Why People Protest

Proefschrift voorgelegd tot het behalen van de
graad van Doctor in de Sociale Wetenschappen
aan de Universiteit Antwerpen te verdedigen door

Jeroen Van Laer

Promotor
Prof. dr. Stefaan Walgrave

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Dedicated Research for the Movement Boys

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Voorwoord

Brussel, januari 1991. Daar liepen we, te schreeuwen: “Nog liever een wolf, dan oorlog in de Golf!”. De betoging tegen de eerste Golfoorlog is zeker mijn vroegste betogingsherinnering, maar strikt genomen niet mijn eerste protestervaring. Dat was de grote antirakettenbetoging van 23 oktober 1983. Als vier maand oude pamperdrager is daar helaas weinig van bijgebleven. Heel anders was de ijzingwekkende stilte en de klapsalvo’s op de Witte Mars, 20 oktober 1996. België daverde op haar grondvesten na de gruweldaden van Marc Dutroux. Op mijn 22 was ik welgeteld drie keer in Brussel geweest om mijn stem te verheffen. Dat lijkt al heel wat, maar het is echt niets in vergelijking met wat er mij te wachten stond als onderzoeker voor Stefaan Walgrave in de onderzoeksgroep M2P, Media, Middenveld & Politiek. Ik val sinds de non-profit betoging van maart 2011 officieel in de categorie 20+ op onze protestervaringsschaal. Ik hou van betogingen. Of beter: ik ben er van beginnen houden. Het sterk wetenschappelijk karakter van dit proefschrift doet wellicht oneer aan de creativiteit en de humor, de woede, verontwaardiging en het verdriet van de vele duizenden betogers die we de afgelopen vijf jaar hebben bevraagd. Ik ben echter oprecht fier op het resultaat. Dit boek is voor mij de kers op de taart van een onvoorziene, maar onwaarschijnlijk prettige academische carrière waar ik altijd met plezier op zal terugkijken. Een stevig woord van dank aan enkele sleutelfiguren is daarom zeker op zijn plaats.

Om te beginnen zijn er Stefaan, de “boss”, en Joris en Ruud, de twee andere Movement Boys. Mijn werk is in belangrijke mate ook hun werk. De vele “Movement-meetings” in het muffe kantoor van Stefaan, op het dakterras van de Meerminne, op de trein richting elders, onder de Art Nouveau/Deco-luster van Joris, of smullend van een Hamburger Highlander, BLT en Ice Tea in De Schot, waren telkens van onschatbare waarde voor dit proefschrift, maar vooral voor het plezier om aan de Universiteit Antwerpen te werken. Als ik

iets of iemand moet bedanken voor de vrolijke arbeidsvreugde van de afgelopen vijf jaar zijn het deze drie heren. Al mag ik de rest van onze M2P groep zeker niet ontzien. Op de maandelijkse staffs, maar vooral op de onnavolgbare M2P-weekends, vormden de intellectuele inspanningen afgewisseld met de meeste platvloerse nonsens telkens de perfecte cocktail. Bedankt om telkens opnieuw naar mijn fwaming-gewouwel te luisteren en er nog zinnige commentaar op te geven ook. Ik heb er uiteindelijk niets mee gedaan, waarvoor mijn excuses. Binnen het departement Politieke Wetenschappen zijn of waren er nog een hele hoop andere mensen waar het zeer fijn mee vertoeven was.[1] Ik denk dan in het bijzonder aan Kris en Jana. Toen we samen nog op de schoolbanken zaten, konden we niet vermoeden ook ooit collega's te worden. Kris was bovendien een protest survey uitdeler van het eerste uur en schopte het uiteindelijk zelfs tot één van de Pointer Sisters. De trouwste Pointer Sister was echter zonder twijfel Thomas Baeckens. Interviewen van betogers vond hij vreselijk, maar het pointen deed hij als de beste.

Een speciaal woord van dank richt ik aan Jan Beyers en Rens Vliegenthart, de leden van mijn doctoraatscommissie. Hun suggesties en commentaren op eerdere versies van dit proefschrift waren bijzonder constructief en vormden een substantiële meerwaarde. Ik ben hen bovendien enorm dankbaar dat ze bereid waren om samen het gaspedaal in te duwen en de formele leestijd waar ze eigenlijk recht op hebben met meer dan de helft in te korten. Anita Muys verdient ook een speciale vermelding. In de gemeenteraad van Edegem schoppen we samen regelmatig tegen de schenen van de plaatselijke beleidsmakers. Protest in de praktijk. Maar Anita ontfermde zich ook over de lay-out van dit boek. Ik ben geen perfectionist, maar wel als het op vormgeving aankomt. Alleen omwille van Anita schikte ik me graag (en overigens zonder problemen) naar de richtlijnen van de Nieuwe Media Dienst.

Ver buiten de academische sfeer dank ik uiteraard ook ons moeder en vader, Pieter, Tine en Anneleen. Ik denk dat uiteindelijk heel de familie (buiten ons vader) enquêtes heeft ingegeven. Mams, Paps, merci voor alles. Het schrijven van dit voorwoord doet alle puzzelstukjes (opnieuw) samenvallen. Straf. Tine, ook na onze gezamenlijke nestvlucht, moest je me nog twee jaar onder het zelfde dak dulden, maar je was minstens zo lang een dankbaar klankbord. Anneleen is mij eigenlijk een dankwoord verschuldigd of beter: haar

[1] Hans Diels krijgt bij deze de voetnootvermelding zoals beloofd na het kauwen van het zoveelste Bastidebroodje.

thesisbegeleider een verontschuldiging. Die grote online Kunstbende-enquête was hoogst relevant, uiterst professioneel en bovendien nog nooit eerder gedaan. De kritiek op dat onderzoek is volledig uit de lucht gegrepen! Het tempo en de precisie waarmee Pieter die verdomde enquêtes uitdeelde en ook nog eens invoerde, getuigde van een knap staaltje broederliefde. Maar het was vooral als charismatische bandleider van de Pieter Van Laer Big Band op het PSW-feest dat hij de lat zo hoog legde dat nadien enkel Stefaan het nog aandurfde om een familielid op de planken te zetten.

Tenslotte een woord voor Laure, mijn vrouw, mijn lief: met dit proefschrift heb ik je danig op de proef gesteld. Het is een zeer schrale troost, maar ondanks de data die we vooral niet verzamelden op het Sociaal Forum in Griekenland heb ik toch twee hoofdstukken kunnen schrijven. Ik hoop dat we ooit nog samen op een normale en ontspannen manier naar Athene kunnen reizen. Het schijnt toch best een mooie stad te zijn.

Edegem, 2011

Introduction: Our Protest Democracy

Western democracies, and the legitimacy of their political system, are experiencing a crisis. Political scientists have repeatedly supported this claim by demonstrating how citizens have grown more distant from political parties, how the public has become very critical towards political elites and political institutions, how people have started to distrust the government and defer authority (Dalton 1999; Inglehart 1999). The relationship between "the state" and "the citizen" has changed dramatically over the past decades. As Peter Mair (2008) notes: "Parties, like the other traditional institutions of the European polities, might well be considered by citizens as necessary for the good functioning of politics and the state, but they are neither liked nor trusted." Not anymore at least. Citizens are increasingly withdrawing from mainstream politics. If voter turnout did not significantly drop, than voters have become extremely volatile and loyal partisan voters a curious rarity (Norris, Curtice, Sanders, Scammel and Semetko 1999; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). However, it is important to note that, quoting Dalton (1999: 74), "public skepticism has not significantly affected support for democratic principles and the political community. As citizens are criticizing the incumbents of government, they are simultaneously expressing support for the democratic creed." Interestingly, in the advent of an alleged crisis of current Western democracies, people are increasingly complementing their political "action repertoire" (cf. Tilly 1978) with other political means to pursue their aspirations, articulate their views or dissent, to give meaning to their lives and express their identities, to struggle for what they value important and worth fighting for. While conventional politics, institutions and political parties witness a dramatic decrease in membership, the streets are filling with demonstrators of all walks, doing "politics by other means" (Gamson 1975).

Examples of popular protest abound. In Brussels, Europe's capital city, on average more than two demonstrations a day take place (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). A quick scan of large-scale protest events in Brussels between 2006 and 2007 reported in the main stream press includes "white" official cleaning ladies worried about their jobs, several thousands of employers from public hospitals and retirement homes asking for more personnel and financial support, thousands of Muslims demonstrating against the publication of Mohamed cartoons, a demonstration gathering nearly 10,000 people to ask for a more humane asylum and migration policy and the regularization of *sans papiers,* hundreds of activists protesting against the "commercialization of water", nearly 2,000 peace-activists "celebrating" three years of American occupation and war in Iraq, more than 5,000 Kurds fighting against the Turkish oppression in "their country" Kurdistan, another 1,000 activists fighting for the right to decent housing in Brussels, a sit-in to protest against Israel's occupation of the Gaza Strip, about 80,000 people expressing their grief and solidarity with the parents of a young boy killed in a mugging, a massive solidarity march after redundancies at a VW-car factory, a rally by members of the Senate to draw the European Union's attention to the precarious humanitarian situation in Darfur (even the political elite uses politics by other means), thousands of firemen claiming more recognition for their profession and safer equipment, hundreds of students protesting against a new way of financing higher education, about 3,000 climate change demonstrators completely soaked by cold, heavy rain, dozens of angry truck drivers who fear that a new regulation will kill their profit and profession, and so forth. Although this is only a snapshot of protest demonstrations, it clearly illustrates the diversity of the claims and claimants who climb on that barricade today.

As more people take to the streets, such forms of political participation have also become more widely accepted. Some scholars coined the notion of today's "social movement societies", to describe this increasing "normalization" of civil society's action repertoire (Neidhardt and Rucht 1993; Meyer and Tarrow 1998). The normalization of protest first of all refers to the fact that the sheer number of protest actions goes up on a much wider range of issues (Fuchs and Rucht 1994). Second, the normalization of the protest repertoire also entails the normalization of the protester himself, meaning that an ever more diverse constituency gets mobilized for (peaceful) collective action (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). In a longitudinal study of demonstrations in Belgium, Van Aelst and Walgrave (2001) show that the number of demonstrations as well as the number of people taking part in demonstrations

has steadily grown in Belgium since the 1950s: where the 1950s witnessed about 60 demonstrations a year and about 200,000 partakers, these figures have dramatically risen to nearly 400 demonstrations and about 400,000 participants by the end of the 1990s. Currently, according to the European Social Survey Round 4, about 7.5 percent of the Belgian population have taken part in a lawful demonstration between 2007 and 2008, which is about 630,000 citizens. Both Dalton (2002) and Norris (2002) confirm that, using cross-national population surveys, the number of people participating in lawful demonstrations has increased since the 1970s in many other industrialized countries as well. It is probably an understatement that political protest has become an "integral part of modern life" (Kriesi 2008: 157). In sum, contrary to the May '68 myth, protest is still on the rise, mobilizing an ever-diverse segment of the population. These individual protest participants are the focus of this thesis: their personal backgrounds and personal beliefs, how they are embedded in informal and formal networks, the relationships they have with other likeminded citizens and organizations, their emotional energy and motivations to take to the streets, all their different personal characteristics that both influence and are influenced by their participation in collective action events. Two central questions run through this thesis: 1) who participates in collective action and who does not (anymore) and 2) are changing dynamics of protest mobilization and participation also influencing who participates, and how and why people participate? The first question tackles the problem of mobilization and participation *in general*: why do some people participate, while others do not? Or why do some people keep protesting, while others stop climbing the barricades? With the second question we are interested in *specific* dynamics of protest mobilization and participation and how these relate to participants' personal characteristics and issue-related motivations to participate in collective action. More specifically three "topical" and changing dynamics will be scrutinized: the increasing professionalization of social movements and the actions they stage, the increasing use of new communication and information technologies, and the increasing transnationalization of claims and claimants. In what follows we will further explain this double interest and how the different chapters try to tackle each of these two questions.

An Anatomy of the Protest Participant

The social movement literature dealing with the individual participant is more than a hundred years old. Over the years several paradigms, theories and research programs have been competing and complementing each other in their quest to delineate the most important factors that explain who takes part and how and why people take part in social movements and the actions they stage. In current social movement studies, the dominant theoretical framework is still fueled by classic resource mobilization and political process theory. In first instance, these models on collective action mobilization and movement participation heavily focus on the so-called "structural" explanatory factors: costs and benefits, available organizational resources, organizational strength, network embeddedness, political opportunity structures, etc. (cf. Oberschall 1973; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978). In their focus on macro- and meso-explanations of collective action participation, they go pretty far in "abandoning the socio-psychological analyses of social movements" (Klandermans 1984: 584). More and more, scholars have begun to re-focus attention to the so-called "cultural" or "motivational" explanatory factors: they re-emphasize social-psychological elements and insights of earlier collective behavior theories, incorporating values, grievances, ideology, emotions etc. into their models (e.g. Gamson, Fireman and Rytina 1982; Morris and Mueller 1992; Johnston and Klandermans 1995; Jasper 1997). These scholars claim, for instance, that much of the causal impact of the networks and organizational embeddedness actually comes from what they transmit and foster: affective bonds, emotions, and identities (Jasper 1998). Updated models of political process theorists now include motivational elements as well, like the very popular concept of framing (cf. Benford and Snow 2000; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). Although the "cultural turn" still continues to generate lively debates (cf. Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2001b), it seems that the theoretical field of social movements and collective action is gradually settling down. Today, there is a growing consensus that both "structural" and "motivational" explanatory factors of collective action participation are important and should be dealt with together (Jasper 2010). It is our ambition in this thesis to integrate these different strands in the social movement literature theoretically and empirically. Each chapter will indeed both deal with structural as well as motivational aspects of protest participants.

Theoretically the social movement literature has come a long way. Empirically, however, a lot of work has to be done, especially on the individual level. How can different structural and motivational variables predict and explain protest participation? Do these different factors mutually reinforce or perhaps cancel each other out? Social movement studies and theories are mostly case-study based, limiting the generalization of specific findings. There is a strong need for more comparative, integrated and large-scale survey research. Recently scholars have pointed to another shortcoming, namely that protest participation is mostly studied in a static way, while mobilization and participation are in fact processes that more likely evolve in different stages (McAdam et al. 2001; Klandermans 2004; Schussman and Soule 2005). Only by organizing longitudinal protest research using panel studies before and after people take to the streets, and by using questions related to the protest *process,* we can solve the participation puzzle. Moreover, new and changing dynamics potentially challenge classic social movement paradigms. The introduction of new information and communication technologies (ICTs) or the globalization of political, social, and economic claims, all pose additional opportunities and limitations on the process of mobilization and participation (cf. Ayres 2005; della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Van Laer and Van Aelst 2010). Digitalization and globalization are both dynamics that are linked with non-hierarchical, network-like movement organizations (van de Donk, Loader, Nixon and Rucht 2004; Juris 2007). Van de Donk and colleagues (2004), among others, claim that thanks to new digital technologies grassroots activism and network-based organizational forms are becoming the norm in order to act collectively and on a global scale. Global Justice Movement activists are frequently used as a case in point (della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Juris 2007). Their "decentralized, egalitarian and inclusive ideology" fits well with the use of digital communication technologies (Bennett 2003, 2005). Because these principles of grassroots, non-hierarchical activism are valued so important, the professionalization of the social movement sector, in terms of more formalization and institutionalization, is often regarded as a negative evolution, endangering grassroots democratic values of inclusiveness and equal representation and participation (Van Laer and Verhulst 2007). In this thesis we take a critical stance towards these claims. Moreover, we will show that formal organizations still matter in important ways and are needed to secure sustained commitment among various protest activists.

Many social movement studies have thus focused on protest participation and mobilization, but rarely in a systematic way, rarely in a comprehensive way, and rarely taking the activist's point of view. What the social movement literature still misses is systematic, comparative empirical research on the individual level. This thesis, therefore, presents a comprehensive, in-depth and empirical study of the protest participant: *an anatomy of the individual activist*. Hence, the first two chapters deal with the "rise and fall" of individual protest participation, or the "birth and death" of the protest participant: Chapter 1 deals with the mobilization of (potential) protest participants and actual protest participation; in Chapter 2 we investigate sustained commitment and activist's disengagement. In short, in the first two chapters we focus on participation and nonparticipation. These chapters focus on differences between activists *in time*.

Figure 0.1
Schematic Overview Different Chapters



The following three chapters successively deal with three specific changing dynamics of protest mobilization and participation and how these relate to participants' personal characteristics and motivations. These changing dynamics are not randomly chosen, but relate to three topical issues and challenges in the social movement literature: 1) the *professionalization* of social movements and protest participation (chapter 3), 2) the introduction of new communication technologies as internet and, consequently, the *digitalization* of protest participation (chapter 4), and 3) the increasing *transnationalization* of the locus of social movement action and activists (chapter 5). In each chapter we compare participants on one of these challenges in terms of *who* they are, *how* they got there, and *why* they participated. Thus, while the first two chapters disentangle the actual process of mobilization, participation and disengagement, comparing protest participants *in time* (cf. research question 1), the last three chapters focus on differences between activists *in depth* (cf. research question 2). Figure 0.1 presents a schematic overview of the different chapters and the subjects they unravel.

Relevance and Contribution

Although the comprehensiveness of this dissertation is important, the true relevance for the social movement field lies in the following three contributions: 1) the consistent inclusion of "structural" and "motivational" explanatory variables, thoroughly weighing these personal features against each other 2) the comparative nature of the studies included in this thesis, comparing protesters across issues, events and organizations, and 3) the intensive gathering and use of original and innovative survey-data of individual protest participants, supplementing the strong focus in the social movement literature on the macro- (e.g. political opportunities) and the meso-level (e.g. movement organizations) of social movement and protest dynamics. In short, we integrate structural and motivational variables, we make it comparative, and we collect and use innovative data on the individual level.

We integrate structural and motivational variables

As introduced above, research on protest participation at the individual level increasingly integrates both structural and motivational variables into their models. As such, it connects different strands of research within the social movement literature: classic resource mobilization and political process theories, principally focused on structural characteristics, are complemented with social-psychological and "cultural" insights, which give weight to motivational factors. Although different strands do acknowledge the importance of including explanatory variables of "the other" into their own models, we still know very little about how exactly "structural" and "motivational" predictors relate to each other, and which are more or less important in explaining protest participation. The "recognition" that both structural and motivational variables are important, often does not lead to the effective integration and inclusion of these variables. Schussman and Soule (2005), for instance, lay bare the importance of organizational and network ties linking individuals to protest, but did not (or could not) include specific motivational predictors, like collective identity or emotions. Still, they do suspect that these motivational factors are crucial in explaining protest participation: "future work should pay attention to grievances and collective identity as factors in a multi-stage mobilization process." (p.1100). This is exactly our ambition.

In this thesis we consistently include both structural and motivational factors, much more than previous studies about individual protest participants did or were able to. Interpersonal networks and linkages are paramount when it comes to protest participation. Numerous scholars made that point in the past. The question always left unanswered is *why* networks are so important (cf. Passy 2001). Structural factors refer to a person's integration into different formal and informal networks. Interpersonal networks and social embeddedness, the extent to which people are linked with other active people, whether they are actively involved in a movement organization or not, are all well-known strong facilitators of activist engagements (Snow, Zurcher and Ekland-Olson 1980; Schussman and Soule 2005). Motivational factors relate to a person's issue-related beliefs, identifications and emotions: collective identity and in-group solidarity, feelings of injustice, anger, but also evaluations of perceived success chances and efficacy (cf. Gamson 1992; Klandermans 1997). The obvious question now is which of these explanatory factors matters most. What, for instance, is most compelling: the fact that people are strongly embedded in interpersonal relations, or the fact that they share strong motivations? Or, are these sets of factors equally important in

explaining who participates in protest actions and whether or not people do this in a very professional way, through digital information channels, and/or on a transnational level? The integration of structural and motivational predictors in this thesis is first of all empirical, but not without significant theoretical implications. What we will demonstrate in this thesis is that structural features, interpersonal linkages and networks, and motivational factors are crucial in explaining protest participation, but that it is above all the combination of these two and the fact that they mutually reinforce each other, that makes both networks and motivations so important in explaining protest participation.

Since each chapter will use more or less the same sets of explanatory variables, some parts of the different studies might inevitably feel repetitive. Nevertheless, we tried to limit the overlap and above all emphasize how the same predictors influence in different ways the separate topics dealt with in each chapter. It was our explicit aim to standardize our research instrument. This standardization is key in our ambition to integrate different social movement perspectives and to make our research comparative (see below) across organizations, mobilizing issues and collective action events. Different concepts are systematically measured in the same way throughout this thesis. We believe this is a true asset and major contribution to the current social movement literature.

We make it comparative

Secondly, with respect to the comparative nature of the different studies presented in this thesis, we go a good deal further than many of the case study based research available in the social movement literature. As Schussman and Soule (2005: 1087) point out: "This approach has been useful to generate testable hypotheses, but as is common with the case study approach, the main findings have varied form case to case, making it difficult to make general statements about the causes of participation in protest." By comparing participants across different organizations, events and issues, it is possible to rigorously test general propositions about protest mobilization and participation. Schussman and Soule (2005) therefore use national representative surveys, but other survey designs are possible as well. A recent comparative endeavor illustrates why we need comparative research in order to solve the puzzles we want to solve. The International Peace Protest Survey (IPPS) was conducted in eight countries on the same day and on the same protest event, the world-wide February 15

demonstration against the imminent war in Iraq (cf. Walgrave and Rucht 2010). This impressive volume underscores that different demonstrations, even if they appear very similar at first glance, may considerably vary in terms of who participated, how people got there, and why they did so. Focusing on one single event or organization, as most social movement research does, may thus obscure more general findings about why people protest. Therefore, we will compare activists across different organizations, issues and collective action events. In chapter 1 we compare potential protest participants in the same protest demonstration across four different environmental organizations. In chapter 2 we compare protest persisters and quitters across seven different mobilizing issues. In chapter 4 we compare activists across nine different mobilizing issues. And in chapter 5 we compare activists in two different social movement events on a similar issue. Comparing different organizations, issues or events means controlling for different organization-related, issue-related, and event-related contexts. Only by controlling for these different specific contexts we are able to draw more general, robust and substantial conclusions about why people protest. So, to make it clear, this thesis will not look for differences between organizations, events and issues and compare these with each other. It is our aim to look for the similarities that hold across different mobilizing organizations, events and demonstration issues, despite the fact that they are all marked by very specific mobilizing contexts.

We collect and use innovative survey data on the individual level

Thirdly, and finally, the data we present in this dissertation provides rich and innovative evidence to deal with individual level questions about protest participation in a comparative way. This is for two reasons: first, the data we use are *not* devoid of any issue-specific context, and second, social movement scholars have only recently started using individual level surveys distributed among protest participants (for an excellent review, see Walgrave and Verhulst 2011). We gathered data among actual participants in various collective action events, mainly by distributing protest surveys “on the scene”. Starting in February 2006 we monitored every upcoming large protest demonstration and similar protest event in Belgium. If our logistics got ready in time, we joined the demonstration armed with loads of protest survey booklets. Each time, assisted by a team of friendly interviewers, we managed to distribute between 500 and 1,000 surveys following a carefully designed survey

method (see the individual chapters for a detailed description). In addition to the highly reliable protest survey we experimented successfully with other surveying tools via the Internet. As such we were able to carry out a very unique pre-survey and post-survey around one single demonstration. Protest surveys allow for a detailed analysis of actual protest participants, which is very often not the case with large-scale population surveys, simply because the sample of actual demonstrators is too small. More importantly, by catching respondents during the act of protesting, our surveys are—in contrast to large-scale population surveys—rich in context specific information crucial to study why people protest for this or that demonstration. People are differently motivated for different issues. Using population surveys would lead to the leveling out of the data to the largest mean. In addition, and as we indicated earlier, our survey instrument and method are designed in such a way that systematic, standardized, and comparative protest survey research is possible.

Figure 0.2
Overview Datasets and Use in Different Chapters



CPPS = Climate Change Panel Protest Survey
MIPS = Multi-Issue Protest Survey
FMIPS = Follow-up Multi-Issue Protest Survey
ESFS = European Social Forum Survey
BSFS = Belgian Social Forum Survey

Throughout the thesis four different datasets will be used, containing information about 5,000 individuals. In order to give some guidance, we presented them in Figure 0.2. More detailed methodological information can be found in each chapter. Four data-gathering phases can be discerned. The core of our data, however, consists of the following three datasets: the Multi-Issue Protest Survey (MIPS), gathered between February 2006 and December 2008, the European Social Forum Survey (ESFS) executed May 2006, and the Belgian Social Forum Survey (BSFS) distributed December 2006. At each of these events interviewers handed out standardized questionnaires among the participants. The Follow-up Multi-Issue Protest Survey (FMIPS) is an extension of the MIPS. The Climate Change Panel Protest Survey (CPPS) consists of a two-wave survey executed before and right after the climate change demonstration (which is also part of the MIPS).

The MIPS consists of nine different protest demonstrations on various issues covering a broad range of issues, both on the left and on the right side of the political spectrum. The MIPS allows for a unique comparison between participants across different demonstration issues and contexts. Only in chapter 4 we fully use the MIPS dataset: across issues we compare participants that used the Internet to be informed about an upcoming demonstration with those that did not use the Internet.

Strictly speaking, the two Social Forum datasets (ESFS and BSFS) are not tapping protest participation, but rather social movement participation. Both the European and the Belgian Social Forum are important events for social movement organizations and individual activists to meet, exchange information and set-up new joint activities. The Social Forums are a clear example of how civil society in an increasing global world is forced to direct its claims and action to the transnational level. We needed these data to study differences between activists in terms of their professionalization (see chapter 3) and to delineate differences between activists that are principally active on a transnational level and those who are only active on a national level (see chapter 5). Only in chapter 5 we employ both the ESFS and the BSFS, strengthening our results across two different events.

The FMIPS was assembled by re-contacting all the respondents that had provided their contact details in the MIPS. One year after their first interview we asked them to fill in a second survey. With this extended MIPS dataset we are able to compare but across issues,

whether someone continued to take to the streets or did not participate anymore, albeit in a limited time frame of one year (see chapter 2).

Finally, the CPPS was collected in December 2007 in the run-up and immediate aftermath of the National Climate Change demonstration organized by the Belgian Climate coalition in Brussels. For this two-wave panel-survey members of four different environmental organizations were questioned two weeks before the climate change demonstration took place, and re-contacted one week after the demonstration via an online survey. Although this dataset focuses on one single issue, it allows for comparing participants and nonparticipants across four different types of environmental organizations (see the first chapter).

Let's Get Started

Since we have now introduced our main research questions, the main explanatory variables, and the different datasets that will be used in this thesis, we can move to the individual chapters. By studying protest participation in a systematic way, in a comprehensive way, and from the activist point of view we hope to better integrate different perspectives in the social movement literature, to better understand why some people participate in collective action, while others do not, and to delineate differences between participants for several topical issues in the study of social movements that are challenging current social movement theories about protest mobilization and participation. In a final chapter we present an over-arching conclusion and discussion knitting the different chapters together.

1

The Mobilization Drop Out Race

Interpersonal Networks and Motivations Predicting Differential Recruitment in a National Climate Change Demonstration

Abstract

The question why some people participate in collective action, while most people do not, has puzzled social movement scholars for decades, and is still generating a burgeoning literature on what has been termed "differential recruitment". Yet, while actual protest participants have been well studied, nonparticipants have been completely neglected. The reason, some authors point out, is that few scholars were lucky enough to have a pre-and post-design which allows for disentangling the whole mobilization process leading towards a protest demonstration. In this chapter we present data about 2,100 potential and actual participants in a national climate change demonstration in Belgium. People were interrogated two weeks before the demonstration and one week after the event took place. Relying on this unique dataset we offer clear evidence on participants and nonparticipants. In addition we present a more thorough investigation of people's issue-related motivations than previous studies. We find strong support for the claim that protest participation is a multi-stage process, with various factors influencing mobilization in different stages. Principally we find that issue-related motivations are especially important in the first stages of the mobilization process, making people willing to participate. Networks and interpersonal ties, however, are above all crucial in the final stages, in eventually convincing people to participate. Our findings complement and refine in important ways previous accounts of protest participation. This chapter is a genuine Van Laer (2011) and has not been submitted nor published in a scientific journal (yet).

The Mobilization Drop Out Race

Interpersonal Networks and Motivations Predicting Differential Recruitment in a National Climate Change Demonstration

Introduction

In many industrialized democracies protest has become an increasingly accepted means to denounce political problems, to ventilate anger and indignation about an unjust situation, to show grief and solidarity, or to express one's identity. It prompted some scholars to speak of today's "social movement society" (Meyer and Tarrow 1998; Tarrow 1998). In our movement society both the sheer number of demonstrations and protest actions go up, but also the number of (different) people that take to the streets. Blue collar workers next to lawyers, students and nurses now all mobilize and get mobilized for collective action. Protest as well as protesters have been increasingly "normalized" (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). Still, while unconventional politics, and street protest in particular, have become most popular, many people informed by a mobilization campaign eventually do not show up. Each social movement organization mobilizing for a protest demonstration knows that it faces an enormous mobilization deficit: a large number of people that agree with the movement's goal, but eventually do not participate. The challenge is to keep that deficit as small as possible. In this chapter it is not our intention to lay bare the do's and don'ts of a successful mobilization campaign, but to investigate some of the variables that can predict and explain why some people show up at a protest demonstration while others stay at home, although they too may support the protest's goal. More specifically, we conceive protest mobilization as a multi-stage process resulting in a drop out race leading towards effective participation. In each stage of the mobilization process, we want to show how people's interpersonal

networks and their issue-related motivations predict and explain who will take the next stage and who will drop out.

The question why some people participate in collective action, while most people do not, has puzzled social movement scholars for decades, and is still generating a burgeoning literature on what has been termed "differential recruitment" (Snow et al. 1980), referring to the factors that influence differences in participation in social movement organizations and the actions they stage (Schussman and Soule 2005). Years of social movement research has learned us a great deal about what explains participation in social movements. We know that a mix of personal characteristics, ideological and attitudinal predispositions, network embeddedness, personal feelings, grievances, and emotions is helpful to understand how people are mobilized for collective action. However, as Oegema and Klandermans (1994) indicated, in strongly focusing on existing movement organizations and successful mobilization campaigns, we know a lot more about actual participants, and much less about nonparticipants. Among the pile of studies investigating protest participation, research comparing actual participants with nonparticipants is rare. One of the most important reasons is a methodological one. "Very few scholars have been lucky enough to be able to use a before-after research design.", Passy (2003: 29) languorously explains why she is forced to use retrospective data about participants and nonparticipants in a Swiss movement organization. A few notable exceptions *were* lucky to interview people before a protest event occurred and to re-interview them afterwards (e.g. Klandermans and Oegema 1987; McAdam 1988; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Schussman and Soule 2005).

However, although the above cited research has truly broadened our insights in several processes and dynamics related to differential recruitment in social movements and their activities, there is an apparent lack in evidence on how issue-related motivations related to a specific protest event or campaign explain differential recruitment. Previous studies have indeed mainly focused on personal and organizational networks supporting protest participation. Klandermans and Oegema (1987), in their renowned pre- and post-study about participants and nonparticipants in the 1983 The Hague peace demonstration, paid only very little attention to people's issue-related motivations. Schussman and Soule (2005) studied protest (non)participation among US-adults across different issues, organizations and movement campaigns. They investigated protest participation *in general*, and could thus not include issue-related motivations. A limitation they do recognize, thereby urging other

scholars to measure and include subjective factors like collective identity and issue-related grievances. McAdam (1988), in his study on the Freedom Summer, did focus on a specific campaign, but he could only tap participants' and nonparticipants' motivations *after* the Freedom Summer campaign took place. Obviously, this makes sound conclusions on the effect of issue-related motivations on the mobilization of people difficult because of possible retrospective and rationalization errors. Most importantly, however, it does not allow to disentangle the role and importance of issue-related motivations in the process leading *towards* protest participation. We know from previous studies on actual protest participants that specific motivational dynamics, like agency, collective identification, and emotions, *matter* in explaining social movement and protest participation (Jasper 1997; Klandermans 1997; Passy and Giugni 2001). Consequently, a comprehensive model explaining participation and nonparticipation should also give ample attention to different motivational variables, which relate to a specific issue and protest event, *before* actual participation took place. In this chapter, we will include interpersonal networks *and* issue-related motivations to predict and explain participation and nonparticipation in a specific protest demonstration. Conceiving protest mobilization as a multi-stage process, we will show how networks and motivations each have a distinct role in different stages of the mobilization process.

We present an individual-level two-stage paneled dataset of about 2,100 members of four different environmental organizations, who were interrogated two weeks before and one week after the December 2007 national Climate Change demonstration in Brussels, Belgium. This dataset allows for a unique comparison between actual participants and nonparticipants in different stages of a specific mobilization process. We will analyze the importance of issue-related motivations linked to the climate change demonstration together with the role of people's interpersonal networks and relations. Because of our pre- and post-test design, and because we give ample attention to different issue-related motivational variables next to network-related characteristics, we can make an important contribution to existing studies on participation and nonparticipation in protest. In addition, we are able to make a comparison across four very different types of environmental organizations accounting for important differences in terms of how these organizations are organized and how they mobilize for specific protest demonstrations. In the next paragraph we start with an overview of the existing literature. After a brief methodological part we move to the analyses. We wrap up with a conclusion and discussion section.

Theory and Hypotheses: Who participates and who does not?

