All in This Together

A Social Network Study into International Cultural Exchange

Djamila Zoë Boulil, BSc

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Djamila Boulil
S2597659

First Supervisor:
Dr. J.A.C. Kolsteeeg
+31 (0)50 363 6078
j.a.c.kolsteeg@rug.n

university of groningen

Second Supervisor:
Dr. B. Bilecen
+31 (0)50 363 4559
b.bilecen@rug.nl

Summary

International cultural exchange - the export and import of arts and culture all over the world - has been going on for decades. As a research topic, international cultural exchange is generally studied within the framework of instrumentalism or colonialism. An example is the research by Paschalidis (2009) into cultural institutes – the organisations that are responsible for the spread of a nation's culture worldwide. Paschalidis (2009) states that international cultural relations that have a development mission which, for instance, provide art education, are exemplary cases of neo-colonialism. Another example of this is given by Brianso (2010), who explains that the international cultural relations between the West and "developing countries" are for the most part about the West teaching the latter how to care for national heritage, instead of establishing mutual international cultural relations.

In contrast, this thesis takes a more empirical approach, using social network analysis. The latter is a methodology rooted in structuralism that looks at the individual and at its surrounding environment simultaneously. Social network analysis operationalises people or organisations as nodes, called actors, and map their relations to each other as lines, called ties, in a network (Robins, 2015). The cases were captured during a previous study in assignment of DutchCulture, the Dutch arm's length organisation responsible for the support of the international cultural community, and concern two international cultural cooperation networks, the Dutch-Turkish cultural cooperation network and the Dutch-Moroccan cultural cooperation network (Boulil, forthcoming). This thesis moves from this practical study into academia and looks at the cultural leadership that is going on in the currently changing international cultural community.

Both actors from international cultural policies and stakeholders from this community, those artists and cultural organisations involved with international cultural exchange, are moving from a cultural diplomacy function, i.e. being an instrument to support economic, diplomatic and political goals, to one of international cultural cooperation, which is a more mutual approach as it aims to create a two-way relationship with everyone involved in the international cultural field (Gienow-Hecht & Donfried, 2010; Wallis, 1994). Rather than a government having the sole power, international cultural policies are setting goals to cooperate with other organisations (Kieft, 2018; Fisher, 2007; Wyszomirski, Burgess & Peila, 2003). As such, the focus is shifting to community inclusion, to an international cultural network of cultural organisations, artists and the parts of national governments responsible for international cultural exchange.

Flowing from the above observations, this thesis therefore asks the question: *What type of cooperation structures have more power in international cultural exchange?*

This thesis combines the two famous social mechanisms underlying the social capital metaphor: network closure and structural holes. Coleman (1990) states that the social mechanism underlying network control is network closure, wherein trust and close relationships create power (1), but Burt (1992) focusses on the usefulness of structural holes, wherein the existence and control of missing ties in a network create power (2). This thesis is rooted in the notion of distributed leadership, a type of leadership wherein the leadership of a group is shared or even taken over by all others involved, has the power in international cultural exchange (Hoyle, 2014; Hewison & Holden, 2011; Bolden, 2004). Based on this notion, the claim is made that close groups of stakeholders and policymakers, or other multidisciplinary combinations, use bridging ties, the relationships that connect otherwise unconnected parts of the network, to control the social environment underlying international cultural exchange.

After comparing and analysing the mentioned cases, this thesis found that the most powerful cooperation structure was that a cooperation triangle between Dutch funds, Dutch governmental departments and international festivals. Such international cooperation was found to reoccur in all the disciplines (performing arts, visual arts, literature, media arts, creative industries, heritage and art education, and international cultural policy), but very little observations of other multidisciplinary cooperation structures without policy involvement seem to have been made. This, the artists themselves having little power in the international cultural networks studied and being rarely part of the powerful cooperation structures, is remarkable, since the policies and literature on the topic was claiming otherwise. Finally, this thesis has observed that the most powerful cooperation structures involve organisations with multiple locations, both in the Netherlands and either in Morocco or in Turkey.

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Introduction

From Cultural Diplomacy to International Cultural Cooperation

The attitude towards international cultural relations has changed over the past decades. In the 1990s, the advocacy to move beyond *cultural diplomacy* took hold and gained popularity amongst research (Wallis, 1994). The new attitude aimed to not only look at international cultural relations as an instrument to support economic, diplomatic and political goals but to move towards a more mutual approach within the study of international cultural relations. Attempts to (re)define its approach has also been taking place in the last decade. Most influential of which was Gienow-Hecht and Donfried (2010). Compared to the 1990s, more instrumental use of international cultural relations, they opted for a two-way relationship with everyone involved as the most important international cultural relation focus. They redefined the term as '[the] exchange of ideas, information, values, systems, traditions, and beliefs […] with the intention of fostering mutual understanding' (Gienow-Hecht & Donfried, 2010: 23).

Developments in contemporary international cultural policies also show a movement beyond the traditional definition of cultural diplomacy. Of the countries Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, the Netherlands, Singapore, Sweden, Poland, Portugal and the United Kingdom, only four have not, in their international cultural strategy, or another form of mutual international cultural relations, chosen a mutual approach as one of their goals in guiding international cultural relations. They are frequenting words like "mutual understanding", "cooperation" and "collaboration" in their strategies towards international cultural relations (Kieft, 2018; Fisher, 2007; Wyszomirski, Burgess & Peila, 2003). In these, focus lies decisively on that second already discussed definition of cultural diplomacy: that of *international cultural cooperation*.

International cultural policies differ in the extent to which they strive for international cultural cooperation and this is visible in their practical execution. When it comes to the support of international cultural relations, there are three policy executions that can be distinguished (Kieft, 2018). First, the most common strategy towards international cultural relations is that of a government having an infrastructure of *cultural institutes* in other countries (Kieft, 2018). Examples are the French Institute/Alliance Française, the (Italian) Dante Alighieri Institute and the (German) Goethe Institute. These governmental organisations promote the spread of the national culture of their country by having departments spread worldwide. They function like a sort of cultural embassies that teach a national language and culture to anyone interested in the country where they are located.

Mostly they are focussed on the instrumental use of international cultural relations to support economic, diplomatic and political goals (Paschalidis, 2009).

Second, there are governments that leave the guidance of international cultural relations completely up to the artists and cultural organisations themselves. This strategy relies on the *international cultural community*, a network of artists and cultural organisations, to fend for itself. An example is the United States of America, who do not have any cultural policy, let alone a formal strategy that supports international cultural relations. In that case artists and cultural organisations have international cultural relations without governmental interference (Hillman-Chartrand & McCaughey, 1989). In this strategy there is international cultural cooperation going on within the community, but this other extreme does exclude the international cultural relations with governmental organisations.

Next to countries working with an international cultural infrastructure of cultural institutes and countries that let the international cultural community guide itself, a strategy came up that does incorporate the inclusive ideal of international cultural cooperation. Schneider (2009) claimed that the way to increase international cultural relations with the US is to create a central independent organisation rooted in the community that functions as a middleman between the policy makers and the international artists and cultural organisations. Applying this final strategy nations are attempting to establish a network of cultural organisations that connects the international cultural policy makers and the international cultural community itself (Kieft, 2018).

What the international cultural policies of these nations have in common is that an (semi-) independent organisation supports and promotes international cultural relations at *arm's length* from the government (Hillman-Chartrand & McCaughey, 1989). In this strategy a cultural organisation is the active international cultural cooperation partner, rather than the government itself. This is the case in the Netherlands and Denmark, where the government relies on a semi-independent organisation located within their national borders that have an international network of cultural organisations and artists surrounding them (Kieft, 2018). Similarly, the British cultural institute, the British Council, is an independent organisation rather than part of a governmental structure. Their goal is to support the British artist internationally by having locations all over the globe (Paschalidis, 2009; Hillman-Chartrand & McCaughey, 1989).

What seems to be the main issue is that there are several strategies that all guide international cultural relations in differently. Some of these are still clinging to cultural diplomacy, while others focus on international cultural cooperation. This leads to the fact that

some nations put the responsibility of guiding international cultural relations with their government, while others leave this to the international cultural community and again others try to find the balance between the two. To this day international cultural scholars and international cultural policy makers disagree on which strategy is best, but all point towards community inclusion in the guidance of international cultural relations. For this reason, this thesis will look at the interaction between the international cultural community and international cultural policy makers together.

The Usage of International Cultural Relations

The wish for equal cooperation from those active in international cultural relations did not mean however that traditional cultural diplomacy was left behind. In fact, international cultural policies, as well as the corresponding academic literature, maintained a persistent focus on that instrumental usage of international cultural relations. Indeed, two interlinking trends are showing: one concerning the usage of international cultural relations to obtain economic goals of a nation (1), which through the way that that influences identity forming, leads to a second which concerns the way international cultural relations are used to obtain diplomatic and political goals of a nation and how this relates to global politics and neo-colonialism (2).

Increasing the export of national culture is a lingering undertone in most contemporary international cultural policies (Kieft, 2018; Fisher, 2007; Wyszomirski, Burgess & Peila, 2003). But it goes further than that. In fact, in the case of Canada, international cultural cooperation is named as a policy goal, but solely as an instrument to enhance Canada's diplomatic and economic position in the global economy, by increasing the spread of Canadian national heritage (Wyszomirski, Burgess & Peila, 2003). Minnaert (2014) states that this form of *nation branding* – i.e. the marketing and selling a national culture as a brand - is related to cultural diplomacy in the sense that both are concerned with the interaction between governmental decisions and the desired image of a nation (see also Paschalidis, 2009).

Going deeper into the literature of the instrumental use of international cultural relations to obtain economic goals quickly leads to studies on identity forming. Both Singh (2010a) and Jansen (2008) claim that international cultural policy and nation branding can shape national identity as much as that it can reflect it. In this trend, Sassatelli (2016) holds a lengthy debate explaining how European cultural policy actively pushes the citizens of the European Union towards embracing a predetermined European identity. Another study by

Mulcahy (2010) talks about the fact that most cultural policies of nations beyond the West focus on reclaiming their national identity after decades of colonial oppression.

For this persuasive power, international cultural relations are considered a strong *soft power* in global politics (Ang, Isar, & Mar, 2015). This means that next to attaining to economic goals, international cultural relations are used to reach political and diplomatic goals. International cultural relations are used by governments to bond to or oppress other nations (Ang, Isar, & Mar, 2015). This usually leads to the fact that international cultural relations are maintained with certain countries and not with others (Paschalidis, 2009). For instance, to this day the Netherlands identifies a list of *priority countries* to exchange culture with, based on existing supranational alliances, such as the European Union, and their ex-colonies (Verhoef, 2015). Although the Dutch selection of countries is claimed to be mainly for practical reasons, as the current international cultural policy of the Netherlands states that a lack of resources led to the choice of eight focus countries, the Dutch also select seven countries that deserve their special attention due to their political instability and the opportunity '[to make] more room for a cultural contribution to a safe, just and sustainable world' (Koenders & Bussemaker, 2016: 7).

Even though in this Dutch example the countries are not ex-colonies, but Russia and countries in the Middle East and North Africa – short: MENA region - these type of selection processes then fuel academic debates on the existence of contemporary forms of colonialism. Paschalidis (2009) states that such international cultural relations, with a development mission, providing for instance educational aid, are exemplary cases of neo-colonialism. Another example of this is given by Brianso (2010), who explains that the international cultural relations between the West and "developing countries" are about the first teaching the latter how to care for national heritage, rather than about establishing mutual international cultural relations.

Next to the large discourse on the effects that cultural diplomacy has on individual identity and global politics, the instrumental use of cultural policy on its own is also discussed extensively by scholars, both arguing for an against it. Hadley and Gray (2017) claim that the *hyperinstrumentalism* in cultural policy, where the value of culture depends completely on its ability to reach a policy's end goal, attacks the autonomy of the cultural sector, while Carter (2015) advocates for a more positive relationship between academics in arts and culture and cultural policy makers. He states that especially the new focus on international cultural cooperation leads to a dialogue that includes the intrinsic value that art has and the possibility to reach beyond national interest (Carter, 2015). In those cases were

international cultural cooperation is actively strived for, the academic debates surrounding cultural diplomacy then become less interesting. What is more vital is the study of international cultural cooperation.

Beyond Cooperation Beyond Borders

Another trend in the study of international cultural relations is that both in comparisons of international cultural policies and in literature published on international cultural relations the focus is on Europe and North America. This is for instance visible in the three papers that compare international cultural policies that were mentioned in the previous paragraph (Kieft, 2018; Fisher, 2007; Wyszomirski, Burgess & Peila, 2003). In these studies, spanning fourteen countries, only three are located outside of Europe and North America. These are Singapore, Japan and Australia, which international cultural policies are all discussed in Wyszomirski, Burgess and Peila (2003).

When countries beyond the West are included, they are almost all about how a Western country exports their culture to Asia. This is for instance the case in an article by Carter (2015), who, to avoid yet another historical European or North American point of view, looks at the current international cultural policy of Australia towards China, more than at their mutual international cultural relations. Looking at a similar study, Ang, Isar, an Mar (2015) do include the point of view of China and South Korea in their relationship to Australia, but still look at cultural diplomacy as well. When contemporary international cultural relations beyond the West are studied, next to the underrepresentation of countries in the Middle East, South America and Africa, it is still focussed on cultural diplomacy rather than international cultural cooperation.

In academic studies this same trend is visible. There are many attempts to look at international cultural relations beyond the European and North American point of view. Gienow-Hecht and Donfried (2010) make it an explicit objective in their book “Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy” and include studies from Eastern Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Upon closer inspection however, it becomes clear that these studies are mostly historical analyses (Jurková, 2015). Jurková (2015), when she reflected on the state of the academic field on cultural diplomacy for a special edition of the International Journal of Cultural Policy, concluded that to study international cultural relations it was increasingly important to take into account the current changes of society, especially the rising internationalisation and the effects of new media on communication.

Second to this trend, there is a need for more contemporary and practical research into international cultural relations beyond the West (Jurková, 2015). An example is Singh's (2010b) book "International Cultural Policies and Power". It focusses on the US, but also gives more contemporary and practical analyses including case studies from Eastern Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. However, these are mostly qualitative discourse analyses (Singh, 2010b). The important way that this thesis adds to the study of international cultural relations is that it uses practical data on international cultural relations and looks at international cultural cooperation, consciously moving beyond cultural diplomacy towards a more inclusive point of view.

