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Voting practices and voters' political thinking during the 2010 Burundi elections

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Comments on this Discussion Paper are invited.

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Voting practices and voters' political thinking during the 2010 Burundi elections*

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*****Hélène Helbig de Balzac and Bert Ingelaere developed the research design; they were in charge of the supervision of the research activities as well as the analysis and interpretation of the data. Hélène Helbig de Balzac supervised data collection in Burundi and was responsible for the data processing. Stef Vandeginste analysed the historical evolution of the Burundi elections and the macro-political results of the 2010 elections.

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ABSTRACT

A scholarly consensus exists regarding the fact that electoral processes can facilitate democratisation but can equally be the source of instability and/or advance authoritarian rule. Generally, these processes are analyzed by focussing on macro-political institutions and actors. This paper, however, presents a « bottom-up » analysis of the 2010 electoral process in Burundi through the analysis of survey results that are representative for the Burundian electorate. The results reveal the existence of two regional tendencies regarding “political mobilisation”. In addition, four major “electoral groups” can be identified throughout the Burundian territory. Although the “generic” motivation to exercise civic rights and democratic duties through elections is widespread throughout these electoral groups and regions, the findings reveal that an important part of the electorate is either disinterested or characterized by populist or clientelistic thinking and behaviour. The findings also suggest the existence of a divide between the perceived preoccupations of the political class and the aspirations of the ordinary population. Situated in the context of twenty years of political transition in Burundi, these “pragmatic” and “populistic” practices and local ways of political thinking observed during the 2010 electoral process reveal the danger of an instrumentalisation of these tendencies by anti-democratic and/or violent “forces”. Secondly, it raises the question how to democratize Burundi’s political transition in substance, thus also in local popular thoughts and practices.

RESUME

Il existe un consensus scientifique concernant le fait que les processus électoraux peuvent faciliter la démocratisation mais peuvent également être la source d’instabilité ou encore amener un régime autoritaire. Généralement, ces processus sont analysés en mettant l’accent sur les acteurs et les institutions politiques macros. Cet article présente toutefois une analyse par le bas du processus électoral de 2010 au Burundi par le biais de l’analyse des résultats d’un sondage représentatif de l’électorat burundais. Les résultats révèlent l’existence de deux tendances régionales sur le plan de la « mobilisation politique ». En plus, quatre grands « groupes d’électeurs » peuvent être distingués au sein du territoire burundais. Bien que la motivation « générique », c’est-à-dire l’exercice des droits civiques grâce à des élections, soit très répandue dans l’ensemble de ces groupes d’électeurs et les diverses régions du pays identifiées, les résultats révèlent qu’une partie importante de l’électorat est désintéressée ou alors caractérisée par des comportements et des pensées populistes ou clientélistes. Les résultats indiquent également l’existence d’un fossé entre la perception des préoccupations de la classe politique et les aspirations de la population ordinaire. Situées dans le contexte de vingt années de transition politique au Burundi, ces pratiques « pragmatiques » et « populistes » et les modes de pensée politique observés au niveau local durant le processus électoral de 2010 révèlent le danger d’une instrumentalisation de ces tendances par des « forces » antidémocratiques et/ou violentes. En second lieu, se pose également la question de savoir comment démocratiser en substance la transition politique du Burundi, donc aussi dans les pratiques et les pensées populaires locales.

1. INTRODUCTION¹

This paper offers a bottom-up analysis of the process of successive elections in Burundi between May and September 2010. By taking into account the (often disregarded) perspective of the Burundian voter, it attempts to fathom the issues at stake as perceived by citizens and communities, as well as the motivations (political, ideological, material and others) determining this particular electoral behaviour. The results of this study should be put within the context of macro-political dynamics at national level with regard to the 2010 elections and their results (see also section 2).

The research leading to this paper took place between January and December 2010. The data was collected during the period of the Burundi 2010 elections.² Two research strategies were used. The first strategy was a quantitative one by means of two surveys conducted among the Burundian population of voting age (18 and up): a first pre-election survey in March 2010 and a post-election survey in August 2010. In each survey, 2000 interviews were conducted across the whole Burundian territory on the basis of a representative cross-section of the Burundian population of voting age. A second strategy was a qualitative one by means of discussion groups. The findings arising from these discussions allowed for an illustration of the quantitative results. The methodology is further explained in section 3.

The analysis and the presentation of these results are structured in five sections. A first section covers electoral practices in terms of participation in different political meetings, thus offering an indicator enabling us to take into account, among other things, affinities with various political parties. A second section concerns the knowledge of national and local personalities in the different political parties. A third section gauges participation in the different 2010 elections. This new indicator allows us to determine the voting practices of the Burundian population. These three sections provide intermediary results that allow us to chart « Burundian groups of voters ». This classification into groups of voters constitutes an analysis grid for the next sections. A fourth section concerns voter motivation. The fifth section examines the perception of the political parties' level of concern when it comes to a series of concrete issues in view of the electorate's major concerns. This analysis takes place both at national level and by taking into account the different groups of voters.

These sections are structured as follows: first, the data are presented in graphs and charts; then, the most relevant findings are highlighted; and lastly, an attempt at interpreting the findings is made. However, these interpretations are mostly hypotheses, difficult to confirm with 100% certainty, but which nevertheless provide a "reading" of the elections from the bottom-up.

[1] The authors wish to thank Filip Reyntjens and Eva Palmans who formulated interesting comments on previous drafts of this paper. We also thank our Burundian research assistants who carried out the fieldwork in Burundi..

[2] This research was financed by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) within the framework of funding the NGO La Bénévolencija for the project « Pool de journalistes ». The primary goal of this research was to measure the impact of media productions during the 2010 election process among the Burundian population entitled to vote. See also: La Benevolencija, Médias pour une responsabilité citoyenne : utilité, efficacité et impact, rapport de recherche, Bujumbura, La Benevolencija, décembre 2010.

2. THE 2010 ELECTIONS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF TWENTY YEARS OF POLITICAL TRANSITION

It is difficult – even undesirable – to separate local electoral practices and dynamics from their context, not only in Burundi but globally, as elections have become the ultimate yardstick for democratic performance in the eyes of donors and other international actors. This section starts by placing the recent election process within the turbulent context of Burundian political transition over the last twenty years. Subsequently, we shall summarise some issues and results of the 2010 elections at the national level.

2.1 Brief historical overview: elections and transitions

Before turning our attention to voter motivation and the voting practices of Burundians, we situate said voters' participation in the elections within the political context of the (multiple) transitions the country has faced in the last twenty years. Indeed, Burundi was first ruled, in the early 1990s, by a single-party authoritarian regime (dominated by a demographic minority group). Later on, this system was replaced by a multi-party system with democratic aspirations. After the failure of this political transition, Burundi underwent a second transition, from an armed internal conflict towards a situation of peace. In this section, we will focus on the role of elections within the context of these two transitions. To put it briefly, the Burundian experience is a perfect illustration of the more realistic theory concerning the advantages and restrictions posed by elections, which, in a « traditional » view, were presented as the ultimate instrument of democracy. More recent scientific literature acknowledges that election processes may hold out the prospect of democratisation as well as the danger of instability and even the return to an authoritarian regime (Lindberg, 2009).

Since 1990 and the introduction in 1992 of a democratic constitution effecting the return to a multi-party system – which Burundi already knew during the first years of independence until the replacement of the Kingdom by the Republic in November 1966 – the Burundians voted on three occasions: in 1993, 2005 and 2010.

In 1993, for approximately four months, Burundi was applauded as a worthy example of the so-called third wave of democratisation (Huntington 1991). The 1993 elections saw the rise of the Frodebu party (Front pour la démocratie au Burundi) on the political scene during the legislative elections and the presidential election, with its candidate Melchior Ndadaye beating incumbent president Pierre Buyoya, who belonged to the Uprona party (Parti de l'unité pour le progrès national), which used to be the only political party allowed in the country. Even if the result obtained by Frodebu during the legislative elections (72.5%, as opposed to 21.8% for Uprona) was not an exact reflection of the demographic composition of society in Burundi (supposedly around 85% Hutu and 14% Tutsi), it was difficult not to consider this democratic voting process as having followed ethnic lines. In a country ravaged by tragic events in, amongst other periods, 1972 and 1988 – that are so radically and divergently perceived by large segments of Hutu opinion (see for example Nsanze, 2002) and Tutsi opinion (see for example Rutamucero, 2007) – it is no wonder that political and electoral competition not only reflects, but even reinforces ethnic cleavages (Reilly 2008). When was this visible in Burundi?

Firstly, the new Ndadaye government ensured, notably at the highest level of political institutions, the allocation of key posts to Tutsis; the president had even appointed a Tutsi Prime Minister. By doing so, he went much further than the minimum requirement stipulated by the constitution, which was designed to reflect the diverse make-up of the Burundian population («être composé dans un esprit d'unité nationale en tenant compte des diverses composantes de la population burundaise», art. 86). Secondly, despite this political inclusion, the country quickly underwent a process of 'Frodébisation' at various levels of public administration (Reyntjens, 2000). For a part of the Tutsi political elite, the electoral defeat posed a threat since it could undermine its access to multiple resources hitherto guaranteed by political power: employment, credit, education grants, land, business contracts, international aid, etc. Thirdly, one part of the Tutsi elite, fearing that the electoral defeat would inevitably lead to the loss of control over protection devices for demographic minority groups, casted a veto (Sullivan, 2005). During a military coup, Ndadaye and other Hutu dignitaries of the Frodebu party were assassinated in October 1993.