In their seminal article on participation and nonparticipation, Klandermans and Oegema (1987) unravel four successive steps towards successful protest mobilization. First, people need to be part of the *mobilization potential*, that is the group of people that could be mobilized by a social movement. It consists of those people who take a positive stand towards a particular social movement and the actions they stage. In this chapter we conceive the mobilization potential more broadly as the group of people that is strongly concerned with a specific issue around which collective agents are mobilizing. Second, people need to be *targeted* by a mobilization attempt. Klandermans and Oegema (1987), and also Schussman and Soule (2005), define "being targeted" as "being asked" by someone to take part. However, this operationalization already assumes a relationship with another person (the one that is asking you), while we believe it is more accurate to think of a mobilizing attempt in terms of the *awareness* of the upcoming demonstration, leaving the question of an interpersonal link open. People can passively receive, but also actively search for information about a protest demonstration. Third, people need to be *willing* to participate. This refers to the propensity of individuals to engage in a protest demonstration against climate change. Finally, people need to be *able* to participate, meaning that all barriers—practical as well as psychological—must be overcome. In short, generously adapting Verba and colleagues' (1995) classic statement: people, being part of the mobilization potential, participate in collective action because they *know to*, because they *want to*, and because they are *able to*. Protest participation can thus be seen as a "multi-stage process" (McAdam et al. 2001; Klandermans 2004; Schussman and Soule 2005), with distinct individual factors influencing participation in the different steps towards effective participation. While the focus in previous studies was principally on networks and structural connections, we argue that issue-related motivations are equally crucial. They should be included in order to fully understand the process dynamics leading towards actual protest participation. A promising framework in that respect is Passy's (2001) distinction between the socialization, structural-connection, and decision-shaping function of networks in the process of mobilization. With this framework, Passy tries to integrate activists' inter-personal networks and issue-related motivations.

The social movement literature has overwhelmingly supported the claim that structural connections, both formal and informal, are paramount to pull people into collective

action (for an overview, see Diani 2004). Organizational affiliations as well as informal friendship ties have proved to be strong predictors of effective participation. Active membership in organizations can even result in "en bloc recruitment" (Oberschall 1973), meaning that entire groups of fellow members get mobilized at once into another movement or protest event. For instance, black churches reinforcing the civil rights movement (McAdam 1982) or busloads of union members participating in an antiwar demonstration (Walgrave and Verhulst 2009). Since the predictive power of networks became clear, several scholars have started to focus on the different mechanisms that make networks so important, to show that "networks play a multiple role in the process leading to participation and that they intervene at different moments along this process" (Passy 2001: 173; Kitts 2000). Instead of focusing on how people are pulled into protest, scholars are now increasingly focusing on what pushes people onto the streets: collective identity, human agency, and emotions (Jasper 1997). Passy's (2001) threefold distinction of network functions tries to integrate the importance of interpersonal networks and people's own motivations to participate in protest actions. In what follows, we discuss for each stage in the mobilization process the role and importance of interpersonal networks and issue-related motivational dynamics.

Stage 1: The formation of the mobilization potential

The formation of the mobilization potential refers to a slow and long-term socialization process which even starts in early childhood (Klandermans 1997; Downton and Wehr 1998). It is about the formation of a collective identity and a social and political consciousness that allows people to "come ideologically closer to a given political issue" (Passy 2001: 178). Interpersonal links provide a fruitful breeding ground exactly because they have this *socialization function* that shapes individual identities and contributes to the formation of general attitudes and dispositions to participate (ibid.). Key in the development of a political consciousness and an identity supportive of issue-specific action are the interpersonal conversations people have with friends, family and fellow members (Gamson 1992). Ongoing interactions create an "interactive structure" which allows people to interpret and re-interpret their understanding of political issues, and which gradually result in the construction of a "collective identity" (Melucci 1988). This collective identity, in a nutshell, is determined by the participants' feel of group belonging, in-group solidarity, as well as some

sort of oppositional consciousness ("us" versus "them") (Melucci 1988; Gamson 1992; Klandermans 1997; Mansbridge 2001; Bernstein 2002). Polletta and Jasper (2001: 284) define collective identity as "an individual's cognitive, moral, and emotional connections with a broader community, category, practice, or institution [that], unlike ideology, carries with it positive feelings for other members of the group". It refers to an individual's identification with a particular collectivity and is related to the interpersonal interactions within and with the group one is a member of (Klandermans 1997; Hunt and Benford 2004). A collective identity is key to explaining social movement and protest participation. In sum, interpersonal networks are important in the first stage of the mobilization process because they support issue-related motivations, more specifically the formation of a collective identity. As such, we expect first of all that *people with more interpersonal links and a stronger collective identity are more likely to be part of the mobilization potential*.

Stage 2: Informing potential participants

The second stage of the mobilizing process is about potential participants being or not being informed about an upcoming protest demonstration. Here too networks have a key role because they have a *structural-connection function*. This function refers to the interpersonal relations, formal and informal, that provide people with opportunities for participation. A recurrent predictor in that respect is the number of memberships in multiple organizations and associations. Such "overlapping memberships" (cf. Carroll and Ratner 1996) create personal networks of activists, which increase the likelihood that information about upcoming demonstrations travels beyond an organization's core membership and "spills over" from one network to another (Walgrave and Klandermans 2010). Walgrave and Klandermans (2010) maintain that the ties generated via overlapping memberships may be less effective in actually mobilizing people for collective action, but they are key in disseminating information about protest events across personal networks. A claim indeed supported by Schussman and Soule (2005) who concluded in their study that higher numbers of associational membership significantly increase the probability of being asked, without any effect on actual participation. Hence, many interpersonal links increase the chances of being informed about an upcoming demonstration. Networks increase the *supply* of information about protest opportunities. On the other hand, and similar to the socialization function

discussed above, interpersonal links also sustain and enhance motivational factors that affect the *demand* for information about protest demonstrations. This claim is most clearly formulated in the so-called frame alignment literature (Snow, Worden, Rochford and Benford 1986; Snow and Benford 1988; Benford and Snow 2000), which claims that mobilizing messages will be more receptive if they strike a "responsive chord" among potential participants. Hartman and Weber (2009) therefore point to the role and importance of people's identification with the issue and of the social group one belongs to. Collective identity, as introduced in the previous paragraph, should, as such, not only increase the fact that people are part of the mobilization potential; it should also increase the information responsiveness about an upcoming demonstration. In addition, scholars—specifically in the field of political psychology—have investigated why and which emotions induce information susceptibility (Gross 2008). Also in the social movement literature scholars have recently re-drawn attention to the importance of emotions (Jasper 1997; Aminzade and McAdam 2001; Goodwin et al. 2001b). Emotions are "part of our response to events, but they also—in the form of deep affective attachments—shape the goals of our actions" (Jasper 1998: 398). Although this research first of all investigates how emotions make people *willing to* participate (see below), emotions also seem to have a role in the stage of receiving information about upcoming demonstrations. Stronger emotions related to a particular issue, make people more susceptible for information on that issue (Nabi 1999). In sum, we expect that: *strong emotions and collective identity, mediated via (multiple) interpersonal networks, will increase the likelihood that someone is informed by a protest opportunity.*

Stage 3: The willingness to participate

A final network function Passy (2001) identified, is the *decision-shaping function*, which shapes individual preferences before individuals eventually decide to join a movement or a protest event. In other words, networks are crucial in the third stage of Klandermans and Oegema's (1987) model by shaping and molding a person's *willingness* to participate in protest events. Important in that respect, according to Passy (2001), is the perceived individual and collective effectiveness. Both Gamson (1992) and Klandermans (1997) assert that a necessary condition for people to get mobilized for collective action, is that they share a conviction that it is possible to alter conditions through collective action. Perceived efficacy

is a key determinant of participation in collective action (Klandermans 1984). Collective efficacy refers to the perceived success of a group, while individual efficacy refers to one's own capabilities in bringing about change. Intentions for protest participation are, of course, not solely a function of the expectancy of success. Equally important are specific emotions that fuel discontent, and often are the spark to push people onto the streets into action (Summers-Effler 2002). Anger, for instance, is one of the primary emotions people express, when they hold external agents responsible for an unwanted situation (Klandermans 1997). Strong emotions can even incline people to participate in a protest event without having any pre-existing personal link or affective ties with movement members or other potential protest participants (Jasper and Poulsen 1995; Walgrave and Verhulst 2006). In sum we expect that *higher levels of perceived individual and collective efficacy and stronger emotions will increase the willingness to participate.*

Stage 4: Actual protest participation

It is unclear whether Passy with the third decision-shaping function discussed above also suggests that networks are crucial in the ultimate decision to participate. As Klandermans and Oegema (1987: 520) point out: "willingness is a necessary but insufficient condition of participation". With respect to the final stage, other research, however, has stressed that especially interpersonal, informal networks are imperative for actual participation compared to formal linkages (Gould 1991; McAdam and Paulsen 1993): "it is your friends that keep you to your promises" (Klandermans 2004: 371). Of course, as Jasper (1998: 413) points out, you do not participate because you agree with your friend, but because you like him or her. Again, strong levels of collective identification and corresponding feelings of solidarity and group belonging should, thus, once more increase actual protest participation. Hence, our final expectation: *informal networks and collective identity will increase the likelihood someone actually takes part in the climate change demonstration.*

Data and Methods

In order to study individual characteristics and different stages of motivations towards actual protest participation, we organized a two-wave panel study around the national Climate Change demonstration, 8 December 2007 in Brussels, Belgium. In short called: CPPS, or the Climate Change Protest Panel-Survey. A first round of interviews was conducted two weeks before the climate change demonstration took place, and a second wave one week after the event. The national climate change demonstration was an initiative of the *Klimaatcoalitie* (the Climate Coalition), a network of about 70 social movement organizations in Belgium, but principally led by several environmental and Third World organizations like Greenpeace, Natuurpunt, Bond Beter Leefmilieu, Oxfam, and 11.11.11. The reason this new coalition mobilized against climate change, urging national and international political leaders to take more radical measures to stop global warming, was the UN climate conference in Bali, Indonesia. This conference took place from 3 until 14 December 2007. About 3,000 participants eventually participated in the "first Belgian climate change demonstration", not the 5,000 demonstrators the coalition had hoped for. Very bad weather and a strike by the railway personnel very likely put some spokes in the Coalition's wheels. Note that the Belgian climate change demonstration was not the only one. In fact, that day similar demonstrations took place in more than eighty other countries all over the world. In that respect, 8 December 2007 was actually a "global day of action".

For our panel, we contacted, via email, members of four different environmental organizations who all actively mobilized for the climate change demonstration on 8 December 2007. First of all, we contacted *Greenpeace*, with more than 50,000 members one of the largest environmental organizations in Belgium. Second, we contacted *Velt vzw,* a small environmental organization that focuses on ecological gardening and sustainable ways of living. Third, we included *Bond Beter Leefmilieu* (BBL), an important Flemish environmental umbrella organization encompassing many different representatives of environmental and other movement organizations in Flanders. Fourth, we contacted *Groen!*, the Flemish ecological party, as the political-institutional counterpart of the previous three organizations. These four organizations agreed to send all their members an email with a link to an online survey. The invitation was send by the organizations themselves, because, for privacy reasons, some of the collaborating organizations could not send us the email addresses. We

should acknowledge two possible biases caused by our online survey which we cannot control: 1) by sending the invitation through the organization, it may be that members who feel closer to this organization are more inclined to take part in the survey; 2) although the use of online surveys is increasingly accepted, we could not contact those members that are not online.

Note that, by focusing on members of four environmental organizations, we underestimate the mobilization potential of the climate change coalition and the climate issue in general. Jordan and Maloney (2006), in their study about participation in environmental organizations in the UK, found that only a third of those people who are very much concerned about the environment, are in fact also member of an environmental organization. However, since the four organizations actively mobilized for the climate change demonstration, by sending emails and flyers, putting banners on websites, or publishing ads in member magazines, our sample is (again) a critical test for the mobilization drop out race: all members of these four environmental organizations *should* belong to the mobilization potential, they *should* have been targeted, they *should* be willing to go to the demonstration, and so they *should* actually be there the 8th of December in Brussels. Of course, we know that is not the case. Therefore, the question is: what factors pulled or pushed (or did not) people onto the streets?

The first part of the survey, in the run-up to the demonstration, was accessible for two weeks until the day before the demonstration. One week after the demonstration all members that participated in the first wave, were re-contacted and asked to fill in a second part. Table 1.1 provides an overview of the survey response figures for the two waves for each organization. Response figures for the first wave are satisfying for an online survey with no reminders (cf. Dillman 2000). Of the 12,000 people that were contacted by email nearly 20 percent responded and filled in the first part of the online survey. Despite the fact that the second part of the survey followed only three weeks after the first wave, overall about 72 percent participated again. We can fairly state this is a very large response. In total 1,524 people took part in both waves of the survey. Figures for Greenpeace are systematically lower compared to the three other organizations. Since the invitation for the online survey was send from the official Belgian Greenpeace email address, we checked whether they had received a lot of non-responses because of incorrect email addresses. This was not the case. Another explanation could be that Greenpeace, as a mass environmental organization,

encompasses a less strong network of members than the other smaller and more specialized organizations, where commitment for the organization and the requests they send might be higher.

Table 1.1
Response Figures CPPS

	Greenpeace	Velt vzw	Bond Beter Leefmilieu	Groen!	Total
	Environmental organization	Ecological gardening	Umbrella organization	Political party	
Wave 1					
Contacted	4996	1663	1923	3288	11870
Completed	744	329	385	651	2109
Response (%)	15	20	20	20	18
Wave 2					
Completed	511	258	308	447	1524
Response (%)	69	78	80	69	72

Note: Response figures for wave 1 are an underestimation. Some email addresses were incorrect or were listed multiple times. Exact figures are unknown, that is why the original number of contacted addressees is presented here. Also, because Greenpeace is a very large organization, we drew a random sample of 5,000 members.

Dependent variables

Klandermans and Oegema's (1987) model consists of four steps resulting in four "pairs" of (potential) climate change demonstrators. The first pair distinguishes respondents who are part of the mobilization potential from those who are not part of the mobilization potential. In order to delimit this potential in our sample, we asked our respondents: *"How important do you find the following political issues at this moment?"* For 15 issues respondents had to indicate a number on a scale from 1 – 'Not important' to 5 'Very much important'. Those who found the issue 'climate change' (very) important (point 4 or 5) were considered as being part of the mobilization potential. The second pair compares, within the mobilization potential, respondents that are aware of a protest opportunity with those that are not aware. In our study we consider everyone who indicated 'yes' on the question *"Did you hear about a national demonstration against climate change on 8 December 2007?"* as "targeted by a mobilization attempt". A third pair differentiates, among informed people,

between those who did and those who did not express clear intentions to participate. Those who indicated 'yes' or 'maybe' to the question *"Do you consider to take part in the climate demonstration on 8 December 2007?"* were considered to have intentions to demonstrate. We opted to combine the 'yes' and 'maybe' group of respondents, but additional analyses revealed some interesting differences between these two groups, as we will explain below. However, since the general picture remained the same, we chose to stick to the combined variable. Finally, among those who expressed their intentions to go, a fourth pair distinguishes between respondents that eventually did and those that did not join the national climate change demonstration. This question was asked in the second wave of the survey: *"Did you participate in the Climate Change demonstration of 8 December 2007?"* (yes/no).

The answers to each of these questions result in a drop out race, very similar to the one described in Klandermans and Oegema (1987). Figure 4 illustrates the four steps towards actual participation and provides corresponding percentages for each organization. In general, a large majority (93 percent) finds climate change an important issue. Of this 93 percent, 68 percent is informed about the upcoming climate change demonstration. Of this 68 percent, one in three considers to participate, but eventually only 10 percent of our respondents did actually show up at the Climate Change demonstration. Note that some respondents do not exactly fit in this "waterfall-figure". For instance, activists that did not hear about the demonstration, but eventually showed up. However, the number of these "anomalies" is extremely small, indicating that the different steps towards actual participation are cumulative. Figure 4 also reveals interesting differences between the four environmental organizations. For instance, the actual participation percentage is lowest among members of Greenpeace and Velt. Greenpeace members are known as the dutiful checkbook activists, implying they are probably less involved in direct action or street protests. Velt members, on the other hand, are people principally interested in ecological gardening. Perhaps their niche interest may be too far removed from the issue of climate change to convince these members to participate in a street demonstration. Or they may believe they already are actively contributing to a better environment by working in the garden. High scores for actual participation are to be found among members of Groen! (15 percent), the political party, and members of the BBL (16 percent), the umbrella organization. This is logic as well, since for the green party climate change is a core issue. Participating in

the climate demonstration may also generate important political credits. BBL members are principally representatives of different environmental organizations and groups. Their strong commitment to their own organization is clearly mirrored by a stronger involvement in the climate change demonstration.

Figure 1.1
The Mobilization Drop Out Race Towards the National Climate Demonstration
8 December 2007 in Brussels
Figures are Percentages based on Totals



Interesting is also that the "mobilization deficit" (see the "No"-numbers in the figure) accumulates for each organization at different moments in the mobilization drop out race. For instance, Greenpeace's deficit starts accumulating very early because many members were not aware of the demonstration (42 percent drop out in stage 2). Groen! members, on the other hand, stay very long in the drop out race (80 percent in stage 2 and still 44 percent

in stage 3). Although many Velt members already drop out in the second stage, the biggest group, in relative terms, drops out in the last stage. Finally, BBL members seem to gradually drop out along the mobilization process: contrary to the other three organizations, there are no sudden spikes to notice.

Independent variables

As outlined in the theoretical section we compare actual and nonparticipants in different stages in a specific mobilization process according to 1) their integration into interpersonal networks and 2) their issue-related motivations to participate. The first group of pull-factors simply measures the presence and number of interpersonal networks and relationships. The second group of push-factors measures a person's issue-related motivations bringing him or her closer to actual protest participation. However, we will control for a list of other variables as well that have been deemed important in explaining protest participation (cf. McAdam 1988; Verba *et al.* 1995; Dalton 2002; Schussman and Soule 2005), but that are not the focus of this chapter. First of all, we control for several socio-demographic variables: sex, age, educational level, occupational status (full time employment versus being a student), marital or relational status, and having children younger than 18. We also include general political interest and left/right placement.

In terms of interpersonal networks, we include 1) active organizational membership, 2) talking about politics, 3) overlapping memberships, and knowing about the demonstration via 4) informal and 5) formal links. Active membership is measured by asking respondents whether they were active the past twelve months in any kind of organization or association (yes/no). Next, we asked, on a scale from 1 "never" till 4 "daily", whether and how often people talked about politics with their partner, friends, family, neighbors, colleagues and/or fellow members. The summation of these scores resulted in a variable, "talking about politics", measuring the extent to which respondents are actively interacting about politics with significant others. With respect to being actively involved in multiple organizations, respondents were asked to indicate on a list of seventeen different organizations whether they were no member, a passive member, an active or board member. "Overlapping memberships" is the summation of all active/board memberships. Finally, we asked whether people had heard about the demonstration via personal, informal relations (family, friends,

colleagues, fellow members) and/or via formal relations (member magazine, organizational meeting).

In terms of issue-related motivations, we include 1) individual and 2) collective perceived efficacy, 3) collective identity, and 4) two emotions: anger and indignation. Individual efficacy is measured with the following statement: "*I can make a contribution myself to stop climate change"* (1 "Completely disagree" – 5 "Completely agree"). Collective efficacy was measured by asking respondents to rate the effectiveness of the climate change demonstration (1 "Little chance" – 7 "High chance"). Collective identity was measured by combining the answers to three questions asking in a slightly different way to what extent people identified with other people that fight climate change (1 "Not at all" – 5 "Very much"). Emotions were measured by asking respondents: *"If you think about climate change, do you feel…"*. We gauged for anger and indignation (1 "Not at all" – 5 "Very much"). For each variable in this study more specific question wording (Table 1.3) and descriptives (Table 1.4) can be found in the Appendix at the end of this chapter.

Results

What factors explain why some people eventually take to streets, while others stay at home, or do not even consider taking part in the climate change demonstration? Are different factors important in different stages towards effective participation? In order to find out, we perform four logistic regression analyses for each step in the mobilization process. Table 1.2 contains the results. Figures are odds-ratios, with figures below 1 indicating a negative relation, and above 1 indicating a positive relation. Note that the number of valid respondents is lower than the number we initially interviewed. This is because some variables where asked in Wave 2 of the survey. Obviously, with each step that brings us closer to actual participation, the number of respondents decreases as well. Figures are based on a weighed dataset, meaning that each organization gets an "equal" weight in the analyses. This is to anticipate possible differences between organizations because of different response rates.

Table 1.2
Logistic Regression For Each Step Towards Actual Protest Participation

	#1 Potential vs. No Potential	#2 Informed vs. Not Informed	#3 Intentions vs. No Intentions	#4 Participation vs. No Participation
Organization (ref = Greenpeace)				
Velt vzw	.862	2.085***	1.227	.671
BBL	.655	3.234***	1.597*	1.267
Groen!	.873	2.805***	1.489	1.124
Interpersonal networks				
Active membership	.929	2.822***	1.136	1.940
Talking about politics	1.168	1.247	1.679***	1.238
Overlapping memberships	1.064	1.226***	1.101	1.025
Informal links	n/a	n/a	1.548**	2.396***
Formal links	n/a	n/a	1.099	1.106
Issue-related motivations				
Collective identity	3.622***	1.458***	1.147	1.345
Collective efficacy	1.160	1.141*	1.445***	1.297**
Individual efficacy	1.385*	1.175	1.019	.906
Anger	1.253*	1.070	1.051	1.051
Indignation	1.039	.921	1.000	.939
Control variables				
Female	1.743	1.316	.973	.898
Age	1.003	1.017*	.989	.971*
Education	.911	.936	.952	.880
Full time occupation	.746	.742	.964	.745
Student	.960	1.354	.761	.543
Married/fixed relationship	1.114	.941	.507***	1.288
Children -18	1.055	1.053	.770	.846
Political interest	.883	.906	1.013	1.203
Leftist political views	.877	1.111	2.003***	1.244
Adjusted Pseudo R^2	.332	.279	.273	.184
% predicted	94.0	79.3	69.7	72.7
Observations	1,254	1,167	862	401

Figures are expected betas and significance levels: *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$. A bivariate correlation matrix did not reveal possible problems of multicollinearity (the highest figure found was .490 p<.001 for anger*indignation). The first two models were re-run including an interaction-effect between "Talking about politics" and "Collective identity". The interaction-effects proved to be significant, supporting the idea that identification is especially constructed via interpersonal linkages (see Table 1.5 in the Appendix).

In general, strong and significant differences exist between potential participants. Also, different predictors are important in each step towards actual protest participation. However, the different pseudo-*R*-squares indicate differences between respondents are decreasing when getting closer to actual protest participation (e.g. .332 in the first stage and only .159 in last stage). Significant findings in the final stages thus indicate really strong differences between those who are still racing towards actual protest participants and those who dropped out in earlier stages. This is indeed how the figures in Table 1.2 should be read: significant findings in, say stage 3 (willingness), are *on top* of the different significant findings in stage 1 (potential) and stage 2 (informed).

At the top of Table 1.2 we notice that, as expected, considerable and significant differences exist between members of the four environmental organizations that participated in the survey, but only in the second comparison. Members of BBL and Groen!, for instance, are about 3 times more likely to be informed about the upcoming climate change demonstration, compared to Greenpeace members. Obviously, this is an interesting finding, since it shows that when it specifically comes to the question of information dissemination, in terms of an organization's strategic choices how and when to mobilize and inform their adherents, organizations can be very different from one another, even among organizations with a very similar focus. The fact that we control for these organizational characteristics makes our results stronger. When it comes to being part of the mobilization potential, to the willingness to participate, and to the actual participation no significant differences are found (except for members of BBL). Whether you are a member of Greenpeace, Velt, or Groen!, once you are informed about the upcoming climate change demonstration, differences between organizations disappear. The list of control variables does not yield many significant and meaningful results. Older members are more likely informed by the demonstration compared to younger activists, but the youngsters eventually have the highest chance to show up compared to their greybeard counterparts; a more leftist political view increases your willingness to demonstrate, but having a fixed relation will significantly decrease your intentions to take to the streets. The significant finding for more liberal political views confirms previous research (cf. Schussman and Soule 2005).

In what follows we successively discuss each step in the mobilization process and how both interpersonal networks and issue-related motivations influence who drops out and who eventually shows up at the climate change demonstration in Brussels.

Stage 1: Predicting the formation of the mobilization potential

In the theoretical section we explained how networks are key in the formation of the mobilization potential because they have a socialization function. Crucial in that respect, we stated, was that members are actively involved in some organization and/or that they actively discuss political issues with significant others, because all this contributes to the creation of a collective identity supportive of collective action. First of all, none of the network related variables yield significant results. Neither being active in an organization nor talking about politics increases the likelihood that someone is part of the mobilization potential. To be sure, we re-ran the model but now including an interaction effect between "talking about politics" and collective identity (see Table 1.5 in the Appendix). This way we can explicitly control for the idea that interpersonal linkages support the formation of a collective identity. The figures in Table 1.5 in the Appendix clearly show that this is indeed the case. Talking to significant others about politics and collective identity mutually reinforce each other as such increasing the odds of being part of the mobilization potential of the climate change demonstration. Instead, talking with significant others increases the chances that someone will *consider* participation. Apparently, the "interactive structure" that is created with significant others (Passy 2001: 178), is more important in the generation of a "specific action preparedness", than of a "general action preparedness" (Walgrave and Klandermans 2010).

In contrast, different motivational factors yield strong and significant results. Members, who find climate change an important political issue, have a stronger collective identity, have higher levels of individual efficacy, and are more angry about the climate issue. The generation of a collective identity linking other people who are struggling against climate change is thus a first important precondition for actual protest participation. Moreover, collective identity is equally and, in subsequent stages of the mobilization process, even more important. Stronger collective identity will increase the odds of being informed about an upcoming demonstration. The fact that active membership in a voluntary organization does not play any role in the formation of the mobilization potential might be good news for mobilizing organizations: they do not need to worry too much about their non-active members not being part of the mobilization potential. They should rather appeal to their collective identity, emphasize their perceived individual efficacy and support the anger invoked by the climate change problem. We suspected individual efficacy and emotions to be most decisive in supporting the *willingness* to take part in the climate change demonstration

(stage 3), but it seems that they play a rather important role in the formation of the mobilization potential. If people are convinced they can do something about a political problem, chances are higher that they find this problem also relatively important. There is a *need* to do something about it. This is an important finding: in the mobilization drop out race people who feel capable of stopping climate change or feel really angry about the problem and how it is currently dealt with, are in pole position. Neither anger nor individual efficacy, however, provides the ultimate spark to get people mobilized, but instead these elements form a fruitful ground at the very beginning of the mobilization process.

In sum, the figures in Table 1.2 show that the mere presence of an interpersonal link is not a sufficient condition for predicting who is part of the mobilization potential. What matters, are the motivations that are shaped and enhanced along these interpersonal networks, a finding which concurs with Jasper's (1998) assertion that networks are important *because* of what they transmit, namely affective bonds.

Stage 2: Predicting who is informed about a protest opportunity

In the second stage we expected first of all that multiple interpersonal links generated by overlapping memberships would increase the likelihood that someone is informed about an upcoming demonstration. As the figures in Table 1.2 show, this is indeed the case: the more you are actively involved in various movement organizations and associations, the higher the chances you are aware of the upcoming climate demonstration. Being committed in different organizations and corresponding information networks clearly helps to disseminate mobilizing messages (Walgrave and Klandermans 2010). There is more, however. Although being an active member *as such* was not significant in the previous stage (see above), it is now a strong predictor of being informed: those members that were active in the past twelve months are about 2.5 times more likely to be informed compared to non-active members. In other words, what seems crucial for mobilizing agents to decrease their mobilization deficit is—next to their usual campaign—a very focused mobilization strategy towards the non-active members. This is further supported by the fact that active membership does not play any role in later stages of the mobilization process: it is in the second stage that non-active members mostly drop out and it is thus at this point in the mobilization process that organization should try to keep them on board. Of course, this is

easier said than done in a real-life mobilization campaign. However, if we look at the motivational factors, we might get some idea of how we can boost information reception among potential participants. As expected a stronger collective identity significantly increases the likelihood someone will be informed about an upcoming demonstration. Stronger emotions do not seem to have any additional effect. Stronger collective efficacy also increases the likelihood that someone will be informed. In other words, both active and non-active members who feel closely related to other people struggling against climate change and strongly believe that a demonstration will be effective will be more susceptible for mobilizing messages.

In sum, both interpersonal networks *and* motivational dynamics have an important role in the second stage of the mobilization process, namely informing potential participants about an upcoming protest opportunity.

Stage 3: Predicting the willingness to participate

Before people actually participate, they first of all need to be *willing* to take part in a collective action. Willingness is a necessary condition for protest participation: people need to be *motivated* to take to the streets (Klandermans and Oegema 1987; Klandermans 1997). A person's willingness was measured by asking if they (maybe) consider taking part in the climate change demonstration.[2] In explaining people's willingness to participate in the climate change demonstration, we foremost suspected important influences from issue-related motivations and less from interpersonal links. Our expectations are not completely warranted by the facts. In terms of interpersonal networks we find significant results for talking about politics with other people and being informed via informal relations, like friends, family, colleagues, or fellow members of an organization. We already discussed the importance of talking to other people about politics. Interactions between politically interested people accordingly create a fruitful breeding ground for specific action preparedness. On the other hand, in terms of motivational dynamics, we only find a significant result for collective

[2] In addition to the logistic models presented here, we ran a separate multinomial model and compared each original category of people's willingness to participate ('yes' and 'maybe') versus the 'no'-category. Similar results were obtained although people indicating 'yes' are more likely active in (multiple) organizations and do share stronger identifications. "Doubtful" willingness is a privilege for the less active persons.

efficacy. Of course, we should see this in the right perspective. The fact that we compare in different steps an ever more specific pool of (potential) participants does not mean that anger, indignation, collective identity or individual efficacy does not matter anymore. On the contrary, what it means is that any *additional* collective identity or emotional energy will not significantly increase a person's willingness. For example, a person who does not belong to the mobilization potential has an average level of collective identity of 2.7 (on a scale from 1 to 5). A person who is informed by a demonstration, however, scores on average 3.9. Those who are willing to go and eventually went to the demonstration have a collective identity of respectively 4.1 and 4.3. The difference between the last to figures is not significant, but still increases. Still, this does not apply for collective efficacy or the perceived success chance of the climate demonstration. Collective efficacy is a strong predictor of the willingness to participate. Moreover, getting ahead of the next stage, collective efficacy is also a significant predictor in explaining actual participation. In other words, if people are really convinced about the success chance of the climate demonstration, the likelihood that they will effectively participate will skyrocket. Interesting to note is that, while collective efficacy is important in all stages, except for the first one, individual efficacy is only significant in the first stage (see higher). In other words, people who believe they can personally do something about climate change will find the issue of climate change very important, but individual efficacy is not a prerequisite when it comes to acting collectively. Then the success chance of the group is what counts. The differences between individual and collective efficacy might prove crucial when organizing a mobilization campaign: in order to make an issue politically important, organizations should initially focus on what people can personally do about the issue at stake. In a next stage, the focus should be on what the demonstration or the group can do about it.

In sum, we find for the second stage that interpersonal informal networks are key in sustaining the necessary motivational factors that make people willing to participate. If people are, however, once more convinced about the success chances of acting collectively, actual participation will come really close. The question now is, whether these people also took part in the climate change demonstration holding on to their promises made before the demonstration took place. Or, are there, in the end, still factors that specifically encourage or perhaps hinder actual protest participation?

Stage 4: Predicting actual protest participation

From the previous discussion we remember that each variable we included in our model, except for indignation and hearing about the demonstration via formal links, played some role at some point in the process leading towards effective protest participation. In the final comparison we thus compare participants and nonparticipants who are all quite active in one or more organizations, love to talk about politics with significant others, likely heard about the demonstration via informal links, are also quite sure about their individual efficacy, and the success chance of the demonstration, and finally, feel a lot of anger about how climate change is dealt with today. If a person's profile fits the previous description, they are very likely considering taking part in the climate change demonstration on 8 December 2007. However, this does not necessarily mean they will be there. To take the last hurdle means to beat all barriers—practical and psychological—that may prevent them from showing up. "The more motivated people are, the higher the barriers they can overcome.", Klandermans and Oegema (1987: 520) state, "Motivations and barriers interact to activate participation". In our final analysis we observe that, among the willing, those people with higher levels of collective efficacy and those who heard about the demonstration via informal links, are most likely to actually participate in the climate change demonstration. Thus, first of all, facing many possible barriers, those with a profound belief in the effectiveness of the demonstration, will show up. Second—as principally claimed in Klandermans' (2004) research as well—informal relationships are in the end paramount in keeping people to their intentions, transforming sympathizers into participants. Especially this latter variable is a strong predictor of actual protest participation, much stronger than collective efficacy.

In sum, the group of people that eventually showed up, is a quite motivated group of people with many and active interpersonal relations. Of course, this comes as no surprise. As we showed earlier in this chapter, only 10 percent of the members of the four environmental organizations in our study, eventually showed up in the streets of Brussels. What above all seems to matter in the final stage are the informal networks one is embedded in, sustaining and keeping warm the emotional and motivational energy that is carefully build up in the weeks, but likely also months and even years, before the climate change demonstration took place.

Conclusion and Discussion

In this chapter we investigated differences between participants and nonparticipants, a subject which scholars have only scarcely given close attention. The main reason was a lack of appropriate data. In this chapter, however, we presented a unique two-wave panel survey of about 2,100 members of four environmental organizations interviewed before and immediately after the national Climate Change demonstration of 8 December 2007 in Brussels, Belgium. Moreover, we tried to contribute to the few existing studies comparing participants and nonparticipants by giving much more attention to the issue-related motivations that closely relate to a particular mobilizing issue and which interact with particular structural characteristics, interpersonal networks and relations. This way we presented an innovative and a more comprehensive study of the process leading towards actual participation and the extent to which both structural "pull"- and motivational "push"-factors predict who drops out and who eventually shows up.