The data comes from an earlier study done in assignment of DutchCulture (Boulil, forthcoming). DutchCulture is one of the organisations responsible in the governance of international cultural relations with the Netherlands through having an international network of policy makers, cultural organisations and artists. The goal was to help DutchCulture improve their position in their network, as well as taking a closer look at the mutual international cultural relations between the Netherlands and the MENA region, as these relations are usually only looked at through the lens of cultural diplomacy. This resulted into a policy advice called "Cooperation Beyond Borders" (Boulil, forthcoming).

Making a Case

In this thesis the goal is to give more academic insight into international cultural cooperation with the same case studies as the policy advice for DutchCulture. With little information on the international cultural relations within the MENA region, the Netherlands was taken as a starting point, looking at their cooperation with the two other countries and not looking at the international cultural relations between Morocco and Turkey. The data is then limited to two cases of international cultural cooperation, one spanning the cultural cooperation between the Netherlands and Morocco and one that shows the cultural cooperation between the Netherlands and Turkey. There are several reasons to what makes the relationship between the Netherlands and the MENA region so interesting and why Turkey and Morocco specifically are good selections in respect to their international cultural relations.

First, although the *Schengen agreement* created free movement of people within European borders, there is a palpable border for anyone outside of the Western world in the art sector and this is felt especially in the international cultural cooperation between the Netherlands and the MENA region. Recently the resulting inequality was addressed in the Dutch national news, when three young dancers from Morocco were refused into the country

at the airport of Eindhoven. It brought the attention to the difficulties of acquiring a visa as an artist, especially from outside of the Schengen Area (Belhaj, 2019).

A few weeks later the Turkish government announced that they were going to "open" twelve weekend schools in the Netherlands. The goal of the schools, according to the Turkish government, is to teach Turkish youth abroad about their language, heritage and culture. Rather this was a reorganisation of the existing weekend schools from private organisation to an organisation at arm's length from the Turkish government. Again, the Dutch news published an article, where the Minister for Social Affairs & Employment voiced his concern that he was worried that there would be "undemocratic education" going in those schools (NOS, 2019). Not only is there a literal border, there is a feeling of distrust that might hinder international cultural relations.

Despite this border, there is a lot of *international cultural exchange*, the export and import of arts and culture across national borders, between the Netherlands and the MENA region. Especially, Turkey and Morocco had a steady flow of Dutch cultural activities happening within their borders in the past few years according to the DutchCulture Database (Figure 1). There is a reason for these longstanding cultural relations and the fact that the Dutch news focussed on this part of the MENA region. The Netherlands profiles itself as a mixture of different cultures, rather than one heterogenous culture (Verhoef, 2015). Both countries have long history of people migrating to the Netherlands. Next to people from the Netherlands Antilles, Aruba and Suriname, Turks and Moroccans make up the largest part of the non-western immigrants in the Netherlands (CBS, 2018).



Figure 1: Dutch Activities Abroad 2013-2018 in Morocco and Turkey (Courtesy of DutchCulture)

Contrary to the other three countries, however, Turkey and Morocco were never part of the Dutch kingdom and are not considered to have any shared cultural heritage with the Netherlands (Website DutchCulture, 2019). Still, they are an integrated part of the Dutch multicultural society, with a little more than 3% of the Dutch population being a first- or second-generation migrant from either Turkey or Morocco (CBS, 2018). This makes that together with the lack of shared cultural heritage between the countries, the policies of the Netherlands, Turkey and Morocco also show a willingness to have international cultural relations despite the current difficult climate.

The countries' willingness to cooperate makes two cases are that of international cultural cooperation, more than cultural diplomacy, but what makes these countries' cooperation truly unique is that their relationship with each other and the rest of the world when it comes to international cultural relations has recently changed. Turkey is adjusting their strategy towards international cultural relations since 2016 towards more active governmental support for international cultural relations with several arm's length initiatives (Girard, Polo & Scalbert-Yücel, 2018). The Dutch government changed their strategy after 2016 as well, moving even more towards that inclusive international cultural cooperation and including a sector-based organisation as a coordinator of international cultural relations by formalising the role of DutchCulture (Koenders & Bussemaker, 2016). Morocco has a same proactive relation with the (international) cultural community as the Netherlands. This is because the unique aspect about Moroccan cultural policy is that it is never a solely executed by the government, but rather shared with those active in arts and culture. In Morocco each art discipline has its own directorate under the Ministry of Culture (Figure 2). A specific directorate then always has local, national or private partners their divisions work with on projects, which in the case of international cultural relations, could be an international partner (Van Hamersveld & Vaughan, 2010).



Figure 2: The Organisational Make-Up of the Moroccan Ministry of Culture (Adjusted from Van Hamersveld & Vaughan, 2010)

More Than International Cultural Governance

This thesis uses the two cases of international cultural cooperation, that of the Netherlands with Morocco and that of the Netherlands with Turkey. Studies that look at (international) cultural policy do not often look at these relations, but when they do, they make conflicting claims. In the first place, Pratt (2005) explains that a part of the cultural community, the cultural industries, are characterized by their ability to participate actively in the market, while cultural policy is aimed at supporting another, more aesthetically oriented, part of the community that cannot support themselves in the current economic system. Some form of government interference is necessary, at least in part. To help decide when governmental interference is needed and when it can be left behind, he proposes to include more sectoral expertise in the governmental decision-making process (Pratt, 2005). Specifically in the case of international cultural policy, Isar (2015) uses the example of how since 2011 European external relations started to take into consideration non-governmental organisations.

This inclusion of different external parties in the governmental decision-making process is usually referred to as *governance* (Papadopoulos, 2003). Interestingly, in governance structures in international cultural relations the external cultural parties are claimed to have the primary power (Luke, 2010). Successful international cultural cooperation is also linked to working with local and private organisations (Johannisson, 2010; Kawashima, 2010). Not surprisingly, the way to increase international cultural relations is then said to lie in having a central independent organisation rooted in the community that moderates between the policy makers and the international artists and cultural organisations, similar to the strategy of the Netherlands and Denmark (Schneider, 2009).

Taking it even further, Janssens (2018) goes even as far as stating that international cultural policy is a force moving against international cultural cooperation. Supporting this last claim, Minnaert (2014) states that the acceptance and sustainability of an international network of artists and organisations, in other words a strong international cultural community, makes the success of international cultural exchange. Kolff (2018), by constructing a network of cultural relations in the internationalising design sector of the Netherlands, noticed that international cultural cooperation happened mainly with fellow artists and organisations in the discipline. Furthermore, by looking at international film festivals, a conclusion is drawn that there are a lot of *international artists*, those that are working in one country but originally from another, cooperating (Champenois, 2010; Feigenbaum, 2010). There is also claimed to be an overlap in cooperation between film and photography, both media art forms, design, part of the creative industries, and music, which is falls under performance art (Hart, 2010). This might suggest that, more than governance, multidisciplinary international cultural cooperation is the best strategy towards increasing international cultural exchange. This led to the research question:

What type of cooperation has more power in international cultural exchange?

This means that this thesis looks at different *types of cooperation* as the balance between those that have a more formal position due to their relation to international cultural policy and actors from the international cultural community, as well as the possibility that those involved in the international cultural community guide the network alone.

Sharing Power

What the cooperation structures have in common is that *international cultural leadership* is shared between different parties. This might call for a redefinition of cultural leadership. Traditionally leadership is connected to the idea of one person leading a group of people somewhere, something aptly called *traditional leadership*. In cultural sector another leadership style is preferred (Hoyle, 2014). Hoyle (2014) list a few "good" cultural leaders, which all have in common that they inspire their organisations to attain a goal rather than pulling them towards one. In the literature this is called *transformational leadership* (Hewison & Holden, 2011; Bolden, 2004). A similar dichotomy between the leader and the group exists, but the leader leads from the back (Hoyle, 2014; Bolden, 2004). But the focus on cooperation between policy makers and stakeholders that Pratt (2005) talks about and the

cooperation within the international cultural community that is rising in the strategies that guide international cultural relations requires a different definition of leadership.

In *distributed leadership* words like “collective”, “share” and “enable” are central. Rather than having one organisation in charge, leadership is shared or even taken over by all others involved. There the ideal is that leadership should not be focussed on acting alone but should be distributed between several people or organisations (Hewison & Holden, 2011). Furthermore, the idea is that this type of leadership can come from anywhere in an organization and that the focus should be on the relationships between people (Hoyle, 2014; Hewison & Holden, 2011; Bolden, 2004). This would mean that in international cultural exchange, more than one central independent organisation, as advised by Schneider (2009), a cooperation of several organisations take the lead.

Based on both the rise of distributed leadership in international cultural exchange and the current conflicting strategies towards guiding international cultural relations, the objective of this thesis is to provide more insight into that power in international cultural cooperation. Podolny (2001) conceptualises relations as *pipes*, where resources, such as information and money, can flow through, or *prisms*, which can influence both the sender and the receiver of a relation. Apart from the generally accepted fact that your relations can influence your point of view, this makes that the relationships themselves are a source of power. In the field of international cultural policy, Singh (2010a: 4) explains: ‘Power is either about effecting or constraining particular outcomes, or about transforming or constituting the identity of the actors and the issues themselves’. *Power* stems from the social environment of an organisation and their ability to control it. The assumption is made that in distributed leadership is that the relationships surrounding these leaders, in other words their social environment, provides them with power.

All in This Together

While including everyone and looking beyond policy is new to the strategies towards international cultural relations, it is not a new research topic. Becker (1986) already advocated that the production of a cultural good takes more than just an artist alone. He argues that outside of the artist creating art there is a whole economy of people and institutions that work together to make art happen. Every one of these *art worlds* has their own rules and dynamics that surround the production of art and without all those supporting parties, artistic production would not be possible (Becker, 1986). Studying arts and culture is then not possible without including all involved. Holden (2015) takes a more social approach

with his *ecology of culture*, which are 'the complex interdependencies that shape the demand for and production of arts and cultural offerings' (Markussen, 2011: 10). He puts the focus on the network of relations that not only exist within art worlds, but also between them. Although Becker (1986) seems to argue that the focus should be on the cooperation within one discipline and Holden (2015) is more about relationships between these groups as well, both seem to argue for a more wholesome approach in the sociology of culture, claiming that leaving the community surrounding the art behind is only looking at half the picture (Holden, 2015; Becker, 1986).

What both Holden (2015) and authors that look at international cultural governance, like Schneider (2009) and Minnaert (2014), have in common is that they are talking about networks of relations. They are taking a step back from individual characteristics and are claiming that the social environment surrounding those active in arts and culture matters. The idea that 'networks provide a way forward in examining power relations shaped by informal patterns of interaction rather than formal positional power' had already taken hold beyond the sociology of culture (Robins, Lewis & Wang, 2012: 390). When it comes to the sociology of policy, the general acceptance has come up that the full community is involved with the decision-making process, not merely the policy makers. An example is the study by Henry, Lubell and McCoy (2010), who, while studying the policy network structure of California regional planning, added *stakeholders*, such as private consultants and neighbourhood organisations, to their participant list. In this line of thought, although not proven, the crux of organisations is said to lie in knowing the underlying social network of relations, more than the formal organisational hierarchy (Raab & Kenis, 2006).

Social network analysis is a methodology that successfully captures and analyses relational structures in a dynamic community (Robins, 2015; Borgatti & Halgin, 2011; Raab & Kenis, 2006). It deals with questions pertaining to the interaction between individuals and their social environment and vice versa. To answer these, social network analysis operationalises people or organisations as nodes, called *actors*, and map their relations to each other as lines, called *ties*, in a network. One could look at only one actor and its direct relations and how those actors again relate to each other. The resulting network is then called an *egocentric network*, an egonet for short. Alternatively, if one looks at a full network of actors, including not only their egonets but also how these again are intertwined, it is called a *whole network study* (Robins, 2015). The relationships between the international cultural community and international cultural policy form an intertwined cooperation network, which is assumed to be what makes international cultural exchange successful. When studying the

relationship between the international cultural community and international cultural policy the idea is then to take international cultural exchange as a whole network.

Outline

This thesis is doing an international, multidisciplinary social network analysis using practical data on international cultural exchange. It revolves around the question *What type of cooperation has more power in international cultural exchange?* It uses data from a policy advice which provided two networks, one containing the international cultural cooperation between the Netherlands and Morocco and one containing the international cultural cooperation between the Netherlands and Turkey (Boulil, forthcoming). In the theoretical framework a further argumentation will be given how this study adds to the existing social network studies. An important question in social network analysis is then to establish the nodes, ties and boundaries of the network (Robins, 2015). The theoretical chapter will continue with discussing what is known already about the international cultural community and the international cultural policy strategies of the Netherlands, Turkey and Morocco. After this it will address theories on how power is gained in a cooperation network. Next, the methodology chapter will show how the cases and the sampling methodology of the policy advice added to more insight into international cultural relations. In this chapter the terms discussed in the theoretical framework will also be operationalised. The methodology chapter will finish with an evaluation of the validity and reliability of this thesis. After the theoretical framework and the methodology, the results will be discussed. This chapter will first describe the network and the results of the policy advice shortly and then going in depth into the types of cooperation structures in the network that reoccur, focussing on those mutual international cultural relations. Finally, a conclusion will be given, answering the research question and summarizing the results. The thesis will close with a discussion of the shortcomings of the study.

Theoretical Framework

Nothing New, Something Network

Like taking a holistic approach, the link between arts and culture and social network analysis is not new. Sometimes social network analysis is viewed as more than just a methodology. The then named *network theory* has its roots in structuralism and ethnographic research (Wittek, 2014). It claims that looking at the underlying structure, knowing the relations of people to each other, and their underlying social motivations, why they are related the way they are, is the only way to understand societal phenomena (Hedström & Swedberg, 1996). Some studies revolving around network theory have been done before by those studying arts and culture, as well as some social network analyses.

