



# Civil Society and Poverty Reduction: Why Participation is not the answer

Norway, 11-14/5/2006

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#### **Outline**

- The discourse of donors in the PRSP
- Why participation will not make a difference killing assumptions
  - On the side of recipient governments (LIC)
  - For civil society in LICs
  - Constraints social tissue of the poor
- Where does that leave the poor?
- Conclusion



### **Discourse donors PRSP**

	<b>オ</b> ownership	7
Civil society participation	→ pro-poor effectiveness	→ poverty reduction
	<b>⅓</b> accountability	71
	<b>¥</b> democracy <b>₹</b>	

- Participation: micro → macro: policy debate, formulation, implementation, M&E
- Angelical perspective on civil society (PRSP-sourcebook)



## Why participation will not make a difference: the killing assumptions recipient side

- Ownership/commitment and institutional quality is a huge problem:
  - Limited GBS: less than 20 countries out of 60 PRSP countries receive GBS for more than 2% of their GDP in 2004/2005 → donors distrust genuine commitment/quality
  - Of the 55 countries reviewed by the World Bank: 5 with operational development strategies of sufficient quality
  - Updated baseline information on poverty is lacking in 42% of LICs
- Room for associational life –willingness to take bottom-up inputs into account in policy-making
  - Only 7 out of 30 African PRSPcountries are rated as free
  - 11 African PRSPcountries are LICUS/fragile states
  - The thin line between ownership and capture

Participation is rendered useless under these conditions – selectivity & sequencing of actions might be considered





## Why participation will not make a difference: the killing assumptions civil society

- Relation with the poor?
  - Participation captured by NGOs: donordriven, donorbred & fed
  - Participation = pro-poor contributions into the PRSP?
  - Link with the poor mainly through service delivery?
- Missing middle



## Why participation will not make a difference: social tissue of the poor

#### What we know from literature

- Poor people/low education... tend not to participate in formal associational life
- Social capital literature:
  - poor people have bonding social capital: getting around
  - but not bridging / linking social capital: getting ahead



#### **Illustration**

- Nicaragua: 2 rural villages, peasants, poorest region of the country (1999)
- Research on:
  - Formal associational life
  - Access to resources through informal networks
    - To land, oxen, labour force during harvest time
    - small loans in times of emergency, food in times of emergency
  - Access strategies
    - inflexible (cash regulated, payment in services or labour force)
    - flexible (unspecified, mutual help)
  - Who is in, who is out?



## Associational involvement = about getting ahead because it entails access to scarce resources

- Both villages: competition/conflict over membership and benefits – local leaders act as brokers – multiple memberships = multiple benefits (members or beneficiaries?)
- Local leaders (all sandinist): very diversified networks (NGOs, interest organisations, political parties...) and access to very diversified resources (tangible, intangible)
- Who's in, who's out?
  - Village 1: Poor are out => socio-economic cleavage
  - Village 2: Sandinists are in Liberals are out => political cleavage



## Getting ahead: access to other scarce resources: land & oxen

- In both villages:
  - Access is personalized/arbitrary
  - Access givers are richer, most of the local leaders are involved in giving access (diffent ses actors involved)
  - → bridging or simply vertical?
- However,
  - Actors involved also share several attributes: associational status, political preference, religion, neighbourhood residence
  - → bonding? horizontal?
- In both villages:
  - Access mainly involves inflexible strategies, but...
  - In village 1: mainly cash strategy → huge problem for the poor
  - In village 2: mainly payment in services → lesser problem for the poor




## Getting around: access to resources that are not so scarce: labour force (mutual help during harvest time)


- In both villages: these networks exist: the relation is mutual trust, accountability, equal dependence/power: mainly bonding & horizontal
  - Village 1: 45% of the poorest families involved in these networks
  - Village 2: 35% of the poorest families
- But, in
  - Village 1: no local leaders involved
  - Village 2: all the leaders are involved across ses, neigbourhood, religion... but <u>not</u> political preference
    - => can bonding relations be vertical/inequal? Or vice versa?





#### Visually displayed: mutual help during harvest time (local leaders underlined)







## So... Civil society...

- Membership is a scarce resource (like other scarce resources) – access is regulated by local leaders – personalized/arbitrary
- Local membership profiles might be a good indication for informal cleavages and patterns of in/exclusion (rather than a cure) → introduce in poverty diagnostics?
- Poor/excluded people do not have the means to challenge → this cannot be solved locally
- Better bring institutions back in...



## **Options for the poor?**

		Institutional context: Getting access to resources		
		Inequality	Equality	
Relations	Bonding	Hierarchy – dependency - solidarity	Egalitarianism – voluntarism (dense networks are needed)	
	Bridging/linking	Hierarchy – dependency - fatalism	Contracts - negotiation	
			(third party enforcement is needed)	

- In most third world contexts poor getting access to scarce resources = per definition about inequality/personalized access
  - Poorest have no 'valuable assets' to offer (except cheap labour force) → weak bargaining position
  - Third party enforcement is absent/lacking/expensive
  - → potential victims of 'powergames'
- Associational life seems to reinforce this



#### So what is there to do?

- Do not leave the dirty work up to civil society! Too ambitious, too naïve
- Never take the 'angelical perspective' of civil society for granted.
- Creation of trust? Institutionalize distrust!
- Think micro, but act macro
  - Think micro: social capital analyzing to understand the local dynamics of poverty reproduction → feed into poverty diagnostics
  - Act macro: push for updated poverty diagnostics, social capital policy relevance lies in linking insights back to institutional level: creation of an enabling environment