



STUDIECENTRUM VOOR ECONOMISCH EN SOCIAAL ONDERZOEK

JOB CREATION PROGRAMS IN AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON

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A b s t r a c t

This article contains a comparative analysis of job creation policies pursued in France, Belgium, W. Germany, Great-Britain and the Netherlands.¹ Striking conclusions are the high degree of congruency in the various policies and the low quality of research material available on this matter. Still an attempt is made to deduct some proposals that can be useful when tracing out an employment strategy for the future.

1. INTRODUCTION

With an election year in France and in the Netherlands, a national collective convention in Belgium and high unemployment rates in most European countries, an economic reflection on the effectiveness and efficiency of the pursued job creation policies is certainly meaningful.

The main purpose of the job creation policies, as conceived in most European countries, is the promotion of an effective and fair fine tuning of supply and demand of labor.

The instruments traditionally used, can be divided into five categories, namely :

1. Wage-cost subsidies
2. Educational and vocational measures
3. Direct job creation measures
4. Reduction of labor supply
5. Promotion of entrepreneurship

In the report "Evaluation of measures, 1980" of the Directorate General for Job Creation Policy (the Netherlands), these measures are further described as follows :

Wage-cost subsidies aim for the (re)admission of categories of unemployed people with a weak labor market position. The target group of this policy consists then of categories unemployed people that experience great difficulty in acquiring a permanent place in the labor market without such measures.

Through temporary reduction of the wage-costs (mostly reductions of employer contributions in social security funds) this group of measures tries to neutralize the crowding-out effect of lower skilled by higher skilled as a result of regulations and rigidities in the labor market (combined with the negative energy shocks of 1973 and 1979).

A variant of this measure is a supplementary payment to unemployed people who are willing to accept work at a lower wage than that of their previous job.

Educational and vocational measures are created to stimulate the functional job mobility and to improve the match of supply and demand in the labor market. In other words, these measures try to fill the gap between the general knowledge of school-leavers, young unemployed people and employees in unstable jobs and the need for 'highly technical' skills of the private sector.

Direct job creation measures create - temporarily - new jobs in the public sector for unemployed people that have not been helped by the policy instruments mentioned above. These jobs are explicitly directed to improve the possibilities for acquiring a permanent job in the labor market. These measures not only strive for more justice by the division of the available work but also for the upgrading of the labor skills of the unemployed.

Reduction of labor supply involves a package of measures oriented towards the re-arrangement of the number of available jobs through early retirement paired with replacement by younger workers.

Finally, in the job creation policy attention is also paid to the promotion of entrepreneurship. This group of measures encourages unemployed people to start their own company through subsidies and long terms loans.

The description of those five groups of labor policy instruments as found in public documents remains rather vague and general. In order to evaluate whether these measures have indeed reached their targets and to what extent this happened in an "effective" and "efficient" way, we opted for an economic analysis of the existing evaluation studies that have been made by scho-

lars in the selected countries. This process is summarized in the following pages.

Paragraph I implied the construction of a list of criteria the evaluation studies could have used to evaluate whether a job creation measure was effective or not. This is discussed in the next paragraph.

Paragraph II involves a chronological overview of the size and the number of measures that have actually been implemented in the selected countries. The highlights of this evolution are described in paragraph III.

Paragraph III consisted of a check-up of each measure with the criteria put forward in paragraph I. This work was described elsewhere in an extensive way.²

However the main results are synthesized in the last part of this article and give some insights into what measures seem to function better than others to realize the above mentioned targets of the job creation policies.

2. EVALUATION CRITERIA OF JOB CREATION MEASURES

In order to compare the results of the evaluation studies a check-list of criteria to which these job creation instruments should content, was set up. The check-list contains 4 parts : (i) the profile of the participants; (ii) criteria of labor market effectiveness; (iii) criteria of financial and economic effectiveness; (iv) organizational effectiveness.

2.1. The profile of the participants

Before these measures can be tested upon their effectiveness, it is necessary to obtain a detailed picture of the profile of the participants (and control-group if possible). Therefore a statistical survey of labor supply determinants such as age, level of education, sex, labor antecedents and nationality of the participants is necessary. Also important is to know through what channels the participants are placed in a program. Ideal would be to construct a control group with identical characteristics as the participating group. Based on this information the volume of placements being part of the target group and the real number of placings can be calculated.