Foremost, there are many applications of Latour's (2007) *actor network theory*, that claims that inanimate objects can function similarly to people as actors in a network. However, Latour is not a structuralist and there are barely any *social* network studies done in the academic field of arts and culture. When this is the case, the actor network theory by Latour (2007) is for instance combined with the study of the behaviour of artists and their social network. This was most recently done by Basov (2018), who studied how artist collectives share space and objects. Basov (2018) works with both a social network and a material network of objects. He found that commonly accepted social processes, namely *homophily*, choosing your friends based on similar characteristics, and *contagion*, the idea that social ties cause similar characteristics among friends, do not always hold true. He concluded that artists tend to choose to work with different objects than their friends (Basov, 2018).

Another famous example of the use of theory building using social network theory in cultural studies is that of DiMaggio and Cohen (2005). Their theory looks at the interaction of social networks and material objects. Studying contemporary capitalism, they make the distinction between networks as a technology, and how worldwide telecommunications aided in the development of the current global economy, and networks as a theoretical construct, taking about *network goods*, goods and services that increase in value as their users increase. In other words network goods are those that have *network externalities.* Based on this, DiMaggio and Cohen (2005) build a model of the diffusion patterns of new technologies, specifically the Internet and television, and look at the *digital divide*, the uneven access to those new technologies. They conclude that the ability to reap the benefits of technological advancements is not developmental alone, but also dependent on the socio-economic factors

of the users and their environment. However, DiMaggio and Cohen (2005), with the focus on television and the Internet as telecommunications and economic goods, are more on the cultural side of the study of arts and culture than the artistic side.

When social network analysis is used to study artists behaviour, the question usually revolves around how social networks can contribute to understanding the economy behind art production. The trend to focus economy already started in the early days of social network studies. In 1971 Peterson and Berger (1971) investigated entrepreneurship in the music industry. They use Schumpeter's definition of *entrepreneurship* as the ability to combine a variation of different elements of otherwise separate services. They explain that the music industry, due to the diversity of parties involved, creates a chaotic market environment and that leadership in such an environment requires a flexibility that is found in an entrepreneur (Peterson & Berger, 1971). In network terms: They looked at how individual factors can affect a social structure.

A few decades later, Uzzi (1996) looks at the fashion industry, to be precise the high-end clothing production in New York (see also Uzzi, 1997). In his 1996 article he questions how embeddedness and network structure affect economic action. Uzzi (1996) comes to the conclusion that a *network strategy*, having a long-term cooperation with other organisations in a social environment, works better than having strictly business relationships. More than about how individual factors affect a social structure, like Peterson and Berger (1971) did, this research is about how different types of social relations effect organisational outcomes.

Recently, there was a study published by Lehman, Wickham and Fillis (2018) on the visual art production in Australia. This study looks at both actor and tie characteristics' effect on art production, but also how they influence the visual artwork, making it again a mix of social network analysis and the study of art objects. Because by nature visual art production is not about what the customer wants, but what the artist produces, they look at the supply-side of the art market and how the network interactions going on there influence artistic production. They concluded that visual art production is the result of an interplay of different types of social interactions between conceptualisers, producers and distributers (Lehman, Wickham & Fillis, 2018). They do something similar to what this thesis is proposing to do in the sense that they identify visual artists and their third-party support system in the visual art market and looked at how this art world, as Becker (1986) would call it, works together.

There were other social network studies done beyond the focus on the economic value of art production. A study into the creative industries by de Vaan, Stark and Vedres (2015) looks at the influence of multiple group membership and success in the gaming industry. In

this study, the previous social environments of game developers were mapped out in order to determine what made some games more successful than others. Unique to this study was that the success of the cultural product, the videogame, was not determined by its economic value alone, but also by its artistic quality (de Vaan, Stark and Vedres, 2015). This thesis moves completely beyond the economic production of art and looks at the social cooperation underlying art exchange.

With this social aspect, this thesis fits more into studies that are currently done in the intersection between culture and urban development. Föhl, Wolfram and Peper (2016) use an existing database of active cultural actors in different German cities to map their network and interview them and the actors in their egonet about the impact they have on their environment. More than the economic value of art, they look at its social value and how this can be better managed. They concluded that *cultural managers*, public officials or cultural professionals hired by the government responsible to maintain the cultural infrastructure of a city, need more support from both the formal institutions and local stakeholders. On an international level, however, there was little know about the practical execution of these types of governance (Jurkovà, 2015; Gienow-Hecht & Donfried, 2010). This thesis does take this practical international point of view by using the previously mapped international cultural cooperation networks between the Netherlands and Morocco and between the Netherlands and Turkey.

Doing It Yourself

Both the study into cultural policy by Föhl, Wolfram and Peper (2016), and studies of Peterson and Berger (1971) into the music industry and Lehman, Wickham and Fillis (2018) into the visual art industry are looking at the cultural cooperation between artists, cultural organisation and policy makers, making this thesis into social network studies in arts and culture nothing new. There are some limits to these studies, primarily that, although social relations are studied on the urban, by Föhl, Wolfram and Peper (2016), and even national level, by Lehman, Wickham and Fillis (2018), it is never found in the academic literature on the international level. This is not because they do not exist. The international cultural network is mapped by sector initiatives and by national governments.

Independent organisations monitor international cultural relations extensively to provide more insight into their parts of the international cultural community. An example is a project called “Visualizing Art Networks” mapped an interactive network of visual artists, curators and exhibitions all over the world from 1880 until now (Artist-Info, 2019). The

network is visualized into an interactive webpage shown in Figure 3. Another mapping of an international cultural network was made in assignment of a cultural organisation in Vienna, the Community Arts Lab. It mapped an international network of community art organisations and their registered their advocacy narrative. In Figure 4 this part of the international cultural community is shown plotted against a world map (Community Arts Lab, & FASresearch, 2018). In both images the nodes are cultural organizations or artists, and the ties are their work relations to each other.



Figure 3: Network of Visual Artists, Curators and Exhibitions since 1880



Figure 4: Mapping of Community Art Organizations Worldwide

Those involved in international cultural policy also use social network analysis, but more to provide data-driven policy advices. The methodology was recently used in the ongoing study into the Flemish-Dutch cultural cooperation by DutchCulture and Art Flanders, the arm's length organization that supports Flemish visual and performance art in the international cultural community. In assignment of the Dutch ministry of Education, Culture and Science and the Flemish Ministry of Culture, Youth and Media, these organisations are currently trying to find an instrument that can measure international cultural exchange as well as pin down the interpersonal relations in the international cultural community. For the pilot of this study, one of the possible instruments was social network analysis. Because of this a social network analysis on the interpersonal relations in the theatre discipline was presented during a conference in November (Grob, Strik & Boulil, 2018). Figure 5 shows the cultural organisations and artists, orange actors, their interpersonal relations, black ties, and the several hubs the cities create. The goal of this study was to create more effective international cultural policy to guide the international cultural relations between the two countries (Grob, Strik & Boulil, 2018).



Figure 5: Mapping of Dutch-Flemish Theatre Relations (Courtesy of DutchCulture)

These three examples of sector-initiated research into international cultural community are and the previous academic studies that look at social networks in arts and culture are also limited to one discipline. This is again not because there is no multidisciplinary data available. Several governments are monitoring their *international cultural export*, the art and artists moving outside of national borders. These databases sometimes go back for decades. Figure 6 shows the overview picture of one of the yearly publications by the arm's length organisation responsible in the Netherlands on their international cultural activities abroad (DutchCulture, 2018). This shows a high amount of cultural export in all disciplines, but also all over the globe. By using this data in combination with what is already known about the two case studies of international cultural cooperation between the Netherlands and Turkey and the Netherlands and Morocco, this thesis adds to both the study of international cultural relations and social network studies in the arts of culture.



Figure 6: International Cultural Activities of the Netherlands per Discipline in 2017

Three Cases of Governance

This thesis looks at the international cultural cooperation that underlies the international cultural exchange between the Netherlands and Turkey and the Netherlands and Morocco. For each of these countries their international part of their cultural policies will be discussed in detail to sketch an image of the part of the network that is rooted in international cultural policies.

The Netherlands

As mentioned, the Netherlands is one of the countries that relies on a national organisation with an international cultural network of cooperating actors, DutchCulture. Surrounding this organisation is the following organisational structure. The leading roles in international cultural relations with the Netherlands are thus distributed between three governmental organisations that in turn cooperate with the (international) cultural community (Figure 7). In the Netherlands, the responsibility for guiding international cultural relations is split between the Ministry of Education, Culture & Science, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But the ministries distributed the actual coordination to another organisation. More than a financial

role, DutchCulture provides information for the national cultural community about the international cultural field and for the international cultural community about the Dutch cultural field (DutchCulture, 2018). The two responsible ministries in the Netherlands lead by providing funding for several national cultural organisations, embassies and public funds for international cultural activities (Asbeek Brusse et al., 2016). With this arm's length organisation formally top, the current Dutch strategy towards international cultural relations seems be focussing on creating an international network where everybody involved with international cultural exchange cooperates rather than exporting culture in the name of cultural diplomacy (Koenders & Bussemaker, 2016).



Figure 7: The Distributed Leadership of International Cultural Relations in the Netherlands

With their current international cultural policy the Netherlands started actively including the international cultural actors of other countries in their policy, but it is not possible to speak of a complete execution of international cultural cooperation. In the relationships with Turkey and Morocco the active inclusion was mainly to attain to the second goal of their new policy '[to make] more room for a cultural contribution to a safe, just and sustainable world' with international cultural relations (Koenders & Bussemaker, 2016: 7). Turkey was always in their list of priority countries, with the international relations of the two countries celebrating their 400th anniversary in 2012, and Morocco was newly introduced as an international cultural partner of the Netherlands in 2017 (Koenders & Bussemaker, 2016). Morocco reciprocated the international cultural relation at the end of 2018, hiring a cultural employee at their embassy in the Netherlands. However, both the Turkish institute in Amsterdam and the cultural employee at the embassy of Morocco in The Hague have limited interactions with DutchCulture and the two Dutch ministries (Boulil, forthcoming).

Turkey

The international cultural policy of Turkey is structured more traditional, with an infrastructure of Yunus Emre Institutes all over the world (Figure 8). Among other things, these Institutes run the weekend schools that teach Turkish language and culture to everyone of Turkish descent in the country they are located. They are also the contact point for artist if they want to exchange arts and culture with Turkey (Website Yunus Emre Institute Amsterdam, 2019a). With that being the main international strategy, Turkish international cultural policy seems focussed on the spread and support of Turkish heritage and language, on Turkish cultural export (see also the Website Turkish Ministry of Culture & Tourism, 2019).

Figure 8: Locations of Yunus Emre Institutes Worldwide (Adjusted from Website Yunus Emre Institute Amsterdam, 2019b)

Beyond the strategy for cultural activities outside the Turkish borders, the national cultural policy of Turkey has a more inclusive role for international cultural partners within their borders. The ideal is to create local economic development through making national cultural organisations host international festivals in different cities (Girard, Polo & Scalbert-Yücel, 2018). These events are not organised by the government, but rather by the local cultural elite (Evren, 2008). Because of this tradition, although the Turkish government is trying to reorganize their art sector with a more arm's length approach, still a lot of the

(international) cultural initiatives inside Turkey are funded by private donors (Girard, Polo & Scalbert-Yücel, 2018; Evren, 2008). In conclusion, Turkish international cultural exchange cooperates beyond their national borders, but it is still the result of cultural diplomacy. Within the Turkish borders, the cultural community seems to hold the power and international cultural cooperation has a larger role.

Morocco

Morocco does not have any official strategy towards guiding international cultural relations. The focus of Moroccan cultural policy is to enhance the national cultural field, where international partnerships are instruments to blow new life into the Moroccan cultural sector and support the position of the national artist (Van Hamersveld & Vaughan, 2010). Like with the Turkish strategy, *international cultural import*, those international cultural exchanges happening inside a nations border, plays are large role. International cultural relations are then managed by the shared responsibility of the Division of Cooperation of the Ministry of Culture and a (sub-) Division of Cultural and Scientific Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These divisions are, much like DutchCulture, only responsible for coordinating the relation of the directorates with the different cultural institutes in Morocco and international partners, rather than the actual execution of international cultural activities.

Although there is a place for the international community within the borders of Morocco, there is little attention given towards international cultural exchange outside of the Moroccan borders. The international partners chosen for cultural activities are not located outside the borders of Morocco but are for instance cultural institutes in the cities were the events are hosted (Van Hamersveld & Vaughan, 2010). When it comes to international cultural exchange, rather than a focus on cultural export, there is a focus on cultural import, but still with a governance structure of distributed leadership between the cultural policy makers and the cultural community.

Underexposed and Divided Community

This thesis is trying to look at the interaction between the international cultural community and international cultural policy makers together, as well as cooperation structures within the community. But the fragmentation over the different expressions of arts and culture makes that this is not a complete overview of multidisciplinary cooperation in international cultural relations. Despite the availability of the databases and the policy studies, there is also little known about the interaction between the international cultural community and international

cultural policy. The existing academic knowledge comes from different disciplines studying how their artists and cultural organisations behave internationally. Each art discipline then seems to simultaneously draw conclusions about the nature of their cooperation ties to international cultural policy actors, like the ministries of several national governments or cultural institutes.

For *visual arts*, including paintings and sculptures, and the *performing arts*, which are dance, music and theatre, the focus is on how their artists function internationally without policy interference. Looking at studies into international cultural relations in visual arts, Janssens (2018) and Wallis (1994) write about international art exhibitions, both concluding that there is international cultural cooperation going on rather than the political game called cultural diplomacy. Janssens (2018) sees this ineffectiveness of international cultural policy in the performing arts as well. But there are more artforms than visual and performance arts.

Literature, *media arts*, such as film and photography, and the *creative industries*, which includes applied arts like architecture and design, are more focussed on the effects of worldwide communication on international cultural exchange, much like the study of DiMaggio and Cohen (2005). Opposed to the analogue discipline literature, media arts, performance arts, and the creative industries use modern technologies. They make international communications easier and thus show more international cultural cooperation (Hart, 2010). Next to this *digitalisation*, the general trend of *internationalisation* that makes that individuals and capital are moving increasingly beyond their national borders (Hesmondhalgh, 2005). For the media arts specifically this last trend is said to positively affect international cultural cooperation (Champenois, 2010; Feigenbaum, 2010). The digital interconnectedness of the sector together with the effects of globalisation are finally suggested to lead to a similar cultural sector in every country (Cowan, 2002).