This assassination led to the most violent episode in the country's history, with the start of a the civil war in June 1994 that would last approximately fifteen years and make thousands of victims. In political terms, the institutional vacuum that followed the military coup gave rise to the perception, notably on the side of the Hutu, that the election results were being renegotiated, if not annihilated altogether. The Kigobe-Novotel agreements and the subsequent government convention of 1994 – which focused on cataloguing all posts to be allocated to the two big political families – could not ease the ethno-political tensions. This also led to a deconstruction of the political landscape – a trend which has not halted yet and which accounts for the fact that the original Frodebu party has meanwhile given way to at least four other parties which are primarily Hutu: CNDD (Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie), CNDD-FDD (Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie – Forces de défense de la démocratie), which again led to the creation of UPD (Union pour la paix et le développement), and finally Frodebu Nyakuri (or 'real' Frodebu - Nyakuri).

The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, signed on 28th August 2000, meant a compromise between the two big political families, a primarily Hutu G7 around Frodebu and a primarily Tutsi G10 around Uprona. It also outlined a new Constitution – now with a reinforced consociative character with the objective to protect the demographic Tutsi minority. An electoral system was put in place to ensure democracy and stability and that departed from the majority model that had proven to be unfeasible within the particular Burundian context. Contrary to what its title suggested, the Arusha Treaty could not put a stop to an armed conflict without the negotiated agreement with the two principal rebel movements, CNDD-FDD (treaty signed in November 2003) and the Palipehutu-FNL (treaty signed in September 2006, but only implemented, after many obstacles, in December 2008). For each of these rebellious parties, the elections – and certainly the hope for an election victory – were presented as a carrot by the international negotiators with the objective to convince them to transform themselves from armed movements to political parties. Although they did not sign the Arusha Treaty, CNDD-FDD did accept the regulatory electoral framework that was negotiated. As a result, despite a landslide victory in 2005, CNDD-FDD was forced to include ministers from the Frodebu and Uprona parties in the coalition government. Only a few months after the inauguration of the new government, CNDD-FDD found their hands tied by the quota system, corrected proportionalities and qualified

majority requirements as stipulated by the Constitution – notably after an internal argument among twenty-two deputies over their former Secretary General, Hussein Radjabu (Vandeginste, 2008).

2.2. The 2010 elections: issues and results at the national level

Given this electoral experience within the context of a tumultuous and bloody political transition, the 2010 elections posed serious challenges. Would these second elections after the civil war allow Burundi to move towards enhanced democracy, as part of the scientific literature suggests (Lindberg, 2006)? Would the dominant party's control over the state, including the local administration, the police, and education services, allow for free and regular elections? By contrast, would the electoral competition not be at risk of waking ethnic demons that had only just been repressed? Would the complex system of consociative power-sharing be able to comfort those who lost the elections to the point of making them recognise defeat and thus preventing a regression that might put an end to the fragile peace that was attained with such great difficulty? What would be the electoral success of the new parties, such as the FNL (Forces nationales de libération) of Agathon Rwaso (a party that, just like CNDD-FDD in 2005, presented itself as the party of change), the UPD party (of the former CNDD-FDD leading man, Hussein Radjabu) and the MSD party (Mouvement pour la solidarité et la démocratie) of Alexis Sinduhije?

After an extremely long pre-election campaign, marked by controversy around the erection of the national electoral commission – the “Commission électorale nationale indépendante” (CENI) and the new electoral code (adopted in September 2009), as well as violent political upheavals (Human Rights Watch, 2010), the electoral marathon was finally on its way, starting with the communal elections on 24th May. For five months - from May to September 2010 - five elections at different levels were organised: communal elections (24th May), the presidential election (28th June), legislative elections (23rd July), senate elections (28th July) and elections at hill (colline) level (7th September).

Of the 44 recognised political parties, 23 took part in the communal elections. Table 1 gives an overview of the results obtained by the eight parties that presented their lists of candidates in at least 100 of the 129 Burundian communes (municipalities)

Table 1 - Communal elections

Turnout Rates: 90.6%		
Party	% of the votes	seats
CNDD-FDD	64.03	1203
FNL	14.15	291
UPRONA	6.25	152
FRODEBU	5.43	123
MSD	3.75	92
UPD	2.21	32
FRODEBU NYAKURI	1.36	8
CNDD	1.26	19

Source: the authors

On the one hand the table clearly shows the electoral triumph of the CNDD-FDD party, on the other hand, in comparison with the 2005 communal election results (62.6% of the votes), the score obtained by this party is not that surprising. What did change, however – and undoubtedly explains in part the reaction of the opposition parties (see below) – were the expectations of the other parties.

The results at national level, as indicated by the table, conceal the diversity at regional level. Indeed, CNDD-FDD obtained the highest scores in Karusi and Ngozi, the original province of President Nkurunziza. Everywhere else, it obtained an absolute majority of the votes with the exception of three provinces (Bujumbura Mairie, Bururi and Bujumbura). Given the fact that CNDD-FDD's political dominance is clearly less absolute in the capital and the adjacent province, this might become a destabilising factor for the new regime in the medium term.

In face of the communal election results, twelve opposition parties (including the FNL, Frodebu, CNDD, MSD and UPD, but not Uprona, which opted for a strategic position between CNDD-FDD and the opposition) immediately put in place an ADC-Ikibiri coalition (Alliance des démocrates pour le changement au Burundi³) and claimed massive electoral fraud as the cause of these unexpected results. They referred to the general climate of voter intimidation (notably after activities led by young CNDD-FDD militants, the imbonerakure (literally: « those who see far ahead ») in various provinces in the north of the country, to the poorly observed voting secrecy in polling booths that did not guarantee full confidentiality, to the systematic filling of ballot boxes, to the power cuts while votes were being counted, etc.) (ADC-Ikibiri 2010). Despite the fact that national and international observers testified that the election process was fair, the ADC-Ikibiri demanded for all the communal election results to be nullified, for the electoral commission to be replaced and for a process of political dialogue to be launched, with international mediation between CNDD-FDD and the opposition, so as to prepare a new election process.

Mere days into the implementation of this process, it became clear that the strategy of the opposition coalition consisted primarily of questioning the elections' legitimacy for the consumption of outsiders, i.e. Burundi's major international partners. If they succeeded in

[3] Parties taking part in this alliance: ADR, CDP, CNDD, FEDS-SANGIRA, FNL, MSD, PARENA, PIT, PDRR, RADEBU, FRODEBU and UPD

convincing the international community not to support the next phases in the election process, everything would be possible and everything would have to be renegotiated. As with the Burundian elections of 1993 and as recent experiences in Kenya and Zimbabwe have shown, it is not impossible to renegotiate a bad election result – on the condition that the occurrence of political violence can be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Despite the efforts of high-ranking representatives in the international community, alarmed by the risk of instability that is linked to the contestation of communal election results – as well as by the number of grenade explosions in many parts of the country – these representatives have not been able to convince the leaders of the opposition parties to join the election process, despite the opportunity for some of them, namely the FNL and the Frodebu, to take part in the future government on the condition of obtaining 5% of the votes in the legislative elections. However, by adopting a strategic decision to save the pluralist nature of the elections, the Uprona party decided to take part in the legislative elections, despite its boycott of the presidential elections – a boycott which would not have affected this party since it had no chance of winning this election.

The first (and only) presidential election round took place on 28th June after the withdrawal of six out of seven of the initial candidates. Voter turnout stood at 76.98% and the only candidate, Pierre Nkurunziza, obtained 91.6% of the votes. Quite paradoxically, the nature of the popular response to the boycott that was launched by the opposition largely confirmed the communal election results. This could be interpreted as an indicator of the accuracy of the latter. Indeed, voter turnout was markedly lower in the three provinces where CNDD-FDD had not obtained an overall majority during the communal voting.

With the exception of some independent candidates and a few small parties generally unknown to the larger public, three parties took part in the legislative elections on 23rd July: CNDD-FDD, Frodebu Nyakuri – generally acknowledged as an auxiliary party created with the active support of CNDD-FDD in order to cause a rift in Léonce Ngendakumana's Frodebu party – and Uprona. As with the presidential election, voter turnout was lower during the legislative elections in the aforementioned provinces (Bujumbura Mairie, Bujumbura and Bururi). Uprona as well as Frodebu Nyakuri largely benefitted from their participation and the boycott by other parties. Uprona, which effectively doubled its score, was able to send – after co-optation – 17 deputies to the national Assembly and, having obtained 5% of the votes, was guaranteed a role in the coalition government. The same rewards were obtained by Frodebu Nyakuri, led by Jean Minani (table 2).