Following Klandermans and Oegema (1987) and more recent accounts of protest participation (cf. McAdam *et al.* 2001; Klandermans 2004; Schussman and Soule 2005) we conceived protest participation as a multi-staged process. We refined the research of Schussman and Soule (2005) by conceiving protest participation and mobilization not as a two-stage process, but as a four-stage process and by including issue-related motivational factors like collective identity, emotions and perceived efficacy. In general strong and significant differences exist between potential participants in terms of interpersonal networks and issue-related motivations. Also important are different predictors in different stages towards actual participation. Principally we find that issue-related motivations are especially important in the first stages of the mobilization process, making people *willing* to participate. Networks and interpersonal ties, however, are above all crucial in the final stages, eventually *making* people participate. Our findings complement and refine in important ways previous accounts of protest participation.

As Schussman and Soule's (2005) suspected, but could not measure, it is clear from our research that protest participation is a multi-stage process whereby "structural" and issue-related "motivational" dynamics have distinct roles to fulfill in different stages towards actual participation. Furthermore, we clearly showed that models predicting and explaining

protest participation should give ample attention to issue-related motivations. These motivations, sustained and reinforced by interpersonal linkages, explain in important ways why people are inclined to take part in collective action. By breaking the mobilization process into four successive stages, we were able to see in detail how different factors, interpersonal networks and issue-related motivations, affect the process of protest participation. Whether or not someone is part of the mobilization potential largely depends on strong collective identification with other people fighting against climate change, on feelings of anger about the climate issue, and on how much people think they themselves can contribute to stopping climate change. People first of all need to generate a political consciousness and collective identity, which brings them ideologically closer to a particular issue (cf. Passy 2001). Whether people are informed about an upcoming demonstration principally depends on active membership in multiple organizations, but is also encouraged by strong levels of collective identity and collective efficacy. Most likely people not only receive information about protest opportunities passively, but they also search actively for ways to express their grievances. Whether or not people are willing to eventually participate is further enhanced by the extent to which a person is embedded in multiple interpersonal and informal relationships that sustain and fire-up the active interest in political issues and the believe that, together, citizens *can* make a difference. Finally, whether or not one eventually participates depends, not on additional levels of issue-related motivations, but on those informal linkages, friends or family, colleagues or fellow members, forcing you to hold on to your revolutionary momentum.

Our findings also add weight to the McAdam and Paulsen's (1993) argument that interpersonal relations and social ties are crucial in explaining protest participation, as long as these linkages reinforce a strong commitment and identity to a particular issue. Strong issue-related motivational factors are key preconditions for actual protest participation. These issue-related motivations are carefully built up and sustained in ongoing interactions and engagements long before a concrete protest opportunity comes along. As such, protest participation is not only a multi-stage process; it is to a large extent also a continuous process.

Still, the mobilization process leading towards protest participation is a fierce drop out race: only a very specific group of people eventually makes it onto the streets. In the case of the climate change demonstration, only 10 percent manages to overcome all possible barriers and joined the demonstration on 8 December. However, large differences are to be

found between the four environmental organizations we investigated. Of course we explicitly chose four organizations we thought were very different. Still, this illustrates that, even for the same issue, mobilization turnout can be really different. Instead of having one large mobilization drop out race, we had, in fact, four small races. If the task is to keep the mobilization deficit as small as possible, each organization should therefore examine when the largest number of members drop out and then try to influence the individual factors that increase the chances to take the next stage. These inter-organizational differences also suggest that the four environmental organizations we studied here are not exactly competitors with respect to the environmentally concerned population in Flanders. Different organizations seem to mobilize different people and thus rather complement each other than compete with each other.

In this chapter we showed that interpersonal networks *and* issue-related motivations matter in predicting protest participation. However, we also showed that these variables matter in different stages leading towards actual protest participation. Protest mobilization is a dynamic process. Obviously it is a process that does not start two weeks before a demonstration takes place. As stated earlier, what matters are the informal networks one is embedded in, reinforcing the emotional and motivational energy that is build up in the weeks, but more likely in the months and even years before a protest opportunity presents itself. Our results, in that respect, may also put in perspective social movement studies that have focused on spontaneous demonstrations, often triggered by an unforeseen event causing a "moral shock" or "suddenly imposed grievance" (Walsh 1981; Jasper and Poulsen 1995), and these days fueled by an unprecedented mobilization capacity via new communication technologies, such as the Internet, SMS, or various social network sites (e.g. Facebook and Twitter). What our research suggests, is that these unforeseen events and new mobilizing channels may enlarge and widen the scope of a protest demonstration, but that an underlying flood of strong emotional and motivational energy is of paramount importance for protest demonstrations to become really big. Despite the death of Mohamed Bouazizi, the young fruit seller in a small town somewhere in Tunisia, and despite the facilitating power of Facebook and the Internet, it are the years of social injustice and the economic and political problems infuriating the Tunisian people, that created such a strong sense of collectively shared grievance and identification which resulted in unprecedented protest participation and the Jasmine revolution.

Appendix

Table 1.3
Operationalization and Question Wording

Variable	Question wording	Values
Interpersonal networks		
Active membership ...	Are you an active member of an organization? In other words, do you have actively participated in any kind of activity of any kind of organization, club or association the past 12 months?	0 'no' – 1 'yes'
Talking about politics	To what extent do you talk about politics with… Partner; Family; Friends; Neighbors; Colleagues, fellow students; Fellow members: 1 'never', 2 'monthly', 3 'weekly', 4 'daily'	Summation of each answer, rescaled to 1 'never' – 5 'a lot' Cronbach's Alpha: .835
Overlapping membership	Could you indicate which sorts of groups/organizations you are an active, passive or board member of?	List of 17 different associations. Summation of active/board memberships
	How did you know a demonstration on climate change would take place? Was this via…?	
Inform links*.....	Friends; Family, Colleagues/Students; Members of an organization	0 'no' – 1 'yes'
Formal links*	Member magazines; Meetings of an organization	0 'no' – 1 'yes'
Issue-related motivations		
Collective identity.....	To which degree do you agree or disagree with the following statements? *"I have a lot in common with the other people fighting against climate change."* *"I feel committed to the other people fighting against climate change."* *"I identify strongly with the people fighting against climate change."*	Summation of three questions and recoded to 5-point scale: 1 'fully disagree' – 5 'fully agree' Cronbach's Alpha: .907
Collective efficacy.....	How effective do you think the climate demonstration will be in reaching these goals?	1 'not at all' – 7 'very much'
Individual efficacy.....	I can make a contribution to stop climate change.	1 'totally disagree' – 5 'totally agree'
Anger ..... Indignation	If you think about climate change, do you feel…	1 'totally not' – 7 'very much
Control variables		
Female.....	Are you a man or a woman?	0 'man' – 1 'woman
Age.....	How old are you?	In years

Education	What is the highest qualification you gained?	1 ‘none’ – 8 ‘Univ.’
Occupational status	What is your occupation?	
Full time	Eight options of which only ‘working full time’	0 ‘no’ – 1 ‘yes’
Student	and ‘being a student’ were used	0 ‘no’ – 1 ‘yes’
Marital/relational status	Are you married or do you have a steady relation?	0 ‘no’ – 1 ‘yes’
Having children below 18	Do you have children? How old?	0 ‘no, or above 18’ – 1 ‘yes, below 18’
Political interest	How interested are you in politics?	1 ‘not’ – 5 ‘very much’
Leftist political views*	In politics, one can hear about 'the left' and 'the right'. When you consider your own opinions, where would you place yourself on this scale?	1 ‘left’ – 10 ‘right’, recoded to 0 ‘position 4 till 10’ – 1 ‘position 1 till 3’

* These questions were asked in Wave 2 of the survey, that is after the climate change demonstration took place.

Table 1.4
Descriptives Independent Variables

Variable	Min	Max	Mean	SD
Interpersonal networks				
Active membership	0	1	.72	.45
Talking about politics	1	5	3.04	.71
Overlapping membership	0	11	1.86	1.69
Informal links	0	1	.26	.44
Formal links	0	1	.44	.50
Issue-related motivations				
Collective identity	1	5	3.75	.91
Collective efficacy	1	7	2.97	1.45
Individual efficacy	1	5	4.33	.81
Anger	1	7	3.43	1.64
Indignation	1	7	3.38	1.70
Control variables				
Female	0	1	.42	.49
Age	14	86	41.6	12.5
Education	1	8	6.15	1.00
Full time occupation	0	1	.62	.49
Student	0	1	.05	.23
Married or stable relationship	0	1	.73	.44
Children -18	0	1	.37	.48
Political interest	1	5	3.77	.91
Leftist political views	0	1	.64	.48

Table 1.5
Logistic Regression Predicting Potential Protest Participation, incl. Interaction Effect

	#1 Potential vs. No Potential	#2 Informed vs. Not Informed
Organization (ref = Greenpeace)		
Velt vzw	.825	2.052***
BBL	.651	3.254***
Groen!	.843	2.749***
Interpersonal networks		
Active membership	.925	2.806***
Talking about politics	.342	.304*
Overlapping memberships	1.084	1.230***
Informal links	n/a	n/a
Formal links	n/a	n/a
Issue-related motivations		
Collective identity	1.071	.489
Collective efficacy	1.155	1.148*
Individual efficacy	1.330*	1.157
Anger	1.248*	1.067
Indignation	1.043	.923
Interaction effect		
Talking politics*Collective identity	1.536*	1.467**
Control variables		
Female	1.788*	1.327
Age	.999	1.015
Education	.925	.928
Full time occupation	.694	.721
Student	.755	1.221
Married or stable relationship	1.065	.938
Children -18	1.071	1.060
Political interest	.896	.934
Leftist political views	.831	1.100
Adjusted Pseudo R^2	.339	.287
% predicted	94.1	79.5
Observations	1,254	1,167

Figures are expected betas and significance levels: *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

2

Diehards and Passer-by Protesters

Predicting and Explaining Protest Sustainment Using Comparative Paneled Protest Survey Evidence

Abstract

In this chapter we present empirical and integrated insights on the reasons and circumstances that foster or hinder activist to persist or to quit their engagements in protest demonstrations. Analyses are based on evidence of more than 600 activists that took part in seven different demonstrations and that were re-interviewed one year after their initial protest participation. First of all, we address the role and importance of specific mobilizing issues and demonstrations contexts. Then, across demonstrations, we compare persisters and quitters, their biographies, attitudes, structural backgrounds and motivational dynamics. Our contribution integrates previous mostly case-study based insights and expands available studies which principally focus on organizations by focusing on participation in protest demonstrations. We find that sustained protest activism is predicted through a mix of personal features and demonstration issues. It is a matter of being "available", but also of being solidarily motivated, and the kind of issues one chooses to take to the streets for. Our results show that for movements to get people to become persistent protesters, they need to "catch them on the scene", getting them involved within more formalized mobilization networks and appeal to their issue-related solidarities. This chapter is co-authored with Joris Verhulst, and—at the time of writing—submitted for publication.

Diehards and Passer-by Protesters

Predicting and Explaining Protest Sustainment Using Comparative Paneled Protest Survey Evidence

Introduction

Civic and political collective action is a function of supply and demand of (opportunities for) collective action (Klandermans 2004). Movements episodically stage protest events, employing a range of repertoires, thereby most often trying to mobilize the largest possible fraction of the available mobilization potential (Klandermans and Oegema 1987). This basic episodic and cyclical nature of protest is mainly studied from the supply side of protest (opportunities). Still, it also has repercussions for, and is just as well shaped by the demand side of protest: those people who potentially or in effect fill the streets at protest events (Klandermans 2004). Therefore, understanding the mechanisms which make citizens to become activists for the first time, which make activists to persist in their activism, and which make protest veterans to terminate their active involvement, is of crucial importance, not only theoretically, but also for understanding the growth and decline of social movement and protest involvement. In this chapter we will investigate to what extent individual-level factors, like personal biographies and opinions, organizational and network embeddedness, individual motives and motivations, foster or hinder sustained participation in protest demonstrations. And, more importantly, we will do so by comparing and controlling across a diverse set of specific mobilizing issues.

We will make use of a multi-issue, two-stage paneled protest survey dataset. In the first stage, actual demonstrators were surveyed on seven different protest events that took place between March 2006 and December 2007 in Belgium (n=2018). To broaden these

"snapshot" data, we have re-contacted all respondents that provided contact details to cooperate in a second survey, which was conducted one year after their first demonstration (n=637). We will draw on the second dataset to register whether the respondents have taken part in another protest demonstration since the first survey, in other words to have a dependent variable. We thus dispose over a unique paneled dataset to account for protest sustainment and disengagement across different mobilizing issues.

Existing studies on activists' careers have generated substantial insights on continuing activism and disengagement, and some of them have duly gained an axiomatic-like status (cf. Hannon 1990; Oegema and Klandermans 1994; della Porta 1995; Downton and Wehr 1997; Klandermans 1997; Downton and Wehr 1998; Passy and Giugni 2000). Still, while our inquiry will largely draw on these studies, its object and scope are different in two important ways. First, whereas the abovementioned studies focus on one or two cases—mostly peace organizations—we will compare persisters and quitters across different mobilizing issues and discern the relative importance of individual-level features deemed important even when controlling for different demonstration issues. In their seminal study on peace activists' careers, Downton and Wehr (1998) learned from their persisters that "the intensity and duration of their commitment varied with the opportunities for and conditions motivating activism. Thus, the continuity of activism will be explained to a degree by the contexts where it develops and continues". A crucial context in that respect is the issue for which people are mobilized and become motivated to participate in social movements and their events. We know that different issues mobilize different issue publics (Verba et al. 1995; Meyer and Minkoff 2004), but how this is the case, and to which degree they instigate individuals to become and stay involved is basically still a theoretical black box. In addition, available studies overwhelmingly have focused on mobilizing issues typically situated on the left of the political spectrum. In this chapter we will include other issues as well, both situated on the right, as well as so-called new emotional issues (Walgrave and Verhulst 2006). These are not situated on a clear political cleavage, but rather have all the properties of consensual issues, moving broad segments of society across ideological understanding and partisan stands. Not seldom these issues are the hotbed of huge mobilizations after a moral shock or suddenly imposed grievance (Walsh 1981; Jasper and Poulsen 1995).

Second, as previous studies examine the way in which activist involvement evolves within and/or in relation to social movement(s organizations), we will study activist

involvement in social movement *events*, and try to find out the reasons and mechanisms behind the fact that individual protest demonstrators have still been active on the streets, or not. Some of these demonstrators are active in specific movement organizations but others are not. Of course, and as we will show, organizational involvement plays an important role in continuing protest activism, but our research question explicitly aims the involvement question beyond the organizational scope.

In the next section, we will elaborate on some existing findings in the literature on activist enduring commitment and disengagement. After a brief methodological chapter, we will get to the essence of this chapter and try to find out who continues to participate and who does not, why this is the case, and how this is interrelated with different mobilizing issues. We wrap up with a conclusion and discussion section.

Theory and Hypotheses: Who persists and who quits?

In this chapter we claim that the individual-level study of continuing protest activism has to be interactively dealing with three different but entwined sets of variables: (1) *availabilities*, in terms of personal features and biographies, general attitudes and opinions, networks and organizational embeddedness; (2) *motivational dynamics*, in terms of personal motivation, emotions, and gratifications, specifically related to a demonstration event; and, above all, (3) the distinguishing role of *mobilizing issues*, the issue people (have) hit the streets for. We will theoretically discuss each of these sets, and put forward several hypotheses, which are again summarized and operationalized in the Technical Appendix.

Availabilities

For people to continue to be active protesters, they first of all have to be *able* to do so. This being able *sensu stricto* has two dimensions: on the one hand it concerns *situational* (Downton and Wehr 1997) or *biographical availability*, being the "absence of personal constraints that may increase the costs and risks of movement participation, such as full-time employment, marriage, and family responsibilities" (McAdam 1986: 70). In terms of relational

and childcare responsibilities we thus first of all expect that persisters are less likely involved in a relation or have children to look after. In the same logic, we would expect more male persisters, not only because women are less likely to engage in protest in the first place (McAdam 1986; Verba et al. 1995; Crozat 1998), but also since they are still taking up a larger share of the family-related responsibilities (Schelton and John 1996; Koelet 2006). Yet this being able also has a second component in the sense of *capabilities*. Seemingly contradictory to this biographical availability component (Schussman and Soule 2005: 1085) is the fact that resources, which are often correlated to a high employment status, enhance participation (ibid; Verba et al. 1995). Downton and Wehr did find a mixture of both arguments in their study: persisting activists had a diverse occupational profile, most of them working, some of them part-time. Yet, all of them seemed to be able to "control situational availability to some extent. In fact, persisters were creative in designing their lives so they could be available" (Downton and Wehr 1998: 538). In terms of employment status, the literature suggest on the one hand that high employment will hinder sustained participation because of time constraints, and on the other hand that it may foster sustainment because high employment relates to reliable levels of resources (Schussman and Soule 2005).

Next to these "day-to-day" types of availability, two other forms of availability are important. First, what Downton and Wehr (1998: 536) identify as *attitudinal availability* is the "propensity to pursue […] action because one's beliefs are in harmony with the movements' goals and means". This, attitudinal availability must be understood as a long-term socialization process which even starts at early childhood (Klandermans 1997; Downton and Wehr 1998). In our case, we describe attitudinal availability as those general and more or less stable political attitudes that are expected to foster protest participation; something Verba and colleagues (1995) call political engagement, and which is often measured by a person's general political views, like political left/right placement, or general interest in politics and talking about politics (cf. Gamson 1992; Schussman and Soule 2005). Talking about politics may be far removed from concrete political action, but these conversations, as Gamson (1992) notes, are key in the development of a political consciousness supportive for collective action. General political interest is frequently indicated as a sound predictor of protest participation (Verba et al. 1995). In terms of left/right placement scholars typically maintain that more extreme political orientations fuel protest participation, which can be either on the left, either on the right (Powell 1982; Dalton and van Sickle 2005). Thus we expect persisters

to have a more general interest in politics, more frequently talk about politics, and have more extreme views about politics.

Which brings us third and finally, to the concept of *structural availability*, which "simply refers to the presence of interpersonal networks which facilitate recruitment to activism" (Schussman and Soule 2005: 1086). In our case this would mean that people who are closely related to others who are (frequent) protesters, are more inclined to take part in protest themselves. This way, we might presume that both organizational memberships as well as acquaintance relations with organization members are also sound predictors of sustained participation. Being directly or indirectly involved in an organization or with organization members enhances the chances of keeping one's own engagement going. In similar vein, having personal connections with other people being politically involved will also raise chances of sustained activism. In sum, we hypothesize that persisters are more likely member of a movement organization and are more strongly embedded in interpersonal relations.

Motivational dynamics

Being available is dependent on a range of determinants, but it is to a large extent also a continuous *process*: people continuously make the *choice* to stay available, and to arrange their lives in a manner in which they are able to do so. And, this choice-making also means making sacrifices. Therefore, people who remain actively involved in protest action need to be motivated to do so. Klandermans (2004: 362-365) suggest that people can be motivated for collective action participation in three different, albeit not exclusive, ways: for instrumental reasons, out of a sense of collective identity, and out of ideological reasons. Instrumental motivations refer to attempts to influence the social and political environment (Klandermans 2004). Downton and Wehr (1998) found that all persistent peace activists in their study held the perception that their actions made a difference and resulted at least in modest success, and that they had learned to see action as a solution. In a recent study, Valentino, Gregorowicz and Groenendyk (2009) clearly show how efficacy and feelings of success chance can boost continuous political participation. In order that people sustain in their protest activism, we thus hypothesize that persistent protesters more than quitters have

the feeling that their engagements are instrumental in bringing about social or political change.

Collective identity, in a nutshell, is determined by the participants' feel of group belonging; in-group solidarity, as well as some sort of oppositional consciousness ("us" versus "them") (Melucci 1988; Gamson 1992; Klandermans 1997; Mansbridge 2001; Bernstein 2002). An "activist identity" (Melucci 1988) also relates to the fact that the more people have invested in their activism, the more this activism becomes integrated in the personal life-style and personality, and the more difficult it becomes to withdraw from activism (see also della Porta 1995: 179; Nepstad 2004). Activism thus becomes rewarding because of close relations with other, like-minded people (Polletta and Jasper 2001). Strong feelings of collective identity are thus an essential component in sustained participation.

The third participation motive of ideology refers to people "wanting to express one's views" (Klandermans 2004: 365), out of a sense of moral indignation, which is to a large degree determined by an emotional response to an aggrieving situation, like feelings of injustice, anger, moral outrage, indignation, or confusion. Following Verhulst and Walgrave (2009) we think it is more useful to speak of "emotional motives" instead of ideology, which is a concept used to point to a whole "structure of beliefs about society" (Oliver and Johnston 2000: 51) and is more accurately included in the discussion about general political attitudes and attitudinal availability. It is only since a decade that emotions have fully regained scholarly attention as important motivators for collective action (Jasper 1998; Aminzade et al. 2001; Goodwin et al. 2001b). Anger, for instance, is one of the primary emotions people express, when they hold external agents responsible for an unwanted situation (Klandermans 1997). Jasper (1998) proposes a distinction of emotions relevant for political action between affective and reactive emotions (see also Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2001a: 10-11). While affective emotions (such as love, solidarity, respect, pride, joy) include longer-lasting affects and loyalties among fellow members or protest participants that help to sustain a movement, reactive emotions (like anger, outrage, indignation) concern more short-term, transitory responses to events and information. Reactive emotions may help to explain why people initially decided to participate in a movement or protest event. Strong reactive emotions can even incline people to participate in a protest event without having any pre-existing personal link or affective ties with movement members or other potential protest participants (Jasper and Poulsen 1995; Walgrave and Verhulst 2006). However, reactive emotions are perhaps less

imperative when it comes to sustained commitment, because of their more transient character. Hypothesizing on our persisters-quitters dichotomy, we suspect that persisters will be more motivated by affective emotions and less by reactive emotions**.**

Clearly, many variables shape and determine people's ability and choices to, in the first place, become involved, and secondly to stay involved or not. One final determinant, running through, shaping and structuring all the previous arguments, are the issues for which people become involved. In the final theoretical section, we will get into this peculiar and likely important role of mobilizing issues.

Mobilizing issues

Mobilizing issues have a peculiar status in existing theories on participation and mobilization. Though they undoubtedly make out the life source of activism, how this is the case, and to which degree they instigate individuals to become and stay involved is basically still a theoretical black box. Verba and colleagues (1995: 522) specify the peculiar importance of issues by referring to them as "theoretical wildcards" in their renowned theoretical model. Meyer and Minkoff (2004: 1461) acknowledge the particular role of "issue-specific opportunities", of which can be asserted that "[w]hat provokes mobilization for one movement or constituency may depress mobilization of another, and be completely irrelevant to a third". Verhulst and Walgrave (2009) found that the issue specific context, the issues around which people are mobilized, are important explananda for protest participation especially for people who participated for the very first time. They point to the following interesting but still speculative paradox. Some issues are prone to engender massive but one-off mobilization (e.g. the accidently killing of a youngster by police men). They attract, even in the absence of strong networks and organizations, a lot of first-time participants, but are probably less able to solidify these freshmen. Other issues, however, attract a more organized protest public (e.g. labor union militants protesting against massive redundancies in a car factory), and although far fewer first-timers participate, chances are higher that relative more of them will sustain in their activism.

In this chapter, three types of mobilizing issues will be taken into account, accounting for a whole lot of differences with regard to ideology, scope, constituency, mobilization patterns, and organizational backbone. The first type of issues are those that are

characteristic for old social movements, and which are mostly associated with labor union mobilizations, like redistribution, wages, social security, working conditions, and corporate restructurings. In short, particularistic bread-and-butter issues concern short-term threats, whereby the direct personal stakes are high. In addition, as Kriesi and colleagues (1995) point out, these issues also encompass "old" regionalist issues, linked with separatist and nationalist movements. In this chapter we thus include not only traditional leftist issues, but also mobilizing issues situated on the right of the political spectrum. Old social movements often consist of strong organizational backbones and resources that are efficiently applied when mobilizing for collective action. Old issue protesters are therefore expected to take to the streets supported by a strong organizational backbone, leading us to presume that their continuing participation will be much more likely compared to activists mobilizing around other issues.

The second type of issue consists of those issues, which are typically linked to new social movements, like peace, anti-racism, environmental, and human rights. In general, these new social movements display a high demonstration frequency with often an engaged supporters base, crosscutting diverse networks and organizational memberships. Emblematic for the new social movement issues is their universal scope and long-term perspective. Since protesters on new issues like peace and environmental concerns are expected to be more aware of the longer-term need of there efforts, which is inherent to this kind of issues, we expect that new issue protesters are also likely to sustain in their protest engagements.

Finally, we take into account a third kind of issues: those associated with so-called new emotional movements (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001; Walgrave and Verhulst 2006), exemplified by large-scale mobilizations following a "moral shock" (Jasper and Poulsen 1995), which often are the result of a widespread reaction to unforeseen events of random violence or other "suddenly imposed grievances" (Walsh 1981). Typical examples of mobilizations on these issues are the "Million Mom March" following the Columbine school shooting in Littleton, USA; the Dunblane Campaign following a tragic murder raid in a Scottish pre-school; and the Belgian White March, a reaction on the kidnapping and murder of several young girls by Marc Dutroux, and the seeming incompetence of police and judiciary in the handling of the case. This type of mobilization is on the rise throughout the Western world (Walgrave and Verhulst 2006), which is supported by the fact that the two largest Belgian demonstrations in the past few years were exactly instigated by highly mediatized random violence events.

Contrary to new and old social movements, new emotional movements are ephemeral and discontinuous phenomena, able to mobilize a very heterogeneous public (ibid.). New-emotional issue demonstrations are more ad-hoc and do not inherently concern longer-term projects nor are they maintained by (large) organizations. Consequently we hypothesize that new-emotional issue demonstrations are expected to produce the least persisters.

Data and Methods

The dataset that will be used is the result of a two-stage data-gathering process, resulting in a unique panel survey dataset of actual protest participants. In the first stage data were gathered at seven Belgian demonstrations throughout 2006 and 2007. For each of these demonstrations we followed a standardized sampling and interview procedure as introduced by Favre and colleagues (1997) and further refined by Van Aelst and Walgrave (2001) and Walgrave and Verhulst (2011): two supervisors, called "pointers", count the rows of the demonstration. In every *n*th row they select a demonstrator, alternately one on the left, one in the middle and one on the right of the row, to be interviewed by an interviewer. The amount of rows left open is dependent on the pointers' estimate of the size of the demonstration. One group of interviewers and pointer starts at the head of the demonstration, the other at the end of the demonstration. Once an interviewer has finished his interview, he returns to the pointer who selects a new demonstrator. Using this method, all demonstrators have an equal chance of being approached by an interviewer. By completely separating selection and the actual approaching of demonstrators, interviewer selection bias is overcome. The interviewer asks the demonstrator to answer a few questions, fills out the answers, and then hands over a booklet questionnaire to be filled out at home and sent back via mail, free of charge. The oral interview paper is torn off of the postal questionnaire, which both have identical numbers. This way, response bias can be tested. Earlier tests have found that only age is a significant variable: older people are more inclined to send back a questionnaire than younger people (Walgrave and Verhulst 2011).

Data were initially gathered at seven demonstrations. Three of them can be labeled as "old" social movement demonstrations. The first two events were organized by trade unions: a demonstration against corporate restructuring and possible layoffs at the Belgian

Volkswagen factory near Brussels, and a joint union mobilization about lowering purchasing power and more solidarity in terms of social security between the two Belgian regions (Flanders and Wallonia) as well as between the lowest and highest household incomes. A third old social movement event, the Flemish March, was organized by the typical "old" Flemish regionalist movement together with some nationalist student organizations. In addition, two typical new social movement demonstrations were covered: a peace demonstration to stop the ongoing war in/occupation of Iraq, and an environmental demonstration urging the world and its leaders to stop climate change. Finally, also two new-emotional movement demonstrations were covered: a march for Joe, after the murder of the young Joe Van Holsbeeck, who was killed for his MP3-player at the Brussels Central Station during rush hour; and the Antwerp Silent March, which was organized in reaction to the brutal racist killing raid by a young men, thereby murdering amongst others a two years old girl.

In the 2006 – 2007 period these seven demonstrations constitute the lion's share of the supply of large demonstrations (that is with an expected turnout above 5,000 people) in Belgium. In other words, as far as large, legal demonstrations in concerned, we draw on a very complete sample of available protest events that occurred between March 2006 and December 2007. In sum, an estimated 144,500 people took part in these demonstrations. 5,296 of them were handed out a questionnaire, of which 2,018 or 38 percent were sent back filled out correctly. For an anonymous postal survey without reminders, this result is satisfactory (cf. Dillman 2000), certainly knowing that the response bias is negligible. Of these 2,018 respondents, 1,126 (or 56 percent) filled out their contact information to be re-contacted for further research one year later; 634 or 57 percent of those people filled out the online, or in a few cases postal questionnaires, which were linked to their original data by a unique, matching number (filled out by the respondent in the online survey as a prerequisite for being able to participate, or printed on the postal survey). Table 2.1 summarizes all details of our survey data.

Of course, these respondents had to pass many survey participation barriers: agreeing on face-to-face interview; fill out and send back the postal questionnaire; leave personal contact information; take part in the follow-up survey. These are indeed very enthusiast and/or dutiful respondents. To assess if these respondents were different from the

Table 2.1
Overview of Demonstrations, Sample Size and Response Rates of Protest Surveys and Follow-up Surveys

	Anti-war	Climate Change	VW Forest	Purchasing Power	Flemish March	March for Joe	Silent March	Totals
Issue Type.....	New	New	Old	Old	Old	Emo	Emo	
Location.....	Brussels	Brussels	Brussels	Brussels	Rode	Brussels	Antwerp	
Date.....	19-03-06	8-12-07	2-12-06	15-12-07	6-05-07	23-04-06	26-05-06	
Participants.....	5	3	15	20	1,5	80	20	144,5
Protest surveys								
Distributed.....	915	548	878	398	554	1018	985	5296
Returned.....	317	189	272	126	238	439	437	2018
Response %.....	35	34	31	32	43	43	44	38
Follow-up surveys								
Contacted.....	174	123	159	92	86	232	260	1126
Responded.....	95	74	93	46	64	112	153	637
Response %.....	54	60	57	50	74	48	59	57

others, we tested: whether people who provided us with their contact information differed significantly from those who did not; whether respondents who filled out the follow-up surveys were significantly different from those who did not; and finally, if those who filled out the follow-up surveys differed significantly from those who did not leave us any re-contacting information. We performed bivariate Mann-Whitney-U tests, which is the appropriate bivariate technique for testing independent samples of very different sizes. Tests were executed across the whole dataset for the variables age, gender, interest in politics and previous protest experience. All seven demonstrations were attributed an "equal" weight.

We only find that those who filled in contact details are significantly more interested in politics and have more past protest experience compared to respondents that did not provide their contact information. When comparing those who did not complete the follow-up survey, with those who did, no significant differences where found. Still, we have to keep in mind that those who are more interested in politics in general and have a longer protest career are also more likely to cooperate in follow-up research on this career. This is not at all surprising, since these individuals might be proud to have a relatively long activist (or protest) history, and on the other hand could first- or one-shot participants be more reluctant to engage in further research on this topic, because they are surveyed on a topic that does not really concern them anymore. This means that predictors explaining sustained protest participation are slightly overestimated. Since the bias only occurs when asking for contact details, we do not consider this as problematic. Finally, respondents that participated in subsequent research were also slightly but significantly older than those who did not engaged in the follow-up survey.

Our dependent variable, taken from the follow-up survey (e.g. wave 2), is based on the question: *"Have you, since your participation in the demonstration for/against [demonstration] on [date] participated in another demonstration?"*, with 'no' being coded as '0', and 'yes' as '1'. Overall, about 47 percent of the demonstrators in our dataset indicated to have participated in another protest event the year after their initial participation. All independent variables and scales, together with some descriptives, are explained in the Technical Appendix. Note that, with some exceptions, most of these independent variables are measured in the first wave of our paneled survey, thus not only explain, but actually predict sustained participation.

Results

Now, do protest participants who took part in another demonstration in the year that followed their initial engagement display higher levels of biographical, attitudinal and structural availability, and/or different motivational dynamics? And do these different kinds of availabilities and motivations mutually reinforce or actually even out each other? Which individual-level factors, in other words, can explain sustained protest participation? And, most importantly, what is the role and importance of different mobilizing issues. In the following paragraphs we will first of all discuss sustained protest participation in general and how different mobilizing issues influence the chances someone will continue to protest onto the streets. Afterwards, we will investigate to what extent certain availabilities and motivational aspects of protest participants are conducive to sustained activism across different issue specific contexts. By adding the demonstration issue in to our model we make a significant contribution to the available mostly case-study research. As outlined in the methodological section our dataset contains seven different mobilizing issues that we can relate to three different "types" of protest events: "old", "new" and "new-emotional" issue demonstrations. As Table 2.2 suggests, sustained participation seems to be issue-dependent to a certain degree.