When it comes to the human expressions that are related to a more general definition of *culture*, for instance heritage but also (art) education, a completely different picture is painted. The study of international cultural relations is strongly focussed on the way cultural diplomacy and international cultural policy effect community and identity (see also Sassatelli, 2016; Ang, Isar, & Mar, 2015; Isar, 2015; Minnaert, 2014; Mulcahy, 2010; Singh, 2010a). In part of the international cultural community Said's (1978) *orientalism*, where the East is made inferior to the West, is still very much alive. Looking into for instance a study into several nations their cultural institutes, they are found to follow European ideal of educating the masses in high arts and culture (Paschalidis, 2009). Beyond art education, most of the international cultural exchange studies related to heritage show similar hegemonic practices.

For instance, there is little international cultural cooperation regarding national heritage, but if there are relations there, the West teaches “developing countries” how to care for national heritage (Brianso, 2010).

There are still many questions unanswered. For instance, visual and performing arts both have a similar relation to international cultural policy, but about their relation to each other nothing is said (Janssens, 2018). Similarly, the media arts might be linked to international cultural policy, but there is no information about this relationship found so far. When it came to the study of international cultural relations, this limitation of knowledge also came up regarding the different policies of countries beyond the West, let alone the international cultural community (Jurkovà, 2015). From the introduction of this thesis it became clear that many policies still focus on cultural diplomacy in their execution despite claiming to strive for a more mutual international cultural exchange (Kieft, 2018; Fisher, 2007; Wyszomirski, Burgess & Peila, 2003; Wallis, 1994). This is claimed to be true for the cultural policies of nations beyond the West as well, but there are no extensive practical studies done on them (Mulcahy, 2010). This thesis, by studying all disciplines in international cultural cooperation between the Netherlands and Turkey and the Netherlands and Morocco, adds to the current information about this underexposed and divided community.

International Cultural Governance

While scholars agree on the fact that the international cultural community is powerful, the exact balance of *international cultural governance*, that distributed leadership found in the cooperation between government and community in the international cultural field, is still much unknown. The only thing that seems to hold true is that these international cultural relations are the driving force behind international cultural exchange (Janssens, 2018; Minnaert, 2014; Luke, 2010). This thesis, for a lack of clarity about who holds the powerful position in studies into international cultural relations, turns to other fields. Social network studies that investigate cooperation, especially between policy makers and the community, are currently also questioning what makes it successful. The importance of community acceptance and informal relations for instance comes up time and again, but is never proven (Raab & Kenis, 2006). In line with this, Bodin, Sandström and Crona (2016) conclude that there is no single strategy for a good cooperation network. But this study was based on a computer simulation of a network rather than real social interactions (Bodin, Sandström & Crona, 2016).

A few years before the same research team that ran the computer simulation on cooperation, after studying an actual case of an organisation network consisting of actors in several marine areas in Sweden, concluded that the previous and current institutional landscape, on the one hand, and government commitment, on the other, are crucial in managing public areas (Sandström, Crona & Bodin, 2014). Another practical study by Berardo and Scholz (2010) shows the community having, or rather, taking the lead. Looking at the management of coastal areas again, this time estuaries in the USA, they concluded that organisations tend to connect to popular actors to coordinate without governmental interference (Berardo & Scholz, 2010). For smaller projects, Berardo and Scholz (2010) state that close-knit reciprocal relations are preferred, and that trust is an important factor.

Although the study by Basov (2018) suggested that artists behave differently on a personal level this seems to be less true on an organisational level. Most of the conclusions of the social network studies into governance can also be linked to studies into international cultural policy. The findings of Sandström, Crona and Bodin (2014), that power lies in a shared effort between community and the government, reminds of the governance strategies advocated by Schneider (2009) and executed by the Netherlands and Denmark (Kieft, 2018). The high influence of a strong existing community that Sandström, Crona and Bodin (2014) found concurs with the claim that international cultural exchange relies on an existing community with sustainable and accepted relations (Minnaert, 2014). Finally, the study by Berardo and Scholz (2010) seems to indicate support for Luke's (2010) and Janssens' (2018) claims that the international cultural community is the one in control (see also Kawashima, 2010; Johannisson, 2010).

It is then not surprising that the policy advice that used the same data as this thesis showed that those that control international cultural relations are arm's length organisations with strong roots in the international cultural community (Boulil, forthcoming). However, this study did not look at the claim of that power of a smaller cooperation structure by Berardo & Scholz (2010). This study and the overlap between social network studies into governance and international cultural governance studies gave way to the idea that in a network where policy makers and organisations work together there are smaller groups of community organisations that work together and lead the network, ergo cases of distributed leadership.

Why Not Both

This thesis is then focussing on types of cooperation structures, cases of where the leadership of a network is shared between different actors. To understand how distributed leadership works started by understanding how relations create power in a network. Power in the international cultural network was said to come from the social milieu of an actor and their individual ability to control it (Singh, 2010; Podolny, 2001). This links to what Bourdieu (1986) calls *social capital,* which are those resources that come from having connections to others. Connecting it to network theory, Burt (2000: 3) states: '[t]he *social capital metaphor* is that the people who do better are somehow better connected. (…) Holding a certain position in the structure of these exchanges can be an asset in its own right'. Which position that is, however, is discussed heavily. This is because underneath this metaphor there are claimed to be several social mechanisms, that make contradicting statements about how social capital creates this advantage over others (Burt, 2000).

The first mechanism is provided by Coleman (1990), who argued the fact that social capital comes from *network closure*. In these networks with closure a lot of the actors are connected to each other. It is a network where most of the relationships are "closed" (Burt, 2000). This happens through a process called *clustering* (Figure 9). People have the tendency to connect to another person if he or she is connected to someone else they are already connected to (Robins, 2015). This means that eventually all possible ties between actors are present (Burt, 2000). According to Coleman (1990) this high *network density* produces an advantage of one group over another, because a dense group can share information easily. Other network scholars use Coleman's (1990) theory as a basis as well. Putnam (1993) claims that this interconnectedness leads to trust in a society and therefor the possibility to more coordination and with that more efficiency. This importance of trust is something that Berardo and Scholz (2010) found in their study as well. In the network closure argument having a well-connected egonet network, with high network closure, makes an actor in that network powerful.



Figure 9: The Process of Clustering

On the other side there is the theory on *structural holes*. Opposed to people connecting, this theory is based on the missing link between people (Burt, 1992). Moving beyond Granovetter's (1973) claim that there is strength in superficial relations, called *weak ties*, Burt (1992) says that having structural holes in a larger network can help you influence the flow of resources. In network closure the driving social mechanism was *bonding*. The fact that everyone was connected made that it is easier to coordinate a group (Coleman, 1990). Looking at social capital as something that comes from structural holes means that connections between people in a network is a disadvantage for the person that connects those people (Burt, 1992). Using those structural holes and being a *bridge* between groups is where the power comes from in a network (Figure 10). In Figure 10 the orange line shows where a structural hole in the network is present, which makes the red actor the powerful actor in the network.



Figure 10: The Difference Between Bonding and Bridging (Adjusted from Reynolds, 2015)

The structural hole theory seems to cancel out the idea that network power can come from closure and vice versa as the latter is about power coming from a network where your connections connect to each other, while the first is about a network where they do not. But contemporary social network analysis is increasingly trying to combine both theories, thinking of a study by Soda, Stoa and Pedersen (2017) who looked at both bridging and bonding actors at the same time, questioning what made them more creative. They concluded that those with an egonet that is bonded benefit from a lot of cooperation, while those that bridge part of the network and broker information through said network become more creative when cooperation is low. In another study Henry, Lubell and McCoy (2010) concluded that policy makers are the ones that connect groups of like-minded stakeholders to

strengthen a governance network. They do not look at the simultaneous existence of both bridging and bonding actors in a network to see which one is more successful but do claim an interdependence between the two. The full network structure depicted in Figure 10 is in basis the structure that they found present in their case of governance of land-use and transportation planning in four regions of California (Henry, Lubell & McCoy; 2010).

Combining the idea of closure with structural holes in this thesis as well, the idea is that smaller groups, those distributed leadership cases of governance and community cooperation, that bridge the rest of the network have power, because of their strong relations to each other and the less strong bonds in the social environment around them. The closure in the in-group creates trust and effective communication, while the structural holes in the out-group make it possible to control the flow of information. Distributed leadership then works as follows: several smaller groups of organisations have power because of the high closure between them and they can control the network because of the high number of structural holes around them.

Methodology

Social Network Analysis

Social network analysis can be used to capture a social structure of different actors and their ties and attempting to explain why the network looks like it does. It is for instance possible to look if a social environment influences an individual or vice versa. More than that, it is possible to see if a system is effective, and even strategize on how to improve the system (Robins, 2015). In this case a *social network intervention* is possible. Applying social network analysis, by identifying stakeholders, while minding a larger context, the idea is that it is possible to devise a strategy to agent change in a social network (Valente et al., 2015; Valente, 2012). This was done in the policy advice that used the same dataset, where powerful stakeholders were identified using social network analysis (Boulil, forthcoming). In this thesis a similar neither qualitative nor quantitative method will be used to gain insight into distributed leadership in international cultural cooperation. It will be using the same network, but in this case selecting cases of distributed leadership and analysing them based on their group composition, rather than individual leadership capabilities.

Establishing Boundaries, Nodes and Ties

A sketch of the international cultural network can be made from the existing research discussed in the theoretical framework, which is visualized in Figure 11. The international cultural community can be divided into six disciplines, spanning both arts and culture, which are listed in the legend, and a group that makes up international cultural policy. The group of international cultural policy actors of different countries, through different strategies, work with the international cultural community (see also Pratt, 2005). Each of these disciplines and those government actors are represented as a circle in the Venn diagram (Figure 11).



Figure 11: A Venn Diagram of the Interaction Between the International Cultural Community and International Cultural Policy Actors

The studies by Janssens (2018) and Wallis (1994) indicate that visual and performing arts would be better off without the interference of international cultural policy, indicating that the relationship is there. Due to the fact that most cultural institutes are part of international cultural policy, but in their execution are mostly active in heritage and language, the disciplines culture, literature and cultural policy are linked (Paschalidis, 2009). Performing arts, media arts, and the creative industries are linked to each other as well, because of the claim made by that there is an overlap between film, photography, design and music (Hart, 2010). Based on the study by Kolff (2018) into the cooperation within the design sector, the assumption was made that the creative industries do not link into international cultural policy.

The disciplines differ in the amount of international cultural exchange going on. Looking at the distribution of the different disciplines in Figure 4 and the studies by Champenois (2010) and Feigenbaum (2010), the circles that represent performing arts and media arts are made larger, indicating that there is more international cultural exchange happening there (Figure 5). Both literature and culture are said to have less international cultural exchange going on, therefor their circles are smaller in Figure 5 (Brianso, 2010; Hart, 2010).

In these different disciplines in the international cultural community, different actors are active. When it comes to the cultural sector it is possible that the actors are one

individual, such as a painter or a singer, or a larger organisation, such as an art collective or a band, but also a ministry of culture (Boulil, forthcoming). If the whole community is studied, they are all included and thus the nodes can be either individuals or groups. These actors are then tied together in work relations, thinking about two international artists creating an artwork together, but also public and private organisations supporting an art project by providing finances. This thesis specifically focusses on what kind of group compositions have power in international cultural exchange. Therefore there are a few individual characteristics of the actors that are measured.

From the examples in the international cultural exchange of film by Feigenbaum (2010) and Champenois (2010) it became clear that the international cultural community consists of actors that might be located in one country but originally from another. It is then important to consider both the country of origin and the current geographical location of an actor. Both the *location*, the current geographical location of an actor, and the *country of origin*, where the actor is originally from or was established in case of a cultural organisation, are noted. In an international cultural network this can be anywhere in the world, but in this thesis the distinction is made between the Netherlands, either Morocco or Turkey, and the rest of the world. But most importantly, there are six disciplines that can be distinguished, as well as actors that are part of international cultural policy structures that were discussed. Most of the disciplines and what falls under them were mentioned before, but a recap is given in Table 1.

Table 1: Defining Disciplines

Discipline	**Definition**	**Art Forms**
Performing Arts	Art performed on a stage	Music
		Dance
		Theatre
Visual Arts	Analogue art objects	Paintings
		Sculptures
Literature	Written art forms	Books
		Poetry
Media Arts	Digital art objects and art made with modern technologies	Photography
		Film
Creative Industries	Functional art	Design
		Architecture
Culture	Other creative forms of human expression	Heritage
		(Art) education

Distributed International Cultural Leadership

With the network boundaries, nodes and ties established the actual networks need to be mapped out. There is then a practical difficulty linked to the current refocussing beyond cultural diplomacy in the international cultural relations, as information on international cultural relations is limited and spread over different sources. To solve this and get an overview of the two cooperation networks different sources were used for the dataset that is used for this thesis. From policy documents and other discourse a general governing structure of international cultural relations for Morocco, Turkey and the Netherlands could be deduced. But, since these networks are primarily limited to the formal structure, to get a grip on the full international cultural community, it needed to be supplemented with data on international artists behaviour.

This data came from the 2016 cohort of the DutchCulture database. During the data collection of the policy advice more current data was not available. Then, although this data is focussed on export, a one-way relation, the ties in the DutchCulture database are considered mutual, as cooperative ties. This is because the data comes from international cultural activities of the Netherlands abroad and provides information on a cooperative triangle between a national artist, a foreign location where they perform and possible international partners or national funds that support or finance the international cultural activity. In Figure 12 and Figure 13 the resulting networks are shown, with the actors from the policy discourse in the darker colour. Most importantly what the figures show is that the policy actors are linked to the community actors, confirming that there is one international cultural network underlying international cultural exchange (Boulil, forthcoming).



Figure 12: International Cultural Cooperation Between the Netherlands and Morocco based on Policy Discourse and Dutch Export Data



Figure 13: International Cultural Cooperation Between the Netherlands and Turkey based on Policy Discourse and Dutch Export Data

Talking repeatedly to the two employees at DutchCulture who are currently responsible for monitoring, supporting and enhancing the Dutch cultural exchange with Morocco and Turkey provided more insight into the direction of the ties in the networks, but it did not provide much new actors. This more informal way of interviewing that relies casual conversations to get information is called *natural inquiry* (Beuving & de Vries, 2015). An important insight of that resulted from these casual conversations was that beyond Dutch export data collected by DutchCulture and knowledge of these different policies, there is little known about international cultural cooperation between the Netherlands and Morocco and the Netherlands and Turkey (Boulil, forthcoming). After that the population was supplemented with data from *desk research*. This sample technique was piloted in the study into the Flemish-Dutch theatre sector and proven useful in studying international cultural relations (Grob, Strik & Boulil, 2018). This resulted in some small adjustments to the networks, but no new actors. It did provide the information for the individual actor characteristics.

