

On individuals…

Let me elaborate on these propositions a bit more. The first claim is a very straightforward one: different kinds of people (who?) get involved in collective protest action out of different motives and motivations (why?), and they get to do so in different ways (how?). We already know a great deal about these different aspects of participation. These three questions – who, how, and why - are not new ones, and they have been treated within a

[1] A few examples of actual protest events in Brussels in 2006. Source: police records.

multitude of scientific disciplines. Political participation students have amply shown that, in general, the more resourceful are more likely to participate in political and civic (collective) action than do those citizens that can dispose of fewer resources. More concretely, those citizens who are more affluent, who are higher educated, who have higher-qualified jobs and who are better skilled, are generally more likely to participate in collective action than their counterparts (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Schussman and Soule 2005). Also disposing over more free time, for example because of flexible working conditions or not having children – what sociologists label as being more 'biographically available', makes people more likely to chip in (McAdam 1986: 70).

Beside these more objective measures, general personal and political attitudes play a role too: interest in politics, the degree to which people trust both others and institutions are two example variables enabling to discern participants from non-participants (Verba et al. 1995; Putnam 2000). The same goes for previous involvement in civic or political action: logically, most people who have previous experience are more likely to engage in political action than people who have not (Downton and Wehr 1997, 1998; Klandermans 1997).

We also know a great deal about *how* people come to participate. Both social movement scholars as well as political participation students have taught us that affiliation with organizations or associations that stage collective action is a sound predictor of individual contribution to this action. (McCarthy and Zald 1973; Rosenstone and Hansen 1995; Verba et al. 1995). Yet also in a far less formal setting, interpersonal networks play an important role: being embedded in such networks where participation is more common, and/or where values and beliefs on politics and on specific issues are shared, makes people within these networks more likely to participate themselves (McAdam 1986; McCarthy 1996; Passy and Giugni 2000; Passy 2001; Diani and McAdam 2003; Passy 2003).

Finally, students in sociology and social psychology, and also economists have learnt us a great deal about *why* people participate, although this still might be the most contested and most diversely studied aspect of individual participation in collective action. People can join their forces because they want to change things in society or policy, or want to prevent things from changing (van Stekelenburg 2006) . Yet, they might also take action out of personal interests or benefits that are a function of their participation (Olson 1971). People sometimes take part purely because of the act itself, out of moral indignation, or because they feel connected to the others that participate (Wilson 1973; Verba et al. 1995;

Klandermans 1997), or contrastingly because they were morally or otherwise obliged to because of their position in an organization or network (Wilson 1973).

Still, although we have already learnt a lot about why people come to participate, how they do so, and who these people are, most of these participation theories are grounded in numerous separate studies on the general personal features, the mobilization trajectories or the motivational aspects of participation, often throughout different disciplines. Yet, it takes no great mind to see that the kind of person one is, which socio-economic status one has, and which interests and global attitudes one shares, clearly influences the way one will feel about a specific issue and how one will be motivated for action. And people's social-economic positions and motivations will drive them to specific networks and channels through which they can be mobilized; put otherwise: *different kinds of people* take to the streets out of *different motivations* and through *different mobilization dynamics*. This study aims at a general view on these three dimensions of individual participation.

…and issues

Considering personal features, mobilization patterns and motives and motivations for participating in protest events to be three entwined correlates predicting differential types of participants, intrinsically entails that this difference is due to a discerning variable; some kind of contextual factor. This is where the issues different protest actions deal with, or in other words, different *issues*, are expected to come in. This way, the first claim is elaborated into a second claim, stating that ***different issues are expected to mobilize different kinds of people, in different ways, and out of different motivations***. Obviously a blue-collar worker taking to the streets against corporate restructuring differs from a left-wing intellectual protesting against an upcoming war; they will differ in their degree of schooling and income, maybe also in civic skills and interest in politics; yet they will most likely also differ in the way in which they have been mobilized, through different kinds of organizations and/or networks, and they will surely differ in the kind and strength of their participation motivation.

Bringing the issues into an explanatory model of participation in social and political collective action can significantly enhance our understanding of the subject. In fact, not taking them into account is rather reductionist. By denying its complexity, important issue-

specific aspects of participation are overlooked. The issues that provoke grievances are very likely to be determining to a large degree the ways in which individuals will be motivated to engage in collective action. Issues, grievances and motivations are three entwined core concepts in understanding individual participation. What an issue is all about, relates not only to who will be or feel addressed by the issue, but also the way in, and degree to which people are affected by the issue, and how they will be motivated to take action on this issue. People's personal relevance with, reaction to and dealing with the issue at stake seems an indispensable mechanism in their activation. Additionally, the ways in which issues affect individuals takes an important place in their personal lives, and, depending on the type of issue, makes people more or less prone to talk about these issues with their friends or colleagues, or to engage themselves in more formal organizational settings dealing with these issues.

On the other hand are certain issues, together with the grievances these create and/or appeal to, not only likely to determine the individual motivational dynamics to become active, but these issues, grievances and individual motivations also inspire meso-level movement strategies, thus reinforcing the internal strength of the issue typology. And, in addition, many issues are incorporated by specific types of organizations with specific mobilizing machineries, of which the result should be found on the streets. In this way, studying issue protest also contains a meso-level element of differential issue social movement strength and strategies, even when focusing on the individual level empirically.

This stress on issues, and the link to individuals and grievances entails by no means a plea for turning theory building on collective action fifty years or more back in time, nor for reinstating an atomistic view on collective action participants. What I am arguing for is the mere fact that protest activism is defined in a thematic context, and that these *issue contexts* matter to fully understand protest participation and activism. These assertions are not in conflict with a social view on participation, rather the contrary, as I will further demonstrate below, since it are specific *groups* of people that are appealed to engage in collective action in similar ways, through similar mobilizing mechanisms.

Issues have been given only little attention in the contemporary study of both political participation in general, as well as that of protest participation in specific. And although there has not been any study scrutinizing the differential importance of such issues, some scholars have stressed their importance for a better understanding of political

participation. Jennings and Andersen (2003: 117) for instance argue that contentious issues could be important factors accounting for differential participation:

a richer comprehension of political participation requires more studies of issue-specific activists and the specification of contextual factors that serve to motivate more intensive degrees of participation.

And Henry Brady (1999: 796) makes a case for integrating issues in existing or new models of participation:

Most models of participation emphasize factors affecting the supply of participation. … Little attention is devoted to those factors, typically the political and social context of an individual that create a demand for political participation. These factors include the issues that motivate participation… Most people get involved in politics because they care about some issue, but most models of participation give short shrift to issues.

Clearly, issues matter. Not only are they very likely to influence the 'who', 'why' and 'how' of participation. They also thematically structure these three aspects into a logical typology of participation, which is what I will show throughout the rest of this study. Yet before that, it is important to get more insight in why these both claims that structure this study have received so little attention in previous studies on political, and especially protest participation.

Why these questions are still questions

Two main reasons can be identified for both claims having received so little scholarly attention so far; the first concerning methodological inadequacy, the second pertaining to theoretical and paradigmatic rigidity. I will start with the former reason. Issue importance can only be assessed when these issues are taken into account in the empirical study of participation to begin with, and, when this is the case, the importance of these issues can only be assessed when the empirical investigation has been carried out using the same, comparable and thus comparative method. The lion's share of current knowledge on political and/or civic participation is based on either large-scale population surveys or, on the other hand, on case studies focusing on one or two specific issue mobilizations. This raises several problems. Population surveys, where the sample size of participants in

specific collective action repertoires is usually very low, completely de-contextualize participation: there are no means to assess for which issues people have decided to join their forces. Additionally, the amount of insight such surveys deliver on the mobilization mechanisms of participation, as well as on its individual motivational aspects remain fairly low and mostly inadequate: important motivational variables like individual issue salience, issue-related attitudes, and reasons to participate are all made abstraction of. Furthermore, these surveys suffer from the incapacity to solve the problematic relation between values, attitudes and actual, self-reported (past or future) behavior.

In spite of the irrefutable use and strengths of large-scale population surveys, studying protest participation through the mere use of such surveys does not allow for an integrated study of the who, why, and how of participation, and certainly not for the inclusion of issues into an explanation of protest participation. This is not to say that participation students like Verba et al. (1995) completely ignore the possible importance of issues in their participation models. As one of the very few, these latter authors in fact include a concept of issue engagement in their model, yet they do so in an inverse way. They refer to two examples of issues, among which the abortion issue, speculating on the fact that 'strong views on the issue produce higher levels of political activity', albeit on *all* issues. In social movement terminology, what Verba et al. (1995) thus do is at best describing the issue's *mobilization potential* (Klandermans and Oegema 1987), and not the role and importance of the issue in differential recruitment and the mobilization of different publics. Interestingly enough, Verba et al. do acknowledge this peculiar and important role of issues and issue engagement, as they note in their concluding chapter:

In contrast to the more or less standing decision embodied by the Civic Voluntarism Model, issue engagements constitute a wild card with respect to their impact on participatory stratification. Their consequences for the representation of publics otherwise not well represented through participation are not fixed and stable. It depends upon whom the issue engages. … As issues come and go, they mobilize to politics different issue publics. (Verba et al. 1995: 522)

If large-scale population surveys are not helpful, maybe case study research is. Case study research has delivered more insights on these aspects; they do report on the importance of the issue at stake, and shed more light on mobilization and motivational dynamics. For instance, in Freedom Summer (1988a), one of the most influential studies in protest and

social movement participation, Doug Mc Adam carefully places the movement issue in the context of demography, economy, politics, geography and social movements, which all relate to the individuals' participation features. This is actually quite often the case for case-study investigations on social movements and protest participation; one movement or (series of) protest event(s) is singled out, and the way in which contentious issues are both subject to more general contexts, as well as themselves constructive of specific issue contexts or issue-specific opportunities, is carefully unraveled. Still, the way in which these issues are comparatively connected to specific issue publics, not only concerning their (SES-) features but also their individual motivations and their mobilization trajectories is left implicit. The reason is simple: case studies like these lack comparability and thus generalizability.

The prevalence of single-case study investigations lacking comparable designs to evaluate the role and significance of issues on the one hand, and survey data evidence, effacing issues altogether in their design and lacking useful individual predictors of participation on the other, is one reason why so little is known about the interrelation between individual features, mobilization tracks and motivations and the role of issues therein. A *second reason* could be referred to as theoretical or even paradigmatic reluctance to take issues into account, as these are in essence linked to concepts of grievances and meaning which have historically-grown into pariah concepts in the study of collective action.

In the course of the study of social movements, collective action and protest from the early 20th century towards the 1980ies, the main level of analysis has gradually shifted from that of individuals (collective behavior theories) to the meso- and macro-level of analysis (resource mobilization and political process theories). One of the main reasons for this shift had been an aspiration to rid theories of collective action of the presumed irrationality of its actors and actions. Yet, whilst doing so, concepts of grievances, issues, and in fact the importance of the entire individual level of collective action participants as constituent of this collective action got washed off, and fainted in favor of more mechanistic theories focusing on resources and opportunities as primordial constituents of collective action. Individuals were supposed to act only out of rational calculations involving 'the selection of incentives, cost-reducing mechanisms or structures, and career benefits that lead to collective behavior'(McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1216). This way these theories seem to deny the simple fact 'there are real social problems—oppression, inequality, disruption, brutality—that protestors get angry about; they are not simply

pursuing their own interests' (Jasper 1997: 23). Although, of course, both are not mutually exclusive.

The rise of 'new social movement' theories in the early eighties reintroduced the link between individual-level grievances and macro-level circumstances by 'bringing in culture' in the study of collective action, with a stress on the concerns that drive activists (Williams 2004). Still, with culture being both individual and shared, cultural social movement and protest theorists often seemed confused in assessing which variables are important at which level. As Jasper (1997: 74) states did European cultural theorists describe the psychologies and motivations of collective historical actors, but not that of individuals, leading to the fact that the structuralist and the culturalist vision 'did not exactly add up to a complete picture of protest' (ibid. 72). Thus, the most important contribution of the inclusion of the concept of culture is probably not the intrinsic usefulness of this concept itself, but the fact that it cleared the way to the inclusion of values, norms, morality, cognitions, and ideologies, as well as the choices and emotions embedded in them, as important factors in explaining protest action (Jasper 1997).

Political process theorists have tried to incorporate some of these aspects in their theories, the most prominent example being the framing perspective, yet these theories are still subject to a strong 'movement-centrist preponderance' (Williams 2004: 94 and onward), making the meso-level of analysis the analytical point of departure, also when the individual participation is the focus of study. All this leading to the problem that 'the potential for individual autonomy and choice is largely denied, replaced by a conception of the individuals as acted upon, rather than acting', as' McAdam (2003: 287) writes in a (self-) critique on current process models. Still, during the last decade a surge of literature has renewed attention to these individual-level correlates of participation, and although even these theories sometimes suffer from meso-level biases, they provide useful insights and tools to ground the claims that structure this manuscript, as will be shown throughout.

This study in essence tries to specify the mechanisms that link individuals to participation, just as Verba et al (1995) attempted, by putting the issues people take action for centre stage. It will try to unravel how different types of issues typically mobilize different kinds of people, through different mobilization dynamics and out of different motivations, and how this results in typical issue-intrinsic participation types which are internally consistent (unity) and mutually different (diversity). The object of study in this thesis is protest action,

and the level on which this is studied is on that of (groups of) individuals. This way, we can not only study who participates in protest, why they do so, and how they get to do so, but also how this is all structured logically by the types of issues people take action for. ***Issues***, thus, once more, ***are expected to arrange the unity within protest events as well as the diversity between protest events*** in a typical and logical way.

Diversity in Unity and Diversity

Before proceeding to a next chapter, it is important to stress that this study is not about singling out one sole and encompassing determinant of the unity and alongside diversity of protest events. A miscellany of other factors can be considered to be possible alongside drivers of this unity and diversity. These could very well be affected to a larger or lesser degree by several rather mundane factors, for instance by the predicted size of a protest event, or by the weather conditions during the event. The larger the size of a protest event, one could argue, the more appealing it gets for sympathetic bystanders to become involved, and thus to mobilize those who are more on the fringes of a movement. This way, the internal unity and diversity (toward other demonstrations) might become smaller. Bad weather, on the other hand, could very well have an opposite effect, refraining those same bystanders from taking the participation threshold and thus making the protest event more one of 'usual suspect' activists, resulting in internal unity and external diversity.

Next to these more trivial explananda of protest unity and diversity there are several other factors likely to be determining their occurrence and degree. Some of these are very stable, structural factors, some of which have been thoroughly described in the literature on political opportunity structures (Kitschelt 1988; Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak and Giugni 1995; Tarrow 1998). For instance, the prevailing strategies by which protest (movements) is (are) met by official authorities has strong influence on how protest will be perceived by the public, and consequentially on the amounts and kinds of people participating in it. Extreme levels of protest repression for example will discourage the majority of the mobilization potential to engage in action, resulting in high internal protest unity, and smaller diversity (Kriesi et al. 1995). For moderate and lower levels of repression, things are more ambiguous, as slight or moderate repression can lead to high public visibility through media, and to increased bystander support (see McAdam 1982). General official facilitation of protest groups on the other hand might stimulate these

groups' internal unity and broaden their external diversity, as we would expect such an approach to create more separate and thematically diverse protest groups.

Also, protest cycles or *waves of protest* most certainly influence the unity and diversity of protest events (Tarrow 1998; Freeman and Johnson 1999). Summarizing Tarrow's ideas (1991), such protest cycles are characterized by 'periods of generalized disorder' and of 'heightened conflict across the social system'. At the high-point of such a protest cycle, the magnitude of protest has expanded in general, involving large parts of the social movement sector and spreading throughout most of the national territory. Logically, then, the more a protest cycle is at a high stage, the more protest will attract more protesters of a larger variety onto the streets, making internal protest unity smaller and external diversity larger as compared to more silent protest stages.

Besides, or rather in conjunction with such more general or structural contextual factors, more fluid and transient ones are probably equally important in understanding protest unity and diversity. Most of these transitory contextual elements are more concretely related with the issue at stake, more precisely with the degree to which the issue's mobilizing strength and mobilization potential are influenced in one way or another by amongst others the issue's overall salience and support or opposition in media, public opinion and political authorities; as well as by the composition, strength and nature of the social movements dealing with the issue and of countermovements opposing it.

For example: gays in Western post-industrialized societies have more 'action credit' than those in certain Islamist regimes. Their cultural, political, public opinion, religious,… issue contexts are, of course, dramatically different. Still, within different Western post-industrial societies, where gays engage in all kinds of action to secure the full equality of all kinds of rights, for instance those of same-sex marriages and adoption by same-sex parent couples, we could also expect different 'relational fields' to be involved with the issue. First, the degree to which gays in a certain community have learnt to see themselves as a distinct group with distinct grievances, and the level to which these grievances and previous contentious issues have resulted in an organizational structure determines the way in which gays are able to bundle their actions and to position themselves as a legitimate actor within the political, economic, cultural, media and other fields (Bernstein 2002; Armstrong and Bernstein 2008).

Next to this classic variable of movement strength, many other macro-level issue contexts are of equal importance. The existence and strength of, in this case conservative, counter-movements, the ways in which these find connection with larger political and cultural conceptions on the issue plays an important role too, as is the case with how the issue is situated within the debates between ruling government and opposition, which, to a large degree determines how the issue is handled in different media, and perceived by the larger public, thus also shaping public opinion (Entman 2004) on the issue, which, again shapes the stances taken by political parties, movements, and other actors involved. All these different, issue-related contextual factors are very likely to be drivers of protest unity and diversity too (see, for instance Walgrave and Verhulst 2009).

Wrapping up, the unity and diversity of protest are very likely to have many origins, some more structural, others more volatile. This means that this thesis only deals with one possible driver of this unity and diversity of protest events- once more: the issue protest is staged on- next to these others.

2

A Typology of Mobilizing Issues

Defining Mobilizing Issues

Mobilizing issues are understood as:

> ***subjects, processes or situations*** *that* ***affect particular groups in society*** *and which, through these groups'* ***shared interpretations of these problems and the grievances they evoke,*** *have the* ***potential to mobilize these groups into action.***

Mobilizing issues thus potentially mobilize specific societal groups, but only after these groups have come to a shared understanding of the problems at stake, the grievances these evoke, and the group they are part of. Conceived as such, the definition of mobilizing issues makes very concrete references to the most basic question of this study, the who, why and how of protest participation

In the next few pages the different parts of this definition are laid out in more detail.

1. *Mobilizing issues are* ***subjects, processes or situations*** *that concern particular groups in society and which, through these groups' shared interpretations of these problems and the grievances they evoke, have the potential to mobilize these groups into action.*

By this definition, mobilizing issues can be virtually anything. They can concern very abstract things as subjects, but also very concrete situations. They can cover more fundamental, deep-rooted ideological issues as well as more banal, everyday concerns. And, they can themselves be, be situated in, or be the result of long-term social, political or other relevant societal processes, or they can be ad-hoc and short-lived. Some mobilizing issues have developed from issues rooted in longer-term conflictual processes and/or unremitting circumstances or situations. To name but a few: separatist issues, issues related to structural strain (Smelser 1969), relative deprivation (Gurr 1969; Piven and Cloward 1977) and other socio-economic inequalities, and issues grounded in ethno-cultural conflicts like migration are typically issues reflecting such relatively longer-term processes and situations. Yet sometimes, issues are not ingrained within such processes

and situations, and are for a larger part dependent on other things, like real-world events fostering the attention for the issues, or successful social movement frame alignment efforts[2], to develop into mobilizing issues. In extreme cases of the genesis of this type of mobilizing issues, the distinction between the issue and the mobilizing issue is de facto non-existent, as the birth of the one coincides with that of the other, as will be shown in the next part.

To fully understand this amalgam of possible mobilizing issues, however, we need to get into all other facets of the definition. Of crucial importance is the understanding of how and why some issues are transformed into mobilizing issues and so many others are not. The reasons for this will become clear in the next few paragraphs.

2. *Mobilizing issues are subjects, processes or situations that **concern particular groups in society** and which, through these groups' shared interpretations of these problems and the grievances they evoke, have the potential to mobilize these groups into action.*

As issues can be of practically all kinds, and can concern both very concrete and visible real-life problems as well as more fundamental, ideological themes, they can also have bearing on all kinds of societal factions; some very broad and unspecific, and others more well-defined social, societal or socio-economic groups like production line workers, cattle breeders or gays. Some issues can also affect an entire population, when they e.g. concern government fraud, international affairs, or global warming.

Though evident, this aspect of the specificity of the groups concerned with the issue at stake is also a highly important one, as these groups form the mobilization pool when protest is actually being staged. It is exactly the degree of unity of the group aggrieved by a certain theme, process or situation which could allow for assessing the diversity between this and other groups aggrieved by different subjects, processes or situations. And, the unity of these groups is essentially a function of these subjects, processes or situations:

[2] Frame alignment efforts are "deliberate attempts to influence beliefs" (Klandermans 1992: 89) which pursue the "the linkage of individual and social movement organization (SMO) interpretative orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals and ideology are congruent and complementary" (Snow et al. 1986: 464).

very often there is a specific social-structural and/or ideational link between the aggrieved groups and the grounds of the issue (and in those cases where this is not the case, it is likely to be a specific feature of the mobilizing issue). Specific groups thus are likely to be(come) concerned and involved with specific issues that thematically relate to their social-structural embeddings and day-to-day life experiences.

Yet this thematic relation between specific issues and specific groups does not entail that be(com)ing concerned with an issue is necessarily associated to potentially benefiting from action on the issue. For different issues, the groups of those potentially benefiting from action on the issue -the *issue beneficiaries*- and those effectively actively engaging on the issue -the *issue constituency*- (for a similar statement see McCarthy and Zald 1977) relate to one another in different ways. Sometimes issue beneficiaries and constituency are one and the same, at other times both exist separately, and in many cases, both groups overlap to some extent. This distinction is important, and will, next to the thematic dimension, be dealt with as a secondary dimension in the typology of mobilizing issues which is presented in the next chapter.

Finally, the relevance of the concerned group is not only vital to understand the thematic and (non-)beneficiary linkage between issues and those engaging in action for them. Issues, reversely, will only become mobilizing issues under some very specific conditions, in which these groups are able to identify themselves as specific collectives with specific collective identities and in-group solidarities. For instance, the mere being the subject of a same injustice, or finding oneself in similar, unwanted situations is likely to make it easier to define the group one is a member of, and thus to be able to consider one's own sorrows as sorrows that are shared by others. Contrarily, the more diffuse an issue is, the more diffuse the social base concerned with the issue is likely to be. In such cases the 'identity work' (Reger, Myers and Einwohner 2008) by and within social movements agents is likely to be much more important in the creation of mobilizing issues. This is what the next part of the definition is exactly all about.

3. *Mobilizing issues are subjects, processes or situations that concern particular groups in society and which, through these* ***groups' shared interpretations of these problems and the grievances they evoke****, have the potential to mobilize these groups into action.*

Mobilizing issues are issues that evoke grievances. They, in one way or another, and in varying degrees, need to stir up some kind of contestation and/or disturbance for this qualitative shift to occur. Not only does this entail that 'there are real social problems' (Jasper 1997; see also above) people are confronted or concerned with in their lives, but also that these problems are saliently laden with discontent or worry - in more scholarly terms: grievances - and, related, that they are the object of a demand for change or at least a need for the expression of this disgruntlement or agony. Grievances must be transformed into claims. And for grievances to become claims, they essentially need to be acknowledged as shared and changeable.

The evolution from issues to mobilizing issues is very much alike to the way in which social phenomena evolve into *social problems*. These social, societal, political or other phenomena grow to be social problems only when they are perceived and collectively defined as such; in simple terms: a problem is only a problem when many recognize and define it as a problem (Blumer [1971] 1994: 51). According to Blumer:

*social problems are fundamentally products of a process of collective definition instead of existing independently as a set of objective social arrangements with an intrinsic make-up. … In short, the process of collective definition determines the career and fate of social problems, from the initial point of their appearance to whatever may be the terminal point in their course (*ibid: 51-53).

The role of grievances for issues to evolve into mobilizing issues is twofold; some kind of objective, empirically definable, 'real problem' on the one hand, and the socially and collectively construed definition of these grievances on the other. As Snow (2004: 383) asserts, it is indeed essential to take into account 'the extent to which material conditions like economic deprivation or unemployment are themselves subject to differential interpretations and therefore do not automatically constitute or generate mobilizing grievances'. For collective mobilization on issues of any kind, it is crucial that those issues which 'are ordinarily perceived as just and immutable must come to seem both unjust and

mutable' as Piven and Cloward (1977: 12) noted in their study on the poor people's movement. Turner (1969: 391) analogously refers to misfortunes that have to be perceived as injustices (Snow 2004: 382) to turn issues into mobilizing issues. Although grievances can be more elaborate than, or different from merely injustice feelings, the mechanism is the same. Collective action will not occur when several individuals have identical personal worries or troubles; their personal worries need to be transformed into shared, collective grievances. Piven and Cloward (1977) have described the involvement process of individuals from bystander to participants as a process of 'cognitive liberation' (named as such by McAdam in 1982) which consists of three stages:

First, the system, or those aspects of the system that people experience and perceive, loses legitimacy. In conjunction, large groups of people begin to believe that these rules are unjust and wrong. Second, those who normally believe their situation is a result of fate, begin to make a demand for change. Third, people who normally consider themselves to be helpless come to believe that they have some capacity to alter their lot. (Piven and Cloward 1977: 3)

This way, cognitive liberation is what makes individual, 'day-to-day' sorrows into shared, collective and salient grievances. First, a situation should be perceived as being unfair, unjust, or just 'not right' by a considerable group of people. This is the moment when people realize e.g. that they have been subjugated, lied at, suppressed; when they perceive specific societal situations or processes as wrong; or when there is significant future menace of one of both. Next, this awareness is transformed into a demand for change, which, finally, together with the awareness that people are able to take their lot into their own hands, makes them predisposed to become mobilized on the issue.

4. *Mobilizing issues are subjects, processes or situations that concern particular groups in society and which, through these groups' shared interpretations of these problems and the grievances they evoke,* ***have the potential to mobilize these groups into action***.

Some collective grievances will eventuate into collective action, and others will not. Some will do so in a successful manner, and other attempts to do so will fail. And many times, the issue will be dealt with in other (political) arenas and never make it to the streets. The

potential success or failure of issues to effectively become transformed into mobilizing issues entirely depends on the dynamics as described in the previous paragraphs: on the kind and degree of grievances provoked by the issues and the alignment of specificity of the issue constituency and the strength of group identification. Nonetheless, why some issues become effectively mobilized upon, and others not, is also dependent on many other factors, like the relative degree of issue salience; the degree of organizational incorporation of the issue; but also issue-related protest cycles, (issue-specific) opportunities, and so on (see respectively Verhulst and Walgrave 2009 and 2010 and Walgrave and Verhulst 2009). Still -this is an important note- the object of this study is *not* to discern between those who are and those who are not activated into protest on a same issue, but to differentiate between those involved on a variety of different issues.

Mobilizing Issues and the Individual Dimensions of Protest

Clearly, the definition of mobilizing issues, one could say the main independent variable of this study, contains all three dimensions of individual participation, which together constitute the main dependent variable of this study, namely differential participation. Yet as argued, this relation between mobilizing issues and individual participation is not a clear one-way causal track. On the one hand, specific mobilizing issues are expected to typically appeal to, target, and mobilize particular societal groups in specific ways and out of specific motivations. On the other hand are these groups themselves essential in the successful development of mobilizing issues. First of all: no people, no collective action. Specific groups need to be concerned with an issue before it can be the object of protest. Also, without a significant amount of persons perceiving themselves as part of an empowered group that can make a change, collective action is also very unlikely to occur. And, finally, without being connected to these others or to groups, networks or organizations representing them, collective action is, once more, not very likely to happen.

Quite evidently, mobilizing issues fully tap into the ‘who’, ‘why’, and ‘how’ of protest participation (see Figure 1). All mobilizing issues depend on the same building blocks, but these building blocks fundamentally vary between issues. This way, different mobilizing issues come to being on different grounds, and vice-versa mobilize different people, in different ways, and for different reasons to the streets. All mobilizing issues concern specific societal groups (the ‘who’ of protest) that are subject to a same injustice, worry or daily displeasure. Yet it are exactly different societal groups who are confronted with

different kinds of worries, injustices and discontents. These then put specific burdens on these different groups, which inspire them to action on different grounds (the 'why' of protest). Also, the fact whether an issue directly affects people's daily lives, or whether it is more remote and thus perhaps more likely to be a matter of principles or values, determines to a large degree these groups' motivations for collective action participation. In both cases, the fact that the problem is acknowledged by these people as burdening *and* changeable is a prerequisite for the development of mobilizing issues and eventual collective action. Still, this is also dependent both on the proximity of the issue, as well as on the kind of societal group concerned with the issue; some of which are more likely to have more relevant personal networks and/or organizational affiliations than others; and some of them for instance being much more conditional to mass media issue coverage to become involved on an issue (the 'how' of protest).

FIGURE 1: THE RELATION BETWEEN THE DEFINITION OF MOBILIZING ISSUES AND THE 'WHO', 'WHY' AND 'HOW' OF PROTEST



To conclude: mobilizing issues exist by virtue of the groups they concern; these groups will become active in protest when a mobilizing issue is 'available' and appealing (or disturbing). In the next chapter we will get into the diversifying aspect of issues, by construction a two-dimensional typology of mobilizing issues. First, a thematic dimension is laid out, allowing discerning between issues based on their intrinsic content. Secondly, a dimension of 'issue scope' or 'issue dimension' is put forward, incorporating the distinction between issues attracting people with varying stakes in possible issue action outcomes. Finally, these two dimensions are assessed together in a two-dimensional issue typology. This two-dimensional issue typology is, as will be shown, very closely connected to the definition of mobilizing issues, thus also making them logically related to this study's main research questions on the who-why-how of protest participation.

Mobilizing Issues: A Typology

Getting grips on complex phenomena like 'issues' is a tough job. They are innumerous and omnipresent, and can concern all aspects of human life. Still, since mobilizing issues are expected to be at least one important indicator of the *who*, *why* and *how* of collective action and protest participation, it is essential to get some structure into this endless myriad by creating a conceptual typology of mobilizing issues. The fact that collective action can be structured around different mobilizing issues inevitably entails that different issues are…very different. Constructing a typology of mobilizing issues is far from easy, which might, apart from methodological difficulties, be another indicator for their absence in most collective action and protest theories. Still, several scholars, mostly in the field of political science, have theorized on issues and how they shape the political landscape. Their works are a good starting point for the set-up of a typology of mobilizing issues.

Following Elman (2005), building on early pioneering work of Lazarsfeld (1937) and Lazarsfeld and Barton (1951) an explanatory typology has a descriptive, classificatory and eventually explanatory function. It starts with shortly describing preexisting theory into a number of categories (the 'rows and columns' of a typology). After having constructed a parsimonious descriptive typology, this serves for the classification of the cases under study within the cells produced by the typology's rows and columns. Finally, 'the dimension of the property space (its rows and columns) reflect alternative values of the theory's independent variables, so each cell in the space is associated with predicted values of the theory's intervening or dependent variables' (Elman 2005: 296). This is what I will do throughout the remaining of this chapter. First, I will construct a two-dimensional typology of mobilizing issues, based on existing, though thematically somewhat remote theory. Next, I will confront this descriptive typology with the empirical cases under study. Finally, I will use the theoretical typology to theorize on how the different types (or cells) explain (or influence) my dependent variables.

A Thematic Dimension of Mobilizing Issues: Conflictual and Consensual Issues

One of the most obvious, uncomplicated and well-known issue typologies is the one distinguishing between consensual issues (or valence issues or style issues) on the one hand, and conflictual issues (or position issues) on the other (Stokes 1963; Easton 1965; Butler and Stokes 1971; Hayes 2005). Originally devised as a theoretical concept in party and voting theories[3] (Stokes 1963; Sartori [1975] 2005), which up until then focused primarily on conflictual issues with clear antagonistic characteristics, consensual (or valence) issues are defined as those issues 'on which parties or leaders are differentiated not by what they advocate but the degree to which they are linked to the public's mind with conditions or goals or symbols of which almost everyone approves or disapproves' (Stokes 1992: 143).

Take, for instance, the issue of corruption. In this example parties do not position themselves on a dimension ranging from very dishonest to very honest, but rather are dependent on how they are associated in the mind of the public with the valued symbolic good of honesty (or of course the unvalued dishonesty). In other words, valence issues are issues which find broad societal consensus, and some parties are more believed to be best placed to address these issues than others (Sartori [1975] 2005: 292); if so these are able to successfully claim the issue ownership of the issue involved (Petrocik 1996). Contrarily, position or conflict issues are issues provoking 'alternative and highly conflictual responses' (Nelson 1984:27).

In the late 1980's, John Lofland (1989) introduced the concept of consensus movements in the study of collective action. Similar to Stokes' views, Lofland recognized that not all collective action is in essence conflictual, and that some forms of collective action are occupied by consensus movements. Such movements, then, are 'instances of collective action conducted by networks of actors who share solidarity and an interpretation of the world, enabling them to link specific acts and events in a longer time perspective, but who do not identify specific social actors as responsible for the deprivation or threats they are fighting' (Diani 2003: 4). Such a view on consensus movements corresponds to that of

[3] Stokes' main critique on economist, 'Downsian' theories on electoral politics (Downs 1957) concerned its *spatial model*, assuming that parties were to be placed on one single conservatism - liberalism dimension. Stokes asserted that there are several 'dimensions of attitudes' toward issues which can be independent and in fact inconsistent from one another (Sartori [1975] 2005: 294).

Hayes (1978, 1981) and other political theorists, which would depict consensus movements as movements occupying issues characterized by a 'consensual demand pattern', meaning that they are typically mobilized upon on only one side of an issue. Yet both views lack one important dimension and this is the essence of the issues themselves. In both cases, the consensual or valence nature of an issue is considered an extrinsic feature of the issue, which depends on either the strategies adopted by the actors concerned with the issue, or by the absence of existing countermovements or other organized antagonists. In fact Diani's view on consensus movements, which are typically refraining from identifying clear targets, makes 'speaking of 'social movements' … more confusing than illuminating' (Diani 2003: 5). In this fashion, Diani's definition seems more fit for describing 'non-movements' (Kurzman 2008) rather than consensus movements.

To avoid such one-dimensional and issue-extrinsic conceptualization, we should also incorporate Stokes' second argument (Stokes 1992), which is in collective action studies more or less represented by McCarthy and Wolfson's (1992) views. They assert that, apart from the fact that they face little or no organized opposition from the population of a geographic community, consensual issues are dealing with change which finds widespread support approaching total consensus - they somewhat arbitrarily put the cut-off point somewhere at 90 percent - in the population of this community. They are thus, in the literal sense, unconflictual. A consensus or valence issue is per definition 'overwhelmingly effective at neutralizing any other definitions of the situation because of the credibility and legitimate messages it evokes' (Tzoumis 2007: 26). They have an aura of untouchableness, and are to a large degree self-evident. In contemporary Western societies, the right to feel safe, the right for children to grow up peacefully, or the right for all to enjoy basic education are typical examples of such consensus issues.

Even so, in spite of the fact that they are neither the basis nor the object of any political, societal or any other conflict, such consensus issues can be transformed into mobilizing issues. And when this transformation occurs, their mobilizing force can be immense. Still, such a conversion is rare and will only occur when the for grantedness of consensus issues gets a sudden breach, most often resulting from a sudden, unforeseen, and intrusive focusing event. Birkland defines such a focusing events as 'an event that is sudden; relatively uncommon; can be reasonably defined as harmful or revealing the possibility of potentially greater future harms; has harms that are concentrated in a particular geographical area or community of interest; and that is known to policy makers and the

public simultaneously' (Birkland 1998: 54). When such a focusing event breaches the day-to-day self-evidence concerning the issue, this can result in 'suddenly imposed grievances' (Walsh 1981) and 'moral shocks' (Jasper 1997), which run trough society through fly-wheel mechanisms by the interplay between high media-outputs and a concerned public opinion. In a different terminology borrowed from policy agenda-setting theories, the 'stable equilibrium' which is the normal function of consensus issues can suddenly be disrupted by an abrupt 'punctuation', which, in this case, are 'precipitated by a mighty blow, an event that simply cannot be ignored' (True, Jones and Baumgartner 1999: 160), and which are reinforced by the entwined attention for the event by media and public opinion (ibid: 165).

Very often, consensual issues have their consensual states for a long time already, and they concern latent, unnoticed and unpronounced certainties. When a sudden event wipes out these certainties, it will most often be 'the system' held accountable for this event. Yet, not always. Where in some cases of e.g. random violence resulting in the deaths of innocent people, the government is regarded as the main culprit for allowing such system failure and/or as the main responsible for the prevention of future, similar events; at other times the focus of guilt by media as well as public opinion is aimed entirely on the individual perpetrator. At still other times, no public debate about guilt and retribution will take place. There is however no clear natural law which makes events turn consensual issues into mobilizing issues. Yet at times, they do, and when do so, they have the potential to mobilize massively.

The previous in mind, consensual issues can be defined as:

Mobilizing issues that are supported by a large majority of a community's population reaching total consensus; triggered by an external event; and confronted by no or little organized opposition.

In contrast with consensual issues, conflictual issues are the stake of one or more groups active on both sides of the issue (Hayes 1981). This does not mean that both sides should be (equally) actively mobilized upon, though, as conflictual movements confront 'organized opposition in attempting to change the social structure, prevailing fundamental policies, and/or the balance of power among groups' (Schwartz and Paul 1992: 206). This definition, highlighting changing the social structure, fundamental policy or power

balances, tells us a lot about the thematic nature of these issues: these are issues dealing with contested societal change. Aarts (2007: 102) summarizes this thematic dimension when stating that position issues are 'problems that can be assimilated by the dominant ideological dimensions of politics'. Although in this sense many conflictual issues are incorporated and even assimilated by party politics, these dominant ideological political dimensions, which are the thematic foundations of political cleavages, also reflect the major thematic variations in street politics (Kriesi et al. 1995). This way, conflictual issues are:

Mobilizing issues that originate within the dominant political cleavages, and which are aiming at change in social structure, dominant policies or power balances.

This broad definition needs further clarification. First, the 'groups being active on both sides of the issue' from Hayes' typology do not simply refer to movements and countermovements (or collective actions and counteractions), but can also concern the contestation of prevailing societal and/or political constellations, which are more or less structural, and thus are considered as structural opposition. McCarthy and Wolfson (1992: 273) refer to the labor movement, poor people's movements, feminist and civil rights movements as typical movements dealing with conflictual issues, and some of these have to face the actions of strong countermovements or -organizations whereas others do not.

Second, and related, whereas consensual issues are typically agreed on by large majorities of the population of a given community, conflictual issues are most often typically supported by minorities or slim majorities (ibid.). This is, again, strongly related to the third major point, namely that conflictual issues are embedded within existing societal divisions, which are typically representing distinguished societal groups in different multi-organizational fields. The interpretation of conflictual issues as being embedded in dominant societal and political cleavages is essential to fully grasp their thematic substance, and this will be the object of attention in the next section.

Conflictual Issues and Cleavage Theory

In their seminal 1967 study, Lipset and Rokkan introduced the concept of cleavage in the field of political science, and more particular in party and voters' theories. Although the content of their theories has been contested and has evolved over time according to

societal evolutions (Norris 2002), the conceptual grounds of their work are still highly relevant in current theories on parties and voting. And although cleavage theories are mostly applied exactly to explain party formation and voter alignment (as well as de- and realignment), their potential value in theories of less conventional forms of collective action has been signaled by a small number of scholars in more structural explanations of the genesis and development of social movements (Giugni, McAdam and Tilly 1998; Klandermans 2001: 271). This has less been the case, however, in the study of collective action *events*, and the relation between *issues and participation*, which is the object of study here.

In the most comprehensive explanation, cleavages are distinct phenomena that are not just to be equated to political, ideological or social 'divisions', but in essence make out the combination of those, thereby thematically bridging such different divisions (Bartolini 2004: 2). In the most encompassing contemporary definition, cleavages then are said to essentially contain:

*an **empirical element**, which identifies the empirical referent of the concept, and which we can define in social-structural terms; a **normative element**, that is the set of values and beliefs which provides a sense of identity and role to the empirical element, and which reflect the self-consciousness of the social group(s) involved; and an **organizational/behavioral element,** that is the set of individual interactions, institutions, and organizations, such as political parties, which develop as part of the cleavage* (Bartolini and Mair 1990: 215 – emphasis not original)

When all of these three cleavage elements are present, there is a full cleavage (Deegan-Krause 2007: 540), which is in fact the only accurate way to use the term according to Bartolini and Mair (1990) and Bartolini (2004)[4]. Clearly, the cleavage concept, transposed

[4] In spite of, and possibly also due to the theoretical rigor practiced by several cleavage theorists, the 'full' cleavage concept is one that has been theoretically challenged continuously during the last three decades. Apart from the introduction of new, rivaling thematic cleavage dimensions (see below) and critiques on the historical macro-level aspect of the cleavage theory and on its structural-functionalist foundations, which are both not to be discussed in full here, (but see Stubager 2003) the main critiques on the cleavage theory rest on the lack of a clear view on the empirical, socio-structural dimension of cleavages, and by extension on the explicit need for a rigid tripod typology.

to the study of collective action can be a useful tool to get more understanding in the way in which the 'who'-the empirical element, 'why'-the normative element and 'how'-the organizational/behavioral element of participation can be studied, and how these three aspects relate to one another. Furthermore, it also relates as such to the definition of mobilizing issues; coupling real-life problems or situations to those specific societal groups who are concerned with them.