Globally, and contrary to what we hypothesized, participants at old issue demonstrations are the most likely to sustain their participation one year later. Participants at new-emotional issues, as expected, are the least likely to sustain their participation. The antiwar demonstrators are also to a large extent continuing activist, with about two third of them having demonstrated at least once more in the one-year period. Still, this is the same for the old issue protesters at the VW Forest demonstration, and even more for the Purchasing Power demonstrators, who are considerably more likely to have participated in another event one year later. Most remarkable are the outlying numbers of quitters among the new emotional issue demonstrations: three out of four of them resigned from the streets in the year after their initial participation. As previous research has shown (Walgrave and Verhulst 2006) many of these participants are one-shot participants: they have an "a-typical" protester profile and just occasionally take to the streets in reaction to a highly publicized moral shock or suddenly imposed grievances (Walsh 1981; Jasper 1997). Whereas these demonstrations could be, somewhat cynically, seen as opportunities for organizations to tap

into new demonstrators' "resources", keeping them active seems hard. Clearly, mobilizing issues and demonstration types do play some role in keeping people to be involved. And probably, issue types might also be accounting for other features of our demonstrators, assuming that different issues attract different issue publics (Verba et al. 1995: 522). The demonstrations issues reveal a lot of the reasons of (non)sustained participation, as the most quitters are found at new-emotional issue demonstrations. These events are in fact typically set up in a less formal way, with help from mass media, attract a more heterogeneous (or less "usual suspect") public and typically mobilize large amounts of people and very quickly disintegrate afterwards (Walgrave and Verhulst 2006).

Table 2.2
Overview Sustained Participation Across Each Demonstration and Type of Demonstration

Demonstration	% Sustained participation	N
Old issue		
VW Forest	64.5	93
Purchasing Power	67.4	46
Flemish March	62.5	64
Total across type	64.5	203
New issue		
Anti-war	65.3	95
Climate Change	51.4	74
Total across type	59.2	169
New-emotional issue		
March for Joe	25.9	112
Silent March	26.1	153
Total across type	26.0	265
Total	47.1	637

Bivariate tests (Pearson's chi-square for nominal variables) resulted in a significance level below .001, indicating a strong association between type of event and sustained activism.

Now, in order to test to what extent specific issues account for specific features of our demonstrators, and to what extent specific features hold true across issue specific contexts, we perform several multivariate regression analyses, successively including the different mobilizing issues, and the different availabilities and motivational features of our respondents. We will however weigh our dataset so that each demonstration gets an "equal"

weight and any difference in response figures do not influence the results here. Since our dependent variable is a binary measure (yes/no), we perform logistic regressions. In Table 2.3 five models are presented. The first model only displays the demonstration issues. The following three models successively add the variables accounting for a protester's different availabilities. The fifth model then adds information about the motivational dynamics.

Irrespective of any information on availabilities or motivations, Model 1 confirms that protest participants at new emotional demonstrations are less likely to persist in their activism one year later (e.g. Purchasing Power participants are about six time more likely to persist, and Antiwar demonstrators are about five times more likely to persist than participants that initially joined the Silent March in Antwerp). While varying the reference category for demonstration issue (not shown in table), we do not find significant differences between participants at new and old social movements, except for VW Vorst demonstrators that are slightly more likely to sustain than Climate Change demonstrators (β=1.940 with p=.063). In the other models, differences between issue contexts remains considerably high. Only from Model 4, adding information on structural availabilities and motivational dynamics, differences between demonstration issues are much smaller. Clearly, whether protesters do or do not persist in their activism is to a considerable degree due to the issue they initially took to the streets for.

The following four models show us which variables account for sustained protest participation across the different issues wherefore participants initially, at the time we surveyed them, took to the streets. This allows us to check whether existing, mostly case-study evidence, matches our quantitative data, regardless of the demonstration issue. In Model 2, the additional six variables provide a broad test of a protester's biographical availability, tapping both into both socio-demographic features as well as into situational constraints, like occupational status or having young children that need to be taken care of. Looking at this model, biographical availability is largely determined by sex and childcare responsibilities: male protesters without children younger than eighteen years old are significantly more available for continuing activism. Also younger activists have more chance to sustain in their protest engagements. These findings are to a large extent what we would expect from previous research and theoretical prepositions, and show that biographical availability matters. The question on the importance of free time versus working (see Verba et al. 1995; Schussman and Soule 2005) seems to be irrelevant. Clearly, having a full-time job

does not hinder continuing participation, nor does it foster it. In this first model, the same holds true for being married or having a relationship. Any commitment that comes with a relationship does not seem to hinder sustained activism. However, looking already to the final two models this specific variable does yield a significant result.

Table 2.3
Logistic Regression Explaining Sustained Protest Participation (weighed dataset)

	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3	MODEL 4	MODEL 5
Demonstration dummies (ref=Silent March)					
VW Vorst	5.136***	4.542***	4.215***	2.928***	2.736***
Purchasing Power	5.838***	6.481***	5.264***	3.458***	2.186*
Flemish March	4.708***	4.307***	3.117***	2.382**	1.840
Antiwar	5.308***	4.767***	3.845***	3.279***	3.047***
Climate Change	2.982***	2.590***	2.389***	1.744	1.410
March for Joe	.987	1.015	1.244	1.399	1.360
Biographical availability					
Male		1.689***	1.482**	1.509**	1.393
Age		.984*	.987	.987	.983*
Full time occupation		.925	.814	.794	.777
Student		1.104	1.027	1.101	1.082
Married/in relationship		.862	.708	.674*	.661*
Children -18		.605**	.625**	.565**	.572**
Attitudinal availability					
Political interest			1.242**	1.202*	1.222*
Talking about politics			1.489***	1.223	1.275*
Extreme political views			1.571**	1.465*	1.377
Structural availability					
Member of staging SMO				2.047***	1.986***
Knowing active people				1.293***	1.278***
Motivational dynamics					
Instrumental motivation					.979
Collective identity					1.337**
Affective emotion: Joy					1.070
Pride					.939
Reactive emotion: Anger					1.060
Indignation					.858**
Adjusted Pseudo R^2	.150	.198	.241	.280	.302
% predicted	65.6	66.9	69.4	71.0	70.9
Observations	637	618	613	608	608

Figures are expected beta's and significance levels: *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01. The dependent variable is 'sustained participation' with 0 'not' and 1 'did participate in another demonstration'.

Next, we measured attitudinal availability using three variables (Model 3): general political interest, giving an idea of the respondents' general predisposition to broad political issues, talking about politics with other people, which is a more active measurement of a person's general political engagement, and a person's self-placement on a political left/right scale, tapping a person's more ideological predispositions. Note that we recoded this variable in order to measure not the direction of a person's ideological position (left or right), but the extent to which a participant has an "extreme" ideological position. As previous research shows, a more distinct political attitude, both on the left or on the right, generally increases the chance of protesting (Dalton and van Sickle 2005) and, likely, sustained protest engagements. In Model 3 these three variables yield significant results. Overall interest in politics and probably matching information gathered via significant others keep people involved, whereas the less interested are more likely to drop out. Also, protesters with extreme political views are more likely to take to streets again. Persisters thus show more attitudinal availability than quitters. Sex and childcare responsibilities also remain significant, although the differences seem to whither.

In Model 4 we add several measurements gauging the impact of organizational embeddedness and social networks on sustained activism. If there is one thing all participation scholars agree on, it is the importance of networks in both getting as well as keeping people involved (Snow et al. 1980; Diani and McAdam 2003; Schussman and Soule 2005). As Model 4 suggests, organizational membership, demonstrators' networks are all significant and important predictors of protest sustainment. The pseudo R^2 (.280) indeed gives an indication that Model 4 *with* structural variables is of great improvement compared to the previous models. Members of an organization involved in the set-up of the demonstration are more than twice as likely persisters compared to non-members. Being a member of a staging movement organization is a strong predictor. Also, irrespective of being a member yourself, the more people you know who are politically active, the more likely you will show up again in protest demonstrations. Interestingly, the effect of "talking about politics" is completely washed out in the face of these structural predictors. Likely this talking is an activity that especially develops in voluntary associations as well as during contacts with co-members of an organization. In sum, structural availability is important, and seems to the largest extent to be determined by formal organizational involvement. Adding these structural explanatory factors also significantly reduces the explanatory power of the

individual demonstration dummies. This indicates that the extent to which individual participants are embedded in interpersonal and organizational networks is an important discriminating factor between the different demonstrations we have included here.

Finally, in Model 5 we investigate, across demonstrations, whether persisters also display other motivational dynamics than quitters. More specifically we hypothesized that persisters are less instrumentally and less emotionally (in terms of reactive emotions) motivated than quitters, but are more aware of a sense of collective identity and are more emotionally motivated in terms of affective emotions. Our results show that instrumental motivation is irrelevant for sustained activism: being more or less convinced about the instrumentality of the initial demonstration makes no difference at all. On the other hand we find that sentiments of collective identity do play an important role in keeping people involved. Moreover, collective identity is the strongest motivational predictor of sustained activism. Although affective emotions, like joy and pride, are expected to strongly relate with group belonging, they do not add much to the model. We performed a separate analysis without the collective identity variable, but still affective emotions appeared non-significant predictors of sustained activism. Some reactive emotions, by contrast, do play a distinguishing role. As expected, quitters were much more indignant in the initial demonstration, though the created emotional energy proved insufficient to keep them on the streets. In sum, especially group consciousness or group identification seem to be important aspects to keep protesters going. These findings underpin the previous conclusion that structural availability and formal organizational embeddedment are important explananda for sustained protest activism. Structural availability matters *because* of the affective ties and commitments that are preserved (Jasper 1998).

Summarizing the above analyses, we have showed in a comprehensive way what variables determine protest sustainment and disengagement, and what the role and importance is of various mobilizing issues and specific demonstration contexts. In general, for people who have children and are less embedded in formal, organizational networks, protest engagement seems to become less important. However, although their general involvement, be it active or passive, may be lower, when they do make an active stance they are strongly indignant about the issue at stake. Once they have made clear their grievances, they are more likely to retrieve from the streets, possibly rendering their actions the status of a “vehicle of catharsis”, clearing themselves from emotional affectedness through expression (Gusfield

1986: 179). Protest sustainers, on the other hand, are initially less indignant, but show stronger feelings of collective identity. This is, in turn, logically associated to their degree of structural availability: protest persisters are more likely members of organizations that staged the initial demonstration and they are more likely embedded within these organizations when hitting the streets.

As the issue for which one takes to the streets for is a good first indicator to predict whether one will keep on or redraw from protest action, it is interesting to know the type of protest issues sustainers keep being active on. To further illustrate that point we performed cross tabulations of each initial demonstration issue with five new mobilizing issues sustainers hit the streets for in the year following our first survey.[3] The figures in Table 2.4 are percentages indicating how many persisters of each of the five initial demonstrations have participated again on one of the new mobilizing issues in the top row of the table below. First thing Table 2.4 reveals is that, if people demonstrate again, this is most likely on an issue that "matches" the initial demonstration issue (cf. figures in bold). For instance, 94 percent of the Purchasing Power demonstrators who persisted in their street engagements, mobilized again for a social/economic issue. In case of the Antiwar demonstration, 73 percent of the persisters took to the streets for an issue related to peace. Of the persisters of the Silent March in Antwerp, to protest against the racist killings, 50 percent participated in another demonstration on an antiracist issue. Thus, different issues attract different issue publics, and these publics largely keep protesting for a very similar issue. Still, there is also a lot of variation. To some degree, habitual old and new emotional issue demonstrators find their ways in demonstrations on other issue types, be it that old issue protest sustainers are the most loyal to their initial demonstration issue. Yet sustaining new issue protesters are much more multi-issue demonstrators, and seem to be concerned with a larger diversity of issues.

Antiwar and climate change demonstrators, for instance, show high percentages for protesting on other issues than peace and the environment: 47 percent of the Antiwar demonstrators that took to the streets again has protested for an issue on asylum or migrant

[3] We asked those respondents that did sustain in their protest engagements to indicate on a list of thirteen issues for which of these issues they took to the streets again. Respondents could check multiple issues, but not all issues are presented here and some have been collapsed (see Appendix for full information).

Table 2.4
Participation Percentages for Each Initial Demonstration across New Mobilizing Issues

	Peace	Anti-racism	Asylum/ Migrants	Human rights/Third World	Social/ economic issues*	Environ-ment	Regional issues
Old Social Mov.							
VW Vorst.....	10	8	18	13	**88**	18	10
Purchasing Power	16	10	23	13	**94**	13	3
Flemish March	8	5	10	13	3	2	**93**
New Social Mov.							
Antiwar	**73**	34	47	39	37	32	0
Climate Change.....	42	24	42	**61**	26	**61**	16
New Emotional Mov.							
March for Joe.....	**55**	38	31	24	14	17	0
Silent March.....	25	**50**	23	20	45	5	3

*Social/economic issues: salary/work conditions; social security; redundancies/unemployment

rights; 61 percent of the Climate Change persisters has protested again for an issue related to Human Rights/Third World. And even the persisters from the Silent March in Antwerp show high percentages for protesting on a social/economic issue (45 percent). Although different issues thus in the first place attract distinct issue publics, some of these publics are more diverse in terms of the issues they find important. This issue diversity is key in the ebb and flow of social movements and the actions they stage. Walgrave and Verhulst (2009) have coined the notion of "internal diversity", which principally refers to the socio-demographic, attitudinal, and behavioral heterogeneity of the protesting crowd, but which also and likely involves a diversity in terms of the issues and specific social/political problems that are deemed important and worth protesting for. Internal diversity, according to Walgrave and Verhulst (2009), is a key resource for social movements for subsequent mobilization efforts as it increases the mobilizing potential beyond an organization's own membership and sympathizers. Distinct issue groups within a demonstration that participate in other demonstrations create bridging opportunities between the other participants at these demonstrations. Diani (2009) has termed this "protest communities", referring to activist sectors with a sustained commitment in a particular issue, say peace, yet mobilizing independent of peace organizations. Although Diani seems to suggest that these protest

communities only mobilize for a specific issue, we would argue that a distinct feature and their true asset for any social movement wanting to mobilize, lies within the fact that these protest communities now and then also participate in other issues. In sum, while organizations and formal networks have proved crucial for continued activism, the links that are built during demonstrations between and within issue publics may prove equally crucial as well.

Conclusion and Discussion

The main aim of this chapter was to get more empirical and more integrated insights on the reasons and circumstances that foster or hinder protesters to persist or to quit their street engagements. Analyses were based on original evidence of more than 600 activists that took part in seven different demonstrations and that were re-interviewed one year after their initial protest participation. We provided a comprehensive analysis including measures tapping activist's biographies, attitudes, structural backgrounds and motivational dynamics. Our contribution therefore integrates previous mostly case-study based insights in a unique panel-study. In addition we expanded available studies about sustained protest engagements beyond the organizational level, by focusing on protest demonstrations and including the importance of issues in explaining why some protesters sustain in their activism while others (temporally) drop out.

First of all, we find that individual, micro-level, characteristics (biographies, attitudinal and structural availabilities, as well as motivational dynamics) play an important role in explaining sustained activism. Controlling for demonstration issue, age, childcare responsibilities and marital status predict protest sustainment, which indicate that continuing protest involvement to a certain degree has to do with life-cycle availabilities and choice. General political attitudes, like general political interest and the amount of talking to others about politics, are significant predictors too, but their effect diminishes when adding structural backgrounds like formal membership in the movement organization that staged the demonstration and knowing people that are politically active. Likely these attitudes especially develop in voluntary associations as well as during contacts with co-members of an

organization. In our model, and regardless of the demonstration issue, structural availability is key, and to the largest extent to be determined by formal organizational involvement. In terms of motivational dynamics, especially group consciousness or group identification seem to be important aspects to keep protesters going. This finding is logically associated to their degree of structural availability: protest persisters are more likely members of organizations that staged the initial demonstration and they are more likely embedded within these organizations when hitting the streets. Persisters are also significantly less indignant than quitters about the initial demonstration issue. Thus, quitters, although their general involvement may be lower, when they do make an active stance they are strongly indignant about the issue at stake. Once they have made clear their grievances, they are more likely to retrieve from the streets, possibly rendering their actions the status of a "vehicle of catharsis" (Gusfield 1986), until a next emotional liberation imposes itself.

The reason that collective identity and structural availability—being or knowing others that are politically active or member of certain voluntary organization—proves so important in our different models, likely is not a separate phenomenon. But may also be seen as the outcome of a longer process of socialization in previous protest experiences maintained and facilitated by organizational embeddedness and the affective bonds which it creates. In that sense, being a persister is contingent on cultivating a "habit" of activism, whereby certain availabilities and motivational aspects are important mediators. People who have invested a lot in their activism have a larger cost-benefit stake in continuing activism, or contrastingly, have a lot to loose when they withdraw from it. Persisters are not only "creative" in organizing their life so that they can remain active (cf. Downton and Wehr 1997), they also deliberately *choose* to remain active. In addition, as persisters are more embedded in activists' networks, they (consequently) also might perceive themselves as "activists among activists" (cf. strong feelings of collective identity) which at the same time strengthens sustained activism and makes it more difficult to withdraw because it becomes part of one's "activist identity" and personality (Melucci 1988; Nepstad 2004).

Next, clearly issues matter. Different issues attract different issue publics that are more prone to sustain in subsequent protest engagements than others. New-emotional issue demonstrations typically mobilize on a more short-term and event-related issue, attracting people who want to express their suddenly imposed grievances resulting from a moral shock (Walsh 1981; Jasper 1997), and after this mobilization moment the issue itself is referred to

the background, and so does the individual issue salience (Walgrave and Verhulst 2006). Participants at new emotional events generally are far less organizationally embedded, whereby their participation is more personal and more a matter of individual, issue-related "catharsis", but without further more formal organizational embeddedness, these people are hard to be kept active. Only those new emotional issue participants that are more organizationally embedded and share corresponding feelings of collective identity are likely to persist in other protest activities. New issues like peace and human rights on the contrary, attract a very different demonstration public. These issues do not spark out of nowhere, but have both longer history of contentious engagement as well as are inherently more focused on a long-term perspective. This means that involving oneself for these issues innately also means to some degree choosing to become active on a longer term, which is clearly reflected in the higher probabilities for participants in new social movement demonstrations of being a persistent activist. We hypothesized that old-issue demonstrators, involved in demonstrations that concern more particularistic bread-and-butter grievances, are committed on a much shorter term (e.g. "job security now"). Hence, our expectations that these specific demonstrators would display lower probabilities of sustained protest engagement: their goal is immediate and often with personal stakes involved. This does not seem to be the case, on the contrary. Both experienced and non-experienced old-issue protesters are very likely to take to streets again. These demonstrators are also more embedded in organizational mobilization networks (e.g. labor unions), which provides the necessary solidary and social incentives to breed future engagements.

In addition, we also showed that protesters principally show up at demonstrations concerning similar issues, but that within these distinct issue publics there is still room for an interesting "issue diversity". It is this issue diversity that provides social movements—on top of the structural connections that proved so important in our models—new and important resources to mobilize for new protest actions. Distinct issue groups within a demonstration that participate in other demonstrations as well create bridging opportunities between the other participants at these demonstrations. This in turn creates new "protest communities" (Diani 2009), that create a sustained commitment in a particular issue, yet mobilizing independent of specific movement organizations. In other words, for subsequent mobilization efforts, the mobilizing potential increases beyond an organization's own membership and sympathizers (Walgrave and Verhulst 2009).

To conclude: persistent protest activism is predicted through a mix of personal features and demonstration issues. It is not just a matter of being available, but also of being solidarily motivated, and of the kind of issues one chooses to take to the streets for. Protest activism is a self-reinforcing process, and each activist experience will strengthen the foundations for further participation. One important lesson we can draw from our results is that for movements to get people to become persistent protesters, it is a matter of "catching them on the scene", getting them involved within more formalized mobilization networks or appeal to their issue-related solidarities.

Appendix

Table 2.5
Overview of Different Variables and their Operationalization

Variables	Operationalization
Biographical availability	
Gender	1 female – 2 male
Age	In years
Occupational status	
Full time	0 'no' – 1 'yes'
Student	0 'no' – 1 'yes'
Marital/relational status*	0 'single' – 1 'married/in a relation'
Having children*	0 'no children/children +18' – 1 'children -18'
Attitudinal availability	
Interest in politics	1 'none' – 5 'very much'
Talking about politics*	Summation of talking about politics (1 'never', 2 'monthly', 3 'weekly', 4 'daily') with partner, family, friends, neighbors, colleagues/students, and/or co-member. Rescaled to 1 'never' – 5 'a lot'
Extreme ideological position	Original 10-point scale with 1 'left' – 10 'right' recoded to 0 'no extreme position' (position 3 till 8) and 1 'extreme position' (position 1 till 2 and 9 till 10)
Structural availability	
Member of movement organization	1 'no member' – 2 'member of an SMO staging the demonstration'
Knowing someone who is politically active*	0 'none' – 6 'knowing partner, and family, and friends, and colleagues/students, and co-members, and others, who are politically active'
Motivational dynamics	
Instrumental motivation:	Perceived success chances of the demonstration in reaching the most important goal: 1 'no success' – 7 'very successful'
Collective identity	1 'none' – 5 'very much', combination of the following questions: *"I have a lot in common with the other people present today", "I strongly identify with the other people present today"*
Affective emotions:*	
Joy	1 'no' – 7 'very much'
Pride	1 'no' – 7 'very much'
Reactive emotions:*	
Anger	1 'no' – 7 'very much'
Indignation	1 'no' – 7 'very much'

Participation in New Mobilizing Issues	
Original multiple issue battery of 13 issues re-grouped into:*	Items not included: Education; Global justice; Women's rights; Other
Peace	Peace
Antiracism	Antiracism
Asylum/Migrants	Asylum/migrant rights
Human Rights/Third World	Human rights + Third World
Social/Economic Issues	Salary/work conditions + Social security + Redundancies/unemployment
Environment	Environment
Regional Issues	Regional issues

* These questions were asked in the follow-up survey.

Table 2.6
Descriptives Independent Variables

Variable	Min	Max	Mean	SD
Biographical availability				
Male	0	1	.61	.49
Age	16	85	46.02	14.95
Full time occupation.....	0	1	.55	.50
Student.....	0	1	.09	.29
Married/in relationship.....	0	1	.72	.45
Children -18.....	0	1	.72	.45
Attitudinal availability				
Political interest	1	5	3.90	.97
Talking about politics	1	5	3.04	.82
Extreme political views	0	1	.28	.45
Structural availability				
Member of staging SMO	0	1	.52	.50
Knowing active people.....	0	5	1.70	1.21
Motivational dynamics				
Instrumental motivation	1	7	3.25	1.45
Collective identity	1	5	3.92	.96
Affective emotion: Joy	1	7	2.73	1.70
Pride.....	1	7	3.49	2.12
Reactive emotion: Anger.....	1	7	4.61	1.90
Indignation.....	1	7	5.40	1.84

3

Voluntary Idealists and Social Entrepreneurs

A Comparative Study of Professional and Nonprofessional Participants in the 4th European Social Forum in Athens

Abstract

Using individual level survey data, this chapter compares professional and nonprofessional participants in the fourth European Social Forum, a huge transnational gathering for activists and various social movement organizations. In many social movements organizations and the events they stage, the tension between professional and nonprofessional activists is a recurrent theme. With regard to the Social Forum this theme fits in an often heated debate about the democratic character of the Forum and its values of all-inclusiveness and equal representation. We find that professionals and nonprofessionals differ in terms of who they are and in terms of what they do at the Forum. Professional activists are more strongly integrated into different activist networks, are actively involved in the organization of the Forum, but do not share strong feelings of collective identity with the other participants. Nonprofessional activists, in contrast, are not involved at all, but use the Forum actively to meet new fellow activists. For them the Forum is a one-time opportunity to celebrate their joint struggle against neo-liberal globalization. These differences may have important implications for the Forum's democratic organization, but may also point to an important and fruitful symbiosis between professional and nonprofessional activists. This chapter is single-authored and revised-and-resubmitted for publication in Sociological Forum.

Voluntary Idealists and Social Entrepreneurs

A Comparative Study of Professional and Nonprofessional Participants in the 4th European Social Forum in Athens

Introduction

"I was just sent by the NGO I work for", an activist replied, when asked why he joined a recent European Social Forum, a cross-national gathering of activists and social movements. The answer, probably not the most inspiring response ever recorded, refers to a classic challenge for the growth and sustainment of many social movement organizations and their activities: the symbiosis between movement professionals and voluntary activists. Previous research has mainly focused on the influence of professionalism on voluntary activism within particular social movement organizations (McAdam 1982; Jenkins and Eckert 1986; Staggenborg 1988; Kleidman 1994; Reger and Staggenborg 2006; Hwang and Powell 2009) or within a social movement sector at large (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Everett 1992; Andrews, Ganz, Baggetta, Han and Lim 2010). These studies focus on the meso-level of organizations looking at dynamics of professionalization and formalization within movement organizations and the possible consequences in terms of tactics or strategies employed, the presence of voluntary adherents, etc. Few studies however have focused on the micro-level by systematically comparing "professional" activists with "ordinary", nonprofessional activists in terms of their personal background and motivation to engage in collective action (but see: Oliver 1983; Marullo 1988), although a myriad of studies (and disciplines) have investigated distinct characteristics of social movement leaders and their followers (cf. Morris and Staggenborg 2004 for an excellent overview). Still, much has been left implicit or untested

about possible differences between professional and nonprofessional activists at the micro, individual level.

Are professional activists different from nonprofessional activists? That is the basic question put forward in this chapter. We investigate possible differences between professional activists and nonprofessional activists who all took part in the 4th European Social Forum (ESF) in Athens, 4-7 May 2006. We want to know whether professional and nonprofessional participants differ in terms of who they are and in terms of what they actually do at the Social Forum. The European Social Forum essentially functions as a space for debate and interaction among civil society organizations, loose networks and individual activists from all over Europe and even outside Europe. These Forums were first held at a global scale (the World Social Forum), but soon organized at other levels as well. The Social Forum is at the same time longing for more participatory and deliberative democracy—a democracy "from below", as well as being a democratic exercise itself (Teivainen 2004; della Porta 2005). In reaction to the infamous World Economic Forums, the Social Forums have become an important venue for activists and social movements to bring alternative globalization issues to the attention of the wider public and of politicians (Pleyers 2004). The first European Social Forum in Florence, Italy, in November 2002, attracted more than 40,000 participants and played a crucial role in the organization of the worldwide antiwar demonstrations of 15 February 2003 (Verhulst 2010). Although the number of participants has steadily decreased, the Social Forum is still the most important highpoint of the global justice movement. The European Social Forum in Athens eventually gathered about 35,000 activists (Haug, Haeringer and Mosca 2009).

However, just like in many other movements and movement-related initiatives, a lively debate has been going on between professional and non- (or less) professional participants ever since the first Social Forum (e.g. Schönleitner 2003; Farrer 2004; Levidow 2004; Sen, Anand, Escobar and Waterman 2004; Allahwala and Keil 2005). While some people ask for more professionalization and formalization in order to maintain the Forum's basic principles of equal representation and inclusion, other people claim the exact opposite, namely that more rigid structures, as well as the inclusion of more professional movements and activists is threatening the Forum's fundamental principles of grassroots, participatory democracy. The tension between professionalism and grassroots democracy is fundamental to the process of the Social Forum and its future existence. This makes the Social Forum an

intriguing case to study the differences between professional and nonprofessional activists, the activists' backgrounds and motivation to participate in the Social Forum, as well as the ways in which both professional and nonprofessional activists are involved in the Social Forum's process. If it turned out that professional and nonprofessional participants are different people, with different motivations and expectations about the Forum, doing different things at the Forum, this could be a real challenge for building an open space that puts unity in diversity into practice, giving both professional and nonprofessional activists similar chances and opportunities to make and get input.

More in general our study can contribute to the broader social movement literature in three ways. First of all, we study participants that join a social movement *event*, whereas previous studies have looked at differences between professional and nonprofessional members within a social movement *organization*. This may have implications for people's motivation dynamics, since organizational membership entails a more long-term commitment whereas participation in a movement event might be a one-time opportunity, especially for nonprofessional participants. Moreover, it seems to be increasingly relevant to study social movement events instead of movement organizations: while membership in various organizations is generally declining (Putnam 2000), the number of people participating in collective action events seems to be less influenced by this trend, on the contrary. Unconventional forms of political participation have witnessed a steady growth in many Western democracies (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). Second, our study focuses on a *transnational* event, whereas previous studies have focused on *national* organizations. As many observers have noted, the current internationalization of political decision making and economic and social interests forces social movement organizations and activists to coordinate their actions and resources across countries (Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco 1997; della Porta, Kriesi and Rucht 1999; Smith and Johnston 2002; Bandy and Smith 2005; della Porta and Tarrow 2005). This shift, however, also puts pressure on social movements in terms of democratic accountability and in terms of representation of people and organizations from poorer less well-connected countries (Tilly 2004). Furthermore, it is especially this international dimension, according to Tilly (2004), that will sharpen the division between "skilled political entrepreneurs" and "ordinary" people. For transnational social movement events we can indeed expect participation barriers to be higher than for national and local activities (see Chapter 5), which of course has repercussions for related motivation dynamics.

Third, our study can contribute by presenting a more comprehensive account of professional and nonprofessional activists. In current social movement studies, the dominant theoretical framework is still fueled by resource mobilization and political process theory. These models on collective action mobilization and movement participation heavily focus on the so-called "structural" explanatory factors: costs and benefits, available organizational resources, organizational strength, network embeddedness, political opportunity structures, etc. (Oberschall 1973; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978; McAdam et al. 2001). Next to these "structural" theories, there are those scholars that draw attention to, and principally focus on, so-called "cultural" or "motivational" explanatory factors: they re-emphasize social-psychological elements and insights of earlier collective behavior theories, incorporating values, grievances, ideology, emotions, etc. into their models (e.g. Zurcher and Snow 1981; Gamson et al. 1982; Klandermans 1984; Morris and Mueller 1992; Johnston and Klandermans 1995). These scholars claim that much of the causal impact of the structures actually comes from what they transmit, e.g. affective bonds, emotions, etc. (Jasper 1998). Today, there is a growing consensus that both "structural" and "motivational" explanatory factors of collective action participation are important and should be dealt with together (Jasper 2010). Although, studies investigating differences between professional and nonprofessional activists do mention structural as well as motivational variables (cf. Oliver 1983; Marullo 1988), they rather focus on the more general beliefs and ideologies, and not on the motivational dynamics that specifically relate to the movement organization or event under study. Here, we will include activists' general as well as specific beliefs and motivations, next to common structural and demographic characteristics.

Results are based on analyses of about 430 individual-level surveys conducted among participants of the fourth European Social Forum in Athens. In a first section we describe current theory and empirical work on the subject at hand. After a brief methodological part we move to the analyses. In a first part we deal with differences between professional and nonprofessional participants in terms of who they are. In a second part we deal with what these two groups actually do at the Forum and how they are involved in the set-up and organization of the Forum. We wrap up with a conclusion and discussion section where we will review our results in light of the more general debate about the Social Forum as an open space designed for activists of all walks, professional as well as nonprofessional.

Professional and Nonprofessional Activists: Theory and Hypotheses

As stated in the introduction, few scholars have explicitly taken into account the micro-level question of professional versus nonprofessional activists. Besides some studies that mention possible differences sideways (cf. Andretta and Sommier 2009), there are, to the best of our knowledge, only two studies that make a systematic comparison between professional and nonprofessional activists: a first study on the Neighborhood movement by Pamela Oliver (1983) that compares paid with non-paid members, and a second on the Nuclear Freeze Movement by Sam Marullo (1988) comparing regular members versus those in leadership positions. Both studies have shown us that professional and nonprofessional activists have a lot in common and "essentially come from the same pool" (Oliver 1983: 160). According to Oliver and Marullo, people become professional activists because of progressive social and ideological commitment and past movement experiences, and not because of simple job opportunities. They find no support for the idea that a salary or other kind of materialistic rewards can be an alternative or supplementary motivation for social movement activism. What matters, thus, is a strong ideological motivation and commitment: professional activists are the most experienced, the most committed and ideologically motivated participants. There studies counter classic predictions, inspired by McCarthy and Zald's (1973) seminal work, that activists being paid for their work in a movement organization or those holding leadership positions are a "special" kind of people, with distinct personal backgrounds and motivations. Our aim is to determine whether Oliver's (1983) and Marullo's (1988) findings still hold for professional and nonprofessional activists participation in a transnational movement event. Although Oliver and Marullo do mention structural as well as motivational variables, their focus is, as indicated, rather limited to the more general beliefs and ideologies, and not the motivational dynamics that specifically relate to the movement organization or event under study. In this chapter therefore, four main analytic sets of variables will be discussed: socio-demographic characteristics, integration into activist networks, general attitudes and beliefs, and fourth, specific beliefs, identifications and emotions. In the following paragraphs we introduce existing literature about each set of factors and the relationship with an activist level of professionalization.

Socio-demographic characteristics

It is obvious to state that particular personal characteristics play a role in explaining political participation. Authors have termed this as an activist's biographical availability (McAdam 1988; Downton and Wehr 1997), referring to the "absence of personal constraints that may increase the costs and risks of movement participation, such as full-time employment, marriage, and family responsibilities" (McAdam 1986: 70). In terms of socio-demographic characteristics, Oliver (1983) postulates in her study on the Neighborhood movement that "no theorist makes specific predictions about comparing paid [e.g. professional] and volunteer [e.g. nonprofessional] activists." (p.141). Oliver (1983) herself, however, found that professional activists have higher average levels of education. Higher positions in a movement organization may require specific skills and corresponding higher levels of education. Morris and Staggenborg (2004: 175) assert that "educational capital is the key resource that social movement leaders derive from their privileged backgrounds". A burgeoning literature on so-called social entrepreneurs, also portraits this group as higher college-educated, but also as likely more female (Harding 2006; Van Ryzin, Grossman, DiPadova-Stocks and Bergrud 2009). That women are more likely occupying jobs in voluntary and non-profit organizations is a constant finding in both UK and US panel studies. Interesting, because entrepreneurial positions in the profit sector are more likely to be occupied by men. It seems that the voluntary and non-profit sector provide specific job opportunities for, or is related to, particular life experiences and histories of women (Van Ryzin et al. 2009). On the other hand, specific research on leadership roles in civil rights social movements shows that men heavily occupy formal leadership positions, while women are heavily involved in secondary leadership roles (Robnett 1997; Morris and Staggenborg 2004). In addition, the above-mentioned studies about the role of gender in social entrepreneurship do not take into account the transnational dimension inherent to the European Social Forum. This transnational dimension may lead to additional constraints for women rather than for men to take up an active role. In fact, Andretta and Sommier (2009), in their study on the European Social Forum in Athens, implicitly acknowledge that this might be the case: more than 50 percent of the professionals coming from Greece (the host country) are women, but this figure is much lower for all other countries. The only aggregate and significant factor Andretta and Sommier (2009) found was age: "professional activists are older than ordinary activists" (p.119) as building a career—even in the non-profit sector—takes some time to

develop. Based on the literature above, we might expect some differences in terms of social characteristics between professional and nonprofessional activists. Professional activists are higher educated, are more likely to be male, and more likely to be older than nonprofessional activists.