To find missing links and actors, Valente (2012) advises respondent-driven sampling techniques. A *snowball sample* is a technique like respondent-driven sampling but can be used to find an entire network structure. A list of actors, called a *seed set*, is asked to identify the people that they connect to, and they are asked in turn to nominate their connections. This

was for instance used to establish the community arts network mentioned (Community Arts Lab, & FASresearch, 2018). The snowball sampling in this research is executed by sending out a survey to the seed set, which consists of the actors that came forward in the discourse analysis, the export data, the desk research and the natural inquiry. This survey and its justification can be found in Appendix 1. It asked the respondents about their network partners in a *name generator*, where they can nominate those who they have ties to (Robins, 2015). The survey was then emailed to any new actors in that came forward in the name generator. Every new list of actors is called a *wave*. Generally, a snowball sample continues until no new actors are named (Robins, 2015). However, there was a limited timeframe of six weeks for the data collection of the datasets used.

The response rate of the survey for the Dutch-Moroccan network was quite low, with only three respondents reacting within the timeframe. Only one of these selected a partner that was not already in the network. With the policy discourse, the information from natural inquiry and desk research, the DutchCulture database and the response on the survey the Dutch-Moroccan network consists of 51 actors. The survey emailed to the Dutch-Turkish seed set had more success, with 19 responses, of which 16 finished the survey. Two more waves had respectively 12 and 5 new actors and again an amount of nominations that were already in the network. The total network of exchange with the Netherlands and Turkey that is used exists of 208 actors.

The Dutch-Moroccan network is depicted in Figure 14 and the Dutch-Turkish network is shown in Figure 15. In both figures the white actors come from the policy discourse, the grey actors come from the DutchCulture database and the black actors are either from the desk research or from the egonet of DutchCulture, which were combined for this thesis to maintain the anonymity of the contacts of DutchCulture. The actors from the snowball sample are coloured, going darker with each wave. Looking only at the actors in Figure 14 and Figure 15, the addition of the sources after the discourse data and export data seem insignificant, and added mainly direction to the ties, more than new partners. This was because the people and organisations who were named as partners in the later sources were already in the dataset.



Figure 14: International Cultural Cooperation Between the Netherlands and Morocco



Figure 15: International Cultural Cooperation Between the Netherlands and Morocco

More than finding new actors in the network, the addition of desk research, natural inquiry and the survey with the snowball provided an important insight into the relationships in the network. Initially a separation was made between the relations to actors that provide information and that provide financial support, as is visible in Appendix 1, but after the survey this was dropped for the ties in the final network. This was because the survey results, as well as the discourse data on Turkish and Moroccan policy, showed that for both networks the ones who provided information on international cultural exchange and those who

provided funding were mostly the same organisations. Therefor there is no distinction made anymore between whether information or financial capital flowed through the network, but simply that the cooperative ties existed.

Analytical Methods

To operationalise previous notions underlying the distributed leadership that guides international cultural exchange and find the powerful cooperation structures, a few things needed to be established. First groups of actors needed to be identified that might control the network as a group rather than as individuals. In sociology a group exists of three or more. In social network analysis studying a group of any size means looking at a *subgraph*, consisting of two or more actors and the number of ties between them (Robins, 2015). In this thesis the subgraph of those that have power will be subtracted from the networks studied in the policy advice, but if network closure is what gives distributed leadership power, then all ties need to be present in a group. The choice is therefor made to look at *cliques*, complete clusters with all possible ties present, with a minimum size of three (Borgatti, 2019; Robins, 2015). These subgraphs can be subtracted from a network by a simple algorithm. Most important is then to consider if it is wanted that the cliques overlap or not (Robins, 2015). In this thesis the choice is made to allow for actors to be members of multiple cliques. The selected cliques are those that consist of only powerful actors, so that not one actor alone is responsible for the power. For good measurement the cliques existing of actors that are not all powerful are also shortly discussed. This last discussion will mainly give the general idea of what type of cooperation structures from in international cultural exchange.

To determine which cliques are able to control the network, part of the stakeholder selection process of the policy advice will be used again. Paraphrasing Boulil (forthcoming: 18): There it became clear that having a powerful position cannot only be measured by whether an actor in the international cultural network is claimed to take the lead in policy documents. In the article by Minnaert (2014) the claim was made that having your *authority* being *accepted* by others in the network is the important drive behind guiding international cultural exchange. In social network analysis, authority is connected to *centrality*, being in the middle of the network. This can be measured by looking at the amount of *degrees*, the number of network partners as having more degrees can be an indication of their central position in the network. This measurement is called *degree centrality*. Acceptance is more about having mutual bonds with others in the network, something called *reciprocity*. The degrees are then split between the number of ties that are directed towards an actor, the

indegrees, and the sending ties of an actor, the *outdegrees*. Having an equal number of in- and outdegrees can be a sign of reciprocity.

The direction of the ties was taken into account to make sure that the selected actors are accepted by the rest of the network. Rather than using degree centrality however, measuring *betweenness centrality* was used to calculate how powerful the actors are in the policy advice. Betweenness centrality measures the ability of an actor to create shortcuts from one part of the network to another; it measures if an actor functions as a bridge in the network (Robins, 2015). With this it is linked to the idea that leadership is about controlling social capital. For this thesis the betweenness centrality of the actors in the powerful cliques will be added together and divided by the number of actors in the clique, thus calculating an average power for each clique and their group ability to bridge the network.

Reliability and Validity

A final step is to reflect on the quality of the research. Usually this is done by considering the reliability and validity of a study. *Reliability* is about the ability of a measurement technique to repeatedly yield the same results and *validity* refers to the question if the object of study is accurately measured (Babbie, 2010). The possibility for repetition and accuracy of measurements can make or break an experiment, but this thesis and most policy related analyses use real world data (Pawson & Tilley, 1997). Discussing validity and reliability is also done a little different in social network research (Borgatti, 2018; Robins, 2015). To start, trade-off between reliability and validity is less present. This trade-off refers to the fact that the more accurate the measurement technique is, the less rich the data becomes. In other words, quantitative social research is therefor usually more reliable, while qualitative social studies are more valid (Babbie, 2010). Social network analysis, being neither quantitative nor qualitative, is less sensitive to this dilemma (Borgatti, 2018; Robins, 2015). Reliability and validity are still used to evaluate the methodology, but only in as far as that they are relevant to social network analysis.

Reliability is relevant to social network analysis in the sense that different forms of data collection can result into different nominations and relations (Borgatti, 2019; Robins, 2015). Borgatti (2019) suggests that self-administered network surveys, where the respondents fill in a questionnaire on their own in their personal environment, as well as meticulous data cleaning, especially if different databases are combined, can minimize the risks of an unreliable network. Although the survey in this thesis was self-administered and

during the desk research the different datasets were checked and corrected if necessary, this did not ensure the validity of the research.

If a research has issues with validity, this can have two big consequences. On the one hand, if *internal validity*, measuring what is intended, is at risk, there is a possibility that the results do not reflect what is actually going on. On the other hand questioning *external validity* is questioning if an experiment or study is generalisable to the real world (Babbie, 2010). Translating internal and external validity to social network analysis terms means that the question if the *right* network was captured *completely* needs to be answered (Robins, 2015).

Concerning the internal validity, especially with small networks like Dutch-Moroccan network, the chance of missing ties is quite high, and this could have an impact on the conclusions drawn (Borgatti, 2019). With a limited amount of time to establish the networks, there were ties and actors coming in after the sampling in this thesis. Without going into further detail, because of the anonymity of the respondents, it is possible to say that these missing ties and actors seemed to confirm the conclusions of this thesis. This, together with the fact that the survey nominations showed that the networks were approaching saturation at the end of the sampling period, makes that the number of missing ties and actors is considered minimal in this thesis.

Another aspect concerning internal validity in social network analysis is the risk of capturing the wrong network (Robins, 2015). In this study the goal is to look at international cultural cooperation, those equal work relations between artists and/or cultural organisations worldwide. It was not always clear how the actors exactly relate to each other, but the reoccurrence of actors in the different sources used to establish both networks showed that the targeted part of the international cultural network, the cooperation between the Netherlands and Morocco and the Netherland and Turkey, was quite accurately captured. Specifically in the case of the Dutch-Turkish network the fact that the actors that are used in this thesis are mentioned in recent publications of the international cultural exchange between the Netherlands and Turkey also support this claim (Yucel et al., 2019).

Results

Cooperation Beyond Borders Too

In the sampling this interwovenness of policy and community came forward. Despite the different policy strategies, the Netherlands and Morocco and the Netherlands and Turkey have an active cultural network underlying international cultural exchange between the countries. Figure 15 and Figure 16 show that that international cooperation is both multidisciplinary (a) and international (b). In Figure 15a and Figure 16a the networks are grouped and coloured on in Figure 15b and Figure 16b they are grouped on their location, but this time the nodes are coloured according to country of origin. What becomes clear in these figures is that there are multiple disciplines active and not only artist and cultural organisations from the one country working and living in the other, but also artists that are either from or active in other countries than the Netherlands, Morocco and Turkey. More than international cultural cooperation the figures also show multidisciplinary cultural cooperation, although most is a cooperation of policy and another discipline.



Figure 15: Overview images of the Dutch-Moroccan network on multidisciplinary (a) international (b) cooperation



Figure 16: Overview images of the Dutch-Turkish network on multidisciplinary (a) international (b) cooperation

The international cultural exchange between the Netherlands and Morocco resulted in the smaller Network 1, with 51 actors in total. About half of the respondents are in the Netherlands (52.9%) or in Morocco (41.2%), the rest is located in another country (5.9%). The distribution of the countries of origin is a little different. There most of the respondents are Dutch organisations or artists (58.8%). For the most part these statistics overlap, with only two Dutch cultural organisations located in Morocco and one Moroccan cultural organisation located in the Netherlands. Finally there are three artists who live abroad, but not in either of the three countries in discussed in these cases (Table 2). Looking at the most legible representation of the network, where the node values correspond to the respondent numbers of the actors, it becomes a star structure that seems to revolve around Actor 13, but on closer inspection a similar structure is visible around Actor 16 (Figure 17). Then in Figure 18 it becomes clear that most of the respondents are active in performing arts and visual arts, respectively 27% and 23%.

Table 2: Crosstabs of Nationality and Country of Origin in Network 1

		Country			
		Netherlands	Morocco	Other	*Total*
Location	Netherlands	26	1	0	*27*
	Morocco	2	19	0	*21*
	Other	2	0	1	*3*
	Total	*30*	*20*	*1*	*51*



Figure 17: An overview image of Network 1



Figure 18: The distribution of the disciplines in Network 1



Figure 19: The subgraph of the powerful actors in Network 1

Selecting only the actors in the network that have a betweenness centrality higher than 0 leads to the subgraph depicted in Figure 19, where the actors are sized according to their betweenness centrality. Most of the actors in Figure 19 are both located in the Netherlands and originally from the Netherlands. They are also mostly cultural organisations or groups of artists. The disciplines are more equally represented in the subgraph, with 31.3% in policy, 25% in performing arts, 18.8% in media arts and 12.5% in visual arts and culture. The descriptive statistics and the betweenness centrality of these actors can be found in Appendix 2. The traineeship then identified one primary stakeholder for the international cultural network between the Netherlands and Morocco. Actor 13 is part of the Dutch policy system but is located in Morocco and has been active in the international cultural exchange between the two countries for a long time (Boulil, forthcoming).

The international cultural exchange between the Netherlands and Turkey has much more actors involved. Network 2 is divided by one large cluster depicted in Figure 20 and several smaller groups and three actors that do not connect at all to the network in Figure 21. This makes that Actor 15, 50 and 63 are the first that stand out. These are all artists, but their international partners are not related to the cultural field, therefore they do not connect to the international cultural exchange network. In this network, about 48% of the respondents are located in the Netherlands and 45% is located in Turkey. The rest is located in another country (6.7%). Furthermore, 45% of the respondents are either Dutch or Turkish. This leaves 10% of the respondents with another country of origin, 9 of whom do not live in either countries.

Then there are 8 Dutch respondents that live in Turkey and 4 more that live in other countries. Last, there are 7 Turkish respondents who live in the Netherlands and one that lives in another foreign country. These crosstabs can be found in Table 3. Again, most of the actors are in performing arts but in this network, it is almost 50% (Figure 22). The second largest discipline is media arts, but with 19% of the actors active in this discipline it is hardly larger than in the other network, which can be found in Figure 18. The visual arts are less represented in the Dutch-Turkish network than in the Dutch-Moroccan network, with only 9% of the actors being in this discipline (Figure 22). As both networks have about the same amount of policy actors involved, this is also a smaller percentage of the Dutch-Turkish network (4.3%).

Table 3: Crosstabs of Nationality and Country of Origin

		Country			
		Netherlands	Turkey	Other	*Total*
Location	Netherlands	82	7	11	*100*
	Turkey	8	85	1	*94*
	Other	4	1	9	*14*
	Total	*94*	*93*	*21*	*208*



Figure 20: An overview image of the large cluster in Network 2



Figure 21: An overview image of the smaller clusters in Network 2



Figure 22: The distribution of the disciplines in Network 2

Finally, in Figure 23, the subgraph of the powerful actors is shown, again sized on their betweenness centrality. It seems like there are much more actors with power in this network, for both cases it is about 30% of the complete network. Opposed to the subgraph of Network 1, when it comes to the actors in Figure 23 about 50% is originally from Turkey and the other half is from the Netherlands. The same goes for where they are located. What is similar to Network 1 is that most of the actors are not individuals but groups.