Table 2 – National Assembly Elections

		Voter turnout: 66.68%			
		Seats (after co-optation)			
Party	% of the votes	Hutu	Tutsi	Twa	Total
CNDD-FDD	81.19	54	27	0	81
UPRONA	11.06	5	12	0	17
FRODEBU NYAKURI	5.88	3	2	0	5
Twa				3	3
Total		62	41	3	106

Source: the authors

The (indirect) election of senators took place on 28th July. Senators were chosen by provincial electoral colleges composed in accordance with the results of the communal elections. It was not surprising to see CNDD-FDD obtain the overall majority of seats in the senate (table 3). As with the National Assembly, the composition of the new Senate complies with the articles of the Constitution (including ethnic parity and a minimum of 30% participation of women).

Table 3 – Senate Elections

Party	Seats			
	Hutu	Tutsi	Twa	Total
CNDD-FDD	17	15	0	32
UPRONA	0	2	0	2
Former presidents (life-long senatorship)	2	2	0	4
Twa (co-opted)			3	3
Total	19	19	3	41

Source: the authors

Some conclusions can be made when considering the election process at national level, from a macro-level perspective (see also : Vandeginste, 2011; see also Palmans, 2011). Firstly, the disastrous strategy of the opposition parties is striking. Despite the constitutional framework and an electoral system that is particularly favourable to the losing parties (notably due to the multiple mechanisms of proportionality), any opposition other than Uprona is currently completely absent in parliament. Given that the electoral boycott of the parties belonging to the ADC-Ikibiri coalition was based on strategic calculations – in order to ‘renegotiate’ the election results to ensure their representation within the institutions – it can be described as a failure. Secondly, the following question arises : haven’t the Burundians, twenty years after the abolition of the single-party regime, actually voted in favour of a return to a single-party structure? To put it differently, has the political pluralism within the Burundian institutions become so insignificant that five years from now, one will have to conclude that the 2010 elections have led to the establishment of an authoritarian regime that cannot lose any new elections? Thirdly, CNDD-FDD could, legally speaking, unilaterally modify the Constitution, including the ethnic balance that is hitherto protecting the demographic Tutsi minority and especially the Tutsi poli-

ticians An aspect that especially the latter consider a safeguard against the demographic Hutu majority. Will CNDD-FDD ever go to such lengths? Fourthly, what is the future for those opposition parties that are currently outside the institutions? Will some of them opt for political violence, which could undermine the results of the long and difficult peace process? And, in case such a worst-case scenario develops, will the parties involved benefit from the indispensable support of the Burundian population?

While these questions concern future politics in Burundi and are more macro-political in nature, the process analysed on the following pages took place in the period of the previous elections and at micro-level, both at the level of the Burundians hills and in the mindset of the inhabitants of these hills. The objective, however, is not only to understand what happened during that election period at that level, but also to move beyond these insights in order to put potential longer-term evolutions in the current political constellation at macro level into perspective.

3. METHODOLOGY

Two strategies have been used to collect the data for this research. The first strategy was a quantitative one by means of two surveys conducted among the Burundian population of voting age (18 and up). A second strategy was qualitative in nature by means of focus groups. The quantitative strategy was realised by means of a «barometer survey» in two stages⁴: a pre-election survey, stage 1, in March 2010⁵, and a post-election survey, stage 2, in August 2010. During each of these two stages, approximately 2000 face-to-face interviews were conducted across the Burundian territory.

The territory was divided in five « provincial zones » (graph 1). These provincial zones have been defined according to precise criteria such as geographical proximity, political tendencies, returnee areas, the resemblance of conflicts (over land or over ethnic issues...), and in line with previously conducted studies by partner organisations.⁶ The zones are: the Centre, with Bujumbura Mairie; the South, with the provinces of Bururi, Rutana, Makamba, Ruyigi; the Centre East with the provinces de Mwaro, Muramyva, Gitega, Cankuzo, Karuzi; the North East, including the provinces of Ngozi, Kayanza, Muyinga, Kirundo, and finally the North West with the provinces of Cibitoke, Bubanza, Bujumbura (previously called Bujumbura Rural)⁷.

In each survey stage, 400 interviews were conducted in each unit of provinces. The samples of the first and the second stage are completely similar as they both represent a cross-section of the Burundian population of voting age (18 and up) according to the following criteria: gender⁸; age (18 - 25, 26 - 40, 41 and older)⁹; the type of residential environment (urban / rural)¹⁰.

[4] More information on the selection and training of the interviewers as well as the nature of fieldwork can be found in: La Benevolencija, Médias pour une responsabilité citoyenne : utilité, efficacité et impact, rapport de recherche, Bujumbura, La Benevolencija, décembre 2010.

[5] The results presented in this paper are taken from the post-election survey unless indicated otherwise.

[6] The survey's design was validated by the ISTEUBU (Institut de Statistiques et des Etudes Economiques du Burundi)

[7] The province of Bujumbura (Mairie) constitutes a separate entity since it includes the capital Bujumbura; it therefore has all the characteristics of a capital (higher socio-economic level, 100% urban population,...). The provinces of Bururi, Rutana, Makamba and Ruyigi are situated in the south of the country and share the same characteristics. These provinces have always been influenced by problems concerning refugees and repatriates. Given their location, they have also been influenced by Tanzania. The return of refugees explains the conflicts over land in these provinces. The provinces of Mwaro, Muramyva, Gitega, Cankuzo and Karuzi are situated in the central/eastern region. The province of Gitega (the most densely populated area of Burundi) and Karuzi have suffered many casualties during the different Burundi conflicts. The provinces of Karuzi and Cankuzo have been greatly influenced by Tanzania. Finally, Mwaro and Muramyva, composed of more conservative Burundians, have not been much affected by the recent socio-political crises. The provinces of Ngozi, Kayanza, Muyinga and Kirundo are situated in the north-east of Burundi. Kirundo has always been influenced by the cultural, socio-economic and political influences of Rwanda, and to a lesser extent, the same goes for the province of Muyinga. Kayanza and Ngozi are characterised by a climate of tension that sometimes erupts in violent confrontations between major political parties. This situation can partly be explained by the fact that the political leaders are all from the north of the country, which is clearly illustrated by CNDD-FDD and FNL (Ngozi) and FRODEBU (Kayanza – if we consider Ndayizeye as the leader), whereas for Uprona and CNDD this is not the case. For UPD, it is the case if we consider Kampayano (Ngozi) or Feruzi (Muyinga) as the leaders; furthermore, the leader Hussein Radjabu also comes from the province of Muyinga. Finally, the north-western provinces include Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura. Bubanza and Bujumbura have always been the heartland of rebel movements. The provinces of Cibitoke and Bubanza are also characterised by superstitious behaviour (high level of illiteracy, strong preference for traditional healing practices, resorting to witchcraft to settle social problems). Moreover, Cibitoke is particularly influenced by Congolese and Rwandan cultures.

[8] Source : National Census 2008


[9] Source : Survey QIBB (Questionnaire unifié des indicateurs de base du bien-être) conducted in 2006 and financed by the Banque mondiale

[10] The hypothesis of a greater heterogeneity in an urban context justifies its overrepresentation.

Within each unit of provinces we ensured an equal spread among the different categories¹¹. During the two survey stages, the interviews were classified as indicated by graph 1.

In addition to the barometer survey, the qualitative material, i.e. the findings from the Focus Groups organised in Burundi in September 2010 by the National Democratic Institute (NDI), serve as illustrations.¹²

Graph 1: Sample




[11] The surveys were conducted by means of a combination of two methods: one consisting of a purposive selection at the first level followed by a random method at the second level; and “itineraries” at the third level. This makes it possible to extrapolate the results for the entire population or per sampled group as well as to calculate errors in terms of variation coefficient or confidence interval. Significant variations were established by comparing averages using the t-test. Moreover, the margin of error for this sample size is ± 2.2 points. This means that for the total sample, a variation could be considered as significant as of 4.4 points.

[12] In September 2010 the National Democratic Institute conducted 55 focus groups in 10 provinces of Burundi (Bujumbura Mairie, Bujumbura, Bubanza, Bururi, Mwaro, Gitega, Ruyigi, Ngozi, Kirundo and Muyinga). For more details about the sample we refer to the report « The road ahead: L'état d'esprit des citoyens du Burundi après les élections de 2010 », NDI, February 2011.

4. PRESENCE AT POLITICAL MEETINGS

Forty-nine percent (49%) of the population says to have attended at least one political meeting during the election process (graph 2). This indicates, if not a certain interest in the election process, at least a curiosity regarding the elections, and certainly the appeal of these popular gatherings. Thus, despite the diversity concerning political mobilisation across different parties, the electoral campaign was massively followed by the population (ICG, 2011).

Graph 2 : Presence at political meetings¹³



The most frequently visited meetings were those of CNDD-FDD. 36% of the population stated having attended at least one meeting of this political party, 15% went to at least one meeting of FNL, 9% went to at least one meeting of MSD or Uprona. It has, however, been observed that there was a disparity between the resources used by the political parties during the electoral campaign; CNDD-FDD disposed of better logistics and promotional means than the opposition (organisation of big rallies, distribution of t-shirts, caps, drinks and transport of people towards the meeting grounds). The lack of public funding for campaigning has prevented the majority of parties from coming up with a considerable election campaign (UE, 2010).