Integration into activist networks

A second set of factors relates to the integration of a person into different activist networks. Network embeddedness, both formal and informal, has repeatedly proven to be of crucial importance, in pulling people into collective action and keeping them there (Snow et al. 1980; McAdam 1988; Schussman and Soule 2005). Following Diani (2009) activists may link to networks through "associations", or through "protests". The associational milieu refers to the ties and solidarity that is built and sustained within movement organizations, while the protest milieu refers to a loose form of communities via recurrent protest participation and interaction between people sharing similar experiences, but not necessarily within an organizational setting. In short, formal and informal ties, according to Diani (2009), can be created and maintained via organizations or via sustained participation in collective action events. These structural connections provide activists with particular resources (both material and purposive) that increase the likelihood of being and staying involved (Passy 2001; Edwards and McCarthy 2004). Networks might be important for both professional as well as for nonprofessional activists. Oliver (1983) finds that paid and volunteer Neighborhood movement activists are equally well integrated into social and political networks. Marullo (1988), however, states that leaders are even better integrated than regular members into different activists networks and corresponding information streams. Results, therefore, can go both ways: professional activists are equally and/or more integrated into different activist networks.

General attitudes and beliefs

Political participation studies systematically show that indicators of general political attitudes, beliefs and ideologies are strong predictors of participation in various forms of political activities (Verba et al. 1995; Schussman and Soule 2005). For instance, higher levels

of political interest and a more liberal conviction significantly increase the chances of being politically active. Some "attitudinal affinity" or "ideological resonance" seems conditional to a person's engagement in collective action (Snow, Worden, Rochford and Benford 1986; Snow and Benford 1988). Distinguishing paid activists from non-paid activists Oliver (1983) finds that the former group has a more general political interest and a more leftist political orientation. These beliefs provide professional activists with important attitudinal availabilities to advance in often lengthy careers of social activism (Downton and Wehr 1997). As Oliver (1983) notes, it is exactly because professional activists work their way up in the movement, that they display the highest levels of ideological commitment and interest in what they are doing. This is not to say that nonprofessional activists do not have strong ideological commitments, on the contrary. Professional activists are just the most committed of all. Therefore, we expect that in our study as well professional participants will be more politically interested and will have more leftist political views than nonprofessional participants.

Specific beliefs and motivations

A final set of factors digs into more specific beliefs, emotions and identifications shaped by both current experiences of, as well as future expectations about a person's engagement in social movement organizations and their activities. Scholars (albeit in different terms and words) usually make a difference between three kinds of specific motivational dynamics relevant for collective action (cf. Gamson 1992; Klandermans 1997): agency or a sense of perceived efficacy; collective identity; and specific emotions that fuel and at the same time are reinforced by participation in collective action.

Perceived efficacy is a key determinant of participation in collective action (Klandermans 1984). This perceived efficacy can be either collective or personal, with collective efficacy referring to the perceived success of a group, and personal efficacy referring to one's own perceived capabilities in bringing about change. Both collective and personal efficacy, in other words, are about the extent to which the Forum is instrumental for a participant. Friedman and McAdam (1992: 158) argue that personal efficacy is closely linked to high levels of organizational participation: those who are organizationally more active are more likely to regard activism as potentially effective and worth participating in. Assuming

that professional activists are also the more active members in a movement organization, a higher position in a movement organization thus coincides with higher levels of efficacy.

Polletta and Jasper (2001: 284) define collective identity as "an individual's cognitive, moral, and emotional connections with a broader community, category, practice, or institution [that], unlike ideology, carries with it positive feelings for other members of the group". It refers to an individual's identification with a particular collectivity and is related to the interpersonal interactions within and with the group one is a member of (Klandermans 1997; Hunt and Benford 2004). The literature on collective identity overwhelmingly supports the idea that a strong sense of collective identity increases levels of involvement and participation (Klandermans 2004). An "activist identity" (cf. Melucci 1988) is key to explaining social movement participation, but it is also, and at the same time, built and sustained through ongoing involvement in social movement organizations and their activities (Zurcher and Snow 1981; Friedman and McAdam 1992; Nepstad 2004). Because of their higher involvement, we expect professional activists to display the strongest feelings of collective identity.

Finally, the social movement literature has recently re-drawn attention to the importance of emotions (Jasper 1997; Aminzade and McAdam 2001; Goodwin et al. 2001b). Jasper (1997, 1998) makes a useful distinction between emotions that are reactive in nature and refer to "known" threats or aggrieving situations (e.g. anger, indignation, disgust,…), and emotions that are more positive and prospective in nature and have some kind of "forward-looking" quality (e.g. hope, solidarity, joy,…). As Jasper (1998) tells us, there is a clear difference between reactive and affective emotions, with the first representing more short-term responses, while the latter refers to more ongoing emotions, "strong and abiding affects". Actually, as Jasper (1998) notes, affective emotions can also be negative (e.g. hate, suspicion). In this chapter we only consider negative reactive emotions and "positive" affective emotions, which captures the bulk of the emotions commonly studied in social movement studies. Positive, affective emotions represent latent feelings and may refer to a professional's strong commitment. Reactive, negative, short-term emotions, like anger and indignation, on the other hand, function more as ephemeral outbursts and are often defined as almost being irrational (Lofland 1985; Jasper 1998). In a recent study on the Animal Rights Movement, Groves (2001) found out that professional activists tend to "suppress" certain emotions because they see emotional responses as less legitimate compared to the "rational"

arguments they need to pursue their organizational goals. Apparently, professional activists in Groves' study fear that being *too* emotional "trivializes" their organizational goals. In other words: professional activists cannot be too emotional about their work, at least not in terms of these negative, more reactive emotions. Consequently, we expect professional participants to display less strong reactive emotions, but stronger affective emotions compared to nonprofessional participants.

Data and Methods

In order to study differences between professional and nonprofessional activists participating in a transnational event, we make use of survey data collected at the fourth European Social Forum in Athens, 4-7 May 2006. Paper versions of the ESF survey were distributed at the Forum venues itself: about 600 in Athens during the first two days of the event. The response rate in Athens was disappointing: only 68 were received on the last day of the Forum. In the weeks and months after the Forum, ESF participants were further invited to participate in an online version of the same survey. We used existing emailing lists (about 700 subscribers) and received about 1,500 unique email addresses of the Greek Organizing Committee of people who had registered themselves online to participate in the event. Also a news entry was placed on the official website of the Athens' ESF. The fact that all communication, practical information, and, more importantly, the ESF registration went nearly exclusively via the internet justifies the use of an online survey, in addition to the paper questionnaires distributed at the venue itself. Since a good indication of the real composition of the entire population is not available, it is impossible to test whether the returned questionnaires or those filled in online are representative of the ESF population. Moreover, it is difficult to estimate the bias caused by both the self-selection of respondents as well as the persisting inequalities in terms of internet use among ESF participants who are coming from different countries. After processing and cleaning the data a total amount of 427 ESF participants had filled in a paper or online questionnaire.

Dependent variable

Our dependent variable in this chapter is the ESF participant's level of professionalization, distinguishing professional from nonprofessional activists. It is important to note that we do not claim any unidirectional causality between the level of professionalization and the different explanatory variables we will introduce below. The relation between our "dependent" and our "independent" variables can easily be put the other way around. Especially with regard to the motivational variables, measuring a person's attitudes and beliefs, it probably makes more sense to state that the level of professionalization influences these beliefs, and not vice versa. It is, therefore, only for analytic purposes that we present them this way.

Figure 3.1
Frequencies of Level of Professionalization Among ESF Participants



In order to tap an activist's level of professionalization we combined several questions from the survey and constructed a five-point scale of professionalization. We used the following questions: (1) whether or not a participant received reimbursements for his or her trip to Athens; (2) whether or not someone is a staff or board level member of a social movement organization; (3) whether or not the participant had a mandate to represent their organization or group; and (4) whether or not someone gets paid for their activities in a movement organization. The first and last question obviously relate to material resources that come with higher levels of professionalization. The second question taps a person's actual position in a movement organization and is complementary to the fourth question: not all staff level activists get paid. The third question catches those participants who, being representatives, somehow need to "act as a professional". The scale is the simple summation of the answers to these four questions, with a zero meaning no professionalization whatsoever, and four indicating the highest possible professionalization (receiving funds, being an active board member, having a mandate, and being paid for that). Note that, despite this simple summation, there is a cumulative logic behind this scale although the constellation of the three middles may vary. An average level of professionalization represents those respondents that receive a reimbursement and are staff or board level or representatives of an organization. We present frequencies for each level in Figure 3.1. Most respondents have an average (26 percent) or rather low (22 percent) level of professionalization. 23 percent has no professionalization whatsoever. Twelve percent of the respondents have a very high level of professionalization.

Independent variables

As outlined in the theoretical section, we will compare professional and nonprofessional activists according to four sets of variables: socio-demographic characteristics, integration into activist networks, general beliefs, and specific beliefs (perceived efficacy, collective identity, reactive and affective emotions). For each variable in this study more detailed question wording and recoding can be found in the Appendix. In Table 3.1 we provide some descriptive statistics for each independent variable. First of all, we will control for an activist's nationality. We make a difference between people coming from Northern/Western Europe (UK, France, Germany, Scandinavian countries, Belgium, etc.),

Southern Europe (Spain, Italy, Portugal), Eastern Europe and other non-Europe countries, and the host country, Greece. It is to be expected that nationality, as a proxy for participants' residence, heavily correlates with a participant's level of professionalization. For instance, for nonprofessional Greek participants thresholds to participate are probably much lower than for nonprofessional activists living outside Greece, resulting in a relative higher attendance of professional participants from other countries than Greece.

Table 3.1
Descriptives for all Independent Variables

Variable	Mean/Freq	SD	Min	Max
Controls				
Nationality				
North/West Europe	44%			
Southern Europe	23%			
East Europe + Non EU	10%			
Greek	23%			
Socio-demographic backgrounds				
Female	43%			
Age	35.53	13.16	17	76
Education	7.57	1.03	1	8
Activist network integration				
Via various organizations	2.48	2.09	0	12
Via past Forum experiences	.79	1.03	0	3
General attitudes and beliefs				
General political interest	4.55	.72	1	5
Left/right scale	2.44	1.41	1	10
Specific beliefs and emotions				
Collective efficacy	4.18	1.53	1	7
Personal efficacy	.42	.49	0	1
Collective identity	3.39	.91	1	5
Reactive emotions	4.48	1.56	1	7
Affective emotions	5.35	1.27	1	7

In terms of socio-demographic characteristics we include sex, age, educational level. Most participants are male, on average 35 years old, and highly (even "hyper") educated. Secondly, following Diani (2009), people can be integrated into different activist networks either via memberships in one or more associations, or via links generated during events. The

latter may be less stable and provide more occasional forms of interaction than associational relationships, but they can be very meaningful in supplying ties and solidarity. Associational network integration is measured by the number of active memberships in various civil organizations and social movements. The more active memberships, the more a person is integrated into different activist networks by forming a network of overlapping memberships that simultaneously link activists and movement organizations (Carroll and Ratner 1996). Apart from associational memberships, people can link to each other via recurrent encounters on different events. The more one participated in previous European Social Forums, the higher the chances that this has effectively lead to new and persistent relationships. Network integration via events is measured in terms of the number of previous European Social Forums a person has attended. These are the first Social Forum in Florence (2002), the second Forum in Paris (2003), and the third European Social Forum in London (2004). Thirdly, we measure a person's general beliefs by asking for general political interest and a person's self-placement on a political left/right scale. These two variables have repeatedly proved important measures for a person's general interest and ideological affinity (cf. Verba et al. 1995; Schussman and Soule 2005). Finally, we tap an activist's specific beliefs and motivations that specifically relate to the European Social Forum, May 2006. We measured perceived collective and personal efficacy, collective identification, and reactive and affective emotions invoked by the theme of the Social Forum. Collective efficacy, or the perceived effectiveness of the Social Forum in general, is measured by asking respondents on a scale from 1 (little chance) to 7 (high chance), how high the chances are that the Athens ESF will boost mobilization or give visibility to the common targets of the social movements participating in the Athens ESF. Personal efficacy is measured by asking respondents whether they will be organizing future activities around common themes with the people they met during the Forum (yes/no). In other words, this variable measures the likeliness that the Forum will have been instrumental in creating new opportunities for individual participants regarding future joint actions and activities. Collective identity was constructed by combining three questions, each tapping in a slightly different way the extent to which a person, on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (completely), identifies or feels committed to the other participants at the Forum: "I have a lot in common with the other people present at the Athens ESF."; "I feel committed to the other ESF participants."; "I identify strongly with the others present at the Athens ESF." These three questions add up to a new collective identity

scale. Finally, we included two types of emotions, following Jasper's (1997: 128) distinction between reactive and affective emotions. Respondents were presented a list of different emotions preceded by the following question: "To what extent do you have experienced, before you attended the Athens ESF, certain feelings regarding the most important theme/issue of the ESF?". The issue refers to a previous question asking for the most important issue of the Forum. For the scale tapping "reactive emotions" we used anger and indignation, two powerful and central emotions for social movements and protest. For the scale representing "affective emotions" we used hope and solidarity, two positive emotions that both refer to more ongoing affects. Hope carries optimistic feelings of positive, transformative effectiveness (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2004), while solidarity refers to a sense of loyalty and emotional interest (Hunt and Benford 2004), and is, as such, heavily related to the previous concept of collective identity. Note, however, that collective identity specifically asks for an activist's relationship towards other participants, while solidarity is intended to tap a person's emotional interest regarding the central issues and targets of the European Social Forum.

Results

Do professional activists differ from nonprofessional activists in terms of who they are? Table 3.2 first of all presents an ordinal regression analysis explaining a Social Forum participant's level of professionalization. Figures are proportional odds ratios, standard errors (SE) and significance levels (Sig.). Odds ratios below 1 indicate a negative relation, implying that higher categories of the dependent variable are less probable. Odds ratios above 1 indicate a positive relation, meaning that the likelihood of the higher categories of the dependent variable increases. Technically, an odds ratio of 1.5 means that for a one unit increase in the independent variable, the probability of a higher level of professionalization versus all lower levels is 1.5 times greater. As the adjusted pseudo R^2 (.245) indicates, our model has a fairly high effect size. The Test of Parallel Lines shows that the coefficients are the same across response categories, which confirms the cumulative logic in our scale of professionalization.

Table 3.2
Ordinal Regression Analysis Explaining Activist's Level of Professionalization

Variable	ß	SE	Sig.
Controls			
Nationality (versus Greek)			
North/West Europe	3.327	.271	***
Southern Europe	2.519	.337	***
East Europe + Non EU	2.570	.315	***
Socio-demographic backgrounds			
Female	.871	.198	n.s.
Age	1.007	.008	n.s.
Education	.772	.106	**
Activist network integration			
Via various organizations	1.099	.047	**
Via past Forum experiences	1.250	.105	**
General beliefs and ideology			
General political interest	1.027	.146	n.s.
Left/right scale	1.088	.076	n.s.
Specific beliefs and emotions			
Collective efficacy	.968	.068	n.s.
Personal efficacy	2.168	.207	***
Collective identity	.795	.112	**
Reactive emotionality	.862	.061	**
Affective emotionality	1.168	.077	**
Observations	385		
Adjusted pseudo R^2	.245		

Significance level: * $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

In general, strong and significant differences exist between professional and nonprofessional activists both in terms of their structural as well as their motivational backgrounds. Which, again, indicates the importance of including both "structural" and "motivational" predictors in our model. Nationality, as a control variable, yields strong significant results. The most professional ESF participants, those being paid for their engagements, disproportionally come from traditional West European countries like France, Germany, UK, Belgium, Scandinavian countries, etc. Participants from these countries are about 3.5 times more likely to be highly professionalized compared to Greek participants. Nevertheless, also participants with other nationalities than Greek, are more likely to be very professional. Thus, compared to all other participants, the Greek activists are the least

professionalized. Of course, as explained, this comes as no surprise. Note, however, that all other results apply on top of this strong predictor.

In terms of socio-demographic backgrounds we find no significant differences for sex and age. Professionals are more likely to be male and older, but the effect is not significant. So male participants do not happen to be more professionalized than women. Educational level, on the other hand, is negatively and significantly correlated with the level of professionalization. At first sight this is a curious result, especially because previous studies systematically found that more professional activists have higher levels of education (cf. Oliver 1983; Marullo 1988; Van Ryzin et al. 2009; Zahra, Gedajlovic, Neubaum and Shulman 2009). Note, however, that on average our respondents are very highly educated. Hence, a negative correlation rather means slightly less highly educated instead of significantly lower educated. Still, it is an unexpected result and we do not have a sound explanation for this finding.

Looking at the variables measuring activist network integration, we find significant differences between professionals and nonprofessionals in terms of how strong they are integrated into activist networks via associations as well as via the relations and experiences built during previous Forum participation. Stronger integration into activist networks significantly corresponds with higher levels of professionalization. This finding is also in line with previous findings that suggest that higher positions in social movement organizations coincide with higher levels of past protest experiences as these provide additional individual resources (Marullo 1988) or serve as a long-term indicator of a “mission” or “passion” that must be fulfilled (Downton and Wehr 1997; Zahra et al. 2009).

In terms of general attitudes and beliefs we find no differences between professional and nonprofessional activists. They are similarly interested in general political issues and share similar leftist political ideological points of view. In contrast to previous research, we do not find professional activists to be especially *more* interested in political issues or having *more* leftist political views (cf. Oliver 1983; Marullo 1988). One possibility is that participating in the European Social Forum by definition requires a considerable level of commitment, exactly because of certain thresholds related to this kind of transnational event. As a consequence, both professionals and nonprofessionals have equally strong levels of political interest and leftist political views.

In terms of specific motivations and beliefs, different measures for collective and personal efficacy, collective identification, and emotions yield strong significant results. Personal efficacy (the belief that the ESF for an activist itself will be successful and generate future collaboration) is strongly related to the level of professionalization. For professional activists it seems that the Forum is an important venue to meet fellow activists and engage in future collaboration. Interestingly, there is a clear distinction between personal efficacy, the chances of future collaboration, and collective efficacy, the more general success of the Social Forum to boost mobilization or give visibility to the common targets of the social movements participating in the ESF. Although not significant, collective efficacy is negatively related with professionalization: for activists that are being paid for their social movement engagement, the general outcome of the Forum is perhaps of a lesser concern than the new collaborative initiatives that are generated for the movement organization one is working for. Another explanation could be that more professional participants are just more realistic about the outcomes of the Social Forum.

Collective identity is negatively correlated with the level of professionalization. All other variables being equal, stronger collective identity is significantly correlated with lower levels of professionalization. This is not what we would expect according to the literature, which suggests stronger levels of collective identity among professional activists, exactly because these people are the most committed in their movement organization. Their engagement reinforces both their motivation as well as their identification with the work and people they are involved with. One explanation, in our study, could be that because of their higher involvement and respective responsibilities more professional activists are confronted with more, and more different people and organizations, representing diverging issues and conveying different opinions. We specifically asked for collective identification with the other people who are present at the Forum, hence the possibility that more professional activists might identify stronger with their own movement organization but less with the Social Forum process and the people engaged in that process. Together with the previous finding about personal efficacy, this result may also reflect the extent to which the Social Forum has a different purpose for professional and nonprofessional participants. For professionals the Social Forum should, in the first place, be instrumental for future collaborative projects, whereas nonprofessional activists more likely value the Forum as a celebration of grassroots

democracy with a lot of like-minded activists. The prospect for future joint activities is perhaps less important.

Finally, we included two types of emotions, following Jasper's (1997) distinction between reactive and affective emotions. Reactive emotionality is measured by feelings of anger and indignation. Affective emotionality is represented by hope and feelings of solidarity. We find that these positive, affective emotions, hope and solidarity, are significantly and positively related with the level of professionalization. Negative emotions, contrary to positive emotions, are significantly and negatively related with the level of professionalization. At first sight this finding seems contradictory to the previous finding that professional activists share lower levels of collective identification. Yet, as indicated, collective identification taps a person's identification with all other ESF participants, while the questions about feelings of solidarity and hope explicitly relate to the ESF issue that activists' themselves found most important (see Appendix for exact question wording). In other words, affective emotionality relates to activists' personal emotional interests and activities. The fact that professional activists have significantly lower levels of reactive emotions fits nicely with the claim that professional activist might see these kind of emotions more as irrational, or even illegitimate as a motive for collective action participation (cf. Groves 2001).

In sum, we find that professional and nonprofessional activists differ in important ways, especially in terms of the integration into different activist networks and in terms of specific motivations and beliefs related to the European Social Forum. We find that more professional activists have stronger feelings of personal efficacy, hope, and solidarity, but less stronger feelings of anger, indignation and collective identity. There is also an important difference in terms of nationality, which obviously relates to certain barriers or thresholds for nonprofessional activists to be and become active on a transnational level.

Now that we have established important differences between professional and nonprofessional ESF participants in terms of who they are, we still need to find out whether these groups also differ in terms of what they do at the Forum. In light of the debate about inclusiveness and representation in the Forum's process of all kinds of activists, it is not necessarily a problem that professionals and nonprofessionals are different people, especially not when they are similarly involved in the organization of the Social Forum. If different people, however, are involved in different ways, this might have important consequences for

the future organization of the Forum. Thus, do professional activists differ from nonprofessional activists in terms of what they do? In order to answer this question, we present the association between an activist's level of professionalization and four different ways of involvement. We believe these four ways measure the degree of inclusion and representation of our respondents in the European Social Forum process: (1) being involved in the preparation of the Social Forum; (2) being responsible for some kind of activity during the Forum (seminar, roundtable, conference,…); (3) having used the Forum to meet activists from other countries; and (4) having used the Forum to contact previously contacted activists prior to the Forum in order to meet in Athens and intensify relationships. In the Appendix we provide full information on question wording and specific operationalization. In Table 3.3, below, we present percentages and Spearman correlations (for quantitative variables or variables with ordered categories) between the level of professionalization and each of the four different types of involvement in the ESF.

The figures in Table 3.3 first of all show that a higher level of professionalization significantly correlates with higher levels of involvement prior and during the Forum. Being involved in the preparation of the ESF and being responsible for activities during the Forum is clearly a matter for the more professional activists, like paid staff members, board members and directors. However, the above percentages also reveal subtle differences between levels of professionalization: whereas the preparation is clearly dominated by the most professional participants, participants with average and rather high levels of professionalization are more involved in activities during the Forum itself compared to the very high professional participants. Participants with no professionalization whatsoever are barely or not involved at all in the preparation of the Forum (3 percent), nor in the administering of activities during the Forum (8 percent). Next, we find that, regardless of their level of professionalization, participants use the Forum to successfully meet and exchange with other participants from other countries. In the end, this is what the Forum is all about: a transnational open space where people from different countries and organizations can meet and exchange ideas and information. The differences between levels of professionalization for this way of involvement are insignificant, but that makes it a significant finding: although activists with lower levels of professionalization are less involved in the organization of the Forum, they actively make use of the Forum as a place to meet and learn from other activists. Participants with low levels of professionalization are even slightly more likely to meet with others than high professionals.

Finally, the last column indicates whether participants have contacted fellow activists prior to the Forum in order to meet each other at the Forum. With this kind of involvement there is a significant association with an activist's level of professionalization. Thus, although nonprofessionals actively meet new activists, chances are smaller that they actively use the Forum to strengthen existing relations with fellow activists.

Table 3.3
Correlation between Level of Professionalization and ESF involvement

Level of Professionalization	Preparation of the Forum (% yes)	Responsible during Forum (% yes)	Meet activists from other countries (% yes)	Meet known activists (% yes)
No professionalization (0)	3.1	8.2	74.4	69.1
Low professionalization (1).....	23.7	19.4	86.4	81.7
Average professionalization (2)...	25.2	35.1	84.3	82.0
High professionalization (3).....	34.7	49.3	87.8	86.7
Very high professionalization (4).	31.4	33.3	84.0	82.4
Spearman correlation.....	.240***	.214***	.089	.124**

Significance level: * $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$. Spearman correlation measures the association between "level of professionalization" and each of the four types of involvement.

Based on the evidence presented above, we can conclude that there is an apparent imbalance in terms of the inclusion of nonprofessional activists in the preparation and organization of the European Social Forum in Athens. Although a lack of involvement in the preparation of the Forum does not necessarily have to be a "bad" thing in terms of representation, possible negative consequences are not exactly speculative. "The larger, better-organized and better resourced interests are most likely to be heard and to dictate the agenda", Smith (2005) notes about the European Social Forum in London. If professional activists have different concerns than nonprofessionals, if they value other issues more important than nonprofessionals, than the ideals of an all-inclusive open space where equal participation and representation is quintessential, become jeopardized. In fact, some activists we interviewed point to this particular problem, as the following quote clearly illustrates: "The ESF is a democratic platform where everybody can speak and indicate its position about big questions in the world against neo-liberalization, globalization, etc. But there is a program,

and there are big organizations in the ESF from France, Italy, England, which shape the actual decision making mechanism. It is a big problem for other organizations that want to indicate their points of view and define their positions because each time they are dominated by the others. This is why people stay away." (personal interview, 2006).

Conclusion and Discussion

We started this chapter with the question to what extent professional and nonprofessional activists differ in terms of who they are and in terms of what they do at a transnational social movement event. Few studies have explicitly focused on the difference between professional and nonprofessional activists. Our results contribute to previous research and the existing literature about professional and nonprofessional activists by studying participants in a social movement *event* rather than as members of a specific social movement organization, by studying a *transnational* event rather than a national one, and by presenting a more comprehensive account of an activist's background characteristics by including structural as well as general and more specific motivational predictors. In addition, our study fits in an old-time peculiar debate in many social movements about the symbiosis between professional activists and nonprofessional activists. We explicitly took the European Social Forum as a case-study, a transnational social movement event with a lively debate about the role and function of nonprofessional and professional activists. About 430 participants of the 4th European Social Forum in Athens, May 2006, were interviewed mainly via an online questionnaire.

In general we find that considerable differences exist between professional and nonprofessional activists: professional participants of the ESF are different from nonprofessional participants in terms of who they are, their personal characteristics and motivational dynamics, and they are different in terms of what they do or how they are involved in the European Social Forum process. Professional participants are strongly embedded in different activist networks, expect a lot from the Forum in terms of specific future collaboration, but do not share strong levels of collective identity and do not feel angry or indignant about the Forum's principal targets. On the contrary, they feel hope and solidarity. The set-up and organization prior as well as during the Social Forum is principally a

matter for the very professional participants. Nonprofessional participants are less integrated into activist networks, feel primarily angry and indignant about the Forum's central issues, but also share strong feelings of collective identity with other ESF participants. In contrast to the very professional activist, they are not involved in the preparation of the Forum, although they use the Forum actively to meet new fellow activists.

Although some of the findings of previous studies about professional and nonprofessional activists (cf. Oliver [1983] and Marullo [1988]) are supported by the results presented here, our evidence deviates in at least two important ways: first, we did not establish significant differences in terms of general political beliefs and ideologies. Second, we find that professional activists do not have stronger feelings of collective identity. We suggested that these diverging results first of all relate to the fact that we studied a specific transnational movement event with significant participation thresholds and perhaps attracting a specific type of social movement activist, meaning the very politically interested and quite politically left oriented activist. In previous studies, focusing on a national organization, variation in terms of general political interest and ideological stance might be more apparent and visible. Next, considering the fact that professionals share less strong feelings of collective identity, we suggested that this clearly illustrates the different purpose of the Social Forum for professional and nonprofessional activists. For professionals the Social Forum fits in a series of opportunities of information exchange and collaborative projects, whereas nonprofessional activists, somewhat stereotypic, experience the Forum more as a personal one-time opportunity to celebrate grassroots democracy with a lot of like-minded activists making a united stance against neoliberal globalization. When studying membership in organizations this is clearly different. Most active members do not participate one single time in a movement organization. With varying degrees, both professionals and nonprofessionals commit themselves to the same organizational project in a more long-term perspective. This explains the strong positive relation between ideological commitment and levels of professionalization as found by Oliver (1983) in her study about members of the same national movement organization.

Our findings point to the following interesting and seeming contradiction: a professional participant's high involvement in the set-up and preparation of the Forum does not lead to stronger feelings of collective identity and commitment to the other participants. Instead their emotional interest and commitment seems to be focused on their own

entrepreneurial work and engagements. As indicated, one explanation could be that their higher involvement confronts them with more, and more different people and organizations, representing diverging issues and conveying different opinions. An other explanation could be that, in line with the notion of "movement entrepreneurs" (McCarthy and Zald 1973), these participants indeed behave as movement professionals, trying to obtain their own organization's goals through their Forum contacts and activities, rather than that they see themselves as being part of a joint struggle and a democratic process. For professionals the Forum should in the first place be instrumental for their own social entrepreneurial work. In contrast we have the nonprofessional activist, with strong feelings of collective identity, but who is probably not engaging in future actions with the people they have met at the Forum. For them the Social Forum is a one-time experience, which leads to interesting contacts and information exchanges that are useful for their commitments back home, but which does not lead to a continued and joint struggle for the ESF common targets. Nonprofessionals are the voluntary idealists: it is more about getting a taste of the Forum, than really advancing in substantive future collaboration. This claim is further supported by the fact that most nonprofessional participants are "local" people, people living nearby the Social Forum venues. At the next Social Forum, taking place in another European country, most of these people will likely not be able to attend the Forum anymore.

In sum, professional and nonprofessional participants are different people and they do different things prior and during the Forum. In other words, professional and nonprofessional activists have different roles to fulfill. Especially and potentially problematic is the absolute underrepresentation of nonprofessional activists in the set-up and organization of the Social Forum. Stated somewhat bluntly, this may eventually entail a threat to the ideal of radical democracy due to a state of factual technocracy. Some critics wonder whether the Social Forum can ever be truly democratic since many people, groups and organizations lack significant resources, both financial and social, necessary to simply attend and even more so to take up an active role in actual decision-making processes (Pleyers 2004), and this seems especially problematic for nonprofessional participants. In that respect the Social Forum has also been criticized of "champagne activism": "open only to those who can afford the time and money to fly around the world and discuss global problems" (Glasius and Timms 2006: 225). This criticism should, however, not make us blind for important positive conclusions we can draw from our results. What we can learn from our study for the

Social Forum and for many other social movement organizations is that differences between nonprofessional and professional activists should be identified and used as an asset rather than as a potential problem. Professional and nonprofessional activists complement each other. In fact, what we find is that professional activists are those people that look for a sustained collaborative project. They have a sincere commitment and emotional interest in their movement work. As such the Social Forum is an important venue for these kinds of people to set up new activities, exchange ideas about past experiences and deepen the debate about alternative solutions for the many problems our world is confronted with. It seems, however, to be the nonprofessional activist that provides “the fire in the belly” as they intermittently supply the Forum with an emotional impetus, a sincere indignation and anger about the same world problems. And this is equally fundamental for the survival of the Forum. In other words, there is an important symbiosis between professional and nonprofessional participants; a symbiosis that is likely present in many other social movement organizations and events as well. Our result may also imply that for the continuance of the Social Forum (and similar grassroots, non-hierarchical social movements and organizations) some level of professionalization and formalization is indispensible.