Hauling out these theories of cleavages and divides from theories of voting and party formation and transposing them onto the study of collective action can prove very useful. First, the full concept of cleavage can easily be transposed onto the study of collective action. Assuming that cleavages should, once again, entail: '(a) self-conscious demographic groups; (b) sharing a common mindset; and (c) a distinct political organization' (Deegan-Krause 2006: 539), they are in fact text book descriptions of how both social movements as well as collective action work: through the representative and mobilizing capacity of more or less established organizations and networks of groups and organizations can distinguished social groups (for instance carpet weavers, bartenders, lesbians or Tibetan monks) who share a vision on the world on issues intruding their personal lives and who are aware of the collectivity of their situation, join their forces for or against change (see e.g. della Porta and Diani 1999: 16; Rucht 1996: 185).

In this manner, the source of the conflictual issues are empirically retraceable to specific social groupings, who, because of this empirical reality share the same grievances, and join their forces through (networks) of organizations who were exactly born out of these grievances, based on solidary feelings and collective awareness. Factory employees, sharing strong redistributive sentiments, engaging in collective action via their affiliation in well-organized labor unions, can be key examples of 'full cleavage collective action'. In these cases, if a conflictual issue is positioned within such a specific cleavage, theorizing on the relation between issues and individual participants' features, motives and mobilization trajectories is quite evident, as the very concept of cleavage already incorporates assumptions on the 'who', 'why' and 'how' of participation.

Sometimes however, one cleavage aspect is only latently present. These cases of 'partial cleavages' (Stubager 2003) are however equally useful in analyzing collective action. First, 'non-institutional cleavages' (ibid.), lacking an organizational/behavioral element, concern specific societal groups with shared attitudes based on grievances rooted in their specific

and common social positioning, but who lack the organizational capacity or capability to get their grievances mobilized into (collective) action. Such cleavages then are the equivalent of conditions of structural strain (Merton 1938; Cloward and Ohlin 1960) which provide fertile breeding ground for collective action (Smelser 1969). Still, similar to the cleavage reasoning, resource mobilization theorists, reacting against amongst other things the implausible relation between macro-level strain and micro-level action, have amply shown (McCarthy and Zald 1977; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996) that such breeding grounds remain fallow land unless they are recognized and mobilized upon by sufficiently strong organizations that broaden the scope of their initial concerns and thus occupy a social-entrepreneurial movement role. In other words, other already organized groups can 'discover' the societal divide and the conflictual issues this divide encompasses, and help in getting it mobilized. Sometimes however, though rarely on a large scale, protests can originate from shared grievances without the initial help of organizations mobilizing for it, whereby affective ties and informal networks socialize people into an ideological commitment which, through processes of 'collective empowerment' and 'bandwagon effects' can lead to collective action (Hirsch 1990; Useem 1998; Passy 2001). The role and import of such informal and non-institutionalized but strong networks in the development of collective action has been amply shown in many contemporary research (Diani and McAdam 2003; Diani 2009). All this means that non-institutional cleavages are not necessarily dead-born when it comes to collective action, and that external influences and latent network formations can mobilize these cleavages, or at least some conflictual issues proper to these cleavages, into action.

Finally, value divides, the second partial cleavage put forward by Stubager (2003), in which people involved in a conflict are not so based on a readily-identifiable shared social-economical reality, are equally suitable for explaining collective action as for voting and party affiliations. In the study of political science the importance people attach to issues has been increasingly studied and has shown to be a central element for people to make their vote choices. In conjunction with the gradual party dealignment of voters and their ballots, the importance of personal issue salience as a voting motive is on the rise. Parties that 'own' an issue, in other words those parties that are perceived to offer the best solution to address the issue salient to a voter, will have most chance to get voted for by this voter (Petrocik 1996). In other words: 'as people identify less with parties and since their ideological links with parties are withering, they increasingly rely on issues as electoral beacons' (Walgrave and De Swert 2007). In the study of collective action, issues,

embedded within specific issue divides might be the same thematic glue that holds together specific organizations' members, or even more diffuse protest milieus, rather than some structural, shared and empirically measurable situation. Such an empirical reality is however very likely to exist, even in a structural way, but it is more latent and less obviously retraceable to very distinct societal groups.

Essentially, the concept of (both full and partial) cleavage can be a valuable tool to understand collective action participation, and how this is related to conflictual issues. In this study, the cleavage concept will thus be used as a theoretical instrument specifically aimed at explaining this specific relation, and thus the scope of its use will be considerably smaller.

Conflictual Issues and the Content of Cleavages

Cleavages, as a combination of structure, values, as well as behavior -or as a combination of two of these elements- are not only the common thematic grounds of political participation in general, but also of protest participation in particular. In fact, as Bornschier (2007: 14) argues, Bartolini and Mair's definition even seems 'much more adequate to analyze the conditions for the initial mobilization of cleavages than for answering the question to which degree historical cleavages structure politics today'. This then also entails that collective action can be regarded as the organizational element of cleavages themselves. As Bornschier (2007: 8) puts forward does the social structure of a cleavage imply a structural potential; when this structural potential becomes pervaded by a sense of shared identities it can transform into a collective action potential (see also Klandermans 1997) which, through several mobilizing mechanisms might result in political (collective) action. In fact, in a refinement of this argument Bornschier (2009) specifically argues that:

> *[Bartolini and Mair's] definition, emphasizing the social structure-collective identity-organization linkage, seems adequate primarily to analyze the initial mobilization of cleavages, since it corresponds to a mobilization sequence put in evidence by social movement research…: common interests fail to result in political mobilization by themselves. In the absence of a collective identity, individuals will not overcome the free-rider problem and thus not act together politically.*

As said, cleavages constitute the more stable common ground of various conflictual issues. Many of such different issues can fit within one same cleavage, if they all affect or concern the same more or less clearly defined empirical group, in which similar values and identities are shared, and which forms the potential constituency of action on these issues. Two essential questions thus remain: which main thematic cleavages are currently important for collective action (participation)? And, which kinds of conflictual issues then fit these cleavages, and in which ways? As Bornschier indicates above, the solution to this puzzle lies in the integration of insights of social movement theory and the more recent cleavage theory.

Conflictual Issues and the Content of Cleavages: Old and New Social Movements

Any scholar familiar with social movement theory knows that clues to do so can be found in the most obvious and most established social movement typology, being that of 'old' versus 'new' social movements (Melucci 1980). Although this distinction has been criticized by many, mostly because of the dubious 'newness' of new social movements which even made the introducer of the term to be repentant for having done so (Melucci 1996), its theoretical straightforwardness and empirical parsimoniousness makes it a social movement study evergreen.

The introduction of the concept of 'new' social movements (NSM) versus 'old' ones (OSM) has many reasons and dimensions. New social movements were said to be new for a variety of reasons, and neither traditional collective behavior theories (portraying collective action as 'actors without actions', nor resource mobilization theories (describing collective action as 'actions without actors' were able to grasp them theoretically (Melucci 1989: 17-20). The emergence of new movements thus asked for new theoretical tools to understand them. What was it then that made them different from the 'old' movements that predated the 1960-s surge of new movements?

Predominantly European theorists wanted to be able to theoretically capture the newness of the movements that emerged in the 1960's and onwards—students', women, environmental and peace movements (Klandermans and Tarrow 1988: 18-23; Melucci 1988). This newness was reflected in these movements by their weaker organizational structures, new mobilization patterns and new grievances (Johnston, Laraña and Gusfield

1994: 6-8; Buechler 2000: 45-48). NSM's differ from old ones concerning 'the *content* of movement ideology, the *concerns* motivating activists, and the *arena* in which collective action was focused—that is, cultural understandings, norms and identities rather than material interests and economic distribution' (Williams 2004: 92).

Next to new social movements and issues, Kriesi (2004: 73) refers to old issues as being situated on traditional social and cultural cleavages, like religious and above all class conflicts. On a political level, old and new issues generally occupy respectively high and low policy domains, the first involving more power and money, and more electoral importance than the latter (Duyvendak and Giugni 1995). Notwithstanding a trend of reluctance in using the old versus new social movement dichotomy, the distinction remains a standard in the study of social movements and has produced many useful insights.

Yet, the fact that often, new social movements are said to focus on cultural and symbolic issues linked with issues of identity, whereas old social movements are only pursuing material interest (Johnston, Laraña and Gusfield 1994: 6-8: Buechler 2000: 45-8), is rather outdated. When institutional authorities are being challenged, this challenge and the grievances from which they originate are not 'just' material, but also cultural and moral, since all institutional authorities are to be understood 'also as producer of systems of meaning' (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008: 91). Tilly (2004) pushes the argument a bit further when stating that as a result of this '[t]he distinction between "identity" and "interests" movements dissolves'. Furthermore, the cleavage concept shows that collective identity, and common shared understanding and solidarities are indispensable for any kind of mobilization. Moral and cultural challenges in turn are also dependent on material and institutional conditions, and a change in morality or cultural beliefs inevitably leads to an alongside change in the institutions, which can range from day-to-day practices to drastic reforms (see for instance how Rosa Parks' single action was an important trigger to eventually lead to the abolishment of institutionalized segregation in the US). And, finally, the fact that some of the 'new' movements have in fact very long-lasting historical roots - as is the case with for instance the women's and peace movement - makes the distinction practically difficult (Haferkamp and Smelser 1992).

The issues new social movements occupy to be dealing with are said to be civic issues in the spheres of culture, lifestyles and identity, with personal and intimate aspects of social

life (like e.g. abortion and gays) and with other postmaterialist concerns like peace and anti-war, environment, and anti-racism to name a few (Buechler 2000). Various NSM theories inherently, though not always explicitly (Buechler 1995, 2000), relate the newness of these movements in one way or another to a reaction to, and (thus) originating in, postmodern or postindustrial societies. The evolution from industrial to postindustrial societies produced new class cleavages and alongside grievances (Touraine 1985; Klandermans and Tarrow 1988; Kriesi 1989), which are for a large part rooted in post-materialist values (Dalton and Kuechler 1990; Inglehart 1990) and left-libertarian ideologies (della Porta and Rucht 1995). Old class consciousness has gradually been replaced (according to some), or supplemented by (according to others) new ones, based on these new values and ideologies (Parkin 1968; Kriesi; Johnston, Laraña and Gusfield 1994; Buechler 2000), and overall relative pacification of the 'old' class cleavage has made way for new issues and grievances to become salient (Kriesi et al. 1995).

Interestingly, the relation between the evolution towards postindustrial societies on the one hand, and the development of emancipative and self-expression values on the other is a very dual one. On the one hand, modern cleavage theory has identified postindustrialist development as the main socio-economic instigator of these latter types of values; on the other do many new social movement theorists exactly refer exactly to these socio-economic processes as the exact aim of this type of social movements, for they are the root cause of many of the causes they are fighting for (Habermas 1981; Touraine 1985).

The link between real-world conditions and the emergence of new cleavages is important, since the main 'newness and distinctiveness of these movements cannot be understood apart from the equally new, historically specific social structures to which they respond' (Buechler 2000: 51), and which, by extension constitute new broad societal divisions and cleavages. In other words; the emergence of new, salient themes next to, or instead of older ones is the product of different societal shifts. Old and new social movements are most obviously discernable on the degree to which these movements identify new and old themes as *their* themes. To get a more thorough insight on the different content of these themes, on the ways these are the product of specific societal evolutions and constellations, and on the ways in which these thus can tell us more of how these typically occupy different kinds of people, for different reasons, and in different ways, we can, once more, find many answers in recent cleavage theory.

Conflictual Issues and the Content of Cleavages: Old and New Cleavages

In their 1967 study, Lipset and Rokkan unveiled four major cleavages throughout Western-European nation states, which were the products of long-lasting social divisions resulting from specific cultural, political and economic evolutions. These cleavages were: a regional cleavage of center versus periphery; a class cleavage between workers and owners; an economic cleavage opposing rural/agricultural versus urban/industrial interests; and finally an ideological and religious cleavage between church and state. Mixtures of these four cleavages, which were the products of different widespread revolutions, were found all throughout Western-Europe, and had gradually evolved into strong, frozen party systems, in which parties, being the organizational cleavage element, appealed to aligned voters with a specific cleavage position and alongside values and social identities. Presuming that all relevant cleavages were the result of long historical evolutions, and that party systems were rock-solid representatives of these cleavages, stable party systems would keep the doors closed to new competing parties.

Still, since the mid 1970's this model of frozen cleavages was challenged by political and societal reality. While parties were able to on the one hand 'organize' several conflicts 'out of politics' (Schattschneider 1975), and on the other to channeling several new conflicts within their existing structures, some of these new conflicts were too far-of, and irreconcilable with their existing value perspectives. New ethno-nationalist parties gained momentum in for instance Spain, Belgium and Canada; environmentalist movements intruded party politics in e.g. Germany and Belgium; anti-immigrant radical right parties rose like mushrooms in Italy, France and many other Western-European countries, as did various protest parties dealing with moral and economic issues cross-cutting different established cleavages (Norris 2004). All these examples embodied the erosion of traditional cleavages and alongside social identities, leading to voters' dealignment with the traditional parties as seen in growing electoral volatility and alongside party competition (ibid.). To which degree these changes in party systems are the relative consequence of 'push' - i.e. effective cleavage erosion and changing social identities- or 'pull' factors -i.e. the relative success or failure of new party strategies to include new constituencies beyond their traditional cleavage base- , has been extensively discussed in core political science theory (Sartori [1975] 2005; Kitschelt 1988, 2000; Norris 2004;

Knutsen 2007), but is not of main interest here since this study exactly focuses on non-institutional politics.

Of key importance for this research are then these effective changes in societal structure, social identities and values, and the political behavior that is related to these changes. If new social positions go alongside with changing values and social identities making people to reassess long-standing group as well as party loyalties, these changes should in fact be equally, and likely even more pronouncedly visible on the streets. After all, protest is an in essence non-institutional political repertoire for the promotion of change or the prevention thereof. What we want to now then, in short, is which are the 'old', remaining, and 'new' cleavages structuring today's empirical, social and political/activist world? And, consequently, which conflictual issues fit within these cleavages and spur people to protest? Still in other words, which are the cleavages on which we can situate old and new movement issues?

Theories on the development and transformation of old and new cleavages are the object of a lively debate, and whereas some assert that Lipset and Rokkan's original typology can easily be updated into more modern terms (Deegan-Krause 2007: 541; see also Katz 2001), many others suggest that their relevance has waned and has been caught up by reality (Kitschelt 1988; Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990b; Kriesi et al. 2006; Kriesi 2008). Several authors have proclaimed the existence of new cleavages, thereby not departing from the level of party politics, but more essentially from the societal level; these are thus cleavages possibly preceding their political-institutional crystallization and as a consequence cleavages possibly relevant for this study on non-institutional collective action. This is, next to more established conflicts, divides and cleavages, what we are also looking for: roots of societal conflict, which are likely to be not yet fully or satisfactorily incorporated in party politics, but which are real in the hearts, minds and(/or) daily lives of considerable groups of people.

From Inglehart's 1977 'Silent Revolution' onwards, the new cleavages that were said to replace the older ones were in the first place thought of as 'emerging new value cleavage[s]' (Inglehart 1984: 55) 'attitudinal divides' (Deegan-Krause 2006) or 'ideological cleavages' (Knutsen 1988). Newly-evolved left-right attitudes, materialist-postmaterialist values, left-libertarianism vs authoritarianism, and cultural openness vs closedness are, or have evolved into primarily ideological cleavages which seem not directly causally linked to

specific socio-structural positions. Still, there are many indications that such links do exist, as several of these new value cleavages have been related to specific structural variables like for instance age cohort membership, education and 'new class' profiles. These links are however not obviously causal in the sense that these socio-structural positions directly cause the values, attitudes and identities related to the conflicts and actions. Rather, in many cases specific socio-structural positions are the precondition for specific attitudes, values and identities to develop.

Getting some structure in this dispersed and continuously proliferating literature is a tough and tricky enterprise, and I will sketch it only briefly here. Just as several major societal developments instigated the 'old' cleavages as described by Lipset and Rokkan, recent similar 'critical junctures' have transformed not only society, but also the conflicts and cleavages prevailing therein. The basic assumption thereby is that '[f]irst, prevailing value orientations reflect prevailing existential conditions. Second, if existential conditions change, value orientations are likely to change correspondingly - but only after a significant time lag (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 23). Inglehart and Baker (2000); Inglehart and Welzel (2005) and Inglehart (2007) point towards two recent such critical junctures, both landmarks in the socio-economic process of modernization. First, the industrial stage of modernization has brought in the 'secularization of authority' as reflected in growing secular-rational values, as opposed to traditional ones. With production becoming increasingly less dependent on the whimsical forces of nature, with indoor production on men-made machines in lighted and heated workplaces, and with the discovery of antibiotics and vaccination, people became less and less dependent on God for their daily fortune: 'as technology gave people increasing control over their environment, God became less central' (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 26). Industrial modernization and the rise of secular-rational values shifted the basis of authority from traditional, religious to rational sources. Yet, it has however not brought about a decline of authority *tout court*.

Where it is the process of industrial modernization that brings about the secularization of authority, it are still other processes emancipating people from authority (ibid). Still according to Inglehart and Welzel (2005: 24; 27-30), it is exactly the post-industrial phase of modernization that spurs this value shift, by providing people with high levels of existential security and prosperity, a massive process of cognitive mobilization through the shift from labor to specialized service professions and rising levels of education, and increasing social complexity freeing people from ascriptive social ties and 'communities of

necessities' to 'elected affinities' (Beck 2002). This all results in a value shift from survival values to self-expression values, which represent a shift from materialist to postmaterialist values on the non-economic quality of life, and with more stress on freedom and expression than on maintaining social order and fighting inflation (Inglehart 1990: 45; Inglehart and Welzel: 56). Also, self-expression values indicate a strong importance to the 'decision-making freedom of the individual human being and the equality of all human beings in this decision-making freedom' (Welzel 2007: 202), and, related, high levels of interpersonal trust, nonconformity and tolerance. It is associated with a positively valued ethnic and cultural diversity, highly-valued political self-expression and high levels of life satisfaction (ibid 201; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Self-expression values reinvigorate non-materialist and spiritual concerns serving the need for meaning and purpose in prospering societies, bringing about the remarkable trend that the emergence of self-expressive values slows down the trend toward secular-rational values. Furthermore, 'the rise of self-expression values fuels humanistic risk perceptions' (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 33) since the risks in postindustrial societies are abstract. Individuals are relatively safe, and free to devote their energy to concerns that not immediately threaten themselves, like e.g. the environment and global warming, and they will engage themselves more easily in more active, elite-challenging, and issue-specific ways (ibid: 44).

Survival values then are the opposites of these values and attitudes, and clearly favor economic and physical security, cultural autonomy and cultural conservatism, exemplified by for instance less tolerance towards out-groups and more conservative values concerning gays and lesbians. The survival vs self-expression/emancipative value dimension is what discerns the highly-developed Western, postindustrial countries from the less and least developed nations worldwide, and its sound relation to socio-economic development, spurring cultural, social and eventually democratic change is convincingly and meticulously argumented by Inglehart and Welzel throughout their 2005 volume. On the other hand, the same dimension constitutes the most salient value cleavage in modern Western societies, between the 'winners' and 'losers' of postindustrialism and globalization (ibid.; Kriesi et al 2006; 2008). Recent evidence also shows that issues dealing with feelings of unsafety and danger, cultural closedness and intolerance, xenophobia and ethnocentrism all are emblematic mobilizing issues on the same 'old', survival side of the new societal cleavage (ibid.; Jacobs, Abts, Phalet and Swyngedouw 2001).

Contrary to what is often assumed in contemporary theories on post-industrial societies are old (class) cleavages not replaced by new ones, but rather, as said, complementing them, or even exactly coinciding with, and thus 'thickening' them. Thus, somewhat simplifying reality, I suggest to refer to 'old' mobilizing issues as issues being based on survival values - material and traditional - and 'new' mobilizing issues on emancipative and self-expression values. This way, once again, the distinction between old and new mobilizing issues fully matches Inglehart and Welzel's concept of value cleavage.

It is important to note, finally, that in most cases, '*old'* and '*new*' *issues* do not exist separately as such, and that this fact is in fact consequential to their definition as conflictual issues. Speaking of 'new issues' and 'old issues' is thus a bit misleading in view of the fact that very often, both represent a position on an issue that is in essence conflictual, and thus is the object of different opinions which are rooted in different values and/or social-economical circumstances. As conflictual issues actually exist by virtue of their oppositional nature, each of them by consequence has a more or less pronounced, but 'typical' old and new issue position. Very often, 'new' issues have in fact been exactly reactions to the supremacy, or even for the taken for grantedness of existing interpretations of the same issue. In other words, where these new issues were *appealing* to new issue publics, they could very well be *appalling* to old issue publics. An example: ecologism and related environmental concerns are typical 'new' issues, in the sense that these issues did not even exist as a social problem, let alone as a mobilizing issue before the 1970-ies. Yet it only came into being as a reaction on a clear materialist view on economy, which had been rooted in the 'Idea of Progress' (Nisbet 1980), making short-term materialist human needs prevail over longer-term humanistic and environmental needs. On the other hand did the issue of pro-choice, a typical 'new social movement' issue rooted in 1960ies feminism, spur the genesis of an entire 'old' pro-life reaction and alongside countermovement.

A Thematic Dimension of Mobilizing Issues: a short summary

Before proceeding to a next part, a short review of this past section: conflictual issues should be interpreted as issues positioned on broad, societal cleavages, which are the breeding grounds of social conflicts. Current cleavage theory provides us with the concept of the postindustrial value cleavage, dividing societies between those adhering survival values on the one, and emancipative/self-expression values on the other, and

encompassing a broad array of other such cleavages like materialism/postmaterialism and new left and new right (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). This value cleavage, spurred by postindustrialism brings about different kinds of conflicts, which are equal to what social movement scholars would term 'old' and 'new' movement issues. The value cleave is thus not (necessarily) an antagonist cleavage, in the sense that citizens at both ends of the value dimension are each others' adversaries or competitors. Rather, these different ends can also represent specific conflicts, most often directed to state actors, companies and cultural institutions, and these are, although not always in an equally manifest manner, related to specific socio-structural positions.

Also, whereas the more manifest socio-structural positions are often the objective ground for the formation of collective identities and shared solidarities, the actions of groups on conflicts related to the more latent empirical positions are not; here action-oriented collective identities are probably more essentially issue-related solidarities originating in more self-transcending values and ideologies. And finally, these different conflicts are the subject of different kinds and degrees of action and social and political organization. According to the cleavage theorem, the socio-structural, empirical element (the who), the motivations and solidarities (why) and organizations and networks (how), or in other words the three cleavage elements are inherently related to each other, and should thus also be as such retraceable on the streets in a similar way. Cleavages thus provide a solid base to explore how mobilizing issues situated within these cleavages are also cultivated within, and relevant to the groups that become active on them. This becomes clear in Figure 2.

FIGURE 2: THE RELATION BETWEEN THE DEFINITIONS OF MOBILIZING ISSUES, CLEAVAGES, AND THE 'WHO', 'WHY' AND 'HOW' OF PROTEST

Mobilizing issues				***Cleavages***
Societal groups	→	WHO?	→	Empirical Element
Shared grievances	→	WHY?	→	Normative element
Mobilize into action	→	HOW?	→	Organizations/behavior

This also renders useful insights on how cleavageless, consensual issues can be related to these three concepts. In relation to mobilizing issues of a conflictual kind, these are exactly likely to be less specifically grounded in specific socio-economic particularities and networks and organizations. In other words, consensual mobilizing issues concern more diverse crowds, and get across these crowds through more unspecific, broad information channels. What binds these groups then are, however, shared grievances which exactly transcend cleavage-related positions, thus mobilizing across, or above these cleavages.

Universalistic and Particularistic Issues

Mobilizing issues are subjects, processes or situations that concern specific groups in society. The specificity (or unspecificity in the case of consensual issues) of these groups is grounded in their latent or explicit social-economical basis, which is the foundation for the creation of shared identities, grievances, and eventually collective action. People belonging to a certain social-economic group will be drawn to specific mobilizing issues, exactly because of their belonging to this group.

The thematically subsuming of different issues under the denominator of a specific cleavage solves another theoretical complexity: the enormous diversification in their scope and ambit. On this difficulty, William Gamson (1975: 44) notes: 'If a group has several issues, the level of generality can be raised so that they are seen as aspects of a single, larger issue, or any larger issue can be subdivided into different aspects'.

Yet this diversification also unveils a second important issue dimension, rooted in the relation between an issue's '*constituency'* and the issue's *'beneficiaries*'. Besides a clear thematic linkage between (groups of) individuals and mobilizing issues, there is also an important second one: the degree to which an issue is directly affecting one's personal life, and the degree to which one would have immediate and direct personal benefits from action on it. One same thematic general issue can subsume a whole series of concrete mobilizing issues, which have differential consequences for the degree of involvement of both different groups. This distinction is important, and will, after the thematic dimension, be dealt with as a secondary dimension in the typology of mobilizing issues laid out here.

In fact, in most existing social movement (issue) typologies this relation between constituency and beneficiaries is considered essential in discerning between different movement (issue) types. In his early typology of social movements, next to an element of amount of change, Aberle (1966) discerns between individual and societal change as an important dimension to discern between different movement types. Duyvendak and Giugni (1995) build on the earlier distinction between strategy-oriented and identity-oriented movements (Pizzorno 1978; Touraine 1981; Rucht 1988) by adding a 'general orientation' component in their typology of social movements. They distinguish between internal and external orientation, referring to the fact that social movements are involved in (re)shaping *their* world, or in (re)shaping *the* world as a whole, respectively. Morris and Braine (2001: 34-7) and Morris and Staggenborg (2004) have devised a social movement typology based on both their thematic as well as their organizational features, in which they discern between those movements challenging issues that affect particular oppressed groups on the one, and those challenging certain conditions that affect the entire population on the other.

All these movement typologies at least implicitly incorporate the relation between the movements' constituency – those active in the movement – and the potential beneficiaries of movement activities. More concrete, all discern movements based on the fact that beneficiaries and constituency more or less coincide on the one hand, and movements where the group of beneficiaries is much larger than that of the constituency, on the other.

Particularistic and Universalistic Mobilizing Issues: the Scope Dimension

In their influential 1977 article introducing resource mobilization theory, McCarthy and Zald make an encompassing effort to categorize the differential degrees of (non)involvement and (dis)interest of individuals in and towards social movements. They distinguish between constituents (those providing resources like time or money for the SMO), adherents (those who believe in the goals of the SMO), bystander publics and opponents, each of them being able to in one way or another support, help in, or depress movement activity. Also, "[e]ach of these groups can also be distinguished by whether or not they will benefit directly from the accomplishment of SMO goals. Some bystander publics, for instance, may benefit directly from the accomplishment of organizational goals, even though they are not adherents of the appropriate SMO" (McCarthy and Zald

1977: 1221). For instance, women, gays, or workers who are not interested or share no real preferences with the organizations pursuing the interests of their equals, will nevertheless benefit from the potential successes of these organizations, through for instance, and respectively, equal wages; the destigmatization of same-sex relationships and collective bargaining agreements.

Social movement organizations will thus make serious efforts to convert bystander publics who are potential beneficiaries into adherents, and to persuade adherents who are potential beneficiaries to become movement constituents. Also, and consequently, social movement organizations will often try to make the group of potential beneficiaries of movement outcomes ideationally as large as possible, through notions of 'a better society' (ibid: 1222). Finally, McCarthy and Zald (ibid.) notice SMO's attempting to "mobilize as adherents those who are not potential beneficiaries. *Conscience adherents* are individuals who are part of the appropriate SM but do not stand to benefit directly from SMO goal accomplishment. *Conscience constituents* are direct supporters of a SMO who do not stand to benefit directly from its success in goal accomplishment".

Summarizing, McCarthy and Zald discern the mobilization potential of an SMO on two dimensions: the individuals' degree of formal involvement (adherents versus constituents) and their either or not benefiting from potential movement success (beneficiaries versus conscious supporters). This results in four types of mobilization potential groups: beneficiary adherents, conscious adherents, beneficiary constituents and conscience constituents. Each of these four, finally, relate to each other and to the SMO in different ways, and should be approached for mobilization in different ways by these organizations.

Still, we are neither interested in movement typologies, nor in those on their supporters. The first dimension discerning between adherents and constituents therefore is not important is this study, as both are part of the mobilization potential for protest action; in our study it is most probably a mixture of both who deliver the resource of their presence, and thus who 'bear the cost' of participation. The second one, discerning between beneficiary and conscious supporters, is, considered disjointedly, very relevant here. Although it is a helpful categorization dimension of social movement publics, it is less a useful *ex-ante* typification of protest participants, as it is also inextricably related to the specific mobilizing issue inspiring the protest action.

For instance; members of a labor union typically join this type of organization to benefit from their political strength, strategies and activities in obtaining collective bargaining agreements and employees' protection (Clark and Wilson 1961). In times of institutional blockage, these movements in turn deploy their members in non-institutional collective action events, like general sector strikes or protest marches. Sometimes however, the members are incited to partake in solidary actions, like solidarity strikes or protests for specific issues for which the group of beneficiaries is too small to mobilize large numbers (for instance in cases of specific corporate closedowns or sectoral bargaining agreements), and which are not directly beneficiary to those specific members. Other actions, as protests against general lowering purchasing power, are aiming to be of benefit to an entire population.

These examples show that different mobilizing issues on a same thematic issue can have bearing on very different beneficiary groups. They also show the evident practice of people protesting for issues beyond their own interest, just as well as they do so to be able to reap the immediate benefits of their action. Different mobilizing issues on a same general issue thus appeal to people in different ways, depending on their beneficiary relation to these different issues. In other words: a mobilizing issue always concerns one or more specific or non-specific beneficiary groups, and appeals to, and is mobilizing to one or more specific or non-specific groups of constituents. These groups sometimes overlap, at other times they are completely separate, and most often they relate to each other in a specific way, all due to the mobilizing issue itself.

As we are looking for an ex-ante typology of mobilizing issues, considering the differential involvement of beneficiaries and constituents as separate groups is difficult. Still, there are two possible decision rules that are applicable on all mobilizing issues:

1 Is the beneficiary group a specific societal group or is it a rather diffuse and unspecific?

2 If an issue's beneficiary group is a concrete societal group, is it likely to mobilize (part of) this group, or not?

The first rule thus concerns the relative specificity of the beneficiary group of a mobilizing issue. The second one relates to the relation between beneficiary and constituent groups,

more specifically whether a mobilizing issue is likely to activate people beyond, or even apart from its beneficiary group.

To start with the first decision rule, a mobilizing issue is likely to either concern a specific societal group, or on the other hand to be unspecific and diffuse, and thus to be referring to no concrete and separate group of beneficiaries. More concrete, specific beneficiary groups are to be understood as *social groups*, as compared to *social categories*; a basic mainstream sociological distinction (Giddens 2002; Brym and Lie 2007: 161).

Where a social category concerns a group of people with similar social characteristics, like gays, single parents or marihuana users, social groups also share these characteristics, but on top of that have a feeling of group belonging and collective identification with the group and its members. Typically for mobilizing issues, this identification of specific social beneficiary groups is, at least to some degree, inspired by the issue itself. In fact, following the definition of mobilizing issues, it is the perception of the sharedness of the grievances and the alongside cognitive liberation that are the drivers of the genesis of social groups.

For instance, ‘single moms’ are a social category of women sharing a social-economical feature. When for instance reforms in day care funding, which are set up to reduce this cost for the modal double-earner family, but which have the perverse effect of hitting single moms specifically very hard as a social category, this in fact is likely to turn them into a social group, with a shared identity based on the combination of their joint social-economic position and the alongside shared threat and grievances. The same goes for coffee drinkers when government would double VAT on coffee, or inhabitants of a country region when they would in one way or another be disfavored towards the other regions.

Very often though, a mobilizing issue concerns no specific social group, and not even a social category. Issues can be unspecific concerning who will benefit from action on in, and in such cases, the beneficiary group is a diffuse one, like society at large. Mobilizing issues on general welfare reforms or overall VAT adjustments do not concern specific social groups, but every citizen in a society more or less in a same way. Issues can also be *framed* as being unspecific towards a beneficiary group. As referred to above, McCarthy and Zald (1977) mention the practice of protest organizers to frame a mobilizing issue as broadly as possible, thus at the same time broadening a specific beneficiary group to ‘society at large’, through notions of ‘a better society’.

After having established whether an issue concerns a specific and well-definable beneficiary group or not, we can apply the second decision rule, which applies only on those cases in which such a concrete beneficiary group exists. If this latter option is the case, the question then is whether this beneficiary group itself is a group that is physically capable of representing itself on the streets, and thus to make out (part of) the issue constituency, or not. More specifically, the question is whether the beneficiary group is at least part of the constituency, or whether both groups are physically separated groups. In this latter case the issue constituency, being those who are likely to undertake action on the mobilizing issue, are not the beneficiaries of their actions. This happens relatively often in 'boomerang-patterned' (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 8) or 'cross-level activism' (della Porta, Kriesi and Rucht 1999), in which the issue beneficiaries are fully represented by a group of conscious constituents, as is the case in for instance Belgian protest actions against the Chinese rule in Tibet, or the international struggle against Zapatista depression in Mexico with its high point in about a decade ago. Such mobilizing issues also exist on a more proximate level, for instance when they concern children's rights or the mentally disabled.

On the other end there are those issues mobilizing (part of) the beneficiary group, possibly (and most likely) to be complemented with a not directly concerned constituency. In such cases, the focus of the mobilizing issue is narrow and aimed only on the benefit of one specific group, which is a constricted one exactly because the issue itself concerns only this, most often relatively small, group. Workers protesting against company cutbacks, or NIMBY protests of neighborhood groups protesting against the construction of a highway in their vicinity are two typical examples of collective action on such issues. Yet as said, most often protests on such issues are not only populated by direct beneficiaries but also by people with non-direct stakes in the object of protest, and which are mostly people belonging to the same broader issue social movement.

In Figure 3, these decision rules are summarized. The result of these rules result in two types of mobilizing issues which can, along the lines of McCarthy and Zald (1977) and Gamson (1968), be summarized into two main groups, with 'particularistic' opposing 'non-particularistic' issues (cf. Gamson 1968) or ***particularistic*** versus ***universalistic*** issues. Mobilizing issues concerning a specific social group of beneficiaries that is probable to (or rather, not improbable to not to) undertake action itself, concern the first type of particularistic issues. Those mobilizing issues that concern a diffuse societal group or

concern a beneficiary group that is unable to undertake action by itself, are universalistic issues. I will refer to this dimension as the issue ***scope dimension*** from now onwards, as it refers to the broadness or scope of the group it affects.

FIGURE 3: STEPWISE DECISION MAKING PROCESS FOR DISCERNING BETWEEN PARTICULARISTIC AND UNIVERSALISTIC ISSUES



As indicated before, such kind of issue division has been implicitly dealt with in the literature on protest and social movement, and has been considered to be primarily an attribute of movements themselves, rather than the issues they mobilize on. In the literatures on policy making and interest groups however, quite similar typologies to this one have been developed to discern between different types of policies and policy issues.

For instance, the opposite ends in Lowi's well-known four-type typology on policy issues discerns between 'distributive' or 'pork barrel' policies and constituent policies (Lowi 1969). Although this policy typology is also based on the costs of policies and who has to bear them, the reasoning is very similar: distributive policies are those for which government distributes resources to very specific social groups, and for which the costs are allocated diffusely (for instance farmers' subsidies paid by general tax money). On the other end of Lowi's typology, constituent policy confers broad benefits (and costs) to society at large, and thus not depends on the social group one is part of. Distributive and constituent policies clearly relate to particularistic and universalistic issues respectively.

As said, the interest group literature also has a special interest in policy issues, not in the least since it are exactly distributive policies that open the door to 'interest group liberalism'. For instance JQ Wilson (1973: 332) compares interest groups according to 'whether the costs and benefits are widely distributed or narrowly concentrated from the point of view of those who bear the costs or enjoy the benefits'. Again this parallels the basis of the issue scope dimension presented here.

Etzioni (1985), finally, proposed a similar typology of interest groups discerning between special interest groups; constituency-representing organizations; and public interest groups. The first type, then, concerns groups 'whose social base is relatively narrow, whose political presentation is limited in scope, typically to pecuniary interests, and whose beneficiaries are almost exclusively the groups' members' (Etzioni 1985: 178). Public interest groups on the other hand are groups 'whose social base varies, whose political presentation concerns the community at large or primarily non-members, and whose focus is typically on non-pecuniary interests' (ibid. 180).

Translated to the issue typology laid out here, both types would typically deal with particularistic and universalistic issues respectively. In between both types, Etzioni (ibid: 178) described constituency-representing organizations, 'whose social base is relatively broad, whose scope of political representation is wide, typically encompassing non-pecuniary interests (e.g. social status, symbolic and values issues) in addition to pecuniary ones, and which seek to balance service to their members with a measure of concern for the community of which they are a part'. It seems that this type is to be situated somewhere in between, but as it concerns concrete social categories (which, in case of collective action evolve into social groups) it is per definition a case of a particularistic issue group.

Particularistic and Universalistic Mobilizing Issues as a True Issue Dimension

Reviewing all this previous literature on interest groups, public policy and social movement types, it is clear that the correlates of the particularistic – universalistic dimension are considered to be important theoretical and empirical tools to understand their nature and working. Contrary to the scope-dimension presented here, these different typologies are primarily conceived of as attributes of these groups, policies and movements, rather than of the issues these are dealing with. I have amply illustrated in the previous section why this scope-dimension should be one of issues and not of organizations types or policies, simply because of the fact that one same group, organization or policy can be dealing with both types of issues, either simultaneously or consecutively. That is exactly where the strength of a two-dimensional issue typology lies: by combining a thematic and a scope dimension, the information included is rich and encompassing. In the different typologies presented above however, the thematic information is either made abstraction of, or to a certain degree incorporated in the second dimension – specifically in Etzioni's typology. All authors agree that, in order to fully understand the goals, targets and strategies of different political groups, organizations, or policies, it is vital to take into account the specificity or diffuseness of the social groupings they are representing or concerned with. However, these typologies do not take into account any thematic dimension, which hinders a full understanding of their research subjects. A pressure group that, for instance, lobbies for farmers' subsidies is, following these typologies, more or less similar to one that fosters civic participation of minority ethnic groups. This is where the thematic distinction makes the difference.

This relation between the thematic and scope dimension within a typology of mobilizing issues poses with a second, important, point of attention. Etzioni (1985) incorporates a pecuniary – non-pecuniary dimension into the scope dimension, thus intermingling thematic and scope elements into one dimension. The relationship of this scope dimension of mobilizing issues does have a peculiar relation to the one discerning between survival and self-expression and emancipative action. First of all, the relation is a hierarchical one. I suggest that the old-new thematic issue dimension is the most essential one, and therefore should be considered as the primary issue dimension; by consequence the particularism-universalism scope dimension is the secondary issue dimension. In more technical terms, when explaining the diversity of protest events, the thematic dimension will be the one explaining the most variance. Within this first, the second dimension is there to get further insights. The reason for this hierarchic relation is very straightforward, since mobilizing issues wouldn't exist without a thematic notion, and the scope dimension can only be applied on existing thematic issues.

Second, according to Maslow, the more individuals are less driven by survival-like needs, the more for these individuals 'egocentrism reduces and makes way for homocentrism' (Maslow 1954; see below). Inglehart and Welzel also indicate that 'The rise of self-expression values fuels *humanistic* risk perceptions' (1954: 33). Both claims indicate a seemingly large conformity with the abovementioned universalism. Yet the survival-self-expression dimension does not converge with that of particularism-universalism. Next to the fact that self-expression values coincide with more humanist values, '[h]igh levels of individualism go with high levels of autonomy and high levels of self-expression values) (ibid: 137). This individualism defined as 'a focus on rights above duties, a concern for oneself and one's immediate family, an emphasis on personal autonomy and self-fulfillment, and basing identity on one's personal accomplishments', strongly contrasts with that same concept of universalism. Clearly, then, both dimensions should thus be independent and mutually crosscutting, which will be amply shown in later parts of this study.

Finally, a practical but substantial note on the particularism-universalism dimension. Since we are searching for an ex-ante typology of mobilizing issues we need thus to be able to categorize an upcoming protest event as based on either a particularistic or a universalistic issue. In practice this means that we thus need to rely on the presentation and/or framing of the issue before it actually mobilizes people onto the streets. Although the same goes

for the thematic issue dimension, it is expected that this exercise will be somewhat more difficult, as this dimension will not always be played out as centrally as the thematic one.

These remarks all in mind, I summarize the distinction between *universalistic* and *particularistic* issues[5]. By including this *scope dimension* into a thematic typology of mobilizing issues, both the broadness of the affected group is taken into account, as well as, by extension, the scope of the goal that is evoked by the issue. By universalistic mobilizing issues I mean issues that have no specific reference to a well-defined social group, or issues that do refer to such groups, but which are highly unlikely or unable to represent themselves in protest action. They could also be referred to as collective good issues. Particularistic mobilizing issues on the other hand are intrinsically related to specific social groups, and taking action for such issues would thus, or at least in first instance, benefit the group to which those partaking in it belong. Particularistic issues could also be referred to as selective good issues, and they will the object of action of the groups themselves to which the action will be of benefit.

As shown in Figure 4, both elements of the scope dimension also tap into the essence of the definition of mobilizing issues. The specificity or concreteness of a group concerned with an issue clearly relates to the societal groups referred to in the definition. Whether this group has the capacity to undertake action on this issue clearly relates to the mobilization process. The distinction between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, finally, tells us a lot about the nature of the grievances that are provoked by the issue.