Table 1 : EVALUATION CRITERIA OF JOB CREATION MEASURES1. Profile of the participants

- i. Number of males versus females
- ii. Level of education
- iii. Division of age
- iv. Difficult-to-place unemployed
(labor-antecedent, unemployment duration)
- v. Sector division

2. Labor market effectiveness

- i. Volume effectiveness
 - Labor market position in the short-run (percentage and profile of participants who have a given labor market position, percentage of participants that is hired by the employer that took part in the program.)
 - Premature leavers
(percentage and profile)
- ii. Quality effectiveness
 - Long-run effects of the job creation policy
- iii. Quality evaluation
 - Percentage of participants that claims an improvement of their labor market position
 - Other qualitative aspects : content of obtained training, stigmatisation etc.

3. Financial and economic effectiveness

- i. Windfall-, substitution- and anticipation effects, unfair competition etc.
- ii. Macro-economic implications of the measures
- iii. Social cost/benefit analysis

4. Organizational effectiveness

- i. Organization of the measure
 - number of employees involved in a project and number of officials concerned
 - selection and motivation techniques of the employers
 - selection and motivation techniques of the participants
- ii. Implementation of the measure
 - effectiveness/competency of the personnel of the mediatory service
 - the speed of the placements/contacts with the employers
 - the quality of the mediation
- iii. Control
 - Evaluation of the participants/personnel/the project
 - Control of the target/the target group/the employers
 - Control of the accountancy/the budget

2.2. Labor market effectiveness

The labor market effectiveness can be divided into two parts : volume and quality.

In order to evaluate the volume effectiveness, it should be calculated to what extent the number of effective placements form part of a specified target group. This is also called "the effectiveness", the extent to which the target group is reached. Under this heading also belong the percentages of participants who have either or not finished the job creation measure (with an analysis of their personal and labor market characteristics) and the percentage of placements by the employers who participate in the measure.

The quality effectiveness measures the durability of the job creation measure. It indicates to what extent the participants in the job creation programs remain in the labor market in the short and in the long run. In the case of schooling, the impact of the received education on a durable participation in the labor market is evaluated. Finally the participants are asked to give an appreciation of the quality of the received training; whether they are being stigmatized etc.

2.3. Financial and economic effectiveness

The financial and economic effectiveness is important on three levels, namely the level of the participant, that of the government budget and that of the economy as a whole.

For an individual the cost of participation in the program is the budget he forgoes in terms of time and money. E.g. in case of an education program its cost is mainly the income the participants could have gained if they had worked.

The individual benefits are measured through the nett discounted future income increased over the life-cycle as result of the participation in the measure (in comparison with the nett discounted income of a control group with analogous personal and labor market characteristics). The individual return of a measure can be calculated on that basis.

To know the overall cost effect on the government budget, the average cost price per application has to be calculated. Possible refinements are for example the average cost price per effective application, i.e. inclusive the costs of non-effective applications. This can be a relevant concept in comparison with analogous programs or with an alternative job creation policy. These costs should be augmented with the operational costs of the mediation agencies.

At the same time, the returns can be calculated in terms of savings in social payments and increments in tax income and social security payments. Finally, goods and services specially produced by the job creation measures can be added on the side of the benefits.

On macro-economic level, the positive effect on the employment has to be quantified. What is the number of employees that can participate in the labor process through job creation measures? Do the job creation measures induce additional hirings beyond the number of applications registered? On the cost-side is there a substitution effect through which employees are gradually replaced by subsidized persons or is there employment in NETTO terms? Do capital intensive sectors experience damage of subsidization of the labor intensive sectors? Is there a wind-fall-effect? etc.

2.4. Organizational effectiveness

Finally, in the evaluation process of the job creation programs, an appreciation of the organizational effectiveness has to be made.

Five thumb rules are in force for the job creation measures on the whole as well as for labor projects in particular.

First, the organizational effectiveness will depend strongly on the organization talent of the officials concerned with the local project, in connection with e.g. the timing and the preparation of the projects. Besides, the support of established pressure groups (particularly employers and employees organizations) is indispensable for the success of the labor projects. The attitude and the motivation of the participants on the measures, the effectiveness of the supporting services, and the economic climate are of decisive importance for the success of the job creation policy.

3. EVOLUTION OF THE JOB CREATION POLICIES IN 5 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

In the past decade, the European countries have been confronted with increased competition on the foreign markets, with a rise of energy prices and a wave of new technologies.