Appendix

Table 3.4
Operationalization and Question wording

Variable	Question wording	Values
Socio-demographic backgrounds		
Female	Are you a man or a woman?	0 'man' – 1 'woman
Age	How old are you?	In years
Education	What is the highest qualification you gained?	1 'none' – 8 'University'
Nationality	What is your nationality?	Open question recoded into 4 categories
Activist network integration		
Via various organizations	Could you indicate which sorts of groups/organizations you are an active, passive or board member of?	List of 17 different associations. Summation of active/board memberships
Via past Forum experiences	Indicate whether you participated at the ESF in Florence, Paris and/or London	Summation of checked boxes.
General beliefs and motivations		
General political interest	How interested are you in politics?	1 'not' – 5 'very much'
Left/right scale	In politics, one can hear about 'the left' and 'the right'. In the scheme below, '1' stands for someone who is situated completely 'on the left', en '10' for someone who is situated completely 'on the right'. When you consider your own opinions, where would you place yourself on this scale?	1 'left' – 10 'right'
Specific beliefs and emotions		
Collective efficacy	How high are the chances that the Athens ESF will boost mobilization or give visibility to the common targets of the social movements participating in the Athens ESF?	1 'little chance' – 7 'high chance'
Personal efficacy	Will you be organizing future activities around common themes with the people you met at the Athens ESF?	0 'no' – 1 'yes'
Collective identity	To which degree do you agree or disagree with the following statements? *"I have a lot in common with the other people present at the Athens ESF."*	Summation of three questions and recoded to 5-point scale: 1 'fully disagree' – 5 'fully

	"I feel committed to the other ESF participants." *"I identify strongly with the others present at the Athens ESF."*	agree' Cronbach's Alpha: .822
Reactive emotionality	Could you indicate on the scales below to what extent you have experienced, before you attended the Athens ESF, certain feelings regarding the most important issue of the Forum? *Anger* *Indignation*	Summation of two emotions, recoded to 7-point scale. 1 'Not' – 7 'A lot'
Affective emotionality.....	*Hope* *Solidarity*	Summation, recoded to 7-point scale. 1 'Not' – 7 'A lot'
Types of involvement		
Preparation of the Forum	How were you involved in the organizing process of the Athens ESF? **Involved within one ore more inter/intra-organizational group decisions in your country* **Attended one or more meetings of the European Preparatory Assembly, or served as a liaison for your group in the ESF planning process* **Participated in the Greek Program Workgroup* **Served on the Systematize working group* **Other*	If one of these boxes was ticked, a participant was involved in the preparation. 0 'no' – 1 'yes'
Responsible during Forum	Were you responsible for any of the following activities at the Athens ESF? **Conference/meeting* **Seminar* **Workshop* **Dialogue table* **Demonstration, march* **Cultural or artistic activity* **Other*	If one of these boxes was ticked, a participant was responsible. 0 'no' – 1 'yes'
Meet participants from other countries.....	Did you get to know other participants from other countries at the Athens ESF?	0 'no' – 1 'yes'
Meet known participants.....	Did you have personal contact with other Athens ESF participants prior to the Athens ESF with the intention to meet there? Did you actually meet this/these person(s) at the Athens forum itself?	Combination of two questions. Zero means no contact or did not meet. 0 'no' – 1 'yes'

4

Activists “Online” and “Offline”

The Internet as an Information Channel for Protest Demonstrations

Abstract

Using individual-level data of actual protest participants in nine different protest demonstrations in Belgium, this article compares activists using the Internet and activists not using the Internet as an information channel about an upcoming demonstration. We find that “online” and “offline” activists differ significantly in terms of socio-demographic and political backgrounds, formal network and organizational embeddedness, and to some extent motivational aspects. The findings suggest that using digital communication channels likely extends, but at the same time narrows the mobilizing potential to a public of experienced, organizationally embedded activists. The Internet is principally used by “super-activists:” highly educated, with a lot of experience and combining multiple engagements at the same time. The article then discusses these results in light of two focal problems: that the Internet reinforces participation inequalities, and that the Internet might prove insufficient for sustained collective action participation and the maintenance of future social movement organizations. This chapter is single-authored and published in Mobilization as: Van Laer, Jeroen. 2010. ‘Activists “online” and “offline”: Internet as an Information Channel for Protest Demonstrations’. *Mobilization: An International Journal*. 15 (3): pp.347-366.

Activists “Online” and “Offline”

The Internet as an Information Channel for Protest Demonstrations

Introduction

The last decade has seen a boom in digital information and communication technologies (ICTs). In this time ICTs have become ubiquitous. The diffusion of ICTs occurred much more rapidly than earlier technological advancements such as the telephone or the TV. Such revolutionary change has obviously led to important changes in many spheres of life, and to politics in particular (DiMaggio, Hargittai, Neuman and Robinson 2001; Norris 2001). Possibly more than in other realms of politics, extra-institutional politics features social movement organizations and activists who are keen adopters of these new communication technologies (Almeida and Lichbach 2003; van de Donk et al. 2004). ICTs, in particular the Internet, are argued to greatly facilitate mobilization and participation in several collective action repertoires such as mass street demonstrations, by effectively and rapidly diffusing communication and mobilization efforts. A recent example was the worldwide mobilization on February 15, 2003 against the imminent war in Iraq. In this one- day globally coordinated event millions of people took to the streets in more than 60 different countries. Several authors have demonstrated that this event would not likely have been as massive and diverse without the coordinating and mobilizing capacity of the Internet (Cortright 2004; Carty and Onyett 2006; Vasi 2006; Bennett, Breunig and Givens 2008; Verhulst 2010).

Certainly, the Internet has a substantial impact on the manner in which contemporary movements and activists organize, coordinate, and mobilize for collective action (Ayres 1999; Bennett 2003). However, contrary to the early “cyber-enthusiasts” (e.g. Rheingold 1993; Coleman 1999), several scholars are increasingly skeptical and even

pessimistic about the Internet's potential to "invigorate democracy" and fuel political participation among "resource-poor" citizens (e.g. Hill and Hughes 1998; Margolis and Resnick 2000; Norris 2001; Scheufele and Nisbet 2002). Di Gennaro and Dutton (2006: 311-12) conclude that "online political participation [is] reinforcing and in some cases exacerbating some of the existing social inequalities in offline political participation by marginalizing the less educated and those from lower socioeconomic groups." Therefore an initial problem with the Internet is that, if Internet use indeed favors or disfavors certain issues and grievances to be attended to by social movements and collective action, this might threaten the democratic potential of social movements (Tilly 2004: 155). Citizens using the Internet may be better equipped to express their grievances, and more importantly, may represent *other* grievances more than people *not* using the Internet. In this case Internet use might indeed reinforce existing inequalities among the activists participating in protest actions.

A second problem is more related to the strength of commitment. Earl and Schussman (2003), for instance, contend that the rise of "e-activism" has created protest "users" rather than "members," meaning that the fast growing support and diffusion of protest enabled via the Internet is followed by an even faster decline in commitment. Because of its low entry costs Internet allows citizens to easily opt in and opt out of different protest issues and causes following their individual preferences and current priorities. But, over the long-run, Internet, as a "weak-tie instrument par excellence" (Kavanaugh, Reese, Carroll and Rosson 2005), may be found insufficient to create a sustainable network of activists, endangering the maintenance and coordination of future social movement organizations (Bennett 2003; Tilly 2004). Many scholars studying the impact of digital media on mobilization and collective action have principally focused on how these media changed mobilization and coordination capacities of social movement organizations and alternative groups within civil society (see, among others: Hajnal 2002; Meikle 2002; Clark and Themudo 2003; McCaughey and Ayers 2003; van de Donk et al. 2004). Only a few studies have explicitly focused on actual protest participants, formally and not formally linked to particular movement organizations, and how digital media might have changed participation dynamics on the micro-level of collective action (but see: della Porta and Mosca 2005). Many questions remain unanswered about how different kinds of activists, mobilized around different types of issues and distinct types of social movements, employ new communication technologies as a means to be informed on and be mobilized for collective action. In this article we present

original evidence of individual activists who actually participated in various protest demonstrations that took place between February 2006 and December 2007 in Belgium. By means of a fairly novel protest surveying technique, asking protest participants during various protest demonstrations to fill in a questionnaire, we can distinguish between activists who are informed about upcoming demonstrations via the Internet from activists who do not use this digital medium. The central question in this article is *do we find differences between protest participants using the Internet and participants not using the Internet as an information channel about an upcoming demonstration?* We will focus on activist's socio-demographic and political backgrounds, their network and organizational embeddedness, and their motivations to participate in a specific demonstration.

Internet Use and Protest Participation: Theory and Hypotheses

The Internet and other new communication technologies can significantly reduce "transaction costs" for groups and activists organizing, mobilizing, and participating in collective action by changing the way in which information is published and accessed (Bonchek 1995; Naughton 2001). The Zapatista uprising in 1994 and the subsequent worldwide support for the indigenous people of Chiapas struggling for greater autonomy is a well-known case in point to illustrate how the Internet can facilitate protest and the global diffusion of solidarity (see, among others: Cleaver 1998; Ronfeldt and Arquilla 1998; Schulz 1998). The so-called "Battle in Seattle," referring to the demonstrations held in that city in late 1999 against the WTO, offers another exemplary moment of protest action in the Internet age (see Eagleton-Pierce 2001; Van Aelst and Walgrave 2004; Juris 2005). Very recently millions of Colombian people took to the streets to protest against the FARC, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. Initially, the call for this mass mobilization was made via an affinity group on the popular social network site Facebook. The group was set up early January 2008 and less than a month later over 4 million people were protesting in a global day of action in dozens of cities in Colombia and the rest of the world (Vargas Llosa 2008). As these examples show, the Internet is somehow conducive in increasing the awareness about collective action events on a much wider and even international scale (Ayres 1999). In no time activists across geographical and social boundaries can easily be invited via

web pages and listservs, blogs or virtual calendars to participate in demonstrations and rallies (van de Donk and Foederer 2001; Bennett 2003; Bédoyan, Van Aelst and Walgrave 2004).

In this article we investigate the role of the Internet in raising awareness about different protest demonstrations and how this is associated with specific activists' characteristics and related mobilization and participation dynamics. We will argue that the use of the Internet as an information channel about upcoming demonstrations is related to protester's personal backgrounds, their social and organizational network embeddedness, and their motivations to actually participate in collective action. The threefold distinction between demographics/attitudes, networks, and motivations refers to Verba, Schlozman, and Brady's (1995) classic explanation of political participation, arguing that people participate because they *can*, because they are *asked to*, and because they *want to*. People *can* participate because, first of all, their present personal and professional demands do not hinder participation (e.g. students are more likely to participate because they generally have fewer demands on their time; see McAdam 1988). Second, they hold certain beliefs and political attitudes that make them more susceptible to participate (Downton and Wehr 1997), essentially pointing to some kind of "attitudinal availability" that complements "biographical" availability. People are more likely to be *asked to* participate when they are embedded in a network of interpersonal relations. Network ties, both informal (with friends or family) as well as formal (with co- members in an organization) are consequently found to be a strong and robust predictor of protest participation (Snow et al. 1980; Schussman and Soule 2005). Finally, people participate because they *want to*. People participating in collective action, at least, are willing to do so (Klandermans 1997). But, their motivation, or the different motives and reasons why they do so, can be very diverse, as we will discuss in the next section. The idea that this article is built upon is that each of these three sets of individual protest participant characteristics to a certain degree explains the extent to which actual protest participants were aware about upcoming demonstrations via digital information channels. In the next three sections we outline this relationship building on previous literature and generate some hypotheses.

Personal Backgrounds and Internet Use

As previous studies have shown, a considerable part of the population lacks access to the Internet or, if one does have access, lacks the willingness or capabilities of using this medium for political ends (Norris 2001; Jennings and Zeitner 2003; Mossberger, Tolbert and Stansbury 2003; Van Dijk 2005). The result, according to some scholars, is a "deepening digital divide" between the political active and less-active citizens; a divide which is highly associated with specific personal backgrounds: citizens with higher SES-markers (e.g. being male, having higher educational levels, and/or a higher socio-economic status), and with general higher levels of political interest and experience are more likely to use the Internet, and use it for political ends. Our first hypothesis, thus, is very straightforward and states that also among our sample of activists, people actually participating in mass street demonstrations, *those with higher SES-markers and levels of political interest and experience are more likely to use the Internet in order to be informed about upcoming protest events and opportunities* (H1).

Network Embeddedness and Internet Use

As mentioned, formal and informal networks are key in pulling people into collective action (e.g. Diani and McAdam 2003; Diani 2004; Schussman and Soule 2005). Many scholars have argued that the Internet plays a significant role in producing and sustaining social relations and networks relevant to civic engagement (Wellman and Hampton 1999; Wellman 2001; Kavanaugh et al. 2005; Boase, Horrigan, Wellman and Rainie 2006). For collective action and participation in demonstrations, the Internet is important in at least two ways: by first of all reinforcing existing networks in which activists are embedded, facilitating communication and interaction capacities across diverse networks and engagements, and second, by expanding new networks, increasing the chances of being asked to take part in collective action.

Regarding existing social networks, some recent studies point to a strong association between activists holding multiple and diverse relations, and Internet use (della Porta and Mosca 2005; Bennett et al. 2008; Walgrave, Bennett, Van Laer and Breunig 2011). Activists, these authors claim, use the Internet to maintain and reinforce multiple engagements and relationships across issue and organizational boundaries. The more a person holds multiple engagements, both in different organizations as well for different causes, the more important

digital media become to be able to "manage" these different engagements and related information and communication streams.

With regard to expanding social networks—increasing the chances of being asked—Kavanaugh and colleagues (2005), drawing on Granovetter's (1973) seminal article on "the strength of weak ties," empirically demonstrate how the Internet enhances information exchange and social relations by also increasing face-to-face interactions. In turn, these processes help to build both strong and weak ties across diverse cliques, groups and individuals. Strong ties are perhaps more effective when it comes to activation, but it is the weak ties that enable information to travel beyond group boundaries (Walgrave and Klandermans 2010). In this sense the "Netville study" by Wellman and colleagues (2003) is exemplary in showing how the Internet is applied as a new form of social infrastructure that can be easily and effectively used to mobilize for (local) protest. Their claim is that Internet use also coincides with new kinds of participation dynamics where formal relationships in social movement organizations, groups and local solidarities seem to matter less, but instead people belong to more spatially dispersed, loosely-knit personal networks heavily mediated through electronic communications (Castells 1996; Rheingold 2002; Wellman 2002; Wellman et al. 2003). One of the consequences is that, with the Internet, people are able to bypass organizational-based memberships and mobilization trajectories (Bimber, Flanagin and Stohl 2005).

In light of the literature it seems reasonable to expect that that *the more activists are embedded in formal or informal networks, the more likely the Internet is used as an information channel about upcoming demonstrations* (H2).

Another recurrent argument is that some people tend to use the Internet because of the *kind* of organization or network they are a member of. Organizations and activists related to the so-called Global Justice Movement (GJM) are said to be especially keen users of the Internet and other ICTs because these tools "match" their organizational and ideological needs (among others: Klein 2002; Bennett 2003). The horizontal, open architecture of the Internet neatly reflects the web-like nature of the Global Justice Movement, a flexible and ever-changing network of activists, groups and communities (Day 2004; Juris 2005). More established movement organizations, such as trade unions, tend to implement new communication technologies more slowly and often inadequately (Ward and Lusoli 2003). For

these established organizations ICTs are mere extensions or amplifications of existing communication routes (Bennett 2003), where new social movements, like the GJM, and the interaction with their "members" may be in large part defined by the Internet (Graber, Bimber, Bennett, Davis and Norris 2004). For example, ATTAC, which is a global network of different national groups working around debt issues, solely communicates with its adherents via the Internet (George 2000). The question of different movement backgrounds has of course important consequences on the supply-side of specific kind of (digital) information channels. It may well be the case that, for instance, a trade union activist is keen on using the Internet as an information channel, but that his or her union just does not provide any information about an upcoming demonstration online.

Therefore we expect that *activists participating in different demonstrations on different issues also differ in their use of digital media as a way to be informed about an upcoming demonstration* (H3). For instance, activists who are committed to so-called "new social movement" issues are more likely to use the Internet for information compared to those activists that are taking part in events staged by established movement organizations, like trade unions.

Motivations to Participate and Internet Use

The reasons people participate in collective action are manifold and the social movement literature about this subject is vast. Klandermans (2004: 361) analytically distinguishes between instrumentality, collective identity, and ideology. Instrumentality points to motives directed at social and political change of an aggrieved situation or social problem. Broadly defined, instrumental motives are about the belief that something can be changed and that participating in a demonstration is an effective means to do so. Motivations stemming from collective identity, on the other hand, emerge from a participants' feel of group belonging and in-group solidarity (cf. Melucci 1988; Gamson 1992). Strong feelings of collective identity make collective action participation a goal in itself (Goodwin et al. 2001a). Finally, ideological motivations are rooted in an expression of one's views, a search for meaning out of a sense of moral indignation (Klandermans 2004: 361). People do not solely participate to enforce political change, but also to express their anger and grievances, their feelings of injustice and other emotions about a certain issue or situation. In the remainder of

this article we therefore follow Verhulst and Walgrave (2009) and refer to ideology as an "emotional motive." Emotions and general cultural explanations of collective action participation have only recently regained attention of social movement scholars (Jasper 1997; Aminzade et al. 2001). In the previous section we highlight the centrality of network ties for explaining collective action participation. But, according to Goodwin and colleagues (2001a) networks are in fact omnipresent, and are only so important because they consists of affective ties, emotional bonds, that bind and preserve these networks (cf. Passy 2001).

Since the Internet may enhance the creation and maintenance of social networks, motives for participation may be also reinforced. Through the Internet and diverse online networking tools people can "discover" other people who share similar problems and concerns, thereby developing a collective identity (Myers 1994). By putting reports, photographs or video images online, a whole new range of people, formally or not formally attached to particular movement organizations, can share in the excitement of an action as a result of which support and participation in subsequent events may develop (van de Donk and Foederer 2001). Instrumental motives can be strengthened too. For most people group size is the most prominent evidence of a group's efficacy (Marwell and Oliver 1993). On social network sites like Facebook one can actually "see" the number of supporters growing. Fisher and colleagues (2005) show that Internet resources are crucial for Global Justice activists to stay more closely connected to related global causes and to engage in struggles that targets transnational actors. This proved to be particularly important as activists found that global protests such as those against the World Bank and IMF in Washington do not actually consist of a global protest population. It is rather through electronic resources that concerned participants within nation-states are aware of similar struggles and participate in worldwide actions.

The literature discussed above suggests there is a positive relationship between Internet use and different motives. However, we are dealing with a very specific sample of respondents in this article: people that actually took part in a protest demonstration. All the people we interviewed are of course motivated to do so, otherwise they would not be there. The extent to which the Internet is significantly influencing different motivational aspects, clearly differentiating online from offline activists, may prove rather limited. Therefore, we expect that *there is only a small positive association between different motivational aspects*

(instrumentality, identity and emotional motives) and using the Internet for information about upcoming demonstrations (H4).

Data and Methods

In order to analyze the three sets of activist characteristics across diverse protest issues between participants using the Internet as an information channel and participants not using the Internet, we distributed individual-level protest surveys at nine different demonstrations on various issues that took place in Belgium between February 2006 and December 2007. For each of these demonstrations a standardized sampling and interview procedure was followed as introduced by Favre and colleagues (1997) and further refined by Van Aelst and Walgrave (2001) and Walgrave and Verhulst (2011): two groups of interviewers, each directed by a fieldwork supervisor, hand out similar questionnaires asking protesters to fill in the survey at home and send it back with the prepaid envelope. The fieldwork supervisor selects the participants to be interviewed in order to reduce possible selection bias. A short face-to-face interview with each respondent makes it possible to check for response bias. Protest participants were picked out according to a carefully designed selection method following a probabilistic logic: a rough estimation of the number of attendants is made, which is then turned into an estimation of demonstration rows. In every n^{th} row, surveys are handed out to attendants alternatively in the middle of a row and at the left- and right-hand side of it. A first group of interviewers moves from the head of the demonstration towards the tail. A second group carries out the same procedure, but starting from the tail up to the front of the demonstration. This way every protester should have a similar "chance" to participate in the survey. This method proved to generate reliable results and only minimal response bias (the only bias is that older people are somewhat more willing to send the survey back). A more detailed description of this method, difficulties in the actual execution, and reliability tests can be found in Walgrave and Verhulst (2011).

Table 4.1 provides descriptive figures and facts and response rates for each demonstration. Appearing first are three demonstrations traditionally labeled as "new social movements" covering issues like migrant rights (Sans Papiers—demanding more rights and legal papers), peace and antiwar (Antiwar—against the enduring occupation of Iraq), and

environmental concerns (Climate Change). A second subset of demonstrations is typically labeled as "old social movements," stage by long-established movement organizations. On the one hand some very typical trade union mobilizations organized around characteristic "bread and butter" issues. InBev is focused on restructuring of a beer multinational, VW Vorst is focused on possible redundancies in a large car factory, and Purchasing Power was mobilized against inflation and decreased purchasing power. On the other hand there is also an old nationalist social movement in this subset (cf. Kriesi et al. 1995): a demonstration organized by a coalition of the Flemish nationalist movement and some right-wing nationalist student organizations. The principle issue in the Flemish March was Flemish independence, an issue that attracted many political far-right militants.

Dependent and Independent Variables

Finally, there is rather a-typical subset of demonstrations labeled as "new emotional movements" (cf. Walgrave and Manssens 2000; Walgrave and Verhulst 2006). What is distinct about these protest events is they are spontaneous and emotional with no clear movement organizations involved in staging the event, and without a clear-cut cleavage around which participants are mobilized, and hence attract a very diverse and broad group of citizens. They are typically organized following an act of random violence (cf. Million Mom March in the U.S.). The March for Joe and the Silent March were both staged after the brutal killings of innocent people: first a youngster named Joe Van Holsbeeck, murdered during a mugging, and second a two year old girl Luna and her Malian nanny, killed during a racist shooting in the city of Antwerp.

General response rates for these demonstrations are satisfying, with an average of 34 percent. The lowest figures can be found for the InBev and the Sans Papiers event (14 and 17 percent). At the InBev demonstration the general atmosphere was very hostile and many participants refused to take a survey. At the Sans Papiers demonstration a lot of participants were migrants who did not speak the interviewer's language (French or Dutch). These low figures might threaten comparability with the other demonstrations, yet their value was considered sufficient to include here. Luckily, both demonstrations belong to a different movement type, so that for comparisons across movements the problem of comparability can

Table 4.1
Descriptive Figures and Response Rates for Each Demonstration

Name……	Sans Papiers	Antiwar 2006	InBev	March for Joe	Silent March	VW Vorst	Flemish March	Climate Change	Purchasing Power
Movement type….	NSM	NSM	OSM	NEM	NEM	OSM	OSM	NSM	OSM
Time……	25 Feb 2006	19 Mar 2006	28 Mar 2006	23 Apr 2006	26 May 2006	2 Dec 2006	6 May 2007	8 Dec 2007	15 Dec 2007
Place……	Brussels	Brussels	Leuven	Brussels	Antwerp	Brussels	Rode	Brussels	Brussels
Aim……	Rights and respect illegal immi-grants	Against occupation of Iraq	Against restructuring InBev beer multi-national	Against random violence + in memoriam Joe Van Holsbeeck	Against racism + in memoriam victims racist killings	Against restructuring VW car factory	More autonomy for Flemish region	Against global warming and climate change	Against inflation and lowering purchasing power
# participants……	10	5	2	80	20	15	1,5	3	20
# questionnaires									
Distributed…..	858	915	722	1018	1131	878	554	548	398
Completed…..	149	316	98	437	437	270	235	185	126
Response (%)……	17	34	14	43	39	31	42	34	32

Note: NSM = New Social Movement; OSM = Old Social Movement; NEM = New Emotional Movement

be partly addressed by the other demonstrations. Our dataset across movement types and diverse demonstration issues implying a great deal of contextual differences, allows for a robust test for any general theory and propositions about how the use of Internet is associated with particular activist characteristics.

In order to differentiate between activists that used the Internet for information about upcoming demonstrations, and activists that did not make use of digital mobilization channels, we asked respondents *"How did you find out about today's demonstration?"* Respondents could indicate several possibilities: TV and radio; newspapers; ads and flyers; posters; family and friends; colleagues and fellow students; magazines of an organization; co-members of an organization; websites; personal e-mail; and/or mailing lists. "Online" activists are then all the respondents that indicated that they used websites and/or personal e-mail to find out about the upcoming demonstration. We explicitly choose not to include mailing lists since these are highly organizationally embedded and "server-side" directed, whereas personal email and browsing organization's websites entail a personal or "user-side" behavior in the first place. We thus compare activists that are actively using the Internet as an information channel, with activists that either do not have access to the Internet or just do not make use of the Internet. In contrast to most studies we do not differentiate between Internet usage in terms of "access." Here we combine both access as well as effective use of Internet as an information channel, which is—regarding our central question about using the Internet as an information channel for collective action—a more useful way of measuring Internet use. Our dependent variable measures the *actual source of information* of an upcoming demonstration.

Looking across the different demonstrations we find large variation in our dependent variable (Table 4.2), with the least Internet usage among participants at the two new emotional events, e.g. March for Joe (14 percent) and Silent March (25 percent). Activists participating in the Antiwar demonstration (69 percent), the Climate Change event (61 percent), and the Flemish March (66 percent) display the highest level of Internet usage. It is clear that Internet is an important information channel for most of the covered demonstrations. Both for the "old" as well as the "new" social movements, the Internet seemed to have played some role in informing participants. The usual suspects however stand out: Antiwar protesters and participants at the Climate Change demonstration extensively reported that they were informed via digital communication channels. Interestingly, this is

also the case for the participants at the nationalist demonstration advocating Flemish independence.

Table 4.2
Descriptives of Dependent Variable Across Demonstrations

Demonstration	N	Internet for information about demonstration % usage
New Social Movements		
Sans Papiers	149	47.7
Antiwar.....	316	68.7
Climate Change	189	52.4
New Emotional Movements		
March for Joe	437	13.7
Silent March	437	17.8
Old Social Movements		
InBev.....	98	48.0
VW Vorst	272	57.7
Flemish March.....	238	66.0
Purchasing Power.....	125	48.4

As indicated earlier these figures also indicate that the use of digital information channels is clearly not only a matter of activist backgrounds, but for a great deal also a matter of supply. The lack of organizational backbone among the new emotional events means that the chance that some organization provides a website with information about the upcoming demonstration is much lower. This was especially the case for the March for Joe. For the Silent March, which took place in the city of Antwerp, the local authorities had quickly set up a webpage with some basic information about the start hour and place of the march. Still, only few people seem to have found there way to this website.

For each of the three sub-categories introduced in the theoretical section we have a set of *independent variables*. In the Appendix we explain in detail how each of these variables is constructed. A first set of variables measures several relevant personal backgrounds of online and offline activists: several socio-demographic variables and two variables measuring general political backgrounds (political interest and past protest experience). A second set looks at the formal and informal networks activists are embedded in. It is important to note

that for most participants the Internet was not the only information channel about the upcoming demonstration. For instance, some people found out about the event via friends as well as the Internet, while others only heard about the event through mass media channels. In fact few participants *only* used the Internet for information about the upcoming demonstration. In order to control for these "secondary" information channels, we include three additional variables measuring whether or not a person used informal information channels (friends, family, colleagues, fellow students), formal channels (co-members of an organization, member magazines), and/or or mass media channels (television and radio, newspaper). With these additional variables we can control for the fact that people are using the Internet next to other information channels, and whether these are especially organizational, informal or mass media channels. A third and final group of variables measure activists' motivations: instrumental reasons, motivations related to collective identity, and reasons related to emotional expression.

Results

What is the role of the Internet in raising awareness about upcoming demonstrations and how is this related to specific activist backgrounds? In other words: what are the differences between "online" and "offline" activists taking part in the same protest demonstration? We structure our analyses in three subsequent steps. In a first step we will discuss how several personal background variables predict the use of the Internet for upcoming demonstrations. In second step we introduce the variables related to the activist's network embeddedness, and in a final step we include the motivational aspects. The different analyses are all multivariate binary logistic regression models since our dependent variable is a binary measure (0 = "No usage" and 1 = "Internet use for information"). Because the number of respondents at each demonstration varies considerably, the analysis is based on weighed data such that each demonstration gets an equal weight. In addition to the three sets of independent variables, we also include demonstration dummies in order to control for differences across these demonstrations. This way we can both assess what determinants are most compelling explaining Internet use for upcoming demonstration *regardless of* the demonstration in which one participated, as well as assess whether there are distinct

elements between the different demonstrations when controlled for all the other independent variables. Looking at the demonstrations will also teach us something about the difference between and within different types of movements as introduced in the methodological section. Table 4.3 contains the results. The figures presented are odds ratios and standard errors. A figure larger than 1 denotes a positive relation, while a figure smaller than 1 points to a negative relation. Categorical covariates should be interpreted in the same way but always compared to the reference category as indicated. Asterisks indicate significance levels.

Personal Backgrounds and Internet Use

In our first model we only include the demonstration dummies and the socio-demographic and political background variables. As the pseudo *R*-square (Nagelkerke) indicates Model 1 improves on the null model (without independent variables) (Nagelkerke R-square is .327), indicating that the list of socio-demographic and political background variables is fairly good in predicting who has learned about an upcoming demonstration via the Internet. Moreover, they also seem to address a substantial degree of the difference in Internet use between the demonstrations: we find less significant demonstration dummies in the first model than in the other two models. Except for sex, all other variables yield significant results. Thus, male and female activists all use the Internet as an information channel for upcoming demonstrations to the same degree. On the other hand, those activists that learned about the demonstration via the Internet are more highly educated, have more general interest in politics, and have more experience in previous demonstrations. If one is retired or does not have a job, chances significantly decrease that he or she learned about the demonstration via the Internet. If you are a student (compared to having a full time job) chances increase by 1.5 that you use the Internet as a means to be informed on an upcoming demonstration. These patterns hold across nine different demonstrations and related issue-specific contexts.

Considering these results, the more pessimistic conclusion that the Internet reinforcing inequalities among strong and weaker groups seem to be confirmed (see H1): the Internet is principally used by the higher educated, those with a full-time job, with a lot of interest in politics and with more experience in previous demonstrations. Especially the

Table 4.3
Binary Logistic Regression Explaining Internet Use as an Information Channel

Variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Exp(B)	*S.E.*	*Exp(B)*	*S.E.*	*Exp(B)*	*S.E.*
Personal backgrounds						
Sex	1.104	.108	1.126	.114	1.161	.116
Age	.986**	.005	.976***	.006	.977***	.006
Education	1.139***	.032	1.160***	.034	1.158***	.035
Occupation (Ref = full time)						
Part time	.935	.165	.999	.172	.965	.174
Unemployed	.456***	.182	.511***	.191	.487***	.196
Retired	.422***	.191	.494***	.204	.491***	.209
Student	1.585*	.215	1.318	.226	1.304	.227
Political interest	1.297***	.057	1.176**	.060	1.162*	.061
Protest experience	1.533***	.049	1.362***	.053	1.341***	.053
Network embeddedness						
Member staging organization (Ref = no member)						
Knowing			1.475*	.171	1.511*	.173
Being member			1.929***	.166	1.986***	.168
Organizational diversity			1.212***	.039	1.206***	.040
Protest company (Ref = co-members)						
Alone			.474***	.191	.469***	.193
Partner/family			.488***	.172	.483***	.173
Friends/colleagues			.501***	.149	.531***	.151
Other information channel						
Mass media			1.252	.131	1.263	.133
Family/friends			.843	.115	.828	.117
Co-members			1.032	.130	1.002	.132
Motivations						
Instrumentality					1.036	.037
Collective identity					.976	.069
Emotions (internal scale)					.992	.061
Emotions (external scale)					1.171*	.073
Demonstrations (Ref = purchasing power)						
Sans Papiers	.944	.211	2.040**	.242	2.287***	.252
Antiwar	1.497	.214	2.384***	.237	2.355***	.246
Climate Change	1.002	.205	1.302	.217	1.283	.220
March for Joe	.201***	.247	.449**	.292	.446**	.307
Silent March	.234***	.228	.469**	.259	.477**	.272
InBev	1.190	.202	1.687*	.218	1.631*	.222
VW Vorst	1.694**	.200	1.944**	.214	1.906**	.225
Flemish March	1.950**	.216	3.838***	.248	3.467**	.261
Constant	.112***	.405	.133***	.458	.128***	.579
Pseudo *R*-square	.327		.383		.386	
N	2146		2084		2045	

Notes: Figures are odds ratios (Exp(B)) and Standard Errors (S.E.). Sig. *<.05, **<.01, ***< .001.

political interest and experience are strongly related with Internet use. Those activists showing up at a demonstration for the first time, or with little protest experience, are more likely not using the Internet. On the other hand we see that especially students and/or young activists are using the Internet as an information channel. This result supports more optimistic hypotheses about the Internet as one important pull-factor to (re)connect with young citizens, tuning out from main stream, conventional politics, but tuning in through new participation modes, like political consumerism or grassroots organizing (Norris 2002; Zukin, Keeter, Andolina, Jenkins and Delli Carpini 2006; Dalton 2007), and that especially social movements should make the most out of these digital channels to attract younger people and make them aware of protesting opportunities (Norris 1996; Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley 2003). Thus, despite some persistent inequalities, our results indicate that the Internet is an important medium to connect with students and young activists, although it remains unclear to what extent this will also lead to sustained and continued participation once this cohort of activists enters a new stage in their lifecycle.

Network Embeddedness and Internet Use

Model 2 adds, in addition to the variables included in model 1, several variables measuring the formal and informal networks in which activists are embedded: whether they are member of several organizations, with whom they took to the streets, and which other information channels they used to be informed about the demonstration they participated in. The pseudo *R*-square (Nagelkerke) increases from .327 to .383; a small but statistically significant increase, indicating that Model 2 including this second group of variables, provide a better fit than the first model. Being a member of multiple organizations is strongly associated with using the Internet for information, confirming previous research (cf. Bennett, Breunig and Givens 2008; Walgrave, Bennett, Van Laer and Breunig 2011). Interestingly we find online activists to be especially strongly embedded in formal organizations and networks instead of informal relations. Online activists are not only more likely to be member of multiple organizations; they are also more likely very closely related to the organization co-organizing the event. They are also more likely participating together with co-members of an organization. The Internet is not particularly conducive as a tool for activists *not* close to a movement organization, or for activists participating apart from formal organizational

networks. The Internet mostly seems to be used by people who are linked or even strongly linked to an organization. What follows is the conclusion that the Internet is not particularly used by organizations to connect with people not part of the organization or the organizational network around different protest events.

This result very much contradicts the "weak-tie argument:" information online does not really travel much beyond organizational boundaries, on the contrary, it very much stays within a formal, organizational setting. Activists that are taking to the streets with informal company are significantly less likely to have learned about the upcoming demonstration via the Internet. This is a very important finding with respect to the literature on Internet and the creation and maintenance of weak-ties (cf. Wellman 2002; Kavanaugh et al. 2005). As our results indicate the Internet is primarily used as an instrument confined (although not limited) to organizational practices, meaning that this medium does not really succeed in informing activists outside the organizational core of a protest event. Even in those cases where a sheer organizational backbone is absent (the two new emotional events), we see that still the activist with the strongest organizational profile is much more likely to use the Internet as an information channel.