FIGURE 4: THE RELATION BETWEEN THE DEFINITION OF MOBILIZING ISSUES, THE SCOPE DIMENSION, AND THE 'WHO', 'WHY' AND 'HOW' OF PROTEST

Mobilizing issues				***Issue Scope***
Societal groups	→	WHO?	→	unspecific/specific groups
Shared grievances	→	WHY?	→	beneficiary/non-beneficiary
Mobilize into action	→	HOW?	→	activated/not activated

[5] Although this terminology is commonly associated with its use by Parsons (1951), here it is used in its literal sense, with particularistic issues denoting issues an exclusive interest and/or relevance to specific or particular societal groups, and universalistic issues contrarily having an inclusive and universal scope.

Having introduced this second dimension of mobilizing issues, we can move on to introduce the final typology of mobilizing issues which will be drawn on throughout the remainder of this manuscript.

Conclusion: a Typology of Mobilizing Issues

In this quest for devising a workable, clear and above all useful typology of mobilizing issues, I have chosen to discern between two dimensions; one comprising the broadness or 'depth' of mobilizing issues, the other grasping the broad thematic array of possible mobilizing issues.

First, a dichotomous dimension is included to try to grasp the broad thematic variety of mobilizing issues. Based on early typologies of policy issues, I first discern between consensual and conflictual mobilizing issues. Whereas the first are by definition cleavageless, the latter are in essence rooted in societal cleavages, which, following both cleavage as well as social movement theories, can be divided in 'old' and 'new' mobilizing issues. This dimension is the principal and primary dimension of mobilizing issues.

Second, and in accordance with many existing typologies of social movement types, I have incorporated a secondary dimension of scope or ambit of the mobilizing issue. This dimension has to do with the clearness of the delineation of the issue, and indicates the degree to which a mobilizing issue is essentially affecting specific societal groups, or rather transcends such a specific group and concerns society at large. In other words, whereas both types of issue demonstrations concern a specific collective good, this collective good is a public good when it concerns a universalistic mobilizing issue, whereas it is a selective good when it concerns a particularistic mobilizing issue.

TABLE 1: THE COMBINATION OF THEMATIC AND SCOPE DIMENSION OF MOBILIZING ISSUES, RESULTING IN SIX TYPES OF MOBILIZING ISSUES

		Theme	
Scope	CONSENSUAL	OLD	NEW
PARTICULARISTIC	1	3	5
UNIVERSALISTIC	2	4	6

In the next chapter, we will lay out how this typology is related to the definition of mobilizing issues, and how we can use it to understand differential protest participation.

The typology will from then on be understood as a model, and the six types it comprehends will each separately be developed into predictive types of protesters.

3

Mobilizing Issues and Individual Action

Characteristics, Motivations and Mobilization Dynamics

People, obviously, care more about some issues than they do about others. And there are several reasons why this is the case. First of all, the mere omnipresence of issues forces people to sift certain issues as important and others as less important. And this sifting is to a large degree dependent on how individuals are in one way or another affected by the issues. To use a framing concept, issues in some way need to find large enough 'resonance' within the individual actors. And this resonance is a matter of exactly the interplay and varying constellations of the three cleavage elements: the structural position of those becoming involved; their views on the issue and to others also concerned with the issue, and the ways in which they are related to these others through personal networks or organizational affiliations. Personal involvement with the issue at stake (Jennings and Andersen 2003), individual biographies (see e.g. McAdam 1988a) and personal features like gender and education (see e.g. Verba et al. 1995; Schussman and Soule 2005) and social networks (see e.g. Passy 2001; Diani and McAdam 2003) are constantly shaping and shaped by individually appropriated morality, ideology and values which, in turn, trigger the emotions and feelings of responsibility which determine to which issues people choose, or are impelled, to become active for, or not. As Verba and Nie noted in 1972 (114): 'citizens tend to become involved in groups that deal with problems salient to them', an observation which also holds true for protest participation, but which has not received the attention it deserves. In the study of collective action, the fact that individual participation is directly and causally related to personal issue salience is largely neglected. This is what this chapter is all about: establishing the relation between individuals and mobilizing issues, and the relevance of this relation for understanding collective protest action.

Let me rephrase the main argument once more. People are confronted with issues of all kinds, all the time. Who these people are, their visions on the world, but also the more structural positions in which they are situated and the networks and organizational settings they are embedded in (which on their own have a varying issue responsiveness and will more or less contribute to the development of mobilizing issues), all to some degree make that for some of these people the issue is the object of grievances, as well as that for some these will become mobilizing issues. The way in which these grievances are both felt and reacted upon is also dependent on the relation between the issue at stake and various personal features. Sometimes issues will touch people in the heart of their beliefs; others have a direct and tangible bearing on people's lives and might make them wanting to change things for their own –for instance economic - benefit. These different

kinds and degrees of personal issue affectedness not only produce specific motives and deeply rooted motivations for people to take action on such an issue, but also reveals a great deal of how these motivations eventually make it to the streets.

Different issues, thus, activate different kinds of people. Before we get into more detail, one important remark: often this relation between issues and (groups of) people is not a unidirectional and causal one. People can also 'create' issues, as seen in the previous chapter, and often the strength, importance and life-span of issues is dependent on the activism around it. And also, some issues only exist because of the specific groups of people to which they concern. Throughout this chapter, I will present the different ways in which individuals are related to the different types of mobilizing issues. The three fundamentals of the study of individual participation are, once more the questions of:

- Who participates?
- Why do they participate?
- How do they get to do so?

Interpreted in cleavage terminology, these questions refer to a mobilizing issue's:

- A social-structural empirical reality;
- A normative element of values, beliefs and identity;
- An organizational/behavioral element.

As is the case with full and partial cleavages, sometimes all three elements together will logically bind people to specific mobilizing issues, at other times this will somewhat less pronounced, but still evident. Below, I make a selection of variables relevant for the general explanation of protest participation, and show their theoretical grounds and relevance for this research.

Who? Personal Features

The question of who participates in protest demonstrations is the most straightforward one of this thesis. And since it has been the focus of many existing studies, we can easily structure the question around established theories of social movements, protest and political participation. In this study this 'who' will be regarded as the individuals' objective, or a priori features, meaning that they conceptually exist before these individuals are activated on the issue; it are their individual, personal characteristics. These personal characteristics are most commonly studied on four themes: socio-demographics and according biographical availability; general political attitudes (or attitudinal availability), general political behavior (political involvement or behavioral availability) (McAdam 1988a; Verba et al. 1995; Downton and Wehr 1998); and general (organizational) embeddedness (structural availability) (Schussman and Soule 2005).

As said, all have proven useful variables to explain political participation in general and protest action in particular, though very specific in more sociological (McAdam 1988a), and very generalized in political participation studies (Rosenstone and Hansen 1995; Verba et al. 1995). All of these sets of personal characteristics have, as shown, in some way been framed within the availability terminology current in movement studies, yet for most of them I will not refer to them as such for conceptual clarity. Together these four groupings of variables comprise the more or less 'stable' and objective individual factors that account for participation in collective action.

Of course our goal here is not to mention these availabilities 'just' as universal predictors of protest participation. The personal features of which is said to be crucial preconditions to become and to stay active in protest politics can to diverging degrees also be understood as differential *issue availabilities*; making people more or less susceptive to different (mobilizing) issues, and thus probably effectively discerning between different kinds of protesters based on different issue types.

Regarding the thematic issue dimension, cleavage literature delivers the insight that people are in the first place positioned in a cleavage, and by extension to specific thematic issues, by their social-structural position, as represented by several socio-demographic characteristics. These positions also to a large extent determine people's vision on the

current state of affairs as well as on the future, and in this way relate to people's political attitudes. These positions furthermore determine the degree to which people are embedded in different kinds of social and political organizations. And, together, socio-demographics, political attitudes and the degree of embeddedness determine to a large degree people's general level of political behavior. This is how the different thematic mobilizing issues are expected to be mobilizing people with different personal characteristics.

The same goes for the scope dimension of mobilizing issues. Whether people are likely to be more or less prone to engage in action on universalistic or rather particularistic issues is also related to these four elements, be it that the relation between these elements on this dimension is more hypothetical, as will be demonstrated below.

FIGURE 5: PERSONAL FEATURES SUMMARIZED



This chapter is structured as follows: One by one I will present the different aspects of the personal characteristics, and immediately relate them to both issue dimensions. Next, we will make an overall overview of how the different personal features are logically related to each other under the heading of the different issue types.

Socio-Demographics

Typically, gender, age, and education are the most important demographic predictors of protest participation (Dalton 1996; Crozat 1998; Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001; Norris 2002). Higher educated, male and young to mid-aged are most prone to participate in protest (Walgrave and Verhulst 2006). What this study is all about, is exactly to differentiate within these general(ist) findings.

Gender

When it comes to the more conventional participation act of voting, the traditional gender gap has been gradually closing for many decades, to become entirely bridged since the eighties of the past century, where a turn was made towards women consistently more taking part in ballots than men (Norris 2000). When it comes to overall forms of participation, in general men participate in more, and more different forms of participation, but, on the whole, these differences between men and women are relatively small. Disaggregating such general participation measures, this gender inequality shows to be larger for some specific action repertoires, but very small to non-existent for others, like campaign work and … protest. In fact, political protest is the only unbiased political action repertoire in the larger list of political activity (Verba et al. 1995: 254-256). Without any knowledge of the content of protest - the issues mobilized on - each random protest action would then be predicted to have equal amounts of men and women engaged in them.

Yet, whereas these general gender-related empirical findings do not deliver that much insight on how different mobilizing issues might concern different proportions of men and women, two general situations and trends might shed more light on this matter. First, the slightly lower general activity of women in diverse sets of political action is counterbalanced by their being higher represented in all kinds of non-political voluntary actions and organizations, which are known to constitute fertile mobilization grounds for non-institutional political action, like protest (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Furthermore, a more general trend, following the closing and, when it comes to voting, the reversing of the traditional gender gap towards higher female ballot participation, is accompanied by another general trend towards differential gender participation. (Inglehart and Norris 2000; Norris 2002; Brooks, Nieuwbeerta and Manza 2006). Whereas women were

traditionally more right-wing, and men more left-wing voters, this ratio has been reversed, as is evidenced in several studies on different postindustrial countries (Norris 2000). Furthermore, this more qualitative gender gap crosscuts many other social-economic predictors, leading some to consider it a new cleavage on its own (ibid; Stubager 2003).

The reasons for this shift are likely to be situated in the strong and entwined evolution of several structural and cultural phenomena. The joint evolution of increasing female participation in the paid workforce, their higher education, and resulting higher social positions, together with the withering of religious rigidness and increasingly flexible family units go hand in hand with enlarged political awareness and female identities. As Norris (2000) writes:

Women's lifestyles, based on their roles within families, the labor market, the welfare state, and the community, may be expected to lead to different patterns of political participation, partisan loyalties and political priorities on a wide range of issues: childcare, family support, public transport, environment and technology, reproductive rights, welfare, education and defense.

Some evidence for these assertions is given by Verba et al (1995: 261), with women being more active than men on issues like abortion, children and education, yet overall, the literature seems inconclusive (Norris 2000 for an overview). How then do we expect men and women to differ in their choice of action on different mobilizing issues? Is it thinkable and even appropriate to theorize on men or women being more or less prone to engage in for instance survival or particularistic issues than their masculine counterparts?

Ingelhart (1997) and Inglehart and Welzel (2005), for instance, make no report of the possibility of gender differences in the adherence of different sets of values; which has been largely corroborated by the empirical findings of, amongst others, Gidengil et al (2003). And Kitschelt and Hellemans (1990a) found no gender difference in Belgian green parties' electoral support.

On the other hand, several indices exist of participatory gender differentiation. A recent study on 2007 Belgian elections firmly supports Norris' (2000) earlier-mentioned findings, showing that the ballots for candidates of liberal, nationalist and (far)-right parties were predominantly made by men, whereas women in the main sent more members from

green, socialist and Christian-democrats to parliament. Moreover, the gender difference was the most striking one throughout the entire survey, more important than educational and job differences[6]. Whether this difference is due to a different appreciation of party leaders and/or messages, or different issues and/or ideologies promoted or different embodied by these different parties is unclear, yet the fact remains that they differ. It seems that women voters, in contrast to their male counterparts, find economic liberalist, nationalist and anti-immigrant parties less appealing than those parties dealing with economic distribution, family values, and several progressive issues of which the most important one is that of ecology. A same conclusion is made by Caiazza and Barrett (2003), who found that feminist issues and the issues of peace and environmentalism, next to being typically 'new' issues, are also typically 'female' issues when it comes to voting.

When it comes to protest, again, theorizing on gender differences in differential protest participation is difficult, and those very few existing clues show mixed results. In a rare account comparing demonstrators between different issue types, Norris, Walgrave and Van Aelst (2005) show that the gender differences between different issue demonstrations are not significant in multivariate analysis. Which is in fact a bit surprising, knowing for instance that typical old social movements like labor unions attract considerably more male than female members, also when controlled for by other SES variables (Steijn 2000). Furthermore, evidence shows that many movements and actions on consensual issues are both initiated as well as attended by relatively much more women than those on other issues; in fact it shows that the net amount of women in these movements and actions is much larger (Goss 2003; Walgrave and Verhulst 2006). Finally, some typical 'new' issues have shown to be 'feminin' issues, like for instance peace (Verhulst, Van Laer, Van Aelst and Walgrave 2007: 53) or environment (Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990b).

Clearly, evidence on the relation between gender and issues is mixed, and theorizing on it is difficult, but it seems that women are more prone to undertake action in new issue protest than in that on old issues, in which they will be relatively underrepresented. Consensual issues even inspire larger net amounts of women to action.

On the issue scope dimension, this distinction is less clear, but some studies show a general tendency for women to be more adhering collectivist values, perhaps also because

[6] ISPO data 2009.

they are more likely to share women or feminist identities and sometimes shared maternalist frames (Goss 2003) whereas men adhere to more individualist values (Mortenson 2002). Furthermore, Caiazza and Barrett (2003) show that women, as opposed to men, show greater levels of empathy, altruism and personal responsibility, making them more prone to wanting 'to protect not only themselves and their families, but also others' (ibid: 3). Universalistic issues are thus more likely to be more 'feminine' issue too, and particularistic issues will attract more male protesters.

Age

Typically, protest is an affair of the younger and middle-aged. As was the case with gender, hypothesizing on different age groups being involved on different issues is not easy. Yet, there are a few clues for doing so. First, youngsters and (college) students are very unlikely to be concerned with old issues, and this is due to a combination of two reasons. First, Inglehart's socialization hypothesis (1990) suggests that the socio-economic conditions under which people are raised into adulthood largely determine the kinds of values they adhere. Consequently, he asserts, continuingly increased levels of safety, welfare and wellbeing in Western societies make that citizens in these societies are in general more adhering to self-expression and emancipative values when compared to less-developed regions in the world. Also, and more relevant in this case, within Western, postindustrialized countries, it are the younger much more than the old who are more inclined to these new values, since the generations before them have lived their youth in somewhat less safer and prosper conditions. This does not at all entail that self-expression and emancipation are values adhered to solely by youngsters, but it means that it is likely that, in general, those who do will be relatively younger than those who do not.

There is also a second reason why we expect the younger and older to differ in the issues they take action for, and this is a more straightforward one. As every older person would say, younger people have less structural responsibilities to deal with. The more one's life is arranged around for instance having a secure job, which provides the income to pay the mortgage and support a family, the more this job becomes a foundation of people's entire lives, and thus also a ground of sorrow when it gets at stake for one reason or another; the more all this can be the object of survival needs when these foundations erode or get a sudden breach. This is also reinforced by the fact that for older people, job searches are relatively more difficult than for younger ones. And this observation, finally, also fits within

the important concept of biographical availability, which entails that people who have enough time and are free of too much 'personal constraints that may increase the costs and risks of movement participation, such as full-time employment, marriage and family responsibility' (McAdam 1986: 70).

When it comes to the other issues types, things are less clear. As consensual issues are expected to typically attract samples of protesters that most resemble the population, one also expects relatively diverse age groups; when compared to old issue protesters, they are probably younger, but compared to new issue demonstrators, they will be somewhat older. On the secondary scope dimension we have even less clues. If we would ask Maslow (1954), however, it will be older people rather than younger who will attend universalist demonstrations, since, according to him, self-actualization, which makes people able to transcend egocentrism to make way for humanism, 'does not occur in young people'.

Education

Higher education levels have since long been associated with a higher affinity with democratic values (Dahl, Shapiro and Cheibub 2003: 58), higher levels of social capital (Van Oorschot and Ars 2005), and increased likelihood of volunteering (Wilson 2000) and to engage in civic and political participation in general (Verba et al. 1995; Putnam 2000). Most likely, then, differential educational levels not only have bearing on differential participation levels, but also on differential issue-participation.

In which ways then can the differential educational levels of demonstrators be related to the different mobilizing issues at stake at different protest events? As mentioned, old and new social movements and the issues they occupy are based on the old and new value cleavages they are grounded in, and thus are logically also representing those adhering to the values prevalent within these cleavages, given the fact that the existence of well-defined social groups representing the values and ideologies indicative of these cleavages is essential to understand them in the first place (Bartolini and Mair 1990: 215).

Concretely, *old* issues, mainly occupied with traditional redistribution questions, safety and cultural conservatism and stressing the importance of wealth, material well-being and safety and security, and *new* issues, explicitly questioning some of these objectives and stressing the importance of non-material objectives and highlighting the need for personal

fulfillment, both logically attract different publics from different backgrounds to their defense and propagation (Milbrath 1984; Dalton and Kuechler 1990). Activists on *old* issues are more likely to be situated in the 'lower' socio-economic strata, having lower educational levels, and the reasons therefore are threefold.

First, a growing trend towards using the concept of post-industrialism (Bell 1973) to describe our modern societies refers to a predominance of service activities, in favor of those within the industrial and agricultural sectors. These latter sectors are thus subject to increasing economic pressure, leading its workers, being relatively lower educated, to engage more in collective action strategies to vent their worries and claims. Second, referring to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, is the occurrence of post-materialist and self-expressive values dependent on the establishment of a sense of economic and physical security within society. On the individual level this entails that for those in weaker economic situations, old issues are more salient. This, third, does not remain confined to feelings of economic security as ample studies show consistent strong correlations between relatively low education levels and, amongst others, feelings of danger and insecurity[7], ethnocentrism (Jacobs et al. 2001), racism (Rydgren 2003) and (consequent) susceptibility for populist radical right ideologies and parties (Mayer 1999). These are all emblematic survival values, which are according to some to be regarded as the defensive reaction of the 'losers of postindustrialization processes' (Rydgren 2007), which on the other hand also spurred the rise of self-expressive and emancipative values.

The adherence of these latter values should thus be associated with higher education levels. According to Inglehart and Welzel (2005: 37), 'a high level of education is an indicator that an individual grew up with a sufficiently high level of existential security to take survival for granted - and therefore gives top priority to autonomy, individual choice and self-expression'). This is not in the least the case because a student's schooling status is an indicator of the parents' educational and professional status, which in turn relates to which needs are prevalent in this student's life (Stanton-Salazar and Dornbusch 1995). And, youngsters being raised in high-educated families in which politics are discussed regularly, are much more likely to become involved in civic action *in general* (Zukin, Keeter, Andolina, Jenkins and Delli Carpini 2006: 149). Also, higher schooling is important in

[7] Based on recent ESS data; see Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek 2009.

creating social capital and increases people's amount of weak ties (ibid), making them more prone to participation in general than their lower schooled counterparts.

The predominance of a lower-educated old issue constituency does, as already mentioned, not entail that all relatively higher educated are occupied with *new* issues. Numerous studies from the seventies onwards have demonstrated the existence of a 'new-class' cleavage, whereby the middle class is divided on the basis of diverse variables (for an overview see Güveli and de Graaf 2007) which makes them more or less adherents of post-materialist values and more or less prone to engage themselves in new social movements (Kriesi 1989). Especially so-called 'social-cultural specialists' as opposed to 'technocrats/controllers' (Kriesi 1989; de Graaf and Kalmijn 1995) are said to be typical new issue supporters. Emblematic for these individuals are high educational achievements set off against often modest-income jobs, like 'social scientists, specialists in art and culture, architects, teachers, welfare workers, librarians, journalists and other people with similar occupations' (Houtman 2004: 123). These are essentially individuals working in the softer sectors of society and who dispose over high amounts of cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986) and thus high, non-economic social status. They constitute the 'new' class of so-called post-industrial societies (Güveli and de Graaf 2007). Cottgrove and Duff's study on 'middle-class radicalism' (1980) found similar evidence: most individuals in their study of early environmentalists were occupying roles in the 'non-productive service sector: doctors, social workers, teachers, and the creative arts' (Cottgrove and Duff 1980: 76).

Inglehart and Welzel (2005: 61) are less specific when it comes to the importance of job sector: 'Within any given society, those with higher incomes, higher education, and jobs in the service sector tend to emphasize self-expression values more strongly than the rest of their compatriots'. How the middle class itself is divided into those with more and those with less affinity with self-expressive and emancipative values is in this study not directly measurable (see below), but keeping this in mind, it is safe to say that new issues will attract the relatively higher educated in their defense or propagation.

Knowing the relation between educational status and issue affinity with old and new issues, what rests is thus assessing the relation between schooling levels with consensual issues. As mentioned, these are not situated on any economic nor ideological cleavage. They often comprise a strong moral appeal and are not occupied by specific organizations nor societal groups. Furthermore they are most of the time momentary and highly

reactive, and do not appeal to people in longer term built-up issue-related ideologies or values. And, most importantly, they quasi-unanimously affect and/or concern a population and exactly cut across existing cleavages and (related) socio-economic divisions. Consequently, and also given the fact that civic and political participation biased towards the better-off and, most importantly, the higher-educated, we would at first sight expect that those taking part in protest on consensual issues are, compared to both old and new issue demonstrators, averagely schooled.

What about the secondary scope dimension? Can we, and if yes, how can we relate this issue dimension with differential education levels? Pre-existing evidence on this matter is hard to find, so thinking of a potential relation is difficult and largely a matter of common sense. Lower educational levels result in cognitive constraints, whereas longer education is expected to provide people with a broader outlook on the world. It is trough this quality that the capability of broadening not only the interests, but also the concerns beyond the own life-sphere logically relates to higher educational levels.

Socio-Demographics and Mobilizing Issues

To continue with education, Stubager (2007) even goes so far as to describe education, or rather differential education levels, as a societal division that has in fact all the features of a cleavage, complete with oppositional identities between both groups, and with a strong correlation to the adherence of libertarian and authoritarian values by higher and lower educated people respectively. Safe to say, then, that education levels will be highly correlated to most other personal feature variables. This will be less the case for the two remaining socio-demographics, but nonetheless the three of them together are logically coherent within both issue dimensions.

Table 2 summarizes the above into the typology of mobilizing issues. Old issue demonstrators are thus typical ‘old social movement’ demonstrators, being somewhat older, lower educated men. New issue demonstrators are more a mixture of men and women, with predominantly more women. They are relatively young and definitely higher educated. Indeed, they have the features of typical new social movement members. Consensual issue protest attracts relatively more females, who are of average age and education, compared to both other issue type protesters.

Table 2 also incorporates the secondary scope dimension. Each thematic issue type is subdivided in being simultaneously either an universalistic or a particularistic issue. In other words, the socio-demographic features of the three general thematic issue protest participants vary by their place on the particularistic-universalistic issue dimension.

This clearly makes a difference. Old issue protesters on the particularistic end are the more extreme version of general old issue demonstrators, with even less female, less young and less educated participants. A similar pattern is found in the subcategory of universalistic new issues, mobilizing more and higher educated women. This makes them quite similar to universalistic consensual issue protesters, which shows how the scope issue dimension can be conceived as a tool to exactly give the thematic issue division more dimensionality. Similarly, universalistic old, and particularistic new issue protesters show to have similar features. And particularistic consensual issue protesters are very akin to general old issue demonstrators.

TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF THE EXPECTATIONS ON THE RELATION BETWEEN SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICS AND TYPES OF MOBILIZING ISSUES

	Socio-demographics		
	Gender (fem)	**Age**	**Education**
Part	- -	+ +	- -
OLD	-	+	-
Univ	-/+	+/-	-/+
Part	+/-	-/+	+/-
NEW	+(/-)	-	+
Univ	+	--	++
Part	+/-	+	-
CONS	+	+/-	+/-
Univ	++	-	+

Having explored these main relevant socio-demographic variables, we can assess the relevance and role of the remaining, more action-specific personal features in mobilizing specific groups of people to the streets on specific kinds of issues.

Political Attitudes

'[W]hich political goals are most likely to attract people depends on [their]… attitudinal affinities, which makes people more receptive to some goals than others' (Inglehart and Welzel 2005 :212). Both Downton and Wehr (1998) and Klandermans (1997) refer to the importance of attitudes in getting people involved, all referring to long-term socialization processes which even start at early childhood. In our case, we describe political attitudes as those general and rather stable political attitudes that are expected to foster protest participation; something Verba et al. (1995) call political engagement. General political attitudes reflecting people's interest in politics as well as their own position in the political spectrum are key variables in any study dealing with individual-level political behavior (Dalton and Klingemann 2007). People who consider themselves as being (very) interested in politics are more politically active than those who do not, as evidenced in numerous studies (for overviews: Verba et al 1995: 345-6; Milbrath and Goel 1977). In addition, interest in politics is also a proxy for other related attitudinal (as well as behavioral) variables, like political efficacy, political information-seeking and overall political knowledge (Verba et al 1995: 348).

A second evergreen variable in political behavior studies is that of left-right self-placement (Mair 2007). In contemporary Western societies, the left-right scale is a parameter of both party preferences as well as of broad political attitudes; these latter being the most important correlates of left-right self-placement when causally interpreted as preceding party choice (Knutsen 1997). Yet the fact that this left-right scale exactly consists out of (at least) two dimensions, has also made it the object of heavy criticism (Mair 2007; Vinopal 2009). Yet, on the other hand it is one of the strongest and most robust variables in political science. And, it works (Mair 2007). Although validity and multidimensionality have been questioned 'the left-right divide … continues to serve as a powerful device in both national and cross-national explanations of political behavior, both at mass and elite levels' (Mair 2007: 219). Below I will get a bit more into the thematic substance of this left-right scale, but for a detailed and systematic overview and well-balanced analysis, see Mair (2007).

Together, both attitudinal variables of political interest and left-right self placement are probably the most commonly used independent variables in the field of political sociology.

They are the two variables measuring political attitudes which are indispensible in any study on the relation between individuals and politics, and that is also why these have been incorporated in all data collection efforts this study draws on. Given their theoretical importance, relating them to specific issue types should therefore be relatively uncomplicated.

For instance, in a recent study on attitudes and behavior concerning violence, peace and war, covering a representative sample of the Flemish-speaking part of Belgium (60 percent of the total inhabitants of the country), both attitudes show very relevant in explaining variation in all kinds of issue-related attitudes and behavior. Next to the aforementioned strong relation to relatively high levels of knowledge on (international) politics, high levels of political interest are positively related to pacifist attitudes and peace activism. Similarly, leftist attitudes show highly positively correlated to pacifist attitudes, pacifist conduct and peace activism (Verhulst et al. 2007). Also, the issue of peace and national defense is (one of the) most important issue(s) discerning between materialists and postmaterialists (Inglehart 1990: 296)

Political Interest

In accordance with new issue protesters' expected relative higher educational levels and cognitive skills, we expect them to have high political interest, to show high, related, information-seeking behavior and high levels of political knowledge. Old issue protesters are, for the same reasons, expected to be a lot less interested in politics. And, similar to the above-mentioned reasoning, are consensual issue protesters most likely to represent those individuals from the broad societal mobilization potential that have relative high interest in politics. Universalists in turn are more likely to have higher levels of interest in politics: only when an issue is fully understood in political terms, and thus also when the ambit of the issue as well as of the groups concerned with them is assessed, will people engage in universalistic issues. Particularistic protests are often a more straightforward defense or propagation of the interests or ideas of specific groups, making the -subjective-political dimension of protest less important.

Left-Right Attitudes

Relating the second attitudinal variable of political interest to the different issue types is a largely similar story. In general, and, as mentioned by Knutsen (1997), 'as a hybrid variable reflecting both a partisanship component and an ideological component that sums up one's position on current issues, Left-Right ideological self-placement should occupy an intermediate position between voting and support for social change' (Inglehart 1990: 306). In concrete, however, the ideological/attitudinal dimension can also be two-layered, when perceived as combining attitudes on social-cultural issues on the one, and social-economic on the other hand. Furthermore, people positioning themselves on the right-hand side of the social-culturally-interpreted left-right dimension, might position themselves on the left of the social-economic dimension. In fact, this is what earlier-mentioned realignment of parties and voters is all about.

Given all these difficulties, however, the left-right self placement scale continues to be ubiquitously used, and also continues to work (Mair 2007), but is less straightforward to theorize on. I suggest the following reasoning. New issues very often have to do with issues often categorized within left-libertarian or 'new-left' values and ideologies. These are very often captured by parties situated more on the left of the political spectrum, and which most often also share a leftist position on 'old-left' redistribution issues. New issue demonstrators are thus very likely to consider themselves as leftist. Both lines of reasoning are substantially proven by, yet again, another account by Inglehart (1990). Old issue demonstrators are however more likely to be more mixed on both dimensionalities, and combine 'old-left' social-economic identifications with more conservative, authoritarian, nationalist and/or ethnocentric ones. Once again, such self-placement on a multilayered left-right dimension is then emblematic of what some have referred to as the 'losers' of postindustrialism and globalization (ibid.; Kriesi et al. 2006; Rydgren 2007). As a consequence, I thus expect them to situate themselves relatively higher on the left-right scale, and thus to be relatively less leftist. Analytically, consensual issue protesters are, given the cleavagelessness of the issue, likely to position themselves somewhere in the middle of the left-right scale, or at least more or less reflecting the average position of the total population. Knowing however that leftist identity is a strong predictor of participation in general (and rightist ones thus are not), we expect consensual issue protesters to be more leftist than their old issue counterparts.

Political Attitudes and Mobilizing Issues

Again, the above is summarized in Table 3. Note that I do not relate the scope dimension to the left-right placement variable. This would not be appropriate as one expects it to be cut across by left-right dimension, just as it would be by the survival-self-expression dimension. Old issue protesters, then are less interested and have more rightist political views. New issue protesters are highly interested, leftist demonstrators. Consensual issue protesters are somewhere in between both others.

TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF THE EXPECTATIONS ON THE RELATION BETWEEN POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND TYPES OF MOBILIZING ISSUES

	Political Attitudes	
	Political Interest	**Left-Right Placement**
Part	--	.
OLD	-	+
Univ	-/+	.
Part	+/-	.
NEW	+	-
Univ	++	.
Part	-	
CONS	+/-	+/-
Univ	+	.

Again, including the second issue dimension (only for the political interest variable) broadens the distance between particularistic old and universalistic new issue protesters, and brings more close their respective counterparts on the interest variable. Consensual issue protesters become more close to general new or old issue demonstrators as it is a universalistic or particularistic issue respectively. Overall, we could say thus that political attitudes vary gradually: Universalistic new issues are on one end of the scale, and particularistic old are on the other, with new and old issue protesters gradually overlapping with consensual issue protesters.

Political Behavior: Previous Protest Experience

The more people have been active in protest the past, the more they will be prone to continue to be active protesters (Verhulst and Van Laer 2010). This not only has to do with

the ratio between participation investments made and the degree to which alternatives are appealing (Klandermans 1997: 97). More even this has to do with the fact that political participation has to be learnt (Verhulst and Walgrave 2009), and that political behavior is a cumulative process: the more someone is politically active, the more they are likely to get involved in still more such behavior (Verba et al 1995). Protesters gradually learn the ropes of protesting, become skilled at getting passed some, mostly very practical, barriers and get embedded within networks of like-mindeds (see below) fostering future participation (Verhulst and Van Laer 2010). Once you take to the streets, chances are high you will take to the streets again; in other words, 'the first time is the hardest' (Verhulst and Walgrave 2009; Verhulst and Van Laer 2010). Also, the higher the past protest frequency, the more likely the future frequency will be high too. Apart from this one-dimensional and purely quantitative measure, people can also be active in protest in many different ways, via different action *repertoires*, ranging from very low-threshold actions like petitioning and hanging posters at one's window, to more disruptive acts (like strikes and sit-ins) and even violent action forms. Issue-differences are probably more encompassing concerning this latter measure of previous political behavior than the first.

Protest Experience

To be brief: at first sight there is no reason to believe old issue protesters to be more or less experienced than new issue demonstrators, except one: that of the relatively constancy of specific issue-salience, which however lies beyond the scope of this research. Consensual issue protesters on the other hand are, evidently, likely to be relatively inexperienced protesters. The same most likely goes for demonstrators on particularistic issues, as the probability of past and future protest is most likely related to the condition that the same, specific issue regains a new phase of heightened salience. In other words: people protesting on issues directly affecting themselves probably have fewer protest opportunities than those protesting on more universalist issues, and will also be less inclined to engage in protest different from the ones benefiting the own group.

Action Repertoire Diversity

Discriminating between old and new issue protesters based on *action repertoire diversity* is more evident, given the fact that new issue protests typically draw on such diversity, whereas this remains largely confined to protest demonstrations and strikes for old issue protests (Dalton and Kuechler 1990; Rucht 1990). Thus, new issue protesters are likely to be confronted with a range of protest opportunities on a larger variation of repertoires than old issue demonstrators. Those on consensual issues again, most probably have the least diverse experience. For the same reasons as above, particularistic issue protesters most probably have fewer diversified protest experience than their counterparts on universalistic issues.

Political Behavior and Mobilizing Issues

Table 4 summarizes the above. Old and new issue protesters seem not to differ that much from one another concerning their political behavior, except for a constant higher diversity for new issue demonstrators. General consensual issue protesters are considered to be the least experienced demonstrators, but after incorporating the secondary dimension, they have a similar protest experience as particularistic old issue protesters; universalistic consensual issue protesters are very much alike general old issue protesters.

TABLE 4: SUMMARY OF THE EXPECTATIONS ON THE RELATION BETWEEN POLITICAL BEHAVIOR AND TYPES OF MOBILIZING ISSUES

	Political Behavior	
	Protest Experience	**Action Repertoire Diversity**
Part	-	-
OLD	+/-	+/-
Univ	+	+
Part	-	+/-
NEW	+/-	+
Univ	+	++
Part	--	--
CONS	-	-
Univ	-/+	-/+

General organizational embeddedness

In this part, organizational embeddedness is defined as a priori involvement in formal participation networks, mostly member organizations and associations. In general, theories are relatively straightforward: participating in such organizations can deliver crucial practical, social and cultural resources and skills which are deemed important in all kinds of activism; it can develop practical experience with democratic values (and in this way is also linked to skills and resources)(Verba et al 1995: 18), cultivate further political behavior (Putnam 2000; Verba et al 1995), and make mobilization more evident (ibid; Rosenstone and Hansen 1995). Thus, the more people are involved in such formal networks - in terms of involvement as well as in terms of the diversified amount of involvement (overlapping memberships) – the more these people can be found ready for protest on issues they are interested in.

The questions then are, first, which issues attract more, and which attract fewer protesters who are actively engaged organization members (formal embeddedness)? And second, which issues attract those demonstrators with the most, and which with the fewest diversely organizationally embedded protesters, as revealed by the amount of overlapping memberships in a diversity of membership organizations?

As put forward by Walgrave (1992), old issues are generally more likely to be crystallized into strong organizations than new issues. First, old issue organizations dealing with redistributive issues and the protection of the workforce and (their) welfare have historically grown into strong, often neo-corporatist organizations (Dalton, Kuechler and Bürklin 1990: 14). The same partly goes for other old issue organizations, like those on nationalist and regionalist issues, many of which have long-lasting historical roots in, often emancipatory movements (Leemans, Deneckere, Boeva and Verdoodt 1999). ‘New radical right’ (Kitschelt 1995; Norris 2005) and ‘extremist right’ (Mudde 1996) ideas and ideologies are either lived within close-knit organizational networks of same-issue organizations, or, as is most often the case, absorbed by new radical right parties (Kitschelt 1995). Old issues are thus often strongly incorporated by single-issue organizations, making some kind of related organizational affiliation by those protesting on this issue very likely, as will be shown in more detail below in the section on mobilization.

New issues are in rule less subject to formal organization, more loosely structured, and dispose over a less formal base and formalized members (Dalton, Kuechler and Bürklin 1990: 15). Conversely, new issues are often very much fragmentized into numerous smaller organizations dealing with very specific aspects of 'new' issues, like e.g. peace or environment. Still, these different organizations most often relate to each other not as competitors, but rather as equal partners in a joint struggle or project. This within-issue fragmentation makes that mobilizations aiming at large numbers (as is the case with most protest demonstrations), is always a matter of cooperation between these different organizations. Moreover, different organizations and associations on *different* new issues (environment, human rights, third world, LGTB-rights,…), are, as amply shown in numerous accounts, all interlaced within strongly interwoven but loosely-structured networks, or 'loosely structured protest communities', as evidenced by many overlapping memberships and affinities, and close mobilization ties. (Oberschall 1980; Staggenborg 1986; Taylor and Whittier 1992; Diani 2005, 2009). The following observation by Mario Diani (2009) on the February 15 2003 global protest action day against war in Iraq is exemplary:

They [the February 15 protest demonstrations] … mobilized very broad sectors of civil society, at least of its leftist sections. The organizers showed a complex relationship to peace activism. On the one hand, many organizations were not primarily oriented to peace issues. On the other hand, their members had a substantial background in peace activism. Not only that: they also had above the average connections to both the world of associations and to the protest communities operating within civil society. In this sense, members of promoting organizations acted as links between specific peace issues and much broader sectors of collective action.

The difference between old and new issue network embeddedness can be summarized by Putnam's (2000) distinction between bonding and bridging ties (see also Gittell and Vidal 1998). The first are typical for old issue embeddeness, where close ties are created and constantly reinforced, leading to strong in-group feelings and identities, but few outward ties. Bridging ties are exactly those ties crosscutting different themes and issues, and these have been associated with not only new issues as a whole, but more specifically with new, 'self-organized and elite-challenging action' (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 142). The field of new issues is horizontal, multi-faceted and mutually supportive.

For evident reasons mentioned several times before, though consensual issue protester will be active more, and in more diverse types of organizations than the national population, they will be less so compared to both others.

What could we expect, finally, on the scope dimension? The dichotomous embeddedness measure is difficult to logically relate to this dimension; that of embedded diversity does make more sense. To do so, the abovementioned distinction between bonding and bridging social capital is useful once more. Without any reference to new or old issues; those protesters having more diverse network ties are more likely to engage in universalistic issue protest than those with only few of such ties. Particularistic issues typically engage people on one specific, well-defined and distinct conflict, whereas universalistic issues are explicitly broader. Bridging ties are at least one way of getting in touch with this latter kind of issues.

Organizational Embeddedness and Mobilizing Issues

Old and new issue protesters are each other's mirror images when it comes to differential organizational embeddedness, with old issue protesters being more formally embedded, but in a lower diversity of organizations, and their new issue counterparts being less formally embedded, but involved in more different kinds of organizations, offering a larger diversity of movement ties. Consensual issue protesters are the least embedded, in the fewest diversity of groups. Table 5 summarizes the above propositions on organizational embeddedness, and fits them into the typology.

TABLE 5: SUMMARY OF THE EXPECTATIONS ON THE RELATION BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONAL EMBEDDEDNESS AND TYPES OF MOBILIZING ISSUES

	Organizational Embeddedness	
	Formal embedded	**Embedded Diversity**
Part	.	-
OLD	+	+/-
Univ	.	+
Part	.	+/-
NEW	+/-	+
Univ	.	++
Part	.	- -
CONS	-	-
Univ	.	-/+

Personal Features and Mobilizing Issues

In the previous couple of pages, I have made several separate assumptions on the relation between different protesters' personal characteristics and the issue they are active on. Here, I recapitulate the results of this quest, and assess how these relate to each other in a general evaluation of how personal features relate to the different issue dimensions. In Table 6, all personal feature tables are assembled.

Following this overview, universalists in general are *relatively* older, higher educated, and more female protesters, with high political interest; more, and more diverse protest experience, and more diverse organizational embedding than their particularistic counterparts. The expectations on universalistic protesters are strikingly fitting overall 'activist profiles' (Verhulst and Van Laer 2010). *All* relevant personal features can be related in a clear and unidirectional way to this dimension. Regardless of the type of cleavage they are embedded in (or not embedded in) do universalistic issues inherently imply a broader, longer-term scope, and more and stronger personal involvement from its supporters. People active on universalistic issues are expected to put these issues and their activism on it more central in their lives, also reflecting higher levels of political engagement, and more diverse network involvement and more diverse political involvement. Finally, universalistic issues are in essence issues that explicitly transcend self-interest or that of a specific group, and only when people are satisfied in their basic needs, 'egocentrism reduces and makes way for homocentrism' (Maslow 1954), and therefore they are expected to be somewhat older and higher educated.

Table 6 also indicates high degrees of similarity between universalistic and new issue protesters, as they are very often reinforcing the thematic issue features. Although the argumentations are different, the end result is that, when it comes to personal features, both issue types mobilize similar, largely typical 'new-activist' profiles. For the reasons described above, and as summarized in one final quote by Inglehart and Welzel (2005: 34), new values and according (political) behavior is to be found in 'the young more than the old, the relatively secure more than the insecure, the educated more than the uneducated, and those having diverse human interactions more than those embedded in closely tied networks'. Together with the fact that new issues attract people with high overall leftist attitudes and strong political interest, this is exactly what is shown in Table 6.