Moving on to the disciplines, they all have powerful actors in Network 2, but they are a little less equally distributed. 37% is in performing arts, 13.7% is in visual arts, 5.5% is in literature, 24.7% is in media arts, 4.1% is in creative industries, 5.5% is in culture and 9.6% are policy related organisations. The descriptive statistics of the powerful actors and their betweenness centrality can be found in Appendix 3. The traineeship then identified three stakeholders in the international cultural network between the Netherlands and Turkey. Two were part of the Dutch policy system, one of which was located abroad, Actor 66, and the other was located in the Netherlands, Actor 71. The final stakeholder was one of the Dutch funds, Actor 156. Two of the three stakeholders, next to their longstanding position in the international cultural network, are providers of financial support for international cultural exchange (Boulil, forthcoming).



Figure 23: The subgraph of the powerful actors in Network 2

To summarize the relevant data from the policy advice (Boulil, forthcoming): In the international cultural cooperation both between the Netherlands and Morocco and between the Netherlands and Turkey, performance arts are the most common discipline. In the Dutch-Moroccan network visual arts have the second largest group, while in the Dutch-Turkish network the second discipline that is represented the most is media arts. There are little policy makers in the networks, but these have a lot of power. The stakeholders in the networks are two Dutch policy organisations located in either Morocco or Turkey and one Dutch policy organisation located in the Netherlands. A final stakeholder is a Dutch organisation that provides funding for artists in international cultural exchange. The two Dutch policy organisations located abroad also have a partial budget that they can spend on the support of international cultural exchange. This was all lead to the conclusion that having a cultural infrastructure of an organisation that supports the full cultural community is the best way to increase cooperation in international cultural exchange (Boulil, forthcoming).

The Power of Dutch Policy in Morocco

Focussing on distributed leadership, the first network has 26 cliques, which are listed in Figure 24. The actors with an individual betweenness centrality higher than 0 are in bold. A visualisation of all the cliques, together with their average betweenness centralities, can be found in Appendix 2. Those that have only powerful actors are considered to have distributed leadership were selected as powerful cooperation structures. A thing that is interesting is that all cliques have Dutch policy actors involved, with the exception for Clique 25 and Clique 26. Clique 26 is a cooperation of three Moroccan cultural policy actors, where their diplomatic facility, Actor 35, was the only one with power in the clique. Clique 25 is the cooperation of a Dutch facility specialised in Moroccan heritage and art education located in Morocco with a Dutch facility specialised in Moroccan heritage and art education located in the Netherlands and another actor in the culture discipline. This actor is located in the Netherlands and the founding organisation of both Moroccan heritage and art education facilities. Surprisingly, this Actor 27 is the only one without power in Clique 25.

1: 5 **13 16** 29	10: **1 13 39**	19: **13 40 47**
2: 10 **13 16**	11: **13** 17 19 24	20: 10 **13 47**
3: **13 15 16**	12: **13** 18 20	21: 9 **14 16**
4: 3 **13** 28 46	13: **13 21** 26 **44** 45	22: **14 15 16**
5: 4 11 **13**	14: **13** 23 40	23: **14 16** 34
6: 6 **13 32**	15: **13** 25 38 48	24: **14 16** 42
7: 7 **13 32**	16: **13 31 33**	25: **1** 27 **39**
8: **12 13** 30	17: **13 31** 41	26: **35** 36 37
9: **12 13** 50	18: **13 32** 51	

Figure 24: The cliques in Network 1

When the cliques have Dutch policy involved, they are mostly linked to Actor 13 and one single discipline. For instance, this is the case five times for media arts in Clique 6, 7, 16, 17 and 18. Then there are two cliques in visual arts, Clique 1 and Clique 13, where the first also involved another Dutch policy actor, Actor 16. There are also two cliques in culture, Clique 10 and Clique 23. This last clique does not contain Actor 13, but two other Dutch policy actors, Actor 14 and Actor 16. A similar structure without Actor 13 is found in Clique 24, but this one is in performance arts, and in Clique 21 for the creative industries. There are no more cliques in the creative industries, but much more in performing arts. Of these 8 cliques, worth mentioning is Clique 2, as it contains the powerful Actors 13 and 16 together. Actually, in most these cliques in Network 1, despite coming from different disciplines, Dutch policy is the only powerful actor.

There are cliques with multidisciplinary cooperation structures in this network, but they are all the same cooperation structure. The size again indicates the betweenness centrality of the actors, while their shape determines if there are a group (triangle) or individual (circle). They consist of Actor 13, one or two actors in visual arts and a third discipline (Figure 25). In Clique 4 two Dutch design artist presented their work in a Moroccan art gallery with the help of Dutch policy. In Clique 11 a Dutch visual art collective works with a Dutch organisation that supports Arabic literature, a Moroccan visual arts school and again Dutch policy. Last, in Clique 15 a Dutch multidisciplinary collective, which exists primarily of visual artists, together with a Moroccan art collective led by another visual artist present their work at a Moroccan museum, again with Actor 13. Although interesting multidisciplinary initiatives are going on here, the only power in this form of cooperation lies with Dutch policy again.



Figure 25: Cliques with more than one discipline in Network 1

This leads to the conclusion that mostly there are cooperation structures of Dutch policy frequenting the international cultural cooperation between the Netherlands and Morocco. When distributed leadership is not happening, Dutch policy has the power. There is then one sole actor that stands out. Actor 49 has quite a high betweenness centrality but does not reoccur in any of the cliques. This actor is a Dutch theatre company that works both in the Netherlands and in other foreign countries. The egonet of this actor was subtracted from the overall network and displayed in Figure 26, showing that they connect to Actor 13, that Dutch diplomatic facility, and Actor 8, a Moroccan theatre company similar to Actor 49.

Figure 26: The egonet of Actor 49 in Network 1

Not an Artist in Sight in Turkey

In Network 2 there are 58 cliques, shown in Figure 27, again with the powerful actors in bold. Their visualisations and average betweenness centralities can be found in Appendix 3. Figure 27 also shows that almost all cliques have at least one powerful actor. An exception to this is Clique 28. This is a clique of two Dutch filmmakers who went to a Turkish film festival together. There are more cliques that have only one discipline. To be precize, 6 more in media arts, 11 in performing arts, 2 in visual arts and 1 in culture. There are some powerful cooperation structures here, which will be discussed. But again actors tend to cooperate with governmental interference, rather than without, as the previous studies suggested. Then there are 35 cliques that are again a combination of Dutch policy and the international cultural

community. They are quite evenly represented in each discipline, as well as 6 examples of cooperation between Dutch policy and multiple disciplines. As these last six are all powerful cooperation structures, they will also be discussed later.

1: **53 69 70 71**	16: **71 97 135**	31: 34 **86 139**	46: **66 97 101**
2: **69 70 71 197**	17: **71 97 139**	32: 37 **66** 161	47: **66 111 130**
3: **68 69 71**	18: **53 71 101**	33: 38 **156** 207	48: **66 147 197**
4: **69 71 139 197**	19: **71 102 148**	34: **25** 43 **93 94 131 132 134 157**	49: **66 70 197**
5: **69 71 148**	20: **71 111 130**	35: **46 47 156**	50: **53 67 70**
6: **69 71 156**	21: **68 71** 117	36: **47 156 183**	51: **53 67 147**
7: **14 71 156**	22: **71 118 156**	37: **25** 49 **93 94 131 132 134 157**	52: **67 70 197**
8: **20 71** 79	23: **71 139 169**	38: **52** 108 **156**	53: **67 147 197**
9: **25 71 157**	24: **2** 87 172	39: **52** 107 **156**	54: **11** 74 77
10: **30 71 156**	25: 3 129 **189**	40: **57 156 184**	55: **86 139** 166
11: 60 **71** 81	26: **10** 92 **102 148**	41: **64 148 162**	56: **120 124 156**
12: **71 83 84**	27: **13 47 156**	42: **64 148 175**	57: **14 120 156**
13: **71** 96 **101**	28: 16 85 185	43: **53 66 70**	58: **97 139 203**
14: **71 97 101**	29: 21 **27 33**	44: **53 66 101**	
15: **71 97 102**	30: 28 **102** 193	45: **53 66 147**	

Figure 27: The cliques in Network 2

In this network there are occurrences of cooperation of more than one discipline beyond policy, with two cliques that have more than one discipline involved, but no policy actor. Taking a closer at look these two cliques, Clique 31 and Clique 55, are two variations of the same cooperation structure. A Dutch public fund in visual arts supports the visit of a Dutch photographer to a Turkish photography festival. More than these artists, the fund and the festival are the powerful actors in these two cliques. Together with again the high influence of Dutch policy, this suggests that the power lies more with cultural organisations more than individual artists in the Dutch-Turkish network.

Finally, there are again actors that have power, but no cluster. Of the 73 actors that have power in the Dutch-Turkish network, there are 22 that do not reoccur in any clusters. Their egocentric networks are all visualised and can be found in Appendix 3. The ones with the largest betweeness centrality in the overall network are Actor 138 with a score of 307 and Actor 32, 80 and 208, all with a score of 217. Their substracted egocentric networks are depicted in Figure 28, where size indicates betweenness centrality, colour the discipline and the shape indicates if they are a group (traingle) or individual (circle). Both Actor 32 and Actor 208 are Turkish locations that were visited by Dutch performance artists. Intresting is

Actor 118, who reoccurs in the cliques as well. Actor 138 is another Dutch performance artist that performed at a university arts festival and a Dutch diplomatic location in Turkey. Finally Actor 80 is a Dutch supporting and programming organisation in film, which also has connections to a Turkish university and to an international film festival hosted in Turkey. This confirms again this power of cultural organisations, rather than individual artists.



Figure 28: The egonets of Actor 138,32, 80 and 208 in Network

Not an Artist in Sight in Turkey

Focussing on distributed leadership, the first network has 26 cliques, which are listed in Figure 24. The actors with an individual betweenness centrality higher than 0 are in bold. A visualisation of all the cliques, together with their average betweenness centralities, can be found in Appendix 2. Those that have only powerful actors are considered to have distributed leadership were selected as powerful cooperation structures. A thing that is interesting is that all cliques have Dutch policy actors involved, with the exception for Clique 25 and Clique 26. Clique 26 is a cooperation of three Moroccan cultural policy actors, where their diplomatic facility, Actor 35, was the only one with power in the clique. Clique 25 is the cooperation of a Dutch facility specialised in Moroccan heritage and art education located in Morocco with a Dutch facility specialised in Moroccan heritage and art education located in the Netherlands and another actor in the culture discipline. This actor is located in the Netherlands and the founding organisation of both Moroccan heritage and art education facilities. Surprisingly, this Actor 27 is the only one without power in Clique 25.

1: 5 **13 16** 29	10: **1 13 39**	19: **13 40 47**
2: 10 **13 16**	11: **13** 17 19 24	20: 10 **13 47**
3: **13 15 16**	12: **13** 18 20	21: 9 **14 16**
4: 3 **13** 28 46	13: **13 21** 26 **44** 45	22: **14 15 16**
5: 4 11 **13**	14: **13** 23 40	23: **14 16** 34
6: 6 **13 32**	15: **13** 25 38 48	24: **14 16** 42
7: 7 **13 32**	16: **13 31 33**	25: **1** 27 **39**
8: **12 13** 30	17: **13 31** 41	26: **35** 36 37
9: **12 13** 50	18: **13 32** 51	

Figure 24: The cliques in Network 1

When the cliques have Dutch policy involved, they are mostly linked to Actor 13 and one single discipline. For instance, this is the case five times for media arts in Clique 6, 7, 16, 17 and 18. Then there are two cliques in visual arts, Clique 1 and Clique 13, where the first also involved another Dutch policy actor, Actor 16. There are also two cliques in culture, Clique 10 and Clique 23. This last clique does not contain Actor 13, but two other Dutch policy actors, Actor 14 and Actor 16. A similar structure without Actor 13 is found in Clique 24, but this one is in performance arts, and in Clique 21 for the creative industries. There are no more cliques in the creative industries, but much more in performing arts. Of these 8 cliques, worth mentioning is Clique 2, as it contains the powerful Actors 13 and 16 together. Actually, in most these cliques in Network 1, despite coming from different disciplines, Dutch policy is the only powerful actor.

There are cliques with multidisciplinary cooperation structures in this network, but they are all the same cooperation structure. The size again indicates the betweenness centrality of the actors, while their shape determines if there are a group (triangle) or individual (circle). They consist of Actor 13, one or two actors in visual arts and a third discipline (Figure 25). In Clique 4 two Dutch design artist presented their work in a Moroccan art gallery with the help of Dutch policy. In Clique 11 a Dutch visual art collective works with a Dutch organisation that supports Arabic literature, a Moroccan visual arts school and again Dutch policy. Last, in Clique 15 a Dutch multidisciplinary collective, which exists primarily of visual artists, together with a Moroccan art collective led by another visual artist present their work at a Moroccan museum, again with Actor 13. Although interesting multidisciplinary initiatives are going on here, the only power in this form of cooperation lies with Dutch policy again.



Figure 25: Cliques with more than one discipline in Network 1

This leads to the conclusion that mostly there are cooperation structures of Dutch policy frequenting the international cultural cooperation between the Netherlands and Morocco. When distributed leadership is not happening, Dutch policy has the power. There is then one sole actor that stands out. Actor 49 has quite a high betweenness centrality but does not reoccur in any of the cliques. This actor is a Dutch theatre company that works both in the Netherlands and in other foreign countries. The egonet of this actor was subtracted from the overall network and displayed in Figure 26, showing that they connect to Actor 13, that Dutch diplomatic facility, and Actor 8, a Moroccan theatre company similar to Actor 49.

Figure 26: The egonet of Actor 49 in Network 1

Not an Artist in Sight in Turkey

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

Figure 28: The egonets of Actor 138,32, 80 and 208 in Network

Who Has Got the Power?

Network 1 has five cliques that meet the requirements of distributed leadership set in this thesis. Clique 3, 10, 16, 19 & 22 are complete subgraphs of which each individual actor has a betweenness centrality higher than 0, making them to a point able to broker the network (Figure 29). Clique 22 has an average betweenness centrality of 180.44, which is the lowest of the powerful cliques in Network 1. The highest scoring in this network is Clique 3, with an average betweenness centrality of 748.99. The rest of the powerful cliques all score a little over 600. For the upcoming figures the sizes of the nodes indicate betweenness centrality, the colour the discipline and the shape indicates if they are a group (traingle) or individual (circle).