The Burundians mostly (31% of the population) went to the meeting of only one political party. This trend was more prevalent among those attending a CNDD-FDD meeting (54%) than among those attending an FNL meeting (23%). The latter public was more likely than average to attend meetings of other parties as well. This observation confirms a stronger CNDD-FDD presence in the field and, potentially, a more indecisive attitude among other voters. The new political forces, MSD and UPD, have mobilised fewer people outside their respective

[13] The arrows indicate the significant variations of the results by age, gender, the set of provinces, the type of residential surroundings, the participation in political meetings or elections. For example, in graph 2, among the total sample population, 31% of the people went to the meeting of one political party. However, for those who went to a CNDD-FDD meeting, the participation rate was higher at 54% and lower for those attending an FNL meeting, at 23%.

heartlands. With respect to the more traditional political forces, Uprona was not able to organise great rallies, even though it disposes of a national stronghold. Frodebu is no longer what it used to be under the leadership of Melchior Ndadaye (ICG, 2011).

Apart from an analysis of the results for the whole of the Burundian population, we also include the regional aspect in our analysis. In the wake of the communal election results of 24th May 2010, two trends in voting at the provincial level could be identified: a single-party trend in one zone, and a pluralist trend in two other zones. The single-party trend is prevalent in the provinces where CNDD-FDD had an overall majority of 78% during the communal elections, namely the provinces of Karusi with 86% of the votes, Ngozi with 81% and Ruyigi with 79%.

The first zone with a pluralist trend is composed of Bujumbura Mairie (the capital). It is the province that showed the most disparity at the level of communal election results. Four political parties (CNDD-FDD, FNL, MSD, Uprona) obtained results varying between 12% and 28% (CNDD-FDD keeps the lead). The second zone showing a pluralist trend is composed of Bujumbura and constitutes the only province where CNDD-FDD was not the first party during the communal elections, but FNL with 57% of the votes against 27% for CNDD-FDD. This pluralist zone also comprises the province of Bururi, a second province with diverging results: four political parties oscillated between 13% and 26%: CNDD-FDD, Frodebu, FNL and Uprona (CNDD-FDD keeps the lead, but Frodebu is the runner-up with only 2% difference). Outside these three zones lay the other provinces¹⁴ where CNDD-FDD was leading in the communal elections with results oscillating between 53% and 77%, depending on the province.

Ten percent (10%) of the respondents was present at the meeting of one or more parties that, after the communal elections, formed the opposition coalition ADC-Ikibiri. These voters did not attend a CNDD-FDD, Uprona or Frodebu Nyakuri meeting.

Nineteen percent (19%) of the respondents said they exclusively attended one or more CNDD-FDD meetings and no meetings of other political parties. In the provinces of Bujumbura Mairie and Bururi/Bujumbura, this percentage is somewhat lower (14% and 16%). By contrast, in provinces where CNDD-FDD obtained the highest scores in the communal elections, 24% only attended CNDD-FDD meetings. Only 2% of the population exclusively attended the meetings of Uprona. Finally, 18% attended political meetings, but not exclusively of one particular political party. So these were individuals who did not exclusively attend one or more CNDD-FDD meetings, one or more meetings of the coalition ADC-IKIBIRI, or one or more Uprona meetings.

One thus observes a correlation between the kind of participation in political meetings and the communal election results in terms of regional divergences. The trends in the zones (single-party-oriented or pluralist) at the level of communal election results are also reflected in the way the population took part in the political meetings.

[14] The other provinces are Cibitoke, Bubanza, Kayanza, Kirundo, Muyinga, Gitega, Muramvya, Mwaro, Makamba, Rutana, and Cankuzo.

5. KNOWLEDGE OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL PERSONALITIES WITHIN THE POLITICAL PARTIES

Generally speaking, the name of the national representative of the political parties mentioned by the individuals was well-known, especially when it comes to the major opposition parties. The leaders' names of the latter parties are mentioned much more often than those of the others (table 4). For the party in power (CNDD-FDD), among the individuals who mentioned this political party when asked « *Which political parties do you know by name* »¹⁵ (that is 99%), 37% confirmed that Pierre Nkurunziza is the national representative and 25% mentioned Jérémie Ngendakumana. For l'ADC-Ikibiri, which is not a political party, but a coalition of opposition parties formed after the communal elections, it is striking to see that, despite the fact that the names of those in charge of this coalition were only vaguely known during the election period (with individuals such as Léonard Nyangoma, Léonce Ngendakumana, Agathon Rwasa and Alexis Sinduhije), Agathon Rwasa (37%) was regarded as the national representative of this « movement », even though he fled from the country in 2010.

Near the end of the electoral marathon (August 2010), the local representatives were barely known. Indeed, in general terms, more than 50% of the population admitted not knowing the name of a single local representative. These numbers confirm the idea that the communal elections had a very national character. People clearly voted for an emblematic leader at the national level rather than for a candidate at local level.

*« As far as I'm concerned, I do not look at CNDD-FDD as a party, I look at individuals instead. I believe that CNDD-FDD won the elections because it had presented Pierre NKURUNZIZA as a presidential candidate »*¹⁶

The campaign for the communal elections was led by the national political personalities who were also potential candidates for the presidential election and around national themes: this election did not revolve around local development programmes (Vandeginste, 2011). The communal elections can therefore be considered as a first round of the presidential election.

[15] « *Quels sont les partis politiques que vous connaissez ne fut-ce que de nom ?* »

[16] « *De mon côté, je pense que je ne regarde pas le CNDD-FDD en tant que parti, je regarde l'individu. C'est-à-dire que le CNDD-FDD a gagné les élections parce qu'il avait présenté Pierre NKURUNZIZA comme candidat à la présidence* » NDI, Focus Group, hommes, province of Muyinga, 30/09/2010.

Table 4 – Knowledge of national and local personalities


Political Parties	Names of national representatives	Knowledge of a local representative		
		Yes	No	
CNDD-FDD (mentioned by 99%)	No idea	36 %	5 %	31 %
	Pierre Nkurunziza	37 %	18 %	19 %
	Jérémie Ngendakumana	25 %	18 %	7 %
	Autres	2 %		
Frodebu (mentioned by 15%)	No idea	47 %	3 %	44 %
	Domitien Ndayizeye	23 %	8 %	15 %
	Léonce Ndengakumana	16 %	5 %	11 %
	Minani Jean	6 %	0 %	6 %
	Nyangoma Léonard	3 %	1 %	2 %
	Autres	5 %		
CNDD (mentioned by 7%)	No idea	18 %	2 %	16 %
	Nyangoma Leonard	71 %	8 %	63 %
	Pierre Nkurunziza	4 %	3 %	1 %
	Autres	7 %		
Uprona (mentioned by 33%)	No idea	55 %	6 %	48 %
	Niyoyankana Bonaventure	20 %	8 %	12 %
	Sahinguyu Yves	14 %	5 %	9 %
	Buyoya Pierre	4 %	0 %	4 %
	Louis Rwagasore	2 %	0 %	2 %
	Rwasa Agathon	2 %	1 %	1 %
	Autres	3 %		
FNL (mentioned by 30%)	No idea	16 %	3 %	13 %
	Rwasa Agathon	76 %	29 %	47 %
	Miburo Emmanuel	2 %	1 %	1 %
	Sinduhije Alexis	2 %	1 %	1 %
	Autres	4 %		
MSD (mentioned by 11%)	No idea	6 %	1 %	5 %
	Sinduhije Alexis	87 %	50 %	37 %
	Rwasa Agathon	2 %	0 %	2 %
	Autres	5 %		
UPD (mentioned by 9%)	No idea	39 %	3 %	36 %
	Feruzi Zedi	29 %	21 %	8 %
	Kampayano Pascaline	13 %	4 %	9 %
	Mugwengezo Chauvineau	9 %	2 %	7 %
	Radjabu Hussein	5 %	2 %	3 %
	Autres	5 %		
ADC-AKIBIRI (mentioned by 3%)	No idea	32 %	0 %	32 %
	Rwasa Agathon	37 %	1 %	36 %
	Nyangoma Leonard	22 %	2 %	20 %
	Autres	9 %		

6. PARTICIPATION IN THE DIFFERENT ELECTIONS

According to the survey results, voter turnout in the communal elections was very high (86%) and it markedly dropped in the later elections: the presidential election and the legislative elections (graph 3). This can be explained by the boycott of the election process after the communal elections by several opposition parties that formed the ADC-Ikibiri alliance. Within this context, the six major opposition candidates withdrew from the presidential election leaving the incumbent President, Pierre Nkurunziza, as the only candidate.

However, voter turnout in the presidential and legislative elections remained rather high (68%). Generally speaking, those who attended (any) political meeting(s) were more likely to have voted in the communal elections. Participation in these first meetings reveals a keen interest in the election process. The communal elections, as the first in a row of elections, were a sort of election poll in a country where the use of election polls is rare. As discussed in the previous section, in the mindset of many voters, the communal elections were a kind of « first round » for the presidential election.

Graph 3 : Participation in different 2010 elections



While 86% of the interviewed people said they voted in the communal elections, voter turnout was even higher among those who only attended CNDD-FDD meetings (98%) and those who only attended the meetings of a party in the opposition coalition ADC-Ikibiri (96%). Concerning the presidential election, 68% of the interviewed people said they voted in this election. This voter turnout is much higher among those who only attended CNDD-FDD meetings (97%) and logically much lower among those who only attended meetings of a party in the opposition coalition ADC-Ikibiri (21%).