In sum, we can support our second hypothesis (H2) with this qualification that especially formal network embeddedness is associated with using the Internet as an information tool about upcoming demonstrations.

Motivations to Participate and Internet Use

Finally we introduce several measures related to individual's *motivations*. We operationalized Klandermans' (2004) threefold distinction between instrumentality, collective identity, and ideology, which we termed emotional motives. Perhaps, although all information about operationalization can be found the Appendix, the latter variable needs additional clarification. Respondents were asked how they felt about the theme of the demonstration, and to indicate on a 7-point scale for six different emotions whether they felt this emotion "not at all" or "very much." A factor analysis reveals two separate dimensions among this group of emotions: a first component with indignation and more "inward" directed emotions like sadness, concern, and fear; and a second component also with indignation, but now clustered with more "external" directed emotions like militancy and

anger. Intuitively, but also theoretically, these dimensions point to two logical types of activists who are both indignant about a certain issue, but for a first group this indignation is more related with personal, "soft" emotions, whereas for a second group feelings of indignation are more related to some sort of group-based anger (cf. van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer and Leach 2004; van Stekelenburg 2006). What we use in the analysis are the factor scores of each component.

In general adding the motivational variables does not really improve upon the prediction of the previous models (Nagelkerke *R*-square increases with .003), indicating that only limited difference exist between online and offline activists in terms of instrumentality, collective identity or emotional motives. The only significant finding is that differences exist between online and offline activists in terms of some group-based anger: those who feel indignation associated with anger and militancy have more likely learned about the upcoming demonstration via Internet. Instrumentality and feelings of collective identity do not significantly differ between online and offline activists. Using the Internet thus seems not particularly conducive in creating a stronger collective identity or reinforcing the perceived efficacy of the demonstration they participated in. That online activists display higher levels of emotional motivations where some sort of group-based anger is the leitmotiv is perfectly in line with the previous section's findings of strong associations between Internet use and formal organizational embeddedness. As research of van Stekelenburg (2006) shows, strong organizational associations are directly related with stronger feelings of group-based anger. In general we can support our hypothesis (H4), that there is only a small association between different motivational aspects and Internet use, but that the significant association that we do find is indeed positive.

Ultimately, we find for each group of independent variables one or more significant explanations of Internet use as an information channel for a demonstration. So "online" and "offline" activists differ in terms of socio-demographic and political backgrounds, network embeddedness, and in terms of motivational aspects. The latter group of variables does not really add much to the model, though. Looking at the socio-demographic/political variables the model presents statistically significant results for age, educational level, occupational status, interest in politics, and protest experience, meaning the probability of using the Internet as an information channel increases when one is younger, better educated, is a student or has a job (e.g. is not unemployed or retired), is more interested in politics, and has

more experience in previous demonstrations. In terms of network embeddedness the model shows statistically significant results for membership of the organization staging the event, holding multiple organizational engagements, and taking to the streets with co-members of an organization. Formal organizational network embeddedness is thus strongly associated with using the Internet for information about upcoming protest events. The probability of using the Internet increases when one has stronger external directed emotions (indignation associated with anger and militancy), but internal emotions (indignation associated with fear, sadness, or concern), instrumental reasons, and feelings of collective identity are not significant associated.

Finally, the movement dummies also yield strongly significant results. Interestingly, activists participating in old social movement events do not necessarily differ in terms of Internet use from activists participating in new social movement events. In fact the distinction between types of movements would obscure some more interesting issue-specific differences within different movements and between the different demonstrations that we covered. Participants at the Sans Papiers and Antiwar demonstration (both new social movement events) are more likely to use the Internet for information than participants at the Purchasing Power demonstration (an old social movement event), but this is not the case for Climate Change protesters (a new social movement). Both for the InBev, VW Vorst, and Flemish March demonstration (all old social movement events) participants are more likely to use the Internet for information than Purchasing Power attendants. Nationalist participants are nearly 4 times more likely to use the Internet for information, whereas Antiwar demonstrators, often hailed as the all-time Internet users because of their specific activist profile, are only 2.5 times more likely to use digital information channels. The fact that people participating in the new emotional events are using the Internet significantly less than people participating in the other demonstrations again confirms the conclusion that the Internet is particularly used by activists belonging to a formal, organizational network.

Following our third hypothesis (H3) we do find indeed important differences between movement types, but we also find some clear heterogeneity within these types. Participants in new social movement events are not necessarily more depending on digital media channels to learn about the demonstration than participants at old social movement events. Using the Internet is thus not only a matter of activist's backgrounds, network embeddedness, or motivational aspects (the demand side), but also a matter of supply. If

mobilizing messages are ubiquitous in mass media channels, like in the case of the new emotional events, than the need for an easy online website with further practical information becomes almost irrelevant.

Conclusion and Discussion

In this article we investigated the use of the Internet to raise awareness about upcoming demonstrations. This role is related to specific characteristics of those activists who actually participate in protest demonstrations. By means of protest surveys conducted at nine different demonstrations on various issues in Belgium, we were able to collect fairly original evidence on actual protest participants and how they learned about the demonstration they participated in. We investigated the association between awareness online about demonstrations with three distinct sets of activist characteristics: personal backgrounds (socio-demographics and general political features), formal and informal network embeddedness, and motivations to participate in collective action. We principally find that, across nine different demonstrations, activists that learned about the demonstration online, are significantly younger, better educated, more likely to be student or full time employed, have more general interest in politics and previous protest experience, are strongly embedded in formal organizational networks, and display stronger levels of some group-based anger. "Online" activist are significantly less likely to participate in collective action alone or be embedded within informal relationships. Between demonstrations we also find considerable differences, showing that Internet is not necessarily more applied by organizers staging "new social movement demonstrations" than organizations sponsoring "old social movement events," clearly suggesting that using the Internet for raising awareness about upcoming demonstrations is "trickling down" to all kind of movement organizations (Chadwick 2007). Furthermore, demonstrations without any organizational backbone (the so-called "new emotional events") do not rely more on the Internet to "by-pass" the lack of organizational infrastructure, clearly suggesting that awareness via the Internet about upcoming demonstrations also depends on supply-side related factors.

Now, what can we learn from these results, recalling our two focal problems this article started with: Internet reinforces inequalities, and Internet might prove insufficient for

(sustained) collective action participation? At first sight, with respect to socio-demographics a rather pessimistic picture emerges. In terms of Norris (2001), there is a clear "democratic divide:" the Internet is used by those people with higher levels of political interest and activist experience. Moreover, online activists are strongly embedded in formal organizational settings. In other words, in our dataset, the Internet is principally used by "super-activists:" highly educated, with a lot of experience and combining multiple engagements at the same time. Our data suggest that the potential of the Internet to reach beyond these formal organizational networks, informing and mobilizing a broad constituency with only weak ties to the organizations staging a protest event thus far has not been realized. Our dependent variable was explicitly chosen to measure the actual source of information about an upcoming demonstration. But this information, in most cases, does not seem to travel much beyond its organizational boundaries. Using digital communication channels likely extends, but at the same time narrows the mobilizing potential to a public of experienced, organizationally embedded activists.

Should movement organizations be worried about using the Internet too much? It depends. The fact that we could interview both online as well as offline activists shows that unequal Internet use in terms of *who* participates is not necessarily the issue at stake here, as long as the issues and concerns conveyed by these experienced activists resemble those of their non-experienced, offline counterparts. Moreover, although the Internet is successfully implemented in organizational networks, people who lack these "easy" digital information channels still share similar motivations to take to streets to mount their grievances. This is shown in the final model where we found only limited association between Internet use and different motivational aspects. Our findings thus may suggest two mobilizing routes: a first one via formal social networks likely mediated through online information channels, and a second route apart from these networks but fueled by people's own motivations. Even in the absence of formal network ties people can still be prone to participate thanks to strong (but not necessarily stronger) emotions and feelings of injustice. This finding resembles Jasper and Poulsen's (1995) suggestion that emotional responses or motivations rooted in moral shocks can serve as "the functional equivalent of social networks, drawing people into activism by building on their existing beliefs" (Jasper and Poulsen 1995: 498). However, if organizations indeed rely too much on the Internet without reaching beyond their own distinct constituency, this might have important consequences for the maintenance of social

movement organizations. Walgrave and Verhulst (2009) recently explained that attracting a broad and diverse public to attend protest events is crucial for social movements to create a "favorable breeding ground for future actions and mobilizations."

Still, we do not believe our data suggests a pessimistic picture of Internet use as depicted by some other scholars (cf. Earl and Schussman 2003). In their account the Internet creates "users" rather than "members." Again, we see that the Internet is in the first place used in a formal setting among (a network of) members of an organization. Moreover, online activists not only seem to make use of the Internet to be informed about upcoming demonstrations. Using the Internet also seems to be related somehow with sustaining and reinforcing particular motivational elements: "online" activists showed higher levels of some sort of group-based anger. In the end this might have a positive effect on future commitment and participation. The question however whether participation in collective action mediated through digital information channels can indeed be turned into real sustained commitment, still remains open for further research. Since our dataset is a snapshot of collective action participation we cannot answer this question at this stage.

Finally, we should acknowledge the boundaries of this study. Although we presented a very rich and diverse dataset covering evidence on actual protest participants that took part in a variety of demonstrations, we only presented evidence of Belgian protest demonstrations. Belgium, as most Western countries, has a vibrant civil society with a lot of different and often strong movement organizations (e.g. trade unions). It would be interesting to see whether the correlations we find here still hold in other mobilizing contexts where formal organizational networks are less evident. In such cases the Internet might prove an important alternative information channel for activists to learn about protesting opportunities. Hopefully this article will stimulate others to tackle this important issue in future research.

Appendix

Table 4.4
Coding of Different Independent Variables

Variable	Question	Coding
Personal backgrounds		
Sex	Are you a man or a women?	1 = "male" 2 = "female"
Age	How old are you?	In years
Educational level	What is the highest qualification you gained?	From 1 = "no diploma" to 8 = "university"
Occupational status...	What is your current occupation?	1 = "full-time" 2 = "part-time" 3 = "unemployed" 4 = "retired" 5 = "student"
Political interest	"How interested are you in politics?"	From 1 = "not at all" to 5 = "very much"
Protest experience	"Can you estimate how often you have, in the past five years, taken part in a local, national, or international demonstration or manifestation?"	1 = "first time" 2 = "2-5 times" 3 = "6-10 times"
Network embeddedness		
Member staging organization	"Are you a member of one of the organization(s) that organized or helped to organize this demonstration?"	1 = "no" 2 = "no, but know someon who is" 3 = "yes"
Organizational diversity.....	"Can you indicate in the list of organizations and associations below, of which you are a passive member, an active member, a board member, or no member at all?" (Summation of "active" and "board" memberships in 16 different organizations, ranging from political parties to charity groups.)	From 0 = "no memberships" to 16 = "16 different memberships"
Protest company	Initially a multi-response question recoded to one variable each time excluding the least formal category. Thus, if people indicated they were there with friends and members, only "members" was used.	0 = "alone" 1 = "partner / family" 2 "friends/colleagues/students 3 = "co-members"

Motivations		
Instrumentality	"How effective do you think this demonstration will be in reaching [the most important goal]?"	From 1 = "very ineffective" to 7 = "very effective"
Collective identity	Combination of two questions: "I have a lot in common with the other people present today," and "I strongly identify with the other people present today" (Cronbach's alpha = .768)	From 1 = "not at all" to 5 = "very much"
Emotions	Two dimensions were extracted after a factor analysis. Indignation loads on both dimensions to a similar degree. The result is a first dimension where indignation clusters with more internal, soft emotions like sadness and concern; and a second dimension where indignation clusters with more external directed emotions like militancy and anger. Dimension 1: Indignation, concern, fear, sadness Dimension 2: Indignation, anger, militancy	Original scale: From 1 = "not at all" to 7 = "very much"

5

Transnational versus National Activism

A Systematic Comparison of "Transnationalists" and "Nationalists" Participating in the 2006 European and Belgian Social Forums

Abstract

Is activism located at a transnational level any different from activism located at the national or even local level? Is there any difference in terms of backgrounds, attitudes, or behavior among activists that are active on a transnational level and activists that restrict their activities to a national level? Using original evidence of about 700 participants in two Social Forums we find substantial differences between "transnationalists" and "nationalists". Especially in terms of organizational embeddedness: far more than nationalists, transnationalists are formally backed by and engaged in organizations; they tend to officially represent these organizations, belong to the decision-making circle; travel and accommodation have likely been arranged and paid for by their organization. While social movement theory, especially in thinking about transnational activism, increasingly emphasized the informality, networked, non-hierarchical and direct character, our evidence suggest, in contrast, that, much more than in national activism, formal organizations play a key role in producing transnational activism. The scale shift of activism to the transnational level brings organizations back in. This chapter has been originally published as Walgrave, Stefaan and Jeroen Van Laer. 2010. 'Transnational versus National Activism. A Systematic Comparison of 'Transnationalists' and 'Nationalists' Participating in the 2006 European and Belgian Social Forums' in Simon Teune (ed.), *The Transnational Condition. Protest Dynamics in an Entangled Europe*. Oxford: Berghahn Books, pp.23-41. Berghahn Books is listed in the VABB-SHW and requires a strict reviewing process.

Transnational versus National Activists

A Systematic Comparison of "Transnationalists" and "Nationalists" Participating in the 2006 European and Belgian Social Forums

Introduction

Is activism located at a transnational level any different from activism located at the national or even local level? More concrete: is there any difference in terms of backgrounds, attitudes, or behavior among activists that are active on a transnational level and activists that restrict their activities to a national level? While the question may seem trivial, the answers to it are important to understand the apparently spreading transnational activism phenomenon and its repercussions for local grassroots activism. Moreover, the question of whether national and transnational activism is different and whether activists active on one of these levels differ from each other remains largely unresolved and heavily debated. Some scholars claim that transnational activism is a distinct type of activism (e.g. Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor 2001), while others maintain that transnational activists are in the first place just common national or local activists rooted in their local settings (Fisher et al. 2005: 105; Tarrow 2005a).

For more than a decade now, social movement scholars have been focusing heavily on the transnationalization of social movements, protest and contentious politics. One of the main issues is whether classic social movement theories are able to explain transnational movement phenomena (McCarthy 1997). Much of this work focused on the meso- or macro-level. Scholars examined, among other topics, to what extent political opportunities shifted from the national to the transnational level (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Sikkink 2005). Imig and Tarrow (2001), for example, undertook protest event analysis to investigate whether protest

events targeted national or European institutions. Many studies have also focused on the link and interplay between organizations operating at the local, national and/or transnational level, and how much global issues shape national and local organizations (see especially della Porta and Tarrow 2005). So, to some extent, the contradiction between the national and the transnational level is arbitrary and we are more likely confronted with a continuum. But for the sake of the argument and the analysis a sharp difference will be maintained between national and transnational activism. Recently, studies started to tackle the micro-level aspect of transnational activism as well. At all kinds of meetings or protest events staged by the Global Justice Movement (GJM), students of social movements distributed questionnaires and interviewed participants (della Porta, Andretta, Mosca and Reiter 2006). Especially European Social Forums (ESF), the periodical meetings of the GJM emulating the World Social Forum (WSF) initially organized in Porto Alegre, appear to have become the home turf of transnational activism scholars (e.g. Andretta, della Porta, Mosca and Reiter 2002; Agrikoliansky and Sommier 2005; della Porta et al. 2006; della Porta 2009). As a consequence, it is well documented who the people are that attend these transnational forums. They tend to be fairly young, highly educated, mostly women and with middle-class backgrounds; they have a left-wing political orientation, they tend to be motivated by diverse values such as democratization, social justice, solidarity and anti-capitalism, and they distrust the traditional political institutions; many of them are committed activists with active movement memberships and a history of protest participation (della Porta *et al.* 2006).

Remarkably, very few of these available studies systematically compare transnational activists with national activists. Even the seminal work of Donatella della Porta and colleagues (2006) on the 2002 ESF in Florence, Italy, did not engage in a systematic comparison of national—that is, Italian—and transnational—that is, non-Italian—participants. To be sure, the authors did present some evidence on differences between the different nationalities present in Florence, but rather than comparing national with transnational activists, their goal was to demonstrate that people from different countries have different backgrounds that reflect the diverging political cultures and social movement sectors in their respective countries. The point della Porta and colleagues make is that transnational activists differ from each other rather than that transnational activists differ from national activists. However, a systematic national-transnational comparison can be helpful to grasp the drivers

of transnational protest and to test whether it really differs from activism that is confined within the national borders.

If transnational activism is something special that is 'produced' by particular prior characteristics, attitudes and behavior, transnational activists would systematically differ from national activists. If transnational activism, in contrast, is similar to national or local activism, transnational activists would have a lot in common with national activists. Consequently, if both types of participants are fairly similar, chances are high that the same theories can be used to explain both transnational and national/local activism; but if both types of activists differ a lot also different theories are needed to explain their activism or, at least, existing theories should be revised to grasp the particularities of transnational activism.

This chapter, therefore, provides a systematic comparison of 'transnational' and 'national' participants taking part in the same social forums. Surveys among participants in Social forums offer an excellent design to test whether transnational activism is different from national/local activism. Consider the World or the European Social Forum. A part of the participants always are locals: they attend an international meeting but they do so in their own region, country or even city. Schönleitner (2003: 136), for instance, has described this 'regional imbalance' for the first WSF in Porto Alegre, Brazil: more than 60 per cent came from South America. Considerable efforts were taken to attract delegates from more countries at the second WSF, also held in Porto Alegre. However, despite these efforts, still more than 55 per cent of the participants came from Brazil alone. The other participants in the same event, people from abroad who travelled to participate in the forum, can be considered as 'pure' transnational activists. The opposite applies to the national social forums that are organized in many countries; almost all of the participants of these forums are nationals. Yet, among these nationals, some have previously attended social forums abroad and thus can be considered transnational activists. It is this double comparison that this chapter builds upon. A few hundred participants were surveyed in the ESF in 2006 in Athens, Greece, and in the Belgian Social Forum (BSF) organized in 2006 in Brussels, Belgium. Within both groups of participants, 'transnational' activists are compared with 'national' activists.

Hypotheses

As mentioned above, few studies have engaged in systematically comparing national with transnational activists or even in theorizing on the differences between national and transnational activists. Thus, hypotheses will remain tentative and explorative. The largest effort to systematically chart transnational activism on a micro-level has been undertaken by della Porta and colleagues (2006). They sampled participants at the 2002 ESF in Florence and at the major anti-G8 demonstration in Genoa in 2001. Implicitly, this study, suggestively entitled 'Globalization from below', claims that people who participate in transnational events share specific common features that may distinguish them from other activists. This becomes clear when the authors state, in the methods section of their study, that they excluded the Tuscans, living close to or even in Florence, from the Italian sample as 'they had a different profile from other participants in terms of sociodemographic dimensions (gender, age, education, social condition): geographically close to the event, Tuscans needed a lower commitment than Italians from other regions to participate in the ESF' (della Porta *et al.* 2006: 24, emphasis removed). This quote contains the main argument for expecting differences between national and transnational activists: costs to participate in transnational events abroad are much higher and this high barrier can be compensated by, amongst others, a higher commitment. The fact that 'costly' participation in terms of time, money and risk requires a certain structural availability with less conflicting personal engagements is by now a classic postulate of the social movement literature (McAdam 1988).

Sidney Tarrow (Tarrow 2005b: 7) also recognizes that 'forming transnational social movements is not easy'. A precondition for the formation of transnational movements, Tarrow ascertains, is the existence of a stratum of what he calls 'rooted cosmopolitans'. Although firmly domestically embedded and drawing on domestic resources and opportunities, these people engage in transnational contacts and transactions. They form a distinct segment in society that was less available before. 'They are a stratum of individuals who travel regularly, read foreign books and journals and become involved in networks of transaction abroad' (Tarrow 2005b: 34). Not all rooted cosmopolitans become transnational activists, to be sure, but they are available to become active in transnational claims-making processes. Tarrow does not make it entirely clear in what precise and measurable respect the transnational activist would differ from the traditional national activist, though. He suggests

some differences, but does not advance a testable list of variables: 'they are better *educated* than most of their compatriots, better *connected*, speak more *languages*, and *travel* more often' (Tarrow 2005b: 43, emphasis added). In another publication, Tarrow (2005a) states that transnational and national activists are not separated and isolated, but form a closely knit continuum, which would imply that there are rather few differences between them. Elaborating on the idea of 'rooted cosmopolitans', Grenier (2004) identifies transnational activists as 'pioneers of global civil society'. They are not detached from local realities, but they have distinct capacities in terms of leadership abilities, education, financial and other resources, and motivation that allow them to connect local and global opportunity structures to pursue their causes. These kind of activists are very often also labeled as 'social entrepreneurs', referring here to business entrepreneurs, who are similar in risk taking propensity and creativity (Grenier 2004: 122).

Fisher and colleagues (2005) surveyed participants in five globalization protest events and systematically compared local participants, living nearby the protest event, with non-local participants, living elsewhere in the same (or a neighboring) country. As they had hardly any transnational participants in their samples, they could not focus on comparing transnational with national activists. Their findings about differences between locals and non-locals, though, are inspirational when thinking about national versus transnational activists. They find that non-locals are significantly more informed about the protest by organizations and less informed by the media, that non-locals attended the event more in the company of organization members, and that non-locals, to a much larger extent than locals, received funding from an organization to attend the demonstration (Fisher *et al.* 2005: 114–116). This suggests, similar to the arguments of della Porta and Tarrow, that non-locals and, thus, transnational activists may be more organizationally embedded than their local or national counterparts. Organizations, this evidence suggests, reduce the thresholds and help people overcome the larger barriers (e.g., financially) to participate in protest abroad. If these organizations are then occupied with transnational and global issues, it is even more likely that activists who are members of such an organization will take part in transnational actions. This is more or less what Diani (2005) found when he studied different social movement organizations in Glasgow and Bristol: those organizations principally more interested in global issues, such as Third World poverty, globalization, ethnicity and human rights, are also more likely to take part in global actions.

The most elaborate study of national versus transnational activists, to our knowledge, has been undertaken by Isabelle Bédoyan and collaborators (2004). Drawing on a survey of protesters against the EU summit in Brussels, Belgium, in 2001, they test the idea that transnational mobilization is more difficult than national mobilization since there are practical, psychological and political barriers that are harder to overcome (see also Marks and McAdam 1999). Drawing on that premise, they find that transnational and national participants in the Brussels' march differed quite extensively. Their results underpin some of the findings mentioned above. The most important differences that they found are related to the demonstrators' *professional situation* (student vs. non-student), to their *organizational embeddedness* (more in company of co-members, more informed by organizations), to their *political interest* and to their more radical *opinions* about politics (more dissatisfied with democracy and representative system, more agree with radical movement strategy) (Bédoyan *et al.* 2004). Bédoyan and colleagues conclude that transnational activists 'are young, organized, and radical compared to their Belgian counterparts' (2004: 48).

Wrapping up, the modest available evidence supports the hypothesis that transnational activists differ from national activists in at least three aspects: social-demographics, attitudes and behavior. First, transnational activists are expected to be younger, higher educated and to be made up more of students. Second, regarding their attitudes, transnational activists are expected to be more radical and critical towards democracy, but, at the same time, more interested in (broad) political issues. Third, and considering behavior, it is foremost expected that transnationalists are more organizationally embedded (and this, in addition, more likely to be within organizations working on global issues) and have more protest experience than their domestic counterparts. Are these expectations warranted by the facts?

Data and Methods

The above questions will be addressed by means of survey data collected at two different social forum events. Social forums can be considered as the main gathering moments of the GJM. Interestingly for our purpose, the social forum concept, and especially the transnational or global events, have been criticized for being 'champagne activism': 'open

only to those who can afford the time and money to fly around the world … discussing global problems' (Glasius and Timms 2006: 225). Some claim that having sufficient resources or finding proper funding is one of the main issues at transnational forums. Furthermore, social forums are extensively prepared in so-called preparatory meetings, which alternately take place in different countries and these too require time and money (Haug et al. 2009). In the International Council, the organ that sets out the main political guidelines and strategic directions of the WSF, meetings are found to be even more costly and time consuming. Moreover, national level organizations are even being excluded from these preparatory meetings in order to avoid 'the logic of the nation-state' (Schönleitner 2003: 133). In any case, social forums are excellent occasions to scrutinize differences between national and transnational activists. Arguably, though, social forums cover only a part of the current transnational activism. International protest events, for example, may have led to a different dynamic and to different distinctions between national and transnational protesters. The data presented in this chapter only tackle part of the transnational activism puzzle.

One of the surveys presented in this chapter was taken among participants at the fourth ESF in Athens, Greece, 4–7 May 2006; a second survey was taken among participants of the third BSF in Brussels, Belgium, 16 December 2006. Paper versions of both the ESF and the BSF questionnaires were distributed at the forum venues itself: about 600 were distributed in Athens in the first two days and about 678 were distributed in Brussels. In Athens, paper questionnaires were distributed in and outside the main hall on the first and second day of the forum. Two interviewers selected each tenth person passing, kindly asked them to fill in the questionnaire and then leave it in a postal box at the main exit or at the stall of the University of Antwerp in the main hall. The initial response rate in Athens was rather disappointing (only 68 questionnaires were completed at the end of the four-day event). In the weeks and months after the forum, participants were therefore contacted via email and invited to participate in an online version of the same survey. Existing email lists (about 700 subscribers) were used and, on top of that, the Greek Organizing Committee provided about 1,500 unique email addresses of people who had registered online. A news entry was placed on the official website of the Athens' ESF, inviting participants to participate in the study. The fact that all communication, practical information, and, more importantly, the ESF registration nearly exclusively went via the internet justifies the use of an online survey, in addition to the paper questionnaires distributed at the venue itself. After

processing and cleaning the data a total amount of 427 ESF participants had filled in a paper or online questionnaire.

Table 5.1
Response Rates of the European and Belgian Social Forum Survey, May and December 2006

	BSF Brussels	ESF Athens
# participants	800	10,000
Questionnaires		
Distributed (emailed)	678	3000*
Response	205	427
Response rate (%)	30.3	14.2

Note: * the number of distributed questionnaires is a rough estimation of the total amount of email recipients and the amount of distributed paper questionnaires at the Forum.

In Brussels, 108 paper questionnaires were completed on one day. The interviewers were positioned at the only entrance and exit of the forum venue. Every participant had to register when entering the building and then immediately received a paper questionnaire together with a postage paid envelope and a little pencil. Along with a very short introduction, each participant was then kindly requested to fill in the survey and leave it by the end of the day in the blue box at the same exit, or to send it via the post once home by using the postage paid envelope. In the weeks immediately afterward, another 87 respondents returned their completed questionnaires. Yet, although the paper version was rather successful (response rate of 29 per cent), the additional online version of the BSF survey was not a great success. For obvious reasons of privacy, the Organizing Committee of the BSF did not agree to us sending an email to the BSF participants who had registered online. As a result, only the existing email lists could be used (about 100 subscribers); only 10 of these people participated in the online version. They all indicated also having received a paper version of the questionnaire at the forum. After processing and cleaning the data, a total amount of 205 unique BSF participants had completed a useful questionnaire.

Since a good indication of the real composition of the entire population at both of these forum events is not available, it is impossible to test whether the returned questionnaires or those filled in online are representative of the BSF and ESF populations. Especially with regard to the Athens' online survey, it is difficult to estimate the bias caused

by both the self-selection of respondents as well as the persisting inequalities in terms of internet use among ESF participants who are coming from different countries. With regard to the postal surveys, though, similar research at street demonstrations indicated that the response bias of returned postal questionnaires is minimal (Walgrave and Verhulst 2011). Of course, participating in a social forum is different from participating in a demonstration, but both can be considered as collective action events and the overlap in participants is probably considerable. As indicated by Fillieule and Blanchard (2010), differences may exist between people filling in the survey on the day itself or afterward once they are at home. Bivariate analysis comparing the two independent samples (those who filled in the survey at the BSF or ESF itself, and those who filled in the survey at home or online), however, revealed no differences in terms of socio-demographic variables as well as general attitudinal or organizational backgrounds. Table 5.2 provides some basic socio-demographic descriptives and information on the dependent variable. General socio-demographic features indicate a highly educated (even hyper-educated), slightly male, young to middle-aged constituency. The BSF respondents are, compared to the ESF sample, slightly older, mostly male and relatively less educated.

In terms of the nationality of the attendants of both forums, Table 5.2 clearly documents that the BSF in Brussels was a truly domestic event. Almost 90 per cent of the attendees had Belgian nationality. A few French participants appeared at the BSF, but all of the other nationalities are negligible or entirely absent. This confirms the finding of many other scholars of transnational activism that most GJM events are dominated by local, national activists, and thus are not that global in terms of its participants (see, e.g. Lichbach and de Vries 2004; Fisher *et al.* 2005). The opposite applies to the ESF participants. Organized in Greece, a fair amount of participants held Greek nationality, but the ESF was a truly transnational event with wide international attendance. The Belgians in the ESF sample seem to be over-represented (13 percent). This is probably caused by the fact that the research team was Belgian, reducing the threshold for Belgian participants to take part in the survey. Moreover, some Belgian participants apparently forwarded the email invitation to their own contacts.

Two separate comparisons will be drawn: one among BSF and a second among ESF participants. The BSF participants were asked whether they had participated in the second WSF (January 2002) or in the fourth ESF (May 2006). At the second WSF, a large Belgian

Table 5.2
Socio-demographics, Nationality, and Previous Transnational Participation of European and Belgian Social Forum Participants

	BSF Brussels	ESF Athens
Socio-demographics		
Gender (% male)	55.2	56.3
Age (mean)	44.3	35.6
Educational level		
None/primary	1.0	0.4
Lower secondary	4.9	2.4
Higher secondary	12.7	10.0
Higher non-university	28.3	8.6
University/doctoral	50.2	76.8
Missing	2.9	3.3
Nationality		
Belgium	89.3	13
France	5.4	5.1
Netherlands	1.0	1.6
Spain/Portugal	-	4.9
Italy	1.5	10.9
Germany/Switzerland/Austria	-	7.4
Scandinavia	-	7.0
UK/Ireland	-	9.7
Turkey	-	3.7
Greece/Cyprus	0.5	24.4
Balkan/Eastern Europe/Russia	1.0	8.6
non-EU	1.5	3.7
(Previous) transnational participation		
No transnational participation	84.4	18.8
Transnational participation	15.6	81.2
Total	100	100
N	205	427

delegation was present and it was on that occasion that the BSF was founded. The fourth ESF was the most recent transnational social forum to have taken place at that time. BSF participants who indicated that they attended one or both of these transnational events were defined as transnational activists (16 per cent); the ones who did not attend any of these events were considered as national activists (84 per cent). This straightforward categorization is rather rough and contains a lot of noise. People may have participated in other transnational events than the two mentioned, but it is the best measure available. Among the ESF participants, a comparable but not identical distinction was made as different questionnaires were used for the BSF and the ESF. Participants from Greece were considered to be national activists, unless they indicated to have participated in one of the following events: the first ESF in Florence (2002), the second ESF in Paris (2003), or the third ESF in London (2004). In that case, these Greek participants were considered to be transnational participants. All other people travelling from abroad to the Athens meeting were also classified as transnational activists. As for the categorization of the BSF participants, here again some of the Greek ESF participants may have participated in another transnational event than the three mentioned.

As the figures in Table 5.2 show, about 81 per cent of the ESF respondents are classified as transnational activists. There is a striking contrast between the amount of transnational activists at the BSF compared to the amount at the ESF, which suggest a different logic for both events. Since the fundamental idea of a social forum is to provide an 'open space' (Whitaker 2004) where social movement organizations and activists can meet, debate, exchange experience and learn from each other, the level of each event consequently might attract more national (in the case of the BSF) or transnational (in the case of the ESF) oriented organizations or activists. Different levels of the social forum process (local, national, regional and global) are very much related, adopting the same organizational proceedings, drawing on the same democratic and participatory principles and addressing the same topics on neoliberal globalization (Glasius and Timms 2006). Yet, as Glasius and Timms (2006) describe, each forum has its own specificities. Especially the local and national chapters very often show typical features that merely refer to the 'higher level' social forums as a source of inspiration, but that have still distinct organizational forms or address specialized local topics. This too is an argument that national social forums in general do attract more nationally

oriented activists, and that regional social forums attract more transnational oriented activists, with only a small overlap.

The analyses below consist of a systematic comparison of the national and transnational activists as defined above: to what extent are they different? Note that the BSF analyses draw on a mainly Belgian sample and basically compare Belgians with Belgians, while the ESF analyses compare Greeks with other nationals. Differences between national and transnational activists in the case of the ESF, then, may not only be due to the difference between different types of activists, but also to their different national backgrounds. This caveat must be kept in mind, especially when taking into account variables on which Greeks in general differ from other European populations.

Finally, although differences between national and transnational activists are expected, at the same time, these differences are not anticipated to be very large. After all, all surveyed participants attended the same events and they more or less overcame the same barriers. Also, Greek ESF participants, for example, were confronted with language thresholds when attending the ESF: many ESF sessions, meetings and workshops were organized in another language than Greek, which might have discouraged participation. Moreover, the ESF analyses lump together many nationalities in the broad 'container' category of transnational activists. Bearing the features of their respective countries, there probably are substantial differences within the transnational activist category that may counterbalance and compensate each other. Still, a rough comparison is presented here, as it is the most straightforward way to test the main argument of national versus transnational activism.