Clique 3 and Clique 22 are different parts of Dutch cultural policy working together, while being located in the Netherlands in the case of Clique 22, and partially being located in Morocco in Clique 3. The rest of the cooperation structures that have power in this network seems to be the ones that are linked to Dutch policy and one single discipline. Clique 16 and 19 are similar, both showing the cooperation of Actor 13, that part of Dutch policy located in Morocco, an international festival that is hosted in Morocco and a Dutch artist. For Clique 16 this is a film festival and for Clique 19 this is a music festival. Finally, Clique 10 has again that part of Dutch policy abroad with Actor 13, but this time the cooperation is with the

Dutch facility specialised in Moroccan heritage and the art education facility located in the Netherlands that were also in Clique 25.



Figure 29: Five most powerful cliques in Network 1

In Network 2 there are much more powerful cliques, 39 in total. Not only has Network 2 more cliques, these cliques also have a higher average betweennness centrality. This will be discussed in detail in Table 2, but first their cooperation structures will be discussed. There are 9 which are cooperation structures of one discipline (Figure 30). In performing arts there are six, which can be divided in two types of cooperation structures. Clique 27, 35 and 36 are all three a cooperation of a Dutch public fund, a Turkish location and a Dutch band. Clique 40, 57 and 56 are again an involvement of that Dutch public fund, but in this case together with a Turkish theatre festival and either a Dutch performance artist or theatre company. In media arts there are two, Clique 41 and 42. Both these cliques are a Dutch public fund, a Turkish film festival and a Dutch filmmaker. Finally there is one powerful clique that is in visual arts. Clique 58 is again a Dutch public fund but this time in cooperation with a Turkish cultural organisation that supports and programmes arts and culture and a similar organisation in the Netherlands.



Figure 30: Powerful cliques in performing arts, media arts and visual arts in Network 2

The largest amount of cliques in Network 2 are a combination of actors from one discipline and one or more policy actors. Of these 29 cliques, 23 exist of only powerful actors. Almost all of the cliques that are a combination of Dutch policy, Dutch public fund and a third actor, they are displayed in Figure 31. When combined with performing arts, the cliques exist of a Dutch public fund, a supporting organisation funded by the Dutch government and a variety of third actors. In Clique 10 they work with a Turkish theatre festival and for Clique 7 and 22 this third actor is a Dutch single perfomance artist. Similar combinations of powerful cliques are in the creative industries, where again Dutch policy works with a Dutch public fund and an international design festival that is hosted in Turkey in Clique 18 and 44. For visual arts as well both Clique 17 and 23 are a combination of Dutch policy and a Dutch public fund with respectivetly a Turkish organisation or festival. Other disciplines show more variation in their cliques, but in media arts there is one cooperation of Dutch policy and a Dutch fund, where in Clique 19 the third party is again a festival in Turkey, this time in international film. Finally, in the culture discipline in Clique 4 there are two Dutch policy actors, a Dutch supporting organisation and a Dutch public fund that supports both heritage and visual arts, all located in the Netherlands.





Figure 31: Powerful cliques were policy and a public fund are involved in Network 2

In some cases the third and even fourth actor is another part of the Dutch policy structure (Figure 32). The final powerful clique in performance arts, Clique 6, has another Dutch policy actor, and three cliques in creative industries, Clique 1, 43 and 50, show this structure as well. For media arts in Clique 5 and literature in Clique 3 there is again the combination of two Dutch policy actors and a Dutch public fund. Last, in the culture discipline, the cooperation structure of Dutch policy and Dutch supporting organisation is found in Clique 2, 49 and 52.



Figure 32: Powerful cliques were only Dutch policy and a public fund are involved in Network 2

Without the involvement of a Dutch fund, the Dutch policy actors in the rest of the cliques cooperate with either Dutch artists or with other supportive organisations (Figure 33). In Clique 9 they are photographers involved in the cooperation structure and in Clique 20 and 47 they are authors. In Clique 12 the partner of the Dutch policy is a Turkish organisation supporting filmmakers and the international film festival they host. In Clique 48 and 53 the partners are Dutch supporting organisations in culture located in the Netherlands and in

Turkey. In three cases, Clique 47, 48 and 53, the Dutch policy organisation is located in Turkey, while Actor 71, the partner in the other cooperation structures, is located in the Netherlands.



Figure 33: More powerful cliques were policy is involved in Network 2

Looking at the final cliques that are composed soley of powerful actors in Network 2, this leaves 6 cliques to be discussed. These are the cliques where more than one disicpline is involved. Every single one of these cliques are composed of solely powefull actors. They, like most powerful cliques, also show the involvement of a policy actor. They are variations on two cooperation strucures that are going on, shown in Figure 34. On the one hand a Turkish supporting and programming cultural organisation works with several Dutch policy actors and hosts festivals in two different disciplines. Clique 15 and 16 are in film and Clique 14 and 46 are in the creative industries. On the other hand in Clique 45 and 51, a Dutch organisation located in Turkey and specialising in Turkish heritage and langue works with a Dutch public fund in another discipline and a Dutch diplomatic location in Turkey.



Figure 34: Multidisciplinary power cliques in Network 2

Conclusions

The Golden Triangle

In Table 4 the average betweenness centrality of all the 44 powerful cliques are ranked from highest to lowest. This shows that the most powerful clique is Clique 6 of the Dutch-Turkish network. Looking at the top five powerful cooperation structures the pattern stays the same. Four of the five are in performing arts, with the exclusion of Clique 5, which is in media arts. Only two have artists involved, while the rest are cooperations of cultural organisations, mainly Dutch policy actors and funds. Finally, only one of the actors is from the MENA region. For the rest all the actors are Dutch. Another thing that springs up is that compared to Network 2 the cliques in Network 1 have a much lower average betweenness centrality score (Table 4). Together with their mutual ties this indicated power in this thesis, concluding that the cases of distributed leadership in Network 1 are much less able to controll the network than Network 2.

One of the possible explanations for this lack of power was given in the policy advice written based on the same data. There the suggestion was made that the Dutch-Moroccan cooperation was still too new and the advice was given to "[g]ive Dutch-Moroccan cultural exchange time to develop" (Boulil, forthcoming: 30). However looking at the cliques provided another insight. The answer to the research question of this thesis is that the cooperation structures that involve a Dutch policy are those with the most power, more than those that have the international cultural community involved.

There was also little example of multidisciplinary cooperation beyond the cooperation between policy makers and one discipline of the international cultural community. When multidisciplinary cooperation was the case, the cases that showed distributed leadership had little power over the network (see Figure 34). The exceptions to the rule seemed to be Clique 14, 15 and 16 from Network 2. They score reasonably high in Table 4, but this is probably because of the presence of actor 71 in these cooperation structures. This was one of the stakeholders that was identified (Boulil, forthcoming). What the most of the powerful cliques do have in common in Network 2 is that they all have Dutch funds involved.

Table 4: The Average Betweenness Centrality of the Powerful Cliques

Clique	Score	Ranking
NLTR 6	4750	1
NLTR 22	4432	2
NLTR 5	4019	3
NLTR 7	3695	4
NLTR 10	3692	5
NLTR 2	3571	6
NLTR 3	3555	7
NLTR 15	3457	8
NLTR 19	3442	9
NLTR 1	3424	10
NLTR 17	3340	11
NLTR 14	3231	12
NLTR 4	3090	13
NLTR 16	2972	14
NLTR 23	2819	15
NLTR 18	2754	16
NLTR 12	2718	17
NLTR 9	2665	18
NLTR 20	2453	19
NLTR 49	2317	20
NLTR 43	2121	21
NLTR 46	1849	22
NLTR 56	1563	23
NLTR 40	1518	24
NLTR 48	1462	25
NLTR 52	1380	26
NLTR 44	1372	27
NLTR 45	1266	28
NLTR 57	1253	29
NLTR 27	1252	30
NLTR 35	1252	31
NLTR 36	1252	32
NLTR 50	1184	33
NLTR 47	1071	34
NLTR 58	965	35
NLTR 41	783	36
NLTR 42	783	37
NLMA 3	749	38
NLMA 16	628	39
NLMA 10	627	40
NLMA 19	613	41
NLTR 53	525	42
NLTR 51	329	43
NLMA 22	180	44

This pattern is visible in Network 1 and Network 2. In Network 2 the cooperation structures with power showed that the international cultural community was present. More than artists however, the partners were Dutch funds and other supporting organisations, both from the Netherlands and Turkey. In Network 2, there are numerous cliques that consist of only those partners, 16 to be exact. It becomes clear that more than Dutch or Turkish supporting organisations, the power lies between Dutch policy and Dutch funds of every discipline. It reoccurs in Clique 6 for performing arts, Clique 5 for media arts, Clique 2 for culture and visual arts, Clique 3 for literature and finally Clique 1 for the creative industries (Figure 35). In all cliques the Dutch arm's length organisation is involved and in Clique 2 and Clique 1 the full governance structure responsible for international cultural relations of the Netherlands is present, while in Clique 6, 5 and 3 this is only the part that is active in arts and culture beyond international cultural relations.



Figure 35: The Cooperation Structure Dutch Policy-Fund

This combination of Dutch policy and Dutch funds is hinting to the power of the Netherlands in the international cultural cooperation with the MENA region that can also be found in Network 1. Of the only five cases of distributed leadership in that network, only two had non-Dutch cooperation partners, Clique 16 and Clique 19. These were international festivals that operated from Morocco. In Network 2 as well, half of the powerful cliques consists of Dutch actors cooperating rather than international cultural cooperation. The rest are again working with international or Turkish festivals trying to cater to the international cultural field, with the exclusion of Clique 17 and 58, where Turkish and Dutch organisations supporting visual arts are involved, and Clique 27, 35, 36, where a Turkish venue hosts a Dutch performance artist. In this cooperation structure most of the disciplines are represented, as well as multidisciplinary cooperation. The final pattern that emerged is the cooperation structure where the formal side of the Dutch cultural community works together with an international festival in the MENA region as this occurs both in Network 1 and in Network 2 numerous times (Figure 36).



Figure 36: The Type of Cooperation Structure That Has Power

Power to the People

What is striking about all these cooperation structures is the lack of artists. Although the international cultural community makes up the large part of the networks studied in this thesis, they are not the ones that are represented in the distributed leadership in the network. This is especially visible when policy, supporting organisations and international festivals work together. Of the 17 powerful cooperation structures that have a festival as one of the actors in the distributed leadership cluster, there are only 7 who have an artist or group of artists as another partner. In Figure 37 it shows that all of these seven cases where leadership is shared among a festival and an artist or group of artists are in either performance arts or media arts. In these cases they also still work with either policy, in the case of the Dutch-Moroccan network, or with a fund, in the case of the Dutch-Turkish network. These cliques are the ones who rank lower in Table 4 and the artists involved are the least powerful actor. When policy and supporting organisations stop working with artists, they seem to gain control over the network.



Figure 37: The cooperation structure Festival-Artist

This is the opposite of what is claimed in the literature. There the claim was made that the international cultural community is the driving force behind international cultural exchange (Janssens, 2018; Minnaert, 2014; Luke, 2010). While there is some evidence found supporting the conclusions of Janssens (2018), Kolff (2018) and Minnaert (2014) that there is community cooperation going on in both networks, these cooperation structures do not have the ability of cliques that involve representatives of this community to control the network by connecting one end of the network to another (Appendix 2; Appendix 3). Rather it seems the case that the supporting actors take the lead in international cultural relations. From both theoretical studies by Becker (1986) and Holden (2015) and the empirical study by Lehman, Wickham and Fillis (2018) the claim that art production takes more than the artist alone was made. The cases in Figure 37 are all the combination of a maker of art, the artist or group of artists, a programmer of art, the festival, and a funder of art, whether this is the policy actor in Network 1 or the funds in Network 2. These last two are the actors that also reoccur in the more powerful cliques, which leads to the conclusion that international cultural governance is going on, but that this cooperation between international cultural policy and the international cultural community does not include the artists, but rather larger cultural organisations.

Be There or Be Square

There are several possible explanations that could explain why not the artists, but the supporting organisations, festivals and policy makers share the distributed leadership in international cultural exchange. One of the possible explanations is that what the cultural organisations can do that the artists cannot, is being in two places at once. The cooperation structures that have power are those that have multiplied their organisation and have established a new organisation either in Turkey or Morocco, when it comes to Dutch actors, or on the international field, when it comes to Moroccan or Turkish actors. This type of distributed leadership is not only effective in multiple disciplines and in both networks, it also is the case in all the multidisciplinary cooperation structures in Figure 34. Beyond a strong policy influence then, just being physically present seems to matter. This gives multidisciplinary support for the findings in the literature on international cultural cooperation in media that being locally present matters in enhancing international cultural exchange (Johannisson, 2010; Kawashima, 2010).

There are those that are the exception to the rule. NLTR 22 and NLTR 7 are very powerful cliques in Table 2 and the cooperation of Dutch policy, a Dutch fund and a

performance artist. Some performance artists seem to have enough power to be equal partners in the cooperation structures. More than that, the artists or groups of artists that are more powerful and are present in powerful cliques are those that identify as “international” or have residence in both countries involved. This was also clear in from the literature on international cultural cooperation in media, but it seems to hold up for other disciplines as well (Champenois, 2010; Feigenbaum, 2010). This leads to the suspicion that it is maybe not the larger organisations their formal structure and financial input into the network, but the fact that they are being locally present that makes the difference in international cultural cooperation.

Still Dreaming of International Cultural Cooperation

Sharing the power between several organisations is a common strategy in international cultural exchange, this thesis looked at what these groups looked like and what made them powerful. Coming from the theories of distributed leadership, the fact that leadership can be shared between several organisations, and the social capital metaphor, that power comes from the relations of a group to each other and their position in the larger network structure, the claim was made that cliques, tight knitted cooperation structures, could control the network if they held a bridging position, as they would be able to control the resources in the network. By looking at a case study of international cultural cooperation between the Netherlands and the MENA region, a cooperation of Dutch policy makers, a supporting organisation and an international festival was found to have the power in this particular type of international cultural exchange. The powerful cooperation structures are in all disciplines, but little are examples of interdisciplinary cooperation. It was speculated that the reason for this power was that having a local presence in the countries involved. This led to the conclusion that social network analysis was a useful addition to the study of international cultural relations, but that the previous claims that the international cultural community holds the power in international cultural exchange is not true.