Voter turnout in the presidential and legislative elections appeared to be lower in the province of Bujumbura Mairie, which is not surprising since the population in this province often attended meetings of an opposition coalition party. People from the provinces of Bururi/Bujumbura and Bujumbura Mairie were less likely to have voted in these elections (60% and 52% respectively) than those who came from provinces where CNDD-FDD reached an important score during the communal elections (76%).

Moreover, while 68% of the interviewed people stated having voted in the legislative elections, voter turnout was much higher among those who exclusively attended CNDD-FDD meetings (94%) and markedly lower among those who only attended meetings of a party in the opposition coalition ADC-Ikibiri (25%). As with the presidential elections, people from the province of Bujumbura Mairie were less likely to have voted in the legislative election (56%) than those who came from provinces where CNDD-FDD reached an important score during the communal elections (72%).

Sixty-four percent (64%) of the Burundians of voting age said they voted in all three elections (graph 4). Of those who attended a CNDD-FDD meeting, 83% voted in all three elections and this percentage is 93% in the group of people who exclusively went to CNDD-FDD meetings. Among those who exclusively attended an ADC-Ikibiri meeting, only 20% actually voted in all elections (i.e. 2% of the whole population). These are voters who decided to use their civil right to vote, despite the call of the opposition parties to abstain from voting, to boycott the process.

We should note, however, that some voters may have decided to still participate in the election process because they were intimidated. According to international observers, the period leading up to the presidential campaign was characterised by violence causing casualties and people being injured (Human Rights Watch, 2010). The representatives of civil society, political parties and the population denounced this climate of intimidation that targeted members of the opposition parties. People were forced to abandon their party and to join CNDD-FDD. Furthermore, new recruits were invited to testify publicly why they had rightfully abandoned their old opposition party in order to encourage the opposition parties' militants to vote for the only presidential candidate (UE, 2010). Intimidating messages were also communicated through pamphlets with incendiary content. It should therefore be clear that CNDD-FDD devised mechanisms to incite voters of the opposition to vote for them.

Graph 4 : The impact of the « boycott »



As to the variations in election participation across the provinces, we see that people coming from the provinces where CNDD-FDD obtained a large majority during the communal elections were more likely to have voted in all three elections (70%) than those coming from provinces with more political diversity, such as Bujumbura/Bururi and Bujumbura Mairie, where respectively 58% and 49% of the people voted in all three elections.

These findings confirm voter turnout rates that were released by the *Commission électorale nationale indépendante (CENI)*: 91% in the communal elections, 77% in the presidential elections and 67% in the legislative elections. The sample in this study can therefore be considered as a representative cross-section of the Burundian electorate. For such a sample, the accepted margin of error is +/- 2.2, with an accepted deviation of 4 to 5 points. For the communal elections, we observe a deviation of 5 points; for the legislative elections a deviation of 1 point; and for the presidential election a deviation of 9 points.¹⁷

Although generally speaking, 22% of the people did not vote again after having voted during the communal elections, the boycott against the presidential and/or legislative elections was far more widespread among residents of Bujumbura Mairie (41%), among those who attended a meeting of the MSD party and/or the FNL party, and even more widespread among those who had exclusively attended a meeting of ADC-Ikibiri (72%). This can be explained by the refusal of the political opposition parties' militants to continue the election process after being called upon to do so by their leader. In addition, people coming from the provinces dominated by CNDD-FDD were less likely to have taken part in the boycott (13%) than those in the provinces with higher political diversity (Bujumbura/Bururi and Bujumbura Mairie).

Moreover, those who attended a political meeting (irrespective of the political party) were not likely to abstain from voting in all three elections (3%). This may indicate a certain commitment in the process among people who attend meetings.

[17] An explanation can be that the CENI might have attempted to inflate the figures since the problem of political tensions posed the risk of low voter turnout.

7. VOTER MOTIVATION AND POPULAR THINKING DURING THE ELECTION PERIOD

The different voting practices during the election process discussed in the previous sections are intermediary results. Following the analysis of these preliminary results, it is relevant to group certain findings together in order to create segments within the Burundian electorate. This classification into “groups of voters” provides an analytical framework to structure the data. We shall thus attempt to determine whether voter motivation differs across different groups, whether the preoccupations of different groups of voters are different, and how these groups position themselves with regard to the intimidations and manipulations of various political actors.

7.1. The “groups of voters”

The first group is called « The CNDD-FDD voters» (N = 329 = 17%¹⁸). When asked: «Which political party do you know? », they spontaneously mentioned CNDD-FDD. They exclusively attended CNDD-FDD meetings and they voted in all elections: communal elections, the presidential election and the legislative elections¹⁹. These responses and practices suggest that these individuals support CNDD-FDD. They tend to have a rural background. This category of voters is primarily composed of peasants and cattle breeders but also civil servants. Only a small segment of this category is constituted by housewives/ family aides and students. This voter group is also less likely to live in Bujumbura Mairie.

Similar indicators have been used to identify another group of voters that was labelled « The voters of the opposition » (N = 121 = 6%²⁰). When asked: « Which political party do you know? », they spontaneously mentioned a party which is part of the opposition coalition ADC-Ikibiri; they only attended meetings of parties belonging to this opposition coalition and they voted in the communal elections, but not in the presidential and/or legislative elections (which were boycotted by the ADC-Ikibiri).²¹ These voters usually belong to a higher socio-economic class in comparison with the rest of the population. Indeed, it is less likely that these persons never went to school (or only attended primary school). They are less likely to be peasants/ cattle breeders, and more likely to be students and unemployed people. These opposition voters mostly come from the capital, Bujumbura Mairie and the province of Bujumbura. Moreover, they are not likely to be elderly people (41 years or older).

A third group of voters are the « undecided voters » (N=359 = 18%²²). They have attended at least two meetings of different political parties thus they did not exclusively attend CNDD-FDD, ADC-Ikibiri or Uprona meetings. Moreover, they voted in at least one of the elections that were held in 2010. Sixty-nine percent (69%) of them voted in all elections and 30% voted in the communal election but abstained from voting in the presidential and/or legislative elections (and 1% never voted in any election). These undecided voters are more often youngsters (between 18 and 25) and they are more likely to be characterised by limited levels of formal education.

[18] Base = total sample.

[19] We did not take the senate elections into account as they were indirect. In addition, also the colline (hill) elections were not considered since they took place at colline level, where political parties are “officially” excluded. In fact, candidates for the colline elections - the positions of hill or neighborhood counsellor - are not based on political party lists. All candidates stand independently without any political party affiliation (UE 2010).

[20] Base = total sample.

[21] The Uprona party is not part of the ADC-IKIBIRI coalition. The group that voted « opposition » therefore does not include those who voted for Uprona.

[22] Base = total sample.

Finally, there is the group we refer to as the « immobile »²³ (N=1004 =51%²⁴). These are individuals that did not take part in any political meeting. Among them, 61% voted in every election, 16% voted in the communal elections but abstained in the other elections, and 23% never voted in any election. The latter type of voter, who did not attend any political meeting and did not vote in any election, represents 11.7% of the population, i.e. approximately 450,000 voters; we can consider them as « outsiders » in the election process.²⁵ These “immobile” voters tend to be older with little or no schooling. They include peasants and cattle breeders as well as retired people and disabled persons.

7.2. Generic motivation and indifference

Generally speaking, a « generic » motivation spontaneously dominated popular thinking during and about the election process: voting is a civic duty and the exercise of a right - the right to choose one’s leader (table 5). This motivation reflects the official discourse communicated by the media, political parties and civil society in general. However, the motivations linked to very precise campaign themes were seldom mentioned spontaneously (peace, security, justice, the fight against corruption and unemployment, children’s future). Finally, with results ranging from 3% to 9%²⁶ across different groups of voters, we see a degree of ritual support along ethnic and religious lines rather than along party lines.

The perception regarding the primary use of elections (« What is the purpose of elections? ») corresponds to the dominant motivation that makes people vote: the elections allow people to choose the political party with the best programme, to voice opinion, to reform the institutions... The idea of a democratic vote is discernable in the results but the idea that elections lead to development is not widespread. It seems that the political parties’ programmes have not been convincing as « visions », as clear projects for development.

« The problem of the Burundians is that they do not yet know what voting really means. They do not elect a person for his good projects, but just for being that person »²⁷

The generic motivation is logically weaker among the “immobile” voters (23% of which never voted in any election). For these voters, the reasons for not voting (other than personal reasons) are mostly a feeling of lost confidence, of disappointment with the political establishment (23%) or simply the feeling that elections lead to nothing (13%).

[23] We use the term “immobile” since they are characterized by limited physical participation in political gatherings and do not seem to be moved by the idea of politics and elections.

[24] Base = total sample.

[25] Based upon figures of the latest census in 2008, when there was a potential of 3,819,120 voters.

[26] We should note that these results originate from an open question.

[27] « Le problème des Burundais c’est qu’ils ne savent pas encore ce que signifie voter. Ils n’éisent pas quelqu’un pour ses bons projets mais ils éisent juste l’individu comme ça ». NDI, Focus Group, women, province of Bujumbura Mairie, Kinama, 21/09/2010.