TABLE 6: SUMMARY OF THE EXPECTATIONS ON THE RELATION BETWEEN PERSONAL FEATURES AND TYPES OF MOBILIZING ISSUES

	Socio-demographics			Political Attitudes		Political Behavior		Organizational Embeddedness	
	Gender	Age	Education	Political Interest	Left-Right	Protest Experience	Repertoir Diversity	Formal embeddedness	Embedded Diversity
Part	- -	+ +	- -	--	.	-	-	.	-
OLD	-	+	-	-	+	+/-	+/-	+	+/-
Univ	-/+	+/-	-/+	-/+	.	+	+	.	+
Part	+/-	-/+	+/-	+/-	.	-	+/-	.	+/-
NEW	+(/-)	-	+	+	-	+/-	+	+/-	+
Univ	+	- -	++	++	.	+	++	.	++
Part	+/-	+	-	-	.	- -	- -	.	- -
CONS	+	+/-	+/-	+/-	+/-	-	-	-	-
Univ	++	-	+	+	.	-/+	-/+	.	-/+

One final, important remark. The fact that, to state the most obvious case, expectations for universalistic and new issue protesters are very similar does *not* mean that they describe the same dimensions. This second dimension is expected to cut across the first, making, for instance, that protesters on new issues which can also be labeled as universalistic will have the most activist profiles of all, whereas this profile will be tuned down in new but particularistic issue protests, of which the constituency will be in turn, for instance, very akin to universalistic consensual protests.

Old issues and consensual issues seem each other's mirror images. Compared to all other issue demonstrations, old issues are expected to attract *relatively* more lower-educated, older men, with low 'attitudinal availability' as measured by political interest, and relatively less leftist views. These somewhat 'weaker' activist profiles, which are very akin to those expected for particularistic issue, as compared to those likely to be active on new and universalistic issues, are however compensated by relatively high action experience and formal embeddedment, which are thus similar to those expected for new and universalist issue protesters. Consensual issue protesters, finally, are expected to have relatively opposite features; they are close to the universalistic issue protesters profiles when it comes to socio-demographics and political attitudes, and closer to the particularistic protesters profiles on both other groups of features, with low experience, and low overall embeddedment.

Most intriguing are the overlaps in the personal features of protesters on the different issue dimensions together. As said, the universalistic dimension clearly reinforces the new issue dimension, making protesters on new, universalistic issues a sort of advanced new issue protesters. A similar mechanism more or less occurs with particularistic, old issues, making protesters on such issues the most opposite to new universalistic issues. Logically then, but remarkably, are particularistic new and universalistic old issue protesters highly alike. And, finally, particularistic consensual issue protesters are quite akin to (particularistic) old issue demonstrators; their universalistic counterparts match up with new issue protesters to a considerable degree.

Clearly, concerning personal features, the inclusion of the secondary scope dimension creates a sort of continuity within the nominal thematic dimension. This then also entails that, when it comes to personal features, protesters of a universalistic or particularistic thematic issue could be to a lesser or larger degree interchangeable with protesters on

another thematic issue in one of both subcategories. In the next few parts we will witness that the interplay of both dimensions delivers some more interesting and consistent protest participation patterns.

How? Mobilization dynamics

Mobilization is the key element in bringing together the demand and supply of collective political action (Rosenstone and Hansen 1995; Brady 1999; Klandermans 2004). Bert Klandermans subdivided the mobilization process in two distinct processes, that of consensus mobilization and action mobilization (Klandermans 1984; 1997; 2004). In simple terms, the first aims at attaining an 'attitudinal disposition' towards participation, the second one to get people targeted and motivated for participation, and to actually get them on the streets.

Most of the time, however, consensus mobilization is accompanied, and sometimes even substituted by 'consensus formation', being the 'unplanned convergence of meaning in social networks and subcultures' (Klandermans 1992: 80), which in fact to a large degree reflects the process by which issues are turned into mobilizing issues. Actual mobilization for action has to do with reducing thresholds and barriers for participation and providing incentives, making participation for action as easy and as rewarding as possible. Still, as this research focuses on those already participating by selecting on the dependent variable, the study objects are in fact those who have taken all possible participation thresholds. Therefore, assessing the different ways in which these thresholds are overcome, i.e. the incentives and 'cost-reducing' mechanisms that convinced them to hit the streets is difficult. Likewise it is difficult to assess the importance of the strength of objectives and motivations in explaining who shows up at demonstrations and who doesn't, although new research designs show promising in being able to do so (Van Laer 2011).

What I can and will do in this study is assessing different mobilization trajectories: how, through which and which diversity of channels, did people get to know about the protest event on the issue, and in who's company did they decide to attend this event. As the key of mobilization lies in 'being asked' (Rosenstone and Hansen 1995; Verba et al. 1995; Schussman and Soule 2005) knowing the channels through which people have been asked, and the relation to the company with whom they decide to attend a demonstration is essential. This brings us back to the importance of the embeddedness in formal, less formal and informal networks. In the previous part on personal characteristics I already

highlighted the importance of this embeddedness in the capacity of a personal-structural personal feature. Here, it will be assessed in its dynamic, activated capacity.

Next to the earlier discussed personal features, which indicate people's empirical realities, the measures used below to grasp mobilization processes essentially capture the second cleavage element of organizational involvement. Knowing to which degree people effectively mobilized through formal or rather informal mobilizing networks and ties is crucial, since cleavage literature makes us expect differential such networks and ties for different thematic issues.

Clearly, mobilization is largely a matter of networks, formal ones, informal ones, as well as those in between. Being a member of an organization that stages a specific protest, knowing someone who is, or being embedded in a network that is in some other way linked to this organization, will make participation on this protest more likely. This relates to what Passy (2001: 180) terms the 'structural-connection function of social networks', whereby 'people who have social ties with people already involved in a movement organization are more likely to become involved in that organization' and thus also to take the streets in protest organized by this organization, if only it were for the mere fact that they are more likely to being asked to do so (Rosenstone and Hansen 1995). Being directly or indirectly involved in an organization or with its organization members enhances the chances of being mobilized on a protest event set up by this organization. Still, organizations are not the entire story, and many other interpersonal networks are said to facilitate recruitment to activism too. Evidently, people who are embedded within informal and loose networks in which a specific issue is of central importance are also far more likely to be activated on that issue when it becomes the object of mobilizing efforts than those who are not (Passy 2001).

The most common reference to such social networks is that of 'micromobilization contexts' (McAdam 1988b; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1988), which constitute 'a wide variety of social sites within people's daily rounds where informal and less formal ties between people can serve as solidarity and communication facilitating structures when and if they choose to go into dissent together' (McCarthy 1996: 143). These micromobilization contexts 'encompass a variety of contexts in which face-to-face interaction is the social setting from which meanings critical to the interpretation of collective identities, grievances and opportunities are created, interpreted and

transformed' (Mueller 1992: 10). Clearly, micromobilization contexts constitute the bridge between individual actors and collective action, not only in practical way, but also through interactive motivational processes, a link which will be elaborated on in the next part.

Still, Jasper (1997: 62) points out to the fact that many networks exist independently of and prior to collective action, and that others 'develop specifically for political purposes without any independent collective identity behind them', and that it is thus very difficult to truly assess the importance of informal networks in activating people, also since informal social networks are omnipresent and therefore are not necessarily causally linked to participation. Reinterpreting Piven and Cloward's well-known statement on organizational networks, this would mean that the variable of protest cannot be accounted for by the constant of social interaction networks. Still, Jasper's comment is to a certain degree accurate, in the sense that micromobilization contexts often constitute out of interaction networks in the lap of organizations and thus becomes 'merely a proxy' (McAdam and Paulsen 1993: 622) for organizational membership.

Nonetheless, such formal but 'weak bridging ties' make that 'movements typically spread by means of diffuse networks of weak bridging ties or die for lack of such ties (Oberschall 1973, 1980; McAdam and Rucht 1993: 61; see also Oberschall 1973; 1983). On the other hand are networks with strong ties, those consisting of family, friends or colleagues, an even less formal level of recruitment than micromobilization contexts, also evidenced to be primary recruiters into collective action (Snow, Zurcher and Ekland-Olson 1980; McCarthy 1996). The reason is simple: these are to a large extent 'chosen' out of a shared vision on the world and out of having matching ideologies, which (thus) also concern social change and social justice (Jasper 1997: 62-65). Measuring these networks and their relative importance in the activation of individuals is difficult, but by assessing diverse mobilization tracks we might however be able to get strong clues on their importance. Finally, mobilization is not *all* about networks. Walgrave and Manssens (2000) have made a convincing case that in some cases, mass media can engage in successful consensus and even action mobilization, although interpersonal evaluations and discussions always play at least some role.

Mobilization is thus a matter of both communication channels and network ties. This embeddedness can range from formal to non-formal, and the channels from public to private. Based on this latter assumption, and in line with similar but less comprehensive

work of Snow, Zurcher and Ekland-Olson (1980), Walgrave and Van Aelst (2003) presented the concept of '*open*' and '*closed*' mobilization channels, which was later elaborated upon by Verhulst and Walgrave (2009) Walgrave and Verhulst (2009) and Walgrave and Klandermans (2010).

This idea is very straightforward[8]. In an open mobilization process the public as a whole, and not only people with certain social features is the potential target of mobilization efforts. The mass media are the epitome of an open mobilization channel (Walgrave and Manssens 2000). Although there are some notable biases in media use, the mass media can be considered as ubiquitous mobilizers because a vast majority of the population is confronted with it. As a consequence, no specific features are required to become a target of mobilization via the media. Mobilization through specific organizations, in contrast, is of the closed type: people need to have certain specific features, in this case membership, to become the target of mobilization efforts; or they need to have made certain specific decisions in the past, in this case the decision to become a member of that specific organization. These are two examples of typical open and close mobilization information channels -media vs. organizations- refer to meso- and macro-level agencies.

Yet, open and closed mobilization types can be traced back to the micro level as well. On a micro level, family, friends, acquaintances and neighbors can be considered as mobilization channels able to reach virtually the whole population. Within the closed mobilization type too, micro level equivalents are available: co-members of an organization and colleagues/classmates. A lot of people have neither colleagues nor fellow students and consequently mobilization via these micro channels is not of the open but of the closed type, only able to reach a specific cross section of the population.

Mobilization thus has to do with two separate things: information or mobilization *channels* on the one hand, which can range from very 'open' to very 'closed', and the nature of network *ties* on the other, which can also be interpreted in these terms of openness and closedness but for which it is more appropriate to assess as a continuum ranging from strong to weak ties (Granovetter 1973; Ashman, Brown and Zwick 1998; Diani, Lindsay and Purdue 2007; Walgrave and Klandermans 2010). Tie strength is defined by Granovetter (1973: 1361) as the '(probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional

[8] See: Walgrave and Verhulst 2009

intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie'. Weak ties then, are thus more instrumental and less based on intimate relations, and are said to be more effective in the activation of individuals (Walgrave and Klandermans 2010), and the strength of these weak ties lies in the fact that they have the ability to 'connect otherwise socially isolated groups' (Ashman et al. 1998: 154), making them crucial in the spreading of information between cliques.

As such, mobilization refers to the active role of networks, be it formal or informal, in getting people involved in protest. Mobilization thus is a strong indicator of the degree to which different issues are mobilized through stronger organizations or rather through more ephemeral networks of like-minded spirits, or both.

As in the previous sections on the *who* of participation, I will now explain the relation between mobilizing issues and mobilization dynamics. As this relation is often relatively obvious, and as the concept of mobilization dynamics (to which I from now on in general also refer to in terms of 'open', 'closed' and 'mixed') and its subparts are relatively straightforward, the discussion will consequently be less lengthy.

Once more let us start with the relation between old, new, and consensual issues and mobilization dynamics. As mentioned in the previous part, old issues are traditionally occupied by strong and powerful hierarchical organizations. These large organizations, dealing with 'old' issues and cleavages are characteristically strong member organizations and dispose over typically large mobilization machineries which they deploy mostly to reinforce their position at times of official power negotiations through protest 'bloc recruitment' (cf. Oberschall 1973). Also the less strong-built old issue organizations, mostly on culturalist issues are quite rigid membership organizations, with primordially internal mobilization dynamics (Duyvendak and Giugni 1995). Clearly, old issues will most likely mobilize people with weak, formal ties, through closed mobilization efforts.

The fact that 'old' issues are typically incorporated by organizations does not mean that new issues are not. Thousands of organizations deal with new issues. Yet, these organizations are often smaller and have much lower membership rates. This of course has to do with the fact that the new cleavages on which these movements operate are far less crystallized, and that new issue organizations also want to objectify their ideals of basic democracy and low professionalism, resulting in smaller sizes and mobilizing power

(Gamson 1990; Clemens 1993; Clemens and Minkoff 2004). On the other hand do these different movements on distinct but related new issues often find each other at times of large mobilizations (see for instance Verhulst (2010) on the 2003 global anti-war demonstrations). I expect the mobilization dynamics of new issue demonstrations to be mixed; with largely closed mobilization efforts resulting in mobilizing people embedded in strong-tied networks, with interpersonal relations on the fringes of movements being at least equally important than pure movement-initiated mobilization efforts. People will be informed through one of their memberships, and take this message home to their personal sphere of friends or loved ones, or to other micromobilization contexts, thus spreading the word and themselves mobilizing others to join in.

Consensual issues are the epitomes of what open mobilization dynamics are all about. The fact that these issues are not situated on any pre-existing cleavage makes that organizational incorporation is very likely non-existing. This leads people to 'engage in an *active* search for protest possibilities' (Jasper 1997; Walgrave and Verhulst 2006: 282). Crucial in the build-up of protest on consensual issues is the activity of the mass media; the amount and the way in which they report on the issue can lead not only to consensus, but also to action mobilization (ibid; Walgrave and Manssens 2000). On the individual level non-formal, interpersonal interactions will further contribute to these open mobilization efforts, and will also result in strong-tied embeddedment of protesters.

Let us end with the issue scope dimension, with their defining characteristics being the (non-)existence of an explicit relation between the issue and specific societal groups. Here, the relation with mobilization dynamics is the least obvious. Most particularistic as well as universalistic issues of all kinds are occupied by specific organizations on those issues, thus leading to a certain degree of closed mobilization on both types of issues. One would however expect mobilization dynamics to be more closed with regard to particularistic issues, and more open for universalistic ones. As universalistic issues are dealing with less concrete matters and not pertaining to specific societal groups, they will be less internalized by strong organizations. Furthermore, as they concern such issues which are mostly rooted in values and ideologies, they are more likely to be the object of 'consensus formation' (Klandermans 1992: 80) within smaller micro-mobilization context and close, interpersonal relations on the fringes of the issues. Still, the most important argument is that universalistic issues far more than their particularistic counterparts have the capacity

to mobilize people beyond the more 'usual suspects' already active on the issue, merely because of the fact that the pool of potential activists is per definition far larger.

Mobilization Dynamics and Mobilizing Issues

Table 7 summarizes the above. Old issues attract people through closed channels and weak network ties. Oppositely, consensual issues do so through open communication channels and strong ties. New issues are positioned in between, mobilizing protesters through closed channels, but also through strong network ties.

This division is largely strengthened by the inclusion of the scope dimension. The most closed mobilization processes will be found for particularistic old issues; universalistic consensual issues will be bringing people on the streets through the most open and informal networks, channels and ties. Again, two issue subtypes reveal a same mobilization process: both universalistic old as well as particularistic consensual issues are expected to bring people to the streets in a similar mixed fashion.

TABLE 7: SUMMARY OF THE EXPECTATIONS ON THE RELATION BETWEEN MOBILIZATION FEATURES AND TYPES OF MOBILIZING ISSUES

	Mob. Channel (open-closed)	Ties (strong –weak)
Part	++	++
OLD	+	+
Univ	+/-	+/-
Part	++	+/-
NEW	+	-
Univ	+/-	--
Part	-/+	-/+
CONS	-	-
Univ	--	--

What is left now are two main questions: what about the relation between mobilizing issues and motivational dynamics leading people into action on these issues? And, second, how do we have to interpret these relations between different types of mobilizing issues with different constellations of motivational constellations, mobilization dynamics and personal characteristics? This is what will be dealt with throughout the remainder of this chapter.

Why? Motivational Dynamics

To get them involved, you've got to have an issue that smacks people somewhere inside that something is wrong … It's got to be an issue that touches them in the gut (a grassroots participant quoted by Charles Kieffer 1984: 25)

Different issues do not only attract different people, they appeal to these people in different ways, motivating them in diverse way, and leading them to participate out of distinguished objectives. As seen in the development of mobilizing issues, do all of them have to do with motivational dynamics like for instance instrumentality, collective identity and injustice, but the constellations of these motivations, or rather their 'relative weight' (Klandermans 2004: 362) will vary depending on the issue. But there is no doubt that issues, and the grievances they provoke will determine people's motivations and objectives to take action on these issues. In fact, the mechanisms through which issues can become mobilizing issues are about the same as those motivating people to become active on the issue. The reasons therefore are in fact the inextricable relation between the issue at stake, and the way in which this issue motivates people into action. In this part I will give an overview of what this 'why' of participation entails, and relate it to mobilizing issues.

Sometimes the *why* of participation is very straightforward, yet at least every so often it is not. Motivation is not a one-dimensional concept and a myriad of rational calculations, group influences and emotive grounds are important aspects playing a simultaneous role in the conscious and less conscious decision-making processes of individuals to participate in collective action. Still, whatever the reasons and motivations, the essence is clear. If people do not care, they will not act. They need to be *moved to be moved*. Yet caring, and being moved can be traced back to many things, and this is what this chapter is all about.

A first clue on differential motivational dynamics can be traced back to the writings of Max Weber ([1943] 1978). According to Max Weber ([1943] 1978), most human action can be defined as social action, which, 'by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individuals (or individuals) … takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby

oriented in its course' (Weber [1943] 1978: 20). All social action then can be categorized within one of four ideal types of social action:

Goal rational action refers to planned and deliberate action, taking into account external situations and other individuals as 'conditions' and/or 'means' to obtain a rationally chosen end. (ibid: 25) *Value rational* action refers to action based on a conscious belief in the absolute value of specific action, entirely for its own sake and independently of any prospect of external success. (ibid: 26). Obviously, both types of action are rational action since both are goal-oriented, deliberate and planned. The difference lies in the locus of the goal that is pursued. Goal rational action describes social action where the goal is external to the action; and that is where the actor is acting towards. For value-rational action, 'the meaning of the action does not lie in the achievement of a result ulterior to it, but in carrying out the specific type of action for its own sake (ibid: 25). The motivation for the act is intrinsic, and by performing the act, the goal is reached. Beside these two explicitly rational action types, Weber also discerned between two others. First, *affective* action, referring to actions based on affective, and especially emotional orientations inside the actor. It concerns action that is led by immediate impulses, like for instance revenge or releasing emotional tenses. Finally Weber describes *traditional* action as the consequence of traditions and repetition, so that the actor has no need to imagine goals, nor to be activated by a value or an emotion. It is acting out of custom. Whereas this latter is not to be fully reconciled with a *motivational* approach to protest participation the three others are, as we will see below.

These four types of action are of course ideal types, and often people act out in more than one way simultaneously. As Weber writes (ibid: 26): 'It would be very unusual to find concrete cases of … social action which were oriented only in one or another of these ways'. In more simple terms: people act out of different simultaneous orientations. As Armstrong and Bernstein argument, action on distribution of resources might be equally driven by feelings of social honor, and that contestations on meaning are often entangled with a struggle for resources (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008: 85-6). Therefore, individuals should not be expected to act in only one type of way, but out of a mixture of internal and external orientations.

Reading through the literature describing or touching upon motivations for participating in (non-conventional) politics delivers a shattered image with many conceptual tools. I will

use Weber's argument as a rough guide throughout. Before getting into more detail it is important to not that I see motivational dynamics as the result of different internal and external stimuli which form motivational constellations which, in turn, shape people's decision to participate in protest action[9]. These motivational constellations are multidimensional, and I will go through each of these dimensions below.

Instrumental and Expressive Action

What do people *explicitly* want to achieve by taking part in protest. In other words, what are their *motives*, which are the most cognitive aspect of their motivational constellation. When we apply Weber's views on social action onto the concept collective action, his two concepts of goal- and value rational action very much resemble those of instrumental versus expressive action (for related concepts see Melucci 1985; Turner and Killian 1987; Duyvendak and Giugni 1995; Rucht and Verhulst 2010; see also Klandermans and Oegema 1987: 529). I refer to instrumental action as action aimed at promoting or preventing change (Van Stekelenburg 2006). The object of change lies outside the action, and instrumental action is thus a type of goal-rational action. Key element of instrumental collective action is the belief that, by demonstrating, a specific goal will be reached. Expressive action, then, is action which is primarily aimed at expressing one's views, regardless of the potential external outcome this may or may not have. In other words, the goal of the action is intrinsic; the protest is the message (cf. Melucci 1985: 801), and all has to do with demonstrating (in the literal sense) or displaying grievances.

Which mobilizing issues then are more likely to be motivating demonstrators rather out of relatively higher instrumental motivations, and which ones rather out of non-instrumental, (thus) expressive motivations? Again the logics of the different issue dimensions speak for themselves. In an ideal type way, *new* issues, to start with, dealing with issues on left-libertarian and post-materialist ideologies and values and alongside cultural understandings, norms and identities (Williams 2004: 92) and the production of symbolic goods (Touraine 1985) are met with expressive objectives. In other words, new issues are

[9] Although proven valuable in many other studies, I will not take into account Klandermans' (1984) analytical distinction between consensus and action mobilization, since my research occupies solely with effective protest participants. Given their status as effectively mobilized, variation is mostly to be found on the dimension of consensus mobilization.

often the object of demonstrative action, exactly pinpointing the existence of the issue in an attempt to bring it to the attention of many. New issues are met with cultural and symbolic forms of resistance (Cohen 1985; Buechler 2000) by 'symbolic challenge[s] to dominant patterns' (Melucci 1985: 801). People engaging themselves for new issues thus 'challenge existing cultural codes' and this is done by enacting and demonstrating the new ones (ibid.: 812)[10].

In theory, old issues are explicitly referred to as typical instrumental issues, action on it being all about 'defending interests' and 'improving economic positions', not seldom (but also not always) out of 'narrow self-interest' (Dalton, Kuechler and Bürklin 1990: 12). In this way, they seem to be particularistic in nature, since action on old issues is always 'aimed at benefiting the interests of members of a collective, even if society or other social groups must pay the price' (ibid). One of the main claims of this thesis is that this is not necessarily the case, or rather, that there exists also a dimensionality in this kind of instrumentality. As will be shown below can old issues also be more universalistic in nature. Still, as an ideal type, old issues are acted upon with instrumental objectives.

Finally, in most cases, consensual issues mobilize people with preliminary expressive objectives, wanting to express exactly the emotions related to the injustice provoked by the issue (see below). On the other hand, Walgrave and Verhulst (2006) have shown that these can be very mixed in demonstrations similar to those captured under the header of consensual issues, as these often also explicitly aim at future prevention of similar events. One would expect consensual issue protesters to be equally driven by both motives.

How do these motives differ on the scope dimension, which refers to the respective presence or absence of a well-defined social group to which the issue is of concern and to which collective action on the issue could be of benefit. I argue that the less well-defined the group affected by the issue, and thus the broader the ambit of the issue and thus the more an issue is a *universalistic* issue, the more collective action on this issue will be guided by expressive objectives, the communicative function of demonstrating being most important. By demonstrating, participants will exactly attempt to broaden the attention of

[10] Although some new social movement scholars conclude out of this that the distinction between instrumental and expressive action, and measures of failure and success are not longer relevant; when the medium is the message (Melucci 1985: 801) instrumentality and expressivity are inextricable. Others however have noticed the explicit 'rejection of the instrumental rationality of advanced capitalist society' (Buechler 2000: 47).

the issue to as broad a public as possible: the protest is considered the message. *Particularistic* issues are more typically related to instrumental objectives. The more well-defined a group, the more this presents people with the awareness of their power to effectively change things.

Collective Action Frames: Injustice & Identity

The remaining motivations are all derived from Gamson's (1990, 1992) and later Klandermans' (1997) parsimonious concepts of collective action frames, here taken to mean constituents of motivational constellations; I will therefore not refer to them as frames, but as stand-alone concepts. These are injustice, collective identity, and agency (Gamson 1992), and have to do respectively with the interpretation of grievances, a sense of both in- and outward group feelings; and a notion of perceived efficacy of the collective action event. These three aspects have been demonstrated to be important elements of the transformation of day-to-day grievances into shared and salient grievances, but I deem only the first two important for discerning between different mobilizing issues, both when it comes to the discursive construction of mobilizing issues, as well as to the ways in which these attract people out of different motivational constellations .

Injustice: Value Threat and Security Threat Perception

Feelings of injustice are, in line with Gamson (1992: 7), the result of both cognitive judgment as well as 'hot cognitions', which are 'laden with emotions'. Rational assumptions are accompanied by righteous anger, or fear, or other emotions, and this combination of cognition and emotions fuels moral indignation.

Moral indignation, according to Klandermans (1997) has to do with the confrontation with an illegitimate inequality, violated principles, or suddenly imposed grievances. However, in this thesis I will break up the injustice concept into only two, and different concepts, merely for reasons of conceptual clarity. The overlap between the concepts of violated principles and moral indignation is substantial, as intuitively, all feelings of violated principles lead to moral indignation, whereas this is conceptually not necessarily true for perceptions of illegitimate inequality, nor for suddenly imposed grievances. These latter, in turn, can be the producers of both others.

Considering all three of these injustice aspects, they all have one thing in common: all of them have to do with the perception of some kind of *threat* or menace. I propose to approach the injustice concept in a trimmed-down way, with either *value threat perception* on the one, or *security threat perception* on the other (or a combination thereof) as its main drivers.

Value threat perceptions then refer to motivations rooted in ideologies and strong-felt values and beliefs (Klandermans 2004), and thus also refers to the reaction to the (possible) violation of highly important principles. People feel threatened or attacked in their values and ideological orientations, and this urges them to 'do something about it'. Value threat perceptions stir feelings of indignation and worry, but also fear and sorrow.

Security threat perceptions in this thesis refer to the motivational reaction to some kind of *perceived* unwanted intrusion in people's personal lives, possible having negative consequences to them and/or the affected social group they are part of. In other words they are the motivational response to a potential violation of security. This intrusion can be very explicit and for instance be based on possible pay-cuts. But it can also be mediated through feelings of collective identity, and concern individuals as possible victims of this injustice, even though this is not (yet) the case. Security threat perceptions almost always have to do with assessing the danger of being (collectively) disadvantaged, and result in the first place in feelings of unfairness. And, if events or circumstances are 'appraised as unfair, then group-based anger should be likely. … This anger should, in turn, explain group members' tendencies to take collective action to address their collective disadvantage' (van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer and Leach 2004: 650). So, whereas value threat perceptions are associated with worry and indignation, security threat perceptions are so primordially with anger and combativeness.

The line between value and security threats is a thin one. Both of them produce activating emotional responses - in this way they are related to Weber's concept of affective action, although this does not entail that they would be irrational as opposed to both previous types of social action[11]. Still the arguments to discern between them are valid, since both

[11] The view on individuals' motivations and objectives for participating in collective action writ large has for long now been the mostly implicit one of rational and instrumental beings who, in a well-informed way, weigh off the costs and benefits of participation. For long, little room was left for motives and motivations that are less straightforwardly 'rational', let alone instrumental. Whereas collective behaviorists have been criticized for describing 'actors without action', and resource

of them are likely to produce distinct emotional responses. Value threats are expected to less immediately influence people's lives, and are thus expected to be more fuelling feelings related to indignation, whereas security threats do encompass a (perceived) direct intrusion into people's personal lives; they are thus expected to produce more directly reactive and aggressive reactions.

Once again, these are not mutually exclusive motivations, on the contrary. Let me give an example. People can oppose to war because they adhere strong pacifist attitudes which are embedded within their deeper personal values and ideologies. When their government prepares a military invasion, this confronts them with a value threat, making them wanting to react out of feelings of indignation. On the other hand, people whose ideological belief system does not make them oppose war, might still do because their son, daughter or other close one is called to arms to join the military invasion. And still others who are not opposing war, and whose close ones are not called to war, might still oppose to war out of the worry that this would one day still be the case. Both latter pose people with security threats. And of course, pacifists with loved ones having to, or possibly having to go to war will display both motivations[12].

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mobilization theorists for describing 'actions without actors' (Melucci 1989: 17-20) emotions have recently gained increasing scholarly attention in the study of collective action (Jasper and Poulsen 1995; Jasper 1997; Goodwin, Jasper and Poletta 2001; Gould 2001; Aminzade and McAdam 2001, and many others), though very often these are still approached at the meso-and macro level, as 'structures of feelings' (Goodwin et al 2001:22) and as movement recruitment arguments (several chapters within this volume) which is probably due to the fact that they consider emotions as cultural or social constructs (ibid: 12), a vision they share with their theoretical antagonist Ruud Koopmans (2007: 702). What this recent surge of attention to emotions in the study of collective action does have engendered is a view on emotions which does not opposes them to rationality, something Turner and Killian already strived for when stating that '[t]o attempt to divide the actions of individuals into 'rational' versus 'emotional' or 'irrational' types is to deny the complexity of human behavior' (Turner and Killian 1989: 14; see also Snow and Oliver 1995). Recent attention in the field of social psychology shows promising results (see amongst others Simon and Klandermans 2001; Van Zomeren and Lodewijkx 2005; Van Stekelenburg 2006; Stürmer and Simon 2004).

[12] To further demonstrate the thin line between both motivation types, and also the relation to collective identity, Duncan and Stewart's (2007) article on 'personal political salience' is very elucidating. By way of examples, they write: 'For committed pacifists, consideration of war by the leaders of their country is … 'personal'. For an individual who identifies with the label 'feminist', political debate about the rights of women to work in particular occupations or public discussion of women's ability to 'do math' are experienced not merely as hot political topics but as personally relevant.' (Duncan and Stewart 2007: 144).

Reading through this overview of different motivations, one would expect a distinct relation between security threats and instrumental objectives, and value threats and expressive objectives. This is likely, however not necessarily the case, as security threats may lead to expressive objectives just as value threats can cause a call for material change. Very often, groups hit the streets after they have been the object of some kind of insecurity, like for instance the passing of a specific law. They might do so to undo this insecurity, and to restore things back the way they were. Yet they might also take to the streets to publicize their existence as a group, and to show the fact that they are able to mobilize their forces. Likewise, and more evidently, can value threats lead to a call for immediate and drastic reforms.

Relating value and security threats to the different types of mobilizing issues is not always equally straightforward. Old issue participants most likely will be mobilized out of security threat perceptions, exactly since these threats are induced by their weaker societal positions. This does not mean that they are not confronted with value threats, but these will very often, consciously or unconsciously, be translated into security threats and by consequence perceived as such. For instance: negative views on migrants might be instigated by value threats of, for instance, own cultural superiority, but the reasons for these negative views can, and more likely are also instigated by security perceptions: immigrant influx often leads to anger towards them, as they are said to increase feelings of physical unsafety; to cause job loss for the autochthonous and social security free riding. The grievances and motivations related to new issues are most likely appealing people exactly in their values and norms and 'symbolic goods', making new issues in effect primarily stir value threat perceptions in those active on them.

Finally, *consensual* issues are per definition the result of specific unforeseen events, which are not situated on any class or other societal or cultural cleavage. Often these events have lead to the unforeseen death or harm of innocent people, which 'has the power to trigger violent emotions and brings people together with little in common but their grief and their solidarity' (Tarrow 1998: 36). The event immediately creates the issue, which is thus by definition momentary. The randomness of the event, and eventually the fact that this could just as well have happened to any other random person or to another geographic community makes people to be activated by strong motivations of security threat perceptions. On the other hand do these focusing events (Kingdon 1984) also result in strong-felt moral shocks (Jasper 1997) tapping into universal values of respect for life

and physical integrity. This way, consensual issues most likely also activate people out of strong motivations of value threat perceptions.

On the issue scope dimension thinking of such a relation is largely artificial. Yet, on the whole one would expect universalistic issues to be mostly concerned with value threats, simply because they are more likely to put greater universal emotional appeal on people's values and ideologies. Particularistic issues then are more likely to be driven from security threat perception, merely because of the fact that chances are much higher that such threats are much more likely posed to very specific societal segments.

Collective Identity

Collective identity, interpreted as in-group solidarities and out-group oppositional consciousness (Klandermans 1997) is generally accredited as a strong motivation to participate: 'a strong identification with a group makes participation in collective action on behalf of that group more likely' (Klandermans 2004: 364). In-group solidarities would convince people that there are other people like themselves sharing their lot and with whom forces can be joined into action; the oppositional consciousness constitutes a common sense of who or what their actions are opposing to (Gamson 1992; Taylor and Whittier 1992). In this sense, collective identity as both in-group solidarity and out-group oppositional consciousness are essential not only in the process of consensus formation of issues into mobilizing issues, but equally importantly in the activation of people to engage in collective action.

Particularistic and universalistic issues also differ on the degree of collective identification they evoke. The fact that *particularistic* issues affect specific, well-definable societal groups makes it quite easy and likely for individuals to identify with that group and its members. For *universalistic* issue protesters it is less obvious to assess the group one could be identifying with, and the degree to which such a group would be rather hetero- or homogeneously constituted. The construction of collective identities on universalistic issues is more based on shared assumptions of 'imagined communities' which can also make them more fragile and, in fact, less strong than when they are closely related to people's personal real-life surroundings. Then again, universalistic issue demonstrations have very much to do with the display of shared, but ideational grievances, rendering identification much more a matter of choice of group belonging, making it probably

stronger and perhaps even longer-lasting. Moreover, for universalistic issues, the sharing of a collective identity might exactly be a more essential precondition for collective action. Since universalistic issues by nature are less easily linked to specific beneficiaries of action on these issues, they are also more likely to be subject to the classical dilemma of collective action (why would I engage if others will do it for me?). The mechanism of collective identification has been demonstrated to exactly help overcome this dilemma of collective action (Klandermans 2002, 2004). For these reasons, we expect universalistic issue protesters to be more engaging in collective action out of shared solidarity and collective identity than their particularistic counterparts.

Old issues, typically addressing cleavage-based specific societal groups, are logically bound by strong collective identity, mostly based on in-group solidarities grounded in the specificity of the group as well as in the shared injustice, which is inflicting equal harm to the members of the group.

Finally, theories on new social movements have put the concept of collective identity center stage in their theoretical models (Pizzorno 1978; Melucci 1988; Johnston et al. 1994; see also Polletta and Jasper 2001; Buechler 2000 and many others). Still the status of these collective identities has many faces, being at the same time interpreted as a prerequisite for movement formation and mobilization, a motive for movement participation, an outcome of movement activities, as well as an explicit strategy of movements (Polletta and Jasper 2001). On the individual level, the 'diffuse social base' to which new issues appeal (Buechler 2000: 46) and the fact that the socio-demographic cleavage element is less clear, might make the creation of collective identities exactly more difficult for people active on new than on old issues. On the other hand do new social movement theories time and again point to the fact that these diffuse social bases can indeed only become united into collective action exactly because of shared identities and solidarities concerning joint grievances. In spite of this duality, I expect new issue activists to be motivated through high collective identities.

Regarding consensual issues, the events and their randomness - the fact that 'this could have been me', or 'these could have been my kids'- trigger an instant identification not only with those affected by the issues, but also with those sharing the threat perceptions provoked by the issues. These are exemplary cases of circumstanced forcing 'a collective identity into awareness whether people like it or not' (Klandermans 2004: 364). On the

other hand, given the cleavagelesness and expected heterogeneity of the crowds protesting on consensual issues, I would expect these collective identities to be less salient than those which are imposed by shared social-economic positions or shared values.

Motivations and Mobilizing Issues

TABLE 8: SUMMARY OF THE EXPECTATIONS ON THE RELATION BETWEEN MOTIVATIONS AND TYPES OF MOBILIZING ISSUES

	Motivations			
	Instrumental (vs ex-pressive)	Value Threat Perception	Security Threat perception	Coll. ID
Part	++	--	++	-
OLD	+	-	+	+/-
Univ	+/-	-/+	+/-	+
Part	-/+	+/-	-/+	+/-
NEW	-	+	-	+
Univ	--	++	--	++
Part	+	-	++	--
CONS	+/-	+/-	+	-
Univ	-	+	+/-	-/+

Old issues appeal to people mainly through security threat perceptions, which are confronted with collective action in an instrumental search to promote or, most often prevent, social change. The grievances evoked by the issue confront them as a specific societal group which identifies itself as such. Yet this identification is enforced through their societal position and the shared threat, rather than that it is chosen, making it probably a somewhat less important participation impetus.

This is the opposite for new issue protesters, where chosen identities are based on shared values and chosen group belonging, of which the expressive collective action is the exhibition, just as it is an expression of the breach of shared, violated principles that bind the group together in the first place.

Consensual issues as well mobilize people with expressive objectives, wanting to express exactly the emotions related to both value as well as security threat perceptions (Walgrave

and Verhulst 2006), This way, they are all about expressing grief and indignation, but also about showing anger and discontent with the fact that things like these have been able to happen. Thus, next to the expressive motives, consensual issue protesters most likely also want to prevent similar events to be able to occur again in the future, making their motives a mix of expressive and instrumental ones. Given the fact that consensual issues are not based on cleavages, and thus most likely mobilize publics most resembling the population, the only collective identification between participants is derived from the shared grievances, instead of similar social-economic positions, or shared, strong-felt values and/or ideologies.

Particularistic and universalistic issues are likely to evoke opposing motivational constellations in those active on them. Universalistic issues are expected to be more dependent on collective identity motivations to pull people into collective action than particularistic issues. The fact that these latter issues essentially concern specific groups renders it more probable that protesters on this kind of issues will be motivated out of security threat perceptions, resulting in instrumental action for similar reasons as with old issue protest. Universalistic issues, produce a motivational constellation similar to those evoked by new issue, with value-threat perceptions fueling largely expressive actions.

Combining both issue dimensions, we see that the particularistic new and universalistic old issues mobilize people out of quite similar and rather diffuse motivations. Consensual issue protesters are quite different from both other issue types.

Mobilizing Issues and the Unity and Diversity of Protest Events: *A Preliminary Overview*

Let me start by reminding what is meant by the unity and diversity of protest events:

First, the kinds of people that take part in collective action, and especially protest action (*who*), the motives and motivations which spur them to do so (*why*), and the ways in which they are mobilized to engage themselves (*how*), are three dimensions of individual participation which should be studied as interrelated correlates of protest activism. This is what I have called the ***unity* within** protest events.

And **second**, the logical entwinedness of this *who*, *how* and *why* of individual participation is thematically structured around the issues that typically motivate and mobilize specific types of individuals. Put otherwise, mobilizing issues are the thematic glue that holds together different types of demonstrators. They are thus an important source of the ***diversity* between** protest events.

Up until now, this chapter has been a very episodic and enumerative account, with the intention of illustrating that variation in (almost) all important estimators of collective action participation can, at least hypothetically, be related to variation in mobilizing issues. In this part I will synthesize the above, with the explicit aim of going beyond this episodic description and to illustrate how both claims can be theoretically traced back to suppositional empirical realities.

Unity and diversity of protest events are to be studied together, as both presuppose each other. The unity within protest is a function of how they group people on similar mobilizing issues which, in turn, exactly cause the diversity between protest events. Let me start with a fictive example.

Rufus is a 46 years old construction worker. He was raised in a one-income family, together with his brother and two sisters. Rufus soon followed in his father's footsteps by going to vocational school to become a skilled metal worker. He would leave school at 17 to start working at the construction company where his uncle was a foreman. Rufus

earned a decent living, he met a girl and they would soon get married. Rufus and his wife were blessed with two daughters before long, and after renting a two-bedroom apartment for over a decade, the couple got a mortgage and finally bought the house they had been dreaming of for so many years. Rufus was a loyal and hard worker, and made it to become foreman himself a couple of years back.

A few months ago however, first rumors started. They spread throughout the workforce, and they would gain credibility along the way. The controlling corporation of the construction company Rufus had been working for for almost twenty years was losing money steadily. The credit crisis caused the demand for construction work to plummet; yet it also made it impossible to obtain stand-by credits. Within a few weeks, corporate restructurings inducing wage cuts, layoffs and the probable closure of several entire regional divisions were formally announced by corporate headquarters.

This imaginary though very realistic situation would be a fertile breeding ground for collective action. Though, not necessarily, and many conditions would have to be met for the issue of possible wage cut or jobs loss to become a mobilizing issue, as amply demonstrated in the beginning of this thesis. Yet, in the case that this situation would develop into a mobilizing issue, and assuming that Rufus would take part in collective action on this issue, he would be doing so out of his very specific situation, being a worker, and also as a worker *versus* corporate owners or capitalism; but also out of his capacity and status as a husband, a father, a colleague, … all of which are closely related to who he is and what he stands for. He would undertake action in accordance with others in the same situation, and these others will become his collective action comrades; they will mobilize one another into protest, most likely together with union organizations concerned, who will put all their efforts in making the threats posed at the different regional divisions perceived as, and mobilized on as a joint struggle. Rufus will also take action out of a specific motivational constellation based on very concrete security threat perception, causing huge uncertainty and, together with a strong identification with the others in the same situations, resulting in the mobilizing emotion of group-based anger, directed at the corporate managers, in an instrumental struggle to prevent or at least diminish the negative consequences of their decisions.

So, what does all this have to do with unity and diversity of protest events? First, the unity of protest events refers to the fact that there are many ‘Rufuses’. Or rather, that the story

of Rufus will be more or less similar for most others confronted with the same situation and related mobilizing issue. More broadly, this means that a specific situation endangers, worries or affects a specific group of people sharing a specific situation. The fact that they are concerned with a same situation, is induced by the fact that they share some specific characteristics, which are very much related to the reasons why they get concerned with the situation in the first place (in Rufus' case, since they are all workers in the same company). The theme, situation or processes invoke precise kinds of grievances which are translated into specific motivational constellations, making people search for, or be receptive to the specific mobilization dynamics which are largely a product of this theme, process or situation. Personal features, mobilization tracks and motivations for action are thus interdependent. This is what is referred to as the **unity within** protest events.