Whatever the design of their employment policy, no country escaped from the necessity to formulate solutions to the exploding unemployment rates. As a result, Europe became during the second half of the seventies the laboratory for all kinds of experiments in job creation measures.

The great diversity in the job creation policies of the studied countries makes every systematisation a bit laborious and defective. Nevertheless the tendencies in the policy can be called syncretic and even in countries with an opposite socio-economic frame of reference, the similarities among the different measures are clear.

Three periods can be distinguished :

1. After the first oil shock in 1973, the policy makers made use of the traditional business cycle instruments to stimulate the economy. More particularly were wage-cost subsidies used to upgrade the employment rate.
2. Nevertheless, as the economic growth kept stagnating and structural changes came about, questions were asked about the priority of economic issues in the labor market versus social ones. Since 1977, the job creation policy tried to offer additional socio-economic security on the basis of the so-called social innovation.

New solutions were worked out in the form of education and direct job creation measures, reduction of labor supply and of working time. To the existing schooling programs, alternative schooling formulas were added. Direct creation of jobs occurred through the set up of labor circuits in the public sector in order to fulfill not-realized and non-competitive social needs. The reduction of labor supply and of working time rested on the solidarity principle.

3. A third tendency that started in the beginning of the eighties brought about a shift in the job creation policy from social innovation into more economic considerations. The social innovation had not fulfilled the

large expectations that had been posed in it. As a consequence they were not longer the central source of inspiration of the employment policies in the selected countries. The centre of gravity of the government policy shifted even to some extent from job creation to industrial policy. In relation to the job creation policy more attention is paid to :

1. Education programs that are better adapted to the needs of the private sector.
2. A shift from public financing to private or autofinancing of the programs and a re-allocation of the public finances to investments on behalf of new technologies.
3. Job creation programs set up in a decentralised way and in time with local developments in the labor market.
4. Flexibilization of the working time.

These tendencies are being reviewed in detail.

3.1. Phase I (1973-1977)

Most European countries replied to the increase in unemployment after the oil shock of 1973 with already tested instruments. Business cycle instruments such as 'Préretraite' (F), 'Conventioneel Bruggpensioen' (B), 'Tewerkgestelde Werklozen' (B), 'Regeling Tijdelijke Arbeidsplaatsen en Aanvullende Werken' (NL) and 'Kurzarbeit' (BRD) gained importance. They were introduced in a period that policy makers were convinced that economic growth was temporarily restrained, but that the disequilibrium between supply and demand of labor was not structural. As unemployment seemed to be more obstinate, a pleading was held for more concentrated action under the form of wage-cost subsidies. France had its 'Embauches avec exonération de charges sociales', Belgium the 'Regeling Tijdelijke Ontlasting Sociale Lasten' and the BRD 'Eingliederungsbeihilfe' and 'Zuschüsse zu den Lohnkosten älterer Arbeitnehmer', the Netherlands the '30 % Loonkostenregeling' and the 'Loonsuppletieregeling'. The most important form of wage-cost subsidies was the British 'Temporary Employment Subsidy'. This measure was so succesful that it came under pressure by the other EEC countries because of unfair competition. It was abolished in 1978.

Most of these interventions were not generalized or prolonged. Sometimes they were reformulated within the framework of other measures, directed towards small and medium sized enterprises or vocational training, or they were placed within a wider framework of reduction or fiscalization of social charges.

3.2. Phase II (1978-1981)

Social innovation was the answer to the structural unemployment announced in the course of the seventies.

First the traditional schooling programs were extended with alternating schooling variants with education- and/or labor contracts : for example 'Bijdrageregeling Vakopleiding Jeugdigen' (NL) and 'Stages pratiques et entreprises' (F), 'Stages de Formation Professionnelle' (F), 'Stages voor Jongeren' (B) and 'Youth Opportunities Program' (GB). All these measures were negotiated on a sectorial or industrial level and offered the youth an indenture. 'Contrats Emploi-Formation' (F) and 'L'Apprentissage' (F), 'Schwerpunkt 1 of the Sonderprogramm 1979' (BRD) offered the employees the opportunity of retraining within the framework of their job.