It did show that that community is cooperating a lot and that that network expands beyond disciplinary and national borders, but that individual artists do not have the power when it comes to controlling international cultural exchange. Another underrepresented group are the other governments. In this thesis the other governments, Morocco and Turkey, use different basic strategies towards international cultural relations, which were already claimed to be ineffective by both those studying international cultural policy and those studying public policy in general. Despite international cultural governance effort booking success,

with a lack of representation of both the international cultural artist and the governments of the countries that the international cultural exchange is happening with in the powerful cooperation structures, mutual cultural exchange with the whole international cultural network is not happening. International cultural cooperation is still a dream.

Discussion

Limitations

During the methodology of this thesis the validity within the borders of social network analysis was discussed. The general concept validity also provides a good framework to reflect on the quality of this research. First, when it comes to the internal validity of the research, there were some larger dilemmas. This is because it questions the accuracy of the measurement technique used (Babbie, 2010). To start, questioning the measurement techniques forces a reflection on some important aspects of the research, like the operationalisation of distributed leadership, and if the data collection is not biased towards larger organisations and policy makers. The assumption was made that the cooperation structures discussed function as coherent groups in the network, but in fact internal group dynamics are not known. The only thing known by a mutual clique selection is that both actors selected each other as cooperation partners.

Another shortcoming is the establishment of the network itself. The supporting organisations and policy makers are the primary funders of international cultural exchange, making them a constant partner for the festivals, while the artists involved might differ from time to time. This, together with the fact that the primary dataset, the DutchCulture Database, focusses on Dutch actors, makes that the dataset might have been biased towards Dutch supporting cultural organisations and policy makers. They are the constant focus of the dataset and consequently could have more ties directing towards them. This would make the betweenness centrality, the measurement that was used to determine if the cases of distributed leadership had power, higher.

Finally, external validity refers to the *generalizability* of a study. This asks if the conclusions drawn in this case can be true in other cases as well (Babbie, 2010). According to Pawson and Tilley (1997), in order to do a realistic evaluation of policy, it is crucial to take the surrounding context into account. For social network analysis specifically this big influence of context is advocated by Valente (2012; see also Valente et al., 2015). This could indicate that the networks found are unique, and that the conclusions drawn are not generalisable to other contexts. But the two networks studied in this thesis showed similar traits, like the distribution of several variables such as discipline, and the distributed leadership between international festivals, Dutch funds and Dutch policy makers reoccurs in both the Dutch-Moroccan and the Dutch-Turkish case of international cultural cooperation.

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Appendix 1: Survey

Accompanying email:

Dear sir/madam,

Let me first introduce myself: my name is Djamila Boulil and I'm in the final year of my master Cultural Leadership at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. On behalf of DutchCulture and the University of Groningen I'm conducting a research for my master thesis on international cultural cooperation, looking at different resources and relations that exist in the network of organisations and people in the international cultural field.

I'm emailing because your organisation is or has been an active participant in the cultural exchange of the Netherlands with <NAME COUNTRY> and I wanted to ask if you would be so kind to fill in a short [LINK SURVEY] on this cooperation? It will take about 10 minutes and will mainly concern questions on who your organisation cooperates with in the international cultural field. The goal is to get a better view of the network of organisations and people that make international cultural exchange possible.

Although no information you give will be traced back to you personally unless you agree to this, by filling in the survey the name of your organisation and its ties to other organisations will be part of study results. An example to how this would look like: "ArtArtArt, an artist collective in Russia, receives financial support from private donors and gets information from other artists in the Netherlands and Russia and the Embassy of Moscow." Initially, my thesis will be viewed only internally at DutchCulture and the University of Groningen, but the results can be published externally by DutchCulture and myself. If this happens, and you would also like to see the results, please responds to this email with your contact information.

If you have any further questions or hesitations, before or after filling in the survey, please contact me, and I will try to answer you as soon as possible. If you want to know more about international cultural cooperation with the Netherlands, perhaps even see how you fit into this, DutchCulture has just launched a new [LINK DATABASE] with the goal to show all international activities by Dutch cultural organisations, performers and artists abroad. DutchCulture kindly invites you to add to this database, so do not hesitate to visit the website and inform them about your activities.

Thank you in advance,
Kind regards,
Djamila Boulil

Met opmerkingen [DB1]: Justification:

Met opmerkingen [DB2]: I do not want to give away too much of the topic, because that could influence the answers.

Met opmerkingen [DB3]: Introduction of me and my study.

Met opmerkingen [DB4]: It will be less, but then they will take out some time and the chances of someone forgetting a partner might be slimmer if they take a little more time.

Met opmerkingen [DB5]: I do not want to name DutchCulture more and make them biased to naming it as a partner if they do not consider them one. Otherwise I cannot test if the ties are reciprocated, read accepted.

Met opmerkingen [DB6]: Convincing them to join the study.

Met opmerkingen [DB7]: Make it more accessible to non-research respondents

Met opmerkingen [DB8]: Anonymity: what happens with the information

Met opmerkingen [DB9]: A positive note to end an awkward message.

Met opmerkingen [DB10]: Questions: how to contact me

Met opmerkingen [DB11]: Again, distancing myself from DutchCulture to prevent bias.

Survey:

First some general questions.

1. What is the name of your organisation?
2. What is your function at this organisation?
3. How long have you been in your current position at your organisation?

The next questions are on the different resources that you share with other organisations in the international cultural field. Please consider your answers to make sure that you did not forget anybody.

4. Within the cultural exchange of the Netherlands and [NAME COUNTRY] who does your organisation get information from?
5. Within the cultural exchange of the Netherlands and [NAME COUNTRY] who does your organisation get financial resources from?

In the second part of my study I will hold in-dept interviews with a selection of the people that are active in international cultural cooperation. These will apply more to you and your personal relations. If you are willing to participate in this, please leave your personal information below.

Name:
Email:
Phone number:

The survey was filled in between the 4th of February 2019 and the 22nd of March 2019.

Met opmerkingen [DB12]: A check to make sure that the person talked to is the person who is responsible for cooperation with the Netherlands/other country.

Met opmerkingen [DB13]: Although I can check in offshore if most organisations are repeatedly (sustainably) interacting, the embassies and such will be a recurring partner every year but led by a different person.

Met opmerkingen [DB14]: People tend to forget important partners. Making them aware of that might prevent that.

Met opmerkingen [DB15]: I want to customise it to all four countries, so they feel unique. Respondents are more likely to participate if they feel special.

Met opmerkingen [DB16]: I have considered also asking about sending ties, but I think that with for instance the ministries and funds these lists will get too long, and that information is already mostly in Offshore.

Met opmerkingen [DB17]: This will not decide who will be contacted for my interviews, but it might help with assessing volunteers.

Appendix 2: Network 1

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Powerful Actors

Resp. No.	**Country**	**Location**	**Discipline**	**Type**	**Betweenness Centrality**
13	Netherlands	Morocco	Policy	Group	1837,667
16	Netherlands	Netherlands	Policy	Group	274,833
15	Netherlands	Netherlands	Policy	Group	134,5
14	Netherlands	Netherlands	Policy	Group	132
49	Netherlands	Netherlands	Performing Arts	Group	46
33	Netherlands	Netherlands	Media Arts	Individual	44
1	Netherlands	Netherlands	Culture	Group	21,5
39	Netherlands	Morocco	Culture	Group	21,5
32	Netherlands	Other	Media Arts	Individual	3
35	Morocco	Netherlands	Policy	Group	2,333
31	Morocco	Morocco	Media Arts	Group	1,5
12	Netherlands	Netherlands	Performing Arts	Individual	1
40	Morocco	Morocco	Performing Arts	Group	1
47	Netherlands	Netherlands	Performing Arts	Individual	0,5
21	Netherlands	Netherlands	Visual Arts	Individual	0,333
44	Other	Other	Visual Arts	Group	0,333

Table 2: The average betweenness centrality of the cliques

Clique	Betweenness Centrality
3	749
2	704
16	628
10	627
6	614
7	614
18	614
17	613
19	613
8	613
9	613
14	613
20	613
5	613
12	613
1	528,25
4	459,5
11	459,5
15	459,5
13	368
22	181
21	136
23	136
24	136
25	15
26	0,666667

Visualisation of the cliques:





2- Multidisciplinary clusters: visual arts and culture



2- Multidisciplinary clusters: media arts



2- Multidisciplinary clusters: performing arts



2- Multidisciplinary clusters: creative industries



visual arts and actor 13

Visualisation of the other powerful actors egonets:

Appendix 3: Network 2

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Powerful Actors

Resp. No.	Country	Location	Discipline	Type	Betweenness Centrality
71	Netherlands	Netherlands	Policy	Group	7341,879
156	Netherlands	Netherlands	Performing Arts	Group	3721,567
66	Netherlands	Turkey	Policy	Group	3194,633
69	Netherlands	Netherlands	Policy	Group	3184,972
70	Netherlands	Netherlands	Policy	Group	3026,026
118	Turkey	Netherlands	Performing Arts	Individual	2232,533
97	Turkey	Turkey	Visual Arts	Group	1574,444
148	Netherlands	Netherlands	Media Arts	Group	1529,989
102	Turkey	Turkey	Media Arts	Group	1453,567
139	Netherlands	Netherlands	Visual Arts	Group	1104,116
124	Netherlands	Netherlands	Performing Arts	Group	950,467
101	Turkey	Turkey	Creative Industries	Group	777
197	Netherlands	Netherlands	Culture	Group	731,165
64	Turkey	Turkey	Media Arts	Group	646
20	Netherlands	Netherlands	Literature	Group	624,149
184	Turkey	Turkey	Performing Arts	Group	557
147	Netherlands	Turkey	Culture	Group	461
83	Turkey	Turkey	Media Arts	Group	430
67	Netherlands	Turkey	Policy	Group	381,95
84	Turkey	Turkey	Media Arts	Group	381
25	Netherlands	Turkey	Media Arts	Individual	325,786
157	Other	Netherlands	Media Arts	Individual	325,786
138	Netherlands	Netherlands	Performing Arts	Individual	307
11	Netherlands	Netherlands	Culture	Individual	281
57	Netherlands	Netherlands	Performing Arts	Group	276
189	Turkey	Turkey	Performing Arts	Group	256
32	Turkey	Turkey	Performing Arts	Group	217
80	Netherlands	Netherlands	Media Arts	Group	217
203	Netherlands	Netherlands	Visual Arts	Group	217
208	Turkey	Turkey	Performing Arts	Group	217
5	Turkey	Netherlands	Visual Arts	Individual	186
52	Netherlands	Netherlands	Performing	Group	182

			Arts		
162	Other	Netherlands	Media Arts	Individual	174
175	Netherlands	Netherlands	Media Arts	Individual	174
53	Netherlands	Netherlands	Creative Industries	Group	143,027
27	Turkey	Turkey	Visual Arts	Group	139,5
68	Netherlands	Netherlands	Literature	Group	139,433
104	Turkey	Turkey	Performing Arts	Group	128
144	Netherlands	Netherlands	Performing Arts	Group	128
196	Turkey	Turkey	Policy	Group	102,167
12	Turkey	Turkey	Visual Arts	Group	95
137	Turkey	Turkey	Performing Arts	Group	92
86	Turkey	Turkey	Media Arts	Group	91,5
10	Netherlands	Netherlands	Media Arts	Individual	68,6
206	Turkey	Netherlands	Policy	Group	56
103	Turkey	Turkey	Visual Arts	Group	46,5
146	Turkey	Netherlands	Performing Arts	Individual	30
13	Netherlands	Netherlands	Performing Arts	Group	29,667
46	Netherlands	Netherlands	Performing Arts	Group	29,667
183	Netherlands	Netherlands	Performing Arts	Group	29,667
14	Netherlands	Netherlands	Performing Arts	Individual	20,333
168	Turkey	Turkey	Visual Arts	Group	19,167
120	Turkey	Turkey	Performing Arts	Group	18
30	Turkey	Turkey	Performing Arts	Group	12,149
169	Turkey	Turkey	Visual Arts	Group	10,167
111	Netherlands	Turkey	Literature	Individual	9
130	Netherlands	Turkey	Literature	Individual	9
44	Netherlands	Netherlands	Performing Arts	Group	7
125	Other	Other	Performing Arts	Group	6
186	Other	Netherlands	Performing Arts	Individual	6
2	Turkey	Turkey	Performing Arts	Group	4
23	Turkey	Turkey	Creative Industries	Group	4
33	Netherlands	Other	Visual Arts	Individual	4

47	Turkey	Turkey	Performing Arts	Group	3
48	Turkey	Turkey	Media Arts	Group	2
59	Turkey	Turkey	Culture	Group	2
133	Turkey	Turkey	Performing Arts	Group	2
90	Netherlands	Netherlands	Performing Arts	Group	1
93	Netherlands	Other	Media Arts	Individual	0,286
94	Netherlands	Netherlands	Media Arts	Individual	0,286
131	Netherlands	Netherlands	Media Arts	Individual	0,286
132	Netherlands	Netherlands	Media Arts	Individual	0,286
134	Netherlands	Turkey	Media Arts	Individual	0,286

Table 2: The average betweenness centrality of the cliques

Clique	Betweenness Centrality
1	3424
2	3571
3	3.555
4	3090,5
5	4019
6	4.750
7	3.695
8	2.655
9	2.665
10	3692
11	2.447
12	2.718
13	2.706
14	3231
15	3.457
16	2972
17	3340
18	2754
19	3442
20	2.453
21	2.494
22	4.432
23	2.819
24	1
25	85
26	763,25
27	1.252
28	0
29	48
30	485
31	399
32	1065
33	1.241
34	82
35	1.252
36	1.252
37	82
38	1.301
39	1.301
40	1.518
41	783
42	783
43	2.121

44	1.372
45	1.266
46	1.849
47	1071
48	1.462
49	2.317
50	1.184
51	329
52	1.380
53	525
54	94
55	399
56	1.563
57	1.253
58	965

Visualisation of the cliques with their average betweenness centrality:



Policy x Performance



Policy x Visual



Media x Visual

Policy x Lit



Policy x Creative Industries



Policy x Media



Multi Disciplinary



Uni Media Arts



Uni Visual

Uni Culture



Uni Performing Arts



Visualisation of the other powerful actors egonets:




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