What Rufus' case also clarifies is that the constellation of people with shared characteristics, motivational constellation and mobilization dynamics is to a large degree related to the aggrieving situation that needled action. Admittedly, the protest Rufus would be participating in would be inspired by an easy to classify, and also itself easily classifying mobilizing issue. It concerns an emblematic old issue protest, as it deals explicitly with the typically materialist survival topic of work security. It also concerns a characteristically particularistic issue, since the beneficiaries of collective action are a specific, well-defined social group, namely workers at Rufus' company. Knowing both the level of concreteness of the grievances and the specificity of the group, makes the relational dynamics relatively easily understood. For other mobilizing issues, things are not always this clear. But, as I assert do all mobilizing issues mobilize people with specific characteristics, in specific ways and out of specific motivations. This is the **diversity between** protest events, and I will spend the largest part of this manuscript at evidencing this core claim.

If different issues mobilize different kinds of people with different motivations in different ways, how then would this be the case? Rufus' case has been exemplary of how things are more or less expected to go for particularistic, old protests. Still, besides this specific one, five different constellations of mobilizing issues are possible (universalistic old, new, and consensual, and particularistic new and consensual), each producing unique, logical constellations of 'who', 'why' and 'how' of protest. Meanwhile fatigued readers do not have to worry; I will not present five more fictive examples of Wendy's, Franks and

Romero's, not in the least since the existing cases which will be drawn on in the empirical part are stronger and better than one could imagine.

Table 9 presents a thorough overview of the assumptions on the relation between different mobilizing issues and the 'who', 'why' and 'how' of protest as made in the previous parts. By placing them all together, the table also reveals the concepts of protest unity and diversity with regards to both mobilizing issue dimensions. In Table 9, this diversity is displayed by the differences between the three threefold columns. Protest unity is the logical coherence of the different parts of these columns with each other, within each threefold column.

TABLE 9: SUMMARY OF THE EXPECTATIONS ON THE RELATION BETWEEN PERSONAL FEATURES, MOBILIZATION DYNAMICS, MOTIVATIONS, AND TYPES OF MOBILIZING ISSUES

WHO	Part	OLD	Univ	Part	NEW	Univ	Part	CONS	Univ
Gender	- -	-	-/+	+/-	+(/-)	+	+/-	+	++
Age	+ +	+	+/-	-/+	-	--	+	+/-	-
Education	--	-	-/+	+/-	+	++	-	+/-	+
Political Interest	--	-	-/+	+/-	+	++	-	+/-	+
Left-Right	.	+	.	.	-	.	.	+/-	.
Protest Experience	-	+/-	+	-	+/-	+	--	-	-/+
Repertoire Diversity	-	+/-	+	+/-	+	++	--	-	-/+
Formal Embeddedness	.	+	.	.	+/-	.	.	-	.
Embedded Diversity	-	+/-	+	+/-	+	++	- -	-	-/+

TABLE 9 CONTINUED

HOW	Part	OLD	Univ	Part	NEW	Univ	Part	CONS	Univ
Mob. Channel (Open-Closed)	++	+	+/-	++	+	+/-	-/+	-	--
Ties (strong –weak)	++	+	+/-	+/-	-	--	-/+	-	--
WHY	**Part**	**OLD**	**Univ**	**Part**	**NEW**	**Univ**	**Part**	**CONS**	**Univ**
Instrumental (vs. expr.)	++	+	+/-	-/+	-	--	+	+/-	-
Value threat perception	--	-	-/+	+/-	+	++	+/-	+	++
Security threat perception	++	+	+/-	-/+	-	--	++	+	+/-
Coll. ID	-	+/-	+	+/-	+	++	--	-	-/+

First, we deal with protest unity. How and to which degree are the 'who', 'why' and 'how' of mobilizing issues logically related to each other? As mentioned several times: specific issues appeal to, affect or concern specific social-economic groups. The distinctive characteristics of these groups, together with the nature of the issue, structure the other aspects of individual participation. People's socio-economic features, and most notably their educational level, directly relates to their political attitudes, which, together with their other demographic features, in turn shape their political behavior and embeddedness. Together, this is easily retraceable to their mobilization trajectories which are, to a certain degree also issue-dependent, as specific issues crystallize (or not) in specific ways into organizations and activist networks. And, finally, specific issues inherently mobilize people out of different motivations, but this is also mediated by these people's political attitudes, activist surroundings and socio-demographic features.

More concrete, new issues, inspired by emancipative and self-expression values, typically mobilize younger, higher educated and more leftist participants. High educational levels typically go hand in hand with high levels of political interest. In spite of relatively moderate protest experience and formal embeddedment (compared to old issue protesters that is), new issue protesters do display high levels of repertoire and embedded diversity, which also typically discerns between the lower and higher educated. In other words, they take part in a high variety of different kinds of actions and have multi-issue memberships, be it active or passive. This latter clearly accounts of the fact that these protesters are aware of the fact that societal problems are not to be fought on one single battlefield but through a variety of channels and means. Again, this is a typical progressive standpoint shared more by the higher educated than by the less schooled. On the other hand are new issues typically issues that concern many different and mostly smaller organizations that overlap on issue-related common grounds. The protesters' multi-issue memberships make that these protesters will to a large degree be mobilized for protest through these memberships. Yet, as their memberships are less formalized and exactly more scattered on the one hand, and as their activism is more central in their personal lives, we expect that strong ties will play an important role in their activation. The larger fragmentation and less strong organizational involvement then is substituted by strong feelings of collective identity. Concerning both other motivations, new issues, being typically focused on emancipative and expressive issues logically mobilize people out of expressive motives and originating in strong feelings of value threat perception.

Consensual issues, in general, typically mobilize 'average people', with average socio-demographic features and political attitudes, be it that they are relatively more female, if only given the more masculine predominance in other issue protests. Given this averageness or rather normality, they are logically to a much lesser degree involved with and within political action and organizations. This is retraceable in their mobilization trajectories, where such organizations play much less a significant role, and where strong ties are the main supportive network for protest participation. A predominance of low embeddedment and weak ties is expected to lead to low collective identities. And given the fact that these issues appeal to people as moral shocks, touching them in their personal security as well as personal values, they will also be instigate both instrumental as well as expressive motives. These motives furthermore will be so strong that they make it possible for people to mobilize themselves for action regardless of any organizational involvement.

Old issues more or less structure protest as put forward in the example of Rufus. Old issues concern the 'losers of modernization', being mostly those working in economic sectors that are under threat of internationalization; being mostly middle-aged men with relatively lower educational level. As a result of these weaker positions, these people will have less interest in traditional politics, and the restorative or conservative (in the literal sense) nature of their issue involvement is retraceable in more conservative political attitudes. This is also related to the fact that they will protest out of security threat perception, and with a strong instrumental motive. As old issues are in general to a large degree incorporated by organizations, these will play an important part in getting these people involved; the same goes for the relation to their fellow-protesters which can be found in these organizational circles, or those of their economic surroundings.

This particular unity that is displayed within the different issue mobilizations, is also cause of protest diversity *between* these different mobilizations. As different mobilizing issues are expected to typically produce (and partly also result from) specific mobilizing processes, the specificity of these processes will be the cause of between-issue diversity. Looking for instance at the difference between general old and new issues, the respective protesters of demonstrations on these issues are one another's logical opposites concerning their socio-demographics, political attitudes and motivations. And, equally logically are these differences smaller (but still logical) when it comes to mobilization

processes and political behavior. And for similar reasons, consensual issues are obviously different from both other issues, on some variables resembling more old issue protesters, on others more those on new issues, and on still others resembling neither of them, for instance because of consistent low political-behavioral experience, or by having 'average' socio-demographic features.

Up until now, not much was said in this final part about the secondary dimension discerning between particularistic and universalistic issues. Yet from table 9 we learn that it should be a crucial dimension in understanding protest diversity, as it seems to consistently reinforce or weaken down some of the mechanisms described above. As said, by including the particularistic - universalistic issue dimension within the thematic one, this latter is given extra dimensionality. Where the social-economic groups, their political attitudes and their protest motives of general old and new issue demonstrators are each other's opposites, this is even more so for particularistic old and universalistic new issues. This also entails that contrarily, particularistic new, and universalistic old issue demonstrators will be a lot alike on these features. And this also goes, be it to a less distinct degree, for their political behavior and mobilization trajectories.

Similarly; consensual issue protesters are divided on this second dimension. This leads to several interesting similarities: universalistic old issue protesters are more akin to general new issue demonstrators, but general consensual issue protesters are much alike old particularistic demonstrators when it comes to political behavioral experience and embeddedness. And particularistic consensual issue protest participants will likely be mobilized in the same way as universalistic old issue protesters. Concerning motivations, the inclusion of the scope dimension shows a more whimsical though still logical pattern, crosscutting both others varyingly.

In the next chapter, I will explain the methods used to obtain the rich set of data used in the empirical part, and explain how the use of this method puts researchers to great advantage in studying this and similar topics. Then, I will describe the cases in depth, and will allocate them to the different issue types. After giving some more concrete insights in the data, I will present the results: can we find both issue dimensions reflected in the protest participants, and above all, do they do so in the same ways as described above?

4

Design, Methods and Data

The Protest Survey Method

All empirical data used in this study are gathered by myself, with substantial help from my colleagues Jeroen Van Laer and Ruud Wouters from the research group M²P and with the assistance of remunerated student helpers. All data were obtained by using the same procedure of protest surveying, following identical sample procedures, which has been amply tested and refined by the author. This story on method, sampling and the (dis)advantages of their use have been documented in depth before by Stefaan Walgrave and myself (2011) and I will thus only give a summarized overview, though with a special focus on this study.

The Sampling Method

The data used in this research are all derived from surveys handed out and/or interviews taken at large, lawful, peaceful demonstrations in Belgium. They all concern moving crowds, and this gives the researcher, wanting to obtain a representative sample as possible, some advantages. Crowds moving from one point to another are more manageable than mass gatherings at e.g. a square. They are more dispersed throughout the streets, which makes the crowd more easily 'permeable'. Also, it makes the randomizing of selecting potential participants more easy: walking demonstrations are most of the time a matter of people walking side-by-side, thus constituting rows. Before a demonstration starts moving, two experienced fieldwork supervisors, based on information received before from protest organizers as well as on their own in situ estimations of the size of the demonstration at the starting point, will make a ballpark estimate of the size of the crowd. Two (or more) groups of one supervisor or 'pointer' and several interviewers each then start the survey procedure. The supervisor, who is walking on the flank of the demonstration, points a person on the left hand side of the demonstration to be approached by one of the interviewers (actually, he/she does not really point, but says something like: 'the guy with the yellow parka and the grey beard' or 'the pretty blonde one in the middle'). Then, based on the rough size calculation, the supervisor skips a fixed amount of rows of demonstrators, and then points another protester in the middle of the row to be approached by another interviewer. A third interviewer is sent out to a person on the right hand side of the demonstration, the same

amount of rows more down in the demonstration, and so on. Once an interviewer has finished, he moves back to the side of the demonstration, searches for his supervisor and is sent to the next interviewee.

Meanwhile, the same procedure is followed by the second supervisor, who thus, together with his team, starts at the end of the demonstration and has to move up into the demonstration, in a continuous 'catching up' operation. At very condense and thus more 'impermeable' demonstrations, two teams start at the top, and two teams start at the end of the demonstration. And, at very large demonstration, two teams of interviewers and one supervisor start at the middle of the demonstration and work their way up and down the demonstration.

The interviewers approach their respondents in a friendly way in their own language (Flemish or French, that is, and in some cases in English), and give a short introduction on themselves (being students at the University of Antwerp) and the research (that it concerns an academic study with no other but scientific purposes). Then, they are handed over a survey booklet in A5 format, together with a stamped envelope to return the filled-in questionnaire. Respondents are assured of their anonymity, of the fact that their participation is free of cost, and they are also noticed of the fact that, if they want to, can choose to give their contact information to receive a short research note on our findings, which they often do.

There are two good reasons for using this procedure. The first one is the randomness of the sample, assuring that every protester has an equal chance at getting approached by our interviewers. The procedure of strategically spreading of groups of interviewers and supervisors/pointers, and the distribution of interviewers within these groups throughout different rows, and on different sides of the demonstration, aims at just that.

Second, by untying the selection of protesters and the actual interviewing, we bypass the problem of selection bias by the interviewers.

Both procedures are essential in obtaining a sample that is both representative as well as reliable, yielding data with the same features. Still, there is also a third possible bias in our sampling procedure; that of response bias -specific types of targeted protesters being

systematically more inclined to participate than others'. I will deal with these topics in more detail below.

Assessing Representativity and Reliability

The questions are: does the sampling method delivers better, thus more representative and reliable results than if the method would not be applied (selection bias)? And what about response bias? We have run tests for both of them.

First, we tested the reliability of the method. To do so, we divided a very large group of interviewers in two. The first group of interviewers, led by a supervisor, was to cover the demonstration using the above described survey method. The other group was instructed to cover the demonstration without guidance, but to use their own method at obtaining a sample that would be as representative as possible. They were pointed to the fact that their results would be compared to that of the others as well as to that of the other group, and that it was really important to strive towards representativity. They were explicitly followed by another 'silent' supervisor who kept an eye on their decision procedure. This experiment yielded some interesting results.

First, 'free' interviewers contacted less respondents (lower productivity), but their contacts were more efficient (less refusals) as compared to their method-following colleagues. Using the method thus increases interview 'productivity', even although the procedure seems more time-consuming, with students having to go back and find their supervisor to be appointed to a new respondent. This, on the other hand means that unguided interviewers took more time to search for appropriate interviewers, assuming that they used other than purely rational means to select them. This is confirmed by the second finding: although their overall efficiency is lower, free interviewers face less refusals: a suspicious finding leading to the question if they approach people more 'open' to them and discard less 'appealing' or radical-looking protesters. We tested for systematic differences in the results of both groups of interviewers, on a list of essential variables in a short, face to face interview (see below). These tests were unambiguously confirming clear and substantial interviewer selection effects. Unguided interviewers selected, amongst others, significantly more female respondents, who were above-averagely educated and were similarly high interested in politics, who were less radical on different issue statements, and were less motivated by feelings of fighting spirit. In other words, 'free'

interviewers systematically selected more ‘approachable’ respondents, being more like themselves, and being less radical in their opinions and feelings. They clearly made ‘safe’ choices. Therefore, we can conclude that the method works - at least that it works better than unguided sampling.

Second, there is the question of response bias, possibly distorting reliability. At several demonstrations, we used a two-part questionnaire; a survey booklet handed-over to the respondent, and a small questionnaire containing a few crucial research variables. When a respondent was approached, he was first asked to answer these few questions in a short face-to-face interview. The answers were noted down by the interviewer on a page attached to the survey booklet. After this short interview, this page was torn off the booklet, which was then handed over to the respondent, asking him to fill out the remaining questions at home. Both the short questionnaire and the booklet are marked with identical identification numbers, so returned booklets can be traced back to the according face to face interview sheet. Response rates of these short, face to face interviews are Stalinistically high, being around 95%; protesters are almost always very willing to cooperate, and having someone hearing their voice.

By using this two-stage questionnaire, not only do we have a very high amount of small surveys containing some essential variables; it also allows us to test for response bias: are those who actually send back their filled-out questionnaires systematically different from those who do not? Our results are consistent with overall survey research (Kaplowitz, Hadlock and Levine 2004; Porter and Whitcomb 2005), indicating that older people are more inclined to return their questionnaires than the younger. Then again, we not find any sample differences on any attitudinal or behavioral variable, strengthening the belief that it are not the more ‘radical’ or ‘eager’ respondents who are more inclined and willing to send back their questionnaires, as has been a typical finding in employee surveys (Borg and Turen 2003).

The above is a very short overview of a much more extensive report (Walgrave and Verhulst 2011), but the tendency of it is clear: the protest survey method is a useful, reliable and representative procedure to survey protest demonstrations. For more information, different methodological tests and particular survey practicalities I refer to this longer article.

Cases

This study will use data gathered at ten different protest events, all following the above-described protest survey method; some of them with the two-stage questionnaires. In Table 10, an overview of these ten demonstrations is presented, including the demonstrations' short names (as they will be referred to throughout the rest of this thesis), the timing, location and size of the protests, and, finally, the amounts of distributed and returned questionnaires and according response ratios. These latter facts on data gathering and response rates will be addressed in the next part; first I will tell the story of each of the different protest demonstrations by one by one putting them in context, to afterwards also be able to allocate them to specific positions in the issue dimensions as discussed above. All the case study information is based on secondary evidence gathered before, during and after the demonstrations.

TABLE 10: DEMONSTRATION FACTS & FIGURES

Time	Location	Size	Questionnaires distributed	Questionnaires returned	Response %
'**Sans Papiers**'					
Demonstration to claim more rights and respect for illegal immigrants (sans papiers)					
Feb '06	Brussels	10,000	858	149	17
'**Iraq**'					
Demonstration against the ongoing occupation of Iraq					
March '06	Brussels	5,000	915	315	34
'**InBev**'					
Demonstration against the restructuring and possible layoffs at beer multinational InBev					
March '06	Leuven	2,000	722	98	14
'**Joe**'					
Memorial March after random killing of Joe Van Holsbeeck + demonstration against violence					
April '06	Antwerp	20,000	1018	437	43
'**Silent March'**					
Demonstration against racism + Memorial march after racist killings					
May '06	Antwerp	20,000	985	437	44
'**VW Forest'**					
Demonstration against the restructuring and possible layoffs at Belgian Volkswagen plant					
Dec. '06	Brussels	15,000	878	270	31
'**Regionalism'**					
Demonstration for unique Flemish rights in Flemish municipalities surrounding Brussels + Flemish independence					
May '07	Sint-Joost	1,500	554	235	42
'**Unity'**					
Demonstration for the unity of Belgium and mutual regional tolerance					
Nov. '07	Brussels	35,000	515	221	43
'**Climate'**					
Demonstration against global warming and climate change					
Dec. '07	Brussels	3,000	548	185	34
'**Purchasing Power'**					
Against inflation and reducing purchasing power					
Dec. '07	Brussels	20,000	398	126	32

'Sans Papiers'

Asylum seekers or '*sans papiers*' -literally: people without papers- are a thorny issue in modern Western societies, and are subject to a steady salience and robust polarization in these societies' political arenas. Yet it is also a very concrete issue, with approximately 11,000 persons or families yearly applying for asylum in Belgium, and with a multiple of that living in Belgium in complete illegality[13]. I will first explain the concrete mobilizing issue, and then fit it within both issue dimensions.

Sans Papiers: the Mobilizing Issue

Causes

Early 2006, different churches and other public spaces were occupied by asylum seekers and illegal immigrants, with help from organizations of very different kinds. They expressed the explicit demands for the 'decriminialization' of asylum seekers, a shorter, more flexible and more humane regularization policy and a more civilized expulsion policy. Then Minister of Internal Affairs Dewael publicly renounced these actions, and he also warned people and organizations helping illegal immigrants for engaging in 'criminal' and penal activities. This created bad blood between government and sans papiers and those helping them out on a voluntary basis, resulting in more occupations. And, in public demonstrations; first one in Antwerp, and ten days later a national demonstration in Brussels.

Demands

The demands put forward by the demonstrations were manifold. Most of them referred to a clearer, shorter and more humane procedure for asylum seekers to apply for asylum, and for those already in the procedure to get regularized within a short period. More concrete, demands were:

i. Clear, and more flexible criteria for regularisation of asylum seekers;
ii. Honest and independent judgment of regularisation applications;
iii. A maximum term of 6 months to deal with the applications (and if not met, an

[13] Number of applications in 2007. These figures from the Flemish Minority Center, obtained from different official statistics (www.vmc.be).

automatic regularisation after this term);

iv. All those who have not received an answer on their application should be immediately regularized;
v. A more humane expulsion policy for those whose applications have been declined.

Initiative

The platform text for the manifestation was subscribed by a large and diverse list of organizations: specific refugee and asylum organizations; socio-cultural and multiculturalist organizations; Christian organizations and radical left organizations and parties, as well as the Walloon Green Party and the Human Rights League. The initiative for the demonstration was taken by the UDEP Nationale (Union de Défense des Sans Papiers; CRER (Coordination Contre les Rafles, les Expulsions et pour la Regularisation); CRACPE (Collectif de Résistance aux Centres Pour Etrangers), VAK (Vluchtelingen Aktie Komitee), Collectif de Verviers (pour une société multiculturelle et pour le respect du droit d'asile) and BASTA!. The first four are organizations specifically involved with the issue of asylum seekers and refugees; both latter are organizations more specifically striving for a more multicultural and tolerant society, and against repression as a tool to diminish feelings of unsafety and instead promoting civic participation and city development .

Sans Papiers typified

The issue of *sans papiers* is a very peculiar one. Asylum seekers and illegal immigrants are maybe the most powerless groups in Western societies, facing large uncertainties, fear of not being able to stay and build-up a stable life, and not seldom having to put up with day-to-day survival difficulties. Yet on the other hand, the issue of migration and related influx of (il)legal immigrants is one of the most typical issues clearly situated on the conflictual new dimension of mobilizing issues. Although they maintain a two-dimensional interpretation of the institutional political sphere (but see Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009) for a falsification and a critique), Kriesi et al (2006; 2008) do acknowledge the major importance of the migration issue in dividing the political arena. According to them, a 'new cultural cleavage' exists in Western societies, and, next to opposition to the process of European integration, [t]he demarcation pole of the new cultural cleavage should be characterized by … restrictive positions with regard to migration'. (ibid: 2006: 7). In spite of

the fact that I do not agree with several assertions in Kriesi et al.'s study[14], I do agree on the central role given to the issue, and the fact that they establish that for about two decades now, 'the cultural conflict is typically expressed by the strong opposition between support for cultural liberalism, on the one hand, and support for a more restrictive immigration policy on the other'. This way then, the issue of migration is a clear divisive mobilizing issues. As an 'old' issue, defensive of migration and migrants, it should be oppositely interpreted, as a problem that would be met with cultural closedness, the defending of the own cultural values and of the rights and wealth of the own people prior to that of newcomers. As a new issue, thus issues defending migration or the rights of migrants, the migration issue then should be interpreted in terms of cultural openness, multiculturalism, universal human rights, and the division of wealth, all typically new-issue features.
Given this fact, the Sans Papiers demonstration should be classified as a typical **new issue** demonstration.

Placing the issue on the second dimension is a lot easier. It are the rights and life circumstances of a very specific (social, but also legal) societal group which are the object of grievances and the subject of the demonstration, of which we would expect many of them (at least those who are legal sans papiers awaiting the decision on their regularization or asylum), making the sans papiers protest a typical **particularistic issue** demonstration.

[14] Amongst other things, the confusing use of concepts of cleavage and conflict; the two-dimensionality of the political sphere, (though they often fall together in different countries as they themselves notice); the fact that cultural cleavages have transformed, but can be fit into existing dimensions, which should however be interpreted based on new kinds of issue; the fact that I believe that the migration issue can be easily integrated in existing cleavage typologies and also within the typology used in this study

‘Iraq’

By early 2006, international forces were occupying Iraq for three years already. After the massive worldwide day of protests against imminent war on Iraq, on 15 February 2003 protest voices had become much more silent, with only small protests in 2004 and 2005 (Walgrave, Bennett, Van Laer and Breunig 2011). The 2006 demonstration managed to mobilize good 5,000 people, far less than in 2003, but much more than those in the two years before. Again, I start with explaining the specific mobilizing issue to then fit it within the mobilizing issue typology.

Iraq: the Mobilizing Issue

Causes

On March 19 2006, Iraq had been occupied for exactly three years, but the region had not been pacified. Meanwhile, the suspicions on the fact that US and UK governments had misguided the UN Security Council in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, by using false and incomplete documents to convey the Council and other countries of the necessity of such an invasion, had been largely confirmed by now. Also the US extra-legal detaining facilities (the Abu Ghraib prison) and highly contested questioning techniques of detained Iraqi’s had been highly publicized on. In the meantime also, Europe had been upset by large Islamist terrorist attacks in London (March ’04) and Madrid (July ’05), each time putting national defense, anti-terrorism, safety and stricter security measures (trading in citizen liberties, to ensure more societal safety) on the political and media agenda’s. It seems that alongside, anti-war feelings also reinvigorated, given the fact that protest participation numbers took a rise again after two years of relative silence.

Demonstration Demands

The March 19 2006 demonstration in Brussels was only one of the many taking place on that day, in 170 cities spread over more than forty countries. All demonstrations, in a ten-item demand list, again refute (the concept of)pre-emptive strikes and war based on allegations concerning terrorism or weapons of mass destruction. They condemn violence against innocent civilians and demand respect for international human rights by all parties concerned, and refute the fact that the war on terror is used as a rationale for limiting civilians’ civil and political rights.

Demonstration Initiative

As was the case in the preceding years, the initiative for the demonstration was taken by the national Anti-War Platform (Anti-Oorlogsplatform), and was subscribed by an amalgam of organizations: different peace and social-cultural organizations; green, left and far-left parties; labor unions (which, however, did not mobilize), and mostly typical 'new social movements' like ATTAC, Oxfam and Greenpeace.

Iraq typified

As mentioned before, the issue of peace and national defense is (one of) the most important issue(s) discerning between materialists and postmaterialists (Inglehart 1990: 296). It also clearly fits within the broader survival-self-expression dimension, and within the dimension of conflictual issues; where citizens positioned on the 'old' side are more likely to be more defensive and more inclined to take up the arms in a war on terror, whereas those on the 'new' side will far less see the use of violence as a solution for any conflict, and will favor the use of diplomatic deliberation. They will, also in line with this dimension, respectively see the issue of war on Iraq as a war against terrorism and the 'threat' posed by Islamists on the one hand, and as a means by which Western countries unrightfully want to settle their own economic interests and want to establish Western cultural, political and economic hegemony. Finally, the reluctance of giving in citizens political and civic liberties to ensure more societal safety is typically a new issue stance. Clearly, the Iraq anti-war demonstration should be classified as a typical **new issue** demonstration.

Given the fact that an anti-war demonstration is set up in a country that is not directly involved in the initiation nor in the further development of that war, makes this anti-war demonstrations typically **universalistic issue** demonstrations**.**

'InBev'

The beer multinational InBev, with its roots in the Belgian provincial city of Leuven, has become a national symbol for how companies from small countries like Belgium can become major players on the international economic market. Yet this strong emblematic imago can also turn towards themselves, as the InBev case shows, when such companies start to cut into their local branches of origin.

InBev: the Mobilizing Issue

Causes

Early 2006. InBev publicized a worldwide annual profit of over one billion Euros. At the same time, the InBev executive board announced several restructurings which would lead to the loss of 350 full-time jobs in Europe, most of them in Belgium. Belgian unions uttered their disgust over the InBev board letting international profit prevail over the Belgian roots, even in a climate of huge prosperity for the company: 'To them, it only has to do with money, and the Belgian beer market is of no importance anymore within the gigantic company that InBev has become' a union secretary announced[15]. The two major Belgian labor unions decided to join their forces in obtaining a collective bargaining agreement applying to the whole of Europe, and agreed on setting up a demonstration to urge on their demands. They seek and find cooperation from their French and Dutch counterparts, as well as from the European federation of trade unions, and plan a demonstration at the European InBev headquarters in Leuven, Belgium on March 28, 2006.

Demonstration Demands

The demands at the InBev demonstrations are unambiguous, and contain three major points:

i. Conserving all employment;
ii. Warranties for the future;
iii. European-wide agreements.

[15] De Standaard, 24 February 2006.

The first two demands are crystal clear and have been dealt with above; the latter has to do with what protest organizers call the by InBev board used ‘salami tactic’ of announcing restructurings; typically publicizing them in small ‘slices’, on different plants and in different countries, so they would seem less worrisome than they actually are. To avoid these things to happen in the future, the demonstration demands for Europe-wide collective bargaining agreements.

Demonstration Initiative

As mentioned, initiative was taken by the largest Belgian Labor Unions (ACV and ABVV). Because of the specific European demands, European, French and Dutch labor unions were also involved, but would only be marginally represented in the actual demonstration.

InBev typified

The case of the InBev workers is a real-world case example of ‘losers of globalization’, in this case of enterprise activities, mobilizing for action. Employees defending against the negative consequences of corporate restructurings and trying to prevent employment cuts makes that, without any doubt, the InBev demonstration is a typical case of an **old issue** demonstration.

Its position on the second issue dimension is equally obvious. The group of possible beneficiaries of action is very concrete, concerning the workers of InBev who are highly likely to make out the bulk of the protest crowd, making it a typical **particularistic issue** demonstration.

‘Joe’

Joe was a young 17 year old boy who was assaulted for his MP3-player by two Polish youngsters (based on the fuzzy images of the surveillance camera they were however for long considered to be Moroccan). Joe refused to hand it over, and was stabbed several times in the chest. He died in the crowded Central Station of Brussels, during rush hour. As already illustrated at the beginning of this thesis, the March for Joe is a case example of how sudden and violent death can stir large mobilizations.

Joe: the Mobilizing Issue

Causes

An innocent 17-year old, waiting a friend to arrive at the Central Station, was brutally killed for something as futile as an ordinary MP3-player. He was killed at broad daylight, surrounded by commuters, at the busiest moment of the day: rush hour. Although in criminological terms the attack and killing of Joe is a case of robbery with murder, it was generally perceived and portrayed in the media as a clear case of ‘random’ or patternlessness violence, in the sense that the victim could just as well have been anyone else. Joe was at the wrong place at the wrong time. This perceived randomness made all public reactions in the media and by the public as well as by politicians to be highly emotional.

Demonstration Demands

Also as mentioned, Immediately following the events, friends, acquaintances and classmates of Joe calling themselves ‘the Friends of Joe’ started a petition pursuing the diffuse claims of the ‘right to more safety’ and ‘more dialogue concerning problem youngsters’; this petition would be signed by 250,000 citizens. Yet eleven days after he was murdered, about 80,000 people joined together in a silent and ‘white’, sloganless march near the Central Station. Whereas the petition had some concrete -be it diffuse- claims, the March for Joe was, as explicitly demanded by Joe’s parents and family, strictly a-political, and silent, both literally as well as figuratively. People were united by the issue; by their grief and solidarity with the victims and by the fear for themselves and their own children.

Demonstration Initiative

The petition was set up by the 'Friends of Joe', but the demonstration was not. Right after the killing of Joe, Flemish MP Fouad Ahidar expressed the idea of a 'white march', but in the end it were the parents of Joe and of his friend who stood next to him when he was attacked, who organized the event. As it was the parents' explicit wish for the march to be a non-partisans, a-political march, many organizations were hesitant to mobilize for the demonstrations up until the last moment, but eventually, the "Association of Associations", different labor unions and professional organizations, and several other organizations made last-minute calls to participate. A number of leaders from Flemish political parties were also present.

'Joe' typified

Clearly, the mobilizing issue of the march for Joe is a typical **consensual issue**. It concerns the murder of an innocent teenager, and this was evidently condemned unanimously in all levels of society. The march for Joe was explicitly a-political and nonpartisan, representing no conflicts, displaying no slogans, containing no explicit messages. The only message conveyed was the crowd itself, which was impressively large, and contrasted sharply to its own unanimous silence.

The very essence of consensual issues - being that they are agreed upon within almost an entire society, and do not confront any organized nor partisan opposition - makes placing them on the thematic dimension very easy, but much less so on the secondary issue dimension. This is due to the fact that their consensuality also bears a probable intrinsic beneficiary relation in it: the fact that an issue is uncontested makes that making headway on the issue will be something that all citizens will in one way or another likely be benefiting from. In other words; consensual issues are in fact all highly likely to also be universalistic issues.

Still, the fact that consensual issues are as good as always consequential to a specific event makes a universalistic-particularistic issue distinction likely. In such cases, serious harm has already been done, with no option of repairing the concrete damage. Consensual issues, then, can go both ways; on the one hand they can be internally-oriented , mobilizing people to be able to publicly deplore the event, to show solidarity with those suffering from it and/or to vent the emotions that come with them. One could say that, given the

narrow protest benefits of dealing with one's own feelings or of displaying solidarity with people closely involved, makes these kinds of consensual issues to be more of a particularistic type. On the other hand can consensual issues be externally oriented, with a clear ambition to prevent similar events from ever happening again, to anyone, which is a typical universalistic issue trait.

At a silent demonstration like the march for Joe, content and goals of the demonstration and its participants remain guised. This also entails the lack of many concrete indications of the group concerned with the issue of the demonstration. We can thus only consider this relation. Knowing that people were very aware of the claimlessness and silence of the protest, and also knowing that, in spite of these *tabula rasa* features, many people did nonetheless show up to march along, we can only assume that they wanted to be part of 'the message' themselves. Whether the march was a means for people to vent their worry and feelings of insecurityfor themselves and their families or society at large, or rather a signal of solidarity to Joe's surviving relatives: there is no way to know for sure (be it only post-factum, after looking into the individual survey results). Yet it is very likely that, when people participate in a march of which they know will be claimless, demandless and sloganless, they can do so out of two reasons: expressing their own feelings and dealing with them in a group of people sharing those same feelings; or expressing solidarity with the surviving relatives and friends by being there with many others. In the first case, then, demonstrations like this are very much what Gusfield termed 'vehicles of catharsis' - a purging of emotions through expression (Gusfield 1986: 179), and is quite akin to Durkheim's religious gatherings in which the reaffirming of collective ideas and sentiments or, in short, 'moral remaking', cannot be achieved except by the means of reunions, assemblies and meetings where the individuals, being closely united to one another, reaffirm in common their common sentiments' (Durkheim [1915] 1995: 427). And, as Tarrow writes (1998: 36), though it 'may be surprising to think of death as a source of collective action', it does have 'the power to trigger violent emotions, and brings people together with little in common but their grief and their solidarity', as it also 'provides legitimate occasions for public gatherings'.

Sharing and showing grief and solidarity can thus be a strong force of collective action. It can be related to strong outward and instrumental goals (see e.g. Goss 2003; Walgrave and Verhulst 2006), but it can just as well remain claimless and mainly therapeutic, both passively (sharing grief, mourning and coping) as well as active (displaying solidarity with

victims and their relatives). Given the claimlessness of the demonstration it is thus likely to think of this demonstration as a **particularistic issue** demonstration. Though in essence a more universalistic issue altogether which is consequential to its consensual nature, the direct beneficiaries of the actions on the issue are likely to remain restricted those involved in the demonstration, or those directly involved by the dramatic events from several days earlier.

‘Silent March’

About a month after the March for Joe, the Belgian nation would be witnessing another silent march, which would be consequential to a series of events, very similar to that of Joe.

Silent March: the Mobilizing Issue

Causes

On the night of 30 April-1 May 2006, 23 years old Moroccan-Belgian Mohamed Bouazza disappeared, after having been chased for long in the Antwerp port area, as observed by several eye witnesses. The leader of the group chasing him allegedly had said a few hours earlier that he would have wanted to go out and kill a ‘makak’ (an abusive Flemish term for Moroccan) later that evening. Ten days later, on May 11, the body of Mohamed was effectively drained from the river ‘de Schelde’. Yet, no arrests were made, and no one would become trialled, let alone be convicted.

On the day Mohamed was found, another series of brutal events shocked the city of Antwerp, and the country of Belgium as a whole. On that day, 18 years old Hans Van Temsche, shaved his head and put on a long, black leather coat, and took the train to Antwerp. There, he bought a hunting rifle to start a ravaging raid throughout the city. He walked composedly through the city, searching for victims. First, he shot a Turkish woman, who was sitting on a bench, reading a book. She got injured but survived the assault. Van Temsche continued his impromptu route until he came across the Malinese Oulemata Niangadou who was walking downtown Antwerp together with the two years young toddler Luna Drowart, who she was babysitting on. Van Temsche killed them both with multiple rifle shots. Soon after that he would be held under fire by the police, and he asked to be shot and killed by the police. Instead, they managed to capture him alive. Soon it would become clear that he had chosen his victims for racist reasons; something he also confessed afterwards. Late 2007, Van Temsche would be sentenced to lifelong imprisonment.

On this murdering raid, media coverage was again huge, and images of the little girl Luna were everywhere. Luna’s parents being well-known in different Antwerp artistic, political, … scenes, inspired many public figures of all kinds to express their confusion, anger and

disgust in many emotional accounts. Amongst these, the Antwerp mayor, who would be an explicit participant in the Silent March, which would take place on 26 May, attracting about 20,000 people marching through Antwerp in the pouring rain.

Demonstration Demands

The Silent March was, obviously, and at least initially conceived as a white sloganles, march. Participants were asked to wear white, the color of hope, but also to explicitly refer to the claimlessness of the demonstration. This whiteness and claimlessness was initially and explicitly required by the Antwerp city council and mayor, to avoid the march to become politically laden in any way, and to thus further divide a city already strongly carved up on the issue of migrants and racism. The march would be united under one slogan: 'Het Verdriet Is van '*A*", or 'The Sorrows are A's', with the A referring to the Antwerp people, but also meaning 'you' in dialect. The grief and sorrow is yours, and that of all Antwerp citizens, the slogan thus says. Yet, the surviving relatives present at the demonstration, mainly those from Mohamed Bouazza, (the parents of the young Luna endorsed the march, but were not present themselves), managed to get another slogan into the march: 'Stop Racism: Diversity is Reality'. This way, the obvious racist motives for all killings could be strongly condemned by the march and marchers. Both slogans, 'Het Verdriet is van A' and 'Stop Racism: Diversity is Reality', were put centre stage at the march. A large banner with both slogans was carried by several surviving family members.

Demonstration Initiative

The initiative for the demonstration was taken by 'Antwerpen aan't Woord' ('Antwerp Talking') - a collective of local associations; the Forum of Minorities, and the families of the victims. Although, as said, the parents of the murdered Luna fully supported the march, they did not take part in it themselves.

Silent March typified

Although I refer to this march as the silent march, I do so not because it is more 'silent' than the march for Joe, but only for the fact that in this case, more than one person was involved in the events leading to the march. In fact, the silent march was in fact a lot less 'silent' than that for Joe about a month earlier.

So then, is this silent march also a consensual issue demonstration, just like the March for Joe had been only a few weeks earlier? Although there is a clear new-issue dimension (anti-racism and multiculturalism) incorporated by the protest, in my view it concerns indeed primarily a consensual issue demonstration. First of all, although the killings had clear racist motives, not all victims were in effect from different ethnic-cultural groups. The Turkish and Malinese women were (the first wearing a headscarf, the latter being black), but the little girl, with blonde hairs and blue eyes was in no ways an obvious racist target, and most media attention on the events concerned the death of this two-years old. This led to the fact that events were not in the first place framed as racist killings, but as acts of senseless and random violence. Again, anyone could have been the victim. Yet most important of all, the events leading to the mobilizing issue were so obviously wrong, that this wrongness is not related to any cleavage position. And, although in the end several slogans turned up at the march itself, it was clearly mobilized for as a silent, colorfree march, astray from political slogans or societal divisions. Therefore, the Silent March was a demonstration on a **consensual issue.**

Putting this Silent March on the second issue dimension is less easy. Yet, whereas the march for Joe was more of a particularistic issue demonstration, since it was supposedly based on the expression of individual feelings and solidarities, in this case the march aimed explicitly at broadening the grievances to everybody: the sorrow and grief are from 'A': from the citizens and politicians of Antwerp, and from all citizens beyond that city. Furthermore, the march also proclaimed the need for preventing future events to occur to anyone in society, which gives the issue a typical universalistic scope. Given this objectivity towards specific societal groups, the silent march was a **universalistic issue** demonstration.

‘VW Forest’

The story of the VW Forest demonstration is very similar to that of InBev. Both are directly spurred by the announcement of large corporate restructurings, which, also in both cases led unions to broaden their mobilization efforts to their European partners in misfortune.

VW Forest: the Mobilizing Issue

Causes

By the end of November 2006, after weeks of speculations about the number of possible layoffs as a result of corporate restructurings at the transnational car company Volkswagen, the board mentioned that 3,500 to 4,000 workers of the Forest plant, nearly four out of five, or eighty percent) would have to go. Also similar to the InBev story, the Vorst plant of the Volkswagen car multinational was profitable, and the entire VW company had made a profit of 1,200 million Euros in the only nine months preceding the demonstrations.

Demonstration Demands

Demonstration demands were crystal clear: less layoffs and more work. And, for those people for whom layoffs were unavoidable, decent severance payments were demanded.

Demonstration Initiative

VW Forest workers had been on strike for several days, visiting other car manufacturers in Belgium (Ford Genk; Opel Antwerp) and their supply companies. The initiative for the demonstration was taken by the three main Belgian trade union federations (Christian, socialist and liberal) and their respective subdivisions. This was, without any doubt, a labor union demonstration.

VW Forest typified

The case of the VW Forest workers is, just like that of InBev workers, a real-world case example of ‘losers of globalization’, mobilizing for action. For the rest, I can copy-paste the InBev story here, as in the VW Forest case also: Employees defending against the negative consequences of corporate restructurings and trying to prevent employment cuts makes

that, without any doubt, the VW Forest demonstration is a typical case of an **old issue** demonstration.

Its position on the second issue dimension is equally obvious. The group of possible beneficiaries of action is very concrete, and concerns the workers of VW Forest, making it a typical **particularist issue** demonstration.

‘Regionalism’

Regionalism: the Mobilizing Issue

The regionalist issue separating between Dutch speaking Flanders and French-speaking Wallonia has some deep-rooted conflictual origins. Though the issue is fully incorporated by political parties on both sides of the language boundary, *several* political parties have claimed the issue of regionalism. Even though the issue is to a large degree pacified (Lijphart 1981), it is still salient, especially in this second half of the decennium, in which governments come and go, time and again reaching a deadlock on the rearrangement of policy powers into the different federal layers. It is within this context that this (and also the next) mobilizing issue should be situated.