Through new labor circuits and existing direct job creation measures an attempt was made to create new jobs in the non-commercial sphere. The programs were also meant to couple economic to social considerations and involved activities considered before as non-profitable. There are three types of programs, namely :

1. Programs that try to improve the match of labor supply and demand, e.g. : the German 'Arbeitsbeschaffungsmassnahmen'. This measure creates a permanent job for long-term unemployed and older hard to place employees (strengthened in 1979 with Schwerpunkt 3).
2. Programs that create new jobs in the short run for example 'Interim Maatregel Jeugdige Werklozen', and 'het Aanvullende Werkgelegenheidsbeleid' in the Netherlands, afterwards developed to the 'Werkgelegenheidsverruimende Maatregelen 1979' and the 'Experimenten Arbeidsprojecten Jeugdige Werklozen'. These measures were all temporary and

attempted to absorb the effects of the downturns of the business cycle. The 'Job creation Program' (GB) converted in 'Special Temporary Employment Programs' want to stop the creeping unemployment without being an instrument in the long run.

3. Programs that pursue quantitative as well as qualitative employment purposes such as e.g. 'L'Emploi d'Utilité Collective' (F) and 'Het Bijzonder Tijdelijk Kader' (B) in which temporary jobs in the collective sector were created on behalf of general purposes.

Thirdly, Belgium, France and Great-Britain experimented with measures to reduce the labor supply. Therefore, early retirement contracts were coupled to the recruitment of young unemployed. Originally, these early pensions were entirely financed by the government.

Of all the measures, that tried to solve the unemployment problem by means of social innovation, the various forms of redistribution of working time are the most progressive. However, reduction of labor time of all employees to get more jobs, implies a certain degree of solidarity among the employees and a certain degree of flexibility in work organization that does not always correspond with reality. Therefore, this measure loses its importance during Phase III.

3.3. Phase III (1982-1985)

Since 1981-1982 the centre of gravity of the job creation policies in the selected countries has shifted from social innovation to more financial and economic aspects of employment. The reasoning was, that in open economies, additional employment can in the end only be generated through additional investments and a labor demand oriented job creation policy.

Hence, existing schooling programs and alternating education were re-oriented towards the needs of the private sector. In new programs such as 'Contrats de qualifications et d'adaption de la formation en alternance', 'Formations réservées aux jeunes de 16 à 18 ans' and 'La préparation à la vie professionnelle' (F) and 'Youth Training Scheme' (GB) the accent lies on the quality of the education and on the technological update of the students.

Secondly job creation programs switched over from public financing to private or autofinancing. By moulding the new measures into form, more attention is paid to the market logic. This tendency implies a shift to the relative cheaper schooling measures and a reduction of expensive short-run direct job creation measures. For prolonged unemployed people, permanent solutions are sought such as the Belgian 'Derde Arbeidscircuit'. The very expensive experiments of reduction of labor supply were stopped or replaced by early retirements formulas financed by the trade and industry. Measures such as entrepreneurship were preferred because the funds are allocated to productive rather than to consumptive projects.

Moreover new programs whereby decentralization and the local development come into prominence, got more attention. They aimed for a better functioning of local syndical and employer organisations and for a more flexible response to changes in the local labor market situation. This also implied more attention to small and medium sized business e.g. 'Plus Eén Plan' (B), 'Indienstneming Werklozen in KMO's' (B).

Finally, there is also a shift from the reduction of labor time to the flexibilization of labor time with an extension of the production time. The possibilities of working time reduction are strongly limited by inherent restrictions of profitability of the enterprises. Therefore, combination measures, that stipulate working time reduction with wage moderation, wage subsidization and additional hirings were created, for example 'Compenserende Indienstnemingen' (B) or 'Experimenten inzake flexibilisering van de arbeid' (B) (working time reduction with prolongation of production time and 2 x 12 hours labor per week).


4. EVALUATION OF THE JOB CREATION MEASURES³

Despite the wide variety of the socio-economic framework of the countries under study, a great similarity can be observed in the job creation policies of Belgium, the Netherlands, BRD, Great-Britain and France. This becomes clear when the evolution of the expenses of those countries on the "pure" job creation policy per unemployed person (see scheme 4.1.) and the evolution of the percentage of unemployed persons reached through the measures (see scheme 4.2.) are traced out. Belgium and France have applied a very large job creation policy and have also realized the greatest number of the unemployed persons, but against very high costs. The bankruptcy of the publicly financed early retirement is the first reason for the decline in the figures since 1981. The second reason, namely the restriction of direct job creation measures, is valid for all countries. This tendency is the strongest in West-Germany. West-Germany is the country where the job creation policy was relatively the most demand directed. Finally, it can be kept in mind, that the job creation policy of the Netherlands was very limited over the whole line, namely it had a very little reach and has required little financial means.