Table 5: Voting motivation

	Group 1. CNDD/FDD	Group 2. Opposition	Group 3. Undecided	Group 4. Immobile	Bujumbura Mairie	Bururi. Bujumbura- Rural	Provinces CNDD-FDD very strong	The rest of the provinces
SPONTANEOUS MOTIVATIONS TO VOTE (% AGREE)								
It's my right, a civic duty, I'm a citizen	Opposition	Group3.	73%	47%	60%	58%	56%	52%
Being governed by those I have elected	Undecided	Group4.	44%	42%	44%	48%	41%	45%
Supporting a party that takes care of my concerns (peace, health,...)	Immobile	15%	44%	29%	26%	26%	26%	29%
I want the reforms that already started to continue	39%	8%	24%	16%	15%	15%	26%	23%
To choose a government that brings peace and security	15%	15%	7%	12%	16%	13%	10%	10%
I want change (innovation, difference)	7%	65%	21%	12%	27%	22%	12%	14%
To choose a government that will fight corruption and guarantees genuine justice	7%	14%	8%	7%	12%	5%	6%	8%
To choose a government that decides my future and my children's future and that preoccupies itself with the environment	10%	9%	5%	8%	8%	8%	7%	7%
To choose a government that fights unemployment	6%	10%	7%	5%	10%	6%	4%	6%
To help someone that I know, to support a person of my ethnic background or religion, someone who believes in God	6%	6%	3%	9%	11%	10%	5%	6%
Because it is compulsory	3%	2%	1%	7%	4%	5%	6%	4%
The institutions exist to change things / help me in daily life	47%	27%	49%	42%	46%	38%	48%	41%
The elections will change my daily life	47%	18%	35%	35%	32%	31%	37%	37%
SPONTANEOUS MOTIVATIONS NOT TO VOTE (% AGREE)								
Personal reasons (ballot booth too far away, illness...)		11%	13%	27%	20%	20%	22%	19%
I'm fed up with politicians		19%	16%	23%	21%	14%	17%	21%
Elections don't change anything		10%	8%	13%	10%	9%	10%	13%
Technical problems: I forgot my "récépissé", I wasn't registered		5%	12%	12%	11%	7%	10%	14%
The elections were manipulated		7%	7%	9%	7%	9%	7%	8%
My husband didn't allow me to go voting, I was afraid to go		4%	12%	12%	10%	7%	10%	13%
My political party boycotted the elections		87%	28%	10%	36%	22%	10%	13%
WHAT ARE THE PURPOSES OF ELECTIONS? (% AGREE)								
... choosing the political party with the best programme	51%	56%	55%	43%	53%	50%	43%	46%
... giving my opinion, choosing who should govern me	46%	37%	53%	49%	47%	46%	46%	43%
... we live in a democracy (renewal of institutions)	41%	34%	35%	33%	39%	44%	42%	31%
... legitimate the elected persons, providing them with authority recognized by all	24%	22%	25%	25%	26%	22%	22%	27%
... replacing the party in power, seeking change	9%	46%	10%	11%	18%	12%	13%	12%
Elections lead to development	14%	8%	10%	11%	11%	10%	9%	12%
... so that the parties' leaders can benefit ... from foreign aid	2%	3%	3%	9%	5%	6%	6%	7%
Elections serve no purpose	1%	1%	0%	4%	1%	2%	3%	2%
... so that we are not governed by the armed forces	3%	2%	1%	4%	2%	1%	6%	4%
Not enough respondents / question not relevant for this profile								

Table 6. Practices and popular thinking in the margins of the elections

	Total population	Groups of voters (% agree)				Groups of provinces (% agree)			
		Group 1. CNDD-FDD	Group 2. Opposition	Group 3. Undecided	Group 4. Immobile	Bujumbura Mairie	Bururi. Bujumbura Rural	Provinces with very strong CNDD-FDD	Other provinces
% agree August 2010									
Getting paid to sensitize voters (through slogans, songs,...) for a political party, even if one is not a member of that party	43%	44%	38%	54%	39%	45%	50%	38%	42%
Getting paid or receiving promises if one commits oneself to a political party	22%	23%	16%	33%	18%	24%	25%	14%	22%
Being obliged to join youth movements	14%	26%	10%	12%	10%	16%	15%	11%	14%
Being obliged to vote for a political party	6%	9%	7%	3%	5%	5%	8%	3%	6%
Being threatened with all sorts of exclusions (health, school,...) if one is not committed to a political party	5%	7%	7%	3%	4%	4%	7%	2%	5%
Those who won the elections must respect the population and the law	95% (87%)*	97% (92%)*	98% (95%)*	96% (78%)*	94% (87%)*	94% (85%)*	97% (93%)*	95% (89%)*	98% (86%)*
If my political party loses the elections, I want to take revenge	5% (16%) ^o	4% (10%) ^o	3% (17%) ^o	5% (16%) ^o	5% (18%) ^o	3% (16%) ^o	4% (14%) ^o	5% (16%) ^o	5% (16%) ^o
I regard anyone from another party as my opponent	10%	15%	11%	14%	9%	8%	12%	11%	12%
If my best friend were to vote for a different political party than I, he/she wouldn't be my best friend anymore	16%	21%	16%	9%	17%	14%	17%	15%	17%
I am willing to accept anything from a politician if he promises to relieve my poverty	21%	23%	15%	37%	17%	17%	18%	25%	23%
Those who lost the elections are « dangerous »	33%	42%	14%	24%	37%	39%	33%	31%	31%
I vote for somebody/a person because he promised me a job	20%	16%	15%	41%	15%	19%	16%	18%	21%
I vote for somebody /a person because he gave me money, paid me a beer	13%	6%	6%	36%	10%	12%	16%	12%	14%

* % fully agree. We thought it relevant to present the % « extremely positive » for these important items

^o % neutral, agree and fully agree. We thought it relevant to combine these three levels for this important item. For example: to state that one does not know whether to agree or not to take revenge if one's party loses the elections, is important information

Moreover, among the voters of the opposition, the motivation to vote lies with the desire to bring about change. While the CNDD-FDD voters largely support a continuation process, the opposition voters tend to follow their political leaders in claiming that the elections were manipulated; hence their withdrawal from the election process (87%). This indicates a strong grassroots support for their leaders, as well as a certain pressure that is linked to certain acts of intimidation that specifically took place before the presidential election (IFES, 2010). The opposition voters are characterised by a strong call for replacing the current government leaders (46%). Their absence during the presidential election and the legislative election in the aftermath of the communal elections thus reflects a punctual mistrust instead of questioning the very concept of elections itself.

The people belonging to the undecided group of voters often spontaneously express that their motivation to vote is characterized by the support of the party which takes care of their preoccupations. This may explain their presence at different party meetings. This group of people is « swinging » and characterised by clientelistic tendencies, as discussed in the next section.

7.3. Opportunism and clientelism

Despite their apparent acquaintance with the concept of a democratic vote (performing one's civic duty, the basic right to elect one's leaders freely), the Burundian people frequently fall victim to manipulative tactics, such as (financial) coercion, threats, clientelism, etc.

«Some politicians threatened the population by telling them that they would get into trouble if they did not vote for them »²⁸

In August 2010, just under half of the people interviewed (43%) testified that it was common practice to get paid for raising voter awareness about a particular political party, even if one is not a member oneself (table 6). This is the case for 54% of the undecided voters. One person in five thinks it is perfectly normal to get paid/receive promises in exchange for affiliation with a party. Compulsory membership of a youth movement of a particular party is considered normal by one in three of the undecided voters (14%): 18% of the youngsters and 26% of the voters for the party in power. Nearly 5% of the population considers it normal to be threatened with all kinds of exclusions (health, school, ...) if one does not commit oneself to a political party, and/or to be under an obligation to vote for a party.

Various elements indicate that how the electoral results are dealt with is far from evident, that the democratic process is not completely safeguarded and integrated: 13% of the population does not wholeheartedly agree with the idea that those who have won the elections should respect the population and the law. Among the group of undecided voters, 22% do not affirm this point very clearly. 16% of the population do not exclude the idea of taking revenge if their party loses elections. One in three perceives those who lost the election as « dangerous » people. Among the CNDD-FDD voters, 42% seem to think so. This result is not surprising: since the withdrawal of the opposition parties from the election process, rumours abounded over the departure of certain opposition party leaders into the bush as well as over the formation of new

[28] « Certains politiciens menaçaient la population en leur disant que si elle ne votait pas pour eux, elle aurait des problèmes dans l'avenir » NDI, Focus Group, men, Province of Gitega, Rweza, 24/09/2010.

rebel groups²⁹.

These results also show a certain despair of the population, who feel that they « are willing to do anything a politician would ask them if he promises to pull them out of their difficult situation, their poverty ». Generally speaking, one in five does not exclude such submission and, among undecided voters, 37% do not exclude this type of submission to escape misery. If we extrapolate to all Burundian voters, this amounts to 270.000 people. Equally, one fifth of the population overtly admits to voting for clientelistic reasons: « I vote for a person because he has promised me a job ». Among the undecided voters, 41% confirm this. 36% even admit to voting for someone who gave them money or paid them a beer. This group represents approximately 270.000 Burundians. These figures show a potential danger in case of mobilisation by armed forces.