Causes

One of the main stalemate items in the conflictual discussions between Flemish and Walloons, is that concerning one, specific electoral district, namely that of ‘Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde’. It is a relatively complicated issue and I will only sketch it briefly. In 2002, electoral districts were reformed, in order to have them to fully overlap with their corresponding provinces. This was a success, except for one: that of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde (in short: B-H-V), uniting the Dutch-speaking electoral districts of Halle-Vilvoorde with that of the bilingual capital of Brussels. This leads to a very peculiar situation, disadvantaging the Dutch-speaking citizens and benefiting the French-speaking. Why is that? First, French-speaking inhabitants of the Flemish Halle-Vilvoorde have the opportunity to vote for, and be electable on Walloon lists, which is not possible for Flemish-speaking citizens living in Wallonia. This way, the influence of French speaking politics affects the entire electoral district, and with suburbanization processes making many French-speaking citizens settling in these regions, certainly in those Flemish municipalities which provide specific bilingual facilities for their French-speaking inhabitants , this trend is likely to grow further. To all this, the Belgian Court of Arbitration has ruled the illegality of the existence of this electoral district of B-H-V because it stands for the systematic discrimination of the Dutch-speaking citizens, and that it should be split or rearranged before next elections would take place. Meanwhile, this has not been the case, but the topic of B-H-V has ruled many a political discussion, and has made governments to fall and to be rearranged, to get stuck again on that same issue. Up until now, it still one of the most knotty problems in Belgian Politics.

Demonstration Demands

Demonstration demands for the Regionalist March were very clear: Flemish independence, and a demand for the splitting of B-H-V without compromising in any way with the French-speaking negotiators. Finally, the march was also strongly supportive for several communities neighbouring the Brussels capital; to prevent first of all the further 'francophonization' or 'frenchization' of their municipalities. And, lastly, to prevent these communities to be the object of compromise in the debates on the splitting of B-H-V, by giving their French-speaking citizens more rights or, even worse, by attaching some of these communities to Brussels, thus making them formally bilingual too.

So, in short, the demands of the demonstration are, in order of increasing range: the support for different threatened fully Flemish communities in the Brussels' area; the splitting of the B-H-V electoral district; to prevent 'Frenchization' of the Flemish areas near Brussels; and the complete breaking up of Flanders and Wallonia into two separate countries.

Demonstration Initiative

The initiative for the demonstration was taken by the Union of Flemish-Catholic Higher Education Students, supported by several moderate, but also extreme and even extreme right and ethno-nationalist Flemish organizations (like e.g. Voorpost and IJzerwake)

Regionalism typified

The regionalist issue is one deeply rooted in Belgian old cleavage structures. The struggle for Flemish rights actually predates the existence of Belgium as a country. Some of the most determining moments in the country's history were based on, or consequential to this French-Dutch antagonism[16]. Most organizations and parties occupying the issue on Flemish side can be traced back to much earlier times, making the issue literally an 'old' issue.

[16] For an overview, see De Wever, Bruno, Petra Gunst, and Maarten Van Ginderachter. 1999. Nieuwe Encyclopedie van de Vlaamse Beweging. Presentation in the Flemish Parliament. Available online at: http://users.telenet.be/frankie.schram/default.html

The regionalist issue, which is based on language and regional identity, but also on the need for economic independence is, in all cases, typically an 'old' issue. Nationalism, narrow identities and consequential economic insolidarity are typically driven by opinions of cultural and material closedness, and therefore, I assert that the Regionalist issue demonstration is an **old issue** demonstration.

What about the secondary dimension? This is equally clear: the issue is mobilized on by one very specific group, in an antagonist way, making the issue being retraceable to a very distinct group, namely the Flemish people, versus the French-speaking Belgians. Furthermore, recent numbers show that in 2007-08, not even ten percent of the Flemish public endorses the concept of separation (Devos and Bouteca 2008). Finally, apart from the first aim, all demonstration demands had reference to the specific municipalities around Brussels and would benefit their Flemish participants. Clearly, this protest on the regionalist issue is a typical **particularistic issue** demonstration.

‘Unity’

In the heat of communitarian discussions (mostly on the electoral district B-H-V as referred to several times already above), leading to a deadlock in Belgian government agreements nearly half a year after actual elections had taken place, a march was set up to strive for maintaining the unity of Belgium. Whereas the regionalist demonstration elaborated on above was set up before new elections in June 2007, this one was staged after those same elections.

Unity: the Concrete Mobilizing Issue

Causes

By November 2007, Belgium still had no formal government. For about 160 days, different parties and politicians had been trying to reach a minimal government agreement, but mistrust between representatives from both language groups was too large to do so. In addition, by November, several bad economic tidings forecasted the commencement of the worldwide economic crisis. Meanwhile, to many Belgian citizens, the political arena had transformed into an astonishing vaudeville of ineffectiveness and wrong priorities: the constant quarrelling on meanwhile seeming futilities; the apparent dominance of typical *politique politicienne* over common sense policy making, and, consequently, the lack of political spirit and authority to guide citizens through the difficult times ahead, all made many people observe their political representatives with increasing astonishment, but also with increasing aversion. Yet, instead of standing idle by, or trailing off into political cynicism, many citizens joint the initiative to show their (future) policy makers that this *politique politicienne* was very much astray from what they expected from them these days.

Demonstration Demands

This is also what the demonstration demands were all about. Literally translating the demand list of the Unionist demonstration, it says:

We want answers to our questions, and solutions to our problems. Safety, employment, energy prices, environment, education, getting by each month, health care, pensions, wages, etc., all keep us out of our sleep more than certain institutional questions that saw discord.

i. *Belgium after all contains all Belgians, and not just a few hundreds of politicians;*
ii. *Tuning everything into language issues leads only to linguistic apartheid, and that, we refuse;*
iii. *We want to demonstrate to our politicians our being attached to a multicultural and tolerant Belgium.*

Demonstration Initiative

The initiative for the demonstration was taken by a civil servant, Marie Claire Houard, who, after seeing a *mockumentary* on TV on the complete disintegration of Belgian, decided to take action. Three months before she even got to think about a demonstration, she set up a petition for Belgian Unity, which would be signed by nearly 150,000 Belgian citizens. Later, she felt obliged to 'do something extra' for all those who signed the petition, and decided to set up a march for the unity of Belgium, and for signalling to Belgian politicians that not regionalist, but many other issues are keeping civilians awake. Many politicians joined the march, though mostly from the French-speaking part of Belgium. Two extreme right separatist organizations (NSV and Voorpost) organized a counterdemonstration of which 15 participants were arrested.

Unity typified

The March for Unity is quite the opposite from the one previously discussed. The societal and political divide on regionalism versus unionism represents a clear old and new cleavage issue. Striving for unity on an issue on which a country is divided, entailing a call to stop addressing this 'old' issue of separatism and regionalism, and with a stress on tolerance, respect and multiculturalism, the march for unity concerns a typical **new issue** demonstration.

Whereas the regionalist issue demonstration clearly relates to a specific population segment, the unity issue specifically does not. In simple terms: the unity of Belgium concerns all Belgians. The march for unity thus is a typical **universalistic issue** demonstration.

‘Climate’

A few days before the coming into force of the Kyoto protocol (to diminish worldwide emissions of greenhouse gasses) on 15 February 2005, a first attempt to organize a series of international demonstrations was made, with modest successes in Brussels and London. Since then, however, the Global Day of Action on Climate Change was born, and each year, at the time of the annual United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) an internationally coordinated surge of protests against climate change takes place. The 2007 demonstration fits within this international cycle of Climate protests.

Climate: the Mobilizing Issue

Causes

The broad mobilizing issue of climate change is rooted in the effective and demonstrated men-induced process of global warming; and mobilizations are set up yearly at the time of the UN talks on climate change, which give the mobilizing issue a more specific focus within its broader struggle.

Demonstration Demands

Demonstration demands are more or less the same each year. The main claims in 2007 were:

I. a drastic reduction of CO2-emissions. For industrialized countries, these should diminish by 30 percent by 2020, and by 80 percent by 2050;
II. a social and solidary approach of the climate problem, giving chances to everyone, here as well as in the South;
III. Support from rich, Western to Southern developing countries, as these suffer most from climate change.

Demonstration Initiative

Initiative for the Climate March was taken by two broad environmental coalitions: Climate Coalition and Climate Call. These are explicitly bilingual and pluralistic, and unite different Belgian associations and organizations: environmental organizations; North-South-movements and social and social-cultural associations.

Climate typified

This mobilizing issue of Climate change is a typical **new mobilizing issue.** It is essentially postmaterialist, it deals with humanistic perceptions of abstract threats (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 33) and is interpreted in an emancipative way (concerning the less well-off here, and in the South). Clearly, the issue of climate change is also a **universalistic mobilizing issue**, as it concerns no specific group, not even on a global scale, but the entire human civilization (in fact, one of the mobilizing slogans was: 'unity in diversity').[17]

[17] Klimaatoproep.be/8december.php

‘Purchasing Power’

The political climate has not changed very much since the March for Belgian Unity. Belgium is still without government, and the financial crisis is starting to be felt, with increasing inflation diminishing people’s purchasing power substantially.

Purchasing Power: the Mobilizing Issue

Causes

Diminishing purchasing power in a climate of governmental insecurity. Furthermore, the prospect of an orange-blue (Christian democrat - liberal) coalition makes the social partners worry about their future measures to raise purchasing power, but to defend welfare and social spending.

Demonstration Demands

The organizers (see below) agreed on three, interrelated, and very concrete claims/demands:

1. Active measures against inappropriate price increases;
2. Lowering of gas and electricity tariffs;
3. Expanding oil fuel fund from underprivileged people to lower income families.

Demonstration Initiative

Initiative for this demonstration was taken, again, by Belgium’s three largest trade unions: Christian (ACV-CSC), socialist (ABVV-FGTB) and liberal (ACLVB-CGSLB) union confederations.

Purchasing Power typified

Purchasing power is, without doubt, an **old mobilizing issue**, as it directly taps into people’s survival needs. Yet contrary to the others, in this case it is not a particularistic issue, concerning one specific group, but rather all members of society, be it with special,

but certainly not unique interest for the weakest. Clearly, it concerns a **universalistic mobilizing issue**.

In the next part, I will summarize this case overview, together with some more information on the concrete data obtained at the different issue demonstrations.

Data

Survey Data Overview

Table 11 contains our ten different cases and their placement on both issue dimensions as explained above.

TABLE 11: MOBILIZING ISSUES THROUGHOUT DEMONSTRATIONS

	Demonstration	*N*	*%*	Particularistic Issue	Universalistic Issue
Old	InBev	*98*	*14*	●	
Issue	VW Forest	*272*	*31*	●	
	Regionalism	*238*	*42*	●	
	Purchasing Power	*125*	*32*		●
	Total	*733*			
New	Sans Papiers	*149*	*17*	●	
Issue	Iraq '06	*316*	*34*		●
	Belgian Unity	*202*	*43*		●
	Climate Change	*189*	*43*		●
	Total	*856*			
Consensual	March for Joe	*437*	*43*	●	
Issue	Silent March	*437*	*45*		●
	Total	*874*			
	Total	*2463*		*1149*	*1269*

Note: N: amount of completed and sent back questionnaires.
%: ratio of returned questionnaires versus total amount of questionnaires handed out

In total, the sample contains almost 2,500 unique respondents, resulting in average samples of 250 respondents per demonstration. The total sample comprises four old issue demonstrations (InBev - VW Forest -Regionalism - Purchasing Power), four new issue demonstrations (sans papiers - Iraq - Unity - Climate) and two consensual issue demonstrations (Joe - Silent March). Given the large samples of consensual issue demonstrators, the ratio's between these three group are fairly equal, each containing about one third of all respondents.

On the secondary dimension of particularism-universalism, demonstrations also divide largely equally into both; five of them fit within the first, particularistic, and five other within the second universalism category. Again, respondents are divided fairly well between both categories.

Combining the first and second dimension, the grid of six possibilities is filled; each possible category contains at least one issue demonstration. Yet some differences are immediately clear from the table. Whereas the division between particularistic and universalistic issues within that of consensual is one versus one, this is a very different story for old and new issue demonstration. Of the four old issue demonstrations, three are labelled as particularistic issue demonstrations on the secondary dimension; for new issues, this is the exact opposite, with three out of four new issue demonstrations labelled as universalistic issues on this second dimension. These systematically skewed combinations might be the result of chance, and could become effaced once having more samples of new and old issue demonstrations. Yet, with only this evidence in hand, we must assume that old issues are more likely to also be particularistic, and that new issues more likely to coincide with universalistic issues. This, however, does not at all contradict the two-dimensionality of the issue typology; it does show that specific combinations are more likely to occur than others and that it are maybe these less self-evident combinations where the most interesting results can be found.

Still, I do think a sound underlying principle can explain this 'pairwise predilection' between old and particularistic issue on the one, and new and universalistic issues on the other hand. First, old issues are more probable to be reactive and short-term, whereas new issues are more likely to be proactive and longer-term. It are the losers of ongoing modernization and globalization processes who are threatened by these exact processes and the situations these cause, and take action defensively, be it on cultural or economic

issues, on short term. For instance: wanting to keep ones jobs at times of corporate restructurings; wanting to put a halt to immigration after seeing a neighbourhood deteriorate, are cases of old issues, dealt with in a reactive way. On the other hand these same processes of post-industrialization and globalization have, as mentioned, created a 'new class' of citizens active on 'new' issues, for which far more often ego-centrist risk-perceptions are substituted by humanistic risk-perceptions as there are global warming, global social justice, etcetera.

These humanistic risk-perceptions are, typically, of a broad scope, and actions on related issues mostly aim at changing things to the benefit of all. And, reactive responses on old issues are more likely to be referring to specific social groupings, mostly specific segments of losers of globalization, whereas proactive action on new issues is more likely to not refer to such groups. Therefore, old issues are more likely to be also particularistic, and new issues more likely to be universalistic at the same time. Though, this is, as the cases have shown, not always the case. In fact, for instance, all kinds of NIMBY actions on new issues (like e.g. waste incinerators or power plants) are in fact particularistic, as they often represent the grievances of specific local groups. And old issues, as the example of purchasing power clearly shows, can be universalistic in nature just as well.

Finally, a note on response rates. On average, response rates are high, much higher than other postal surveys with no reminders (Walgrave and Verhulst 2011). Protesters, thus, are often engaged respondents in more than one way, yet for some demonstrations, more specifically the InBev and Sans Papiers demonstrations, response rates are quite a lot below average. In both cases this is due to idiosyncratic circumstances. In retrospect, the InBev demonstration was covered with too large a group of interviewers. This way, the team of researchers was too obviously present at this relatively small demonstration, making them even an object of conversation between protesters, instead of inconspicuously blending in within the demonstration. This conspicuous presence also led to a mechanism described by Walgrave and Verhulst (2011) as 'contagious refusal', making demonstrators seeing others refuse, more likely to refuse themselves (and those seeing others throw their survey booklets on the streets, will be more prone in doing the same than those who do not see this).

The Sans Papiers demonstrators were a different story. Here, the problem of low response rates most probably was that, whereas many of the demonstrators were sans papiers or

asylum seekers, our surveys were only in French and Dutch. Furthermore, many of these sans papiers first thought that our surveys were actually a means to obtain some kind of legal residence permit (ibid.), so the disappointment must have been large when they found out that it were only surveys with 'solely academic goals'.

Do these relative high levels of non-response have an effect on the representativeness of the data? We do not know, as we only started testing for this after these problems posed themselves. Yet, again Walgrave and Verhulst (2011) show that for many different issues, of different sizes and on different issues, results are in all cases reliable and representative (see also: Peterson, Wennerhag and Wahlström 2009). Furthermore, if the empirical results show that the typologies work, this most probably means that both demonstrations behave in the expected ways also, and, thus, that they are equally good samples as the others.

Variables

At stake in this study is how different constellations of protesters' personal features ('who'), motivations ('why') and mobilization trajectories ('how) can be traced back to the mobilizing issues these people are active on (exactly out of different motivations, and through different channels and within different kinds of embeddings). First, I will set off each issue type against all others. This way, we can assess if these issues types differ from both others (on the primary dimension) or from the other (on the secondary dimension), when it comes to who takes action on them, why they do so, and how they come to do so. Next, I will make the same exercise using multivariate analyses, thus also showing the relative importance of the who, why and how of participation, and shedding more light on the ways in which these are (un)likely to be (mutually) influencing each other. Finally, I make the combined two-dimensional analysis, analyzing the differences between particularistic and universalistic issues *within* old, new and consensual issues.

In the multivariate analyses, I will use causal models, although the direction of the causalities is questionable. For instance, it are not the kinds of people, their motivations and mobilization trajectories and contexts that determine issues, but these are on the contrary consequential to these issues. The reason why I think using these causal models is appropriate is that I am searching for *types* of mobilizing issues in a quest for an encompassing *typology* of such issues. The causal relation between these issue types

(dependent variable of this research) and the other variables (predictor or explaining variables) is mixed and bi-directional. A typology exactly aims at explaining different constellations of variables, which, in different constellations explain the existence of the typology.

The list of 'independents', then, contains those variables discussed in the previous part. I sketch them briefly in Table X; all variables and scales are explained in more detail in Appendix 1.

TABLE 12 : LIST OF PREDICTORS

		Range	Mean	Std. Dev
WHO?				
1	Gender	(1) male - (2) female	1.41	.461
2	Age	15-86	45.06	14.9
3	Diploma	(1) none - (8) university	6.38	1.76
4	Interest in Politics	(1) low - (4) high	3.67	1.02
5	L-R self placement	(1) left - (10) right	4.14	2.33
6	Action Rep Diversity	(0) low - (5) high	2.88	2.01
7	Demo past 5 yrs	(1) first time - (5) 20+	2.19	1.18
8	Member org. circle	(0) no -(1) yes	.61	.49
10	Embedded diversity	(0) low - (16) high	3.10	2.70
HOW ?				
11	Information Channel	(1) informal - (5) formal	3.32	1.48
12	TIes	(1) open - (6) closed	4.32	1.95
WHY ?				
13	ID scale (3)	(1) low - (5) high	3.93	.877
14	Success chance	(1) low - (7) high	3.56	1.52
15	Security threat perception	(1) low - (7) high	4.88	1.59
16	Value threat perception	(1) low - (1) high	4.74	1.47

5

Results

Mobilizing Issues Explored: Bivariate Analyses

After this long and by times exhausting overview of theory, data and cases, we can finally move on to the results. First, I will present several bivariate analyses to provide some first insights in how the different variables separately behave within the different issue types. In a next part, I will then use those same variables to predict the belonging to the different issue types and verify the strength of the typology of mobilizing issues.

The bivariate analyses all draw on independent samples t-tests, which are used to assess if the means of two groups are statistically and significantly different from each other. For each variable, the difference between the mean within each group of the issue variable is weighed off to the variance of these variables within each of these groups of issue variables. Each analysis measures whether significant differences on the different variables, between one issue type and the other issue type(s).

Table 13 shows a simple summary of the results of these t-tests on all independent variables, and for all dependent issue variables; the separate analyses can be found in appendix I, but are not reported on separately here. The different issue variables are conceived as dichotomous variables, setting off one issue against the other(s): old versus new and consensual; new versus old and consensual; consensual versus old and new, and finally particularistic versus universalistic. Keeping in mind the bivariate nature of these results, the data presented in Table 13 suggests very strong differences between protesters on different issues, and, first and foremost, all of the variables show a significant association with at least two issue types; most of them with three, or with all four. Clearly, they are the right ones to discern between the different issue types.

TABLE 13 : SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN **DIFFERENT ISSUE TYPES**

	Old	New	Cons.	Universalistic (vs particularistic)
WHO ?				
Gender	–	+	+	+
(1) male - (2) female				
Age	+	–	n.s.	n.s.
Scale				
Diploma	–	+	n.s.	+
(1) low - (8) high)				
Interest in Politics	+	n.s.	–	+
(1) low - (4) high				
L-R self placement	+	–	–	–
(1) left - (10) right				
Demo past 5 yrs	+	n.s.	–	n.s.
(1) low - (5) high				
Action Rep Diversity	–	+	–	+
(0) low - (5) high				
Member org. Circle	+	–	–	–
(0) no -(1) yes				
Embedded Diversity	n.s.	+	–	+
(0) low - (16) high				

TABLE 13 CONTINUED

	Old	New	Cons.	Universalistic (vs particularistic)
HOW ?				
Ties	+	–	–	n.s.
(1) informal - (5) formal				
Channel	+	+	–	n.s.
(1) open - (6) closed				
WHY ?				
ID scale (3)	+	n.s.	-	+
(1) low - (5) high				
Instrumental	–	n.s.	+	n.s.
(1) low - (7) high				
Security threat perception	+	–	–	–
(1) low - (7) high				
Value threat perception	n.s.	–	+	–
(1) low - (1) high				

All data based on t-Test for Equality of Means

'+': significantly more than comparison group

'–':significantly less than comparison group

'n.s.': no significant difference between groups

All significance levels ≥ 95%

Who?

Analyses start with the 'who' of protest participation. When it comes to the socio-demographics of our demonstrators, by and large *all* of them relate to the specific issue types expectations in typical ways. Old and new issues attract people with significantly distinct socio-demographic features. Old issue demonstrations are attended by proportionally more men and the relatively older: with 47 years old, the average old issue demonstrator is five years older than their new issue counterpart. Also, old issue protesters are, on an eight-level scale, on average about one level less educated than their new issue counterparts. Consensual issues appear to be attracting significantly more female protesters, which in fact outrank the men, and their age and education level is middling that of both other groups of protesters.

Universalistic issue protests are significantly more an affair of women and higher educated than their particularistic counterparts, but they both attract demonstrators of an average age of 45.

The political attitudes of our different issue demonstrators also create considerable variation across issue types. Though all demonstrators are in fact very much interested in politics, we do find significant differences between them. Consensual issue demonstrators are not that much interested in politics, but, surprisingly, it are not the new, but rather the old issue protesters who show the highest levels of interest in politics. When it comes to left-right self-placement, although the average means of all issue type protesters lies (just) below the middle of the scale, indicating that all demonstrators share on average more leftwing than rightwing attitudes, the variation between different issue protesters is considerable. The left-right dimension variable shows a more evident pattern, with the average old protester positioning himself most rightist with about a centre position on a 1-10 scale, and the average new issue protester substantially more leftist, indicating a score about 1.5 points lower on this scale. Again, consensual issue demonstrators position themselves somewhat in between.

On the secondary issue dimension of issue scope, it is the universalistic protester type that indeed consists of people who are relatively more interested in politics, and they are, relatively more leftist than the particularists. Clearly, the second issue dimension does not exist fully independent from this subjective left-right dimension, at least not in these

preliminary bivariate findings, and if these results persist in multivariate analyses, they will need further specification.

Next, we turn to the behavioral variables. Old issue protesters are on average the most routinized demonstrators. Whether this a matter of a greater 'demand' for protest among these old issue protesters as a result of more continuously salient issues, or a consequence of more protest 'supply' by the relatively much stronger labor unions organizations we cannot say for now. Consensual issue demonstrations typically are able to draw a-typical protest participants onto the streets, which is evidenced by high amounts of first time participants and low overall protest experience, which is clearly suggested here by the results.

Somewhat surprisingly, new issue demonstrators are only averagely experienced in protest action. Again, this can be a matter of less recurring protest supply, or it could also be due to the fact that new issue demonstrations attract relatively many younger, and therefore maybe less experienced protesters. Yet, in spite of this lower overall protest frequency, new issue demonstrators are on the other hand much more experienced in a diversity of other action repertoires; with an average practice of 3.75 out of 5 action repertoires, they grossly outrank old (2.57) and consensual (1.80) protest activists. Particularistic and universalistic issue protesters finally do not differ from one another on protest frequency; yet they do, again, differ concerning action repertoire diversity, with universalistic issue protesters being experienced in almost 1.5 action repertoires more than particularists.

What can we learn, finally, from the numbers in table 13 when it comes to the different measures of embeddedness? Issue-network embeddedness, interpreted as being or knowing a member of an organization staging the protest on the issue, and thus indicating a pre-existing involvement with or attachment to this issue, seems to be subject to a same distribution as above, with relatively many highly embedded old protesters, and less-embedded new and consensual protesters. Yet, a very similar dynamic to that between protest experience and action repertoire diversity seems to be at play here. Whereas new issue protesters are less formally or informally embedded in organizational networks directly involved in the set-up of the demonstration, they are however much more diversely embedded in different organizations than their protest counterparts on other issue. In other words, although they are less members of, or connected to members of the

organizations staging the specific demonstration, they are much more embedded in a multitude of organizations on a diversity of different issues. Finally, universalistic issues attract more diversely embedded protesters, but they also attract less people who are involved in some way in the protest-staging organizational circles; again universalistic issue protesters distinguish themselves from particularistic issue demonstrators in a largely similar way as do new issue demonstrators from old ones.

How?

On the primary issue dimension, results show that different mobilization contexts are also associated in different ways to these specific issue dimensions. Old issue protesters are relatively most mobilized through closed information channels and take part in the company of people connected to them through weaker and more formal network ties. Consensual issue protesters are the relative opposites, hitting the streets together with informal, strong tie fellow-protesters, and being mobilized through open mobilization channels. New issue demonstrators take an intermediate position, combining closed mobilization channels with strong tie companionships. In other words, new issue demonstrators are informed through inner-circle information channels, but eventually show up to demonstrate more with their family, friends and acquaintances. It seems that they somehow are able to broaden their own mobilization to their close ones, and/or that these latter in effect play an important part in their personal networks in which the issue at stake has high salience.

On the secondary dimension, particularistic and universalistic issue protesters do not significantly differ from one another on both mobilization variables.

Why?

Finally, the ‘why’ of participation proves different for different issue protesters. On a scale from one to five, collective identity is highest for old issue protesters (4.2), followed by new (4.0) and consensual issue demonstrators (3.4). Clearly, new social movement theories predicting high levels of collective identity underestimate its importance in mobilizing old issue protesters onto the streets. On the secondary dimension, this identity is significantly lower for particularistic issue protesters than for those active on universalist issues, although the difference is only 0.1 point on the five-point scale.

The perceived instrumentality (versus expressivity) of the protest one takes part in delivers remarkable results. It are those active on consensual issues who prove to be the most believing the fact that the demonstration they take part in will be effective in obtaining at least one of its goals.

Finally, security threat perceptions, spurring feelings of group-based anger, and thus reflected in strong feelings of anger and combativeness, are of very high importance to both old issues as well as particularistic issues, just as expected. Interestingly however, this does not mean that new issue protesters score high on the emotions measuring value threat perceptions, on the contrary. It are consensual issue protesters who show highest levels of to these threats related emotional responses of worry, fear, sadness and indignation. In fact, and unlike the non-significant relation for old issue protesters, do new issue demonstrators display even relatively low levels of these feelings. The same goes for universalistic issue protesters, making that those partaking on particularistic issues are not only more motivated by security threat perceptions, but also by values threat perceptions.

This quick run through the first, bivariate analyses renders interesting results, some of which are obvious, but others also surprising and unexpected. A few systematic, related typological differences already seem to surface. For instance, old issue demonstrators are highly embedded in the organizational circles of those organizations that stage the demonstration, but are far less involved in organizations on other issues. They are well-versed demonstrators, but far less experienced in other action types. And, old issue demonstrators are mobilized through closed channels, and take the streets with weak, more formal tie co-workers or fellow members of an organization. All this indicates a strong, formal embeddedment that spurs protest activism on one singular issue. New issue demonstrators are also mobilized through organizational channels, but show up more with their friends and family. They are less embedded in the circles of organizations that stage the demonstration, but they are involved in a much higher diversity of other organizations. They are less routinized participants of protest marches, but this is compensated by a high experience in other repertoires. New issue protesters thus show a broad, but more unspecific involvement in protest politics in general, across issues, and seem to incorporate their activism more into their personal lives. The fact then that new issue protesters actually discern themselves from the others by showing not one positive relation with one of the four motivational variables could then for instance very well be

related to much stronger relational processes through strong-tie mobilization processes. For these and similar reasoning, we lift analyses to a higher level and try to get full insight in these issue typologies using multivariate analyses.

Mobilizing Issues Explained: Multivariate Analyses

In a reliable, and above all effective typology, the different types within one dimension of a typology, and by which this dimension is constituted, are mutually exclusive, and internally consistent. Therefore, we should set off each type against the other types to see if they differ from overall other demonstrators, and, secondly, we should also assess the internal logic of the type itself: which variables are important, and in which ways do they account for people to belong to this specific issue type. To do so, we need multivariate analyses, and, given the dichotomous dependent variables, more specifically logistic regression. Each logistic regression model then predicts the belonging to protest within one of the specific issue types, versus the not belonging to this type.

In most statistical programs, there are no tools to assess for multicollinarity within the regression model, and to still be able to do so it is common to perform these tests using OLS regression models. For all logistic regression models used in this study such collinearity tests were run. They calculate tolerance values and VIF scores. Small tolerance, i.e. below .1 to below .3 in more rigid interpretations, indicates a quasi linear combination between an independent with another independent. In the models in this study, tolerance values are always higher than .6, indicating none such relations between the models' independents. Next, VIF scores are calculated, which are the inverse of these tolerance values (1/tolerance), which should, according to the most strict norms, never exceed 2.5; in all models presented here VIF scores are smaller than 2.

Furthermore, all models' Chi^2 tests are significant, indicating a good fit for all of them. This means that all models that include the independents produce significantly better results than those which do not include them. More advanced Hosmer and Lemeshow tests are ruled out because of the large sample size (N>2000) which destabilizes the tests' accuracy. Still, the significant Chi^2 fits for all models in combination with high pseudo-R^2's and correct classifications ranging from 70 to 91 percent, provides with sufficient confidence in these models.

All regression models report unstandardized regression coefficients (B) and standard errors (s.e.), being the standard deviation of the data as they are distributed around the regression line. The sign of the unstandardized regression coefficients is useful to get a

first immediate insight on the direction of the association between the predictors and the dependent variable of the regression model. Next, Wald statistics are reported, which gives a good estimation of the 'importance' of the contribution of each variable in the model. They are the squared ratios of the unstandardized regression coefficients and the according standard errors $(B/s.e.)^2$. The smaller the standard error, thus, the larger the Wald statistic, and the larger the B, the larger the Wald statistic. Next, the standardized regression coefficients are reported in the form of odd ratio's, and represents the amount of chance on change within the dependent variable at a one unit change in the independent variable. Subsequently, significance of the variables association with the dependent variable within the regression model is reported. Finally, the entire models' explaining power is expressed by the Nagelkerke Pseudo R^2's.

First, full regression models are presented. The first three models together test the primary issue dimension by each time contrasting one group of protests on a same mobilizing issue against both others. The fourth model distinguishes between particularistic and universalistic issue protests. The overall strength of these models is high to very high. Nagelkerke R^2's ranging from .330 to .664, numbers referring to the degree to which the dependent variable can be explained or rather predicted by the groups of independents, are satisfying, to say the least.

TABLE 14: LOGISTIC REGRESSION PREDICTING OLD ISSUE PROTEST PARTICIPATION VERSUS NEW AND CONSENSUAL ISSUE PROTEST PARTICIPATION

		B	s.e.	Wald	Exp(B)	
WHO	Gender *man – woman*	-.412	.128	10.272	.663	**
	Age	.031	.005	48.376	1.032	***
	Diploma	-.202	.039	26.793	.817	***
	Interest in Politics	-.061	.069	.772	.941	
	Left-Right attitudes	.392	.034	130.773	1.479	***
	Protest Experience <5 yrs	.285	.059	23.188	1.330	***
	Action Repertoire Diversity	-.135	.043	10.099	.874	**
	Member org. circle	2.060	.180	130.574	7.842	***
	Embedded diversity	-.158	.025	40.610	.854	***
HOW	Channel *open – closed*	.128	.042	9.256	1.136	**
	Ties (company) *strong/informal – weak/formal*	.406	.048	72.303	1.502	***
WHY	Expressive – Instrumental *not - very instrumental*	-.062	.042	2.170	.940	
	Identity	.112	.077	2.109	1.119	
	Security Threat Perception	.417	.052	64.666	1.517	***
	Value Threat Perception	-.233	.052	19.836	.792	***
	Constant	*-5.663*	*.616*	*84.520*	*.003*	***
	N = 2113			**Nagelkerke R^2 = .565**		

Notes: weighted dataset

Chi^2 = 1129,44*** (15 df); % correct = 82%

***: p<.001 **: p<.01 *: p<.05

TABLE 15: LOGISTIC REGRESSION PREDICTING NEW ISSUE PROTEST PARTICIPATION VERSUS OLD AND CONSENSUAL ISSUE PROTEST PARTICIPATION

		B	s.e.	Wald	Exp(B)	
WHO	Gender *man – woman*	.092	.117	.613	1.096	
	Age	-.036	.004	73.289	.965	***
	Diploma	.242	.039	37.702	1.274	***
	Interest in Politics	-.033	.063	.275	.968	
	Left-Right attitudes	-.326	.032	105.385	.722	***
	Protest Experience <5 yrs	-.250	.054	21.380	.779	***
	Action Repertoire Diversity	.501	.037	185.423	1.651	***
	Member org. circle	-.342	.147	5.377	.711	*
	Embedded diversity	.081	.022	13.818	1.084	***
HOW	Channel *open – closed*	.337	.039	72.669	1.400	***
	Ties (company) *strong/informal – weak/formal*	-.354	.044	64.072	.702	***
WHY	Expressive – Instrumental *not - very instrumental*	-.166	.039	18.263	.847	***
	Identity	.390	.072	28.953	1.476	***
	Security Threat Perception	-.270	.044	36.787	.764	***
	Value Threat Perception	-.040	.047	.735	.961	
	Constant	*-.050*	*.545*	*0.009*	*.951*	
	N = 2113			**Nagelkerke R^2 = ,417**		

Notes: weighted dataset

Chi^2 = 759,87*** (15 df); % correct = 78%

***: p<.001 **: p<.01 *: p<.05

TABLE 16: LOGISTIC REGRESSION PREDICTING CONSENSUAL ISSUE PROTEST PARTICIPATION VERSUS OLD AND NEW ISSUE PROTEST PARTICIPATION

		B	s.e.	Wald	Exp(B)	
WHO	Gender					
	man – woman	.633	.171	13.673	1.883	***
	Age	.009	.006	2.059	1.009	
	Diploma	-.042	.052	.633	.959	
	Interest in Politics	.098	.093	1.126	1.103	
	Left-Right attitudes	-.120	.047	6.578	.887	**
	Protest Experience <5 yrs	-.142	.094	2.272	.867	
	Action Repertoire Diversity	-.579	.057	103.595	.560	***
	Member org. circle	-1.663	.182	83.181	.190	***
	Embedded diversity	.111	.032	11.757	1.118	**
HOW	Channel					
	open – closed	-.529	.048	122.281	.589	***
	Ties (company)					
	strong/informal – weak/formal	-.127	.067	3.611	.881	
WHY	Expressive – Instrumental					
	not - very instrumental	.370	.057	41.871	1.448	***
	Identity	-.969	.106	83.996	.380	***
	Security Threat Perception	-.194	.064	9.168	.824	**
	Value Threat Perception	.463	.074	38.770	1.589	***
	Constant	*3.209*	*.751*	*18.230*	*24.744*	***
	N = 2113			**Nagelkerke R^2 = .664**		

Notes: weighted dataset

Chi^2 = 1164,76*** (15 df); % correct = 91%

***: p<.001 **: p<.01 *: p<.05

TABLE 17: LOGISTIC REGRESSION PREDICTING UNIVERSALISTIC ISSUE PROTEST PARTICIPATION VERSUS PARTICULARISTIC ISSUE PROTEST PARTICIPATION

		B	s.e.	Wald	Exp(B)	
WHO	Gender					
	man – woman	.275	.108	6,468	1.316	*
	Age	-.005	.004	1.661	.995	
	Diploma	.099	.033	8.741	1.104	**
	Interest in Politics	.126	.057	4.894	1.134	*
	Left-Right attitudes	-.384	.029	175.796	.681	***
	Protest Experience <5 yrs	-.398	.052	57.868	.672	***
	Action Repertoire Diversity	.454	.037	149.356	1.574	***
	Member org. circle	-.404	.136	8.830	.667	**
	Embedded diversity	.086	.021	16.886	1.090	***
HOW	Channel					
	open – closed	.060	.035	3.042	1.062	
	Ties (company)					
	strong/informal – weak/formal	-.034	.040	0.696	.967	
WHY	Expressive – Instrumental					
	not - very instrumental	-.068	.035	3.866	.934	*
	Identity	.412	.066	38.725	1.510	***
	Security Threat Reaction	-.079	.041	3.703	.924	
	Value Threat Reaction	-.044	.044	1.011	.957	
	Constant	*-1,050*	*.488*	*4.641*	*.350*	*
	N = 2113			**Nagelkerke R^2 = .330**		

Notes: weighted dataset

Chi^2 = 591,32*** (15 df); % correct = 70%

***: p<.001 **: p<.01 *: p<.05

Some models have a much higher explanatory strength than others. The by far relatively lowest (but still reasonably high) explanation strength is produced by the final regression model. Clearly the issue scope dimension discerning between particularistic and universalistic issues is strong and important, but its relatively low explanation strength compared to the other models discerning within the first dimensions provides empirical justification to consider the scope dimension as the secondary issue dimension, and the thematic one as the primary issue dimension. This will further be dealt with later in this chapter; before, instead of running through these entire models, again I will discuss the analysis per sub-section, of who, why and how. This is rather an unusual way of reporting on regression models, but it is done for reasons of clarity. Again, we start with the 'who' of participation.

WHO?

Socio-demographics

Several expectations were drawn from different theories on the relation between different issues and different personal characteristics and properties, and these will be evaluated here. Table X gives a summarized overview of the first part of all four regression models; it presents Wald statistics and odds ratio's for all significant variables in the model. Once more: in each of these models, one issue type is set off against two (of the first three) or one (for the fourth) other issue type(s). If, in the fourth model a variable shows to be not significant, this evidently means that both types of issues do not attract people significantly differing on this variable. Yet this is somewhat different for the first three models. If a variable shows not significant in one model, but it does in both others, this could signify the existence of some kind of issue rank-order order on this variable, with two issues attracting both extremes of this variable, and the third, insignificant one, attracting the mean of both extremes.

TABLE 18: WALD SCORES AND ODDS RATIOS OF SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES IN THE 'WHO'-PART OF FOUR LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS PREDICTING DIFFERENT ISSUE PROTEST PARTICIPATION.

	OLD		NEW		CONS		UNIV	
	Wald	*ß*	*Wald*	*ß*	*Wald*	*ß*	*Wald*	*ß*
Gender (m – f)	10.272	.663			13.673	1.883	6,468	1.316
Age	48.376	1.032	73.289	.965				
Diploma	26.793	.817	37.702	1.274			8.741	1.104
Interest in Politics							4.894	1.134
Left-Right attitudes	130.773	1.479	105.385	.722	6.578	.887	175.796	.681
Protest Exp. <5 yrs	23.188	1.330	21.380	.779			57.868	.672
Action Rep. Diversity	10.099	.874	185.423	1.651	103.595	.560	149.356	1.574
Member org. circle	130.574	7.842	5.377	.711	83.181	.190	8.830	.667
Embedded diversity	40.610	.854	13.818	1.084	11.757	1.118	16.886	1.090
Constant	*84.520*	*.003*	.		*18.230*	*24.744*	*4.641*	*.350*

Note: weighted dataset

For instance, this dynamic discussed above is probably at play with some of the socio-demographic variables. Old issue protests attract significantly more men, and consensual issues much more women, so, given the insignificant result in the second model, new issue protesters will be a much more gender-mixed audience. Having a look at the percentages within these different issue type demonstrations, this makes perfect sense. Old issue protest publics are made up out of men for as much as 70 percent. New issue protests attract more women, but still 57 percent of all new issue protesters are men. For consensual issues, this latter ratio is almost reversed, with 56 percent of female protesters, nearly twice as many as in old issue demonstrations. This is also exactly what was expected, with consensual issues being typically more 'feminine' and old issues attracting typically more male protesters. New issues are somewhere in between, attracting more men than consensual issues, but more women than old issues. Furthermore, also as expected, are women less likely than men to partake in particularistic issue protests, and more so in universalistic ones.

A similar dynamic is at play for both age and education. As predicted, old issue demonstrators are significantly older and less educated; those on new issues are significantly younger and higher educated; consensual issue demonstrators are a bit a mix of both, being of more or less average age and education. Looking at the Wald scores, for both old and new issues, age is the most important socio-demographic signifier of protest on these respective issues. Maybe the youth indeed do adhere to more self-expression and emancipative values, as they were socialized more in prosperity and welfare (Inglehart 1990). Yet higher education has a similar effect, resulting in new issue appealing to the higher educated and old issues to the less highly educated. Oppositely, economic, social and physical insecurity, typically being translated into old issue protests, are most likely to affect the lower, and thus less educated sections of society.

Where there are no significant age differences found between protesters of particularistic and universalistic issue protesters, this is however the case concerning their schooling, with these latter having obtained significantly higher schooling degrees than particularistic demonstrators. Relative higher schooling levels are indeed likely to be a prerequisite for people to be able to broaden their outlook on the world, and be willing to engage in action on more universalistic issues.

On the whole these socio-demographics differ significantly between different issue protests and they do so in very logical and anticipated ways. Older and relatively less highly educated men are most likely to be active on old issues. New issues attract higher educated and younger demonstrators; both men and women. Consensual issue protest participants, finally, are more women, of average age, and average education level, thus most reflecting those of the population, as expected. Universalistic issues also attract more women, and these are significantly higher educated than their particularistic counterparts.