After these general remarks we give now a more detailed evaluation of the different measures.


1. The wage cost subsidy policy conducted in the studied countries, did not result in an improvement of the labor market position of the participants. France and Belgium have strongly reduced the importance of the package of measures 'Loonkostensubsidies' in case it was applied without conditions to engage personnel and/or working time reduction. Also in the BRD and in Great-Britain the wage-cost subsidies, with the view to the placing of difficult-to-place unemployed are respectively abolished. Only the German wage cost subsidy 'Kurzarbeit' can be called successful because it offers enough flexibility to reduce the working time during the downturns of the business cycle and to increase labor time. About the 'Regeling Werktijdverkorting' (NL) no evaluation material is available. Since this measure highly corresponds with the successful German 'Kurzarbeit', it is presumably effective.

Scheme 4.1. Expenses on the "pure" job creation policy per unemployed (*)
1975-1983, in guilder of 1983



(*) $\frac{\text{Tot. expenses in milj.guilder of 1983}}{\# \text{ unemployed} + \text{participants job creation policy}}$

Scheme 4.2. Percentage of unemployed (*) persons reached through the measures 1975-1983



(*) $\frac{\text{Participants job creation policy}}{\# \text{ unemployed} + \text{participants job creation policy}}$

2. The schooling policy is the most uniform and over all the most successful measure of all categories of instruments. Only the organization and the relative number of participants differ in the various schooling measures. The schooling measures can be divided into three categories, namely traditional training programs, schooling measures that provide an indenture and schooling measures that provide a labor contract.

- The traditional training programs are the oldest schooling measures and are generally positively evaluated. However for unemployed youngsters these measures seem to be unattractive. The regular participants (unemployed with work experience and employees who desire to retrain) perceive these programs as an improvement of the labor market position.
- In the Netherlands, France, Belgium and Great-Britain, the alternating schooling measures with an indenture aim for low skilled and for unemployed youngsters. In the Netherlands, this measure has not been evaluated. In the other countries the measure is evaluated as being positive. The French schooling measures 'Formations professionnelles avec un statut de stagiaire' consist of training programs with various training levels for youngsters. The most important training program is 'Les Formations réservées aux jeunes de 16 à 18 ans'. This measure gives an additional training to low qualified young people by means of three types of training programs (an orientation-, an introductory- and an advanced training program). This measure reaches a great number of people from the target group and is very effective.
In Belgium, the employers of companies with more than 50 employees are forced to recruit full time an additional 3 % youngsters in the measure 'Stages voor Jongeren'. This is the most important reason for the vocational training size of this measure. In a period of 6 years, almost 20,000 young people were temporarily employed through the training system.

After the reorganization and the simplification of the package of schooling measures, in Great-Britain two measures are left over. One for the youngsters and one for the adults. At the moment, the measure for the youngsters is the most important job creation instrument. In

Great-Britain, all unemployed schoolleavers are taken up in the 'Youth Training Scheme'; this scheme offers during one year a training of high quality to the youth.

The non-evaluated measure of the Netherlands 'Bijdrageregeling, Vakopleiding Jeugdigen' is unique in its framework. The Directorate-General for the job creation policy does not interfere with the content of the training places, but contributes a particular amount (f 4000) per indenture in a special training fund. On sectorial level, the social partners decide on the number and the content of the training places.

- The schooling measures, that provide a labor contract to the participants evidently offer the greatest chance of a permanent job when the training is finished. In the Netherlands ('Scholing in samenwerking tussen overheid en bedrijfsleven') and the BRD ('Einarbeitungszuschüsse' and 'Schwerpunkt'), these measures aim for adults. They are very successful. Problems arise in times of high unemployment, when it becomes harder to capture the interest of the employers for these measures. The successful French measure 'Contrats Emploi-Formation' is targeted on the youth.

The disadvantage of these measures remains however, that difficult-to-place unemployed are hardly reached.

3. The experiences with the traditional job creation measures are in almost all countries negative. The measures are too expensive, too short, offer no improvement of the labor market position of the difficult to place unemployed and they tempt the youth to suspend their formal schooling. Only the formula 'Derde Arbeidscircuit' (B) offers a permanent solution to very specific target groups (namely unemployed persons older than 45 and/or people unemployed for a long time (minimum 2 years)). Nevertheless, this measure is also expensive and the chances of a transition to the regular labor market are slim.