With respect to these results, a large section of the undecided voters seems to be a group of « opportunists » susceptible to illicit strategies used by political parties, such as intimidation, corruption through clientelism, fraud (Collier and Vincent, 2010). The politicians who seek to expand their electorate can focus on the undecided voters as a public to intimidate and manipulate. Especially within institutionally weak contexts, politicians use substantial resources to achieve their aims among these undecided voters (Robinson and Torvik, 2009).

These results clearly reveal a gap between the positive representation of what the great majority of Burundian voters regards as a democratic vote (use the right to elect its leaders freely) and real practices. The latter are totally contradictory to a democratic process. The population is often lured by political parties on campaign and, due to its feeble economic situation, forced to accept the buying of votes. Indeed, it seems that a large segment of these voters have clientelistic tendencies characterizing their political thinking and practices.

«The people do not choose by merit, but by who pays them drinks»³⁰

These results confirm to a certain extent the idea that clientelism and the buying of votes are relatively common practice in African elections (Wantchekon, 2003; Collier et Vicente, 2010). And that for politicians, the election periods are moments when they engage in the manipulation and mobilisation of the masses. Campaign strategies often take the form of political intimidation and material incitement (Bratton, 2008).

[29] @rib News, 20/08/2010 – Source APA, Rumours of a rebellious army abound in Burundi.

[30] « Le peuple n'élit pas selon les mérites, il privilégie plutôt ceux qui leur donnent à boire » NDI, Focus Group, men, province of Bururi, Tora, 25/09/2010.

8. PERCEPTION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES' LEVEL OF CONCERN VERSUS THE ELECTORATE'S MAJOR CONCERNS.

Generally speaking, the gap between the major concerns of the population and the perception of the political class being strongly preoccupied with those issues has narrowed somewhat in comparison with the pre-election results (March 2010) (graph 5). However, the gap still remains rather wide. For a majority of issues, the population's level of strong concern is always higher than the perceived level of strong concern of the political class. This may indicate a rift between two different worlds. This rift, however, is less deep than it was at the beginning of the election process. This is not true for the domains of health, education, and the reintegration of former soldiers. In this regard, we should note that health and education were two important campaign themes of the incumbent party. During his 2005-2010 term in office, the President of the Republic, Pierre Nkurunziza, took some very popular measures, such as free education and healthcare for children under the age of five and for pregnant women. His presidential campaign strongly focused on these measures.

«He supported women giving birth, today it is free, he gave notebooks to schoolchildren, money is used for buying flour and the children return to school after their meal ».³¹

In the economic field (the price of products and access to employment), the gap between strong personal concerns and the perception of a strong involvement of political parties remains very wide although these concerns are shared by 89 and 83% of the population. This may indicate that the political power is unable to propose something credible in this domain. The same observation is made regarding the access to fertiliser, a concern of 65% of the population, whereas less than 50% of the interviewed people feel that at least one political party concerns itself with this problem. By contrast, in the field of governmental management, public services (access to health, education and drinking water), the gap hardly exists. This illustrates the presence of a discourse upheld by political parties that expresses their involvement with state responsibilities in the field of health, education and drinking water... However, with respect to the effectiveness of justice, the gap stood at 17% in August 2010, while it was 15% in March 2010.


[31] « Il a aidé les femmes qui accouchent, maintenant c'est gratuit, il a donné des cahiers aux élèves, l'argent sert à acheter de la farine et les enfants retournent à l'école après avoir mangé ». NDI, Focus Group, women, province of Gitega, Mutoyi, 23/09/2010.

Graph 5: The population's personal concerns and perceptions of the degree of involvement of political parties.

► **The populations' personal concerns and perceptions of the degree of involvement of political parties :**

Perception that at least one political party known has **a strong involvement**

REMEMBER "very high" or "high" personal concern



Furthermore, there is a 27% gap concerning the fight against corruption. Apparently, as during the pre-election period in March, the political class has very low credibility regarding this issue in August 2010, although it is a very strong concern among the population (87%), only 60% of which perceives a real commitment of political parties to resolve this issue.

« I dare say that corruption has become a vital part of Burundian culture. In the minds of the people, corruption has become a law. »³²

« Corruption is everywhere. »³³

Finally, concerning the security linked to disarmament, the gap between strong personal concerns and the political parties' perceived involvement is much narrower; as for the reintegration of former soldiers, there is no gap at all. This indicates a certain confidence of the population in the political class regarding its handling of problems in the peace process. While the 2005 elections placed great stock on peace and security - « the elections will bring peace », « a good statesman seeks to establish peace » (Nimubona, 2005) - it seems that this peace, which was achieved and preserved by Pierre Nkurunziza, was no longer the prime concern for the Burundian voter in 2010. By contrast, with respect to land problems and access to land, especially as it concerns local families, and, to a lesser extent, repatriates, political parties did not succeed in convincing the population that they concerned themselves with these issues.

8.1. Differences across regions and « groups of voters »

With respect to land issues, especially since they involve local families (population increase), repatriates and the access to land, the electorate of Bujumbura Mairie is obviously less preoccupied with these issues than people living in CNDD-FDD-oriented provinces and, to a lesser extent, people living in provinces with a stronger disparity between communal election results, i.e. Bururi and Bujumbura (table 7). This indicates that these issues pertain to a rural context.

With respect to other groups of voters, the voters belonging to the voting group of the incumbent party are mostly preoccupied with primary needs (table 8). There are no significant variations across groups of voters for land issues involving repatriates and local families. The issues that concern CNDD-FDD voters more than the opposition group are access to land and chemical/organic fertiliser. This indicates that the electorate of the opposition is less preoccupied with the issues that directly concern the incumbent power. Moreover, it indicates that the electorate of the party in power is more preoccupied with issues relating to a rural context, i.e. the peasantry.

[32] « Je dirais que la corruption est devenue comme de la culture au Burundi. Dans la conscience des hommes, la corruption est devenue comme une loi. » NDI, Focus Group, men, province of Bujumbura Mairie, Kamenge, 25/09/2010.

[33] « Partout c'est la corruption ». NDI, Focus Group, men, province of Bujumbura Mairie, Kamenge, 25/09/2010.

Table 7: Preoccupations of the electorate (regional)

Préoccupations		Bujumbura Mairie	Bururi. Bujumbura	Provinces CNDD-FDD très fort	The rest of the provinces
Security	The disarmament of civil population to avoid crime and banditism (theft etc.)	71%	65%	61%	61%
	Violence perpetrated by certain members of the security forces (police and the army)	52%	38%	42%	40%
	The reintegration of former soldiers	25%	23%	28%	26%
Corruption	Corruption	67%	60%	60%	59%
The Economy	Unemployment and access to employment	53%	49%	51%	49%
	The increase in basic merchandise (beans, flour, sugar, rice, fuel, beer)	64%	63%	62%	59%
Government Responsibilities	Access to drinking water	39%	57%	57%	56%
	Access to health	38%	39%	36%	37%
	Access to education	32%	34%	29%	32%
	The effectiveness of justice (detention, preventive measures, time taken up by procedures)	52%	45%	41%	45%
Land	Land problems for repatriates	14%	23%	30%	26%
	Access to land	24%	27%	36%	31%
	Access to chemical and organic fertiliser	20%	30%	36%	31%
	Land problems concerning local families (population increase)	22%	27%	36%	32%

In the fields of security, corruption and unemployment/access to employment, which are the strongest preoccupations for the CNDD-FDD voters (even though their level of concern is lower than that of the opposition voters), we do not observe any disparity between their level of concern and their perception of their political party's level of concern. For example, 60% of the CNDD-FDD voters are concerned with corruption, and 60% of them reckon that CNDD-FDD is greatly concerned with this issue. Moreover, the CNDD-FDD electorate is much less preoccupied with the issue of effectiveness of justice than other groups of voters.

Table 8: Concerns of the electorate by « voter groups »

Concerns	Group 1. CNDD-FDD		Group 2. Opposition		Group 3. Undecided		Group 4. Immobile	
	Very strong concern of voter group	Political parties' perceived level of concern (% strong)	Very strong concern of voter group	Political parties' perceived level of concern (% strong)	Very strong concern of voter group	Political parties' perceived level of concern (% strong)	Very strong concern of voter group	Political parties' perceived level of concern (% strong)
Security	69%	67%	83%	56%	52%	63%	62%	61%
	44%	68%	65%	81%	40%	54%	37%	46%
	27%	63%	38%	68%	26%	42%	22%	41%
Corruption	60%	60%	84%	88%	57%	48%	57%	40%
	50%	50%	70%	74%	46%	38%	47%	32%
The Economy	64%	51%	77%	71%	46%	38%	64%	32%
	55%	66%	60%	61%	52%	47%	51%	42%
	39%	80%	50%	63%	40%	57%	35%	53%
Government Responsibilities	34%	85%	49%	65%	35%	53%	28%	57%
	45%	64%	69%	86%	47%	47%	42%	39%
	28%	54%	22%	46%	22%	35%	20%	32%
Land	30%	44%	23%	41%	36%	32%	27%	28%
	34%	49%	23%	48%	34%	32%	26%	29%
	31%	46%	28%	42%	34%	32%	27%	27%

With regard to state functioning, the delivery of public services such as access to health or education, which were actually two key themes in the CNDD-FDD campaigns, the group of CNDD-FDD voters is less preoccupied with these issues than the opposition voters. This could mean that voters for the party in power tend not to vote for a political programme but rather vote by way of adherence to the party. Such a populist adherence might be influenced by five years marked by many trips of the president to the country's interior. Since his accession, Pierre Nkurunziza, more than any other president before him, has been visiting the "communes" (municipalities) in the country to participate in various development projects and in the construction of social infrastructure. He created a political proximity with rural populations on social issues in doing so (ICG, 2011).