Still, although almost all of our expectations on these socio-demographic variables are confirmed, the relative explaining power of these in all four regression models is fairly low. Only age seems to be a relatively strong predictor of belonging to old, new or consensual issue protest, yet it is still far less important than some variables representing specific attitudes or embeddedment measures, which will be dealt with below.

Political Attitudes

Reviewing both political attitudes, still in table 18, strangely, political interest is not an important variable in discerning between different issue protesters, whereas theory would make us think new issue protesters to stand out with high, and old issue protesters with low political interest in politics. Whether this is due to indeed equally high interest in politics, or to the fact that the concept of politics is interpreted in different ways by different issue protesters, or even to the fact that the effect of this variable is absorbed by another one like e.g. that of education, we do not know. On the whole, then, this result indicates that, regardless the thematic issues at stake for action, ***all*** protest participants have unvaryingly high political interest, thus corroborating earlier more general findings by for instance Verba et al (1995), but also indicating this variable's irrelevance in explaining differential issue participation. On the secondary dimension discerning between particularistic and universalistic issues, the variable of political interest does make a significant, though also relatively modest, difference: quite logically, universalistic issues presuppose higher levels of political interest of its protest participants.

Yet the second attitudinal variable does provide significant variation across all issue dimensions, and the high Wald scores in almost all of them indicates this variable's high importance to account for differential issue participation. More specifically, it sets off old

issue demonstrators as having relatively more rightist, or rather less leftist attitudes, against both new and consensual issues, with more leftist attitudes. Looking at the Wald scores, less and more leftist attitudes are especially important in making people to engage in protest on respectively old and new issues. Very clearly, new issue protesters pose themselves unidimensionally on the left on the scale, where old issue demonstrators position themselves more on the right, which might be an indication of them combining more leftist attitudes on the economic dimension, with less leftist attitudes on the cultural dimension. Old issue demonstrators were indeed were above said to be 'more likely to be more mixed on both dimensionalities, and combine 'old-left' social-economic identifications with more conservative, authoritarian, nationalist and/or ethnocentric ones'.

On the scope dimension, left-right attitudes are also very important predictors of universalistic or particularistic issue protest participation. The more a protester has leftist attitudes, the more he/she is likely to be a universalistic protester. The relation is significant, large, and very important in the model. Clearly, the particularistic-universalistic issue dimension is strongly associated with the left-right dimension, instead of cross-cutting it. Perhaps this has to do with the fact that universalistic issues inherently presume solidarity, which is deeply rooted in leftist attitudes. This would then also be reflected in shared identities, later on in the section on motivations.

Political Behavior

Next, we come to both behavioral variables, dealing with two questions: To which varying degrees are our different issue-demonstrators more or less well-versed in this protest repertoire? And, to which degree are they familiar with many other action repertoires by which they can engage in protest?

Overall results are very similar to those of the bivariate analyses. Old Issue protesters again prove to be by far the more routinized protest demonstrators, while their new issue counterparts show to be far less experienced. The protest experience variable does not remain significant in setting-off consensual issue protesters from the others, meaning that the low protest practice of consensual issue demonstrators is explained to a large degree by another independent variable included in the model. In this case it is very much related to the overall protest action repertoire diversity, which is relatively very low for consensual

issue protesters, and very important in discerning them from all other issue demonstrators, as is shown by the high Wald score. Indeed, running the model without this latter variables significantly decreases the models explanatory strength (with an R^2 dropping a formidable ten percent), but it also makes that the protest experience variable becomes a significant, strong and negative predictor within the model (exp(B)=.754; sig=.000; Wald=33,330). Consensual issue demonstrators are thus typically inexperienced protesters, who have not had a taste from much protest diversity (yet). Yet this protest repertoire diversity is also relatively low for old issue protesters, and high for new issue demonstrators for whom this variable proves the most important personal feature variable in the model. Again, thus, old issue demonstrators prove to be very routinized in the repertoire of protest demonstrations, but they are on the other hand far less likely to leave this protest track and to engage in other repertoires. New issue demonstrators are less routinized demonstrators, but this is probably not due to the fact that they engage less in protest in general, but rather that they divide their protest actions among a larger variation of action repertoires. Both variables should thus not be taken into account separately, as their combination uncovers a typical duality between old and new issue protest participation (see for instance Dalton and Kuechler 1990).

Universalists and particularists differ on both variables in the expected direction. Universalistic issue protesters are more, and more diversely experienced in protest action; particularistic demonstration participants seem to turn to protest more sporadically, and less diversely. These latter probably hit the streets only when the specific group they take action for is under threat, making universalistic issue demonstrators more inclined to take part in a wider array of protests. And, this exact same mechanism will most probably also explain the differences in protest action repertoires.

General Organizational Embeddedness

As mentioned before, are old issues much more likely to be crystallized into strong social movement organizations (Walgrave 1992) or very close-knit single issue organizational networks, so we expect protesters on these issues to be embedded within these kinds of networks. New issues are less subject to such organizational formalization (Dalton and Kuechler 1990: 15), and are more activating in ‘loosely structured protest communities’ (Oberschall 1980). The data, still in Table 18, are clear: old issue protesters are overwhelmingly more embedded within the formal organizational networks involved in

the staging of the demonstration than new and consensual issue protesters. In the models of old issue and consensual issue protest participation, these are important variables, meaning that this varying degree of embeddedness is a strong predictor of belonging to one of both issue protests. Interestingly, particularistic issue protests are much alike old issue protests, as its demonstrators discern themselves with relative high levels of embeddedness from universalistic issue protesters.

Yet, these same multivariate analyses show that both old and particularistic issue protests attract not only those demonstrators who are the most strongly embedded within the organizing movement networks but also that these are on the other hand the least diversely embedded protesters of all. New, consensual and universalistic issue protesters are thus less embedded within the organizations staging the demonstration, but more on a larger diversity of different organizations, which might have in some way 'structurally connected' them to these more protest-specific organizations (Passy 2001).

Multivariate analyses more clearly lay bare the interesting, issue-differential trade-off dynamics within the political behavior and embeddedness variables. Old and Particularistic issue protesters are highly experienced demonstrators, but far less practiced in other protest action repertoires. They are strongly embedded in the organizing networks, but hardly broaden their scope beyond these specific issue-related networks. New and universalistic issue protesters on the other hand seem to spread their protest actions amongst a greater variation of repertoires, which also results in relatively lower experience in protest demonstrations. On the other hand are both issue type protesters significantly less involved within the formal organizing networks, but they are contrarily much more involved in a broader diversity of other organizations. Both diverging tracks concerning the political behavior and embeddedness of these different issue types seems to uncover specific, issue-related, participatory trends. Most likely similar trends can also be revealed in the next part on mobilization dynamics, as these are the dynamic translation of the more structural individual features reported upon until now.

HOW?

Mobilization is a matter of communication channels and network ties. In this study, mobilization dynamics are summarized by two distinct measures. How did people come to know about the (opportunity for) protest? And with whom did they finally show up at the demonstration? Table 19 presents the partial regression models for both variables. Given the fact that only two, interrelated variables are under discussion in this section, I will not subdivide the discussion but rather describe both at the same time. This is the more so appropriate since both variables interact in a similarly interesting way as those gauging for embeddedness and behavior in the previous section.

First, let us again compare old and new issue protests. Demonstrators on old issues are mobilized more through closed information channels, and, to a very large degree partake in protest with formal, weak-tie companions. In ordinary terms this means that old issue demonstrators were informed through organizational ties or network affiliates, and that they participate in protest far more with colleagues and fellow-members. New issue protesters are also very much informed through closed, organizational mobilizing channels, but on the contrary come to hit the streets much more with strong, informal ties of family and friends (who are not also fellow-members of organizations they are a member of).

TABLE 19: WALD SCORES AND ODDS RATIOS OF SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES IN THE 'HOW'-PART OF FOUR LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS PREDICTING DIFFERENT ISSUE PROTEST PARTICIPATION.

	OLD		NEW		CONS		UNIV	
	Wald	*B*	*Wald*	*B*	*Wald*	*B*	*Wald*	*B*
Channel *open – closed*	9.256	1.136	72.669	1.400	122.281	.589		
Tie *informal – formal*	72.303	1.502	64.072	.702				
Constant	*84.520*	*.003*	.		*18.230*	*24.744*	*4.641*	*.350*

Note: weighted dataset

The fact that both old as well as new issue protesters are informed primarily through closed channels is most likely related to their earlier-mentioned organizational embeddedness, with old issue demonstrators being embedded in strong, single-issue organizational networks, and new issue protesters being more diversely embedded in a multitude of organizational fields and networks on a variation of issues. Yet whereas old issue protesters remain largely confined to these specific organizational embeddings, and come to protest with more formal, weak-tie fellow protesters, new issue protesters on the contrary participate together with strong-tie, informal companions of family members, friends and relatives. Old issue demonstrators, being informed and mobilized through closed and formal channels and ties thus are the epitomes of totally closed mobilization dynamics. Yet new issue demonstrators, combining closed information channels with informal and strong tie companionship are mobilized through mixed mobilization dynamics, and this can be due to several things. Perhaps new issue demonstrators, given their overall lower age and higher education levels are more involved in different online organizational media, making them more regular targets of mobilization efforts from these media. When they later bring up and discuss this information and these efforts in their informal networks of peers, friends, and family which decide together to participate in protest, they would typically be mobilized within mixed mobilization dynamics. Furthermore, new issue protesters are more diversely embedded within a much broader range of different issue organizations, which very likely implies their embedding within diverse and multi-issue 'protest milieus' (Diani 2009), in which strong ties outweigh weak ties, and in which objective formal ties are submerged under the predominance of subjective informal bonds.

Next to the closed – old issue, and mixed - new issue protest mobilizing dynamics, consensual issues spawn the most open mobilization dynamics. Consensual issue demonstrators are mobilized through open information channels, and will hit the streets with predominantly strong tie companions of friends and family. The variable of information channels truly dominates the entire regression model, and this dominance also explains the fact that the significance of the second mobilization variable is fully absorbed by this first one.

Conclusively, as expected; old, new and consensual issues respectively create closed, mixed and open mobilization dynamics.

One would expect particularistic issues being most internalized by strong organizations, given the fact that these issues often are more concrete, and thus more likely to become organizationally crystallized. On the other hand would it be plausible for universalistic issues to be able to be mobilizing in more diffuse ways through more informal and strong tie networks. Still, none of both hypotheses can be confirmed, and the bivariate conclusion stands firm; universalistic and particularistic issue protesters do not discern themselves from one another on either of these mobilization variables.

WHY?

Why people protest is a thorny issue at the core of many accounts of political participation across a diversity of social science disciplines (Verba et al 1995; Klandermans 1997; 2004). In about every one of these studies motivations of effective participants are set off against those of non-participants, to assess the role of motivations in activating people onto the streets or not. Only very rarely, differential motivational dynamics, related to different issues are studied (yet for two exceptions, see Van Stekelenburg 2006 and Walgrave, Verhulst, Van Laer and Wouters 2010). Obviously, it is this latter research track which will be followed below.

Again table 20 summarizes the different partial regression models.

TABLE 20: WALD SCORES AND ODDS RATIOS OF SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES IN THE 'WHY'-PART OF FOUR LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS PREDICTING DIFFERENT ISSUE PROTEST PARTICIPATION.

	OLD		NEW		CONS		UNIV	
	Wald	*β*	*Wald*	*β*	*Wald*	*β*	*Wald*	*β*
Expressive-Instrumental			18.263	.847	41.871	1.448	3.866	.934
Identity			28.953	1.476	83.996	.380	38.725	1.510
Security threat perception	64.666	1.517	36.787	.764	9.168	.824		
Value threat perception	19.836	.792			38.770	1.589		
Constant	*84.520*	*.003*	*.*		*18.230*	*24.744*	*4.641*	*.350*

Note: weighted dataset

A first overall look at table 20 shows that the motivational variables display quite an unsteady pattern throughout the different regression models. I will first discuss the results variable per variable, to afterwards assess whether there are some interesting overall motivational dynamics at play.

Expressive vs Instrumental motives

As said, as this variable actually measures instrumentality of the protest demonstration, it presumes expressive motives when instrumental motives are lacking. Clearly, consensual issue demonstrators are quite confident in the instrumentality of the protest demonstration they participate in; yet as their explicit goals are often inherently expressive (like for instance showing solidarity), this does not tell us that much really. More important is the fact that both new as well as universalistic issue protesters seem to be significantly less driven by these motives than their respective old issue and particularistic issue counterparts. For old (Dalton and Kuechler 1990) and particularistic issues, instrumental motives indeed are the most logical, if only as they are most likely to be relating to very specific and real-world concerns.

Collective Identity

Given the typical diffuse social bases of protest on both new as well as universalistic issues, we expected these protest participants to be the most sharing high levels of collective identity, if only as a means to surpass the dilemma of collective action (Klandermans 2002). In this study, multivariate data give new proof of this hypothesis, as both new and universalistic issue type protesters indicate having high levels of collective identity. Old issue protesters also share high levels of collective identity, but this association loses its significance in multivariate analyses, indicating that it is probably explained by another variable, perhaps both mobilization variables which give strong indication where collective identities would have been formed. Consensual issue demonstrators seem indeed very much aware of the internal hetereogeneity of the protests they partake in, as they display significantly low levels of collective identity.

Security and Value Threat Perception

The perception of security threats and value threats, respectively instigating feelings of anger on the one hand, and worry and indignation on the other, are expected to appeal to different issue publics in different ways. Old issue protesters are expected to be taking action out of security threat perceptions, as their overall weaker societal positions will make them not only more prone to be the effective victim of security threats, but also make them perceive other threats as security threats. Security threat perception is transformed into collective action through group-based anger (van Zomeren et al. 2004), which are in this study operationalized by feelings of anger and combativeness concerning the issue at stake. Next, and not opposed to security threat perceptions, value threat perceptions, stirring mobilizing emotions of worry, fear, sadness and indignation, are hypothesized to be more motivating new issue protest participants, as new issues exactly appeal to them in their values and norms. Finally, consensual issue protesters are expected to be moved by both, as the events inflicting the mobilizing issue in the first place evoke both threats to people's own security and that of their close-ones, as well as to their core values which have been breached by strong-felt moral shocks (Jasper 1997). For particularistic and universalistic issues, things are less rooted in theory: as chances are higher that security threats are more likely to concern specific societal segments, they are expected to be related to particularistic issue. Universalistic issues provoke value threat perception because they are more likely to tap into people's ideologies and values.

So then, what do the data tell us? First, in multivariate analyses, particularistic and universalistic issue demonstrators show no significant differences on either of both variables. Yet on the primary dimension they do discern between different issue protesters. As predicted, old issue protesters are drawn into protest significantly more out of security threat perceptions, and significantly less out of value threat perceptions. This means that old issue protesters are most of all angry and combative. Both new and consensual issue demonstrators are significantly *less* driven by these security threat perceptions which was expected for the first, but not for the second group of demonstrators. Yet, contrary to expectations, new issue protesters are on the other hand not more driven by value threat perceptions. This is however the case for consensual issue protesters, which were expected to do so to a large degree.

First Conclusions

Up until now, we have been comparing different variables in the degree and direction to which they are able to account for differential issue participation. This way, we have been focusing primarily on the external differences between different issue types, or in other words, the diversity of protest. Yet as said, the unity of protest events, incorporated by the typology's internal consistency, is inextricably related to this diversity, and is equally important. In the final part of this chapter I will give a short overview of the differences between the different issue types in total, and alongside give a first overview on the internal consistency of the different issue types: do the different constellations of more and less important and significant variables across the 'who', 'why' and 'how' of protest make sense, or not?

TABLE 21: SUMMARY OF THE REGRESSION MODELS ON DIFFERENT ISSUE TYPES.

		OLD	NEW	CONS.	PART.	UNIV.
WHO	*Gender*	Male		Female	Male	Female
	Age	Old	Young			
	Education	Low	High		Low	High
	Pol. Interest				Low	High
	Left-Right	R	L	L	R	L
	Protest Experience	High	Low		High	Low
	Repertoire Diversity	Low	High	Low	Low	High
	Member org.circle	High	Low	Low	High	Low
	Embedded diversity	Low	High	High	Low	High
HOW	*Channel*	Closed	Closed	Open		
	Tie	Formal	Informal			
WHY	*Expressive/instrumental*		Expr	Instr	Instr	Expr
	ID		High	Low	Low	High
	Security threat perc.	High	Low	Low		
	Value threat perc.	Low		High		

First, let us overview the first issue dimension, discerning between old, new and consensual issues. It seems that old and new issues on a multitude of variables show opposite patterns. Old issues attract relatively older, lower educated males with less leftist attitudes; new issues mobilized younger men and women who have more leftist attitudes, and are higher educated. Old and new issues seem to attract indeed the prototypes of the 'losers' and 'winners' of post-industrialization and globalization processes. This is supported by the fact that old issue protesters are driven to collective action out of security threat perception, whereas new issue protesters show to perceive very little of this threat. New issue protesters enjoy the sharing of collective identity and engage in protest out of expressive motivations, just as their typical inclination to self-expressive values would make us expect.

Old issue protesters are highly embedded within the movement staging the protest but are not very much inclined to broaden their embeddedness to other (issue) networks. This seems to be translated into a high experience in one type of action, but much fewer experience in other action repertoires. New issue activists are the exact opposites: they participate in a much higher diversity of actions, and therefore are less confined to the one repertoire of protest demonstration. Maybe again this is related to the balance between their low embeddedness in the specific organizational circle, and a high involvement within more, different issue organizations. Differences in both embeddedness and action experience also produce different mobilization dynamics. As all happens within the relatively small organizational circles for old issue protesters, they are also mobilized through, by and with the channels and ties prevailing in these circles resulting in closed mobilization dynamics. New issue protesters are also mobilized through organizational networks, but their protest ties are informal and strong, meaning that they participate in protest more with friends and loved ones than with people who they (also) describe al being fellow members.

So, the fact that old issue demonstrators are less educated, relatively older and have more rightist attitudes, and new issue protesters their exact younger, higher educated and more leftist opposites is exactly what we would expect from Inglehart's value cleavage theories and those on winners and losers of globalization. Old issues unite the losers of post-industrialization and globalization through their shared security threat perceptions. These citizens then unite in strong and close-knit movement organizations with little or few bonds with other issue-organizations, and thus solely focusing on this one cause. This

strong and one-issue embeddedment translates itself in largely closed mobilization dynamics.

At the side of the 'winners' of globalization a completely different dynamic is at play. Their protest actions are less a matter of need, and more one of choice, and this is obvious along the entire line. They engage in protest not out of security threat perception and not even that much out of value threat perception: they are more than all other true 'demonstrators' of their ideas, they want to express their views, and above all they want to do so together with, and in the name of those with whom they identify with. Their organizational and activist profiles seem to be much less driven by necessities, but rather by 'elected affinities' (Beck 2002) based on the issue on takes action on, as well as on many different, but related other issues. They are embedded in a diversity of organizations, have tasted from a multitude, and, very importantly, are thus not confined to activism on one issue.

Altogether, it seems that old and new issue protesters clearly make out distinguished protest groups, with different personal characteristics and attitudes; different embeddedment, networks and ties, and different action motivations. What about consensual issue then? They mobilize entirely different issue publics, whose main features are that they are very 'normal' people, having mostly only moderate and often a-typical protester profiles. Consensual issue protesters are of average schooling and average age, and they are much more female than old and new issue demonstrators. They do not have much protest experience, and were mobilized through primarily open mobilization dynamics, probably filtered through a relatively high embeddedness within different-issue organizations. They seem to be the prototypes of normal, but politically interested civilians, who are mobilized in the first place out of value threat perceptions. It is clear that consensual issue protesters also make out a very distinct protesters' profile.

What about the second issue dimension, that of issue scope, discerning between particularistic and universalistic issues? Concerning their personal profiles, particularistic and universalistic issue protesters discern themselves very much from one another in the same way as do respectively old and new issue protesters, as is very clear from Table 21. This is however not the case for both other groups of variables. In spite of the same, significant difference in protest experience and organizational embeddedness as with old and new issues, particularistic and universalistic issues seem to not create different

mobilization climates. Furthermore, the motivational differences between both issue type protesters do not lie in security or value threat perceptions, but in both other motivational variables, with particularists, one might say typically engaging out of highly instrumental motives and low collective identities, and universalists, also typically being active out of highly expressive motivations and strong collective identities.

Particularistic and universalistic issue protesters thus also discern themselves from one another in a logical way. In the next and final empirical part, we now can impute this issue scope dimension within the primary, thematic one, and thus use it to refine the threefold thematic typology by dividing each thematic type into two subcategories, which again should all be clearly distinguishable from one another (diversity) and be internally consistent (unity).

A Final Typology of Mobilizing Issues

The final step in this empirical quest is thus to refine the first issue dimension by integrating it together with the secondary scope dimension. Yet, before getting more into the data: one important remark. Applying a final typology comprising in total six different issue types on a total of ten different protest demonstrations inevitably leads to different types being represented by only one demonstration. This also entails that results are far less robust than they were before, and as a result also much more vulnerable, since variations between different issue types are much more likely to be consequential to protest idiosyncrasies. More specifically, whereas two of the six types comprise three different demonstrations, four types are only constituted by merely one demonstration (see table 11 on page 149).

The first two are old-particularistic and new-universalistic issues. Old-universalistic, new-particularistic and both particularistic and universalistic consensual issues, then, are represented by only one demonstration. Consequently, all results on this combined two-dimensional typology should be interpreted with caution and should be regarded as much as tentative explorations as they are strong conclusions.

On the next couple of pages, again three regression models are presented. Each model predicts universalistic versus particularistic protest *within each thematic issue type*, and draws on the same predictor variables as in the previous series of regressions, except for those ones that proved to play no significant role in discerning between particularistic and universalistic issue protests. In other words, the variables age, both mobilization variables, as well as both threat perception variables are not incorporated in the model, since for these variables we thus assume no differences on the scope dimension.

Next to the trimming down of the amount of independent variables, the models have changed in two other ways. First, data in these models below are weighed to the mean of the dependent variable, within the thematic issue type; in other words, particularistic and universalistic issue demonstrations are given an equal weight within the collection of respectively old, new and consensual issue protest demonstrations. Second, since each model only deals with one issue type of the primary dimension at the same time and thus

each includes only a part of the total amount of protest(er)s, the N's of these models are significantly lower than before. This entails that for these models, Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit tests can be safely calculated. These tests analyze whether there are significant differences between the frequencies as they are observed in the data with the frequencies as they are predicted by the model. If these differences are significant, the model does not fit the data; non-significant differences thus indicate a good fitting model.

TABLE 22: LOGISTIC REGRESSION PREDICTING UNIVERSALISTIC VERSUS PARTICULARISTIC ISSUE PROTEST PARTICIPATION WITHIN OLD ISSUES

		B	s.e.	Wald	Exp(B)	
WHO	Gender					
	man – woman	-0.072	0.217	0.110	0.931	
	Diploma	-0.089	0.059	2.271	0.915	
	Interest in Politics	0.044	0.103	0.181	1.045	
	Left-Right attitudes	-0.464	0.051	84.034	0.629	***
	Protest Experience <5 yrs	-0.226	0.096	5.509	0.798	*
	Action Repertoire Diversity	-0.036	0.119	0.090	0.965	
	Member Org. Circle	1.265	0.403	9.860	3.544	**
	Embedded Diversity	0.243	0.046	27.697	1.275	***
WHY	Expressive – Instrumental					
	not - very instrumental	0.070	0.067	1.078	1.072	
	Identity	1.326	0.143	85.856	3.765	***
	Constant	-4.831	0.953	25.699	0.008	***
	N = 686			**Nagelkerke R^2 = .493**		

Notes: weighted dataset

Chi^2 = 321.279 *** (10 df); % correct = 79%

Hosmer & Lemeshow Test: Chi^2 = 8.102 (8df); sig= .424

***: p<.001 **: p<.01 *: p<.05

TABLE 23: LOGISTIC REGRESSION PREDICTING UNIVERSALISTIC VERSUS PARTICULARISTIC ISSUE PROTEST PARTICIPATION WITHIN NEW ISSUES

		B	s.e.	Wald	Exp(B)	
WHO	Gender *man – woman*	0.054	0.181	0.090	1.056	
	Diploma	0.032	0.059	0.297	1.033	
	Interest in Politics	0.211	0.108	3.828	1.235	*
	Left-Right attitudes	0.115	0.065	3.091	1.122	
	Protest Experience <5 yrs	-0.296	0.084	12.522	0.744	***
	Action Repertoire Diversity	0.650	0.066	95.945	1.916	***
	Member Org. Circle	0.722	0.194	13.908	2.058	***
	Embedded Diversity	0.041	0.031	1.686	1.041	
WHY	Expressive – Instrumental *not - very instrumental*	-0.417	0.064	42.300	0.659	***
	Identity	0.279	0.123	5.183	1.322	*
	Constant	-2.765	0.865	10.204	0.063	**
	N = 686			**Nagelkerke R^2 = .407**		

Notes: weighted dataset

Chi^2 = 279.598 *** (10 df); % correct = 73%

Hosmer & Lemeshow Test: Chi^2 = 12.752 (8df); sig= .121

***: p<.001 **: p<.01 *: p<.05

TABLE 24: LOGISTIC REGRESSION PREDICTING UNIVERSALISTIC VERSUS PARTICULARISTIC ISSUE PROTEST PARTICIPATION WITHIN CONSENSUAL ISSUES

		B	s.e.	Wald	Exp(B)	
WHO	Gender *man – woman*	0.032	0.222	0.021	1.033	
	Diploma	0.136	0.071	3.674	1.145	
	Interest in Politics	0.112	0.118	0.894	1.118	
	Left-Right attitudes	-0.561	0.077	52.598	0.571	***
	Protest Experience <5 yrs	-0.004	0.149	0.001	0.996	
	Action Repertoire Diversity	0.300	0.122	6.039	1.350	*
	Member Org. Circle	0.672	0.287	5.464	1.958	*
	Embedded Diversity	-0.118	0.046	6.739	0.888	**
WHY	Expressive – Instrumental *not - very instrumental*	-0.085	0.071	1.427	0.919	
	Identity	0.116	0.127	0.835	1.123	
	Constant	*0.469*	*0.972*	*0.233*	*1.598*	
	N = 686			**Nagelkerke R^2 = .292**		

Notes: weighted dataset

Chi^2 = 116.316 *** (10 df); % correct = 71%

Hosmer & Lemeshow Test: Chi^2 = 4.562 (8df); sig= .803

***: p<.001 **: p<.01 *: p<.05

Again, results are strong and significant. The explanatory strength of all three models is high, as indicated by the Nagelkerke R's varying between .292 and .493. Once more, collinearity statistics are all negative, with all tolerance measures above .700 and all VIF scores smaller than 1.5, which is well above and below the most rigid tolerance levels. Clearly, within the already strong thematic issue types, variation on the secondary dimension is still highly significant, thus indicating that both dimensions are truly cross-cutting, and that the second dimension truly makes a difference.

Dividing the groups of old, new and consensual issue protesters into particularists and universalists has consequences for all variables across the three models, except for those on gender and education. Throughout the models, and thus within the different thematic issue protests, universalistic issue demonstrators discern themselves from particularistic issue protesters just as their general overall difference would lead us to think, and in most of the cases the scope dimension discerns within the thematic dimension in the expected directions (significant or not significant). Significant differences within the scope dimension, imputed in the different issue types, indicate that universalists are more interested in politics (in new issue protests), more leftist (old and consensual protest), have less protest experience (old and new protests) but have more diverse action repertoire experience (new and consensual protests); they have more expressive motives (new) and higher levels of collective identity (old and new protests).

Interestingly, in all three models universalists are more embedded within the circle of organization(s) staging the demonstrations, where in the original model discerning between particularists and universalists, this was the other way around. It is not the exclusion of both mobilization variables out of the model which leads to this different result as one would expect, but rather simple mathematical coincidence[18]. On the other

[18] This is represented in the next table. Data are split up in particularistic and universalistic issue demonstrators. As the data in the table are weighed so that each demonstration has an equal weight, and since both issue type represent half of all demonstrations, total N's of each column is identical (1231 each) for the 'total' rows, as well as for the sum of the rows within old, new and consensual issue protesters. Part (1) of the table shows that, indeed in general particularistic protesters outweigh universalistic protesters in their organizational embeddedness 799/1231 against 711/1231). Yet, in spite of this general higher organizational embeddedness, the ways in which these organizational embedded (and not-embedded) are spread throughout both issue dimensions together, makes that the universalistic versions of old, new as well as consensual issue demonstrations produce higher embedded/non-embedded ratio's than the particularistic versions. The table shows the clarifying data.

hand, and in line with previous results, do universalists in two models (old, consensual) also show to be embedded within a higher diversity of different issue organizations.

By and large, these models show that also within different thematic issue demonstrations, we can discern between universalistic and particularistic issue protests as a secondary and crosscutting dimension. And at first sight the internal logic of these within-issue divides seems to make sense. In table 25, I once more present the results of this exercise in an abbreviated way. The columns in dark recapitulate the summarizing table of the previous section. The columns to the left and right of these dark columns are the results of discerning between particularistic and universalistic issue within these thematic issues, as seen in the previous three regression models. Finally, the original particularistic/universalistic dichotomy is presented in the two columns on the right.

Within ***old issue protests,*** particularistic and universalistic issue demonstrators for a large part remain having the same profiles. Invariably, both universalistic and particularistic protest participants are mostly older males, with lower educational degrees. They have relatively little experience in different action repertoires, are mobilized via closed information channels and participate in formal tie company, instigated by security threat perceptions. Yet there also are some significant differences between both.

		PARTICULARISTIC	UNIVERSALISTIC
1. TOTAL	Embedded	799	711
	Not embedded	432	520
	Ratio	***1.85***	***1.37***
Total		*1231*	*1231*
2. OLD	Embedded	636	236
	Not embedded	103	10
	Ratio	***6.17***	***23.6***
3. NEW	Embedded	131	405
	Not embedded	116	334
	Ratio	***1.13***	***1.22***
4. CONSENSUAL	Embedded	33	69
	Not embedded	214	177
	Ratio	***0.26***	***0.39***
Total		*1231*	*1231*

The profile of particularistic issue protester to a large degree consolidates that of the typical general old issue protester. Particularistic issue protesters on old issues have even more rightist attitudes, are more routinized protesters, have lower membership diversity and they identify less with their fellow-protesters than universalistic old issue demonstrators, who have more leftist attitudes, have less protest experience but a higher membership diversity, and identify more with other protesters. One could discern between them as **defenders** on the one hand, and **safeguards** on the other. Defenders or particularistic old issue protesters want to protect their own security, without being driven by much feelings of identity or solidarity with others who are in the same boat. Safeguards do feel connected with others, and have more leftist attitudes. Their acts then are also more 'political' in the sense that these universalistic old issue protesters act for the sake for, and on behalf of a group broader than themselves or any other specific population group. This is exactly what these results show us.

Within ***new issue protests*** also, particularistic and universalistic demonstrators are not dissimilar from one another on many variables. Both of them are typically younger, higher educated protesters with considerable leftists attitudes. They are not particularly experienced in the repertoire of protest demonstrations, but are embedded in quite a lot of different issue membership organizations. They are motivated to protest far less out of security threat perceptions, and are mobilized through rather closed information channels, but participate with people relating to them in more informal ways. Yet here also, particularists and universalists differ significantly from one another on an entire series of variables. These latter show to be more interested in politics, to be less experienced in protest demonstrations, but far more in a broader diversity of other repertoires than particularistic new issue protesters.

Universalistic new issue protesters are also more members of the organizational circle involved with the set-up of the demonstrations, but they are significantly more driven by expressive motives, and share higher levels of collective identity. Clearly, in the same way as with particularistic old issue protesters are universalistic new issue protesters the more extreme types of new issue demonstrators, where their particularistic counterparts are the more moderate versions of new issue protesters. I would refer to these more moderate ones as the **advocates**, the more extreme types as the **world improvers**. The first are the

new-issue defenders of the cause of specific population segments. World improvers undertake action for the sake of all. New, universalistic issues are typically broad, encompassing issues with a long-term and transnational scope, like, in these particular cases, the issues of peace, environment and long-term cultural solidarity.

Finally, **consensual issue** protests share a same logic, with several variables showing no, and others showing significant variation between particularistic and universalistic issue protesters. Both subtypes of consensual issue protest invariably attract relative high amounts of women and more people with leftist attitudes. They are typically protesters with low embeddedness in the organizational circles, but relative high memberships in different issue organizations. They are mobilized through open channels, and motivated more instrumentally, and less so out of feelings of security threat perception. Variation between particularistic and universalistic consensual issue protesters occurs all on variables that deemed significant in at least one of both other models, with universalistic protesters being significantly more leftist, more experienced in different action repertoires, more embeddedness in the organizational circles of the protest-staging organizations, and having higher membership diversity than their particularistic consensual issue protest counterparts. Discerning on the scope dimension within the consensual issue type also delivers two relatively distinct subtypes.

TABLE 25: EFFECTS OF THE INTRODUCTION OF THE SECONDARY DIMENSION INTO THE FIRST DIMENSION, BASED ON SEVEN LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS

		PART	OLD	*UNIV*	*PART*	NEW	*UNIV*	*PART*	CONS	*UNIV*	PART	UNIV
WHO	Gender		Male						Fem.		Male	Fem
	Age		Old			Young						
	Education		Low			High					Low	High
	Pol. Interest				-		+				Low	High
	Left-Right	+ R	R	+ L		L		+ R	L	+ L	R	L
	Protest demo	+	High	-		Low					High	Low
	Experience Repertoire Diversity		Low		-	High	+	-	Low	+	Low	High
	Member org.circle	-	High	+	-	Low	+	-	Low	+	High	Low
	Embedded diversity	-	Low	+		High		-	High	+	Low	High

TABLE 25 CONTINUED…

HOW	Channel Tie		Closed Formal			Closed Informal			Open			
WHY	Expr./instr ID Security threat perc . Value th perc.	-	High	+	+ I -	Expr High Low	+ E. +		Instr Low Low		Instr Low	Expr High

Particularistic-consensual issue protesters are, compared to both old as well as new issue demonstrators, probably the least resembling these more activist profiles. Their profiles of being little or not involved in social and political organizations, having very low experience with different action repertoires, and being less leftist, together with the general consensual issue features of open mobilization dynamics and low identities makes them resembling the non-activist population more than their activist counterparts on other issues. They are probably indeed non-routinized protesters who take to the streets only exceptionally after being confronted with a moral shock. Their acts seem more inspired by a need to vent their own personal worries and feelings by participating in the ritualized repertoire of a white march (Walgrave and Verhulst 2006). I refer to them as the **morally shocked**.

The universalistic consensual issue protesters on the other hand seem to be more politically involved and inspired to participate, giving their actions more content and body than those of the morally shocked, and compared to the general consensual protesters, these demonstrators have a slight 'activist upgrade' in the direction of new issue protesters. In other words, of those general issue protests attracting people with the least typical activist profile (i.e. consensual issues), they share the most typical activist profiles. This is not all that surprising, since the universalistic scope gives the issue an inevitably broader and political focus. I refer to participants on these issues as the **activated**. Their participation is reactionary to an external event, which is able to mobilize less probable protest participants. On the other hand is their participation to a large degree the enacting of their concern with the consensual issue that touches upon all, and this broader (political) dimension draws people with a more politically involved profile than the pure moral shock mobilization.

Yet table 25 also gives us a good indication of how these subtypes are likely to relate to each other across thematic issue types. The lion's share of this empirical part has all been about setting off different of such thematic issue types against other of such issue types. By including the second dimension into this thematic issue typology, we can now also search for degrees of homogeneity exactly between subtypes within the thematic diversity of protest types.

Looking at the signs of particularistic new, and universalistic old issue protesters as compared to their general thematic issue types, both seem to be leaning towards each

other. In other words, safeguards and advocates seem to be much more sharing the same features than the opposition between old and new issues would make us expect. If it were not for their remaining oppositional socio-demographic features, they seem practically interchangeable, and it is probably their socio-demographic base which has made them active for old and new issues respectively, thus giving strong indications that socio-demographic positions to a large degree determine whether people will be more or less attracted to action on old or on new issues. Also, but to a lesser degree, do the particularistic consensual issue protesters seem to be more close to both safeguards as well as advocates. And, finally, world improvers and activated are subtypes that seem much closer to one another than their respective general thematic issue types.

Yet, the differences between for instance advocates and world improvers can very well, and are given all previous results most likely to be, (much) smaller than those between both subtypes and any other subtype from either old or consensual issues. I will however not further subdivide analyses to potentially demonstrate so, since this would entail once more contrasting single demonstrations against one another. In the next and final analyses, I present a graphic overview of all subtypes, plotted within a two-dimensional space based upon all predicting variables, using multiple correspondence analysis. Though this is a rather explorative technique it does enable to give a good graphical overview of how the six different combined issue types, each attributed an equal weight, relate to one another in a two-dimensional field, on the backdrop of the different predictor variables.

Dimensions one and two have high (.813) and sufficient (.654) Cronbach's Alpha, indicating that they have a respective high and moderate internal consistency. The explained variance of both models together is 42.5%. More information on these numbers, as well as individual variable loadings on both dimensions can be found in appendix 3. In Figure 9 the six different issue types are plotted as they are positioned within the two-dimensional field.

FIGURE 9: VISUALIZATION OF BOTH DIMENSION IN A MULTIPLE CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS PLOT



Note:

Defenders = particularistic old; safeguards = universalistic old; advocates = particularistic new; world improvers = universalistic new; morally shocked = universalistic consensual; activated = universalistic consensual.

This figure is very revealing indeed, even at first sight without getting fully into the content of the dimensions. At the exact centre of both dimensions, and thus centering the two-dimensional space, we find the advocates, the particularistic new issue protesters. They thus constitute what could be termed as the 'average' demonstrator around which the protesters' profiles of other issue demonstrations are positioned. The figure also shows

that safeguards and activated, and morally shocked and world improvers differ the most from each other in this two-dimensional space.

Let us get into the figure more thoroughly. The sSecond dimension more or less seems to discern in the first place between the thematic issue types, as it groups the subtypes together per thematic issue type. New issue protesters are positioned at the centre of the dimension, between old issue protesters on the left, and consensual issue protesters on the right. Having a look at the loadings of the different variables on this dimension, it is clear that it discriminates largely on the basis of protest experience, embeddedment, ties and mobilization channels. Results of the different t-tests and different regression models earlier in this chapter do indeed show that old issue protesters are effectively the most embedded, have most protest experience, and are mobilized through closed channels and take to the streets in formal-tie protest company. Consensual issue demonstrators are their exact opposites on all of these variables, and new-issue protesters indeed position themselves somewhere in between. Furthermore, this dimension reveals that on these variables, the introduction of the scope dimension is varyingly important. It does not really discern within new issue protesters on these variables, but it does within the old and consensual issue protesters' groups, with defenders and activated being more alike the new issue protesters, and safeguards and morally shocked being more typically representing their general protest issue demonstrators.

As it is most discerning on the variables of diploma and identity, and to a lesser degree on those of age and both threat perceptions (see appendix 3), the first dimension indeed tells an entirely different story, and it to a considerable degree confirms the earlier-mentioned seeming similarities between some issue subtypes. And, these results do also corroborate the finding that the particularistic-universalistic dimension does not as much divide protesters on the mobilization variables of channels and ties as the binary regression model on this variable showed, but rather on socio-demographic and motivational variables. Morally shocked protesters on this dimension are rather akin to both old issue protesters; world improvers and activated also show high resemblance with one another on this dimension; probably as they both share high educational levels and identity feelings. Again, advocates position themselves somewhere in between these latter on the one hand and both old issue protesters and morally shocked on the other, which can also be read to a large degree in Table 25 in which the different regression models were summarized.

Wrapping up the findings in Figure 9, the second dimension shows almost a continuum of different issue protest groups, ranging from old, over new to consensual issue demonstrators. The first dimension, then, seems to indeed reveal how this second dimension gets rearranged after the introduction of the issue scope dimension, again clearly justifying its (be it secondary) importance in understanding how mobilizing issues shape differential participation.

6

Conclusion and Discussion

Remember Rufus? He was the happily-married foreman, whose long and fruitful career in building was threatened by upcoming corporate restructurings, entailing not only wage cuts and layoffs, but also the potential closedown of several regional divisions of his company. If Rufus himself would become a dupe of these restructurings, this would swipe the solid earth under his feat, creating huge financial insecurity and jeopardizing his plans for the future.

Allow me to refresh your memory a bit more. If these restructurings would transform into a mobilizing issue, it would be very likely that Rufus would participate in action on the issue. And if he would do so, the mechanisms by which he would be mobilized and motivated are obvious. With real-life certainties becoming swept away, strong feelings of uncertainty and insecurity would bestow Rufus and his family. Yet, he would also feel let down by the company for which he has given the best years of his life. Both feelings would strengthen the bond with his fellow workers, increasing workers' collective identity, and workers-employers antagonism. This collective identity, which is likely to be strategically strengthened by the mobilizing efforts of a labor union, would be an important driver of collective action. The perception of security threats and strong collective identity would lead to the strong mobilizing emotion of group-based anger, directed at the employer's level, and inspiring an instrumental fight to put off the prospect of harmful measures.

The story of Rufus is exemplary of how mobilizing issues thematically liaise to people, their daily lives, their aspirations and sorrows, their personal networks and organizational bonds. Mobilizing issues strike certain individuals exactly because their social, economic and/or cultural position makes them –directly or indirectly- more prone to be susceptible to, or hurt by these issues (or both). Specific mobilizing issues thus, affecting or concerning definite societal groups, make that members of these groups will develop particular feelings on the issue, which are indispensable in getting people onto the streets. In Rufus' case, for instance, the most probable victim of corporate restructurings would be men just like him, who are not that young anymore, and in economic terms represent the relatively highest wage costs. The main individual motivational driver of Rufus and his colleagues would thus logically be one of strong feelings of insecurity. Not only for facing the possibility of losing one's job. But also since for relatively older and often lower schooled workers, finding a new decent job is far less evident than for their younger fellow-workers.