Overall direct job creation measures, connected with special conditions are very promising. The 'Compenserende Indienstnemingen' and the 'Experimenten tot Aanpassing van de Arbeidstijd' are evaluated positive by both

employers and employees. However, 2 major shortcomings are :

- (i) companies are forced to hire new people in return for labor time reduction and a wage cost subsidy or else must deposit a contribution in a national fund;
- (ii) the cost of this form of job creation is placed on the production factor labor.

The enterprises are forced to enlarge their personnel base with 3 % relative to the previous year after 5 % working time reduction and 3 % wage moderation. This means that labor intensive companies have to make a greater effort to create new jobs than capital intensive companies. In a number of cases, these are companies which have an obsolete production structure and which need rationalization.

4. The system of early retirement combined with hiring of young unemployed people was the most important form of new employment. In France for example, a quarter of the employees between 60 and 65 years took advantage of this measure. Besides, the employers and the employees were very satisfied with the measure. For the employers could improve the promotion chances of the young employees and reduce the overall wage sum. In some cases the measure also allowed for the reorganization of the production process. On the side of the employees the inability to follow the new technologies and the attractive financial status of early retiring employee motivated many to leave the labor market. The financing however posed insurmountable problems. Given the large effect on the total number of new jobs and the positive appreciation by employers and employees of this measure, this seems useful to look for adequate forms of financing.
5. Entrepreneurship produced in all countries, which have taken up the measure in their job creation policy.

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As stated in the extensive analysis none of the examined measures can be scientifically proven to be effective due to the important lack of data and information about control-groups. Nevertheless recommendations with respect to a new job creation policy on the short run should go in the direction of large-scale alternating schooling programs.

F O O T - N O T E S

1. This article is based upon an extensive comparison of job creation policies, sponsored by the SER/COB. For detailed information see :

De Wachter, M. and E. Visser (1986), Doelmatigheid intredingbevorderende arbeidsmarktinstrumenten, SER/COB, 100 pag.

2. This is covered in detail and country by country in

- i. De Wachter, M. and E. Visser (1986), Arbeidsvoorzieningsbeleid in Nederland, SER/COB, 140 pag.
- ii. De Wachter, M. and E. Visser (1986), Arbeidsvoorzieningsbeleid in België, SER/COB, 75 pag.
- iii. De Wachter, M. and E. Visser (1986), Arbeidsvoorzieningsbeleid in West-Duitsland, SER/COB, 110 pag.
- iv. De Wachter, M. and E. Visser (1986), Arbeidsvoorzieningsbeleid in Frankrijk, SER/COB, 120 pag.
- v. De Wachter, M. and E. Visser (1986), Arbeidsvoorzieningsbeleid in Groot-Brittannië, SER/COB, 120 pag.

3. See appendix for schemes of the development of the labor job creation policies in the Netherlands, France, Belgium, BRD and Great-Britain.

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
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
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A P P E N D I X

Scheme 1 : Development job creation policy - the Netherlands 1975-1985




Continuation Scheme 1




Noten bij schema 4.1

1. Besluit Stimuleringspremie Partiële Leerplicht.
2. Terugploegexperiment in de bouw.
3. Experimentele Werkgelegenheidsprojecten Vrouwen.
4. Rijksgroepsregeling (startende) Zelfstandigen.
5. Experimentele Regeling Startfaciliteiten Vrouwenbedrijven.
6. Onbeloonde arbeid uitkeringsgerechtigden.
7. Migratieregeling Noorden des Lands.

Scheme 2 : Development job creation policy - France 1975-1985




Continuation Scheme 2



Noten bij schema 4.2


1. Pactes Nationaux pour l'emploi des jeunes
2. Plan Avenir Jeunes
3. Les stages d'initiation à la vie professionnelle de la formation en alternance
4. Contracts de solidarité de préretraite démission
5. Campagne pour les chômeurs de longue durée

Scheme 3 : Development job creation policy - Belgium 1975-1985



* Hulp aan werklozen die eigen onderneming willen oprichten.
 ** Bijzondere stelsels van bruggpensioen.

Scheme 4 : Development job creation policy - the BRD 1975-1985



* S1, S2 en S3 zijn de drie Schwerpunkte van het Arbeidsmarkt-politische Programm der Bundesregierung für Regionen mit besonderen Beschäftigungsproblemen (Sonderprogramm 1979); ZAV = Zuschüsse zu den Aufwendungen für Vorruhestandsleistungen.

Scheme 5 : Development job creation policy - Great-Britain 1975-1985