This rural population, which constitutes CNDD-FDD's electoral base, is poor but also important from a demographic point of view (89% of the population); it is primarily concerned with basic needs (security, access to land, health, education etc.) and less concerned with governmental problems and impunity, which mostly concern the intellectual elites (ICG, 2011)

In a general way, the opposition voters are more preoccupied with what directly affects public governance (justice, corruption...). More than 80% of the opposition electorate is preoccupied with corruption while this preoccupation degree stands only at 60% among other electorates. The corruption issue is thus of greater concern to the electorate that wants to see a change in political personnel. In this respect, there is no disparity between the opposition voters' level of concern and their perception of their own political party's level of concern. They feel that their preoccupation with this issue is shared by their political party.

Nearly 70% of the voting group "opposition" is concerned about the effectiveness of justice, while only 45% of the CNDD-FDD voters and 47% of the undecided voters are concerned about this. Justice is the prerogative of the state. In Burundi too, as in other post-conflict countries, we see that those in power have a strong grip on justice (RCN, 2011). The fact that the opposition voters are so heavily preoccupied with the issue of effective justice ties in with their rejection of the party in power as a whole. Generally speaking, these figures confirm the findings of two other studies that showed little confidence among the population in the judicial system (RCN, 2009; RCN, 2011).

This group of voters is also more preoccupied with economic issues such as the increase in prices of basic goods and the access to employment. More than 70% of this electorate is strongly preoccupied with economic issues and seems to be satisfied with the way its political party is handling the economy.

The opposition voters are far more concerned about security issues (disarmament of the civil population, denouncing violent acts perpetrated by certain members of law and order) than the other voters. More than 80% of them are concerned about the disarmament of the civil population, and more than one in three is concerned about the reintegration of former soldiers. This could be explained by the fact that this group of voters is partly composed of former combatants of the rebel movement, the FNL Palipehutu. Among the group of opposition voters, we see a disparity between their level of concern about disarming the civil population and their perception of the ADC-Ikibiri coalition parties' level of concern. While 83% of the opposition voters claim to be concerned about this issue, only 56% feel that a party within the

ADC-Ikibiri is strongly focussed on this problem.

Whereas access to education and health are two key themes in the CNDD-FDD campaign, the opposition voters turn out to be more preoccupied with these two themes (49% and 50% respectively) than the CNDD-FDD voters (34% and 39% respectively). This could indicate lower satisfaction with the measures taken during the previous presidential term. For the CNDD-FDD voters, the perception of their political party's level of concern about access to education and health stands at 85% and 80% respectively.

The opposition electorate's different levels of concern about these topics (table 8) in comparison with other electorates could be partly explained by the fact that the opposition voters constitute rather an elite group, which is of a higher socio-economic level than the average population. They therefore have better access to the media, who communicate information and different points of view about various topics. This led them to be preoccupied with issues other than primary needs. « People concerned about filling their stomachs cannot be preoccupied with more abstract issues »³⁴ - (A. Mbembe, 1988).

The undecided voters are less preoccupied with these different issues than the voters of the party in power or the opposition voters, especially in terms of security; only half of this voter group is concerned about security issues. Moreover, there is no disparity between their personal level of concern and their perception of their political party's level of concern.

Even if this group of voters is less preoccupied with the problem of corruption, we should note that there is nevertheless a disparity between their level of concern about this issue and their perception of their political parties' level of concern. While 57% of the undecided voters claim to be concerned about this issue, only 48% feel that there is a political class that is strongly focussed on the issue. This lack of confidence in the political establishment is also reflected in issues related to the economy. The undecided voters do not perceive sufficient commitment of political parties in this field, even though nearly half of them are concerned about this subject. Nevertheless, the level of concern of these voters in this field is far less important than that of other groups of voters.

Generally speaking: the group of voters that is not very committed (the "immobile" voting group) is always less preoccupied with different issues than other groups of voters. We see this as a sign of this group's low commitment to societal issues. However, this group does remain concerned about issues such as price increases (64%), disarmament (62%) and corruption (57%). Furthermore, these voters do not feel that the political class focusses on these problems. This illustrates a feeling of disappointment with the political class and a possible loss of confidence.

Both CNDD-FDD voters and opposition voters often reckon that their political party is greatly focussed on their concerns, and thus the concerns of the population. The undecided voters seldom think so and the "immobile" voters even less so. Therefore, the CNDD-FDD and opposition voters often find that the party whose meetings they attended really cares about these issues. This has more to do with belief: these individuals do not tend to stand back and take stock, they do not question the messages they hear at political meetings, but simply accept them as truths. Their attitude towards the political scene is one of adhesion.

[34] « Les personnes préoccupées par le ventre ne savent pas être préoccupées par des questions abstraites »

9. CONCLUSION

According to the survey results, the communal elections have been regarded, in the mindset of the Burundian voters, as a first round of the presidential elections. During these communal elections, the electorate has largely voted for the national political party and its emblematic leader rather than for local candidates or local development programmes.

Generally speaking, for the whole of Burundi, the analysis of political meeting attendance and of the knowledge of national and local personalities confirm a very strong presence of CNDD-FDD, especially in rural areas. However, on the basis of the communal election results of 24th May 2010 and an analysis of political meeting attendance, we could distinguish two regional trends in the dynamic process of political mobilisation: a single-party trend in one region and a plurality trend in another. Attendance at political party meetings in Bujumbura Mairie, Bujumbura and Bururi show a diverse picture, while in the other provinces political mobilisation (participation in meetings and voter practices) shows a single-party trend: people in these provinces tend to vote for the incumbent CNDD-FDD party.

The average participation rate in the communal elections was very high but decreased considerably – although still remaining high compared to elections in other countries – during the presidential and legislative elections. This can be explained by the boycott of the election process by some opposition parties. The participation rate in all elections remained high among those who exclusively attended CNDD-FDD meetings. Consequently, we can infer that the participation rate was markedly lower among people who exclusively attended a meeting of a party of the opposition coalition, ADC-IKIBIRI.

An analysis of the survey results suggest that a distinction can be made between four voter groups in Burundi (in 2010). The « CNDD-FDD voters », representing 17% of the population of voting age, reflect a rural population; this group mostly includes peasants, cattle breeders and civil servants. Six percent of the population of voting age can be considered « opposition voters ». They mostly belong to a higher socio-economic category and tend to live in the capital and the province of Bujumbura. The group of « undecided voters » represents approximately 18% of the population of voting age. This group includes mostly youngsters (between 18 and 25) with low levels of formal education. The group of « immobile voters » is larger, with 51% of the population of voting age; these voters tend to be elderly people with little or no schooling. They are often peasants and cattle breeders.

Generally speaking, within these groups of voters, the « generic » motivation dominates: voting is a civic duty linked to carrying out a basic right, the right to choose one's leaders etc. In addition, one can conclude that the CNDD-FDD voters sought to consolidate the power in place with their vote, while the opposition voters wanted change. A finding that is to a certain extent evident, of course. This conclusion is also confirmed by the analysis of the political parties' perceived level of concern regarding the electorate's concerns. We pointed out that these results suggest that the voters of the incumbent party tend to vote by way of populist adhesion rather than for a particular political programme.

For all political parties, we observe a general disparity between two different worlds: the political class does not seem to respond to the preoccupations of the population. This observation is reinforced by a large part of the “immobile” voters, who express a feeling of lost confidence and disappointment regarding the political class. Moreover, a large group of

voters, especially among the undecided electorate, seems susceptible to clientelist practices.

These results clearly show a rift. On the one hand there is the positive image that the majority of the Burundian population has of the democratic voting process: it gives them the right to choose their leaders freely. On the other hand, there is the pragmatism that inspires them and that makes them receptive to clientelist practices. In addition, there is an alienation from the goal of the country's democratisation discernable in their actual thoughts and practices. Not only is this lack of political maturity observed at micro level and in the mindset of the voters, it also plays a role at macro level when politicians « jeopardize the rules of democracy » (Palmans 2011). We could even doubt whether in such a situation maturity in the democratic process could actually develop at the local level, in the practices and minds of voters.

If one tries to make a link with the nature of the political transition in Burundi, two questions arise. First, if this political transition shows a democratic trend, the challenge will be to create links between political parties and voters for a shared vision of society and a joint development project. If, by contrast, the trend is one towards authoritarian autocracy, chances are that the voters' indifference and their populist or clientelist motivations will be exploited to suit anti-democratic goals and violent strategies.

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