Rufus and his colleagues would find each other in collective action only if they would come to see themselves as a group, as a group that has the power to change things, or rather to prevent things from changing. They would identify themselves with one another, exactly based on the fate they are sharing. Yet again, given their social-economic positions, their relatively low political interest and often alongside little political skills, they are likely to be dependent on an organizational empowering agent to actually get them mobilized. In the case of Rufus, union involvement is a highly welcome, if not indispensible actor to get collective action off the ground.

Clearly, the story of Rufus tells us a lot about how issues mobilize specific people, out of particular motivations, and in specific ways. And as said, there are many more Rufuses, as there are countless Wendy's, Romeros and Charlottes. All of them having different life stories, all of them being confronted with different kinds of grievances, and all of them reacting to them in different ways, and out of different reasons and motivations.

For instance: when asked why he participated in a protest event on a regionalist issue, a Flemish-nationalist protester answered:

Because it is necessary that the people, and above all the politicians, get a clear signal that the people want an independent Flanders. The current Belgian Federal model has become unworkable, unclear and also disadvantageous to the Flemish.

A participant at the demonstration against the restructurings at beer giant InBev responded:

I have been working for InBev for almost 21 years. Just like everyone else, I have always given the best of myself. And now I just have to keep on working with a letter of resignation hanging above my head. The restructurings within InBev are wrong.

An anti-war protester answered the question as follows:

I am here out of solidarity with the peoples that are suffering. To protest against the American imperialism and the politics of Bush. Out of hope that we will open the eyes of some. For a bit more peace in the world!

A participant at the sans papiers demonstration filled in:

I have been here for 6,5 years as an illegal immigrant and I would like to regularize my situation to obtain all my rights and live a dignified life.

A climate marcher noted:

Because we, humans, are responsible for climate changes, and because together we are one, global, community. Because it is important that many people become convinced that change is needed urgently.

Finally, a participant of the Marsh for Joe wrote:

I knew a lot of Joe's close ones, but without knowing Joe himself. I thought I had to be present out of respect and to protest against the insecurity.

These are just a random selection of answers out of the many thousands provided by protest participants when asked for the reason of their presence at the demonstration they took part in. And by glancing over these very brief statements we can get a rough though clear indication of the broad diversity of protest participation. First, and obviously, people protest for all kinds of issues that are clustered under different thematic headers. Regionalist protesters, climate marchers, asylum rights demonstrators, people hitting the streets against corporate closedowns or in reaction to an act of random violence and many, many others protesting on many more different issues alternately crowd the streets of the small country they live in. These different issues bring people together in a joint demonstration of worry or discontent on the issue.

People turn to protest because they care about an issue or are concerned with it. For some, this is a matter of confronting the forces menacing the natural course of their own daily lives, like for instance the threat of wage cuts. Or by the perception of menace or threat, which can lie in migration or of the loss of solid societal ground, like for instance the Europeanization of national politics. Oppositely, others turn to protest because they are concerned with broader issues like peace, or the environment. Often they are able to do so exactly because they enjoy the societal privilege to not having to worry about many of the day-to-day insecurities that keep many fellow-citizens awake during the night. And their

social-economic advantageous position, almost always including higher levels of education and a broader general development, makes them more susceptible to understand, and concerned with these less mundane issues. Rather than out of material-defensive motives, their motivational guide to protest is one of values and moral obligation. Sometimes, protest is more indiscriminate, and attracts a more (though not entirely) heterogeneous crowd. Issues that have a large emotional appeal can mobilize people from all walks of life, since the emotionality exactly strikes the hearts of people, regardless their social-economic position.

Clearly, *who* we are determines *what* we care or worry about. What our dreams are and fears. And what we want to step up for to make things change, or prevent them from changing. In this dissertation, I have done little more than showing that this is the case. Our daily lives and our social-economic positions to a large degree determine which issues we are concerned with, and in what ways they concern us. And, inevitably, this also relays to the ways in which we come to protest, as some need more guidance to the streets through strong and single-issue organizations, whereas for others, protest participation is a much more a matter of personal choice and rooted in interpersonal interactions with like-minded spirits. This is the story about how mobilizing issues thematically relate (to) the 'who', 'why', and 'how' of protest.

Different mobilizing issues bring different groups of people together. Yet the selection of quotes also reveals that these groups can be externally diverse for a second, non-thematic reason. Sometimes issues mobilize people like Rufus, who are very closely involved with it, like factory workers protesting against restructurings at their workplace. In such cases it is very likely that protest manifestations are contentious venues for people who are already acquainted with of their fellow workers. They share the fact that they are part of a specific group that is faced with the problem at stake, as well as the fact that action on the issue will be directly benefiting them. At other times however, issues do not concern such specific groups, as is the case with for instance climate change demonstrations, and as the example above shows, such issues make more universal protest appeals. All these differences, logically, are retraceable to the individual protesters. The mere fact that having a direct personal stake in the outcome of issue protest action has an effect on people's protest motivations is intuitively clear. And this also goes for the opposite case, with people protesting without clear direct personal benefits.

This thesis has been a quest to get more grips on these and many more similar observations and the relation that intuitively exists between different issues types on the one hand, and different types of protesters on the other. It has been inspired by observing the huge diversity between different protest events and their respective participants, and the internal unity or homogeneity within these different events. It has tried to make sense of this unity and diversity by putting the mobilizing issues, which inspire and drive collective action, center stage.

I argued that mobilizing issues are one important driver of this diversity; more specifically that these mobilizing issues to a large extent generate the internal coherence of the relation between the 'who', 'why', and 'how' of protest or *protest unity*. And, consequently, that they bear an important explanatory force of protesters' diversity between different such issues, being *protest diversity*.

To get grips on the relation between mobilizing issues one the hand, and protest unity and diversity on the other, I devised a twofold, hierarchical typology of mobilizing issues, based on theories of cleavages, old and new social movements, interest groups and policy issues.

A thematic dimension, discerning between 'old', 'new' and 'consensual' issues was complemented with a secondary scope dimension discerning between issues having a particularistic or universalistic connotation. Together, this resulted in a typology consisting of six types of mobilizing issues.

To be able to evaluate this typology, protest surveys were conducted at ten different protest demonstrations in Belgium. This data collection effort resulted in a comparative dataset containing responses of almost 2,500 demonstrators. After having assigned each demonstration to one of the six issue types, the strength of this issue typology was tested.

The results of this quest were strong and largely consistent with the expectations. Both issue dimensions are logical and consistent explananda of the unity and diversity of protest. I will not repeat all details again, but focus on the global results.

Protest Unity and Diversity: Main Findings

In this dissertation I made an attempt to jointly understand the concepts of protest unity and protest diversity. Protest unity refers to the fact that the 'who', 'why' and 'how' of protest events are best understood together as interdependent aspects of protest participation Protest diversity, which is in fact the external or inter-protest aspect of protest unity, is caused by the variation in mobilizing issues. Because protest on similar issues joins together similar people in a joint demonstration of their worries or discontent, these people will differ from people hitting the streets for issues that are fundamentally different. What progress did we make in understanding this protest unity and diversity by putting mobilizing issues forward as an important explanandum?

The thematic issue dimension makes a lot of sense, and most, though not all, variables were as relevant as expected. The thematic dimension of mobilizing issues clearly discerns between the 'losers' and 'winners' of globalization. This is evident within demonstrations (protest unity) and, consequently, also between demonstrations (protest diversity).

In general, old issues mobilize the older and lower educated. They are also more rightist, or rather, less leftist in their political views, indicating the likeliness of them having less liberal views on several cultural issues, and being more inspired by, indeed, more conservative survival needs and values. Clearly, one's social-economic position is an important and quite common sense predictor of thematic issue protest participation. But it also clearly inspires protesters' protest motivations, which are stirred by strong feelings of security threat perceptions, as they perceive their daily certainties becoming threatened.

As suggested in the cleavage literature, people's social-economic reality is related to a specific kind of organizational structure, resulting in a typical kind of organizational embeddedness. Old issues seem to be highly incorporated by organizations, with old issue protesters being mostly members of labor unions. Yet, this organizational circle is very narrow, and old issue protesters are highly unlikely to be members of different other organizations. This means that their embeddedness is highly single-issue, making that the issue they hit the streets for is likely to be the only one that is able to mobilize them. Also, they focus on one kind of repertoire, that of protest demonstrations, and leave aside other, often more 'creative' kinds of protest. All this indicates that old issue protest is very much an affair of strong organizations engaging in top-down movement mobilization

processes, which is reinforced by the fact that the ties of protesters are more formal and organizational. Old issue protesters, thus, having weaker social-economic positions, are driven to protest exactly because of the threats posed to these positions, and they are led to protest by strong organizations that put these issues center stage.

New issue demonstrations evidently mobilize an entirely different protest public, attracting the younger and higher educated who are, according to Inglehart and Welzel (2005) exactly the heralds of the 'new' values. New issue demonstrators seem to fully embrace the liberal views of self-expression and emancipation by having strong leftist political attitudes. According to the new cleavage theory, self-expression and emancipative values also coincide with high levels of individualism and autonomy. This becomes evident in the peculiar relation between new issue protesters and organizations. Although they are members of several different kinds of organizations, they are, compared to old issue protesters, far less involved in the organizations that actually stage the demonstration. Most often they are mobilized through an organization, but then take to the streets with friends and family, rather than with fellow members. And, they do not keep their protest actions confined to street demonstrations, as these make out only a fraction of their broad experience in a variety of different action repertoires.

Without a doubt, organizations also play a role in the involvement of new issue demonstrators, but in a much freer and more 'chosen' way. These protesters seem to be picking their own battles, through differential and multi-issue memberships and diverse action repertoires, and perceive protest to an important degree as a social event. This translates also in their protest participation motives, which are, besides being evidently based on expressive motives, rooted in strong collective identification, and not at all on security threat perception.

Consensual issues, finally, which were expected to draw cleavageless crowds onto the streets, only do so partially. They seem to attract more leftist demonstrators. Consensual issues thus do not seem to be able to convince that part of the population leaning to the right to take action. Furthermore, consensual issue protesters are active citizens, not as much when it comes to protest experience of any kind, but they are often embedded in a variety of different issue organizations. Interestingly, consensual issues attract more women, which indicates their relatively high attachment to issues of this kind. Organizations play only a marginal role in the mobilization process, which is much more a

matter of open channels. Finally, consensual issue protesters are not inspired by security threat perceptions, nor strong feelings of collective identity, but rather by strong instrumental motives. This is a bit against expectations, but clearly indicates that they take their participation serious and not want it to be in vain.

In general, the thematic issue dimension seems to work. It clearly discerns between three distinct types of protest actions, mobilizing different kinds of people, in different ways, and for different reasons. And, these people, their participation motivations and mobilization pathways are logically related to each other. The thematic dimension of protest thus accounts for both the typical unity and relative diversity of protest events.

This is however not the entire story. The unity and diversity created by this thematic dimension gets even more clearly delineated by the inclusion of a second issue dimension, that of particularistic versus universalistic issues. The inclusion of this dimension largely renders extra dimensionality to the nominal thematic issue dimension. By incorporating the scope dimension within the thematic issue dimension, six different subtypes of mobilizing issues are created. Some of these bring the thematic issue protest types closer to their issue counterparts, and contrarily put other such protest types further away from one another, by reinforcing the specific thematic issue protest properties.

Clearly, the two-dimensional issue typology, resulting in six types of issue protests, works. It lays bare the specificity of different issue protests, by unveiling the issue-specific protest dynamics. Consequently, it discloses at least one useful way in assessing for the diversity of protest.

The six different issue subtypes thus attract six types of demonstrators, each having specific features, motivations and mobilization trajectories that connect them to this specific issue type. I gave each of these six protesters' types a name to set them off against one another.

TABLE 26: TYPES OF MOBILIZING ISSUES AND TYPES OF PROTESTERS

Thematic Dimension	Protester Type	Scope Dimension
Old	**Defenders**	Particularistic
	Safeguards	Universalistic
New	**Advocates**	Particularistic
	World Improvers	Universalistic
Consensual	**Morally shocked**	Particularistic
	Activated	Universalistic

Relating these six types of protesters, as portrayed in Table 26, with the six different types of issues that bring these different protesters' types to the different streets has been a useful exercise. While protesters on old issues, in general, differ from new issue protesters on many grounds, things are much more nuanced when the scope-dimension of issues is also included. And more clearly defined in other cases: World Improvers and Defenders, on the other hand, could not be more different from one another, not only concerning their socio-demographics, but also on protest motivations and mobilization pathways. Yet exactly by combining both issue dimensions, it also became clear that the one issue subtype can bring people together that are quite akin to those mobilized by another issue subtype. Safeguards and Advocates, for instance, share many similar features, including mobilization channels and ties, embeddedness and protest motivations. This shows that the relation between personal characteristics, motivations and mobilization patterns is not absolute, as people with different such characteristics can be mobilized in similar ways, and out of similar motivations. But the fact that they are different people, with different social-economic backgrounds, is what connects them to the specific issue they participate for in protest. Advocates and Safeguards, like all other types, are thus not mutually exchangeable.

The above makes clear that this dissertation has demonstrated that different issues bring different kinds of people to the streets, out of different motivations and through different mobilization pathways. And, reversely, that specific issue types unite specific kinds of people, who share similar motivations, and who are drawn to the demonstration through similar mobilization routes. In this way mobilizing issues are the drivers of the unity and diversity of protest events.

Clearly, protest participation is rooted in people's fears, aspirations, or dreams. And for people of different walks of life, these fears, aspirations or dreams are very dissimilar. Who we are, and what we dream or fear of, determines which issues we are concerned with, and how we will be inspired and moved to take action on them. Issues unite similar people, with similar motivations through similar mobilizing mechanisms. And it is this same unifying mechanism which also accounts for inter-protest diversity.

So What?

Establishing something is one thing. But this does not automatically mean that it is relevant or important. Do we really know that much more after having read this dissertation? And, is all this writing on issues, unity and diversity not just quite…evident? More bluntly: so what?

Let me start by saying: Yes, this is all rather evident. Yet, the findings are certainly not plain. And in spite of their seeming triviality, they have some far-reaching consequences for our views on protest participation, and perhaps also on all other kinds of non-conventional action.

'The' protester?

If there is one thing this dissertation shows, it is that 'the protester' does not exist. Just as 'the citizen', 'the voter' or 'the housewife' do not. Yet this is precisely how the individual, or 'demand' side of protest has been studied for so long. Many case studies have been carried out on protest participants; on their backgrounds, motivations and network surroundings. Yet, findings from one case study are generalized and applied on cases that, apart from the fact that both concern protest, do not have that much in common. Should

we just assume that a routinized peace protester and a worried factory worker have a lot in common, just because they are both protesters? Of course not.

Numerous studies on protest participation on the other hand draw on population survey data. Those few people within those survey datasets that have been taking to the streets (or worse, that indicate that they *might* be willing to do so in the future) are clutched together, and compared to those who have (or *will probably*) not. The picture we get from demonstrators is that of a homogeneous group that mostly fits the profile of the 'advocates', the particularistic new issue protesters. This seeming homogeneous group is then compared with people who have not (or are not willing to) take(n) part in protest. Yet, although this renders useful general insights, more in-depth information goes lost, as it is rubbed out by statistical compiling. By disposing over a large data pool of demonstrators taking part in different protest demonstrations on different issues, we not only get much richer information, but are also able to exactly diversify within this pool of protesters, and thus to assess the ample heterogeneity within the often treated homogeneous group of demonstrators.

It is exactly this what I have attempted to do in this study. Of course the characteristics of 'the average protester' can be useful to know more in general. And this thesis does not falsify or even corrects these existing previous general insights, and never had the intention to. A critical reader might ask why bother to read it then. Perhaps I should have warned such critics in the beginning of this study, but I do believe that I have a few answers ready.

By assessing the diversity that exists within this general category, our understanding of protest has increased. By knowing the issue-related differences that drive different constellations of protesters, their motives and their mobilization trajectories, we learn for instance that some issues only mobilize within specific societal cleavages, whereas others are capable of crossing-over, mobilizing people at both sides of a cleavage. Demonstrations of this latter kind are exceptional though, mobilizing people who are quite different from the 'general demonstrators', and we can learn from these exceptional mobilizations how people who normally don't protest, still come to do so. Differentiating between different issues and protesters' types also gives us more information on the fact that some groups will be reached using specific mobilization channels, which would in turn be completely unsuccessful in getting other kinds of people activated. We also learn that protest is

stratified, with different issues drawing different social-economic groups of protesters to the streets. Worries are demonstrated and claims are made on different issues, by different people. Clearly, relating the claims to the people who make those claims is essential if we expect policy makers wanting to positively react to them.

(a) Besides these general points, this thesis shows that: In general, Issues are important drivers of protest;
(b) These issues are a bridge between micro-level and meso-level protest theories;
(c) This could lead to a democratic protest deficit in our societies.

I explain all three below.

'Issue Protest'

More related to this dissertation than a market study on housewives is the study of voting. As party affiliations and party identification are steadily withering, and electorates become much more volatile, election studies have shifted away from parties to issues. The study of issue voting largely exists by virtue of the relation between different kinds of electoral publics, with different kinds of election issues. This is also one of the reasons why political parties promote and abandon issues all the time: the want and need to bind themselves to specific issue publics.

The fact that issues structure protest participation is not world-shocking news either, I could hear a reader think. But the same then goes for the importance of issues on voting. Indeed, we do know a lot more about people's involvement in electoral politics by including the thematic grounds of their vote choice. In a similar vein, knowing that the label of 'the protester' actually hides very diverse protest publics, is revealing. Not only because we dispose over more in-depth information, but mostly because it makes us to see and to understand things we would otherwise just miss out on.

Issue-related protest diversity tells us a lot about our society. The roots of protest are always social-structural and retraceable to people, sometimes very clearly, sometimes more indirectly. Protest is always entrenched in people's daily lives and societal positions and the problems, challenges and opportunities, and worries and discontent these bring about. Interpreting issue diversity is an important key in understanding not only which

issues are important on the streets, but exactly which groups are concerned with them, and why, and to which degree. Knowing how different groups of people become united in different, and sometimes opposing claims-making, learns us a lot about the roots of this protest, and the broader societal situations these protests lay bare. It gives us in-depth insight in how issues are channeling these different people, with different motivations in different ways to a same action repertoire: that of protest. Insight in these mechanisms can inform us on which issues are broadly carried and which ones are not; which ones are likely to stay and which ones are likely to disappear after one or two rounds of protest; which ones are likely to herald new protest cycles, and which ones are not. In other words: we have much more precise and relevant knowledge about an essential part of our daily political reality.

Issues bridge between micro- and meso-level studies of (protest) participation

If mainstream political science gets so preoccupied with the importance of issues in vote choice and electoral and party politics, they do so because issues are important. They structure individual political choice and party profiling. They are not only important in understanding individual voting and meso-level party strategies, but also in linking both together. Issues are what bind politics to people, and people to politics.

In this way, this study also contributes to a more scholarly debate, that of micro- versus meso-level focus of study, or that of agency versus structure. By distinguishing between different issue types and observing their relation to different protesters' features, motivations and mobilization track, we are able to get a much closer look at this often grey area between individual concerns and collective action. Protest participation is not about motivations OR mobilization OR personal features, it is the result of a combination of all three. And these combinations differ according to the issue that stirs the participation. For instance, some societal problems and challenges have been taken up by strong organizations, which are indeed very important in getting their publics onto the streets. As is the case with political parties, these organizations are also fighting a battle for issue ownership. For other issues, organizations seem to be less needed to get a protest action off the ground on the issue they work on, as some issue publics clearly draw more on their personal networks and ties, which unmistakably also indicates the importance they attach to the issue. Issues help us to understand the routes people take to protest, and how these are prearranged differently for different kinds of protesters. As issues link people to

organizations and/or to other kinds of formal and informal network ties and channels, they tell us how these people have become linked to the others they jointly take part in protest with.

Democratic Protest Disequilibrium

Finally, the observation that some protest is much more dependent on the mobilizing activities of strong organizations, also unveils a potential democratic protest deficit. If we take protest seriously as a democratic way for citizens to have their voices and preferences heard by policy makers, in other words, as practices of civic culture, we should also expect someone to listen to and act on these voices and preferences (Almond and Verba 1989). Protests are meaningful signals *from* society *to* society; from citizens to the government and/or the public of the society they are a citizen of. This research has shown, however, that not all signals are likely to be transmitted equally loud and understandable.

Those mobilizing issues that fit within the survival end of the cleavage dimension mobilize people facing more social-economic uncertainty. And, for these people to become mobilized, strong organizations seem to be crucial, much more so than for other issues. The existence of organizations of this kind seems a prerequisite for 'survival issues' to become seen and heard on the streets. Yet this also entails that many survival issues could probably not make it to the streets, as long as no organizations exist that can take up the role of mobilizing agents. In Belgium, organizations currently dealing with issues like these are some of the strongest, largest and richest social organizations around. This thus seems well-needed given their empowering relevance, and observations like these one can only legitimize their societal power. Yet on the other hand might the fact that it are such strong and resourceful organizations that take up the mobilization of weaker societal groups, also prevent other organizations on similar (or future new) topics from becoming equally powerful in addressing the needs of other societal groups that will not easily get empowered on their own.

Students of public protest should thus be aware that mobilizing issues of these kinds will probably be underrepresented, or at least that the protests that do surface on these issues represent a societal base that is probably larger than that of protest on other cleavage issues.

To whom does this dissertation speak?

After having established the usefulness of this issue typology, one could ask to whose use it could be. To be short, it speaks to all who deal with political participation from the 'demand side' of protest (Klandermans 2004). It clearly elucidates how issues, in this case mobilizing issues, structure participation. Just as it are specific societal groups that create issues, it are the issues that mobilize specific issue publics. They do so in very particular ways, with different issue publics being mobilized in very different fashions. And they inspire people to participate out of very specific motivations.

As said, with most existing studies being based on either large-scale population surveys, or extensive in-depth single-case studies, this study combines the best of both worlds, by describing several cases using the macro-level study tool of surveying. This way, this study delivers useful additional insights to existing studies that miss the comparative inclusion of the important variable that issues are.

This study also very concretely speaks to those involved in protest surveying. As the method is spreading rapidly, its adopters could use this typology not only as a tool to make a first case selection, but also to assess for large inter-protest diversity.

This dissertation also reveals a lot of the supply side of protest politics (ibid.). Different issues seem to be more or less adopted by strong organizations and produce very different mobilization dynamics. This way, these findings can be useful for all studying these processes, be it in conventional or unconventional political participation. Being inspired by cleavage theory, this study in this way also contributes to the literature in this field, by including non-conventional political participation in their theories, and by adding extra dimensionality within the cleavage concept.

Finally, this study also speaks to those who want to mobilize for protest politics. By knowing the importance of differential issue mobilization processes, they could be able to reach either broader, or either larger parts of a smaller and more specific issue public.

Pitfalls and Suggestions for Further Research

As is the case in probably every scientific study in the social sciences, this study also suffers from several shortcomings and blind spots.
First of all, this study would benefit from replication with several other demonstrations. As some of the categories in the six-fold typology contain only one demonstration, the typology is not robustly tested. Only by including several extra demonstrations, this problem could be resolved.

Second, there exists a potential arbitrariness in the allocation of the different demonstration issues to one of the six issue types. Within the thematic dimension, this is most often clear, although sometimes issues might overlap or cut across thematic boundaries.

A silent march, for instance, could have some traits of a new issue as well as of a consensual issue demonstration, when it concerns racist killings that have shocked the nation, for example. Also, issues can be framed as being universalistic, but be in essence particularistic. In fact, this is quite a common strategy for movement mobilizers, as it gives their struggle more overall legitimacy. And, thematic issues can also be framed differently for strategic reasons: NIMBY protests, for instance against works in a certain neighborhood, will often be framed in terms of environmental concerns, a typical new issue, while the main action grounds and mobilization platforms could very well be lying in the fear of lowering housing prices, to name one thing. Clearly, the researcher should gather as much information as possible before categorizing the demonstration issue into one of the six types of the issue typology. It will take more different issue demonstrations and more researchers using the typology to get to several strict, clear, and unequivocal guidelines following which issues can be categorized into the six-type issue typology in a fully objective way.

Third, this thesis brought to the fore *one* possible driver of protest unity and diversity. In the introductory chapter, I suggested several possible alternative causes of unity and diversity of protest events. Finding one such driver obviously does not exclude the existence of one or more equally or even more important explananda. And, the data itself implies room for that. Intra-subtype differences are still large, with regression models' R^2's ranging to .25 within new-issue events on the same issue scope dimension, and even to .35

within old-issue events on the same scope dimension. Clearly, protesters within different issue types are not just interchangeable, and other forces driving diversity are also at play. The next challenge will be to map these forces, which are very likely to be for a large part lying in the outside world of media, politics and public opinion. In an earlier study, Stefaan Walgrave and I (2009) exactly unveiled these factors as drivers of the diversity of different national protesters' publics on one same mobilizing issues. Current international comparative protest survey research projects in which many of these contextual data are gathered are very promising in being able to account for the interplay between mobilizing issues and other contextual factors as the drivers of diversity.

Finally, another possible critique on this study could be its potential idiosyncrasy. I have studied the important effect of several mobilizing issues on *one* action form (peaceful protest demonstrations) in *one* country (Belgium), in *one* time period (2006-2007). Of course this study would benefit from comparison over action forms, nation, and time. But there is no reason to assume that the fact that all three are constant in this study makes its results uninteresting.

I study protest, the most common and widespread Western political action repertoire after petitioning, and, in some countries, contacting politicians. Of course, this typology would not work in the same way for, let us say petitioning, nor would it be helpful in getting more understanding in, for instance rioting. Petitioning is a much more common action means, more widespread throughout different societal layers, and it is a repertoire with much lower participation thresholds than protest participation. Therefore, people will probably be more inclined to sign a petition to support issues which do not really affect their lives as much or which they have not given much thought before. Yet, the issues for which these people would take the time and effort for to go out and protest on a free Sunday afternoon are most certainly issues they feel personally close to, and responsible for getting something done on them. Contrarily, rioters, let alone that we would probably have major difficulties in having them filling out one of our surveys, might make out a very distinct societal group in themselves, and in that case using a six-fold typology would just not make that much sense. That is not to say that riots or petitions issues are not worth studying. And, certainly in the case of petitioning, the use of a similar, but probably adapted, typology which is likely to have several overlaps with the typology discussed here, could be very illuminating indeed.

Still, I would dare to go as far as to say that the six-fold typology could be representative for all kinds of existing, legal, and peaceful political collective action forms. Or at least a good starting point to study all of them. The most important reason for this is that protest is exactly the most important liaison action repertoire between traditional political participation, and other, non-conventional collective action, like strikes, sit-ins and many others. If the typology works for protest, it is highly likely that studying issues inspiring action using these other repertoires will be benefiting from the typology, if only it were as a well-documented starting point for further elaboration.

Is the fact that the empirical part focuses on one nation, and one period, problematic? I do not think so. Of course, different national social, political and economic contexts make that a diversity of issues might come and go in one country, whereas they might never gain any such relevance in another. Still, as this study is focusing on a typical Western country, it is safe to say that the typology is very likely to work in all other different Western countries, be it only given the fact that the survival-self expression dimension is gaining equal importance in all Western countries. On the other hand, it could however be that in some countries other cleavages also prevail on the streets, and that these cross-cut the survival-self expression one. Although the evidence does not really point in that direction (Knutsen 2010), this could, for instance in Southern-European countries, very well be the case for the older, religious cleavage. In such cases, the typology should of course be elaborated to account for such national peculiarities.

And what about the short time frame? Again, this is not likely to be problematic. As cleavages are in essence structural and long-lasting, and as the survival-self expression cleavage is in cleavage terms relatively new, one could suppose the typology to be useful for at least several decades. Yet of course, if cleavages and alongside issues would come to change, the typology would have to adapt to these changes accordingly.

Still, whether timing, place or repertoire differ or change or not, this study has in any case clearly indicated that the use of an issue typology is, and is likely to always be, an important and highly useful tool in the study of collective political action of any kind, in any place, at any time. Not only because issues clearly discern between different types of protesters, their motivations and mobilization pathways, but also since this ‘who’, ‘why’ and ‘how’ of participation will always be related to each other in a way that is meaningful, and that is structured by, exactly, issues.

APPENDIX 1

Below I present all variables used in this research. First, I present the variable name, than the question(s) it is based on and the different answers categories. If applicable, scale constructions based on the variables of this/ese question(s) are presented.

(1) Gender

Are you a man or a woman?

(1) man
(2) woman

---

(2) Age

How old are you?

….. years old.

---

(3) Diploma

What is the highest educational degree you obtained? If you are a student, please indicate which diploma you are studying for.

(1) none
(2) primary
(3) lower secondary technical/vocational
(4) lower secondary university-preparatory
(5) higher secondary technical/vocational
(6) higher secondary university-preparatory
(7) higher, non-university
(8) university

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(4) Interest in Politics

How interested are you in politics?

(1) not at all
(2) not very much
(3) neither
(4) quite a lot
(5) very much

(5) L-R Self-Placement

In Politics, people sometimes talk of 'left' and 'right'. Where would you place yourself on this scale, where '0' means completely left and '10' completely right?

Scale 0-10

(6) Action Repertoire Diversity

There are many ways in which people can engage themselves for societal change. Have you ever:

Signed a petition

Worn or displayed a pin, flyer or poster of a (political) campaign

Joined a strike

Joined a sit-in

Participated in violent action?

Action Repertoire Divertsity:

SUM scale 0-5

(7) Demo Past 5 yrs

Can you say how often you have participated in a demonstration in the past five years?

(1) this is the first time

(2) 2-5 times

(3) 6-10 times

(4) 11-20 times

(5) 20+ times

(8) Network embeddedness: Is/Knows Member Org.Org.

Are you a member of one of the organizations (co-)staging this demonstration?

(0) no (1) yes

If you are no member of one of these organizations, do you personally know someone who is a member?

(0) no (1) yes

Combined Variable:

Is or knows member organizing organization

(0) no (1) yes

---

(9) Embedded Diversity

Could you indicate in the list below of which arganizations you are a passive, active or board member?

Church; Student; Union_Prof_Org; Party; Womens_Rights; Sport_Recreation; Environment; Art_Music_Educ; Neighborhood; Charity; Global_Justice; Third_World; Human_Rights; Peace; Anti_Racism; Other

Membership Diversity:

SUM scale 0-16

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(10) Company: network embeddedness

Are you at this manifestation: (multiple answers possible):

1. alone
2. with partner
3. with family members or relatives
4. with friends, acquaintances or neighbors;
5. with fellow workers or - students?
6. with fellow members of an organization/association

Company (informal - formal)

The Company variable is a theoretical scale that ranges people's protest companions from 'informal' to 'formal' (see chapter X). Of people who gave more than one answer, the most 'formal' answer is taken into the scale, which summarizes the above categories as follows:

1 = 1
2 = 2; 3
3 = 4
4 = 5
5 = 6

---

(11) Mobilization channels / network ties

How did you find out about today's demonstration; was that through:

1. radio or TV

2. newspaper (also online)
3. posters/flyers/ads
4. members' magazine of an organization/association
5. family, friends, acquaintances, neighbors
6. fellow workers / - students
7. fellow members in an organization/association
8. website(s) of an organization/association
9. e-mail list of an organization/association

Mobilization (open - closed)

The Mobilization variable is a theoretical scale (see a.o. Walgrave and Verhulst 2009; Walgrave and Klandermans 2010) that ranges information channels (or ties) from 'open' to 'closed' (see chapter X). Of people who gave more than one answer, the most 'closed' answer is taken into the scale, which summarizes the above caterogries as follows:

1 = 1; 2
2 = 5
3 = 6
4 = 3
5 = 8; 9
6 = 4; 7

---

(12) ID Scale

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

I have a lot in common with people present here today
I strongly identify with the others present here today
I enjoy being part of this group

1 not at all
2
3
4
5 very much

PCA factor anaylsis on the three variables revealed only one underlying component, reinforcing the identity measure's validity. This component explains 65.6 percent of variance, and component loadings are, respectively .825; .875; .721. Cronbachs α reliability score = .730, which is sufficiently high.

The scale was constructed as a mean scale of the scores on all three variables, thus also ranging from 1-5.

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(13) Success chance

How high do you estimate the chance that the demonstration will help attain the for you most important goal of this demonstration?

1: small chance
2
3
4
5
6
7: high chance

---

(14) Angry/combative

(15) Worry/fear/sad/Indignated

Can you indicate to which degree the issue of this demonstration has made you feel:

angry
indignated
worried
sad
afraid
combattive

1: not
2
3

4

5

6

7: very much

Two mean scale variables are derived; one comprising ‘activating emotion’; one comprising ‘grievance emotions’.

Angry/Combattive:
Mean of both variables

Worry/sad/fear/indignation
Mean of four variables.

APPENDIX 2

Table A2_1 : Means and Independent Samples t-Test for Equality of Means for '**old**' issues versus 'new' and 'consensual' issues

	Means		t	Sig
Gender	*new & consensual*	1,48	8,74	0,000
(1) male - (2) female	*old*	1,30		
Age	*new & consensual*	43,57	-6,02	0,000
Scale	*old*	47,26		
Diploma	*new & consensual*	6,68	10,32	0,000
(1) low - (8) high)	*old*	5,94		
Interest in Politics	*new & consensual*	3,61	-3,42	0,001
(1) low - (4) high	*old*	3,75		
L-R self placement	*new & consensual*	3,62	-13,21	0,000
(1) left - (10) right	*old*	4,93		
Demo past 5 yrs	*new & consensual*	2,02	-9,15	0,000
(1) low - (5) high	*old*	2,46		
Action Rep Diversity	*new & consensual*	3,08	6,27	0,000
(0) low - (5) high	*old*	2,57		
Member org circle	*new & consensual*	0,43	-25,45	0,000
(0) no -(1) yes	*old*	0,89		
Embedded Diversity	*new & consensual*	3,16	1,25	0,210
(0) low - (16) high	*old*	3,02		
Ties	*new & consensual*	2,83	-21,76	0,000
(1) informal - (5) formal	*old*	4,05		
Channel	*new & consensual*	3,75	-18,87	0,000
(1) open - (6) closed	*old*	5,19		
ID scale (3)	*new & consensual*	3,77	-11,64	0,000
(1) low - (5) high	*old*	4,18		
Succes chance	*new & consensual*	3,64	2,96	0,003
(1) low - (7) high	*old*	3,45		
Security threat perc.	*new & consensual*	4,51	-13,70	0,000
(1) low - (7) high	*old*	5,40		
Value threat perc.	*new & consensual*	4,74	0,03	0,975
(1) low - (1) high	*old*	4,74		
	N=2,463			
	Weighted dataset			

Table A2_2 : Means and Independent Samples t-Test for Equality of Means for '**new**' issues versus 'old' and 'consensual' issues

	Means		t	Sig
Gender	*old & consensual*	1,39	-2,04	0,042
(1) male - (2) female	*new*	1,43		
Age	*old & consensual*	46,40	5,51	0,000
Scale	*new*	43,01		
Diploma	*old & consensual*	6,12	-9,39	0,000
(1) low - (8) high)	*new*	6,80		
Interest in Politics	*old & consensual*	3,64	-1,48	0,139
(1) low - (4) high	*new*	3,70		
L-R self placement	*old & consensual*	4,60	11,29	0,000
(1) left - (10) right	*new*	3,47		
Demo past 5 yrs	*old & consensual*	2,18	-0,78	0,433
(1) low - (5) high	*new*	2,21		
Action Rep Diversity	*old & consensual*	2,31	-18,38	0,000
(0) low - (5) high	*new*	3,74		
Member org. circle	*old & consensual*	0,66	5,80	0,000
(0) no -(1) yes	*new*	0,54		
Embedded Diversity	*old & consensual*	2,90	-4,48	0,000
(0) low - (16) high	*new*	3,40		
Ties	*old & consensual*	3,50	7,71	0,000
(1) informal - (5) formal	*new*	3,04		
Channel	*old & consensual*	4,19	-4,02	0,000
(1) open - (6) closed	*new*	4,52		
ID scale (3)	*old & consensual*	3,91	-1,36	0,175
(1) low - (5) high	*new*	3,96		
Succes chance	*old & consensual*	3,61	1,81	0,071
(1) low - (7) high	*new*	3,49		
Security threat perc.	*old & consensual*	5,12	9,43	0,000
(1) low - (7) high	*new*	4,49		
Value threat perc.	*old & consensual*	4,87	5,62	0,000
(1) low - (1) high	*new*	4,52		
	N=2,463			
	Weighted dataset			

Table A2_3 : Means and Independent Samples t-Test for Equality of Means for '**consensual**' issues versus 'old' and 'new' issues

	Means		t	Sig
Gender	*old & new*	1,37	-8,13	.000
(1) male - (2) female	*consensual*	1,56		
Age	*old & new*	45,15	0,64	,524
Scale	*consensual*	44,67		
Diploma	*old & new*	6,36	-1,10	,270
(1) low - (8) high)	*consensual*	6,46		
Interest in Politics	*old & new*	3,73	6,11	,000
(1) low - (4) high	*consensual*	3,42		
L-R self placement	*old & new*	4,20	2,12	,034
(1) left - (10) right	*consensual*	3,93		
Demo past 5 yrs	*old & new*	2,34	12,29	,000
(1) low - (5) high	*consensual*	1,63		
Action Rep Diversity	*old & new*	3,15	13,87	,000
(0) low - (5) high	*consensual*	1,80		
Member org. Circle	*old & new*	0,71	22,76	,000
(0) no -(1) yes	*consensual*	0,21		
Embedded Diversity	*old & new*	3,21	3,99	,000
(0) low - (16) high	*consensual*	2,67		
Ties	*old & new*	3,54	15,84	,000
(1) informal - (5) formal	*consensual*	2,41		
Channel	*old & new*	4,85	31,09	,000
(1) open - (6) closed	*consensual*	2,25		
ID scale (3)	*old & new*	4,07	15,73	,000
(1) low - (5) high	*consensual*	3,38		
Succes chance	*old & new*	3,47	-5,84	,000
(1) low - (7) high	*consensual*	3,92		
Security threat perc.	*old & new*	4,96	4,96	,000
(1) low - (7) high	*consensual*	4,55		
Value threat perc.	*old & new*	4,63	-6,92	,000
(1) low - (1) high	*consensual*	5,15		
	N=2,463			
	Weighted dataset			

Table A2_4 : Means and Independent Samples t-Test for Equality of Means
for '**particularistic**' versus '**universalistic**' issues

	Means		t	Sig
Gender	*particularistic*	1,38	-2,88	0,004
(1) male - (2) female	*universalistic*	1,43		
Age	*particularistic*	45,01	-0,15	0,881
Scale	*universalistic*	45,10		
Diploma	*particularistic*	6,12	-7,29	0,000
(1) low - (8) high)	*universalistic*	6,64		
Interest in Politics	*particularistic*	3,59	-3,85	0,000
(1) low - (4) high	*universalistic*	3,75		
L-R self placement	*particularistic*	4,86	14,53	0,000
(1) left - (10) right	*universalistic*	3,47		
Demo past 5 yrs	*particularistic*	2,22	1,38	0,167
(1) low - (5) high	*universalistic*	2,16		
Action Rep Diversity	*particularistic*	2,17	-18,71	0,000
(0) low - (5) high	*universalistic*	3,59		
Member org. circle.	*particularistic*	0,65	3,65	0,000
(0) no -(1) yes	*universalistic*	0,58		
Embedded Diversity	*particularistic*	2,64	-8,61	0,000
(0) low - (16) high	*universalistic*	3,56		
Ties	*particularistic*	3,37	1,87	0,061
(1) informal - (5) formal	*universalistic*	3,26		
Channel	*particularistic*	4,31	-0,25	0,803
(1) open - (6) closed	*universalistic*	4,33		
ID scale (3)	*particularistic*	3,88	-3,15	0,002
(1) low - (5) high	*universalistic*	3,99		
Succes chance	*particularistic*	3,59	0,98	0,329
(1) low - (7) high	*universalistic*	3,53		
Security threat perc.	*particularistic*	5,04	4,90	0,000
(1) low - (7) high	*universalistic*	4,72		
Value threat perc.	*particularistic*	4,81	2,39	0,017
(1) low - (1) high	*universalistic*	4,67		
	N=2,463			
	Weighted dataset			

APPENDIX 3

Discrimination Measures

	Dimension		Mean
	1	2	1
Gender	0,07274	0,01509	0,04391
Age	0,09852	0,20205	0,15028
Education	0,01912	0,42996	0,22454
political interest	0,23174	0,18430	0,20802
left right attitudes	0,18143	0,15540	0,16841
action repertoire diversity	0,40494	0,06933	0,23714
protest experience	0,46226	0,05913	0,26069
organizational embeddedness	0,59232	0,00067	0,29649
membership diversity	0,10987	0,09385	0,10186
Ties	0,48764	0,01457	0,25110
Channels	0,64052	0,06650	0,35351
ID	0,17268	0,31743	0,24506
instrumentality	0,01740	0,17388	0,09564
security threat perceptions	0,07957	0,27839	0,17898
value threat perceptions	0,02364	0,29652	0,16008
Issue Type	0,61432	0,22906	0,42169
Active Total	4,20871	2,58614	3,39743

Dimension	Cronbach's Alpha	Variance Accounted For	
		Total (Eigenvalue)	Inertia
1	0,81322	4,20871	0,26304
2	0,65421	2,58614	0,16163
Total		6,79485	0,42468
Mean	0,75270	3,39743	0,21234

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