Analyses

Table 5.3 contains two logistic regression analyses predicting transnational activism in contrast to national activism. The first column contains the results for the BSF and compares participants with and without previous international social forum experience. The second column documents the comparison between Greek (national) participants without previous experience in social forums abroad, and those ESF participants with previous (Greek) or current (all other nationalities) transnational experience. A binary logistic regression was

applied since the dependent variable has only two possible outcomes (national or transnational). As the ratio between the number of cases and the number of variables is rather low, and in order to reduce the number of missing cases, the final models exclude non-significant variables in a backwards procedure. For the specific coding of the different predictors, see Table 5.4 in the appendix. Three sets of independent variables can be discerned, each of them referring to the different hypotheses described above: a first set of socio-demographic variables (age, gender, education, and occupational status [student or not]); a second set of attitudinal variables (self-identification with other forum participants, general satisfaction with democracy in one's own country, general political interest and expected outcome of the forum); and a set of behavioral variables (organizational involvement, member of a transnational organization or not, information channel about the forum, re-imbursement/organization of travel, past protest frequency). The parameters presented are odds ratios: coefficients larger than 1.0 indicate a positive effect; parameters smaller than 1.0 denote a negative effect.

Table 5.3
Logistic Regressions Comparing National with Transnational BSF and ESF Activists

	BSF	ESF
Socio-demographics		
Age (low-high)	n.s.	n.s.
Gender (male-female)	n.s.	2.351*
Education (low-high)	n.s.	n.s.
Student (no-yes)	n.s.	n.s.
Attitudes		
Forum identification (low-high)	2.343*	n.s.
Satisfaction democracy (low-high)	n.s.	n.s.
Political interest (low-high)	n.s.	n.s.
Expected outcome Forum (low-high)	n.s.	.695***
Behavior		
Organizational involvement (low-high)	1.341*	1.597***
Member transnational organization (no-yes)	n.s.	2.337*
Info-channel Social Forum (open-closed)	n.s.	1.932*
Travel reimbursed/reimbursed (no-yes)	---	1.299***
Protest frequency (none-frequent)	1.947**	---
N	177	389
Nagelkerke *R*-square	.229	.250

Note: coefficients in the table are odds-ratios and their significance *p< .05, **p< .01, ***p< .001. A backward (likelihood ratio) stepwise procedure was applied.

First of all, both models manage to grasp a considerable part of the differences between national and transnational activists. The Nagelkerke *R*-square of the two models is not particularly high, but it is satisfying. Moreover, the explained variance is very similar: local Greek and transnational ESF participants on the one hand, and BSF participants with a transnational participation track record and BSF participants without such a record, on the other hand, are more or less equally different. The ESF model yields more significant predictors. This is most likely due to the much larger number of observations on which the ESF analysis is based (389 compared to 177).

As expected, the main finding is that organizational embeddedness makes a big difference. The more people are part of and embedded in an organization, the more likely it is that they participate transnationally. Organizations seem to systematically lower the barriers for transnational mobilization. Organizational involvement (a scale of four distinct organizational variables, see the appendix) is a significant predictor of transnationalism. And more importantly, confirming Diani's (2005) findings, especially those people who are a member of transnational organizations focusing on global justice, third world issues, or human rights are sparked to take part in transnational activism, at least among ESF participants. Among the BSF participants, transnational organization membership was not a significant predictor, but the bivariate correlation went in the expected, positive direction. How organizations exactly perform their barrier reducing function can be seen in the two other organizational variables. Organizations, first of all, inform their members in many ways about upcoming international movement events. Technically speaking, transnational activists are more mobilized via closed mobilization processes, while national activists are informed through open channels such as mass media, friends and posters (Walgrave and Klandermans 2010). Again, this mobilization variable is not significant for the BSF, but the bivariate correlation goes in the same positive direction. Secondly, organizations take care of the practical worries of their members' transnational participation: they organize the trip, arrange accommodation and they pay for the expenses. In short, in terms of organizations, our data strongly corroborate previous results (Bédoyan *et al.* 2004; Fisher *et al.* 2005). Transnational activism is, much more than national activism, a predominantly organizational embedded activity. This implies that, at transnational movement events, we do not in the first place encounter the movements' grassroots and rank-and-file, but rather the organizational elites. Apart from their organizational distinctiveness, transnational activists, much more than mere

national activists, are experienced and veteran protesters. Protest experience was only assessed by means of past protest frequency in the BSF sample, but it is likely that the same would be true for the ESF crowd. Again, this suggests that transnational activism is not the practice of novices, but rather an activity performed by experienced and weathered activists. Only after a certain activist career can people take their activism a step higher to the transnational level. Likewise, on a national or local scale, we are more likely confronted with occasional passers-by who are merely interested in the social forum as an individual, grabbing a taste of it, but who are not a member of or are not representing any organization. In the BSF sample, for instance, among the national activists, 55 per cent were attending the forum 'as an individual' compared to only 22 per cent among the transnational activists (figures not shown in table).

Regarding both of the other dimensions of activism, socio-demographic background and attitudinal dispositions, we can be brief: they are much less helpful in distinguishing both activist types than the organizational and behavioral variables. Only gender makes a difference in the ESF sample. Transnational activists at the ESF meeting are more likely female than national ESF activists. Structural differences between Greek society and other countries might offer a tentative explanation. First, it might be the case that, in general, female Greeks are less active in social movement organizations compared to other organizations. More likely, the fact that our ESF research design drew mainly on internet surveys probably skewed the Greek sample in terms of gender: of all European countries, Greece is, after Ukraine, the country with the far least internet access. More than three-fourths of the Greeks, in 2005, declared that they had no access to the internet at home or work. In most other European countries, that figure lay below one-third (European Social Survey 2006, round 2). Furthermore, internet access in Greece, the figures show, is very much a privilege of the male population, both in lower as well as in higher social strata. Interestingly, neither age, nor studentship nor education are significant predictors of transnational activism, which goes against the findings of previous studies.

Finally, our attitudinal predictors are not very performant either. Neither general satisfaction with democracy in one's country nor political interest proved to be an important predictor of transnational activism. An interesting result, yet only for ESF activists, is the expectation that the forum would be successful in disseminating the movements' ideas and

boost mobilization.[4] Transnational ESF participants are much less optimistic than their national counterparts. We can only speculate that the Greeks' self-confidence, maybe overwhelmed by the success of having the ESF in Athens, was boosted. One of the organizers of the Greek ESF explained that for many Greek – often activists rather isolated from other activists in the world – the ESF was indeed an eye-opener, as they 'realized that they were part of a big family engaged in a common fight. Even the organizations most hostile to the EU have found in the ESF the political space they needed to express themselves' (Anastasia Theodorakopoulous, cited in Delmas 2007: 141). Also, the transnational and, as we showed, the more experienced and weathered activists may be more realistic in their expectations about the effect of the ESF than their less experienced and maybe more naive colleagues. Moreover, both the euphoria characteristic of the first ESFs and the media attention are decreasing (Rucht and Teune 2007). This is probably why experienced activists are more skeptical about the ESF's potential impact beyond the GJM. Finally, yet only at the BSF, transnational activists tend to identify more with the forum and other participants than national activists. Despite the clear indications of transnational activists being more of an 'elite' kind of activist, this result can be positively interpreted as a commitment to represent not only one's own organization, but rather also the broader movement and movement's grassroots. Either way, firm conclusions regarding the attitudes cannot be drawn; neither can the claim be corroborated that transnational activists are particularly more committed or have consistently different attitudes than national activists.

The models presented here are incomplete. To really test Tarrow's 'rooted cosmopolitans' thesis, for example, information should be included about the private, non-activist related travelling behavior of the activists and about their command of foreign languages, etc. (cf. Fillieule and Blanchard 2010). That the organizational variables are dominating the models at the expense of the socio-demographic and attitudinal predictors may also be caused by the fact that we did not dispose of the most adequate indicators. However, it makes sense that especially organizational embeddedness matters. As Marco Giugni and colleagues claim in this book, the transnationalization of collective action and activism probably is a dissymmetric process. Some aspects are more affected by

[4] The question was formulated as follows: 'How big are the chances that the BSF/ESF will boost mobilization or give visibility to the common targets of the movements participating in the BSF/ESF?'

transnationalism than others. The increased role of organizations might be one of these aspects.

Conclusion and Discussion

In this chapter, transnational and national participants in local and international social forums, the typical meeting place of the GJM, were systematically compared to each other. Participants were surveyed in two social forum events in 2006: the BSF in Brussels and the ESF in Athens. In both samples, transnational activists were distinguished from national activists by drawing on a nationality criterion and on the self-reported participation in previous transnational social forums. Furthermore, transnational activism is considered as physically moving across borders, which does not include those activists who might report that they are pursuing global causes and issues without actually travelling abroad (see e.g. Jossin [2010] for a detailed discussion about the extent to which activists in fact conceive their engagement as being transnational activism). Here, we explicitly focused on activists being geographically active on a transnational or a national level. We recognized the shortcomings and limitations of this operationalization, but consider it to be a first step to further study the relation between national and transnational activism. The relevance of our exercise is empirical as it is theoretical. Empirically, very few studies directly assessed whether the geographic level of activism really makes a difference. Some asserted that transnational activism is just an extension of national activism; others claimed it to be something entirely different. Theoretically, the geographic level of activism is relevant as large differences between the two types of activists might challenge mainstream activism theory, which has been devised for activism within the confines of the national state.

So, is transnational activism then any different from national activism? Substantial differences were found between the people who were merely active in their own country and the people who travelled abroad to participate in movement events. Particularly important was the organizational embeddedness of the transnational activists. Much more than national activists, transnationalists tend to be formally backed by and engaged in organizations; they tend to officially represent these organizations in the forum; they often belong to the decision-making circle in their organization; their travel and accommodation have likely been

arranged for them and their expenses are frequently paid by their organization. This is not to say that personal motivations for being active on a transnational level are not important, on the contrary, they are. For instance, we also find transnational activists (although only at the BSF) identify more strongly with the social forum process. But the backbone for transnational activists is largely an organizational one: (national) groups and networks function like an anchorage for those activists who want to stay active on a transnational level. While our data only offers a snapshot of an activist career, Jossin (2010) already offers some hints that the same (organizational) factors are important in sustaining transnational activism.

Social movement and protest theory has recently witnessed an increase in attention for informal networks, micro-mobilization contexts, etc. (see e.g. McAdam 1988). Also, in thinking about transnational activism and especially about the GJM, it is a common practice to emphasize the informality, networked, non-hierarchical and direct character of participation practices and action repertoires (della Porta 2005). The evidence presented here suggests, in contrast, that, much more than in national activism, organizations play a key role in producing transnational activism. The explanation is simple: transnational activism entails more costs than national activism. Organizations, probably more than informal arrangements, can help potential participants in overcoming these problems and taking the thresholds. The barrier-lowering capacity of organizations has been known for a long time (Klandermans and Oegema 1987). Yet, these qualities of organizations become again more relevant in a new context. As the cost of participating in national events has probably gone down over the years – protest participation is up and protest has become normalized – organizations have probably lost some of their indispensability regarding national activism. Examples of mobilization without formal backbones abound in the recent protest literature. The scale shift of activism to the transnational level, however, brings organizations back in. In the end, we do not need a separate theory to tackle transnational activism, but we can simply rely on the existing mobilization and participation theories with a renewed respect for the strength of organizations. Transnational activism is simply national activism with more restrictions.

Appendix

Table 5.4
Independent Variables and their Operationalization

	Operationalization	Range
Attitudes		
Forum identification	Rescaled summation of three 5-point scale questions: 'I have a lot in common with the other people present at the B/ESF', 'I identify strongly with the others present at the B/ESF', and 'I feel committed to the other people present at the B/ESF'	1 'low' – 5 'high'
Satisfaction democracy	4-point scale question: 'In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy in your country?' with 1 'completely dissatisfied', 2 'dissatisfied', 3 'satisfied', and 4 'completely satisfied'.	1 'low' – 4 'high'
Political interest	5-point scale question: 'How interested are you in politics?'	1 'Not at all' – 5 'Very much'
Expected outcome	7-point scale question: 'How big are the chances that the B/ESF will boost mobilization or give visibility to the common targets of the movements participating in the B/ESF?'	1 'little chance' – 7 'high chance'
Behavior		
Organizational involvement	Participants were first asked whether they represented an organization at the form or just participated as an individual. If they were a delegate, respondents were further asked to indicate what position they had in this organization and whether they got paid for the work they did for this organization. These three questions resulted in a new scale ranging from 1 'non-delegate', 2 'unpaid, active member' 3 'paid, active member' 4 'unpaid staff', to 5 'paid staff'.	1 'low' – 5 'high'
Member transnational organization	Respondents were asked whether they were an active, passive or board member of the following organizations: church or religious organization, student organization, union or professional organization, political party, women's right organization, sport-recreational organization, environmental organization, art/music/educational organization, community organization, charity organization, global justice organization, third world organization, human rights organization, peace organization and anti-racist or migrants' rights organization. If respondents were an active or board member of	0 'no' – 1 'yes'

	a global justice, third world or human rights organization this variable was coded as one. All others were coded as zero.	
Info-channel Social Forum	If a respondent was informed about the Forum via radio or television, newspapers, posters, flyers, family, friends, people at school or work, or via personal email, this variable was coded zero. Those who got informed via member magazines, websites or email lists of an organization, or via people within an organization, were coded as one.	0 ‘open’ – 1 ‘closed’
Travel organized/ reimbursed	Participants were asked whether they had organized their trip to the ESF by themselves or whether it was an organization that arranged travel and accommodation. Also we asked them whether all the costs for their ESF participation were ‘completely’, ‘partially’ or ‘not at all’ on behalf of an organization. Both questions were simply multiplied to indicate the extent to which an organization was responsible for travel and expenses.	1 ‘not at all’ – 6 ‘completely by an organization’
Protest frequency.....	6-point scale indicating one's protest frequency the last 5 years: 1 'never' 2 'only once' 3 'between 2 and 5 times', 4 'between 6 and 10', 5 'between 11 and 20', 6 'more than 20'	1 ‘low’ – 6 ‘high’

Conclusion

The protagonist of this thesis was the individual protest activist, presented in various shapes and with a variety of qualities, unique characteristics, backgrounds and motivations to act collectively. We followed his steps throughout the process of mobilization, actual participation, sustained activism and disengagement. Moreover, we looked closely at three "topical" issues that are said to profoundly change classic ideas about who, how, and why people participate in collective action: the activist professionalization, the activist digitalization, and the activist transnationalization. All three provide new opportunities *and* limitations for popular protest participation.

We investigated protest participation in a comprehensive way, in a systematic way and, very deliberately, from the activist point of view. Our research is comprehensive since we looked at the dynamics of protest participation *in time* and *in depth*. We provided systematic analyses by integrating different social movement perspectives, structural and motivational accounts of protest participation, using standardized research instruments and measurements. By focusing on the individual level, interrogating activists "on the scene", we were able to draw on original and innovative data about who, how, and why people take to the streets. Our individual-level protest survey data, combining classic postal with new online survey methods, are undoubtedly unique. The efforts, personal and by colleagues, invested in the collection of these data were all worth it, knowing the richness and diversity of the information we had at our disposal. Our research was comparative in the sense that we looked for protest mobilization and participation dynamics that hold across different organizations, events and mobilizing issues. In this concluding chapter we bring the different studies in this thesis together and draw several substantial conclusions. As indicated in the introduction, two central questions run through the preceding pages: 1) who participates in

collective action and who does not (anymore), and 2) are changing dynamics of protest mobilization and participation also influencing who, how and why people participate? While the first question focuses on the *general* process of mobilization and participation, the second question disentangles *specific* dynamics of protest mobilization and participation and how these relate to participant's personal characteristics and issue-related motivations to participate in collective action.

Summary of key findings

Let us start with an overview of the different key findings of the five chapters in this thesis. In chapter 1 we disentangled the mobilization process leading towards a specific protest demonstration. We compared potential and actual participants in different stages in terms of their structural backgrounds, in other words their embeddedness in multiple networks and relationships, and in terms of their issue-related motivations. We found that motivations, people's own beliefs, identity and emotions, are key in generating a *willingness* to participate in collective action, but that networks, and in particular informal linkages, actually *make* people participate. Protest participation is a multi-stage process with distinct factors influencing mobilization in different stages. If people have developed a strong sense of collective identity and are convinced that they can collectively make a difference, actual participation is very likely to occur in case of a protest opportunity. The final triggers then are the interpersonal, informal linkages between people, forcing people to hold on to their willingness to participate. Interpersonal relations are crucial in explaining actual protest participation, as long as these linkages reinforce a strong commitment and identity to a specific issue. Issue-related motivations, of course, do not fall out of the sky, but have in most cases developed through a long history of interpretation and re-interpretation. In sum, protest participation is not only a multi-stage process, but to a large extent also a continuous process. Which brings us to the next chapter, where we investigated sustained protest engagement and disengagement.

In the second chapter we compared, across several different mobilizing issues, activists who continued to take to the streets with activists who stopped protesting. Sustained protest activism is predicted through a mix of personal characteristics and

motivations. To some extent, sustained commitment has to do with life-cycle availabilities and choice: people without family-related responsibilities are more likely to sustain. Even more important are the affective bonds that are created and sustained via ongoing interactions, mainly facilitated by movement organizations. Protest diehards share a strong collective identity and are more embedded in formal organizations and activist networks. However, we also found that quitters, although their general involvement may be lower, are strongly emotionally motivated when they do make an active stance. Once they have made clear their grievances, chances are high they will disappear from the streets, until the need for another emotional liberation imposes itself. In sum, we showed that sustained protest activism is largely contingent on cultivating a habit of activism, whereby certain availabilities and motivational aspects are important mediators.

In chapter three we looked at differences between professional and nonprofessional activists participating in the so-called European Social Forum, a huge transnational gathering for individual activists and social movement organization representatives to meet and exchange ideas about their joint struggle against neoliberal globalization. We principally find important differences between professionals and non-professionals: they differ in terms of who they are, their personal characteristics and motivational dynamics are different, and they differ in terms of what they do and how they are involved in the Social Forum process. Thus, professional and nonprofessional activists are different people and they do different things prior and during the Social Forum. Professional activists first of all look for a sustained collaborative project for which they have a sincere commitment and emotional interest. The Forum is an important venue to build new joint opportunities, yet it is not the joint project which they most closely identify with. In contrast, the nonprofessional activists feel strongly committed to the Forum itself, actually providing the venue with a strong and necessary emotional impetus. Of course, they want to learn and meet fellow activists, but the celebration of the Forum as a highpoint of a global struggle against neoliberalization is equally, and perhaps even more, important. Nonprofessional activists put the “fire in the belly” of the Social Forum. Hence, we concluded that there is an important symbiosis between professional and nonprofessional activists. This symbiosis might be present within other social movement events and organization as well: there is a group of more professional activists, strongly embedded in the organization, actively working on future collective action opportunities, and there is the group of rather nonprofessional activists, less strongly

connected, but highly motivated, intensely grasping new protest opportunities to show their discontent and solidarity.

In the fourth chapter we further dissected the protest participant, but now in terms of the information channels they use to be informed about upcoming protest opportunities. We were especially interested in the role and importance of new communication technologies, like the Internet, to make people aware of a demonstration. Therefore, we compared activists "online", those who are informed via Internet channels, with "offline" activists, those who are informed through different channels. We find that both groups of activists differ significantly in terms of their personal backgrounds, integration into different activist networks, and motivational dynamics. Activists that are informed via digital communication channels are possibly activists who are strongly embedded in formal organizations, with a lot of experience and combining multiple engagements at the same time. The Internet is principally used in a formal setting, suggesting that the Internet's potential to easily reach beyond an organization's own constituency has not been realized so far. On the other hand, it seems that the Internet relates to particular motivational dynamics, possibly reinforcing and sustaining future commitments.

Finally, in chapter five we looked for differences between activists who are principally directing their claims on a transnational level and activists who restrict their activities within their own country. As in chapter three, we used data of the Social Forums to delineate possible differences. The main conclusion was that far more than national activists, transnational activists are formally backed by social movement organizations, they likely represent an organization or belong to the decision-making circle, they are paid for the work they do, or receive additional resources to pay for travel and accommodation expenses. In terms of motivational dynamics overall differences between transnational and national activists remain small. Thus, although transnational activists are better integrated in formal networks, this does not lead to different motivations. In the end it seems that transnational activism is similar to national activism only with more restrictions, amplifying the importance of social movement organizations.

What general conclusions can we draw from these different findings? In the next section we bring the different findings presented in each chapter together.

Putting the pieces together

In this thesis we have tried to integrate so-called "structural" explanatory factors, mainly organizational strength and network embeddedness (cf. Snow et al. 1980; McAdam 1988; Schussman and Soule 2005), and so-called "cultural" or "motivational" explanatory factors, incorporating values, grievances, ideology, emotions (e.g. Gamson et al. 1982; Morris and Mueller 1992; Johnston and Klandermans 1995; Jasper 1997). The different chapters in this thesis proved that the (empirical) integration of structural and motivational variables is important to explain why people protest, and this for two reasons. First, because they *both* explain to a great extent who, how and why people take to the streets or participate in large social movement events, but more importantly, because they mutually reinforce each other and are indispensably linked. Second, because they explain different parts, different aspects, and different stages of protest participation. Let us further clarify these points. In chapter 1 we found motivational variables to be key in creating a willingness to protest, whereas structural variables, and specifically informal interpersonal linkages, are crucial in the final step of the mobilization process, actually pulling people onto the streets. Moreover, multiple interpersonal links and collective identity mutually reinforce people's willingness to participate in collective action, as we clearly showed with the interaction effect. In chapter 2 we found clear evidence that people who persist in their activist engagements are more strongly integrated in diverse activist networks, which again explains their strong collective identity. This is not to say that quitters are less strongly motivated, on the contrary. Strong motivations among quitters clearly differentiate them from persisters. It seems, however, that their motivational energy was not picked up and sustained in a more formal, organizational setting. Thus, where informal linkages are important to connect strong motivations with a protest opportunity, formal linkages are important to connect strong motivations with sustained protest commitments. In sum, to make a person protest they need friends, to keep a person protesting they need organizations, but people always need a strong motivational impetus.

Structural and motivational factors also explain different aspects of activists in different ways. In chapter 3 we found nonprofessional activists more strongly motivated, but less structurally integrated than professional activists. In chapter 4 we saw activists using digital communication channels more strongly integrated than activists not using these

channels. Online and offline activists were equally motivated, though. In chapter 5 we also found national and transnational activists to be equally motivated, but the latter group was—again—more strongly integrated into formal and organizational networks. Two ideal groups of activists emerge from the final three chapters: on the one hand, the "super activist", being professionally involved in protest activism, being a core activist using digital communication means, and/or being active on a transnational level, in other words "the José Bové" of the protest participants; and on the other hand the "regular activist", Protest Joe Average, with the exact opposite characteristics. Still, both "super" and "regular" activist jointly take part in the same demonstrations. Moreover, the latter group of activists often shares similar or even stronger levels of motivation. The difference is that "super activists" and "regular activists" have other roles to fulfill. Professional activists, core activists using digital communication channels, and transnational activists are all strongly embedded in formal organizations. With these capacities they also are much more likely involved in the organization and set-up of collective action events or, in any case, more closely related to the decision-making circle of movement organizations staging an event. In the ebb and flow of social movements two distinct groups of activists, as such, have to find each other: those who have a clear demand for protest participation, and those who are capable of turning this demand into a protest opportunity. In the social movement literature the demand-side and supply-side of protest participation (cf. Klandermans 2004) are usually conceived as individuals (demanding protest) who meet (formal) organizations (creating supply) through mobilization processes. In this thesis a subtler picture emerges. Protest participation is not simply a matter of people who meet organizations, but of *people meet people*, with the former being motivationally strong, but not necessarily strongly embedded in formal relations, and the latter being motivationally strong *and* strongly embedded in formal organizations. What this thesis has clearly demonstrated, is that organizations are so important exactly because of their top-notch constituency, their "super activists" who each mobilize their own network of motivated friends, family, acquaintances, colleagues, etc. While scholars have repeatedly mentioned the notion of a demand for protest on the micro-level and a protest supply on the meso-level, we believe there certainly is something of a *supply on the micro-level.* A "micro-supply" that is offered by motivated core activists.

Structural and motivational factors, therefore, explain participation in different stages, and they relate differently to the three topical challenges we have studied

(professionalization, digitalization, and transnationalization). Issue-related motivations *and* interpersonal networks are absolutely key. Issue-related motivations form the soil, the fertile breeding ground on which protest participation grows and keeps growing. Without strong motivations people do not take part in collective action. Issue-related motivations are built and sustained via ongoing interactions between people both in informal settings with friends or family as well as through formal settings, during organizational meetings and actions. This is why the integration of structural and issue-related motivational explanations is so crucial. Interpersonal networks and linkages go hand in hand with people's feelings of collective identity, solidarity, emotions, etc. Structural and motivational explanations are mutually reinforcing predictors of protest activism. We have, as said, clearly demonstrated this in the first chapter, by including the interaction term between interpersonal linkages and collective identity. Without strong identifications and emotions, structural connections and interpersonal relations are meaningless, but without interpersonal linkages strong motivations will not cumulate to actual protest participation. Interpersonal networks, either informal or formal, keep the motivational energy warm. Paraphrasing our top-notch colleague and rising social movement super-star Ruud Wouters, people's motivations are the little spark, whereas networks and interpersonal linkages are the oxygen stoking up the fire. This same basic pattern was found across different mobilizing issues, types of organizations, and collective action events.

Our findings also put in perspective the common claim that professionalization, digitalization and transnationalization are profoundly changing protest and mobilization dynamics. Especially scholars studying the role and importance of new information technologies and the globalization of claims and claimants, usually stress the informal, non-hierarchical character of today's protest actions. These assertions are not fully warranted in this thesis, on the contrary. A recurrent theme across the different chapters is the prevailing importance of strong, organizational networks: it is via formal linkages that protest commitments are sustained, it is within organizational circles that digital information channels are principally used, it are organizations that provide activists on a transnational level with the necessary resources. The finding in chapter 1 that especially informal linkages are crucial in pulling people onto the streets might indicate that mechanisms facilitating these informal relations, like new information and communication technologies (ICTs), are changing the first occurrence of a protest act. The spread of the Internet may increase the speed and

scope of protest opportunities. Although our findings point to the opposite, the Internet theoretically *has* the potential to easily reach new segments of the population outside a social movement organization's borders. Moreover, with or without these digital means, people who are deeply angry about an unjust or unwanted situation, or who feel strongly connected and sympathize with a particular cause, these people *will* take to the streets. But, if acts of dissent have the ambition to prevail, both on a national or a transnational level, than we need professional activists and their formal social movement organizations to actively work on future collective actions, channeling the motivational energy that was initially unleashed into the streets. We believe this is a strong finding, certainly knowing that we investigated individual protest participants on various protest *events* rather than members or constituencies of specific movement *organizations*. Thus, despite studying collective action events, moving our research questions beyond the organizational scope, a formal organizational backbone still appeared very important for protest participation both *in time* (e.g. sustained participation) as well as *in depth* (e.g. professional, digital and transnational participation).

Limitations and further research

The research presented in this thesis does not pretend to definitely solve the topical issues in the field of social movement and protest participation studies. Moreover, many improvements could be made to further disentangle the relation and interaction between "structural" and "motivational" characteristics of individual protest participants. The design of our studies is certainly innovative. Protest surveys offer a unique opportunity to look closely at the driving forces behind activists of different walks who collectively join demonstrations around various issues and for various reasons. However, several improvements and corresponding limitations should be addressed. These include: 1) the measurement of motivational factors, 2) the type of protest action repertoire (e.g. large-scale legal protest demonstrations) we have focused on in this thesis, 3) the possible generalization beyond the Belgian territory, and 4) the overall strong focus on actual participants (and not the nonparticipant).

A first limitation and opportunity for further research could be how individual motivations are measured. One might wonder whether it is possible at all to tap a person's heart and mind via postal (or online) questionnaires. Gamson (1992), for instance, executed in-depth focus-groups to discover people's "political consciousness supportive of collective action". Possibly structural explanatory factors appear so important in our research because they are just better or easier to measure. Objective characteristics like organizational membership or the presence of interpersonal linkages are more straightforward to measure compared to subjective features like issue-related identification or certain emotions like anger or indignation that are triggered by an unjust or aggrieved situation. It is easy to indicate that you are a member of a Third World organization, but how to express your heartfelt indignation or identity on a 7-point Likert-scale? Nevertheless, it seems that the self-assessment of personal feelings is a quite reliable technique, even in large-scale surveys, and has been applied in various studies (e.g. van Stekelenburg 2006; Klandermans, van der Toorn and van Stekelenburg 2008). In several chapters, motivational factors appeared strong predictors of protest participation. We have measured a person's motivational impetus in various ways by tapping collective identification, different emotional responses, and feelings concerning a person's own and collective efficacy. A further refinement, however, might be necessary. Moreover, an important drawback from the survey method used in this thesis is that people's motivations (though not in the first chapter) are measured *immediately after* their protest participation, which might mean that their initial motivation to participate is influenced by their actual participation. Further research is needed to investigate whether people are differently motivated *before, during,* and *after* taking part in a demonstration. It is clear that demonstrations and other collective action events in itself are socializing people, reinforcing activist identities and emotional energy. It would be very interesting to know how possible differences interact with the key structural predictors that we identified in this thesis.

Second, although the list of collective action events and issues covered in this thesis is certainly diverse, we only covered large-scale and legal protest demonstrations (and two Social Forums). The fact that we controlled for very different specific contexts, across organizations, events and issues, definitely proves that we have presented a sound case. Moreover, with respect to legal demonstrations, we practically covered every single protest demonstration that took place in Belgium between 2006 and 2008 with a suspected turnout

of at least 5,000 participants (we made an exception for the Flemish March in Sint-Genesius-Rode). In terms of large legal demonstrations in the period 2006-2008 we have a practically "perfect" sample. Still, the protest "action repertoire" is much more diverse than the type of actions discussed in this thesis. Protest participation can take many different forms: signing petitions, organizing a sit-in at your university, blocking trains or spotting bombs, striking days and weeks, boycotting or buycotting certain products or services, riding bikes naked, etc. "If there is one thing that distinguishes social movements from other political actors, than it is their strategic use of novel, dramatic, unorthodox, and non-institutionalized forms of political expression to try to shape public opinion and put pressure on those in positions of authority" (Taylor and Van Dyke 2004: 263). Legal protest demonstrations certainly is a very familiar protesting technique, but still, it is reasonable to expect that for different types of actions, we would find different findings and relevant dynamics of protest mobilization and participation.

A third limitation, and related to the previous remark, is that, except for one all events took place in Belgium. Why should people interested in protest politics and living outside Belgium be interested in the evidence presented here? To what extent can we generalize our findings beyond the Atomium? These questions are definitely food for next studies comparing protest participants across issues and countries. Whether or not Belgium is a case on its own remains open for speculation. Belgium, as most Western countries, has a vibrant civil society, but, similar to Scandinavian countries, the Belgian civil society is dominated by strong trade union organizations (Visser 2006). Trade unions are the "giants" of our movement society and for many other social movements they are indispensible in what has been termed "meso-mobilization" (cf. Gerhards and Rucht 1992). Meso-mobilization refers to strategies of often smaller movement organizations not mobilizing individuals but other organizations that mobilize their own constituencies. It is a well-known credo among Belgian social movement organizations that you should be sure to have the unions behind your cause, otherwise you had better not mobilize at all. Nevertheless, the strong presence of trade unions in Belgium, their formal organization and structure, might have influenced the results in this thesis. It would thus be a challenge to look for similar results in countries with far less strong trade union organizations dominating the country's "social movement industry".

A final limitation of using protest surveys relates to the problem of "selecting on the dependent", meaning that we mainly interviewed participants that *did* participate and not

those who were *not* present. The first chapter clearly is an important exception with respect to this problem, but all other chapters indeed depart from a set of activists that *are* mobilized making it fairly impossible to make sound conclusions about the effect of, for instance, the introduction of new communication technologies or globalization of claims and claimants on protest mobilization and participation. In other words, with evidence about nonparticipants we could have asked a whole new set of questions. We are very confident, though, that the findings presented here, would be very similar. That is to say, differences between participants and nonparticipants would probably be stronger and more pronounced. For instance, actual participants using digital media would be even more integrated into formal organizational networks compared to nonparticipants using similar means. In a similar vein people active on a transnational level might have much more organizational resources at their disposal than people that are not active at all. In the first chapter we have explained the empirical difficulties in order to compare actual participants with nonparticipants. It is an extremely difficult task the delimit and accurately interview the so-called "mobilization potential" (Klandermans and Oegema 1987), and especially the nonparticipants: those who did not show up but *should* have been their since they agree with the movement's goals. We have however showed how the use of an online survey method offers a fruitful way to start investigating in much more detail not only why people protest, but also why people do not protest. Expanding this research track would definitely open up a whole new range of different and interesting question with respect to the mobilization and participation of protest participants, especially in terms of the kind of people (who?) taking or not taking part in protest demonstrations, and the interaction between motivations and the many practical and psychological barriers to overcome before people join struggles for which they feel deep concern or indignation.

Final words

Recall our two focal questions that run through this thesis: 1) who participates in collective action and who does not (anymore) and 2) are changing dynamics of protest mobilization and participation also influencing who, how and why people participate? For these two broad questions we have sought answers among many activists, about 5,000

individuals who potentially or effectively took part in various collective action events. We have showed that for people to participate, they need to be motivated, but they need—above all—to be embedded in and stimulated via interpersonal and informal networks reinforcing the "fire in the belly, and the iron in the soul" (Gamson 1992: 32). Protest is about people who push themselves and pull each other on the barricades. Whether or not these people will keep fighting for similar or other struggles, whether they professionally join and even set-up protest events, whether they use digital communication means to inform and be informed about new protest opportunities, whether they are concerned about issues and struggles on a transnational level, that foremost depends on a formal, organizational backbone. It is this organizational backbone that supports the necessary micro-supply fulfilling the sincere micro-demands for protest participation and activism, pursuing causes outside the conventional realm of politics.

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